Shock Without Awe Lessons of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

BY ANTHONY BERGIN & KARL CLAXTON

aunched in July 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was widely hailed as a textbook case of a sophisticated multinational intervention to stabilize L a failing state. Its tenth anniversary prompted a flurry of retrospectives on the extent to which the mission really was such a success story. Most experts continue to give RAMSI high marks for providing the circuit-breaker that halted serious violence and allowing rebuilding to begin. However that acclaim is increasingly accompanied by complaints that such a long and expensive intervention left some of the underlying political, social, and economic causes of the original crisis in place.1 The recent re-evaluations largely neglect military aspects of the mission. This is understand- able since “the only thing all assessors agree on” in evaluating RAMSI is that getting guns off the street was crucial, done quickly, and well.2 It is nevertheless a pity since studies of the military dimension are largely confined to works by practitioners who were personally involved early on in the mission.3 Although a book-length U.S. analysis from 2007 focuses on security questions, its assessment period ends before severe problems re-emerged in 2006-07, and it squeezes the RAMSI experience slightly awkwardly into a counter- (COIN) framework more suited to the sort of higher intensity complex operations then underway in the Middle East.4 A fresh look at the military component of RAMSI indicates that Combined Joint Task Force 635’s (CJTF 365) performance mirrored the strengths and limitations of the wider RAMSI mission. By leaving executive authority in the hands of Solomon Islands’ elected politicians rather than transferring sovereignty to an interim administration (an idea that never had much regional sup- port)5 the overall intervention model kept unsustainable logging, localized money-politics, and uneven governance at the heart of the country’s “patronage state.”6 That, however, provided a durable basis for the Solomons elite to accept “cooperative intervention” long enough to cement key state-building objectives, reject force as a tool for political competition, and establish what

Dr Anthony Bergin is the Deputy Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and Dr Karl Claxton is an ASPI Analyst

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appears to be a durable political settlement.7 them. Challenges remain, but peace seems A more intrusive mission would have become more likely than not to endure. unwelcome much sooner. The Causes and Course of “the Tension” Similarly, the way CJTF635 used irresist- ible military to deter rather than Solomon Islands is a country of just over half confront and defeat armed resistance— a million people in the southwest Pacific described as “shock and awe without the vio- Ocean. Nine major island groups stretch across lence”8 —deprived the mission of a climactic a 1,500 km chain, approximately 2,000 km to encounter with which to stamp its authority. It the northeast of Australia. Sixty-three distinct is nevertheless highly uncertain that RAMSI languages and numerous local dialects are spo- would have retained the legitimacy to prevail ken, with English the official language and if its military component had sought decisive Solomons Pijin a lingua franca. More than half . of its population lives on the large islands of Instead, CJTF635 and RAMSI as a whole Guadalcanal and Malaita. A British protector- provided space and some new tools for ate from 1893 until Independence in 1978, Solomon Islanders to put violence behind Solomon Islands was a site of bitter fighting

Map courtesy of the US Central Intelligence Agency

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between Allied and Japanese forces during the represent the indigenous people of the prov- Second World , after which the capital ince against unwelcome, disrespectful and dis- moved to Honiara on Guadalcanal for its war- ruptive guests became the more structured time infrastructure. Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) that waged After the war, many settlers from densely a violent campaign against Malaitans and populated Malaita Island, who see themselves demanded “compensation,” while the Malaita as more assertive and entrepreneurial than Eagle Force (MEF) arose in January 2000 to their Guale neighbors, moved to take advan- protect the interests of the initial targets of vio- tage of the greater economic opportunities lence. available in Honiara and elsewhere on Although casualties of the fighting were Guadalcanal.9 The start of a violent campaign quite low by the standard of many conflicts, of harassment by Guale militants against over 20,000 people were displaced, and gov- Malaitans and other “outsiders” around ernment services and the economy ground to Honiara in 1998 took most observers by sur- a halt. The Government effectively lost control prise. Up until then, deft politics by commu- of Guadalcanal, with Malaitans dominating nity leaders had kept pressures in check for the capital and Guale militants dominating the over a decade, during which time periodic countryside. strains and demands had been partly a product In June 2000, the MEF, supported by ele- of genuine resentment but were also some- ments of the Malaitan-dominated police force, times engineered to serve political objectives.10 forced a Malaitan prime minister they regarded Key ingredients of “the tension” included as insufficiently pro-Malaitan, Bart Ulufa’alu, the weak authority and capacity of the postco- to resign at gunpoint and took control of the lonial state; rapid social change; internal government. Following the coup, a ceasefire migration; inequality and jealousies over land was negotiated between the MEF and IFM on issues and development disparities; Guale con- 2 August 2000, followed by the signing of the cerns about Malaitan dominance of govern- Australian and New Zealand (NZ)-brokered ment and business institutions; the presence Townsville Peace Agreement on 15 October. of many underemployed and frustrated young This led to the deployment of a small,unarmed men (“masta lius”—experts in the art of wan- International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) dering aimlessly); inter-generational conflict which withdrew, four months earlier than over resource-distribution; leaders’ instrumen- planned, in mid-2002 having done all it could. tal use of “ethnic” divisions to promote their The signing of the Marau Peace Agreement on own popularity; the demonstration effect of 7 February 2001 ended inter-ethnic violence the 1988-98 conflict in neighbouring on Guadalcanal (though a key Guale militant, Bougainville; and the disruption of patronage Harold Keke, and his group kept up a violent networks by declining demand for log exports campaign against all-comers along the rugged due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.11 Weathercoast of Guadalcanal).12 As the harassment and intimidation With the end of the ethnic conflict how- spread, unrest quickly hardened into orga- ever, the militant groups’ command structures nized violence by militias. A Guadalcanal eroded, and undisciplined armed gangs Revolutionary Army (GRA) claiming to emerged which turned to crime, pay-back

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violence, compensation demands and extor- embark on a potentially decade-long “coop- tion against the Finance Department, produc- erative intervention” without an exit strategy ing a near collapse of the national government in Solomon Islands as a “very important policy and economy, around 250 murders, very high change” that set aside the bipartisan approach levels of sexual violence and a breakdown of that had existed since 1975.17 Canberra was law and order in Honiara. The country contin- determined not to “have a failed state on our ued to spiral downwards. doorstep.”18 Requests in 1999 and 2000 to lead a more Although planning was already underway forceful intervention were declined on the when the Australian Strategic Policy Institute grounds of the longstanding practice that (ASPI) published a report on 10 June calling Australia is not a neo-colonial power and for action,19 preparations for that report had could “not presume to fix the problems of helped prompt officials’ thinking and reframed South Pacific countries.”13 As late as January the problem as a threat to regional security 2003, Australia’s Foreign Minister argued that that engaged Australia’s interests.20 Canberra sending Australian troops to occupy Solomon decided to intervene, subject to a formal Islands would be “folly in the extreme,” as it request from Solomon Islands and Pacific would be resented in the Pacific, difficult to Islands Forum support, on 25 June. justify to Australian taxpayers, and would not For the 14 other states of the Forum be successful as foreigners did not have the beside Australia and NZ—many of whom face answers to the Solomons’ deep-seated prob- complex challenges, are recently de-colonized, lems.14 On 22 April 2003 Honiara made and wary of external interference—Honiara’s another such request. request for help nevertheless resonated with a sense that regional countries must work “Cooperative Intervention” together to address security and development Following receipt of advice that Australia challenges.21 The Forum Foreign Ministers met might this time be interested in helping, Prime on 30 June to consider intervening. The UN Minister Allan Kemakeza, who had been also supported the mission though it did not elected in December 2001, flew to see Prime occur under UN auspices. Minister John Howard on 5 June. Governor General Lapli wrote to formally Although suggestions that RAMSI was request help on 4 July; the Solomon Islands conceived as a “convenient exit strategy” for Government agreed to the mission on 11 July; Canberra from operations in Iraq (which special legislation setting the terms and condi- Australia had invaded as part of the U.S.-led tions of the assistance package (the Facilitation Coalition in March 2003) are overstated,15 it of International Assistance Act) was endorsed by was shaped by the post 9/11 and 2002 Bali the Solomons Parliament on 17 July; and on bombings security environment.16 While 24 July, in Townsville, seven member states of Australia had led major regional stabilization the Forum including Australia, NZ, PNG, Fiji, missions in Bougainville (1998-2003) and Tonga, Samoa and Solomon Islands – signed Timor Leste (1999-2013) before the start of the the RAMSI Treaty authorizing RAMSI. “national security decade,” Foreign Minister Shortly after dawn that morning, the first Alexander Downer described the decision to C-130 Hercules touched down in Honiara with

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lead elements of the 1,400 troops, 300 police logistics element) in order to signal that resis- and officials from the nine Forum countries tance would be a criminal matter. Technocrats that were initially contributing. Troops also drawn from the region’s capital cities but par- came ashore from the amphibious ship HMAS ticularly from Canberra were a key ingredient. Manoora, crossing “Red Beach” where U.S. RAMSI’s eight defining characteristics were to Marines had landed in August 1942. be preventive, permissive, regional-in-nature, Operation Helpem Fren was the local name nationally led, supported by the United given to RAMSI. The first Special Coordinator, Nations, non-sovereign, police-led, and light Nick Warner, referred to it as a “unique and in touch.23 complex operation” as it came about as the RAMSI personnel were deployed as advis- result of an invitation from a democratically ers and in-line across the three pillars of law elected government, had a major focus on and justice, economic governance, and police work, enjoyed regional endorsement machinery-of-government, through seven dis- and participation, and was complex because of tinct phases. CJTF 635 was most prominent in the mission’s mandate to not only restore law the first and fourth phases: and order but to rebuild the nation.22 ■■ Phase One “commencement” stage: The mission was multinational and mul- Restoring security and budgetary stabiliza- tiagency from the start. Charged with orches- tion were the most urgent tasks to be per- trating all RAMSI’s components on the ground, formed in RAMSI’s opening phase. Warner was from Australia’s Foreign Affairs department. Police rather than military units Although conceived primarily as an ambi- led the security operations (though visibly tious state-building project, RAMSI took a supported by a capable military combat and “security-first” approach. In the planning

Timeline of RAMSI key events and phases

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stages, the NZ Government had suggested an where he could have been arrested, which ulti- unarmed mission, which had worked well on mately led his whole gang to turn itself in. Bougainville. But given the IPMT’s experience Although military planners had gamed various as a “toothless tiger,” and the lawless environ- scenarios, there was no specific Plan-B should ment into which RAMSI would enter, planners Keke take his gang into the bush to wage a opted for a muscular posture, designed to vis- guerrilla campaign, beyond requesting a spe- ibly signal that change was unstoppable. That cial forces operation that would be expected to approach worked. Some 3,730 firearms, prevail though not necessarily quickly or with- including 700 high-powered stolen out bloody fighting from police armories, were destroyed during ■■ Phase Two “consolidation” stage: The RAMSI’s first year, with all but five of those second phase focused, throughout 2004, on surrendered during a 21-day amnesty, which the consolidation of the rule of law, clean- removed the rationale that communities had ing-up the Solomons Police (removing 400 to hang onto their guns for safety.24 Despite – a quarter – of its officers and arresting 88), the importance of RAMSI’s military compo- beginning institutional reform, and com- nent, the military was never in the lead. Rather, mencing measures to revive the economy via it provided security backup and logistic sup- a three-pillars approach.26 port to unarmed Solomons’ police and the ■■ Phase Three “sustainability” stage: international Participating Police Force (PPF) Commencing in 2005, RAMSI’s third phase to remove weapons, demobilize militia, and built on the commencement of technocratic provide basic physical safety. Seventeen assistance by focusing on moves towards regional police posts were established in all future self-reliance. These efforts empha- nine provinces within the first 100 days – sized capacity-building, training, and bed- including six in the first month – partly con- ding down systems and reform. structed, supplied, and wholly guarded at the ■■ Phase Four “a prickly” stage: RAMSI seven “accompanied” stations, by military entered a difficult period in April 2006 with troops. poor preparations for the initially inconclu- A key breakthrough occurred on day 21 of sive national elections and unanticipated the mission with the arrest of the Weathercoast major riots that occurred when Snyder Rini, warlord, Harold Keke, who had shunned peace a former finance minister perceived to be efforts and remained at large terrorizing com- especially corrupt, won. This was followed munities with horrific acts committed by his by a series of bitter rows between the highly disciplined, if eccentric, militia. Public Australian and Solomons Governments. displays of military might, important to deter- ring resistance throughout the first phase,25 Rini’s victory was met with public dismay were particularly important in Keke’s surren- and stoked much anger, possibly also partly der. The sight of a huge amphibious ship off- incited by his political adversaries, which trig- shore and medium helicopters overhead gered two days of riots.27 The riots targeted allowed Warner and the PPF commander, Ben Honiara’s Chinatown due to public suspicions McDevitt, to take some calculated risks, such about links between Rini and prominent busi- as allowing Keke to walk away from meetings nessmen of Chinese origin and Taiwanese

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officials conducting cheque-book-diplomacy. preoccupations with rural development and RAMSI and Solomon Islands police were criti- “acutely clientelistic” politicking.31 The lat- cized for their response – widely seen as an ter centered on leaders dispensing largess to “intelligence failure” for not predicting, pre- supporters and, for the most part, neglecting paring for, and preventing the looting and to govern the country, using ever-growing arson, and for the tactics of riot police.28 The constituency development funds, Taiwanese PPF and CJTF 635 had not been sufficiently aid, and logging money to pursue highly supplemented for a possibility that, in retro- localized rather than national causes. spect, seemed all too likely, and during the event the response force on standby was not Suggestions that RAMSI’s military element activated until too late to be effective.29 China was no longer truly required appeared proba- arranged a civilian air evacuation of people of ble, since CJTF 635 had taken a low profile to Chinese origin and Rini resigned, replaced by emphasize civil policing. RAMSI took a cau- Manasseh Sogavare. tious approach, however, having been stung in As Sogavare was unsympathetic to April 2006. The ADF and NZDF contingents Australia and held reservations about RAMSI, were, in any case, largely comprised of it was difficult for the mission to make prog- Reservists, and the deployment helped build ress during this period. The “Moti affair,” the capacity of the PNG and Tongan contribu- involving Sogavare’s choice of Attorney- tors. General, saw an ill-advised raid on the Prime ■■ Phase Six “transition” stage: By early Minister’s office by Australian members of the 2010, the NZ Government felt it was time to PPF, in addition to a series of episodes that start winding RAMSI down in favor of bilat- poisoned Canberra’s relations with PNG.30 eral aid programs, and, following a reason- Sogavare did not seek to eject RAMSI, which ably smooth election in August, a transition remained popular with Solomon Islanders, strategy that had flagged the year before was and in some senses the mission continued on, put into place. The mission sought to bal- but Australia’s High Commissioner, the ance the risk of leaving too soon with that Australian head of the Solomons police, and of staying too long. other officials were expelled, and focus was ■■ Phase Seven “residual” stage: Defense distracted from RAMSI’s efforts on institu- personnel finally withdrew and RAMSI tional-strengthening. reconfigured primarily as a police-assistance ■■ Phase Five “incremental” stage: With program in mid-2013, ten years after it new governments in place in both Canberra began. The RAMSI Treaty and its enabling and Honiara, a fifth phase commencing in legislation could, with some quick legal early 2008 saw efforts on both sides to take footwork, still help facilitate a rapid interna- a more patient, partnership-based approach, tional military response (most likely by ele- with neither side wanting to push the other ments from 3 Brigade’s Ready Battalion in too hard, but also saw priorities diverging. Townsville – deployable within 24 hours) Successive Solomons governments appeared should the Solomons request urgent support ever less interested in state-building and again. increasingly focused again on the usual

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Lessons Learned About Integrating the society, could undermine its ability to achieve Management of Conflict either the well-being of Solomon Islanders or security for the region, and might create a crip- Any assessment of RAMSI’s value as an exam- pling dependency.34 Writing five years later, ple of integrated security efforts between police John Braithwaite and his co-authors judged and military forces, uniformed and civilian RAMSI a qualified success but felt it had for officers and officials, government and civil the moment “contained conflict but shelved society, and regional security partners, for use specifics that fuelled conflict.”35 The two most elsewhere in the world, depends on an evalu- prominent recent re-evaluations of RAMSI, by ation of the mission’s success. Jenny Hayward-Jones and by Jon Fraenkel and Overall, there is little argument that his co-authors, each suggest that a more mod- RAMSI arrested the unravelling of the state and est state-building project that avoided creating re-established a stable environment that parallel bureaucracies, or an alternative gov- allowed it to collect revenue, stabilize its ernment for Solomon Islanders frustrated with finances, and start delivering services again. It their own leaders, would have been preferable. also enabled businesses to trade and invest. Yet the decision by Howard and Downer RAMSI Treasury and Finance officials helped to act against official advice, “with a spirit of resurrect the Solomons’ economy, which had state-building until the job was done, without been contracting before 2003 but has since any exit timetable,” reflected their conviction achieved record rates of growth – albeit mostly that there is no exit strategy from our own driven by unsustainable logging exports. region and that it is worth paying a premium RAMSI has, however, been an expensive for regional leadership.36 It is unlikely that endeavor at $2.6 billion (and the cost of two stabilization would have been nearly as quick servicemen), and real concerns remain over or durable without the prospect that things continuing poor governance and growing eco- would get better under a longer-term state- nomic dependence on fast disappearing forest building program. In addition, since the law resources in Solomon Islands. Experts are and justice pillar accounted for 83 percent of therefore obliged to ask whether different the cost of RAMSI,37 less ambitious state- approaches might have achieved a greater building efforts would have yielded only lim- return on RAMSI’s substantial investment. ited savings. The key criticism made by some scholars Concerns that RAMSI would deepen is that RAMSI failed to address the root causes dependency, weaken the impetus for Solomons of the conflict and to change patterns of polit- leaders to address challenges themselves, and ical behavior. According to that view, a top- introduce perverse incentives that entrench down, technocratic focus on reform was not dysfunction have been partly borne out.38 But the only possible model, and may not have is dependency a valid criterion by which to been the best option, for promoting enduring judge RAMSI? Tobias Haque argues that eco- stability. Writing early in the mission, Tarcisius nomic self-sufficiency is not a useful goal, Kabutaulaka warned that RAMSI’s emphasis given the Solomons’ immutable economic on shoring-up a perennially weak central gov- geography as a small, isolated market recover- ernment, and its inattention to other pillars of ing from collapse.39 For him, and others,

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dependency does not diminish RAMSI’s lessons from it, given the value derived from achievement but does demand further innova- taking a fresh approach to unique circum- tion. As for the complaint that RAMSI did not stances. At the operational level, flexibly try hard enough to transform local political combining solid planning with inspired behavior, its social license to operate rested on improvisation and willingness to accept sen- an understanding – partly tacit, partly reflect- sible risks helped achieve crucial early wins ing RAMSI’s mandate – that the mission would such as Keke’s . not interfere too much with unsustainable log- ■■ Harness the power of whole-of-govern- ging or associated localized money politics.40 ment. The ADF’s operational tempo in mid- That reality not only constrained what could 2003 (with commitments in the Middle be achieved but also defined the bounds East, Timor-Leste and elsewhere) produced within which Solomons leaders were willing an imperative for Defence to draw-down as to let RAMSI rebuild the country’s machinery fast as possible that sat slightly at odds with of government over a long period. RAMSI other agencies’ acceptance that RAMSI was a arrested over 3,000 people, but the uncertainty long-term project. Nonetheless, preserving a of its welcome in 2006-07 suggests it would unified whole-of-government voice – for have achieved less, not more, had it attempted example by sticking to a single daily report- to drastically transform society. ing cable rather than multiple separate lines Nor was there any appetite among of communication to home agencies – Solomons politicians (or in the Pacific Islands allowed the four main (Foreign Affairs, Forum) for an interim administration to Australian Federal Police, Defence, and assume sovereignty even temporarily – RAMSI AusAID) and other contributing Australian and the Solomons Government had to operate agencies in Honiara (such as Attorney- in parallel. Generals, Treasury, and Finance) to accom- Criticizing RAMSI for not acting more modate such differences, and to avoid being decisively to try to reshape Solomons political micro-managed by Canberra. That collegial and business practices seems akin to chiding approach was a function of personalities, CJTF 635 for deterring rather than seeking out professionalism and leadership, but also armed clashes. While decisive encounters benefited from habits of interagency coop- might, in theory, have been more transforma- eration formed in Canberra. Many officials tive than impressive shows of strength not had served together before. Such links can accompanied by deadly force – initial shock be fostered via secondments, exchanges, without much lasting awe – in practice, such joint training, and College. violence would more likely have quickly ■■ Draw on the power of international sapped the force’s moral authority (on which partnerships. RAMSI demonstrated that its efficacy partly depended.)41 there are operational as well as political/ If RAMSI is considered a success, what les- legitimacy advantages to working in a mul- sons might we draw for other stabilization tinational coalition. Although different missions? Ten military implications stand out: forces’ doctrines, capabilities, and styles ■■ Innovate. The first lesson of RAMSI needed to be understood and managed, the might be not to actually draw too many CJTF was able to utilize the strengths of each

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contingent – such as the ability of the weapons beyond the gun-amnesty to hand Melanesian platoons to develop a quick rap- them in, according to its first Commander, port with Solomon Islanders – to be more LTCOL John Frewen. Displays of strength, than the sum of its parts.42 radio broadcasts, and community meetings ■■ Pre-deployment training is especially were important in the Solomons. critical for interagency and multinational ■■ Seize opportunities at the ripe operations. The tight planning timeframe moment. Notwithstanding their different for RAMSI, and its innovative composition, scale, RAMSI occurred at a more opportune meant that an early war-game was crucial to time than when the IPMT arrived following work out what effects the Special the 2000 Townsville Peace Accord, at which Coordinator wanted to achieve by specific point the MEF was ascendant and war-wea- milestones through the critical first month, riness had not hit rock-bottom. At an opera- and how to deliver those effects. tional level, RAMSI’s recognition of Keke as ■■ Strategic communication can shape a center-of-gravity, and the investment of outcomes and save lives. The use of a delib- effort to apprehend him, paid off. erate information campaign and messaging ■■ A deployable police capability comple- to signal the CJTF’s edge over potential ments the military as an instrument of adversaries helped persuade some those national power. The Australian Government who might otherwise have sought to conceal judged the AFP’s contribution to RAMSI so

Village children gather on the beach to watch the amphibious ship HMAS Manoora anchored in Lambi Bay at the start of RAMSI

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useful that it created a standing, nearly bat- capabilities, notwithstanding the separation talion-sized, International Deployment of police and military powers.43 Group trained and ready to be quickly dis- ■■ Even open-ended major interventions patched to complement the ADF’s different eventually wind-down. For countries that skills in order to promote regional stability invite intervention, RAMSI shows that (the ADF includes seven regular bat- requesting international security assistance talions plus two Special Forces regiments). need not entail even a temporary forfeiture Notwithstanding their very different plan- of sovereignty and executive authority. ning and operational styles, the two forces Conclusion: Strong Military Performance cooperated well. is Insufficient but Necessary ■■ Force size has a quality all of its own. The re-emergence of instability in Timor- Solomon Islands was a low-income country Leste and Fiji, as well as Honiara in 2006, at before the tensions and remains so now, but a time when the ADF was heavily committed the existence of poverty and inequality do not in the Middle East, underscored the value of dictate that violence will return. CJTF 635 putting sufficient boots on the ground. This helped offer space for Solomon Islanders to contributed to the Government’s decision to break the cycle of violence, perhaps for good. establish two extra regular infantry battal- Challenges remain – especially with turbu- ions. Drawn straight from his role at the lence likely to accompany the end of logging head of the ready battalion of Army’s “first- – but stability seems at least as likely to endure response” 3BDE, the Commander of the as violence is to return. CJTF in of the initial military deploy- Australia retains the motive and ability to ment was always likely to be a capable promote positive Solomons responses to the leader. And having a mid-ranking ADF offi- full range of transformations underway within, cer helped signal that Defense was not in the above, and beneath the state.44 Honiara’s rea- lead. But the military mission’s success prob- sonably effective response to severe flooding ably came down to good fortune as well as last April (including unrest by residents of good management; with a single O5 level some evacuation centers45) and preparations officer initially commanding a multi-service for well-run elections in November indicate and multinational force of nearly 2,000 per- that the success of conventional capability- sonnel, since he was also heavily involved in building supported by foreign aid, although in RAMSI’s overall command team. A more hardly inevitable, is far from impossible. senior ADF headquarters would have Scholars and development professionals are reduced risk. also, however, suggesting innovative ■■ Troops conducting stabilization mis- approaches to economic,46 migration,47 aid,48 sions need relevant training and equipment. land,49 and other challenges likely to be inten- The 2006 riots and death of an Honiara sified by the end of logging and ever-deepen- local man shot by RAMSI troops responding ing money-politics.50 Any successes will be to a drunken brawl showed that infantry bat- relevant to fostering peace and prosperity both talions require basic crowd control in and beyond the Solomons. PRISM

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Iron Dome system intercepts Gaza rockets aimed at central Israel. BERGIN

Notes 12 Clive Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis: the historical causes for a failing state (Canberra, Asia Pacific Press, 2004). 1 For example Jenny Hayward-Jones, ‘Australia’s 13 Australian Government, Advancing the costly investment in Solomon Islands: the lessons of National Interest—Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy RAMSI’, Lowy Institute Analysis, 8 May 2014. White Paper, Canberra, 2003, p 93 2 Terence Wood and Stephen Howes, 14 Hon Alexander Downer MP, ‘Neighbours ‘Introduction’, in Terence Wood and Stephen Howes cannot be recolonised’, The Australian, 8 January (eds.) Debating Ten Years of RAMSI (Canberra, 2003, p.11 Development Policy Centre, 2013) p 3. 15 In particular, see Daniel Flitton, ‘A Pacific 3 For example LTCOL John Frewen, Escape: Australia, the US and Solomon Islands’, ‘Communication as a Tactic’, Defence Magazine, Australian Quarterly Vol 75 No 4, July 2003 pp 6-8 and Canberra, Department of Defence, July 2005; LTCOL 40. John Hutchenson, ‘Helping a Friend’, Australian Army 16 Sinclair Dinnen and Abby McLeod, ‘The Journal Vol 2 No 2, 2005; and Ben McDevitt, Quest for Integration: Australian Approaches to ‘Operation Helpem Fren—A personal perspective’, Security and Development in the Pacific Islands’, Australian Army Journal Vol 3 No 2, 2006. Security Challenges Vol 4 No 2, 2008, pp 23-43. 4 See Russell W Glenn, in a 17 Hon Alexander Downer MP, ‘Statement to Test Tube—Analysing the Success of RAMSI (Santa Parliament RAMSI’, 12 August 2003. Monica, Rand Corporation, 2007). 18 Hon John Howard MP, ‘Australian Foreign 5 Jon Fraenkel, Joni Madraiwiwi & Henry Policy’, Address to the Sydney Institute, Sydney, 1 July Okole, ‘The RAMSI Decade: A Review of the Regional 2003. Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, independent- 19 Elsina Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour- review commissioned by the Solomon Islands Australia and the future of Solomon Islands (Canberra, Government with support from the Pacific Islands ASPI, 2003). Forum Secretariat, 14 July 2014, p 8. 20 Michael Fullilove, ‘The Testament of 6 Matthew Allen, ‘Long-term engagement: the Solomons: RAMSI and International Statebuilding’ future of RAMSI’, ASPI Strategic Insight, March 2011, (Sydney, Lowy Institute for International Policy, p 9. March 2006) p 7. 7 Karl Claxton, ‘Solomon Islands: the Freest and 21 See the Pacific Islands Forum, ‘Biketawa Fairest Election Money Could Buy?’, The Strategist, 27 Declaration’ guiding principles for good governance November 2014. and courses of action for a regional response to crises 8 Jeni Whalan, ‘The Power of Friends: the in the region, 28 October 2000. Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, 22 Nick Warner, ‘Operation Helpem Fren: Journal of Peace Research Vol 37 No 5, September 2010, Biketawa’s First Success’, speech at the Pacific Islands p 12 (citing RAMSI’s first Special Coordinator Nick Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting, Nadi, Warner). 17 June 2004. 9 Matthew Allen, Greed and Grievance: 23 Fullilove, Op Cit, pp 10-17. ex-Militants Perspectives on the Conflict in Solomon 24 McDevitt, Op Cit, p 76. Islands (Honolulu, University of Hawai’i Press, 2013) 25 Frewen, Op Cit, p 11. pp 137-156. 26 Elsina Wainwright, How is RAMSI faring? 10 Jon Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom: from Progress, challenges and lessons learned (Canberra, ASPI Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands 2005) p 3. (Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2004) pp 27 Matthew Allen, ‘The Politics of disorder: the 44-53. social unrest in Honiara’, in Sinclair Dinnen and 11 John Braithwaite, Sinclair Dinnen, Matthew Stewart Firth (eds) Politics and State Building in Allen, Valerie Braithwaite and Hilary Charlesworth, Solomon Islands (Canberra, ANU E Press, 2008) pp Pillars and Shadows: Statebuilding as Peacebuilding in 39-59. Solomon Islands (Canberra, ANU E Press, 2010) pp 28 John Braithwaite et al, Op Cit, p 62. 95-133. 29 Government of the Solomon Islands, Second Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 Civil Unrest in Honiara’, 7 September

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2007, pp 10-17. CJTF 635 only had 63 troops in 45 Richard Ewart, ‘Calm in Honiara after two Solomons at the time of the election, most of whom nights of rioting’, Radio National Pacific Beat, ABC, 19 couldn’t leave their posts providing security at Rove May 2014. Prison—Joanne Wallis, ‘A helpem fren in need: 46 Haque, ‘Economic Transition’, pp 1-2. evaluating RAMSI’, Security Challenges Vol 2 No 2, July 47 Matthew Allen, ‘Long-term engagement: The 2006, p 30; and Mark Tamsitt, ‘RAMSI Defence future of RAMSI’, Canberra, ASPI, 2011, pp 11-13; and Summary’, unpublished paper 2014, p 5. David Craig and Richard Bedford, ‘Labour mobility 30 David Marr, ‘Costly pursuit ends Moti and Solomon Islands Development’, ANU SSGM In deportation ruled unlawful’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Brief, 2013. December 2011. 48 Wood, ‘Lessons learnt on the role for aid’, pp 31 Terence Wood, ‘Lessons learnt on the role for 35-37. aid’, in Terence Wood and Stephen Howes (eds.) 49 Marcus Pelto, ‘High value urban land in Debating Ten Years of RAMSI (Canberra, Development Honiara for sale – deep, deep discounts available to Policy Centre, 2013) pp 35-37. the right buyer’, Development Policy, 16 December 32 Jon Fraenkel et al, ‘The RAMSI Decade’, pp 2013. 20-21. 50 Although most candidates in last year’s 33 Nicholas Coppel, ‘Transition of RAMSI’, ANU election campaigned on a “time for change” platform, SSGM discussion paper, Canberra, 2012, p1. the apparent connection between sitting members’ 34 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Failed State and increased discretionary constituency development the War on Terror: Intervention in Solomon Islands’, funds and more incumbents being returned than East-West Center Honolulu, March 2004, p 1. usual points to the further entrenchment of a cycle 35 John Braithwaite et al, Op Cit, pp 151-164. whereby rational choices by voters seeking leaders’ 36 Ibid, p 50. personal assistance contribute to poor governance 37 Hayward-Jones, Op Cit, p 4. and reinforce those choices in turn. The problem isn’t 38 Tobias Haque, ‘The Influence of Culture on so much that leaders and voters don’t take seriously Economic Development in Solomon Islands’, ANU the national motto – “to lead is to serve” – but rather SSGM discussion paper, 2012, p 1 and p 8. that they do so at a profoundly local level. It might be 39 Tobias Haque, ‘Economic transition in unfair to condemn candidates’ provision of solar Solomon Islands’, ANU SSGM In Brief, 2013. panels, roofing iron, school fees, or small-scale water 40 See Shahar Hameiri, ‘The inconvenient truth’, and sanitation projects to constituents as “frittering in Terence Wood and Stephen Howes (eds) Debating away” national wealth, since such help can be of real Ten Years of RAMSI (Canberra, Development Policy benefit to the poor (reducing deprivation as a Centre, 2013) pp 17-19; and Terrence Wood, ‘The potential spur for instability). But the seemingly vast causes and consequences of local voting in Solomon SI $6 million (nearly U.S. $1 million) available to Islands’, ANU SSGM In Brief, 2013. each Member of Parliament (often supplemented by 41 Whalan, Op Cit. income from business-favors, and sometimes 42 Hutcheson, Op Cit, pp 51-52. Other national allegedly from corruption) only translates to about contingents may have lamented a relaxed attitude to U.S.$50 per citizen each year – not enough to be unit-discipline by the Fijian ‘rock-stars of interna- individually transformative but cumulatively enough tional ’ but usually conceded they to sap state funding for roads, schools, and hospitals. brought a particular flair to community engagement, It also diverts leaders from dealing with difficult for example. national issues, such as resolving commercial and 43 Ilya Gridneff, ‘Honiara man shot dead by landowner issues preventing the de-watering of a RAMSI soldiers’, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 August dangerously over-full mine tailings-dam – see 2010. Matthew Allen, “Gold Ridge Standoff Deepens,” 44 Matthew Allen and Sinclair Dinnen, DevPolicy, 20 February 2015. ‘Solomon Islands in transition’, in Terence Wood and Stephen Howes (eds) Debating Ten Years of RAMSI (Canberra, Development Policy Centre, 2013) pp 31-33.

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