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Iran Ignores UN Ban, Tests New Ballistic Missile October 16, 2015 15 News & Analysis Iran Iran ignores UN ban, tests new ballistic missile James Bruce Up to now, the Iranians have not fence Weekly reported carried an had the technology to hit individ- advanced guidance system which ual military targets in Israel, only gives it greater precision, although Beirut to threaten large areas, such as the its payload was probably reduced to cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa, with accommodate it. ran has test-fired a new long- the long-range missiles that are the It has a range of 500 km, enough range ballistic missile in defi- country’s primary strategic weap- to reach most major targets in the ance of a UN ban in what ap- ons. This has severely limited Teh- Arab powers of the Gulf Coopera- pears to be a concentrated ran’s military effectiveness. tion Council (GCC), led by Saudi drive to improve the accuracy Dehghan said the Emad can be Arabia. Iof its growing arsenal, a develop- controlled up to the moment of im- The Islamic Republic boasts “the ment that must dismay Israel which pact and is able to hit targets “with largest and most diverse ballistic has threatened pre-emptive strikes great precision”. missile arsenal in the Middle East”, against the Islamic Republic’s nu- If the Emad programme is suc- according to Michael Elleman, a clear facilities. cessfully completed, it would signif- missile expert with the Interna- Iran’s parliament, on the same icantly alter the strategic equation tional Institute for Strategic Studies day, approved an outline of a bill as any pre-emptive strike by the in London. But he estimates it will giving the regime the power to Jewish state could be countered by take Iran “many years… and dozens withdraw from the landmark July an Iranian attack with missiles ca- of flight tests” to master the new 14th nuclear agreement with US- pable of inflicting far greater dam- guidance technology. led global powers if crippling eco- age than before. Despite Western efforts to include nomic sanction against Tehran are limits on Iran’s missile programme, not lifted. Iran’s ballistic the July 14th deal had no such stip- It is not clear what impact the bill missile arsenal ulations. However, the UN Security may eventually have on the nuclear Council has decreed that foreign accord. But Iranian Defence Minis- remains largely powers cannot aid Iran in its mis- ter Hossein Dehghan declared after untouched by the sile development programme, a ban the October 11th test of the Emad nuclear deal. that stays in place under the accord. (Pillar) missile: “We don’t ask per- The United Nations also prohibits mission from anyone to strengthen Tehran has released few details Iran from undertaking any activ- our defence and missile capabili- of the Emad. But Anthony Cordes- ity related to ballistic missiles that ties.” man, a military specialist with the could produce a nuclear warhead. The Iranian Defence Ministry Center for Strategic and Interna- That applies to the Emad pro- said testing of the Emad, which it tional Studies in Washington, has gramme. The October 11th launch said is the Islamic Republic’s first said the Emad is a variant of Iran’s was the first such test of a ballistic precision-guided, long-range mis- Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic system since the Security Council sile, was successful. “This greatly missile, which is the backbone of endorsed the July 14th agreement increases Iran’s strategic deterrence Tehran’s missile armoury. in Resolution 2231, which called on capability,” Dehghan declared. Cordesman said the liquid- Tehran not to undertake any activ- There was no independent veri- fuelled Emad carries a manoeu- ity related to developing ballistic fication of the test, although it vring re-entry vehicle “to improve missiles capable of carrying nuclear was probably monitored by US spy accuracy and complicate missile warheads. satellites and possibly Israeli ones defence” and should be accurate to So to a large extent, Iran’s ballis- as well. Iranian state news agency within 500 metres of its intended tic missile arsenal remains largely IRNA said Emad is Iran’s first preci- target. It has a range of 1,700 kilo- untouched by the nuclear deal and Picture released on October 11, 2015, by the Iranian Defence sion-guided missile with the range metres and can carry a 750-kg war- could well grow even larger and Ministry showing the launch of Emad missile during tests at an to reach Israel. head. Cordesman estimated the deadlier despite the continuance of undisclosed location in Iran. If the project is successful, it system is scheduled for operational a UN ban on selling missile technol- could dramatically improve Teh- deployment after 2016. ogy to Tehran. ran’s military capabilities by allow- In August, Iran unveiled its All this sends shivers of concern able to any Iranian aggression and Republic at a time when the United ing Iran to target strategic targets in Fateh-313 medium-range ballis- through the Arab monarchies of the are currently locked in an escalat- States is scaling down its military Israel. tic missile, which IHS Jane’s De- Gulf, which are the most vulner- ing confrontation with the Islamic presence in the region. Khomeini’s grandson tests Iran’s political waters Ali Alfoneh the monarchy in 1979. ness to run for the assembly, an- lamic Republican Party, which Raf- Khomeini welcomed Khamenei’s The younger Khomeini gave cre- swering the call of former president sanjani directed. leadership but he was plotting re- dence to the speculation when he Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who Rafsanjani even persuaded Ah- venge. Washington addressed reformist political activ- upon declaring his own candidacy mad to run for president against After Saddam Hussein invaded ists visiting his grandfather’s mau- for the assembly in August, invited the secular Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Rafsan- s Iran’s fractious politi- soleum outside Tehran on August “all those who consider themselves the main candidate. On both occa- jani was in daily contact with Wash- cal elites prepare for the 28th. righteous” to join the race. sions Ruhollah Khomeini expressly ington seeking to extract conces- February 25, 2016, elec- “‘I’m not saying you should not Against this backdrop, the Iran forbade his son to accept political sions in return for Iran’s neutrality tions for parliament and accept any responsibility in the Is- Labour News Agency proclaimed or executive responsibilities. in the war. Ahmad Khomeini taped the Assembly of Experts, lamic Republic. If necessary, do an- on August 4th that the triumvirate those conversations and produced theA clerical body that selects the ything… but if there are others, let of Hassan Khomeini, Rafsanjani Hassan Khomeini’s them at a Supreme National Secu- supreme leader, there is growing them do the job’,” Hassan Khomei- and President Hassan Rohani is the statements were rity Council meeting as proof Raf- speculation that Hassan Khomeini, ni quoted his grandfather as telling most dynamic force in Iranian poli- widely interpreted sanjani was “an American agent”. grandson of the founder of the Is- his father. tics. There was even a report that a lamic Republic, will run for a seat “If one day it’s necessary for me Clearly, Rafsanjani and Rohani as showing his group of Ahmad Khomeini loyalists on the 82-member assembly. to do something, it would be wrong supporters are already imagining a readiness to run for within the Islamic Revolutionary If he is successful, that is being of me not to take the responsibil- new Khomeini to succeed Supreme the assembly. Guards Corps (IRGC) seized control seen in some quarters as a precursor ity upon my shoulders,” Hassan Leader Ali Khamenei, who was of a missile battery in southern Iran to running for supreme leader, the Khomeini said. elected after Ruhollah Khomeini’s The elder Khomeini believed seeking to target US military forces position his grandfather, Ayatollah In the Iranian media, Hassan death in 1989. that so long as his clan kept free in Saudi Arabia to start a war that Ruhollah Khomeini, created when Khomeini’s statements were wide- However, as he enters the fierce of such involvement, it would be could help Khomeini’s son seize the Islamic revolution overthrew ly interpreted as showing his readi- arena of Iranian politics, Hassan above factional disputes and un- power in Tehran. The plot was Khomeini, 42, would be wise to likely to be held responsible for the foiled by Mohsen Rezaei, then the study the fate of his father, Ahmad, failure of the executive branch in IRGC commander. who was offered a similar proposi- delivering on promises made to the Ahmad disclosed that his father tion by Rafsanjani but perished un- Iranian people. had been against continuing the der mysterious circumstances aged Accepting executive responsibil- war with Iraq after Iranians lib- 49. ity would mean being asked why erated the south-western city of He died suddenly on March 16, God’s “Republic on Earth” has Khorramshahr in 1982. The war, he 1995, allegedly of a heart attack. unemployment, a rickety public implied, only continued because But Saeed Emami, deputy head of health service and, long after the Rafsanjani and others wanted to the Intelligence Ministry who was 1980-88 war with Iraq, meat ra- consolidate their power. arrested as the main culprit in the tioning. A few days before his mysteri- systematic elimination of dissident Rafsanjani’s scheme seems to ous death, Ahmad Khomeini ac- Iranian intellectuals in the 1990s, have worked. Throughout the cused the regime of betraying the confessed he had assassinated Ah- 1980s Ahmad Khomeini helped ideals of his revered father.
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