CANADIAN CASES on the LAW of TORTS Third Series/TroisiÈme SÉrie Recueil De Jurisprudence Canadienne En ResponsabilitÉ Civile VOLUME 94 (Cited 94 C.C.L.T

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CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS Third Series/Troisième série Recueil de jurisprudence canadienne en responsabilité civile VOLUME 94 (Cited 94 C.C.L.T. (3d))

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[Indexed as: Gallardo c. Bergeron] Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, Martine Bertrand et Normand Bergeron (Appelants-défendeurs) c. Maria Thérésa Gallardo et L. C. (Intimés-demandeurs) Cour d’appel du Québec Docket: C.A. Montréal 500-09-020681-102 2012 QCCA 908 Chamberland, Rochette, Dalphond, JJ.C.A. Heard: 9 février 2012 Judgment: 15 mai 2012 Droits de la personne –––– Procédure — Commissions, tribunaux et commissions d’enquête — Compétence — Pour conclure a` une violation de la Charte des droits et libertés –––– Victime, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la cafétéria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a re- marqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Commission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveillante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — En vertu de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, lorsque la Commission avise le plaignant de sa décision de ne pas saisir le Tribunal, le plaignant est substitué a` la Commission pour les fins des procédures — Ceci signifiait que la mère de la victime ne pouvait saisir le Tribunal qu’en ce qui concernait les commentaires emis´ par la surveillante a` propos de l’omission de son fils de se laver les mains — Cour a fait remarquer que d’autres recours etaient´ ouverts, en particulier devant la Cour du Québec et la Cour supérieure — 176 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Par conséquent, la décision du Tribunal concernant sa compétence etait´ incorrecte, sa décision d’accorder 17 000 $ en dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable et, conformément a` une décision antérieure de la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour devrait intervenir. Droits de la personne –––– Procédure — Commissions, tribunaux et commissions d’enquête — Compétence — Lorsque d’autres recours sont dis- ponibles –––– Victime, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la caf- et´´ eria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a remarqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Commission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveillante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — En vertu de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, lorsque la Commission avise le plaignant de sa décision de ne pas saisir le Tribunal, le plaignant est substitué a` la Commission pour les fins des procédures — Ceci signifiait que la mère de la victime ne pouvait saisir le Tribunal qu’en ce qui concernait les commentaires emis´ par la surveillante a` propos de l’omission de son fils de se laver les mains — Cour a fait remarquer que d’autres recours etaient´ ouverts, en particulier devant la Cour du Québec et la Cour supérieure — Par conséquent, la décision du Tribunal concernant sa compétence etait´ incorrecte, sa décision d’accorder 17 000 $ en dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable et, conformément a` une décision antérieure de la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour devrait intervenir. Droits de la personne –––– Procédure — Commissions, tribunaux et commissions d’enquête — Compétence — Compensations et ordonnances –––– Victime, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la Gallardo c. Bergeron 177 surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la cafétéria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a remarqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Com- mission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveil- lante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — En vertu de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, lorsque la Commission avise le plaignant de sa décision de ne pas saisir le Tribunal, le plaignant est substitué a` la Commission pour les fins des procédures — Ceci signifiait que la mère de la victime ne pouvait saisir le Tribunal qu’en ce qui concernait les commentaires emis´ par la surveillante a` propos de l’omission de son fils de se laver les mains — Cour a fait remarquer que d’autres recours etaient´ ouverts, en particulier devant la Cour du Québec et la Cour supérieure — Par conséquent, la déci- sion du Tribunal concernant sa compétence etait´ incorrecte, sa décision d’accorder 17 000 $ en dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable et, conformément a` une décision antérieure de la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour devrait intervenir. Droits de la personne –––– Procédure — Contrôle judiciaire — Norme de contrôle –––– Victime, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la caf- et´´ eria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a remarqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Commission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas 178 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveillante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — En vertu de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, lorsque la Commission avise le plaignant de sa décision de ne pas saisir le Tribunal, le plaignant est substitué a` la Commission pour les fins des procédures — Ceci signifiait que la mère de la victime ne pouvait saisir le Tribunal qu’en ce qui concernait les commentaires emis´ par la surveillante a` propos de l’omission de son fils de se laver les mains — Cour a fait remarquer que d’autres recours etaient´ ouverts, en particulier devant la Cour du Québec et la Cour supérieure — Par conséquent, la décision du Tribunal concernant sa compétence etait´ incorrecte, sa décision d’accorder 17 000 $ en dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable et, conformément a` une décision antérieure de la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour devrait intervenir. Droit administratif –––– Norme de contrôle — Principes généraux –––– Vic- time, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la cafétéria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a remarqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Com- mission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveil- lante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — En vertu de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, lorsque la Commission avise le Gallardo c. Bergeron 179

plaignant de sa décision de ne pas saisir le Tribunal, le plaignant est substitué a` la Commission pour les fins des procédures — Ceci signifiait que la mère de la victime ne pouvait saisir le Tribunal qu’en ce qui concernait les commentaires emis´ par la surveillante a` propos de l’omission de son fils de se laver les mains — Cour a fait remarquer que d’autres recours etaient´ ouverts, en particulier devant la Cour du Québec et la Cour supérieure — Par conséquent, la déci- sion du Tribunal concernant sa compétence etait´ incorrecte, sa décision d’accorder 17 000 $ en dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable et, conformément a` une décision antérieure de la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour devrait intervenir. Droits de la personne –––– Reparations ´ — Dommages-intérêts—Dom- mages-intérêts compensatoires –––– Victime, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la cafétéria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a re- marqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Commission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveillante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — Cour etait´ d’avis que la décision du Tribunal d’accorder des dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable — Cour a conclu que la victime, comme l’avait fait remarquer la Commission, avait et´´ e l’objet de discrimination lors d’un incident, au moins — Cour a conclu que, lors de cet incident, la surveillante avait commis une faute et que le lien de causalité entre la faute et le préjudice subi par la victime etait´ evident´ — Cour a précisé qu’à titre d’employeur de la surveillante, l’école etait´ responsable du fait d’autrui pour le préjudice causé par les commentaires de la surveillante — Toutefois, le directeur de l’école n’était pas personnellement impliqué dans cet incident de sorte qu’on ne devrait pas le tenir responsable du préjudice causé par les commentaires de la surveillante — Par conséquent, le Tribunal aurait dû se limiter aux com- 180 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d) mentaires de la surveillante concernant l’omission de la victime de se laver les mains, et le montant accordé a` la victime devrait etreˆ ramené a` 2 000 $. Droits de la personne –––– Responsabilité du fait d’autrui en matière de discrimination — El´´ ements permettant de conclure a` la responsabilité du fait d’autrui — Lien d’emploi— Divers –––– Victime, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la cafétéria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a remarqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Commission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveillante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — Cour etait´ d’avis que la décision du Tribunal d’accorder des dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable — Cour a conclu que la victime, comme l’avait fait remarquer la Commission, avait et´´ e l’objet de discrimination lors d’un incident, au moins — Cour a conclu que, lors de cet incident, la surveillante avait commis une faute et que le lien de causalité entre la faute et le préjudice subi par la victime etait´ evident´ — Cour a précisé qu’à titre d’employeur de la surveillante, l’école etait´ responsable du fait d’autrui pour le préjudice causé par les commentaires de la surveillante — Toutefois, le directeur de l’école n’était pas personnellement impliqué dans cet incident de sorte qu’on ne devrait pas le tenir responsable du préjudice causé par les commentaires de la surveillante — Par conséquent, le Tribunal aurait dû se limiter aux commentaires de la surveillante concernant l’omission de la victime de se laver les mains, et le montant accordé a` la victime devrait etreˆ ramené a` 2 000 $. Droits de la personne –––– Ce qui constitue de la discrimination — Race, as- cendance ou lieu d’origine — Divers –––– Victime, qui etait´ d’origine philippine, suivait ses cours dans une ecole´ primaire d’une commission scolaire de la région de Montréal — A` deux occasions, la surveillante de l’heure du dˆıner a dit Gallardo c. Bergeron 181 a` la victime que ses fa¸cons de manger etaient´ dégoûtantes et a décidé de l’isoler des autres enfants dans la cafétéria — A` une autre occasion, la surveillante a remarqué que la victime ne s’était pas lavé les mains et lui a demandé si l’on se lavait les mains dans son pays — Mère de la victime a saisi la Commission des droits de la personne de l’affaire, faisant valoir que son fils avait et´´ e victime de discrimination fondée sur la race — Commission a rejeté le dossier au motif que la victime avait fait l’objet de mesures disciplinaires pour avoir fait le pitre, davantage que pour sa fa¸con de manger — Commission a confirmé que la victime avait fait l’objet de propos discriminatoires de la part de la surveillante parce qu’elle ne s’était pas lavé les mains mais a décidé de ne pas saisir le Tribunal des droits de la personne — Mère de la victime a déposé une requête devant le Tribunal relativement a` l’ensemble des faits se rapportant au dossier — Tribunal a d’abord conclu qu’il avait compétence pour trancher le litige, puis a conclu que la fa¸con dont les représentants de l’école avaient géré cette affaire avait affecté la victime au point où elle ressentait de la honte a` l’égard de son origine ethnique et se sentait rejetée socialement — Tribunal a accueilli la requête et a octroyé 10 000 $ en dommages-intérêts moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Surveillante et la commission scolaire ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli — Cour etait´ d’avis que la décision du Tribunal d’accorder des dommages-intérêts etait´ déraisonnable — Cour a conclu que la victime, comme l’avait fait remarquer la Commission, avait et´´ e l’objet de discrimination lors d’un incident, au moins — Cour a conclu que, lors de cet incident, la surveillante avait commis une faute et que le lien de causalité entre la faute et le préjudice subi par la victime etait´ evident´ — Cour a précisé qu’à titre d’employeur de la surveillante, l’école etait´ responsable du fait d’autrui pour le préjudice causé par les commentaires de la surveillante — Toutefois, le directeur de l’école n’était pas personnellement impliqué dans cet incident de sorte qu’on ne devrait pas le tenir responsable du préjudice causé par les commentaires de la surveillante — Par conséquent, le Tribunal aurait dû se limiter aux commentaires de la surveillante concernant l’omission de la victime de se laver les mains, et le montant accordé a` la victime devrait etreˆ ramené a` 2 000 $. Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Commissions, tribunals and boards of inquiry — Jurisdiction — To find breach of Charter of Rights and Freedoms –––– Victim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Montreal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commis- sion dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commission did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to 182 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d) wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — Accord- ing to Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, when Commission notifies complainant of its decision not to submit application to Tribunal, complainant is substituted for Commission for purpose of application — This meant that victim’s mother could bring application only with respect to monitor’s comments about her son’s failure to wash his hands — Court noted that other remedies were available, in particular before Court of Quebec and Superior Court — Therefore, Tribunal’s decision regarding its jurisdiction was incorrect, its decision to award $17,000 in damages was unreasonable and, according to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada, Court should intervene. Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Commissions, tribunals and boards of inquiry — Jurisdiction — Where other remedy available –––– Victim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Montreal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commission dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commission did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — Accord- ing to Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, when Commission notifies complainant of its decision not to submit application to Tribunal, complainant is substituted for Commission for purpose of application — This meant that victim’s mother could bring application only with respect to monitor’s comments about her son’s failure to wash his hands — Court noted that other remedies were available, in particular before Court of Quebec and Superior Court — Therefore, Tribunal’s decision regarding its jurisdiction was incorrect, its decision to award Gallardo c. Bergeron 183

$17,000 in damages was unreasonable and, according to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada, Court should intervene. Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Commissions, tribunals and boards of inquiry — Jurisdiction — Awards and orders –––– Victim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Montreal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commission dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commission did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — According to Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, when Commission notifies complainant of its decision not to submit application to Tribunal, complainant is substituted for Commission for purpose of application — This meant that victim’s mother could bring application only with respect to monitor’s comments about her son’s failure to wash his hands — Court noted that other remedies were available, in particular before Court of Quebec and Superior Court — Therefore, Tribunal’s decision regarding its jurisdiction was incorrect, its decision to award $17,000 in damages was unreasonable and, according to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada, Court should intervene. Human rights –––– Practice and procedure — Judicial review — Standard of review –––– Victim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Montreal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commis- sion dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commission did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s 184 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d) mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — Accord- ing to Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, when Commission notifies complainant of its decision not to submit application to Tribunal, complainant is substituted for Commission for purpose of application — This meant that victim’s mother could bring application only with respect to monitor’s comments about her son’s failure to wash his hands — Court noted that other remedies were available, in particular before Court of Quebec and Superior Court — Therefore, Tribunal’s decision regarding its jurisdiction was incorrect, its decision to award $17,000 in damages was unreasonable and, according to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada, Court should intervene. Administrative law –––– Standard of review — General principles –––– Vic- tim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Montreal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commission dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commission did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — Accord- ing to Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, when Commission notifies complainant of its decision not to submit application to Tribunal, complainant is substituted for Commission for purpose of application — This meant that victim’s mother could bring application only with respect to monitor’s comments about her son’s failure to wash his hands — Court noted that other remedies were available, in particular before Court of Quebec and Superior Court — Therefore, Tribunal’s decision regarding its jurisdiction was incorrect, its decision to award $17,000 in damages was unreasonable and, according to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada, Court should intervene. Gallardo c. Bergeron 185

Human rights –––– Remedies — Damages — General damages –––– Victim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Montreal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commission dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commission did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — Court was of view that Tribunal’s decision to award damages was unreasonable — Court found, as Commission had pointed out, that victim had actually been discriminated against on at least one occasion — Court concluded that, on that occasion, monitor had committed fault and that causal link between fault and prejudice suffered by victim was obvious — Court specified that school, being monitor’s employer, should be held vicariously liable for prejudice resulting from monitor’s comments — However, school principal was not personally involved in this incident and should not be blamed for prejudice resulting from monitor’s comments — Therefore, Tribunal should have considered only monitor’s comments regarding victim’s failure to wash his hands, and amount awarded to victim should be reduced to $2,000. Human rights –––– Vicarious liability for discrimination — Factors in determining vicarious liability — Employment relationship — Miscellane- ous –––– Victim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Mon- treal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commis- sion dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commission did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal 186 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d) first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — Court was of view that Tribunal’s decision to award damages was unreasonable — Court found, as Commission had pointed out, that victim had actually been discriminated against on at least one occasion — Court concluded that, on that occasion, monitor had committed fault and that causal link between fault and prejudice suffered by victim was obvious — Court specified that school, being monitor’s employer, should be held vicariously liable for prejudice resulting from monitor’s comments — However, school principal was not personally involved in this incident and should not be blamed for prejudice resulting from monitor’s comments — Therefore, Tribunal should have considered only monitor’s comments regarding victim’s failure to wash his hands, and amount awarded to victim should be reduced to $2,000. Human rights –––– What constitutes discrimination — Race, ancestry or place of origin — Miscellaneous –––– Victim, who was of Filipino origin, attended primary school of Montreal-area school board — On two occasions, lunch monitor told victim that his eating habits were disgusting and decided to isolate victim from other children in cafeteria — On another occasion, monitor noticed that victim had not washed his hands and asked whether hand-washing was common practice in his country — Victim’s mother brought matter before Human Rights Commission, claiming her son had been discriminated against because of his race — Commission dismissed case, arguing that victim had been disciplined for clowning around, rather than for his way of eating — Commis- sion did find that victim had been victim of discriminatory comments from monitor regarding his failure to wash his hands but decided not to apply to Human Rights Tribunal — Victim’s mother brought motion before Tribunal concerning whole matter — Tribunal first found that it had jurisdiction to decide matter and then concluded that way matter had been handled by school’s representatives led victim to feel shame towards his ethnic origin and left him facing social exclusion — Tribunal granted motion and awarded $10,000 in moral damages and $2,000 in punitive damages — Monitor and school board appealed — Appeal allowed — Court was of view that Tribunal’s decision to award damages was unreasonable — Court found, as Commission had pointed out, that victim had actually been discriminated against on at least one occasion — Court concluded that, on that occasion, monitor had committed fault and that causal link between fault and prejudice suffered by victim was obvious — Court specified that school, being monitor’s employer, should be held vicariously liable for prejudice resulting from monitor’s comments — However, school principal was not personally involved in this incident and should not be blamed for prejudice resulting from monitor’s comments — Therefore, Tribunal should have considered Gallardo c. Bergeron 187

only monitor’s comments regarding victim’s failure to wash his hands, and amount awarded to victim should be reduced to $2,000. Cases considered by Dalphond, J.C.A.: Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop (1993), 93 C.L.L.C. 17,006, 13 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, 1993 CarswellNat 1365, 1993 CarswellNat 1377, 46 C.C.E.L. 1, 149 N.R. 1, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, 100 D.L.R. (4th) 658, 17 C.H.R.R. D/349, [1993] S.C.J. No. 20, EYB 1993-68604 (S.C.C.) — referred to Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat (2011), 93 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, D.T.E. 2011T- 708, 337 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 26 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 CarswellNat 4190, 2011 CarswellNat 4191, 2011 SCC 53, 422 N.R. 248, (sub nom. C.H.R.C. v. Canada (A.G.)) 2011 C.L.L.C. 230-043, (sub nom. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General)) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471, [2011] S.C.J. No. 53, [2011] A.C.S. No. 53 (S.C.C.) — referred to Coutu c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne) (1993), [1993] R.J.Q. 2793, 59 Q.A.C. 253, 1993 CarswellQue 355, REJB 1993-64213 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Crevier v. Quebec (Attorney General) (1981), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 38 N.R. 541, 1981 CarswellQue 109, 1981 CarswellQue 109F, [1981] S.C.J. No. 80 (S.C.C.) — considered Fontaine c. C.L.P. Qué. (2005), 2005 CarswellQue 7023, 2005 QCCA 775, [2005] R.J.Q. 2203, EYB 2005-94565 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2009), 82 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434, 2009 CarswellNat 435, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 385 N.R. 206, (sub nom. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration) v. Khosa) [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12 (S.C.C.) — referred to Lambert c. Québec (Ministère du tourisme) (2002), 2002 CarswellQue 241, (sub nom. Québec (Procureur général) c. Lambert) [2002] R.J.Q. 599, REJB 2002-29363 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Manoir Archer inc. c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne) (2012), 2012 CarswellQue 1222, 2012 QCCA 343, EYB 2012-202417 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Ménard c. Rivet (1997), [1997] R.J.Q. 2108, 1997 CarswellQue 668, (sub nom. Ménard c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne)) 36 C.H.R.R. D/361 (Que. C.A.) — considered Montreuil c. Collège Fran¸cois-Xavier-Garneau (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 494, REJB 2004-55340 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Multani c. Marguerite-Bourgeoys (Commission scolaire) (2006), 38 Admin. L.R. (4th) 159, (sub nom. Multani v. Marguerite-Bourgeoys) 55 C.H.R.R. D/463, 137 C.R.R. (2d) 326, (sub nom. Multani v. Marguerite-Bourgeoys) 264 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2006 SCC 6, 2006 CarswellQue 1368, 2006 Carswell- Que 1369, 345 N.R. 201, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6 (S.C.C.) — referred to 188 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

N.L.N.U. v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board) (2011), 2011 Car- swellNfld 414, 2011 CarswellNfld 415, 2011 SCC 62, (sub nom. Nfld. and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board)) 2011 C.L.L.C. 220-008, (sub nom. Newfoundland & Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board)) 424 N.R. 220, 340 D.L.R. (4th) 17, D.T.E. 2012T-7, (sub nom. Newfoundland & Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board)) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, 213 L.A.C. (4th) 95, 97 C.C.E.L. (3d) 199, (sub nom. Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board)) 986 A.P.R. 340, (sub nom. Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board)) 317 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 340, [2011] S.C.J. No. 62 (S.C.C.) — referred to New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers) (1994), (sub nom. Pezim v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)) 46 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. Pezim v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)) 75 W.A.C. 1, 1994 Car- swellBC 1242, 4 C.C.L.S. 117, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, 114 D.L.R. (4th) 385, (sub nom. Pezim v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)) 168 N.R. 321, [1994] 7 W.W.R. 1, 92 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 22 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, 14 B.L.R. (2d) 217, 1994 CarswellBC 232, [1994] 24 B.C.S.C.W.S. 23, EYB 1994-67086, [1994] S.C.J. No. 58 (S.C.C.) — referred to Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. (New Brunswick) v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice) (2005), 2005 CarswellNB 405, 2005 CarswellNB 406, 201 O.A.C. 293, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286, (sub nom. New Brunswick Provincial Court Judges’ Association v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)) 288 N.B.R. (2d) 202, (sub nom. New Brunswick Provincial Court Judges’ Association v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)) 751 A.P.R. 202, 49 Alta. L.R. (4th) 211, (sub nom. Provincial Court Judges Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)) 135 C.R.R. (2d) 55, (sub nom. Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario) 85 O.R. (3d) 79 (note), 2005 SCC 44, 367 A.R. 300, 346 W.A.C. 300, 30 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 14 C.P.C. (6th) 1, 336 N.R. 201, 255 D.L.R. (4th) 513, [2006] 1 W.W.R. 407, 135 C.R.R. (2d) 57, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 458, EYB 2005-93017, [2005] S.C.J. No. 47 (S.C.C.) — referred to Gallardo c. Bergeron 189

Québec (Commission de protection du territoire agricole) c. Québec (Cour du Québec) (2009), 2009 QCCA 2397, 2009 CarswellQue 12641, [2010] R.J.Q. 23, EYB 2009-167265 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Québec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) c. Des Samares (Commission scolaire) (2000), 2000 CarswellQue 2168, 38 C.H.R.R. D/482, (sub nom. Commission scolaire des Samares c. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) [2000] R.J.Q. 2542, REJB 2000-20486 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Québec (Procureur général) v. Farrah (1978), 1978 CarswellQue 130, (sub nom. Quebec (Attorney General)) 86 D.L.R. (3d) 161, (sub nom. Farrah v. Quebec (Attorney General)) 21 N.R. 595, 1978 CarswellQue 130F, (sub nom. Quebec (Attorney General) v. Farrah) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638, [1978] S.C.J. No. 24 (S.C.C.) — considered Québec (Procureur général) c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne) (1999), [1999] R.J.Q. 1123, 1999 CarswellQue 857, REJB 1999-11460, [1999] J.Q. No. 766 (Que. S.C.) — referred to R. v. Leblanc (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 4940, 2011 CarswellNat 4941, 2011 CMAC 2, 2011 CACM 2, 425 N.R. 96, 281 C.C.C. (3d) 451, [2011] C.M.A.J. No. 2 (Can. Ct. Martial App. Ct.) — referred to Statutes considered: Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, L.R.Q., c. C-12 en général — referred to art. 62 — referred to art. 78 al. 2 — considered art. 80 — considered art. 100-133 — referred to art. 101 — referred to art. 103 — referred to art. 104 — considered art. 109 — considered art. 111 — considered art. 111-113 — referred to art. 112 — considered art. 114-124 — referred to art. 123 — considered art. 128 — considered art. 132 — considered Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64 art. 1619 — referred to Code de procédure civile, L.R.Q., c. C-25 art. 2 — considered Code des professions, L.R.Q., c. C-26 en général — referred to 190 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Tribunaux judiciaires, Loi sur les, L.R.Q., c. T-16 art. 1 — considered

APPEL interjeté par la surveillante d’une ecole´ primaire et sa commission scolaire a` l’encontre d’une décision publiée a` Gallardo c. Bergeron (2010), 2010 CarswellQue 3749, EYB 2010-172968, 2010 QCTDP 5, 75 C.C.L.T. (3d) 248 (T.D.P.Q.), les ayant condamnés a` payer des dommages-intérêts moraux et punitifs pour leur fa¸con d’avoir géré un dossier impliquant un jeune ecolier´ d’origine philippine.

Me Fran¸cois Houde, Me Marie-Josée Villeneuve, pour les appelants Me René Saint-Léger, pour l’intimée

La Cour:

1 Les appelants se pourvoient contre une décision rendue le 15 avril 2010 par le Tribunal des droits de la personne qui a condamné les appelants a` payer aux intimés la somme de 12 000 $ a` titre de dommages moraux et punitifs. 2 Pour les motifs du juge Dalphond, auxquels souscrivent les juges Chamberland et Rochette; 3 LA COUR : 4 ACCUEILLE l’appel, sans frais vu les circonstances; 5 INFIRME la décision du Tribunal et procédant a` rendre celle qui aurait dû etreˆ prononcée : CONDAMNE Mme Bertrand et son employeur, la Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeois, a` verser a` Maria Thérésa Gallardo, en sa qualité de mère de L.C., la somme de 2 000 $ avec intérêts au taux légal majoré de l’indemnité additionnelle depuis la signification du recours.

Dalphond, J.C.A.:

6 Les trois parties appelantes sont un employeur, la Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, une enseignante a` son emploi, Martine Ber- trand, et le directeur de l’école où elle œuvrait, Normand Bergeron. Elles se pourvoient contre une décision rendue par le Tribunal des droits de la personne (Tribunal) les condamnant a` payer au total 12 000 $ a` l’intimée, Maria Thérésa Gallardo, la mère d’un enfant, L.C., qui a fait l’objet de propos inappropriés tenus par Mme Bertrand. Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 191

7 Le pourvoi soulève deux questions : l’étendue de la compétence du Tribunal a` l’égard d’évènements classés sans suite après une enquête par la Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (CDPDJ) et le caractère raisonnable des dommages accordés par le Tribunal. 8 Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis que le Tribunal a agi sans compétence en tentant de sanctionner des ev`´ enements considérés non discriminatoires par la CDPDJ et que les dommages accordés sont, en partie, dénués d’assise, ce qui nous oblige a` intervenir.

LE CONTEXTE 9 Au moment des faits, l’enfant a 7 ans. Il fréquente une ecole´ primaire de la commission scolaire dirigée par M. Bergeron. Mme Bertrand est une educatrice´ au service de garde de l’école; ses fonctions incluent la supervision du repas du midi. 10 Le 7 avril 2006, constatant que l’enfant remplit sa bouche de spaghet- tis en utilisant simultanément une fourchette et une cuillère, Mme Ber- trand l’invite a` cesser. L’enfant, qui semble trouver la chose drôle, per- siste; Mme Bertrand le met alors a` l’écart en le dépla¸cant a` une autre table. Le 12 avril, un incident du même genre se produit alors que l’enfant mange du riz. Le soir même, l’enfant parle des incidents a` sa mère, déclarant ne plus vouloir prendre son repas du midi a` l’école et s’interroger sur sa fa¸con de manger. 11 Le lendemain matin, la mère se rend a` l’école et rencontre Mme Ber- trand. Cette dernière lui explique sa compréhension des incidents, notamment le fait que l’enfant semblait trouver cela amusant et faisait le clown. La mère l’informe qu’il s’agit de la fa¸con de manger pour les Philippins, ce a` quoi Mme Bertrand répond qu’une autre enfant d’origine philippine ne le fait pas. La mère rétorque que son enfant a droit de manger selon ses coutumes et retient que Mme Bertrand n’est pas très réceptive. Elle revient a` l’école sur l’heure du déjeuner et se rend a` la salle où les enfants mangent. Elle y voit Mme Bertrand et l’interpelle; cette dernière lui demande de comparer la fa¸con de manger de son fils et celle de l’autre enfant d’origine philippine. Fâchée de cette réaction, elle va rencontrer la responsable du service de garde en présence d’une autre personne qui agit comme interprète. La responsable répète que Mme Bertrand con- sidère que l’enfant voulait se faire remarquer; la mère s’offusque et ex- prime l’avis qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une manière appropriée d’agir auprès 192 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

d’un enfant de sept ans. La responsable s’engage a` discuter avec Mme Bertrand et invite la mère a` contacter le directeur. 12 Dès son retour a` la maison, la mère appelle le directeur. Celui-ci n’étant pas libre, elle laisse un message sur sa boˆıte vocale. M. Bergeron la rappelle le lendemain, le 14 avril. Il décline une rencontre en personne et les parties se parlent au téléphone environ cinq minutes. Selon la mère, le directeur lui aurait dit qu’ils vivaient au Canada et qu’ils devraient manger comme les Canadiens. M. Bergeron nie avoir tenu de tels propos; il aurait plutôt essayé de lui expliquer que l’intervention de Mme Ber- trand ne visait pas l’utilisation des ustensiles, mais le comportement de l’enfant. 13 Visiblement offusquée, la mère envoie le 18 avril une lettre recom- mandée a` M. Bergeron dans laquelle elle se plaint des agissements de Mme Bertrand a` l’égard de l’enfant et des propos du directeur lors de leur conversation téléphonique. Cette lettre, re¸cue le 20 avril, demeurera sans réponse. 14 La mère communique aussi avec certains médias pour dénoncer l’école, ce qui donne lieu a` un article intitulé « Filippino table etiquette punished at local school: lunch monitor tells student his eating habits are disgusting », publié dans l’édition du 19 avril du West Island Chronicle. 15 Le même jour, l’enfant ne se lave pas les mains avant le repas. Mme Bertrand lui dit : « Dans ton pays, est-ce qu’on se lave les mains? » 16 Le 25 avril, la directrice adjointe du réseau primaire de la commission scolaire invite la mère et son mari a` une rencontre avec elle et M. Ber- geron le 27. La mère accepte, mais ni elle ni son mari ne se présenteront. 17 Entre-temps, soit le 26, un reportage sur les ev`´ enements est diffusé sur le réseau anglophone Global TV. Des demandes d’entrevues affluent a` l’école, mais sur instructions de la commission scolaire, elles demeurent sans suite. 18 Le 28 avril, la mère se présente a` nouveau a` l’école et, selon Mme Bertrand, elle l’interpelle devant plusieurs enfants au sujet des propos qu’elle a tenus le 19. Ses propos sont per¸cus comme injurieux et mena- cants¸ par Mme Bertrand et la responsable du service de garde. En ré- ponse a` cet ev`´ enement, la commission scolaire envoie une mise en demeure a` l’intimée, datée du 1er mai 2006, l’avertissant qu’aucun autre ecart´ de conduite a` l’école ne sera toléré. Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 193

19 Le 2 mai, les parents retirent l’enfant du service de garde. Ils l’inscrivent aussi dans une autre ecole´ qu’il fréquentera a` compter de septembre 2006. 20 Le 8 mai 2006, le Centre de recherche-action sur les relations raciales (CRARR) porte plainte a` la CDPDJ, au nom de la mère et de son enfant, contre les appelants, alléguant discrimination fondée sur la race et l’origine ethnique ou nationale. 21 Deux ans plus tard, après avoir mené une enquête, la CDPDJ adopte la résolution CP-522.23 dans laquelle elle conclut que la preuve ne permet pas d’établir que le personnel de la commission scolaire aurait agi de manière discriminatoire en mettant l’enfant a` l’écart en avril 2006 ou dans ses communications par la suite. Dans la résolution, on peut lire : Considérant, de l’avis de la Commission, que la preuve ne permet pas d’établir, dans le contexte et les circonstances du présent dossier, que le personnel de la Commission scolaire mise en cause, tant lors de l’incident survenu le ou vers le 11 avril 2006 qu’à l’occasion des communications subséquentes a` ce sujet, aurait agi de fa¸con discriminatoire, sur la base de l’origine ethnique ou nationale et de la race, a` l’endroit de L.C. ou de ses parents; En conséquence, la CDPDJ décide de cesser d’agir (art. 78, 2e al., de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne1) a` l’égard des mises a` l’écart et du traitement qui en a et´´ e fait par la commission scolaire et son personnel. 22 Par contre, quant aux propos tenus par Mme Bertrand le 19 avril 2006, la CDPDJ conclut qu’ils réfèrent a` un motif de discrimination prohibé par la Charte, soit l’origine ethnique ou nationale. Elle estime néanmoins « qu’il n’est pas dans l’intérêt public de saisir un tribunal, etant´ d’avis que les propos (. . .) constituent un ev´´ enement isolé dont la portée est limitée dans le contexte de la plainte initiale. » et décide de cesser d’agir (art. 80 Charte). 23 Ce n’est que deux mois plus tard, soit le 8 septembre 2008, que la CDPDJ envoie a` la mère un avis de la résolution. Dans cette lettre re¸cue le 16 septembre, elle l’informe de sa décision de ne pas saisir le Tribunal, mais précise que la plaignante peut, a` ses frais et dans un délai de 90 jours, intenter un recours devant le Tribunal. La lettre se termine en ex-

1Charte des droits et libert´es de la personne, L.R.Q., ch. C-12, (Charte). 194 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

primant l’avis que les parties auraient avantage a` régler le litige a` l’amiable et leur propose de nouveau ses services de médiation. 24 Le 12 décembre 2008, la mère et l’enfant saisissent le Tribunal par l’entremise de l’avocat du CRARR, alléguant les ev`´ enements ayant eu lieu entre le 11 avril2 et le 1er mai 2006. Selon eux, les appelants se sont conduits de manière discriminatoire a` leur egard´ et les plaignants demandent au Tribunal de condamner M. Bergeron et Mme Bertrand a` leur payer chacun 5 000 $ en dommages moraux et 2 000 $ en dommages punitifs, et la commission scolaire, 10 000 $ en dommages moraux et 5 000 $ en dommages punitifs. 25 Les appelants rétorquent par une requête en exception déclinatoire où ils contestent la compétence du Tribunal et demandent le rejet de l’action. 26 Dans une décision rendue le 31 mars 2009, le Tribunal3 rejette cette requête, d’avis que la reconnaissance par la CDPDJ qu’il existe une preuve suffisante de certains faits pour le saisir lui donne compétence sur l’ensemble du dossier. Il estime aussi qu’il ne convient pas d’écarter des el´´ ements de preuve qui pourraient etreˆ pertinents. 27 Les appelants choisissent de ne pas demander la révision judiciaire de cette décision interlocutoire du Tribunal par la Cour supérieure, recours alors disponible (Québec (Procureur général) c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne), [1999] R.J.Q. 1123 (Que. S.C.); Coutu c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne), [1993] R.J.Q. 2793 (Que. C.A.)). Le fait qu’ils ont préféré réitérer leur argument sur l’absence de compé- tence dans le cadre de l’audition au fond du recours par le Tribunal ne peut avoir pour effet de lui conférer compétence s’il ne l’avait pas dès le départ. Il n’en irait pas autrement du défaut de plaider a` nouveau cette question. 28 La décision finale du Tribunal est rendue le 15 avril 2010, soit quatre ans après l’incident retenu par la CDPDJ. Le 7 septembre 2010, j’accorde la permission d’appeler en vertu de l’art. 132 de la Charte,qui prévoit un droit d’appel devant notre Cour, sur permission, des décisions finales du Tribunal.

2Par erreur ou autrement, le recours semble exclure l’évènement du 7 avril 2006. 3Celui-ci est composé de la juge Rivet de la Cour du Québec, sa présidente, et de deux assesseurs. Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 195

LA DECISION´ DU TRIBUNAL 29 Le Tribunal réitère d’abord qu’il a compétence pour statuer sur l’ensemble des faits, ceux-ci ne pouvant d’ailleurs etreˆ dissociés. Il conclut aussi qu’il serait préjudiciable pour la mère et l’enfant de limiter sa compétence aux faits jugés discriminatoires par la Commission. Puis, il enonce´ les critères applicables pour déterminer s’il y a eu discrimination en raison de l’origine ethnique. 30 Analysant ensuite les témoignages, il décide que ceux de la mère, de son epoux´ et de l’enfant sont crédibles et plus vraisemblables que ceux de Mme Bertrand et de M. Bergeron. Le Tribunal retient que l’enfant a et´´ e mis a` l’écart a` au moins deux occasions et qu’il a per¸cu ces sanctions comme découlant d’une manière de manger liée a` son origine ethnique. Il ajoute que Mme Bertrand et M. Bergeron n’ont pas fait le nécessaire pour tenter de comprendre la situation de l’enfant ni démontré la tolér- ance requise dans une société de plus en plus pluriculturelle. Il reproche particulièrement a` M. Bergeron sa méconnaissance de la politique d’intégration et d’éducation interculturelle de la commission scolaire4 et de ne pas avoir désamorcé la situation en prêtant une oreille attentive a` ce que vivaient la mère et son enfant. 31 Traitant spécifiquement des propos du 19 avril 2006, le Tribunal est d’avis qu’ils « ont conforté le sentiment de honte de L. C. face a` son origine ethnique et ont renforcé l’idée qu’il avait et´´ e isolé en raison de sa particularité culturelle de s’alimenter ». Il ajoute : [124] Le 19 avril 2006, alors que L.C. a simplement oublié de se laver les mains, cette même figure d’autorité l’humilie devant ses pairs en lui demandant : « dans ton pays, est-ce qu’on se lave les mains? ». Cet ev´´ enement a eu pour effet d’exclure encore plus L.C. 32 Passant a` la réparation demandée, des dommages, le Tribunal condamne M. Bergeron et Mme Bertrand a` verser a` l’enfant 5 000 $ chacun a` titre de dommages moraux, car l’ensemble des ev`´ enements a affecté son estime de soi et a créé chez lui un sentiment de honte par rapport a` ses origines culturelles. Il estime que la commission scolaire a aussi une part de responsabilité en tant qu’employeur, ainsi que pour avoir failli a` son devoir de mettre sa politique d’intégration et d’éducation interculturelle en œuvre et parce qu’elle s’est rangée du côté de M. Bergeron et

4Dont le contenu n’est aucunement analys´e par le Tribunal. 196 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

de Mme Bertrand sans s’enquérir de la version des autres parties. Il la condamne a` verser des dommages-intérêts de 5 000 $. 33 En ce qui concerne les dommages punitifs, le Tribunal ne condamne pas Mme Bertrand a` en verser, car elle a exprimé des regrets et a et´´ e dissuadée de prononcer de tels propos a` l’avenir. Il ne condamne pas non plus la commission scolaire parce qu’il n’y pas de preuve qu’elle a voulu attenter intentionnellement aux droits de l’enfant. Par contre, le Tribunal condamne M. Bergeron a` verser 2 000 $ a` ce titre, car il n’a pas exprimé de regrets, n’a pas tenté de régler le conflit equitablement´ et avait une méconnaissance de la politique d’éducation et d’intégration interculturelle de la commission scolaire.

LES MOYENS D’APPEL 34 Les appelants soumettent trois questions a` la Cour, que je regroupe ainsi : 1 – Le Tribunal a-t-il erré en s’attribuant compétence sur des faits pour lesquels la CDPDJ a résolu de cesser d’agir? 2 – Le Tribunal a-t-il erré en condamnant les appelants a` des dommages-intérêts, notamment M. Bergeron et la commission scolaire? 3 – Le Tribunal a-t-il erré en condamnant M. Bergeron a` des dommages punitifs? 35 Selon les appelants, tous ces moyens « réfèrent a` la juridiction du Tribunal » et peuvent etreˆ traités ensemble.

L’ANALYSE I. La nature du Tribunal 36 Le Tribunal a et´´ e mis sur pied en 1990 a` la suite de l’ajout en 1989 des art. 100 a` 133 a` la Charte, adoptée en 1975 et entrée en vigueur en 1976. 37 Le Tribunal est un forum spécialisé. Outre le fait que sa compétence soit limitée a` certaines questions prévues par la Charte, ses membres sont Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 197

des juges de la Cour du Québec5 et des assesseurs6, choisis pour des mandats de cinq ans7 en fonction de leur expérience, expertise, sen- sibilisation et intérêt marqués en matière des droits et libertés de la personne (art. 101, 103 et 62). Il siège généralement par divisions, com- posées de trois personnes, un juge et deux assesseurs (art. 104). Les assesseurs assistent le juge, mais n’ont pas voix décisionnelle (art. 104)8. Le Tribunal, ses juges et ses divisions jouissent de pouvoirs et immunités précises (art. 112). 38 Sa compétence est définie par les art. 111 a` 113. Elle est limitée de deux fa¸cons. D’abord, le Tribunal ne peut etreˆ saisi que d’une plainte considérée fondée par la CDPDJ. Ensuite, le Tribunal n’a compétence qu’à l’égard des questions ainsi décrites a` l’art. 111 de la Charte : 111. Le Tribunal a compétence pour entendre et disposer de toute demande portée en vertu de l’un des articles 80, 81 et 82 et ayant trait, notamment, a` l’emploi, au logement, aux biens et services ordinairement offerts au public, ou en vertu de l’un des articles 88, 90 et 91 relativement a` un programme d’accès a` l’égalité. Seule la Commission peut initialement saisir le Tribunal de l’un ou l’autre des recours prévus a` ces articles, sous réserve de la substitution prévue a` l’article 84 en faveur d’un plaignant et de l’exercice du recours prévu a` l’article 91 par la personne a` qui le Tribunal a déjà imposé un programme d’accès a` l’égalité.

5C’est aussi le cas des membres du Tribunal des professions, un tribunal administratif supervisant l’application du Code des professions, L.R.Q., c. C-26. 6Pour une description complète de leur processus de nomination, encadrement et fonctions, voir l’excellent article de Me Luc Huppé, un assesseur, « Le statut juridique des assesseurs du Tribunal des droits de la personne », (2011) 70 Re- vue du Barreau 219. Au Québec, on trouve aussi des assesseurs qui sont membres de la Commission des lésions professionnelles (CALP). Dans ces deux cas, le législateur veut permettre au décideur ultime de profiter de l’éclairage de personnes expertes. 7Contrairement aux juges de l’ordre judiciaire qui doivent etreˆ nommés a` titre inamovible (R. v. Leblanc, 2011 CACM 2 (Can. Ct. Martial App. Ct.)). L’inamovibilité est, avec l’indépendance administrative et la sécurité financière, une composante de l’indépendance de la magistrature : Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. (New Brunswick) v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 (S.C.C.), par. 7. 8Les assesseurs membres de la CLP sont aussi sans voix décisionnelles. 198 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

39 En somme, le Tribunal n’agit qu’en prolongation du travail de la CDPDJ et constitue avec cette dernière deux mécanismes, l’un d’enquête préliminaire et de filtrage, l’autre d’adjudication, ayant pour objectif de faciliter le respect de certains droits fondamentaux9. 40 Dans l’arrêt Ménard c. Rivet, [1997] R.J.Q. 2108 (Que. C.A.), le juge LeBel, alors de notre Cour, ecrit´ aux pages 2120 et 2121 : D’après le juge Gendreau, la Commission se voit chargée d’un rôle général de traitement et de gestion des plaintes, qui se déploie en trois etapes´ successives et obligatoires. A` cet egard,´ il rappelle que le Tribunal n’agit pas en appel ou en révision des décisions de la Com- mission (p. 2798), tout en reconnaissant sans plus de précision le droit de saisir le Tribunal si la Commission se désiste du dossier. Il n’a pas cependant a` examiner le problème de la saisine du Tribunal. L’interprétation donnée par le Tribunal réduit presque a` néant la fonction de gestion et de filtrage des plaintes par la Commission. L’obligation de s’adresser a` la Commission et son rôle acquièrent alors un caractère essentiellement préjudiciel. Du seul fait de l’introduction d’une plainte, si elle n’est pas satisfaite de la décision de la Commission a` son sujet, une partie aurait droit de s’adresser directement, certes a` ses frais, au Tribunal des droits de la personne. Cette conception néglige le mécanisme de contrôle qu’administre la Commission sur les plaintes en vertu de la Charte. Ainsi, d’après l’article 77, a` la suite d’un examen a` caractère préliminaire susceptible de précéder l’enquête, une plainte peut etreˆ rejetée avec notifica- tion aux parties. Plus tard, elle peut etreˆ ecart´´ ee en vertu de l’article 78, après enquête, si celle-ci dégage des el´´ ements de preuve insuf- fisants. Dans ces cas, le processus de traitement de la plainte dans le système spécialisé prévu par la Charte s’arrête là. Ce n’est que dans l’hypothèse où la Commission a estimé la plainte fondée, c’est-à-dire dans les cas où elle croit qu’il existe des possibilités d’intervention et d’exercice des recours prévus dans les articles 80 a` 82, lorsqu’elle a décidé d’arrêter son action, qu’existe le droit de substitution en faveur du plaignant, selon l’article 84. Celui-ci constitue l’une des

9Cette dualité existe aussi ailleurs au Canada : Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 (S.C.C.); Pearl Eliadis, « Human Rights Tribunals and Direct Access to Adjudication : A New Generation of Human Rights Protec- tion? », dans Tribunal des droits de la personne et Barreau du Québec, L’accès direct a` un tribunal spécialisé en matière de droit a` l’égalité : l’urgence d’agir au Québec, Cowansville, Editions´ Yvon Blais, 2008, p. 205-248. Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 199

deux exceptions a` la règle de la saisine obligatoire par l’intermédiaire de la Commission des droits de la personne. Dans l’interprétation donnée par le Tribunal des droits de la personne, une partie pourrait s’adresser directement au Tribunal des droits de la personne, même après le rejet de sa plainte pour cause de frivolité. Ce serait ecarter´ toute fonction de gestion des plaintes ou, même, l’idée d’un système intégré de gestion de ces dossiers par l’action combinée de la Commission des droits de la personne et du Tribunal des droits de la personne. Ultimement, on pourrait penser qu’on aurait tout simplement etabli´ deux systèmes de recours paral- lèles et egaux´ laissés a` l’initiative des parties devant le Tribunal des droits de la personne et devant le tribunal régulier de première instance, comme la Cour supérieure ou la Cour du Québec. Si l’accès aux tribunaux de droit commun reste libre, sans egard´ a` l’obligation de déposer une plainte préalable a` la Commission et sans nécessité d’une décision favorable de celle-ci quant a` la recevabilité de la plainte, il en va tout autrement du recours spécialisé au Tribunal des droits de la personne. Intégré dans un système de gestion des plaintes, sa saisine dépend, en règle générale, de l’initiative de la Commission des droits de la personne. Sauf la substitution prévue dans les cas visés par les articles 80 a` 82, en vertu de l’article 84, et ceux de l’article 91, il ne peut se saisir directement de la plainte d’une partie. Certes, la jurisprudence a elargi´ substantiellement les conditions de leur admissibilité (voir a` ce sujet les observations du juge Robert dans Maison L’Intégrale c. Tribunal du travail, [1996] R.J.Q. 859, pp. 868-869). Même les débats parlementaires ne soutiennent pas la position des intimées. Leur lecture complète indique que la position du ministre de la Justice de l’époque est restée fort prudente a` propos des demandes d’élargissement des voies de recours direct. Il a rap- pelé les risques constitutionnels de cette solution, qui tend a` assimiler le Tribunal a` une cour supérieure, et a consenti a` l’insertion d’un texte comme l’examen confirme aujourd’hui qu’il avait un caractère limité, malgré de vigoureuses et multiples demandes de l’opposition parlementaire et de plusieurs organismes. Voir aussi : Dufour c. Centre hospitalier St-Joseph de La Malbaie (1998), D.T.E. 98T-1136 (Que. C.A.); Québec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) c. Des Samares (Commission scolaire), [2000] R.J.Q. 2542 (Que. C.A.); Lambert c. Québec (Ministère 200 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

du tourisme), [2002] R.J.Q. 599 (Que. C.A.), par. 33-34; Montreuil c. Collège Fran¸cois-Xavier-Garneau (2004), J.E. 2004-720 (Que. C.A.). 41 Il est aussi bien etabli´ qu’il revient a` la Cour supérieure, le tribunal de droit commun du Québec, de surveiller et contrôler la CDPDJ et non au Tribunal qui ne peut siéger en révision ou en appel de cette dernière (Coutu c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne), précité, p. 2798). Si un plaignant veut contester une résolution de la CDPDJ, il doit s’adresser a` la Cour supérieure (Commission des droits de la personne c. Québec (Procureur général), D.T.E. 2000T-141 (C.A.)). 42 Les règles de procédure et de preuve applicables sont prévues aux art. 114 a` 124. Elles se veulent simples et souples; ainsi le Tribunal n’est pas tenu de respecter les règles particulières de la preuve en matière civile et il peut recevoir toute preuve utile et pertinente par tout moyen (art. 123)10. Il faut ajouter que le recours est initié et conduit générale- ment par la CDPDJ au nom du plaignant, sans frais pour lui11. 43 Le Tribunal a adopté des Règles de procédure et de pratique12, un Code de déontologie13 et un document intitulé Orientations générales du Tribunal des droits de la personne. Dans ce dernier document, il se définit une mission et enonce´ non seulement certains principes d’accessibilité et d’efficacité, mais aussi d’interprétation de la Charte, ce qui sied a` des tribunaux administratifs chargés de l’application d’une loi particulière, mais non a` des tribunaux judiciaires. 44 Comme une douzaine de tribunaux ou organismes administratifs de compétence provinciale, le Tribunal peut aussi, sur demande et même d’office, réviser toute décision dans les trois situations reconnues aux tribunaux administratifs québécois, soit la découverte d’un fait nouveau, le fait qu’un intéressé n’a pu etreˆ entendu et la présence d’un vice de fond ou de procédure de nature a` invalider la décision (art. 128; Fontaine c. C.L.P. Qué., [2005] R.J.Q. 2203, 2005 QCCA 775 (Que. C.A.)).

10C’est le cas pour les tribunaux administratifs qui n’appliquent pas le Code de procédure civile contrairement aux tribunaux judiciaires. 11Comme c’est le cas des plaintes par la Commission des normes devant la Commission des relations du travail (CRT). 12Règles de procédure et de pratique du Tribunal des droits de la personne, R.R.Q., c. C-12, r. 4. 13Code de déontologie des membres du Tribunal des droits de la personne, R.R.Q., c. C-12, r. 1. Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 201

45 Seules les décisions finales du Tribunal peuvent faire l’objet d’un appel devant notre Cour, et ce, uniquement sur permission (art. 132)14. De plus, une clause privative standard a` la suite des arrêts Québec (Procureur général) v. Farrah, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638 (S.C.C.) et Crevier v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.), protège toutes les décisions du Tribunal, interlocutoires ou finales, statuant qu’elles ne peuvent etreˆ annulées ou révisées par la Cour supérieure que sur une question de compétence (art. 109). 46 En résumé, le Tribunal est un forum d’adjudication spécialisé ou tribunal administratif (et non un tribunal judiciaire15), dont les décisions sont protégées par diverses clauses16.

14L’appel d’un tribunal administratif directement a` notre Cour est inhabituel, mais parfois prévu par le législateur. Par exemple, les décisions du TAQ agis- sant comme commission d’examen sous le Code criminel peuvent faire l’objet d’un appel devant nous. Il en va de même des décisions des commissions des valeurs mobilières dans certaines provinces (voir l’arrêt Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.)) et de certains tribunaux spécialisés fédéraux devant la Cour d’appel fédérale. Au Qué- bec, c’est le cas, par exemple, des décisions du Conseil du référendum. 15Il n’apparaˆıt d’ailleurs pas dans la liste des tribunaux judiciaires québécois que l’on retrouve a` l’art. 2 C.p.c. et a` l’art. 1 de la Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires, L.R.Q., c. T-16. 16Comme le Tribunal des professions, le TAQ, la CLP, la CRT, la Régie du logement, la Régie de l’énergie, le Bureau de décision et de révision en valeurs mobilières, le Comité de déontologie policière, la Commission d’accès a` l’information, la Commission de la fonction publique du Québec, la Commis- sion municipale du Québec, la Commission de protection du territoire agricole, la Commission québécoise des libérations conditionnelles, la Commission des transports du Québec, la Régie des alcools, des courses et des jeux, la Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec, il ne fait pas partie de l’ordre judiciaire, mais de l’administration publique (Québec (Commission de protection du territoire agricole) c. Québec (Cour du Québec) (2009), [2010] R.J.Q. 23, 2009 QCCA 2397 (Que. C.A.), par. 32). Son processus de fonctionne- ment, l’indépendance de ses membres pendant leur mandat, ses règles de preuve et la nature des questions traitées en font un tribunal quasi-judiciaire qui s’apparente aux tribunaux judiciaires québécois, soit le tribunal de droit commun, la Cour supérieure, et le tribunal statutaire a` vocation elargie,´ la Cour du Québec avec ses trois chambres et nombreuses divisions. 202 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

II. La norme de contrôle applicable 47 Le contrôle des décisions finales du Tribunal par notre Cour est as- sujetti aux principes dégagés par la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.), et précisés depuis dans de nombreux arrêts, applicables tant au contrôle judiciaire par voie de révision judiciaire par une Cour supérieure que par appel devant une cour de justice a` compé- tence elargie´ d’une décision d’un adjudicateur spécialisé. 48 Lorsqu’un appelant soulève des questions de fait ou des questions mixtes de fait et de droit devant nous, il nous faut faire preuve de défér- ence. En fait, nous ne pouvons intervenir que si la décision du Tribunal, sur ces questions, est déraisonnable dans le sens entendu par Dunsmuir et les arrêts subséquents en droit administratif. 49 Si la question en litige en est une de droit, il y a lieu de distinguer. Lorsque la question de droit porte véritablement sur sa compétence stricto sensu, la réponse du Tribunal doit etreˆ correcte (Dunsmuir, par. 50 et 59). Dans ce cas, aucune déférence n’est due. Il en va de même pour les questions de droit d’importance pour le système judiciaire (Dunsmuir, par. 60; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471, 2011 SCC 53 (S.C.C.), par. 27). Tel est le cas de l’interprétation des disposi- tions de la Charte, particulièrement a` l’égard de droits qu’un plaignant pourrait aussi faire valoir tout autant devant la Cour supérieure ou la Cour du Québec. Sur ces questions, le Tribunal ne peut prétendre disposer d’une expertise qui commande de la déférence. Par contre, pour les autres questions de droit, comme le choix de la réparation ou l’interprétation des règles de procédure et de preuve, l’intervention d’une cour supérieure, que ce soit notre Cour ou la Cour supérieure, selon le cas, ne sera possible que si la décision du Tribunal est déraisonnable (Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat, précité; Manoir Archer inc. c. Québec (Tribunal des droits de la personne) (2012), J.E. 2012-490, 2012 QCCA 343 (Que. C.A.), par. 10). 50 Je rappelle qu’est déraisonnable une décision d’un décideur administratif qui n’est pas motivée, intelligible et transparente ou ne fait pas partie des issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifier au regard des faits et du droit (Dunsmuir, par. 47; Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2009 SCC 12 (S.C.C.), par. 59; N.L.N.U. v. Newfoundland & Labrador (Treasury Board), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, 2011 SCC 62 (S.C.C.), par. 16). Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 203

51 Il faut donc déterminer la norme de contrôle applicable a` l’égard de chacun des moyens soulevés par les appelants. Contrairement a` ce qu’ils affirment, ils ne sont pas tous relatifs a` la compétence stricto sensu du Tribunal et cela a un impact sur la norme de contrôle applicable.

III. La compétence du Tribunal sous l’art. 84 de la Charte 52 En l’espèce, la difficulté provient du fait que la CDPDJ a choisi de ne pas saisir le Tribunal et de ne pas agir pour les plaignants, la mère et son enfant, a` l’égard de l’incident du 19 avril 2006, seul ev`´ enement qu’elle considérait, au terme de son enquête, etreˆ discriminatoire. 53 Conformément a` l’art. 84 de la Charte, la mère pouvait, dans les 90 jours de la réception de l’avis de résolution de la CDPDJ, en saisir elle- même et a` ses frais le Tribunal. Il s’agit du seul cas où un plaignant peut s’adresser directement au Tribunal sans passer par la CDPDJ. 54 Son recours ne peut cependant etreˆ plus etendu´ que celui qu’aurait pu introduire la CDPDJ, mais qu’elle a choisi, pour des considérations d’intérêt public, de ne pas initier. Comme l’indique l’art. 84 de la Charte, la plaignante est substituée pour l’exercice du recours a` la CDPDJ avec les mêmes effets que si celle-ci l’avait exercé. 55 Il s’ensuit qu’à la suite de la décision de la CDPDJ de ne pas introduire un recours en relation avec les propos tenus par Mme Bertrand le 19 avril 2006, la mère de l’enfant ne pouvait intenter un recours qu’à l’égard de cet ev`´ enement. C’est a` tort que la plaignante a introduit un recours plus large, portant sur tous les ev`´ enements survenus entre le 11 avril et le 1er mai 2006. Si elle n’acceptait pas les conclusions de la CDPDJ a` l’égard de ces ev`´ enements, sauf celui du 19 avril 2006, la mère n’était pas sans une voie de redressement; au contraire, elle pouvait intenter un recours en Cour supérieure ou en Cour du Québec, selon le montant réclamé. 56 Le Tribunal ne pouvait etreˆ saisi par la mère que d’un recours relatif a` l’évènement du 19 avril 2006 et sa compétence se limitait a` cela. En ac- ceptant d’examiner tous les ev`´ enements allégués par la mère pour déter- miner s’ils etaient´ discriminatoires, plutôt qu’en se limitant a` la détermi- nation du caractère discriminatoire des propos tenus le 19 avril 2006 par Mme Bertrand, le Tribunal a agi sans compétence rationae materiae, de manière ultra vires (Ménard c. Rivet, précité; Dufour c. Centre hospitalier St-Joseph de La Malbaie, précité; Lambert c. Québec (Ministère du tourisme), précité). 204 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

57 La d´ecision du Tribunal sur cet aspect est donc incorrecte et la Cour doit intervenir.

IV. La décision du Tribunal est-elle néanmoins raisonnable? 58 Reste maintenant a` déterminer le caractère raisonnable de la décision du Tribunal, une fois etabli´ qu’elle ne pouvait porter que sur les propos tenus par Mme Bertrand le 19 avril 2006. 59 Contrairement a` ce que plaident les appelants, l’absence de compé- tence a` l’égard des mises a` l’écart des 7 et 12 avril 2006 et des ev`´ enements y associés ne signifie pas que le Tribunal ne puisse en prendre connaissance si cela est pertinent a` la détermination du caractère discriminatoire des propos du 19 avril 2006 ou a` l’évaluation du préjudice pouvant en découler. Pour les motifs indiqués plus haut, il ne peut cependant indemniser les plaignants pour ces ev`´ enements ou prononcer une mesure réparatrice a` leur egard.´ 60 En l’espèce, le Tribunal n’a manifestement pas respecté ces principes, ce qui se reflète dans l’octroi des dommages, au point de les rendre dér- aisonnables sous plusieurs aspects. Je m’en explique. 61 Les propos du 19 avril 2006 de Mme Bertrand ont et´´ e considérés discriminatoires. Cette conclusion faisait partie des issues raisonnablement possibles eu egard´ aux faits et au droit quand on considère la preuve et le contexte, dont l’admission de Mme Bertrand. Une faute pouvant donner lieu a` indemnisation a alors et´´ e commise. 62 Le lien de causalité entre cette faute de Mme Bertrand et le préjudice des intimés est incontestable. En vertu de l’art. 1463 C.c.Q., la commission scolaire, en sa qualité d’employeur, peut aussi etreˆ tenue responsable de la faute de son enseignante. 63 Rien dans la preuve, telle que résumée par le Tribunal, ne permet cependant de retenir une quelconque faute de M. Bergeron a` l’égard de la tenue de ces propos, tout a` fait spontanés, de Mme Bertrand alors que l’enfant avait omis de laver ses mains avant de manger et que M. Ber- geron ne pouvait anticiper ou prévenir. Quant a` la réaction subséquente de M. Bergeron, il faut rappeler que le même jour, le 19 avril 2006, un journal local contacté par la mère traitait des incidents des 7 et 12 du même mois, et que le lendemain, il a re¸cu une lettre recommandée de la mère. Dans les jours qui ont suivi, la directrice adjointe du réseau primaire de la commission scolaire invite la mère et son mari a` une rencontre avec elle et M. Bergeron le 27. La mère accepte, mais ni elle ni son mari ne se présenteront. Entre-temps, soit le 26, un reportage sur les Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 205

ev`´ enements est diffusé sur le réseau anglophone Global TV. C’est dans ce contexte que la direction de la commission scolaire prend charge du dossier et on ne saurait blâmer M. Bergeron d’une quelconque faute dans le traitement des propos tenus par Mme Bertrand le 19 avril. Les con- damnations contre lui (dommages moraux et punitifs) n’ont donc aucune assise et sont, de ce fait, déraisonnables. La Cour doit intervenir. 64 Je passe maintenant au quantum des dommages moraux auxquels ont et´´ e condamnées Mme Bertrand et la commission scolaire, soit 5 000 $ chacune. 65 La condamnation de Mme Bertrand a` 5 000 $ semble découler de l’ensemble des faits qui lui sont reprochés par les plaignants, essentiellement des mises a` l’écart et un manque d’ouverture face a` la manière de manger d’un groupe ethnique. Ainsi expliquée, cette condamnation ex- cède la compétence du Tribunal. Manifestement, si le Tribunal avait bien compris les limites a` sa compétence, il aurait octroyé un montant moin- dre, limité a` la compensation des conséquences découlant de l’évènement du 19 avril. Cette condamnation doit etreˆ modifiée en y substituant un montant de 2 000 $. 66 Quant a` la condamnation de la commission scolaire a` des dommages moraux de 5 000 $, le Tribunal l’explique ainsi : [135] Quant a` la Commission scolaire, elle porte aussi sa part de responsabilité. Après que les ev´´ enements aient et´´ e médiatisés, ses représentants ont exigé que M. Bergeron se retire du dossier, lui enlevant alors tout pouvoir de régler le conflit avant qu’il ne s’envenime. [136] La Commission a aussi pris entièrement fait et cause pour M. Bergeron et Mme Bertrand, sans s’enquérir de la version des principaux intéressés. Plutôt que de considérer le point de vue de Mme Gallardo, elle a d’emblée agi sur la défensive en lui envoyant une lettre d’avocat visant a` lui faire cesser ses dé- marches afin d’obtenir réparation pour son fils. [137] En outre, il ne suffit pas que la Commission scolaire adopte une politique d’intégration et d’éducation interculturelle, encore faut-il qu’elle la mette en œuvre. Dans le cas en l’espèce, la Commission scolaire a manifestement failli a` son devoir. Qui plus est, les ev`´ enements impliquant L.C. ont eu lieu après que l’affaire Multani ne donne lieu a` un jugement de la Cour suprême du Canada, reconnaissant le droit au port du kirpan d’un jeune sikh dans une ecole´ de la même Commission sco- 206 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

laire17. Cette Commission scolaire qui dessert une population pluriculturelle d’élèves etait´ déjà sensée etreˆ sensibilisée aux relations interculturelles et aurait donc dû agir afin de désarmorcer les tensions de nature culturelle qui avaient pris naissance et prenaient de l’ampleur dans l’un de ses etablissements.´ [138] En vertu de l’article 1463 du Code civil du Québec18, la Commission scolaire s’avère aussi responsable en tant qu’employeur de la faute commise par ses employés. En l’occurrence, en tant qu’employeur, la Commission scolaire est responsable des agissements fautifs de M. Bergeron et de Mme Bertrand. [139] L’octroi de dommages-intérêts de 5000$ de la Commission scolaire apparaˆıt ainsi justifié. 67 Même si le Tribunal fait référence a` l’art. 1463 C.c.Q., la respon- sabilité de la commission scolaire ne tient pas de la condamnation de Mme Bertrand, mais d’une source de responsabilité autonome reliée a` sa manière de gérer le dossier du début avril a` la fin. Ce faisant, le Tribunal excède sa compétence qui etait´ limitée aux propos du 19 avril 2006. La Cour doit intervenir pour annuler ce chef de condamnation.

17Multani c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 R.C.S. 256, 2006 CSC 6. 18Article 1463 du Code civil du Québec : « Le commettant est tenu de réparer le préjudice causé par la faute de ses préposés dans l’exécution de leurs fonctions; il conserve, néanmoins, ses recours contre eux ». Gallardo c. Bergeron Dalphond, J.C.A. 207

LE DISPOSITIF 68 Pour ces motifs, je propose d’accueillir l’appel, sans frais vu les circonstances, d’infirmer la décision du Tribunal et procédant a` rendre celle qui aurait dû etreˆ prononcée, de condamner Mme Bertrand et son employeur, la Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, a` verser a` Maria Thérésa Gallardo, en sa qualité de mère de L.C., la somme de 2 000 $ avec intérêts au taux légal majoré de l’indemnité additionnelle depuis la signification du recours19. Appel accueilli.

19Ceci est conforme a` l’art. 1619 C.c.Q. Sans explication, le Tribunal fait débuter les intérêts a` la date de sa décision, soit le 15 avril 2010, alors que le recours demandait que ceux-ci remontent au jour de la signification de la résolu- tion de la CDPDJ, soit le 16 septembre 2008. 208 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

[Indexed as: Goulet c. Gazette (The)] The Gazette et Publications Canwest inc. (Appelantes- défenderesses) c. Alain Goulet (Intimé-demandeur) et Syndicat des agents de la paix en services correctionnels du Québec (Intervenant) Cour d’appel du Québec Docket: C.A. Montréal 500-09-021071-105 2012 QCCA 1085 Dalphond, Giroux, Dufresne, JJ.C.A. Heard: 17 mai 2012 Judgment: 11 juin 2012 Délits civils –––– Atteinte a` la vie privée — Divers –––– Photo montrait un agent correctionnel se tenant debout a` l’entrée d’une prison — Photo a et´´ e utilisée pour illustrer un article qui a et´´ e publié dans un quotidien montréalais — Article rapportait que des citoyens se plaignaient de l’agrandissement de l’établissement carcéral — Agent correctionnel a déposé une action a` l’encontre du quotidien et de son editeur,´ demandant des dommages-intérêts pour atteinte a` sa vie privée — Juge de première instance a cité une décision antérieure rendue par la Cour suprême du Canada portant sur le droit a` la vie privée et, plus précisément, sur le droit a` l’image — Juge de première instance a conclu que la photo n’était pas pertinente pour illustrer le propos — Juge de première instance a conclu que la publication de l’image de l’agent correctionnel constituait une atteinte a` la vie privée et a accordé 5 000 $ en dommages-intérêts compensatoires et 5 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Quotidien et son editeur´ ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli en partie — Juge de première instance a bien appliqué la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada — Juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant que la publication de l’image de l’agent correctionnel constituait une atteinte a` la vie privée — Toutefois, la Cour etait´ d’avis que la preuve ne permettait pas d’accorder des dommages-intérêts punitifs — Cour etait´ convaincue que ni le quotidien ni son editeur´ n’avaient eu l’intention de causer de préjudice a` l’agent correctionnel — Par ailleurs, il a et´´ e démontré, lors du procès, que le quotidien n’était pas une entité indépendante — Par conséquent, l’éditeur ne devrait etreˆ condamné a` verser que des dommages- intérêts compensatoires. Réparations –––– Dommages-intérêts — Dommages-intérêts fondés sur la responsabilité délictuelle — Préjudice personnel — Principes relatifs aux pertes non-pécuniaires — Divers –––– Photo montrait un agent correctionnel se tenant debout a` l’entrée d’une prison — Photo a et´´ e utilisée pour illustrer un Goulet c. Gazette (The) 209 article qui a et´´ e publié dans un quotidien montréalais — Article rapportait que des citoyens se plaignaient de l’agrandissement de l’établissement carcéral — Agent correctionnel a déposé une action a` l’encontre du quotidien et de son editeur,´ demandant des dommages-intérêts pour atteinte a` sa vie privée — Juge de première instance a cité une décision antérieure rendue par la Cour suprême du Canada portant sur le droit a` la vie privée et, plus précisément, sur le droit a` l’image — Juge de première instance a conclu que la photo n’était pas pertinente pour illustrer le propos — Juge de première instance a conclu que la publication de l’image de l’agent correctionnel constituait une atteinte a` la vie privée et a accordé 5 000 $ en dommages-intérêts compensatoires et 5 000 $ en dommages- intérêts punitifs — Quotidien et son editeur´ ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli en partie — Juge de première instance a bien appliqué la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada — Juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant que la publication de l’image de l’agent correctionnel constituait une atteinte a` la vie privée — Toutefois, la Cour etait´ d’avis que la preuve ne permettait pas d’accorder des dommages-intérêts punitifs — Cour etait´ convaincue que ni le quotidien ni son editeur´ n’avaient eu l’intention de causer de préjudice a` l’agent correctionnel — Par ailleurs, il a et´´ e démontré, lors du procès, que le quotidien n’était pas une entité indépendante — Par conséquent, l’éditeur ne devrait etreˆ condamné a` verser que des dommages-intérêts compensatoires. Réparations –––– Dommages-intérêts — Dommages-intérêts exemplaires, punitifs et majorés — Principes généraux –––– Photo montrait un agent correctionnel se tenant debout a` l’entrée d’une prison — Photo a et´´ e utilisée pour illustrer un article qui a et´´ e publié dans un quotidien montréalais — Article rapportait que des citoyens se plaignaient de l’agrandissement de l’établissement carcéral — Agent correctionnel a déposé une action a` l’encontre du quotidien et de son editeur,´ demandant des dommages-intérêts pour atteinte a` sa vie privée — Juge de première instance a cité une décision antérieure rendue par la Cour suprême du Canada portant sur le droit a` la vie privée et, plus précisément, sur le droit a` l’image — Juge de première instance a conclu que la photo n’était pas pertinente pour illustrer le propos — Juge de première instance a conclu que la publication de l’image de l’agent correctionnel constituait une atteinte a` la vie privée et a accordé 5 000 $ en dommages-intérêts compensatoires et 5 000 $ en dommages-intérêts punitifs — Quotidien et son editeur´ ont interjeté appel — Appel accueilli en partie — Juge de première instance a bien appliqué la déci- sion de la Cour suprême du Canada — Juge de première instance n’a pas commis d’erreur en concluant que la publication de l’image de l’agent correctionnel constituait une atteinte a` la vie privée — Toutefois, la Cour etait´ d’avis que la preuve ne permettait pas d’accorder des dommages-intérêts punitifs — Cour etait´ convaincue que ni le quotidien ni son editeur´ n’avaient eu l’intention de causer de préjudice a` l’agent correctionnel — Par ailleurs, il a et´´ e démontré, lors du procès, que le quotidien n’était pas une entité indépendante — Par consé- 210 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d) quent, l’éditeur ne devrait etreˆ condamné a` verser que des dommages-intérêts compensatoires. Torts –––– Invasion of privacy — Miscellaneous –––– Picture showed correctional officer standing at entrance of prison — Picture was used to illustrate story that was published in Montreal newspaper — Story reported that citizens were complaining about expansion of prison facility — Correctional officer brought action against newspaper and its publisher, seeking damages for breach of privacy — Trial judge referred to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada regarding right to privacy and, more specifically, right to one’s image — Trial judge found that picture was not relevant to illustrate story — Trial judge concluded that publication of correctional officer’s image constituted breach of privacy and awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages — Newspaper and its publisher appealed — Appeal allowed in part — Trial judge correctly applied Supreme Court of Canada’s decision — Trial judge did not err in finding that publication of correctional officer’s image constituted breach of privacy — However, Court was of view that evidence did not support award of punitive damages — Court was satisfied that neither newspaper nor its publisher intended to cause prejudice to correctional officer — Also, it was shown at trial that newspaper was not separate entity — Therefore, publisher should be ordered to pay only compensatory damages. Remedies –––– Damages — Damages in tort — Personal injury — Princi- ples relating to non-pecuniary loss — Miscellaneous –––– Picture showed correctional officer standing at entrance of prison — Picture was used to illustrate story that was published in Montreal newspaper — Story reported that citizens were complaining about expansion of prison facility — Correctional officer brought action against newspaper and its publisher, seeking damages for breach of privacy — Trial judge referred to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada regarding right to privacy and, more specifically, right to one’s image — Trial judge found that picture was not relevant to illustrate story — Trial judge concluded that publication of correctional officer’s image constituted breach of privacy and awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages — Newspaper and its publisher appealed — Appeal allowed in part — Trial judge correctly applied Supreme Court of Canada’s decision — Trial judge did not err in finding that publication of correctional officer’s image constituted breach of privacy — However, Court was of view that evidence did not support award of punitive damages — Court was satisfied that neither newspaper nor its publisher intended to cause prejudice to correctional officer — Also, it was shown at trial that newspaper was not separate entity — Therefore, publisher should be ordered to pay only compensatory damages. Remedies –––– Damages — Exemplary, punitive and aggravated damages — General principles –––– Picture showed correctional officer standing at entrance of prison — Picture was used to illustrate story that was published in Goulet c. Gazette (The) 211

Montreal newspaper — Story reported that citizens were complaining about expansion of prison facility — Correctional officer brought action against newspaper and its publisher, seeking damages for breach of privacy — Trial judge referred to previous decision by Supreme Court of Canada regarding right to privacy and, more specifically, right to one’s image — Trial judge found that picture was not relevant to illustrate story — Trial judge concluded that publication of correctional officer’s image constituted breach of privacy and awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages — Newspaper and its publisher appealed — Appeal allowed in part — Trial judge correctly applied Supreme Court of Canada’s decision — Trial judge did not err in finding that publication of correctional officer’s image constituted breach of privacy — However, Court was of view that evidence did not support award of punitive damages — Court was satisfied that neither newspaper nor its publisher intended to cause prejudice to correctional officer — Also, it was shown at trial that newspaper was not separate entity — Therefore, publisher should be ordered to pay only compensatory damages. Cases considered: Aubry c. Editions´ Vice Versa Inc. (1998), (sub nom. Aubry v. Editions´ Vice- Versa inc.) 157 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. Aubry v. Editions´ Vice-Versa inc.) 78 C.P.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. Aubry v. Editions´ Vice-Versa inc.) 224 N.R. 321, 1998 CarswellQue 4806, 1998 CarswellQue 4807, (sub nom. Aubry v. Editions´ Vice-Versa Inc.) 50 C.R.R. (2d) 225, (sub nom. Aubry v. Editions´ Vice-Versa inc.) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591, 5 B.H.R.C. 437, 45 C.C.L.T. (2d) 119, [1998] S.C.J. No. 30 (S.C.C.) — followed De Montigny c. Brossard (Succession) (2010), 78 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, (sub nom. de Montigny v. Brossard (Succession)) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 64, (sub nom. de Montigny v. Brossard (Succession)) 408 N.R. 80, 325 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 62 E.T.R. (3d) 161, 2010 SCC 51, 2010 CarswellQue 11312, 2010 CarswellQue 11313, [2010] S.C.J. No. 51 (S.C.C.) — referred to Sourour c. Clavet (2009), 2009 CarswellQue 4328, [2009] R.R.A. 435, 2009 QCCA 435, EYB 2009-158713 (Que. C.A.) — referred to Statutes considered: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Generally — referred to s. 49 — considered Code civil du Qu´ebec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64 art. 1619 — referred to

APPEL interjeté par un quotidien et son editeur´ a` l’encontre d’une décision pub- liée a` Goulet c. Gazette (The) (2010), 2010 CarswellQue 9910, EYB 2010- 179630, 2010 QCCQ 8057, [2010] R.R.A. 1159 (C.Q.), ayant accordé des dom- 212 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

mages-intérêts compensatoires et punitifs a` un agent correctionnel dont la photo a et´´ e utilisée pour illustrer un article.

Me Mark Bantey, pour les appelantes Me Jérémie Martin, pour l’intimé Me Sylvain Lallier, pour l’intervenant

La Cour:

1 La Cour statue sur l’appel d’un jugement rendu le 10 septembre 2010 par la Cour du Québec (Chambre civile) du district de Montréal (l’honorable Armando Aznar) qui a condamné les appelantes a` 5 000 $ de dommages pour atteinte a` la vie privée, dommages moraux et troubles et inconvénients et a` 5 000 $ pour dommages punitifs1. 2 Le juge de première instance s’est bien dirigé en droit en appliquant aux faits de l’espèce l’arrêt de la Cour suprême Aubry c. Editions´ Vice Versa Inc.2 et en concluant de la preuve que les appelantes avaient porté atteinte au droit au respect de la vie privée de l’intimé dont le droit a` l’image est une composante. 3 La question de savoir s’il etait´ possible d’identifier l’intimé sur la photo publiée dans le quotidien The Gazette est une question de fait qui relève de l’appréciation de la preuve testimoniale par le juge de première instance. Les appelantes ne font pas voir d’erreur manifeste et dominante sur cette question. 4 Doit egalement´ etreˆ rejeté leur argument selon lequel l’intimé, un gardien des services correctionnels en uniforme exer¸cant ses fonctions officielles a` l’entrée publique d’un etablissement´ de détention, ne pouvait prétendre a` aucune expectative de vie privée. 5 Dans son arrêt Vice-Versa, la Cour suprême enseigne que la pondéra- tion entre le droit au respect de la vie privée et l’intérêt du public a` etreˆ informé dépend de la nature de l’information véhiculée, mais aussi de la situation des intéressés. Il s’agit d’une question dépendante du contexte3. 6 En l’espèce, les appelantes ont utilisé une photo d’archives permettant d’identifier l’intimé en uniforme debout dans la porte de

12010 QCCQ 8057, J.E. 2010-1910 (C.Q.). 2Aubry c. Editions´ Vice Versa Inc., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.). 3Ibid., paragr. 57-58, p. 616-617. Goulet c. Gazette (The) La Cour 213

l’établissement carcéral qu’il garde pour illustrer un article concernant l’opposition des citoyens du voisinage a` un projet d’agrandissement du bâtiment abritant la prison. On est loin ici de l’analogie faite par les appelantes avec la situation d’un pompier photographié sur les lieux d’un incendie qu’il cherche a` maˆıtriser. 7 Le juge de première instance pouvait alors conclure que l’image de l’intimé n’était aucunement pertinente au contenu du message véhiculé4. Ce critère a déjà et´´ e retenu par notre Cour dans son arrêt Sourour c. Clavet5. 8 Enfin, a` supposer même que l’entrée de la prison de Bordeaux puisse etreˆ considérée comme un lieu public, la photo d’archives utilisée en l’espèce n’est pas celle d’une personne qui paraˆıt de fa¸con accessoire dans un tel lieu comme un « el´´ ement anonyme du décor »6 ni celle d’une personne « faisant partie d’un groupe dans un lieu public »7 dont elle n’est pas le sujet principal. Vu le sujet de l’article, le texte de la légende associée a` la photographie de l’intimé8 démontre en l’espèce que« [. . .] le caractère public du lieu où cette photographie a et´´ e prise est sans con- séquence lorsque ce lieu sert simplement a` encadrer une ou plusieurs personnes qui constituent l’objet véritable de la photographie »9. 9 La Cour estime cependant qu’en l’espèce la preuve ne justifiait pas la condamnation des appelantes a` payer a` l’intimé 5 000 $ en dommages punitifs. Selon l’article 49 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la per- sonne10, c’est l’atteinte illicite et intentionnelle a` un droit reconnu par la Charte qui justifie l’octroi de dommages-intérêts punitifs et la Cour su- prême a rappelé que l’intentionnalité de l’atteinte ne s’attache pas a` la

4Jugement de première instance, précité, note 1, paragr. 40. 5Sourour c. Clavet, 2009 QCCA 435, J.E. 2009-1038 (Que. C.A.), paragr. 48- 49 (j. Dutil). 6Aubry c. Editions´ Vice Versa Inc., arrêt précité, note 2, paragr. 59, p. 617. 7Ibid. 8« Come on in : Guard stands at the main entrance to Bordeaux Jail, which was built from 1908 to 1912 ». 9Supra, note 6. 10Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, L.R.Q., c. C-12. 214 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

volonté de l’auteur de commettre la faute, mais plutôt a` celle d’en en- traˆıner le résultat11. 10 Il est vrai que, lors d’une visite de l’institution par les médias en septembre 2006, d’autres représentants des appelantes alors présents avaient et´´ e informés de la politique des services correctionnels de ne pas permettre la prise de photographie des agents du service autrement que de dos. Ce fait a` lui seul ne prouve pas qu’en publiant en janvier 2008 la photo de l’intimé prise a` l’été 2007 les appelantes voulaient les incon- vénients subis par l’intimé dont elles ne connaissaient pas la sensibilité a` la préservation de son anonymat. 11 Par ailleurs, il a et´´ e confirmé a` l’audience que The Gazette n’avait pas d’existence juridique distincte de l’autre appelante, Publications Canwest inc., de telle sorte qu’une condamnation a` payer des dommages ne pouvait etreˆ prononcée que contre cette dernière.

POUR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR : 12 ACCUEILLE l’appel pour partie a` la seule fin de remplacer le deux- ième paragraphe des conclusions du jugement de première instance par le suivant : CONDAMNE la défenderesse, Publications Canwest inc., a` payer au demandeur la somme de 5 000 $ avec intérêts au taux légal plus l’indemnité additionnelle prévue a` l’article 1619 du Code civil du Québec a` compter du 28 janvier 2008; 13 SANS FRAIS en appel, vu le résultat mitigé. Appel accueilli en partie.

11De Montigny c. Brossard (Succession), [2010] 3 S.C.R. 64, 2010 SCC 51 (S.C.C.), paragr. 60. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 215

[Indexed as: Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP] Vijay Arora, Stacey Jacobs, and Kathleen Oliver, Plaintiffs and Whirlpool Canada LP and Whirlpool Corporation, Defendants Proceeding Under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 Ontario Superior Court of Justice Docket: 10-CV-404742CP 2012 ONSC 4642 Perell J. Heard: July 24-26, 2012 Judgment: August 16, 2012 Civil practice and procedure –––– Parties — Representative or class proceedings under class proceedings legislation — Certification — Plaintiff’s class proceeding — Pleadings disclose cause of action –––– Plaintiffs owned front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant manufacturer W Co. — Plaintiffs brought action on behalf of Canadian residents, excluding Que- bec, who owned 2001 to 2008 W Co. front-loading washing machine or who previously owned machine — Plaintiffs alleged that W Co. negligently designed washing machines and negligently failed to warn of design defects and need to take remedial action; that W Co. breached warranty that machines were fit for their intended purpose; and that W Co.’s failure to disclose defects was misrepresentation contrary to s. 52 of Competition Act — Plaintiffs brought certification motion under s. 5(1) of Class Proceedings Act, 1992, in proposed product liability class action against W Co. for pure economic losses — Motion dismissed — Plaintiffs did not show reasonable cause of action — Proposed class action should not be certified — It was plain and obvious that there was no tenable contractual or statutory claim to underpin plaintiffs’ claims of economic losses — Further, it was plain and obvious that negligence claim for pure economic losses for non-dangerous, negligently-designed consumer product was untenable — Therefore, plaintiffs had no cause of action in contract, breach of statute, or tort — Waiver of tort claim was also untenable. Commercial law –––– Trade and commerce — Competition and combines legislation — Competition offences and reviewable practices — Miscellane- ous offences –––– Plaintiffs owned front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant manufacturer W Co. — Plaintiffs brought action on behalf of Canadian residents, excluding Quebec, who owned 2001 to 2008 W Co. front- loading washing machine or who previously owned machine — Plaintiffs alleged that W Co. negligently designed washing machines and negligently failed to warn of design defects and need to take remedial action; that W Co. breached 216 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

warranty that machines were fit for their intended purpose; and that W Co.’s failure to disclose defects was misrepresentation contrary to s. 52 of Competi- tion Act — Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that W Co. breached s. 52 of Competi- tion Act because it made false and misleading representations by failing to disclose certain information about its washing machines — Plaintiffs brought motion under s. 5(1) of Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to certify action as class proceeding — Motion dismissed — Since alleged design defect in washing machines did not make machines dangerous, it was plain and obvious that W Co. was not under obligation to disclose alleged design defect — W Co. had no duty of care to disclose, no fiduciary duty to disclose, and no statutory duty to disclose — It was plain and obvious that there was no viable cause of action pursuant to s. 52 of Competition Act. Torts –––– Negligence — Practice and procedure — Parties — Representa- tive or class actions –––– Plaintiffs owned front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant manufacturer W Co. — Plaintiffs brought action on behalf of Canadian residents, excluding Quebec, who owned 2001 to 2008 W Co. front-loading washing machine or who previously owned machine — Plain- tiffs alleged that W Co. negligently designed washing machines and negligently failed to warn of design defects and need to take remedial action; that W Co. breached warranty that machines were fit for their intended purpose; and that W Co.’s failure to disclose defects was misrepresentation contrary to s. 52 of Com- petition Act — Plaintiffs brought motion under s. 5(1) of Class Proceedings Act, 1992, for certification of action as class proceeding against W Co. for pure economic losses — Motion dismissed — It was plain and obvious that plaintiffs had not pleaded reasonable cause of action in negligence — It was plain and obvious that there is no product-liability negligence action for pure economic losses against manufacturer for negligently designing non-dangerous consumer product — There was settled law of highest authority binding on present court indicating that pleading in present case did not show reasonable cause of action — Applying test for duty of care, it was plain and obvious that pure economic loss claim in negligence is not available for carelessly designing non-dangerous product — Century old policies of law against negligence law providing compensation for pure economic losses applied in case at bar to negate prima facie duty of care — Negligence claims for non-dangerous products are foreclosed — Case at bar also did not fall within established category for design negligence, which is established category only for dangerous goods. Restitution and unjust enrichment –––– Benefits arising through wrongful acts — Waiver of tort –––– Plaintiffs owned front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant manufacturer W Co. — Plaintiffs brought action based on concurrent liability in contract, breach of statute, negligence, and waiver of tort, on behalf of Canadian residents outside Quebec who owned or previously owned 2001 to 2008 W Co. front-loading washing machine — Plain- Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 217 tiffs alleged that W Co. negligently designed washing machines and negligently failed to warn of design defects and need to take remedial action; that W Co. breached warranty that machines were fit for their intended purpose; and that W Co.’s failure to disclose defects was misrepresentation contrary to s. 52 of Com- petition Act — Plaintiffs brought motion for certification of action as class proceeding, pleading contractual causes of action; statutory causes of action; negligence; and waiver of tort — Plaintiffs brought motion for certification of action as class proceeding — Motion dismissed — Plaintiffs did not show reasonable cause of action on any basis, including waiver of tort — Waiver of tort claim was untenable — It was plain and obvious that there was no predicate wrongdoing upon which to base plea of waiver of tort — All proposed causes of action were untenable, thus there was no predicate wrongdoing to support claim of waiver of tort be it remedy or cause of action — Waiver of tort claim failed to satisfy s. 5(1)(a) of Act. The plaintiffs, who owned front-loading washing machines manufactured by the defendant manufacturer W Co., brought an action on behalf of Canadian residents, excluding Quebec, who owned a 2001 to 2008 W Co. front-loading washing machine or who previously owned the machine. A companion Quebec action was proceeding. The plaintiffs alleged that W Co. negligently designed the washing machines and negligently failed to warn of the design defects and the need to take remedial action; that W Co. breached a warranty that the machines were fit for their intended purpose; and that W Co.’s failure to disclose the defects was a misrepresentation contrary to s. 52 of the Competition Act. The action was based on concurrent liability in contract, breach of statute, negligence, and waiver of tort. The plaintiffs brought a certification motion under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceed- ings Act, 1992, in the proposed product liability class action against W Co. for pure economic losses. Held: The motion was dismissed. The plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable cause of action. The proposed class action should not be certified. Although contractual or statutory claims would support a claim for purely economic losses, in the case at bar, it was plain and obvious that there was no tenable contractual or statutory claim to underpin the plaintiffs’ claims of economic losses. Since the alleged design defect in the washing machines did not make the machines dangerous, it was plain and obvious that W Co. was not under an obligation to disclose the alleged design defect. It was plain and obvious that W Co. did not commit an offence under s. 52 of the Competition Act. It was plain and obvious that a negligence claim for pure economic losses for a non-dangerous, negligently-designed consumer product is untenable. Therefore, 218 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

the plaintiffs had no cause of action in contract, breach of statute, or tort. And assuming that waiver of tort is a cause of action, there was also no predicate wrongdoing, so the waiver of tort claim was also untenable. Because the case at bar ultimately was about an allegedly shoddy but non-dangerous consumer product, it was not necessary to analyze the certification criteria from the perspective of a proposed class action about a dangerous product. In obiter, the remaining criteria for certification were examined. It was held that the class definition criterion was satisfied; the common issue criterion was satisfied, but some proposed questions were not certifiable, and some proposed questions required revision or substitution; the preferable procedure criterion was not satisfied for some proposed common questions because of unmanageability, but the preferability criterion was satisfied for the questions that remained; and the representative plaintiff and litigation plan criterion was satisfied, although improvements should be made to the plan. Cases considered by Perell J.: Abdool v. Anaheim Management Ltd. (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 129, 21 O.R. (3d) 453, 31 C.P.C. (3d) 197, 78 O.A.C. 377, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 496, [1995] O.J. No. 16 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Andersen v. St. Jude Medical Inc. (2012), 2012 ONSC 3660, 2012 CarswellOnt 8061 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Anderson v. Wilson (1999), 36 C.P.C. (4th) 17, 44 O.R. (3d) 673, 1999 Cars- wellOnt 2073, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 409, 122 O.A.C. 69, [1999] O.J. No. 2494 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Anderson v. Wilson (2000), 138 O.A.C. 200 (note), 2000 CarswellOnt 1837, 2000 CarswellOnt 1838, 258 N.R. 194 (note), 185 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note), [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 476 (S.C.C.) — referred to Anger v. Berkshire Investment Group Inc. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 329, 141 O.A.C. 301, [2001] O.J. No. 379 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), (sub nom. Anns v. London Borough of Merton) [1977] 2 All E.R. 492, [1978] A.C. 728, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024, 121 S.J. 377, [1977] UKHL 4 (U.K. H.L.) — followed Aronowicz v. EMTWO Properties Inc. (2010), 98 O.R. (3d) 641, (sub nom. Aronowicz v. Emtwo Properties Inc.) 258 O.A.C. 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 598, 2010 ONCA 96, 319 D.L.R. (4th) 621, (sub nom. Aronowicz v. Emtwo Properties Inc.) 316 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 64 B.L.R. (4th) 163, [2010] O.J. No. 475 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2003), 29 C.P.C. (5th) 242, 2003 Carswell- Ont 347, [2003] O.J. No. 344 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 4868, [2003] O.J. No. 4708 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 219

Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2008), 59 C.P.C. (6th) 195, 300 D.L.R. (4th) 415, 2008 CarswellOnt 5661, 2008 ONCA 660, 254 O.A.C. 91, 93 O.R. (3d) 35, [2008] O.J. No. 3766 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2009), 260 O.A.C. 394 (note), 303 D.L.R. (4th) vi, 2009 CarswellOnt 2343, 2009 CarswellOnt 2344, [2009] 1 S.C.R. v (note), 396 N.R. 397 (note), [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 491 (S.C.C.) — referred to Barwin v. IKO Industries Ltd. (2012), 2012 ONSC 3969, 2012 CarswellOnt 9055 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. (1931), [1931] All E.R. Rep. 1, [1932] A.C. 161 (U.K. H.L.) — referred to Bhadauria v. Seneca College of Applied Arts & Technology (1981), 2 C.H.R.R. D/468, 1981 CarswellOnt 117, 1981 CarswellOnt 616, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, (sub nom. Seneca College of Applied Arts & Technology v. Bhadauria) 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 37 N.R. 455, 14 B.L.R. 157, 81 C.L.L.C. 14,117, 22 C.P.C. 130, 17 C.C.L.T. 106, [1981] A.C.S. No. 76, [1981] S.C.J. No. 76 (S.C.C.) — considered Bondy v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd. (2007), 39 C.P.C. (6th) 339, 2007 CarswellOnt 1419, [2007] O.J. No. 784 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp. (2002), 14 C.C.L.T. (3d) 233, 2002 CarswellOnt 1395, [2002] O.J. No. 1075 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 1813, [2002] O.J. No. 2135 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1405, 32 C.P.C. (5th) 203, 226 D.L.R. (4th) 747, 170 O.A.C. 333, 64 O.R. (3d) 208, [2003] O.J. No. 1374 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 2129, 174 O.A.C. 44, [2003] O.J. No. 2218 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. (1997), 221 N.R. 1, 1997 CarswellNfld 207, 1997 CarswellNfld 208, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 490 A.P.R. 269, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210, 48 C.C.L.I. (2d) 1, 37 B.L.R. (2d) 1, 158 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 269, 40 C.C.L.T. (2d) 235, 1999 A.M.C. 108, [1997] S.C.J. No. 111 (S.C.C.) — referred to Brett-Young Seeds Ltd. v. Assi´e Industries Ltd. (2002), [2002] 7 W.W.R. 418, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 492, 166 Man. R. (2d) 33, 278 W.A.C. 33, 11 C.C.L.T. (3d) 265, 2002 MBCA 74, 2002 CarswellMan 248, [2002] M.J. No. 229 (Man. C.A.) — referred to Brett-Young Seeds Ltd. v. K.B.A. Consultants Inc. (2008), 2008 CarswellMan 140, [2008] 5 W.W.R. 622, 55 C.C.L.T. (3d) 98, 419 W.A.C. 291, 225 Man. R. (2d) 291, 2008 MBCA 36, 68 C.L.R. (3d) 170, 53 C.P.C. (6th) 351, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 688, [2008] M.J. No. 107 (Man. C.A.) — considered Brownlie v. Campbell (1880), (1879-80) L.R. 5 App. Cas. 925 (Eng. H.L.) — referred to 220 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Bywater v. Toronto Transit Commission (1998), 27 C.P.C. (4th) 172, 1998 Cars- wellOnt 4645, 83 O.T.C. 1, [1998] O.J. No. 4913 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — followed Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. (1992), 11 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 137 N.R. 241, 1992 A.M.C. 1910, (sub nom. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. c. Cie des Chemins de Fer nationaux du Can- ada) [1991] R.R.A. 370, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021, 1992 CarswellNat 168, 53 F.T.R. 79, 1992 CarswellNat 655, EYB 1992-67217, [1992] S.C.J. No. 40 (S.C.C.) — followed Canadian Pacific International Freight Services Ltd. v. Starber International Inc. (1992), 12 C.C.L.T. (2d) 321, 44 C.P.R. (3d) 17, 1992 CarswellOnt 839, [1992] O.J. No. 1547 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 423, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 348, 42 B.L.R. (3d) 276, 22 C.C.L.T. (3d) 261, 44 C.P.C. (5th) 350, [2004] O.T.C. 112, [2004] O.J. No. 299 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 3838, 138 O.A.C. 55, 1 C.P.C. (5th) 62, 11 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 196 D.L.R. (4th) 344, 51 O.R. (3d) 236, [2000] O.J. No. 4014 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Catre Industries Ltd. v. Alberta (1989), 36 C.L.R. 169, 63 D.L.R. (4th) 74, 99 A.R. 321, 1989 CarswellAlta 527, [1989] A.J. No. 903 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to Catre Industries Ltd. v. Alberta (1990), 105 A.R. 254 (note), [1990] 1 S.C.R. vi, 65 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note), 108 N.R. 170 (note), [1989] S.C.C.A. No. 447 (S.C.C.) — referred to Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co. (1874), L.R. 10 Q.B. 453, [1874-80] All E.R. Rep. 492, 44 L.J.Q.B. 139, 33 L.T. 475, 39 J.P. 791 (Eng. Q.B.) — followed Chadha v. Bayer Inc. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1697, 200 D.L.R. (4th) 309, 8 C.P.C. (5th) 138, 15 B.L.R. (3d) 177, 147 O.A.C. 223, 54 O.R. (3d) 520, [2001] O.J. No. 1844 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Chadha v. Bayer Inc. (2003), 223 D.L.R. (4th) 158, 168 O.A.C. 143, 2003 Cars- wellOnt 49, 63 O.R. (3d) 22, 23 C.L.R. (3d) 1, 31 B.L.R. (3d) 214, 31 C.P.C. (5th) 40, [2003] O.J. No. 27 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Chadha v. Bayer Inc. (2003), 320 N.R. 399 (note), 65 O.R. (3d) xvii, 2003 Cars- wellOnt 2810, 2003 CarswellOnt 2811, 191 O.A.C. 397 (note), [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 106 (S.C.C.) — referred to Childs v. Desormeaux (2006), 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, 80 O.R. (3d) 558 (note), 210 O.A.C. 315, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710, 2006 CarswellOnt 2711, 2006 SCC 18, 347 N.R. 328, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, [2006] R.R.A. 245, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18 (S.C.C.) — referred to Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 5026, 73 O.R. (3d) 401, 192 O.A.C. 239, 27 C.C.L.T. (3d) 50, [2005] 1 C.N.L.R. 8, 2 C.P.C. (6th) 199, 247 D.L.R. (4th) 667, [2004] O.J. No. 4924 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 221

Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1866, 2005 CarswellOnt 1867, 344 N.R. 192 (note), [2005] 1 S.C.R. vi (note), 207 O.A.C. 400 (note), [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 50 (S.C.C.) — referred to Collette v. Great Pacific Management Co. (2003), 2003 BCSC 332, 2003 Car- swellBC 530, [2003] B.C.J. No. 529 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to Collette v. Great Pacific Management Co. (2004), 42 B.L.R. (3d) 161, 195 B.C.A.C. 79, 319 W.A.C. 79, 2004 BCCA 110, 2004 CarswellBC 410, 26 B.C.L.R. (4th) 252, [2004] B.C.J. No. 381 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to Cooper v. Hobart (2001), [2002] 1 W.W.R. 221, 2001 CarswellBC 2502, 2001 CarswellBC 2503, 2001 SCC 79, 8 C.C.L.T. (3d) 26, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 96 B.C.L.R. (3d) 36, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.)) 277 N.R. 113, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.)) 160 B.C.A.C. 268, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.)) 261 W.A.C. 268, [2001] S.C.J. No. 76, REJB 2001-26862 (S.C.C.) — referred to D. (B.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Halton (Region) (2007), 39 R.F.L. (6th) 245, 49 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, 284 D.L.R. (4th) 682, 2007 CarswellOnt 4789, 2007 CarswellOnt 4790, 2007 SCC 38, 365 N.R. 302, 227 O.A.C. 161, (sub nom. Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. D. (B.)) [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83, 86 O.R. (3d) 720 (note), (sub nom. Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. D. (B.)) [2007] S.C.J. No. 38 (S.C.C.) — considered D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England (1988), [1989] A.C. 177, [1988] 2 All E.R. 992, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 368, 94 N.R. 286 (U.K. H.L.) — considered Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage & Warehouse Inc. (1998), 26 C.P.C. (4th) 1, 111 O.A.C. 201, 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 1998 CarswellOnt 3202, 20 R.P.R. (3d) 207, [1998] O.J. No. 3240 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Design Services Ltd. v. R. (2008), 69 C.L.R. (3d) 1, 55 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Design Services Ltd. v. Canada) 293 D.L.R. (4th) 437, (sub nom. Design Services Ltd. v. Canada) 374 N.R. 77, 64 C.C.L.I. (4th) 159, 2008 SCC 22, 2008 CarswellNat 1298, 2008 CarswellNat 1299, (sub nom. Design Services Ltd. v. Canada) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 737, [2008] S.C.J. No. 22 (S.C.C.) — considered Dick Bentley Productions Ltd. v. Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd. (1965), [1965] 1 W.L.R. 370 at 623, [1965] 2 All E.R. 65 (Eng. C.A.) — considered Drady v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 4631, [2007] O.J. No. 2812 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Drady v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2008), 270 O.A.C. 1, 300 D.L.R. (4th) 443, 68 C.P.C. (6th) 306, 2008 CarswellOnt 5662, 2008 ONCA 659, [2008] O.J. No. 3772 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Drady v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2009), 260 O.A.C. 399 (note), 2009 CarswellOnt 2345, 2009 CarswellOnt 2346, [2009] 1 S.C.R. viii (note), 396 N.R. 396 (note), [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 492 (S.C.C.) — referred to 222 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Ducharme v. Solarium de Paris Inc. (April 15, 2008), Doc. 07-DV-1302, [2008] O.J. No. 1558 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2001), 34 Admin. L.R. (3d) 38, 2001 CarswellOnt 3962, 2001 CarswellOnt 3963, 2001 SCC 80, 8 C.C.L.T. (3d) 153, 13 C.P.C. (5th) 35, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 211, 277 N.R. 145, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 562, (sub nom. Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (No. 2)) 56 O.R. (3d) 456 (headnote only), 153 O.A.C. 388, [2001] S.C.J. No. 77, REJB 2001-26863 (S.C.C.) — considered Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health & Long Term Care) (2006), 35 C.P.C. (6th) 7, 2006 CarswellOnt 6777, 43 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 82 O.R. (3d) 321, 217 O.A.C. 69, 276 D.L.R. (4th) 411, [2006] O.J. No. 4400 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health & Long Term Care) (2007), 372 N.R. 392 (note), 2007 CarswellOnt 3256, 2007 CarswellOnt 3257, 239 O.A.C. 198 (note), [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 514 (S.C.C.) — referred to Ernewein v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (2005), 260 D.L.R. (4th) 488, 46 B.C.L.R. (4th) 234, 218 B.C.A.C. 177, 359 W.A.C. 177, 2005 BCCA 540, 2005 CarswellBC 2592, 19 C.P.C. (6th) 253, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2370 (B.C. C.A.) — considered Ernewein v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (2006), 2006 CarswellBC 680, 2006 CarswellBC 681, 353 N.R. 197 (note), 233 B.C.A.C. 320 (note), 386 W.A.C. 320 (note), [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 545 (S.C.C.) — referred to Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon (1976), [1976] 1 Q.B. 801, [1976] 2 All E.R. 5, 2 Ll. L. Rep. 305, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 583 (Eng. C.A.) — considered Falloncrest Financial Corp. v. Ontario (1995), (sub nom. Nash v. Ontario) 27 O.R. (3d) 1, 1995 CarswellOnt 910, [1995] O.J. No. 4043 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Fehringer v. Sun Media Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 3841, 39 C.P.C. (5th) 151, [2003] O.J. No. 3918 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Folland v. Ontario (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1087, 104 C.R.R. (2d) 244, 17 C.C.L.T. (3d) 271, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 50, 170 O.A.C. 17, 64 O.R. (3d) 89, [2003] O.J. No. 1048 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Fort Frances (Town) v. Boise Cascade Canada Ltd. (1983), 1983 CarswellOnt 817F, (sub nom. Boise Cascade Canada Ltd. v. R.) [1983] 1 S.C.R. 171, 143 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 46 N.R. 108, 1983 CarswellOnt 817 (S.C.C.) — referred to Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd. (1999), 127 B.C.A.C. 287, 207 W.A.C. 287, 67 B.C.L.R. (3d) 213, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 1999 A.M.C. 2840, 50 B.L.R. (2d) 169, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108, [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 199, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 245 N.R. 88, 1999 CarswellBC 1927, 1999 CarswellBC 1928, [1999] I.L.R. I-3717, [1999] 9 W.W.R. 380, 11 C.C.L.I. (3d) 1, [1999] S.C.J. No. 48 (S.C.C.) — considered Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 223

Fullowka v. Royal Oak Ventures Inc. (2010), (sub nom. Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd.) [2010] 1 S.C.R. 132, [2010] 4 W.W.R. 35, (sub nom. Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd.) 398 N.R. 20, (sub nom. Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd.) 479 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd.) 474 A.R. 1, 80 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 315 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2010 SCC 5, 2010 CarswellNWT 9, 2010 CarswellNWT 10, 71 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, [2010] S.C.J. No. 5, [2010] A.C.S. No. 5 (S.C.C.) — referred to G. Ford Homes Ltd. v. Draft Masonry (York) Co. (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 401, 2 O.A.C. 231, 2 C.L.R. 210, 1 D.L.R. (4th) 262, 1983 CarswellOnt 732, [1983] O.J. No. 3181 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Gallant v. Beitz (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 86, 22 M.V.R. 144, 25 C.C.L.T. 81, 148 D.L.R. (3d) 522, 1983 CarswellOnt 26 (Ont. H.C.) — referred to Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2270, 23 C.P.C. (5th) 360, [2002] O.T.C. 459, [2002] O.J. No. 2766 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co. (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 8813, [2004] O.J. No. 5309 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Gordelli Management Ltd. v. Turk (1991), 6 O.R. (3d) 521, 1991 CarswellOnt 1000 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc. (2009), 72 C.P.C. (6th) 158, 2009 CarswellOnt 560, [2009] O.J. No. 418 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4742, [2009] O.J. No. 3438 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Harris v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (2010), 78 C.C.L.T. (3d) 52, 106 O.R. (3d) 661, 272 O.A.C. 214, 2010 ONCA 872, 2010 CarswellOnt 9696, [2010] O.J. No. 5546 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Harris v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 6308, 2011 Carswell- Ont 6309, 426 N.R. 391 (note), [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 85 (S.C.C.) — referred to Haskett v. Trans Union of Canada Inc. (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) 419, 169 O.A.C. 201, 2003 CarswellOnt 692, 15 C.C.L.T. (3d) 194, 63 O.R. (3d) 577, [2003] O.J. No. 771 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. (1963), 107 Sol. Jo. 454, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 101, [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 485, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (U.K. H.L.) — considered Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton (1912), [1911-13] All E.R. Rep. 83, [1913] A.C. 30 (U.K. H.L.) — considered Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst & Young (1997), 31 B.L.R. (2d) 147, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165, 1997 CarswellMan 198, 211 N.R. 352, 1997 CarswellMan 199, 115 Man. R. (2d) 241, 139 W.A.C. 241, (sub nom. Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young) 146 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 35 C.C.L.T. (2d) 115, [1997] 8 W.W.R. 80, [1997] S.C.J. No. 51 (S.C.C.) — considered 224 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Heward v. Eli Lilly & Co. (2007), 39 C.P.C. (6th) 153, 2007 CarswellOnt 611, 47 C.C.L.T. (3d) 114, [2007] O.J. No. 404 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Heward v. Eli Lilly & Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3837, 56 C.P.C. (6th) 309, 91 O.R. (3d) 691, 239 O.A.C. 273, 295 D.L.R. (4th) 175, 58 C.C.L.T. (3d) 99, [2008] O.J. No. 2610 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board (2007), 2007 SCC 41, 2007 CarswellOnt 6265, 2007 CarswellOnt 6266, 87 O.R. (3d) 397 (note), 40 M.P.L.R. (4th) 1, 64 Admin. L.R. (4th) 163, 50 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, 368 N.R. 1, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 620, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, [2007] R.R.A. 817, 50 C.R. (6th) 279, 230 O.A.C. 253, [2007] S.C.J. No. 41 (S.C.C.) — referred to Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (2001), (sub nom. Hollick v. Toronto (City)) 56 O.R. (3d) 214 (headnote only), (sub nom. Hollick v. Toronto (City)) 205 D.L.R. (4th) 19, (sub nom. Hollick v. Toronto (City)) [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158, (sub nom. Hollick v. Toronto (City)) 2001 SCC 68, 2001 CarswellOnt 3577, 2001 CarswellOnt 3578, 24 M.P.L.R. (3d) 9, 13 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 277 N.R. 51, 42 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 26, 153 O.A.C. 279, [2001] S.C.J. No. 67, REJB 2001-26157 (S.C.C.) — considered Hollis v. Birch (1995), 1995 CarswellBC 967, 1995 CarswellBC 1152, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) 129 D.L.R. (4th) 609, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) 190 N.R. 241, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) 67 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.) 111 W.A.C. 1, [1996] 2 W.W.R. 77, 14 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 27 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 26 B.L.R. (2d) 169, EYB 1995-67074, [1995] S.C.J. No. 104 (S.C.C.) — referred to Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2919, 28 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 61 O.R. (3d) 433, 165 O.A.C. 68, 25 C.P.C. (5th) 230, 219 D.L.R. (4th) 467, [2002] O.J. No. 3457 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. (2003), [2003] 1 S.C.R. xi (note), 2003 CarswellOnt 1925, 2003 CarswellOnt 1926, 189 O.A.C. 200 (note), 224 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note), 320 N.R. 193 (note), [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 446 (S.C.C.) — referred to Hunt v. T & N plc (1990), 1990 CarswellBC 216, 43 C.P.C. (2d) 105, 117 N.R. 321, 4 C.O.H.S.C. 173 (headnote only), (sub nom. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.) [1990] 6 W.W.R. 385, 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, (sub nom. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.) 74 D.L.R. (4th) 321, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, 1990 CarswellBC 759, 4 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.) [1990] S.C.J. No. 93, EYB 1990-67014 (S.C.C.) — followed Inuit Tapirisat of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General) (1980), 1980 Car- swellNat 633, [1980] 2 F.C.R. 735, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, 115 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 33 N.R. 304, 1980 CarswellNat 633F, [1980] S.C.J. No. 99 (S.C.C.) — referred to Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 225

Johnson v. Adamson (1981), 1981 CarswellOnt 585, 18 C.C.L.T. 282, 128 D.L.R. (3d) 470, 34 O.R. (2d) 236 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Johnson v. Adamson (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 64n, 41 N.R. 447n, [1982] S.C.C.A. No. 277 (S.C.C.) — referred to Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. (2011), 2011 CarswellBC 1968, 2011 CarswellBC 1969, 2011 SCC 42, (sub nom. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.) 419 N.R. 1, 86 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, (sub nom. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.) 335 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 215, [2011] 11 W.W.R. 215, 25 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.) 308 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.) 521 W.A.C. 1, 83 C.B.R. (5th) 169, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45, [2011] S.C.J. No. 42, [2011] A.C.S. No. 42 (S.C.C.) — considered Koubi v. Mazda Canada Inc. (2012), 2012 CarswellBC 2060, 2012 BCCA 310 (B.C. C.A.) — considered Kumar v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 4449, 17 C.P.C. (5th) 103, (sub nom. Williams v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada) 152 O.A.C. 344, 34 C.C.L.I. (3d) 316, [2002] I.L.R. I-4052, [2001] O.J. No. 4952 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Kumar v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1209, [2003] I.L.R. I-4181, 226 D.L.R. (4th) 112, 31 C.P.C. (5th) 205, 47 C.C.L.I. (3d) 43, 170 O.A.C. 165, [2003] O.J. No. 1160 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Lambert v. Guidant Corp. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 2535, 72 C.P.C. (6th) 120, [2009] O.J. No. 1910 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Lambert v. Guidant Corp. (2009), 82 C.P.C. (6th) 367, 2009 CarswellOnt 6512, [2009] O.J. No. 4464 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 569, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 121, 1971 CarswellOnt 174, 1971 CarswellOnt 174F (S.C.C.) — referred to Le Livre v. Gould (1893), [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, 41 W.R. 468, 4 R. 274 (Eng. C.A.) — considered Leek v. Vaidyanathan (2011), 2011 ONCA 46, 2011 CarswellOnt 222, 329 D.L.R. (4th) 190, [2011] O.J. No. 200 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to LeFrancois v. Guidant Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 2073, 56 C.P.C. (6th) 268, [2008] O.J. No. 1397 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to LeFrancois v. Guidant Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5201, [2008] O.J. No. 3459 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to LeFrancois v. Guidant Corp. (2009), (sub nom. Guidant Corp. v. LeFrancois) 245 O.A.C. 213, 2009 CarswellOnt 30, 67 C.P.C. (6th) 9, [2009] O.J. No. 36 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd. (1992), [1993] 1 W.W.R. 1, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, (sub nom. London Drugs Ltd. v. Brassart) 143 N.R. 1, 73 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 43 C.C.E.L. 1, 13 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, (sub 226 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

nom. London Drugs Ltd. v. Brassart) 18 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. London Drugs Ltd. v. Brassart) 31 W.A.C. 1, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 261, 1992 CarswellBC 913, 1992 CarswellBC 315, EYB 1992-67042, [1992] S.C.J. No. 84 (S.C.C.) — considered M. Hasegawa & Co. v. Pepsi Bottling Group (Canada) Co. (2002), 1 B.C.L.R. (4th) 209, 169 B.C.A.C. 261, 276 W.A.C. 261, [2002] 7 W.W.R. 600, 213 D.L.R. (4th) 663, 11 C.C.L.T. (3d) 249, 2002 BCCA 324, 2002 CarswellBC 1165, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1125 (B.C. C.A.) — considered M.J.B. Enterprises Ltd. v. Defence Construction (1951) Ltd. (1999), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 49 B.L.R. (2d) 1, 237 N.R. 334, 44 C.L.R. (2d) 163, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 619, 232 A.R. 360, 195 W.A.C. 360, 1999 CarswellAlta 301, 1999 CarswellAlta 302, 2 T.C.L.R. 235, 69 Alta. L.R. (3d) 341, [1999] 7 W.W.R. 681, 3 M.P.L.R. (3d) 165, [1999] S.C.J. No. 17 (S.C.C.) — referred to Marathon Realty Co. v. Ginsberg (1981), 18 R.P.R. 222, 1981 CarswellOnt 510, [1981] O.J. No. 1140 (Ont. H.C.) — referred to Marathon Realty Co. v. Ginsberg (1982), 42 N.R. 180, [1982] S.C.C.A. No. 232 (S.C.C.) — referred to Marathon Realty Co. v. Ginsberg (1982), 1982 CarswellOnt 644, 24 R.P.R. 155, [1982] O.J. No. 45 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Mariani v. Lemstra (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 5126, 246 D.L.R. (4th) 489, 27 C.C.L.T. (3d) 261, 39 C.L.R. (3d) 71, [2004] O.J. No. 4283 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Mariani v. Lemstra (2005), 204 O.A.C. 396 (note), 2005 CarswellOnt 90, 2005 CarswellOnt 91, 336 N.R. 199 (note), [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 355 (S.C.C.) — referred to Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank (2007), 43 C.P.C. (6th) 10, 2007 ONCA 334, 2007 CarswellOnt 2716, 282 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 32 B.L.R. (4th) 273, 224 O.A.C. 71, 85 O.R. (3d) 321, [2007] O.J. No. 1684 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank (2007), 383 N.R. 381, [2007] 3 S.C.R. xii (note), 2007 CarswellOnt 7420, 2007 CarswellOnt 7421, 248 O.A.C. 396 (note), [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 346 (S.C.C.) — referred to Martel Building Ltd. v. R. (2000), 2000 SCC 60, (sub nom. Martel Building Ltd. v. Canada) [2000] 2 S.C.R. 860, 36 R.P.R. (3d) 175, (sub nom. Martel Building Ltd. v. Canada) 193 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2000 CarswellNat 2678, 2000 CarswellNat 2679, 3 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, 5 C.L.R. (3d) 161, (sub nom. Martel Building Ltd. v. Canada) 262 N.R. 285, 186 F.T.R. 231 (note), [2000] S.C.J. No. 60, REJB 2000-21224 (S.C.C.) — followed Martin v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals PLC (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 6210, 2012 ONSC 2744 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Matoni v. C.B.S. Interactive Multimedia Inc. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 228, [2008] O.J. No. 197 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 227

McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson (1932), [1932] A.C. 562, 37 Com. Cas. 850, 101 L.J.P.C. 119, 147 L.T. 281, [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 (U.K. H.L.) — followed McCracken v. Canadian National Railway (2010), 3 C.P.C. (7th) 81, 2010 C.L.L.C. 210-044, 2010 CarswellOnt 5919, 2010 ONSC 4520, [2010] O.J. No. 3466 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to McCracken v. Canadian National Railway (2012), 21 C.P.C. (7th) 57, 2012 ONCA 445, 2012 CarswellOnt 8010, 100 C.C.E.L. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc. (2010), 88 C.P.C. (6th) 27, 2010 ONSC 1591, 2010 CarswellOnt 1460, [2010] O.J. No. 1057 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc. (2010), 78 C.C.L.T. (3d) 143, 266 O.A.C. 314, 76 B.L.R. (4th) 170, 2010 ONSC 4068, 2010 CarswellOnt 5389, 103 O.R. (3d) 451, [2010] O.J. No. 3183 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc. (2011), 87 C.C.L.T. (3d) 141, 2011 ONSC 5882, 2011 CarswellOnt 11093 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. (1979), 1979 CarswellOnt 148, 23 O.R. (2d) 456, 96 D.L.R. (3d) 113, 5 B.L.R. 284, [1979] O.J. No. 4088 (Ont. H.C.) — considered Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd. (2008), 55 C.C.L.T. (3d) 36, 375 N.R. 81, 293 D.L.R. (4th) 29, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, 2008 CarswellOnt 2824, 2008 CarswellOnt 2825, 2008 SCC 27, 238 O.A.C. 130, 92 O.R. (3d) 799 (note), [2008] S.C.J. No. 27 (S.C.C.) — referred to Nadolny v. Peel (Region) (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 5901, 78 C.P.C. (6th) 252, [2009] O.J. No. 4006 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Nelles v. Ontario (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 448 (note), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 98 N.R. 321, 35 O.A.C. 161, 41 Admin. L.R. 1, 49 C.C.L.T. 217, 37 C.P.C. (2d) 1, 71 C.R. (3d) 358, 42 C.R.R. 1, 1989 Cars- wellOnt 963, 1989 CarswellOnt 415, EYB 1989-67463, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86 (S.C.C.) — considered Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd. (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 53, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 1986 CarswellOnt 965, [1986] O.J. No. 1320 (Ont. H.C.) — considered Nielsen v. Kamloops (City) (1984), [1984] 5 W.W.R. 1, 1984 CarswellBC 476, 66 B.C.L.R. 273, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 54 N.R. 1, 11 Admin. L.R. 1, 29 C.C.L.T. 97, 8 C.L.R. 1, 26 M.P.L.R. 81, 1984 Car- swellBC 821, [1984] S.C.J. No. 29 (S.C.C.) — referred to Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5007, (sub nom. Odhavji Estate v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Force) [1998] O.J. No. 5426 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 181, 3 C.C.L.T. (3d) 226, 2000 CarswellOnt 4742, (sub nom. Odhavji Estate v. Metropolitan Toronto Police Force) 194 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 142 O.A.C. 149, [2000] O.J. No. 4733 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to 228 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse (2003), 19 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, [2004] R.R.A. 1, 233 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 11 Admin. L.R. (4th) 45, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 70 O.R. (3d) 253 (note), 2003 SCC 69, 2003 CarswellOnt 4851, 2003 CarswellOnt 4852, 312 N.R. 305, 180 O.A.C. 201, [2003] S.C.J. No. 74 (S.C.C.) — considered Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fatehi (1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 536, 15 D.L.R. (4th) 132, 56 N.R. 62, 6 O.A.C. 270, 31 C.C.L.T. 1, 31 M.V.R. 301, 1984 CarswellOnt 28, 1984 CarswellOnt 810, [1984] S.C.J. No. 57 (S.C.C.) — referred to Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R. (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 59 N.R. 1, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 12 Admin. L.R. 16, 13 C.R.R. 287, 1985 CarswellNat 151, 1985 CarswellNat 664, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22 (S.C.C.) — considered Oscar Chess Ltd. v. Williams (1957), [1957] 1 W.L.R. 370, [1957] 1 All E.R. 325 (Eng. C.A.) — considered Parker v. Pfizer Canada Inc. (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 7940, 2012 ONSC 3681 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered PDC 3 Ltd. Partnership v. Bregman+Hamann Architects (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 533, 8 C.L.R. (3d) 167, 12 B.L.R. (3d) 215, 2001 CarswellOnt 318, 140 O.A.C. 302, [2001] O.J. No. 422 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Pearson v. Inco Ltd. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2446, 33 C.P.C. (5th) 264, [2002] O.J. No. 2764 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Pearson v. Inco Ltd. (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 557, 6 C.E.L.R. (3d) 117, 183 O.A.C. 168, 44 C.P.C. (5th) 276, [2004] O.J. No. 317 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Pearson v. Inco Ltd. (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6598, 205 O.A.C. 30, 78 O.R. (3d) 641, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 629, 20 C.E.L.R. (3d) 258, 43 R.P.R. (4th) 43, 18 C.P.C. (6th) 77, [2005] O.J. No. 4918 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Peek v. Gurney (1873), L.R. 6 H.L. 377, 22 W.R. 29 (U.K. H.L.) — referred to Peter v. Medtronic Inc. (2007), 50 C.P.C. (6th) 133, 2007 CarswellOnt 7975, [2007] O.J. No. 4828 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Peter v. Medtronic Inc. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 2759, 55 C.P.C. (6th) 242, [2008] O.J. No. 1916 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd./Ford du Canada Lt´ee (2006), 35 C.P.C. (6th) 264, 2006 CarswellOnt 7317, [2006] O.J. No. 4625 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd./Ford du Canada Lt´ee (2008), (sub nom. Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd.) 301 D.L.R. (4th) 610, 65 C.P.C. (6th) 247, 2008 CarswellOnt 6184, (sub nom. Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd.) 242 O.A.C. 209, [2008] O.J. No. 4153 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Queen v. Cognos Inc. (1993), 1993 CarswellOnt 801, 1993 CarswellOnt 972, D.T.E. 93T-198, 45 C.C.E.L. 153, 93 C.L.L.C. 14,019, 99 D.L.R. (4th) 626, Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 229

60 O.A.C. 1, 14 C.C.L.T. (2d) 113, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, 147 N.R. 169, EYB 1993-67486, [1993] S.C.J. No. 3 (S.C.C.) — considered Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. (2000), 4 C.C.L.T. (3d) 132, 2000 CarswellOnt 4613, 51 O.R. (3d) 603, [2000] O.J. No. 4597 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Rentway Canada Ltd./Lt´ee v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd. (1989), 16 M.V.R. (2d) 86, 49 C.C.L.T. 150, 1989 CarswellOnt 23, [1989] O.J. No. 786 (Ont. H.C.) — distinguished Rentway Canada Ltd./Lt´ee v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd. (1994), 1994 CarswellOnt 2790, [1994] O.J. No. 50 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works (1973), 1973 CarswellBC 191, [1974] S.C.R. 1189, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 692, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, 1973 Car- swellBC 269, [1973] S.C.J. No. 126 (S.C.C.) — considered Robinson v. Medtronic Inc. (2009), 80 C.P.C. (6th) 87, 2009 CarswellOnt 6337, [2009] O.J. No. 4366 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Rumley v. British Columbia (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 9 C.P.C. (5th) 1, [2001] 11 W.W.R. 207, 157 B.C.A.C. 1, 256 W.A.C. 1, 275 N.R. 342, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 39, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184, 2001 SCC 69, 2001 CarswellBC 2166, 2001 CarswellBC 2167, 10 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, [2001] A.C.S. No. 39, [2001] S.C.J. No. 39, REJB 2001-26160 (S.C.C.) — referred to Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp. (2007), 41 C.P.C. (6th) 329, 2007 NSCA 70, 2007 CarswellNS 257, 61 C.L.R. (3d) 173, 814 A.P.R. 164, 255 N.S.R. (2d) 164, [2007] N.S.J. No. 246 (N.S. C.A.) — considered Sauer v. Canada (Attorney General) (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 3996, 2007 ONCA 454, 31 B.L.R. (4th) 20, 225 O.A.C. 143, 49 C.C.L.T. (3d) 161, [2007] O.J. No. 2443 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Sauer v. Canada (Attorney General) (2008), 256 O.A.C. 391 (note), 2008 Cars- wellOnt 4315, 2008 CarswellOnt 4316, 389 N.R. 393 (note), [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 454, [2007] C.S.C.R. No. 454 (S.C.C.) — referred to Sauer v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture) (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5081, [2008] O.J. No. 3419 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Sauer v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture) (2009), 246 O.A.C. 256, 2009 Cars- wellOnt 680, [2009] O.J. No. 402 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Schick v. Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd. (2011), 10 C.P.C. (7th) 167, 2011 CarswellOnt 24, 2011 ONSC 63, [2011] O.J. No. 17 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Schick v. Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd. (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 2096, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 128, 2011 ONSC 1942, [2011] O.J. No. 1381 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd. (1961), [1962] 1 All E.R. 1, [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 365, [1962] A.C. 446 (U.K. H.L.) — considered 230 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2004), 49 C.P.C. (5th) 283, 2004 Cars- wellOnt 2809, 11 E.T.R. (3d) 226, (sub nom. Serhan (Estate Trustee) v. Johnson & Johnson) 72 O.R. (3d) 296, [2004] O.J. No. 2904 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2004), [2004] O.T.C. 969, 2004 Carswell- Ont 4511, [2004] O.J. No. 4580 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 3705, 28 C.P.C. (6th) 83, (sub nom. Serhan (Trustee of) v. Johnson & Johnson) 85 O.R. (3d) 665, 269 D.L.R. (4th) 279, 213 O.A.C. 298, 24 E.T.R. (3d) 265, [2006] O.J. No. 2421 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (October 16, 2006), Doc. M33963 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 2150, 2007 CarswellOnt 2151, [2007] 1 S.C.R. x (note), (sub nom. Johnson & Johnson v. Serhan) 369 N.R. 397 (note), (sub nom. Johnson & Johnson v. Serhan) 234 O.A.C. 398 (note), [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 494 (S.C.C.) — referred to Silber v. DDJ High Yield Fund (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 3784, 20 B.L.R. (4th) 134, 24 E.T.R. (3d) 211, [2006] O.J. No. 2503 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Silver v. Imax Corp. (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7873, 86 C.P.C. (6th) 273, [2009] O.J. No. 5585 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Sorensen v. Kaye Holdings Ltd. (1979), 14 B.C.L.R. 204, 1979 CarswellBC 242, [1979] 6 W.W.R. 193 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. (1972), [1972] 3 All E.R. 557, [1973] Q.B. 27 (Eng. C.A.) — considered Syncrude Canada Ltd. v. Hunter Engineering Co. (1989), (sub nom. Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Can. Ltd.) 92 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Can. Ltd.) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426, (sub nom. Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Can. Ltd.) [1989] 3 W.W.R. 385, (sub nom. Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Can. Ltd.) 57 D.L.R. (4th) 321, (sub nom. Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Can. Ltd.) 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 1989 CarswellBC 37, 1989 CarswellBC 703, [1989] S.C.J. No. 23, EYB 1989-66979 (S.C.C.) — referred to Taub v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 379, 1998 Cars- wellOnt 5216, [1998] O.J. No. 2694 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to Taub v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 576, 1999 Cars- wellOnt 1803, [1999] O.J. No. 5737 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General) (2012), 2012 ONCA 479, 2012 Carswell- Ont 8820 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Temelini v. Ontario Provincial Police Commissioner (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 664, 38 O.A.C. 270, 1990 CarswellOnt 759, [1990] O.J. No. 860 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation & Highways) (2010), 397 N.R. 331, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69, 281 B.C.A.C. 245, Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP 231

475 W.A.C. 245, 315 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 2010 CarswellBC 296, 2010 Car- swellBC 297, 2010 SCC 4, 86 C.L.R. (3d) 163, 65 B.L.R. (4th) 1, [2010] 3 W.W.R. 387, 100 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201, [2010] S.C.J. No. 4 (S.C.C.) — followed TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Solar Turbines Inc. (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 4288, [1998] O.J. No. 3594 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4673, 64 C.P.C. (6th) 136, [2008] O.J. No. 3070 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton (2001), (sub nom. Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Bennett Jones Verchere) 201 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [2002] 1 W.W.R. 1, 286 A.R. 201, 253 W.A.C. 201, 8 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 94 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 272 N.R. 135, 2001 SCC 46, 2001 Carswell- Alta 884, 2001 CarswellAlta 885, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, [2000] S.C.J. No. 63, REJB 2001-25017 (S.C.C.) — referred to Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co. (2002), 156 O.A.C. 201, 35 C.C.L.I. (3d) 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 2002 SCC 18, 2002 CarswellOnt 537, 2002 Carswell- Ont 538, 283 N.R. 1, 20 B.L.R. (3d) 165, [2002] I.L.R. I-4048, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2002] S.C.J. No. 19, REJB 2002-28036 (S.C.C.) — referred to Williams v. Canada (Attorney General) (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 2378, 95 O.R. (3d) 401, 57 M.P.L.R. (4th) 164, 2009 ONCA 378, 66 C.C.L.T. (3d) 193, 249 O.A.C. 150, 70 C.P.C. (6th) 213, 310 D.L.R. (4th) 710, [2009] O.J. No. 1819 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Williams v. Canon Canada Inc. (2011), 2011 ONSC 6571, 2011 CarswellOnt 12407, [2011] O.J. No. 5049 (Ont. S.C.J.) — followed Williams v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 3739, 24 C.C.L.I. (3d) 298, 51 O.R. (3d) 54, [2001] I.L.R. I-3896, [2000] O.J. No. 3821 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co. (1995), 18 C.L.R. (2d) 1, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85, 23 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 43 R.P.R. (2d) 1, [1995] 3 W.W.R. 85, 1995 CarswellMan 19, 176 N.R. 321, 1995 Car- swellMan 249, 74 B.L.R. 1, 50 Con. L.R. 124, 100 Man. R. (2d) 241, 91 W.A.C. 241, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 193, EYB 1995-67138, [1995] S.C.J. No. 2 (S.C.C.) — followed Wuttunee v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. (2009), 2009 SKCA 43, 2009 Carswell- Sask 191, 69 C.P.C. (6th) 60, 324 Sask. R. 210, 451 W.A.C. 210, [2009] 5 W.W.R. 228, [2009] S.J. No. 179 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to Zicherman v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Canada (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 5779, 47 C.C.L.I. (3d) 39, [2000] O.J. No. 5144 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Zicherman v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Canada (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1206, [2003] I.L.R. I-4182, 226 D.L.R. (4th) 131, 47 C.C.L.I. (3d) 60, (sub nom. Williams v. Mutual Life Assurance Co.) [2003] O.J. No. 1161 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to 232 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Zidaric v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd. (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 4611, 5 C.C.L.T. (3d) 61, [2000] O.J. No. 4590 (Ont. S.C.J.) — followed 1176560 Ontario Ltd. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (2002), 28 C.P.C. (5th) 135, 62 O.R. (3d) 535, 2002 CarswellOnt 4272, [2002] O.J. No. 4781 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to 1176560 Ontario Ltd. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 998, 169 O.A.C. 343, 64 O.R. (3d) 42, [2003] O.J. No. 1089 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to 1176560 Ontario Ltd. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (2004), 50 C.P.C. (5th) 25, 184 O.A.C. 298, 70 O.R. (3d) 182, 2004 CarswellOnt 945, [2004] O.J. No. 865 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to 2038724 Ontario Ltd. v. Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corp. (2009), 70 C.P.C. (6th) 27, 2009 CarswellOnt 2533, 96 O.R. (3d) 252, 250 O.A.C. 87, [2009] O.J. No. 1874 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to 2038724 Ontario Ltd. v. Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corp. (2010), 100 O.R. (3d) 721, 87 C.P.C. (6th) 375, 320 D.L.R. (4th) 612, 265 O.A.C. 134, 2010 ONCA 466, 2010 CarswellOnt 4305, [2010] O.J. No. 2683 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to 2038724 Ontario Ltd. v. Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corp. (2011), 417 N.R. 397 (note), 2011 CarswellOnt 499, 2011 CarswellOnt 500, [2011] 1 S.C.R. x (note), 284 O.A.C. 396 (note), [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 348, [2010] C.S.C.R. No. 348 (S.C.C.) — referred to Statutes considered: Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2 Generally — referred to Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Generally — referred to Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 Generally — referred to s. 5(1) — considered s. 5(1)(a) — considered s. 5(1)(b) — considered s. 5(1)(c) — considered s. 5(1)(d) — considered s. 5(1)(e) — considered s. 24 — considered Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 Generally — referred to Pt. VI — referred to s. 36 — considered s. 36(1) — considered s. 52 — considered Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 233

s. 52(1) — considered Consumer Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sched. A Generally — referred to Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 Generally — referred to Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 1 Generally — referred to Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 5 Generally — referred to Rules considered: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 R. 21.01(1)(a) — considered R. 21.01(1)(b) — considered Rules of Practice, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 540 R. 126 — referred to Words and phrases considered: biofilm “Biofilm” are thin sheets of microorganisms including bacteria and sometimes mould. scrud “Scrud” refers to the collection of various types of debris including possible microbial growth. fungi “Fungi”, which include moulds, yeasts, and mushrooms, are microorganisms that [break] down other organic material.

MOTION by plaintiffs for certification of product liability action as class proceeding under s. 5(1) of Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Harvin D. Pitch, Colin P. Stevenson, Bruce W. Lemer, for Plaintiffs Tim Buckley, S. Gordon McKee, Cheryl M. Woodin, for Defendants

Perell J.: A. Introduction and Overview 1 This is a certification motion under s. 5 (1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 in a proposed product liability class action against a manufacturer for pure economic losses. The action is based on concurrent liability in contract, breach of statute, negligence, and waiver of tort. 234 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

2 The Plaintiffs, Vijay Arora, Stacey Jacobs, and Kathleen Oliver, owned front-loading washing machines manufactured by Whirlpool Can- ada LP and Whirlpool Corporation (collectively “Whirlpool”). The Plaintiffs bring their action on behalf of Canadian residents, excluding Québec, who owned a 2001 to 2008 Whirlpool front-loading washing machine or who previously owned the machine. A companion Québec action is proceeding, and a companion action in British Columbia is on hold. 3 The Plaintiffs allege that Whirlpool negligently designed the washing machines and negligently failed to warn of the design defects and the need to take remedial action. The Plaintiffs allege that Whirlpool breached a warranty that the machines are fit for their intended purpose. The Plaintiffs allege that Whirlpool’s failure to disclose the defects is a misrepresentation contrary to s. 52 of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. 4 In the reasons that follow, it will be very important to keep in mind that although a few class members might have claims for damage to property or for personal injuries, the class action is a product liability claim for pure economic losses for an allegedly negligently designed non-dangerous product. 5 The critical allegations in the class action are that: (a) Whirlpool’s washing machines are negligently designed because they do not adequately self-clean and thus are prone to biofilm buildup; i.e., to mould, mildew, and bacteria growing on inaccessible internal parts of the machine; (b) Whirlpool knew about the proclivity of the front-loading washing machines to biofilm buildup but failed to design for an efficient self- cleaning mechanism; (c) the biofilm is odoriferous and sometimes a health hazard and these defects depreciate the fitness and the value of the machine; (d) Whirlpool’s proposed design changes were ineffective and did not solve the odour problem; and (e) Whirlpool’s proposed remedies were ineffective, but Whirlpool used them as a source of income that unjustly enriched Whirlpool. 6 In the run-up to the certification motion, there was a great deal of evidence about the health hazards of bacteria and mould, and this evidence was necessary to understand why the washing machines were allegedly negligently designed and of diminished value, but the health hazards are not the raison d’être of this proposed class action, and thus, for instance, class membership is defined by ownership of the washing machines not by use of or exposure to the machines. Although the epide- Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 235

miological evidence was relevant to the factual background for the claims, it was conceded during argument that this proposed class action is not a class action about a dangerous product or about exposure to disease or illness; it is about a shoddy consumer appliance. 7 Whirlpool resists certification, and it submits that all five criteria for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c.6 are not satisfied; visualize: • First, Whirlpool submits that it is plain and obvious that the plaintiffs do not have a tenable cause of action. (This indeed is the major battlefield for this certification motion.) • Second, Whirlpool challenges the class definition as overbroad and unconnected to a tenable cause of action. • Third, Whirlpool submits that the proposed common issues want for commonality. It submits that the allegation of a design defect has no commonality because during the class period, there were 14 design configurations, differences in instructions to users, changes in washing detergents, and changes in state of knowledge, all of which negate commonality. Because of the numerous models and associated changes, there is, to use counsel’s metaphor, no “golden thread of commonality.” • Fourth, Whirlpool submits that the proposed class action is not the preferable procedure. It submits that a class action adjudicating the design issues would be unmanageable and unproductive for class members and leave any class members interested in pursuing individual claims with disproportionately complex individual issues, including contributory negligence, causation, damages, and limitation periods. • Fifth, Whirlpool submits that the representative plaintiffs do not have claims and do not qualify to be representative plaintiffs and their proposed litigation plan is deficient. Thus, Whirlpool submits that the fifth criterion is also not satisfied. 8 For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the certification motion. 9 In my opinion, although contractual or statutory claims would support a claim for purely economic losses, in the case at bar, it is plain and obvious that there is no tenable contractual or statutory claim to underpin the Plaintiffs’ claims of economic losses. Further, it is plain and obvious that a negligence claim for pure economic losses for a non-dangerous, negligently-designed consumer product is untenable. Therefore, the 236 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Plaintiffs have no cause of action in contract, breach of statute, or tort. And assuming that waiver of tort is a cause of action, there is also no predicate wrongdoing, so the waiver of tort claim is also untenable. Thus, the Plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable cause of action, and their proposed class action should not be certified. 10 Because, there may be an appeal, and on the assumption that I am wrong about the first criterion for certification (the cause of action criterion), for the reasons that follow, assuming there are causes of action, my conclusions about the remaining criteria for certification are: (1) the class definition criterion is satisfied; (2) the common issue criterion is satisfied, but some proposed questions are not certifiable, and some proposed questions require revision or substitution; (3) the preferable procedure criterion is not satisfied for some proposed common questions because of unmanageability, but the preferability criterion is satisfied for the questions that remain; and (4) the representative plaintiff and litigation plan criterion is satisfied, although improvements should be made to the plan. 11 Thus, in addition to the absence of a tenable cause of action against Whirlpool, depending on the configuration of the action, there are other reasons to dismiss this certification motion.

B. Methodology 12 In order to explain my reasons, I shall move back and forth from factual issues, legal issues, and issues of mixed fact and law. I shall draw legal conclusions bearing on certification throughout these reasons. 13 I shall address the cause of action criterion at some length including a detailed discussion about how the court should go about determining whether this criterion has been satisfied. 14 I shall organize these Reasons for Decision under the following headings. • Introduction and Overview • Methodology • Evidentiary Background and Dramatis Personae • The Washing Machines • The Operation of Front-End Loading Washing Machines • Whirlpool’s Front-End Loading Washing Machines • User and Care Guides and Warranties Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 237

• Biofilm (Mould, Mildew, and Bacteria) • Introduction — The Nature of Biofilm • Dr. Wilson’s and Dr. Yang’s Evidence about Biofilm • Dr. Bot’s Evidence about Biofilm • Complaints, Whirlpool’s Biofilm Investigation and Troubleshoot- ing • Troubleshooting Odour from Front-End Loading Machines • The Crosspiece Changes • Background to the Proposed Class Action • Evidentiary Findings and the Certification Criterion • Certification • Introduction • Cause of Action Criterion • The Plain and Obvious Test • The Position of the Parties • Contractual Causes of Action • Statutory Causes of Action • Negligence • Introduction • Negligence and Pure Economic Loss • Duty of Care Analysis — Design Negligence • Waiver of Tort • Identifiable Class • Common Issues • Introduction — Common Issues • Common Issues — Analysis • Background or General Questions • Negligence Questions • Breach of Contract Questions • Competition Act and Misrepresentation Questions • Remedies Questions 238 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

• Preferable Procedure • Introduction — Preferable Procedure • Analysis — Preferable Procedure • Representative Plaintiff and Litigation Plan • Conclusion

C. Evidentiary Background and Dramatis Personae 15 The Plaintiffs are Vijay Arora, Stacey Jacobs, and Kathleen Oliver. 16 The Plaintiffs’ lawyers of record and proposed Class Counsel are the law firms of Stevensons LLP and Bruce W. Lemer Law Corporation, which is counsel in the companion British Columbia class action. 17 “Class” and “Class Members” mean persons resident in Canada other than Qu´ebec who own or previously owned a Washing Machine. “Wash- ing Machine” means Whirlpool Front-Loaders defined in the Statement of Claim. The Amended Amended Amended Statement of Claim identifies Whirlpool’s Duet, Duet HT, and Duet Sport washers, Kenmore washers (HE2, HE2t, HE3, HE3t, HE4t, HE5t) and Maytag Front-Load- ing Automatic Washers. 18 The Defendants are Whirlpool Canada LP and Whirlpool Corporation (collectively “Whirlpool”). 19 The Defendants’ lawyers of record are the law firms of Borden Ladner Gervais LLP and Blake, Cassels & Graydon. 20 The Plaintiffs supported their certification motion with affidavits and reports from Vijay Arora, Stacey Jacobs, Jennifer Lake, Kathleen Oliver, Dr. Raymond Gary Wilson, and Dr. Chin S. Yang, as follows: • The plaintiff Vijay Arora of Brampton, Ontario is an electrical engineer. His affidavits are dated January 6, 2011 and May 6, 2011. He was cross-examined. • The plaintiff Stacey Jacobs of Toronto, Ontario is a private school teacher. Her affidavits are dated January 4, 2011 and April 26, 2011. She was cross-examined. • Jennifer Lake of Oakville, Ontario is an associate with Teplitsky, Colson LLP, counsel for the Plaintiffs. Her affidavits are dated January 6, 2011 and May 18, 2011. • The plaintiff Kathleen Oliver of Burlington, Ontario is a hospital social worker. Her affidavits are dated January 4, 2011 and April 20, 2011. She was cross-examined. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 239

• Dr. Raymond Gary Wilson, Ph.D., P.E. of Clover, South Carolina is a professional engineer, who is on the engineering faculty at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and a consultant under the company name RGW Research and Engineering. He is a former employee of Whirlpool. He was retained by the plaintiffs to provide an expert opinion with respect to front-loading washing machines that were manufactured by Whirlpool. He delivered reports dated December 21, 2010 and November 25, 2011. His affidavits are dated December 23, 2010, May 18, 2011, and Novem- ber 25, 2011. Dr. Wilson was cross-examined. • Dr. Chin S. Yang of Cherry Hill Township, New Jersey is a mi- crobiologist with a specialty in mycology, who is employed as a Scientific and Technical Advisor and Senior Consulting Scientist at Prestige EnviroMicrobiology, Inc. He was retained to provide an expert opinion about biofilm formation. His affidavits are dated December 10, 2010 and December 2, 2011. He delivered a report dated December 9, 2010 and a report dated November 28, 2011. He was cross-examined. 21 Whirlpool resisted the certification motion with affidavits and reports from Richard Conrad, Charles R. Cravens, Warrington Ellacott, Ronald E. Gots, Anthony H. Hardaway, K. Deanna Moore, and Paul M. Taylor, as follows: • Richard J. Conrad of Stevensville, Michigan is the Senior Direc- tor, Top Load Laundry, Product Management at Whirlpool Corpo- ration. His affidavit is dated April 7, 2011. • Charles R. Cravens of St. Joseph, Michigan is the Senior Engi- neering Manager, Materials and Color Laboratory, Fabric Care for Whirlpool Corporation. His affidavit is dated October 13, 2011. • Warrington Ellacott of Orangeville, Ontario is the Senior Manager of Government Relations, North American Region for Whirlpool Canada LP. His affidavit is dated April 8, 2011. • Ronald E. Gots of Rockville, Maryland is a physician and toxicol- ogist with a doctorate in pharmacology, whose speciality is the causality of illness arising from environmental exposures. His affidavit is dated November 7, 2011. • Anthony H. Hardaway of Stevensville, Michigan, now retired, was the Lead Engineer, Advanced Chemistry Technology at 240 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Whirlpool Corporation. His affidavit is dated April 8, 2011. Mr. Hardaway was cross-examined. • K. Deanna Moore of Cleveland, Tennessee is a Senior Project An- alyst at Whirlpool Corporation. Her affidavit is dated April 8, 2011. • Paul M. Taylor of Menlo Park, California is a professional engineer with a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering. He is the Principal Engineer employed by Exponent, an engineering and scientific consulting firm. His affidavit is dated November 1, 2011. 22 Dr. Wilson and Dr. Yang were deponents in a class action in Ohio against Whirlpool. Mr. Hardaway and Mr. Conrad were deponents for Whirlpool in the American proceedings. All were cross-examined. On consent, the cross-examinations from the American proceedings were filed in the Ontario action.

D. The Washing Machines 1. The Operation of Front-End Loading Washing Machines 23 All clothes washing machines clean through a combination of thermal energy (hot water), mechanical energy (agitation or tumbling), and chemical energy (detergent and other laundry additives such as chlorine bleach). 24 Front-loading washing machines are different from conventional top- loading washing machines. A conventional clothes washer uses a top- loading, deep-water wash basket or “drum” that uses up to 159 liters of water and rotates on a vertical axis to create the washing action (agitation) with a spin speed of up to 640 rpm. It has a capacity up to approximately 6.5 kilograms of clothes. The main energy consumption is the use of hot water. The average energy consumption in kilowatt hours per year is 708kWh. 25 A front-loading washing machine uses a front-loading wash drum that uses approximately 64 liters of water and rotates on a horizontal axis to create the washing action (tumbling) with a spin speed of up to 1,200 rpm. It has a capacity of approximately 10.0 kilograms of clothes. A front-loading machine should be used with a concentrated low suds or high-efficiency detergent (“HE detergent”) because of the reduced water volume. HE detergents have, higher levels of soil-suspending agents, and dye inhibitors, and suds suppressors. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 241

26 The washing technique of the top-loading and the front-loading have some similarities and some differences. The major difference is that in a top-loading machine, the soiled clothes are submerged under a mix of water and detergent in the tub and then agitated as the tub moves hori- zontally (around a vertical axis), while in a front-loading machine, the soiled clothes tumble in-and out of the mix of water and detergent as the tub moves vertically like a wheel (around a horizontal axis). After the wash cycle, there is a horizontal drain and spin cycle in a top-loading machine and a vertical drain and spin cycle in a front-loading machine. 27 The design of a front-loading washer makes it substantially more water-efficient and gentler on laundry than a top-loading washer. The front-loading washer is also more energy-efficient because less water is used and heated and because the faster maximum spin speeds pull more moisture out of fabrics, which, in turn, reduces the time and energy needed to dry a load of laundry in a clothes dryer. The average energy consumption for a front-loading machine in kilowatt hours per year is 296kWh. 28 For the purpose of the products liability claims against Whirlpool, a very important point to note is that the design and operation of front-end loading machines means that the self-cleaning capability of the washing machine is less robust and less effective than the self-cleaning capabilities of a top-loading machine. 29 The Plaintiffs submit that, unlike conventional top loading washers that self-clean well, the Whirlpool Machines were negligently designed and do not effectively self-clean. The lesser self-cleaning capacity can be explained in part by the fact that less of the tub is filled with water during the wash cycle of a front-loading washer. 30 The Plaintiffs submit that Whirlpool’s solutions to the biofilm problem associated with the less robust self-clean capability, which include a regular maintenance program and the use of a special chemical tablet called Affresh®, are not solutions and what is required is a design change to enable the Whirlpool washer to adequately self-clean.

2. Whirlpool’s Front-End Loading Washing Machines 31 In late 1998, Whirlpool began to develop the front-end loading technology that became the “Access,” “Horizon” and “Sierra” platforms of its washing machines. 32 In the period 2001 through 2008 Whirlpool Corporation’s foreign subsidiaries, Whirlpool Mexico and Bauknecht Hausgerate GmbH manu- 242 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

factured front-loading washers for distribution and sale to consumers in North America. It is estimated that about 400,000 front-loading washing machines were sold in Canada. 33 The brand names for the machines were Amana®, Kenmore®, Ken- more Elite®, KitchenAid®, Maytag®, and Whirlpool®. The Kenmore® and Kenmore Elite®-brand were manufactured exclusively for Sears Holdings Corporation and its subsidiary Sears, Roebuck and Co. and its affiliate Sears Canada Inc. for resale to customers under Sears’ private brand names. Whirlpool did not manufacture and sell any Amana-brand or Maytag-brand washing machines until it acquired Maytag Corporation in March 2006. 34 In June 2001, Whirlpool began manufacturing and exporting to North America front-loading washing machines to Sears under Sears’ private Kenmore Elite® brand name. 35 In September 2001, Whirlpool began manufacturing front-loading washing machines under the Whirlpool-brand name for its trade customers, which include nationwide and regional retailers, as well as local retailers, builders, contractors and other distributors of Whirlpool-brand appliances. After March 2006, Whirlpool also began manufacturing Maytag®-brand washing machines after it acquired Maytag. 36 For the purposes of the legal analysis that will follow, it is important to note that save for its employees, Whirlpool does not sell washing machines directly to consumers. 37 Whirlpool front-loading washing machines may have different features and designs. The Horizon platform has a smaller capacity, and unlike the Access and Sierra platforms, its wash basket is not horizontal and rather has a 10-degree tilt for easier loading. During the class period, the crosspiece within the models was redesigned and its metallurgy changed to a stronger and more impermeable aluminum with less copper content. In the later years of the class period, the “ribs” (structural rein- forcements) to the tub were moved from the inside to the outside of the tub. 38 Some models included a Sanitary Cycle feature that utilizes a built-in heater to increase water temperatures to kill 99.9% of the biofilm found on the inside of the machine. Some models were programed to include a Maintenance Cycle, and other models included a Clean Washer Cycle to maintain the machine with the advantage over the Maintenance Cycle of the cycle being selectable on the control panel of the machine. Some Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 243

models had a steam feature to enhance sanitization of the clothes and to enhance the Clean Washer cycle. 39 In the early years of the class period the User and Care Guides recom- mended the use of a HE detergent and provided cleaning instructions for the washer door. In 2004, the guide was revised to direct owners to use only HE detergent and the guide included a warning that using regular detergent may result in component failures or noticeable mould or mildew. The Sears guide directed owners to clean the interior of the washer at least once per month by running a cycle with bleach, to reduce or prevent any accumulation of mould or mildew odours and to leave the washer door open between cycles to allow the interior to dry out. 40 The guides gave troubleshooting instructions for odour problems, including instructions to perform the monthly cleaning procedure with bleach to reduce or prevent the accumulation of mould or mildew odours. With the introduction of the pre-programmed Maintenance Cycle, the guides were amended to provide instructions and provided troubleshooting instructions for odour problems including performing the Monthly Maintenance Cycle and leaving the door to the machine open. Additional instructions were added to the guide with the introduction of the Clean Washer Cycle and with the introduction of the steam feature. 41 The following chart describes the front-loading washing machines manufactured by Whirlpool from 2001 to 2008. Washer Models Manufactured by Whirlpool 2001-2008 Model Engineering Features Platform 1.Duet Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite HE3 2. Duet HT Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite Sanitary Cycle HE3t Kenmore Elite HE4t, 3. Duet Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite New crosspiece material HE3 244 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Model Engineering Features Platform 4. Duet HT Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite Sanitary Cycle HE3t New crosspiece material Kenmore Elite HE4t 5. Duet HT Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite Sanitary Cycle HE3t New crosspiece material Kenmore Elite Maintenance Cycle HE4t 6. Duet Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite New crosspiece material HE3 Maintenance Cycle 7. Duet Sport Horizon Horizontal wash basket axis Kenmore HE2 Improved tub drainage Kenmore HE2Plus New crosspiece material and shape Clean Washer Cycle 8. Duet Sport HT Horizon Horizontal wash basket axis Kenmore HE2t Sanitary Cycle Improved Tub Drainage New crosspiece material and shape Clean Washer Cycle 9. Duet Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite New crosspiece material HE3 Clean Washer Cycle 10. Duet HT Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite Sanitary Cycle HE5t New crosspiece material Clean Washer Cycle 11. Duet Steam Access 10° tilt in wash basket axis Kenmore Elite New crosspiece material HE3t Sanitize water temperature Kenmore Elite Clean washer cycle with HE5t Steam steam Steam Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 245

Model Engineering Features Platform 12. Duet Sierra 10° tilt in wash basket axis New rear tub design New crosspiece shape Clean Washer Cycle 13. Duet HT Sierra 10° tilt in wash basket axis New rear tub design New crosspiece shape Sanitary Cycle Clean Washer Cycle 14. Duet Steam Sierra New rear tub design Sanitize water temperature Clean washer cycle with stam Steam 42 From September 1, 2001 through December 31, 2008, Whirlpool sold approximately 246,786 Whirlpool Access-platform washers to trade customers. From 2006 through 2008, Whirlpool sold approximately 24,494 Maytag Access-platform washers. 43 From March 1, 2006, through December 31, 2008, Whirlpool sold approximately 132,952 Whirlpool Horizon-platform washers to trade customers. During the period 2007 and 2008, Whirlpool sold approximately 19,895 Maytag Horizon-platform washers to trade customers. 44 From May 1, 2007, through December 31, 2008, Whirlpool sold approximately 12,184 Sierra-platform washers to trade customers. In 2008, Whirlpool sold approximately 4,932 Maytag Sierra-platform washers to trade customers.

3. User and Care Guides and Warranties 45 Sears and Sears Canada provide the written warranties for the Ken- more-brand appliances. Sears and Sears Canada are not parties to this action. 46 During the period from 2001 to 2008, Whirlpool included a warranty in the User and Care Guides provided with the washing machine. There were four versions of the warranty. There were three Whirlpool warranties and the Maytag warranty. 47 The first Whirlpool warranty was used from 2001 to 2006. The second version was used from 2006 to 2008. The third version was used 246 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

from 2007 to 2008. Thus, the first Whirlpool warranty was used from 2001 to 2005. The first and second warranties were used in 2006 depending on what model was purchased, and the second and third warranties were used in 2007 and 2008 depending on what model was purchased. The Maytag warranty was used from 2006 to 2008. 48 The first Whirlpool is perhaps the most favourable for consumers, but it is a quite limited warranty. The “One-Year Full Warranty” applied only when the washer was operated and maintained according to instructions, and Whirlpool agreed only to pay for replacement parts and repair labour costs to correct defects in materials or workmanship with the service provided by a Whirlpool designated service company. There was a second year limited warranty on electronic control boards. There was a second through fifth year limited warranty for the top, drive system belt, and pulleys, if defective in materials or workmanship. There was a life- time limited warranty for the stainless steel wash drum if defective in materials or workmanship. The warranty provided that Whirlpool was not liable for incidental or consequential damages but noted that some provinces do not allow the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages. 49 The second and third warranty was a limited one year warranty as follows, with the underlined words in the second but not the third version: For one year from the date of purchase, when this washer is operated and maintained according to instructions attached to or furnished with the product, Whirlpool Corporation or Whirlpool Canada LP (hereafter “Whirlpool”) will pay for Factory Specified Parts and repair labor to correct defects in materials or workmanship. Service must be provided by a Whirlpool designated service company. This limited warranty applies only when the major appliance is used in the country in which it was purchased. 50 The second and third warranty contained a disclaimer of implied warranties and limitation of remedies as follows: DISCLAIMER OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES; LIMITATION OF REMEDIES Customer’s sole and exclusive remedy under this limited warranty shall be product repair as provided herein. Implied warranties, including warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose are limited to one year or the shortest period allowed by law. Whirlpool shall not be liable for incidental or consequential damages. Some states and provinces do not allow the exclusion or limitation of Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 247

incidental or consequential damages or limitations on the duration of implied warranties or merchantability or fitness, so these exclusions or limitation may not apply to you. This Warranty gives you specific legal rights and you may also have other rights, which vary from state to state or province to province.

E. Biofilm (Mould, Mildew, and Bacteria) 1. Introduction — The Nature of Biofilm 51 “Biofilm” are thin sheets of microorganisms including bacteria and sometimes mould. “Scrud” refers to the collection of various types of debris including possible microbial growth. 52 Bacteria are microorganisms that are ubiquitous. Bacteria are found throughout homes, transported by humans and pets. Bacteria grow on many surfaces, such as cutting boards, and in sink traps, showers, air conditioner condensate pans, automobile air conditioners, humidifiers, and dehumidifiers, etc., and they may grow in well water and supplied public water. 53 Some bacteria are good and essential for life; for example, billions of bacteria are in the intestinal tract and are needed for digestion of food and the absorption of nutrients. Some bacteria are bad and cause illness and disease some of them being fatal diseases. Among the notorious infectious bacteria are tuberculosis, salmonella, listeria monocyctogenes, and legionella pneumophila. 54 “Fungi,” which include moulds, yeasts, and mushrooms, are microorganisms that brake down other organic material. Like bacteria, some fungi are good and others are bad. Some are used to make foodstuffs including cheese and beer. Some fungi are health hazards. 55 A fungus has a nucleus, it requires nitrogen and carbon, and it repro- duces by means of spores. It is estimated that there may be 1.5 million fungal species that exist naturally in air, soil, and water. Without inten- tionally sterilizing and sealing an environment, a “mould-free” indoor environment is not possible. 56 All moulds detected indoors have an outdoor source, and the level and type of mould depends on climate, geography, and favourable growth conditions, which indoors include elevated humility, water, and an available nutrient source. Moulds are introduced into the indoor environment through windows and doors, ventilation systems, by shoes and clothing, and by pets. Concentrations of moulds and mould spores may be floating about in the indoor ambient air and settle in the dust. Activi- 248 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

ties such as cleaning, dusting, vacuuming, vegetable peeling, the presence of plants and pets all influence mould levels. 57 Moulds can cause allergic reactions, mild irritant effects to the eyes or nose, rarely infections in immune-compromised individuals, and toxicological effects, which are associated with ingestion of mould-contaminated materials. Allergic effects are primarily respiratory, including asthma, and in very rare cases, hypersensitivity pneumonitis. 58 The Plaintiffs’ proposed class action is built on the proposition that the Whirlpool front-end loading washing machines have a design defect that makes the machines unnecessarily prone to biofilm buildup. 59 Whirlpool denies any design defect. It would attribute the presence of biofilm in its front-loading washing machines to individual circumstances where consumers do not operate the washing machines as recom- mended. Whirlpool also asserts that it addressed any biofilm problems by several design changes and that any remaining problems with biofilm buildup are idiosyncratic and not common problems.

2. Dr. Wilson’s and Dr. Yang’s Evidence about Biofilm 60 Dr. Wilson took apart and analyzed some Whirlpool washing machines built between 2002 and 2008. He also examined reports from the examination of the machines of the Plaintiffs and that of another proposed class member. 61 Dr. Wilson opines that biofilm (mould, mildew and bacteria) in the Whirlpool front-loading washing machines is present because of a fundamental design defect; namely, the front-loading machines were not designed to adequately self-clean by the end of a wash cycle. To quote excerpts from Dr. Wilson’s Expert Report on Whirlpool Front-Loading Washer, December 21, 2010: In the case of the ACCESS and HORIZON products that were evaluated... they uniformly fail to self-clean which often leads to severe odour not only from the washer itself but also from the clothes and towels that have been washed in the machines. Since the ACCESS and HORIZON do not adequately self-clean, the by-products from the wash process (lint, suds, fabric softener, soils of all types, and flakes of skin, body oils, and hair) remain trapped in the washer. The warm moist environment inside the washer along with the debris mentioned above provide an ideal environment for the growth of mould and bacteria which feed on the debris and produce Biofilm and a foul odour. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 249

The odour is a symptom of the actual problem which is, the machines uniformly fail to self-clean. Therefore bacteria and mould begin to feed on the by-products of the washing machine process producing Biofilm which eventually produces the offensive odour. [T]he ACCESS and HORIZON do not adequately clean or rinse the following components and areas: the tub walls, especially the back of the tub; the aluminum bracket that attaches to the basket; the sump area; the pump strainer and drain hose; the door gasket area; the air vent duct; the detergent dispenser duct. The deep cavities and ribs [of the water tub] all help to strengthen the tub so that it can support the basket. However, the cavities and structure are on the water side and in locations where rinse water cannot adequately reach the cavities to flush them out.... The design of deep cavities on the water side of the tub is, in my opinion, a gross technical design error and should never have gone into production but once in production should have been given the highest priority for redesign. The heavy cast aluminum bracket (or cross brace) that is attached to the back of the basket has cavities which cannot be rinsed out to prevent the collection of material similar to that of the back wall of the tub. Even with the spinning motion of the bracket severe amounts of debris still collect on it.... This in combination with doses of chlorine bleach may create the potential for structural failure in the forms of cracks in the cross brace..... It is my opinion that Whirlpool should have known from the beginning that the bracket would be a severe collection point for the by-products of the wash process and that the build-up of Biofilm would result in foul odours and could also result in potential structural failure of the bracket. Uniformly inherent in the design of these machines are areas, such as the cavities in the tub back wall and the basket bracket, where rinse water cannot adequately reach. These are design features that are manufactured into every ACCESS and HORIZON... and therefore the problem is systemic and applies to all of the machines that were produced from 2002 to 2008. Newer models of the ACCESS and HORIZON have some design modifications, such as ribs and cavities on the ACCESS tub which have moved to the back side of the tub out of contact with the wash water. The basket brackets of the ACCESS and HORIZON have been redesigned to reduce collection points. In addition, consumer instructions for cleaning processes and special cleaning cycles have been added to the washers. Whirlpool has also made special cleaning tablets available. It is in my opinion that consumers with ACCESS or 250 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

HORIZON models from the time period that was evaluated (2002) do not have solutions available to resolve or eliminate the contain- ments and the resulting odour. 62 Doctors Wilson and Yang opine that chemical washes such as bleach and specialized washing machine cleaners, such as Whirlpool’s, Af- fresh®, might remove some of the residue and buildup of biofilm, but the remainder will rapidly repopulate the machine. They opined that because of the front-loading machines’ design the chemical cleaner would not reach all of the affected portions of the machine and thus there was no way to permanently or completely eliminate the problem of biofilm without a design change. 63 The Plaintiffs closed the class in 2008 because it was Dr. Wilson’s opinion that adequate design changes to address the biofilm problem were finally implemented at that time.

3. Dr. Bot’s Evidence about Biofilm 64 Dr. Got’s opinion was that since only five percent of the general population are allergic to moulds, it is unlikely that mould exposure connected to the Whirlpool washing machine would have any significant effect and certainly not across the class. Similarly, it was his opinion that infections from moulds are very rare and limited to immunity-compromised individuals. It was his opinion that toxicological effects would not occur from the presence of mould in washing machines. 65 It was Dr. Got’s opinion that chemicals arising from microbials in the indoor environment may produce some odours, but they have never been shown to produce toxicity. There is no precedent for chemicals produced by bacteria or mould in biofilms to cause physical illness and there would be absolutely no commonality from one washing machine to another. It was his opinion that bacteria can cause infections, but bacterial infections caused by the growth in an indoor biofilm would be extraordi- nary and improbable and an intense individual investigation would be needed to determine the susceptibility of the sufferer and to identify the cause of the infection. 66 Dr. Got deposed that odour, as such, is not a health hazard. Some dangerous things smell; others are odourless. There is no direct relationship between smell and toxicology. 67 Dr. Got saw little likelihood of any actual exposure to biological agents by the user because the biofilm, if any, would be located in the Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 251

interior of the washing machine. The smell might escape but not the biological agents. 68 It was Dr. Got’s opinion that the nature and intensity of odour from fungi will depend on what fungi is growing, how much is growing, how long it has been growing, where it is growing, and what its food sources are. Some biofilms are odourless. 69 In Dr. Got’s opinion, neither the amount, if any, nor nature of the organisms in biofilm growing in a washing machine will be common from machine to machine. The nature and amount of biofilm, if any, would depend upon the model and design of the machine, the frequency of use, what is washed, whether or not bleach is used and how frequently, water temperature, whether or not disinfectant tablets are used, whether or not the door remains open after use, and the location of the machine.

F. Complaints, Whirlpool’s Biofilm Investigation and Troubleshooting 1. Troubleshooting Odour from Front-End Loading Washing Machines 70 From the introduction of its front-end loading machines, Whirlpool’s Use and Care Guides, which came with the washers, instructed consumers about the use and care of the washers, including the use of low-sud- sing, high-efficiency detergent (“HE detergent”) and the need to periodically clean the washing machines. 71 Beginning in September 2003, Whirlpool began to receive complaints associated with service calls about odour, mould, or mildew. In late 2003 and early 2004, Whirlpool’s Customer Experience Center began to receive an average of two to three North American customer complaints per day about musty odours or mould in Whirlpool Access washers. This was a complaint rate of less than two-tenths of one percent, but Whirl- pool decided to investigate the matter. 72 In 2004, Whirlpool received information from consumers, service technicians, trade customers, and other sources, such as The Procter & Gamble Company that some consumers were not using HE detergent in their Access washers. 73 In response to this situation, Whirlpool prepared a one-page “Leave Behind Sheet” for consumers and sales associates emphasizing why “Customers Should use High Efficiency Detergents for Calypso and 252 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Duet washers,” to obtain the best cleaning performance and to avoid performance problems with the washers. The “Leave Behind Sheet” emphasized that HE detergent should be used by the consumer to avoid performance problems in Duet washers, including “[d]etergent residues” and “[m]achine odour due to residues.” 74 In April 2004, Mr. Hardaway was asked to lead an engineering project team of 13 personnel, which became known as the “Biofilm Project Team,” to investigate and identify the causes of the mould and malodour complaints, and to recommend machine design, manufacturing, literature, or service protocol changes that Whirlpool could implement to reduce the complaints. 75 By December 2004, the Biofilm Project identified several factors that could contribute to possible mould or malodours including owners’ use of regular detergents; using too much detergent; increasing use of cold- water washes; use of liquid fabric softener; decreasing use of chlorine bleach; keeping the washer door closed between uses; failing to remove and clean the detergent dispenser periodically; and failing to inspect and clean the rubber door seal periodically. There also were environmental factors in some consumers’ homes, such as soft water, pre-existing mould colonies in a basement laundry area, and a relatively warm and humid climate. 76 In December 2004, Whirlpool and Sears added new HE detergent instructions, as well as the “HE detergent” logo to the User and Care Guides’ cover page. The following instruction was repeated several times in the revised guides: Using regular detergent will likely result in washer errors, longer cycle times, reduced rinsing performance, and may result in component failures and noticeable Mould or mildew. HE detergents are made to produce the right amount of suds for the best performance. Follow the manufacturer’s instructions to determine the amount of detergent to use. 77 In February 2005, as a result of a letter that Mr. Conrad of Whirlpool had written in November 2004, to Consumers Union, the publisher of Consumer Reports. Consumer Reports Canada printed an article that stressed the importance of using HE detergent and stated that “[n]umerous readers have reported that their front-loading washers developed mould or a musty smell. Using chlorine bleach occasionally and leaving the door ajar should help.” Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 253

78 In July 2005, Whirlpool changed the design of its Access washers to include a pre-programmed washer “Maintenance Cycle” or “Cleaning Cycle” that enabled consumers to clean the inside of their Access washers, using chlorine bleach, no laundry, a higher water volume, and more mechanical action than the machines used in a normal wash cycle. When Sears launched its Kenmore Horizon models in 2005, all of these machines also included the pre-programmed washer Maintenance Cycle. 79 With the introduction of the Cleaning Cycle, the Users’ Guides were revised. The troubleshooting sections of the guides included instructions for avoiding and remediating “washer odour,” including use of HE detergent and leaving “the door open to allow the washer to dry between uses.” 80 All Whirlpool and Maytag Horizon models, from 2006 and all of the Whirlpool Sierra models from 2007 included a Clean Washer cycle on the control panel and the User and Care Guide instructed the consumer about the use of the cycle. Whirlpool also explained the new Clean Washer cycle in its marketing literature that was made available to consumers. 81 In September 2007, Whirlpool launched its Access washers with a steam feature to enhance the Clean Washer cycle. The control panels for the steam washers include a “Clean Washer Reminder” light that illumi- nates after 30 wash cycles to remind the consumer to run the Clean Washer cycle. 82 Also in September 2007, Whirlpool began selling Affresh® Washer Cleaner. This product was specifically designed to clean residues from surfaces inside of washing machines. Whirlpool included one free sam- ple of Affresh® in new washers. 83 Whirlpool modified its guides for Whirlpool and Maytag Access, Si- erra, and Horizon washers to instruct consumers to run a monthly Clean Washer cycle with either one Affresh® tablet or with liquid chlorine bleach. Affresh® costs between $5.99 and $9.99 for a three-month supply. 84 Since at least October 2007, Whirlpool’s North American website for consumers, www.whirlpool.com, has included information about the potential for mould and associated odours to develop in washing machines, including Whirlpool’s front-loading washing machines. The information indicates that odours may develop if consumers do not follow proper use and care procedures, including using only HE detergent, leaving the door open between uses, and regularly cleaning and maintaining the washer. 254 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

85 The Plaintiffs submit that consumers were never adequately informed about the biofilm problem. They submit that the owner’s User and Care Guides are unpacked after delivery of the washer and although the manu- als were revised to include reference to the cleanout cycle, they never refer to the mould, mildew and bacteria problems as being the explanation for the need for the Clean Washer cycle. In addition, they submit that a consumer was not told that the wash cycle would not reach inaccessible areas within the washing machine and therefore, the machines did not effectively self-clean. 86 In August 2008, Whirlpool launched a new Affresh® Washer Cleaner Kit. Its marketing information included statements about the potential for residue, mould, and associated odours to develop in HE washers, as well as, the steps consumers could take to prevent the accumulation of odour- causing residues. 87 Whirlpool also worked with the detergent manufacturers and their industry association, The Soap and Detergent Association, to develop and publish both a written and electronic brochure for consumers. The Asso- ciation’s brochure informed consumers that excess suds can lead to residue buildup since they are not as easily rinsed away — and over time, this buildup could lead to unpleasant odours, potential machine malfunc- tions, or damage. The brochure indicated that over time soils may accu- mulate in the HE washer and lead to the growth of bacteria and mould — and create odours in the washer and that these potential problems can usually be avoided by using an HE detergent and by running a regular maintenance cycle. 88 Whirlpool deposed that several of its design changes were implemented for the specific purpose of controlling the development of biofilm, and it asserted that the available empirical data from the field show that those design changes were effective in reducing the rate of biofilm-related complaints and service calls. 89 Whirlpool admitted that the following design changes were made to address the mould, mildew, bacteria and odour concerns: (a) late 2004 to July 2005, the ribs in the Horizon platform were tilted at an angle to reduce water pooling; (b) late 2004 and early 2005, copper content of the cross piece in the new Horizon model was reduced and the piece was redesigned to reduce the risk and rate of corrosion by eliminating water pooling areas; (c) 2005, copper content of the Access platform aluminum cross piece was reduced; (d) July 2005, Access platform machines introduced the Clean Washer cycle; (e) 2006, Clean Washer cycle added to Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 255

control panel; (f) September, 2007, a steam feature was added to the Ac- cess machine; and (g) 2009, Access machines were modified to eliminate water pooling sites. 90 Dr. Wilson’s opinion was that none of the designed changes were adequate to address the design deficiency which was that the front-loading machines do not adequately self-clean.

2. The Crosspiece Changes 91 In 2004, as part of Whirlpool’s biofilm engineering investigation, it examined Access-platform washers that were subject to an odour complaint. A very small number of these washers had aluminum crosspieces that exhibited biofilm-related intergranular corrosion. Whirlpool concluded that it was possible, though very unlikely, for very heavy biofilm contamination to build-up on an Access washer’s crosspiece under certain rare usage conditions, especially the use of regular detergents, the use of mostly cold-water wash cycles, and leaving the washer’s door closed between wash cycles, which prevented the machine from drying out between uses. This contamination could cause biologically-induced intergranular corrosion of type 383 aluminum alloy. 92 Whirlpool’s investigations indicated that crosspiece cracking, including cracking due to potential intergranular-corrosion-induced failure of the type 383 alloy crosspiece, did not present a safety hazard or danger to consumers. A crosspiece cracking failure would cause the machine to stop working without posing a threat of personal injury. 93 In June 2005, Whirlpool made a design change to the Access-platform’s crosspiece to change the material to the new 413 alloy. This change reduced the likelihood of biologically-induced intergranular corrosion, as well as, other types of corrosion. The 413 alloy was used in all future front-loading washer models that Whirlpool sold in North America. It was Mr. Craven’s opinion that that the material change was effective in significantly reducing or possibly eliminating the miniscule risk of biologically-induced intergranular corrosion that existed for the 383 alloy components. 94 Whirlpool also changed the geometric design of the crosspieces in the Access-platform washers and used different geometric designs for the Horizon-platform and Sierra-platform washers. The Sierra crosspiece has a different shape than the Horizon crosspiece. The Horizon and Sierra crosspieces shapes, as compared to the original Access platform’s crosspiece, have reduced surface areas where moisture or residue could accu- 256 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

mulate. The Horizon and Sierra crosspiece designs increase water flow and improve rinsing of the crosspiece, and they further limit the growth of biofilm and odour-causing residue on the crosspiece itself. 95 There are no confirmed report of biofilm-related intergranular corrosion in any Access-platform washer that was built after the 2005 design change, nor any reports of intergranular corrosion of any Horizon or Si- erra washer.

G. Background to the Proposed Class Action 96 Mr. Aurora has owned a Whirlpool washing machine since 2004, and in late 2006 he began to notice an odour from the machine. He tried the Clean Wash cycle without success. In 2010, he contacted Whirlpool, and they advised him to use the Affresh® tablets, but since he read on the web that the tablets did not work, he did not use the tablets. 97 In 2007, Mrs. Jacobs purchased her house with a Whirlpool front- loader washing machine. She used HE detergent. In 2007 or early 2008, she noticed an odour from the machine, and took steps to eliminate it, including using Affresh® tablets. The efforts were unsuccessful. She says her clothes were damaged by the odour. In 2010, she replaced the Whirlpool machine with a Miele clothes washing machine. 98 In 2007, Mrs. Oliver purchased a Whirlpool front-loader in 2007. In 2008, she noticed an odour from the machine. She attempted to eliminate the problem including following the recommendations in the manual and hiring a plumber. These efforts were unsuccessful. She says her health was affected, and she had symptoms such as sore throat, runny nose, and headache. In 2010, she replaced the Whirlpool machine with a Samsung washing machine. 99 On June 10, 2010, Mr. Arora commenced an action against Whirlpool pleading alleged design deficiencies in front loading washing machines for model years 2001 through 2008. The Statement of Claim makes an unjust enrichment or waiver of tort claim for $200 million. In the alternative, it claims damages for out-of-pocket expenses to repair the washing machines and the fair replacement value of the machines or the diminution in value of the washing machines. Punitive damages in the amount of $10 million are claimed. 100 In the first iteration of his Statement of Claim, Mr. Arora sued in negligence for defective design and failure to warn, breach of the Con- sumer Protection Act and the Competition Act, and waiver of tort for the Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 257

cost of identifying and repairing the alleged design deficiencies or for the cost of replacing the Whirlpool Front Loaders. 101 In the first version of the Statement of Claim, Mr. Arora alleged that the washing machines were not designed properly to direct water to clean all the surfaces exposed to the water, soap, softener, dirt, and debris and to provide air circulation to allow these surfaces to dry once a wash had ended. 102 In the first version of the Statement of Claim, Mr. Arora did not allege that the washing machines posed a danger to the health and safety of the plaintiffs and the proposed class did not he seek personal injury damages. 103 On December 12, 2010, the Statement of Claim was amended to add Stacey Jacobs and Kathleen Oliver as Plaintiffs. 104 On August 16, 2011, the Statement of Claim was further amended to plead breach of an express contractual or implied warranty at common law or under the Sale of Goods Act to supply the Whirlpool Front Load- ers free from material defects and fit for their intended use. 105 On August 26, 2011, the Statement of Claim was amended to insert an allegation that the Whirlpool Front Loaders pose a “substantial danger to the health and safety” of the Plaintiffs and the class members, and for the first time the Plaintiffs pleaded “personal injury damages”. Paragraph 13 of the pleading alleges: “The corrosion and the scrud create a real and substantial risk to the health and safety of consumers because parts spinning at high speed may break and/or consumers will be exposed to toxins and allergens.” 106 The Plaintiffs plead that they have suffered damages as a result of the defendants’ conduct and the design deficiencies, including out-of-pocket expenses for repairs and replacement parts and the diminution of value of the Whirlpool Front-Loaders. The Plaintiffs submit that damages, being either the “value of the loss of their bargains or the cost of maintenance”, can be assessed either on the basis of documents or through a statistical approach. 107 Shortly before the certification motion, Whirlpool delivered a State- ment of Defence.

H. Evidentiary Findings and the Certification Criterion 108 For certification, the plaintiff in a proposed class proceeding must show “some basis in fact” for each of the certification requirements, 258 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

other than the requirement that the pleading discloses a cause of action: Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), supra at para. 25; Taub v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 379 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 576 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Ernewein v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., [2005] B.C.J. No. 2370 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, (2006), [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 545 (S.C.C.). 109 The class representative must come forward with sufficient evidence to support certification, and the opposing party may respond with evidence of its own to challenge certification: Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) at para. 22. Certifi- cation will be denied if there is an insufficient evidentiary basis for the facts on which the claims of the class members depend: Williams v. Canon Canada Inc., 2011 ONSC 6571 (Ont. S.C.J.); Chadha v. Bayer Inc. (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 22 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 106 (S.C.C.); Ernewein v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., supra; Taub v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., supra. 110 On a certification motion, evidence directed at the merits may be admissible if it also bears on the requirements for certification but, in such cases, the issues are not decided on the basis of a balance of probabilities but rather on that of the applicable much less stringent test of “some basis in fact”: Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), supra at paras. 16-26; Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] O.J. No. 4924 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 50. 111 The evidence on a motion for certification must meet the usual stan- dards for admissibility: Martin v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals PLC, 2012 ONSC 2744 (Ont. S.C.J.); Williams v. Canon Canada Inc., supra; Ernewein v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., supra; Schick v. Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd., 2011 ONSC 63 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para.13. 112 That the plaintiff has shown that there is some basis in fact for a criterion for certification does not end the analysis. The some basis in fact test is applied as a necessary but a sufficient condition for certification. In so far as a criterion is factual, the plaintiff is more favourably treated than is the defendant by the some basis in fact standard. However, all the criteria are issues of mixed fact and law, and the legal and policy side of the class definition, commonality, preferability, and the adequacy of the representative plaintiff are matters of argument and not just facts, although there must be a factual basis for the arguments: McCracken v. Canadian Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 259

National Railway, 2010 ONSC 4520 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 283-301, rev’d on other grounds, 2012 ONCA 445 (Ont. C.A.). 113 In the case at bar, despite Whirlpool’s vociferous attacks on the credi- bility, reliability, and cogency of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses and their evidence, subject to one important caveat or clarification, I am satisfied that there is some basis in fact for each of the certification requirements, other than the requirement that the pleading discloses a cause of action, which requirement is based on assuming that the facts set out in the statement of claim are true. 114 The caveat is that the action that the Plaintiffs ultimately sought to certify as a class action was a product liability action for a non-dangerous product. There is no basis in fact for a class action based on a dangerous product. Indeed, it was conceded during the argument of the certification motion that this motion is about whether a product liability action against the manufacturer of a shoddy non-dangerous product is certifiable as a class action. 115 On the run-up to the certification motion, however, and in their argument in the factum, the Plaintiffs submitted that there was evidence that biofilm presents a health risk making the machines dangerous. They also submitted that there was evidence that the accumulation of biofilm could corrode and crack the aluminum crosspiece, once again, making the washing machine dangerous. 116 However, given the concession made during argument, strictly speaking, it is not necessary to rule on these hotly contested evidentiary dis- putes between the parties that concern the dangers of biofilm. It is also not necessary to rule on whether there is some basis in fact for the certification of this action on the basis of Whirlpool manufacturing a dangerous product. 117 That said, given the extent of the debate leading to the certification motion, I will briefly say that Whirlpool met the high evidentiary standard of showing that the possible cracking of the crosspiece did not pose a danger. If the crosspiece broke, the washing machine simply would stop functioning. There is no basis in fact that the design of the crosspiece made the machine dangerous. 118 As for whether biofilm was potentially dangerous, I have no doubt that it is. I also have no doubt that all of the Whirlpool machines, and all washing machines for that matter, have the potential of being the sites for biofilm growth. However, it does not follow that all Whirlpool machines are actually dangerous. In the main, in washing machines, biofilm is 260 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

odoriferous and unpleasant but not harmful, and often biofilm is neither odoriferous nor pathogenic, and if pathogenic, biofilm only infrequently causes harm because of the idiosyncratic circumstances of the persons exposed to pathogens. 119 Because the case at bar ultimately is about an allegedly shoddy but non-dangerous consumer product, it is not necessary to analyze the certification criteria from the perspective of a proposed class action about a dangerous product. For present purposes, I can simply say that it is doubtful that the case at bar would have been certifiable if it had been advanced as a case about a dangerous product. It was thus sensible for the Plaintiffs ultimately to concede that the case at bar was different from the dangerous goods product liability actions.

I. Certification 1. Introduction 120 Pursuant to s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court shall certify a proceeding as a class proceeding if: (a) the pleadings disclose a cause of action; (b) there is an identifiable class; (c) the claims of the class members raise common issues of fact or law; (d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure; and (e) there is a representative plaintiff who would adequately represent the interests of the class without conflict of interest and who has produced a workable litigation plan. 121 For an action to be certified as a class proceeding, there must be a cause of action shared by an identifiable class from which common issues arise that can be resolved in a fair, efficient, and manageable way that will advance the proceeding and achieve access to justice, judicial economy, and the modification of behaviour of wrongdoers: Sauer v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture), [2008] O.J. No. 3419 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 14, leave to appeal to Div. Ct. refused, [2009] O.J. No. 402 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 122 On a certification motion, the question is not whether the plaintiff’s claims are likely to succeed on the merits, but whether the claims can appropriately be prosecuted as a class proceeding: Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) at para. 16. 123 The test for certification is to be applied in a purposive and generous manner, to give effect to the important goals of class actions — providing access to justice for litigants; promoting the efficient use of judicial Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 261

resources; and sanctioning wrongdoers to encourage behaviour modification: Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (S.C.C.) at paras. 26 to 29; Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) at paras. 15 and 16. 124 The purpose of a certification motion is to determine how the litigation is to proceed and not to address the merits of the plaintiff’s claim; there is to be no preliminary review of the merits of the claim: Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) at paras. 28 to 29. 125 In the case at bar, Whirlpool submitted that all the certification criteria have not been satisfied. Its major challenges were about the cause of action criterion, the common issues criterion, and the preferable procedure criterion. Of these challenges, the most critical issue is whether the Plaintiffs satisfied the cause of action criterion.

2. Cause of Action Criterion I. The Plain and Obvious Test 126 The first criterion for certification is whether the plaintiff’s pleading discloses a cause of action. The “plain and obvious” test for disclosing a cause of action from Hunt v. T & N plc, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.) is used to determine whether a proposed class proceeding discloses a cause of action for the purposes of s. 5 (1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992: Anderson v. Wilson (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 673 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 679, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, (2000), [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 476 (S.C.C.); 1176560 Ontario Ltd. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (2002), 62 O.R. (3d) 535 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 19, leave to appeal granted, (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 42 (Ont. Div. Ct.), aff’d (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 182 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 127 The plain and obvious test derived from what historically was known as a demurrer pleading and what in Ontario was rule 126 of the former Rules of Practice and what is now rule 21.01 (1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 21.01 (1) A party may move before a judge,... (b) to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly. 128 Where a defendant submits that the plaintiff’s pleading does not disclose a reasonable cause or action, to succeed in having the action dis- 262 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

missed, the defendant must show that it is plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot succeed in the claim: Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage & Warehouse Inc. (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (Ont. C.A.). Matters of law that are not fully settled should not be disposed of on a motion to strike: Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage & Warehouse Inc., supra, and the court’s power to strike a claim is exercised only in the clearest cases: Temelini v. Ontario Provincial Police Commissioner (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 664 (Ont. C.A.). 129 In assessing the cause of action or the defence, no evidence is admissible and the court accepts the pleaded allegations of fact as proven, unless they are patently ridiculous or incapable of proof; Inuit Tapirisat of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735 (S.C.C.); Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.); Falloncrest Financial Corp. v. Ontario (1995), 27 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); Folland v. Ontario (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 89 (Ont. C.A.); Canadian Pacific International Freight Services Ltd. v. Starber International Inc. (1992), 44 C.P.R. (3d) 17 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 9. 130 The law must be allowed to evolve, and the novelty of a claim will not militate against a plaintiff: Johnson v. Adamson (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 236 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 64n (S.C.C.). However, a novel claim must have some elements of a cause of action recognized in law and be a reasonably logical and arguable extension of established law: Silver v. Imax Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5585 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 20; Silber v. DDJ High Yield Fund, [2006] O.J. No. 2503 (Ont. S.C.J.). 131 Generally speaking, the case law imposes a very low standard for the demonstration of a cause of action, which is to say that, conversely, it is very difficult for a defendant to show that it is plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot succeed with the claim. 132 The low standard to disclose a reasonable cause of action is emphasized by numerous directives from appellate court that issues that are novel, complex, and important should normally be decided on a full factual record after trial: Leek v. Vaidyanathan, [2011] O.J. No. 200 (Ont. C.A.), para. 3; Haskett v. Trans Union of Canada Inc., [2003] O.J. No. 771 (Ont. C.A.), para. 24; PDC 3 Ltd. Partnership v. Bregman+Hamann Architects, [2001] O.J. No. 422 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 7-12; Anger v. Berkshire Investment Group Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 379 (Ont. C.A.). 133 Thus, in the case at bar, the Plaintiffs were fervent in arguing that the issue of recovery of pure economic losses in negligence required the full Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 263

evidentiary record of a trial or at a minimum the record for a summary judgment motion. The Plaintiffs argued that I should not even undertake a duty of care analysis, which should be done with the evidence of a trial or a motion for summary judgment. 134 However, Whirlpool was equally fervent in arguing that the Plain- tiffs’ claim was not novel, that the Canadian law in this area of negligence had been settled, and the Plaintiffs’ arguments about the need for a more fulsome factual record and about how the law should be allowed to develop and change could not get around the inevitability of the Plain- tiffs’ defeat based on the pleaded allegations. Whirlpool argued that the Plaintiffs’ pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. 135 I found these competing arguments about whether I should even bother to do an analysis of the Plaintiffs’ negligence claim troublesome. 136 I have no difficulty understanding and applying the principle that an action should only be dismissed in the very clearest of cases and that the novelty of a claim should not militate against the plaintiff; however, I find the argument that complex and important issues should only be decided on a full record after trial problematic and an invitation to shirk the court’s obligation under s. 5 (1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. 137 Following the directive complex and important cases of leaving to trial the legal issue of whether the plaintiff has disclosed a reasonable cause of action is problematic because an examination of the cases decided by appellate courts reveals that in motions to strike pleadings for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action, there are three different types of outcome — all reached without a full evidentiary record; namely: (1) the appellate court concludes that it is not plain and obvious that the plaintiff will not succeed in establishing a cause of action at trial; (2), the appellate court concludes that there is a cause of action and the plaintiff may succeed at trial; and (3), the appellate court concludes that it is plain and obvious that the plaintiff has not disclosed a reasonable cause of action. 138 Examples of the first category, the neutral category, where the court defers to trial the determination of whether the test for a duty of care has been satisfied, include the following. In Anger v. Berkshire Investment Group Inc., supra, the Court of Appeal held that it was not plain and obvious that compliance officers at an investment planning firm did not have a duty of care to ensure that the sales force complied with Securities Act regulations. In Sauer v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 454 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused (2008), [2007] 264 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

S.C.C.A. No. 454 (S.C.C.), the Court of Appeal held that it was not plain and obvious that the Government of Canada did not have a duty of care to the cattle industry for negligent regulation of the cattle industry. In Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 479 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the proximity analysis of a duty of care was fact specific and it was not plain and obvious that the Govern- ment of Canada did not have a duty of care in carrying out its duties in regulating manufacturers of medical devices. 139 There are, however, examples of the second category, the positive category, where without a full evidentiary trial record, appellate courts have decided there is a cause of action and the plaintiff may succeed at trial. Thus, in Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85 (S.C.C.), much discussed below, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that there was a product liability claim in negligence for the pure economic loss of the cost of repairing a defective product that posed a danger. 140 There are other examples of the second category. In Nelles v. On- tario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.), reversing the Ontario Court of Ap- peal, on a motion to have an action dismissed on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Attorney General (but not the Crown) was not immune from an action for malicious prosecution. In Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.), rev’g (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 181 (Ont. C.A.), which varied [1998] O.J. No. 5426 (Ont. Gen. Div.), a person fleeing from a bank robbery was fatally shot by police officers, and the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision and held that the tort of misfeasance in public office includes breach of duty and thus the estate of the deceased had a viable action against the police officers who did not co-operate with the Special Investigation Unit’s investigation and the Chief of Police, who under the Police Ser- vices Act is required to ensure that members of the police force carry out their duties in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 141 And, of course, there is the most famous positive category example of all, McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (U.K. H.L.), which is the seminal case of the modern law of negligence, which was decided on a pleadings motion. 142 In my opinion, Haskett v. Trans Union of Canada Inc. supra, is another example of the second category, where the appellate court actually decides that the pleaded cause of action is tenable. The Plaintiffs, how- Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 265

ever, relied on this case only for the proposition that issues that are novel, complex, and important should normally be decided on a full factual record after trial. 143 In Haskett, Mr. Haskett brought a proposed class action on behalf of a class of persons who had been denied credit because of the practice of the defendant credit reporting agencies improperly including inaccurate information in credit reports. Reversing the motions judge, who had held that there was no cause of action in negligence, the Court of Appeal concluded that it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiff had no cause of action. 144 However, it appears to me that in Haskett, the Court actually went further and made affirmative conclusions that there was a viable cause of action. Based solely on an analysis of the pleadings, Justice Feldman for the Court concluded that Mr. Haskett had satisfied the first stage of the test for a duty of care. Then, Justice Feldman went on to the second stage of the analysis and addressed the two policy issues that the credit agencies had advanced to negate a prima facie duty of care; namely, first, the spectre of indeterminate liability and second, the factor that there was a statutory alternative to a tort action. On these two policy issues, she emphatically rejected that there was any problem of indeterminate liability, and then, for four reasons, she concluded that the recourse to alternative legal remedies did not preclude a negligence claim. It was only when she reached the third and fourth reasons that she said that a court should be reluctant to dismiss a claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action based on policy reasons at the motion stage with a full evidentiary record. 145 There are numerous examples of the third category, the negative category, where without waiting for a trial record, appellate courts have declared that it is plain and obvious that a cause of action does not exist. 146 Thus, for example, in Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, (2003), [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 446 (S.C.C.), a case that I will discuss further below, there is the phenomena that on the one hand the Court of Appeal declared that it was not plain and obvious that the claim was untenable as against the manufacturers of the smoke alarms, and on the other hand, the Court of Appeal simultaneously declared that it was plain and obvious that there was no cause of action for pure economic losses against the Underwriters’ Laboratories of Canada (“ULC”), which had certified an allegedly ineffective and unreliable smoke alarm. 266 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

147 There are other examples of an appellate court declaring that there is no cause of action without having the full factual record developed for a motion for summary judgment or at a trial. In Bhadauria v. Seneca College of Applied Arts & Technology, [1981] S.C.J. No. 76 (S.C.C.), reversing the Ontario Court of Appeal, on a motion to have an action dismissed on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, the Supreme Court of Canada held that there was no common law action for racial discrimination in employment opportunity. In Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.), on a motion to strike out a statement of claim for not showing a reasonable cause of action, the Supreme Court of Canada struck out a claim for damages, declaratory relief, and an injunction to enjoin the federal government’s alleged violation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by allowing the United States to test cruise missiles in Canadian air space. In Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.), affirming the Ontario Court of Appeal, on a motion to have an action dismissed on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown (but not the Attorney General) was immune from an action for malicious prosecution. In Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2001 SCC 80 (S.C.C.), affirming a decision of the On- tario Court of Appeal on a motion to strike, the Supreme Court held that the Law Society as the regulator of the legal profession had no private law duty of care to a lawyer’s client to investigate that the lawyer did not misuse his trust account. In Drady v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 ONCA 659 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, (2009), [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 492 (S.C.C.), and Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 ONCA 660 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, (2009), [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 491 (S.C.C.), the Ontario Court of Appeal held that pleadings did not allege a reasonable cause of action in that they did not contain facts capable of establishing that the federal government regulator owed a private law duty of care to the recipients of a medical device. (See also: Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health & Long Term Care) (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d (2007), [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 514 (S.C.C.) and Williams v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 378 (Ont. C.A.). (infectious disease control measures).) In Harris v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc., 2010 ONCA 872 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 85 (S.C.C.), on the appeal of the certification motion, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a proposed class action against a pharmaceutical company that had initiated regulatory patent proceedings for the alleged Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 267

wrongful purpose of delaying the entry of a competitor’s generic drugs into the marketplace for failing to show a reasonable cause of action in tort. In Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada held that tobacco companies did not have a cause of action against the federal government for negligent misrepresentation, failure to warn, and negligent design with respect to the development, manufacturer, and supply of low-tar tobacco products to consumers that caused tobacco-related illnesses and health care costs. In Koubi v. Mazda Canada Inc., 2012 BCCA 310 (B.C. C.A.), the British Colum- bia Court of Appeal decertified a class action and held that a claim for waiver of tort based on the wrongdoing of breaching the Business Prac- tices and Consumer Protection Act or the Sale of Goods Act did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. 148 In D. (B.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Halton (Region), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83 (S.C.C.), the motions judge had decided that it was not necessary to have a full evidentiary record and that it was plain and obvious that social workers at a treatment centre for children did not have a duty of care to the child’s parents but only to the child. With Justice Sharpe dissenting, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the motion judgment and held that a social worker might owe a legal duty of care to the family of the child and, therefore, the matter should proceed to trial. In dissent, Justice Sharpe held that there was no need for a case-specific factual inquiry into the policy issues that negated a duty of care. The Supreme Court restored the motion judge’s decision and agreed with Justice Sharpe’s dissent. In the Supreme Court, writing for the Court, Justice Abella stated at paragraphs 19-21: 19. Both the majority and dissenting reasons acknowledged that imposing such a duty of care would represent a novel duty at law. The benefit of making a determination on a Rule 21 motion about whether such a duty should be recognized, is obvious. If there is no legally recognized duty of care to the family owed by the defendants, there is no legal justification for a protracted and expensive trial. If, on the other hand, such a duty is accepted, a trial is necessary to determine whether, on the facts of this case, that duty has been breached. 20. For the reasons that follow, I agree with the motions judge and with Sharpe J.A. that to recognize such a legal duty to the family of a child in their care, would pose a real risk that a secure treatment centre and its employees would have to compromise their overriding duty to the child. I also agree with Sharpe J.A. that “the duty of care 268 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

pertaining to the relationship between children in need of protection and those who are charged with their care should be clearly defined on a categorical basis, rather than being left in a fluid state to be resolved on a case-by-case basis” (para. 74). 21. I would not, as a result, recognize such a new legal duty. It follows that, in my view it is “plain and obvious” that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action against these defendants. 149 A review of all three categories of cases reveals that in complex and important cases, appellate courts, on pleadings motions, frequently decide whether a cause of action does or does not exist without waiting for a full trial record. 150 The directive or argument that complex and important issues should only be decided on a full record after trial is also troublesome because depending on the legal and policy issues associated with assessing whether a plaintiff has disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the court might not need the assistance of a fuller factual record. In this regard, see Andersen v. St. Jude Medical Inc., 2012 ONSC 3660 (Ont. S.C.J.). That was a products liability class action, in which Justice Lax indicated at paragraphs 576-594 of her reasons that her experience presiding at the trial suggested that resolving the legal issue of whether waiver of tort is a cause of action does not necessarily require a trial. On this point, see also Koubi v. Mazda Canada Inc., at para. 39; Parker v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2012 ONSC 3681 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 108-12. 151 Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the directive from appellate courts that complex and important issues should only be decided on a full record after trial is that it may conflate the operation of a motion to strike for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action under rule 21.01 (b) with a motion to dismiss under rule 21.01 (a). Rule 21.01 (a) states: 21.01 (1) A party may move before a judge, (a) for the determination, before trial, of a question of law raised by a pleading in an action where the determination of the question may dispose of all or part of the action, substantially shorten the trial or result in a substantial saving of costs; or... and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly. 152 Some of the cases that direct that complex and important issues should only be decided on a full record after trial are cases about rule Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 269

21.01(a), where evidence is admissible on consent or with leave, and not necessarily about rule 21.01 (b), where evidence is not admissible. 153 In Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., supra, at paras. 17-25, Chief Justice McLachlin discussed the dynamic that the facts as pleaded are the basis for the examination of whether the plaintiff has disclosed a reasonable cause of action. A motion under rule 21.01 (1)(b) or under s. 5 (1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 is based on assuming the pleaded facts are true and not speculating that the evidence from a trial would elucidate the elements of a cause of action or a defence. In contrast, a motion under rule 21.01 (1)(a) may sometimes be supported by evidence. 154 In Imperial Tobacco, the defendant tobacco manufacturers brought third party claims against the Government of Canada, all of which were eventually dismissed for the failure to show a reasonable cause of action. In the Supreme Court of Canada, the tobacco companies argued that the motion to strike should take into account, not only the facts pleaded, but the possibility that as the case progressed, the evidence would reveal more about Canada’s conduct. At paragraph 23 of her Reasons, The Chief Justice rejected this argument and stated: 23..... This fundamentally misunderstands what a motion to strike is about. It is not about evidence, but the pleadings. The facts pleaded are taken as true. Whether the evidence substantiates the pleaded facts, now or at some future date, is irrelevant to the motion to strike. The judge on the motion to strike cannot consider what evidence ad- duced in the future might or might not show. To require the judge to do so would be to gut the motion to strike of its logic and ultimately render it useless. 155 In Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., the British Columbia Court of Appeal in refusing to dismiss the claim against Canada concluded that evidence was required to establish whether Canada’s alleged misrepresentation was made pursuant to government policy. In the Su- preme Court, the tobacco companies argued that it should be allowed to lead evidence at a trial to show that the government was engaged in oper- ational activities and exposed to liability in negligence. At paragraph 70 of her judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin said that the approach of the British Columbia Court of Appeal and the arguments made by Canada and by the tobacco companies misunderstood the nature of a motion to strike, which by its very nature was not dependent on evidence. She said that the question for the court was assuming the fact pleaded as true, was it plain and obvious that any duty of care would be defeated on the 270 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

ground that the conduct grounding the alleged misrepresentation is a matter of government policy and hence not capable of giving rise to liability in tort. 156 Apart from accepting that the juridical tool of a motion to strike must be used with care and recognizing that the law is not static and unchang- ing, there does not appear to be any red-line or litmus test for following the directive that a judge should not decide a complex and important issue without the benefit of a developed factual record. 157 I believe that the case at bar is one of those cases where the legal issues can be decided based on the jurisprudence and assuming the facts pleaded in the statement of claim have been proven.

II. The Position of the Parties 158 For the purposes of their motion for certification, the Plaintiffs assert four causes of action; namely: (1) contractual causes of action; (2) statutory causes of action; (3) negligence; and (4) waiver of tort. 159 Reserving its right to challenge waiver of tort at a subsequent hearing, Whirlpool submits that it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs have not disclosed a reasonable cause of action. 160 Whirlpool would have challenged the waiver of tort claim as not satisfying the cause of action criterion, but it thought the challenge was not open to it, given the existing case law. See Peter v. Medtronic Inc., [2007] O.J. No. 4828 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal ref’d [2008] O.J. No. 1916 (Ont. Div. Ct.); LeFrancois v. Guidant Corp., [2008] O.J. No. 1397 (Ont. S.C.J.) and [2008] O.J. No. 3459 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal ref’d [2009] O.J. No. 36 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and Lambert v. Guidant Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 1910 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal ref’d [2009] O.J. No. 4464 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Heward v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2007] O.J. No. 404 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff’d [2008] O.J. No. 2610 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Robinson v. Medtronic Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 4366 (Ont. S.C.J.); Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 296 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal granted [2004] O.J. No. 4580 (Ont. Div. Ct.), aff’d (2006), 85 O.R. (3d) 665 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal to C.A. ref’d Oct. 16, 2006 [(October 16, 2006), Doc. M33963 (Ont. C.A.)], leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d (2007), [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 494 (S.C.C.). 161 Thus, Whirlpool prepared for the certification motion knowing that the convention has been to certify waiver of tort claims, on the basis that it is not plain and obvious that the claim is untenable. However, after Whirlpool’s preparation, I released my decision in Parker v. Pfizer Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 271

Canada Inc., 2012 ONSC 3681 (Ont. S.C.J.), where I certified waiver of tort without prejudice to Pfizer Canada bringing a motion to decertify the waiver of tort question. Whirlpool asked that the same approach be applied to the case at bar subject to its arguments that waiver of tort should not be certified on the basis that the claim did not satisfy the other certification criteria. 162 As I will explain in the next following sections of these Reasons for Decision, it is my opinion that the Plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable cause of action on any basis, including waiver of tort.

III. Contractual Causes of Action 163 The Plaintiffs allege that Whirlpool has breached an express warranty or an implied warranty to supply goods free from material defects and fit for their intended use at common law or under the Sale of Goods Act or equivalent legislation in other provinces. This claim and the particulars of it are found in paragraphs 31A and of the Amended Amended Amended Statement of Claim, which state: 31A. Further, the defendants were subject to an express warranty and/or an implied warranty at common law or under the Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1 or equivalent in other provinces) to supply the Whirlpool Front-loaders free from material defects and fit for their intended use. 38A. The defendants breached their express or implied warranty (pleaded in para. 31A) when they supplied the Whirlpool front-loaders because, as pleaded above, these machines were not free from material defects or fit for their intended use. 164 Whirlpool’s argument was three-pronged. First, it submitted that the Plaintiffs had pleaded only a bald allegation of breach of contract and no express warranty was actually pleaded, and, therefore, it was plain and obvious that a breach of contract claim was untenable. 165 The Plaintiffs’ response was that although not expressly pleaded, there were user’s guides that came with the washing machines that contained express warranties. 166 Second, relying on Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd. (1961), [1962] A.C. 446 (U.K. H.L.), Schick v. Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd., [2011] O.J. No. 1381 (Ont. S.C.J.) Whirlpool argued that there was no contract or sale or any privity of contract between Whirlpool and purchasers of Whirlpool machines, and, therefore, there could be no express 272 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

or implied contractual warranties and no foundation for a claim under the Sales of Goods Act upon which to base a claim for an implied warranty. 167 Whirlpool submitted that although the Supreme Court had held in Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108 (S.C.C.) and London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.) that there could be new common law exceptions to the doctrine of privity, the change to the law sought in the case at bar went too far and was a matter for the Legisla- ture. Whirlpool submitted that the case at bar was not like Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp., [1979] O.J. No. 4088 (Ont. H.C.), where a breach of warranty claim was allowed against a manufacturer because, unlike the manufacturer in that case, no representations were made by Whirlpool. 168 Relying on Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 299 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Plaintiffs’ response was that it was not plain and obvious that the doctrine of privity would not be relaxed. 169 Third, and this argument was first made during the hearing of the certification motion, Whirlpool submitted that if there was a warranty, it was plain and obvious that it did not cover design defects and was a limited warranty that precluded inconsistent terms being applied. Whirl- pool’s third argument was that as a matter of contract interpretation, it was plain and obvious that the warranty in the user’s guide did not support the Plaintiffs’ claim. 170 The Plaintiffs’ response was that it was not plain and obvious that Whirlpool’s interpretation of the warranty was correct. 171 My analysis of these competing arguments begins with the observation that there is no expressed warranty at all by Whirlpool to owners of Kenmore washing machines purchased from Sears. These purchasers would have contractual claims against Sears not Whirlpool. Many Ken- more purchasers would not know who manufactured the machine. In my opinion, it is plain and obvious that there are no contractual claims by these class members against Whirlpool. 172 Turning to the purchasers of Whirlpool washing machines, the next observation is that they did receive an express warranty in the user’s guides accompanying the machines. The limited Whirlpool warranty is described above. In my opinion, it is a mere technicality that the Plain- tiffs’ pleading of breach of express and implied warranty is bald. I, therefore, do not agree with the first prong of Whirlpool’s argument. The provisions of the express warranty are available to be interpreted. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 273

173 I also do not agree with Whirlpool’s second argument. In my opinion, although Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. ultimately is quite helpful to Whirlpool’s third argument, it does not support Whirlpool’s second argument; rather, it refutes it. 174 In Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp., Mr. Murray purchased from a dealer in farm machinery a forage harvester that had been manufactured by Sperry Rand. Before purchasing the machine, Mr. Murray carefully read the Sperry Brand brochure and met with a Sperry Rand representative who visited Mr. Murray’s farm. The harvester did not operate at anything like the representations contained in the brochure, and Mr. Murray suc- cessfully sued the distributer and also Sperry Rand for breach of contract and for breach of the implied warranties of fitness for purpose and merchantability found in the Sale of Goods Act. 175 Relying on the classic cases of Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton (1912), [1913] A.C. 30 (U.K. H.L.); Dick Bentley Productions Ltd. v. Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd., [1965] 2 All E.R. 65 (Eng. C.A.); Oscar Chess Ltd. v. Williams, [1957] 1 All E.R. 325 (Eng. C.A.), and Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, [1976] 2 All E.R. 5 (Eng. C.A.), Justice Reid held that an affirmation made with the intention of inducing contractual relations is a collateral warranty and Sperry Reid was liable for damages. Then, applying the doctrine of fundamental breach, Justice Reid held that the express warranty, which stipulated that the seller made no warranty other than the harvester was free from defects in material and workmanship and which express warranty limited the seller’s obligation to repairing or replacing parts, did not apply to exculpate Sperry Rand from liability. 176 For present purposes, I think it can safely be assumed that all purchasers of the Whirlpool washing machines anticipated that there would be a manufacturer’s warranty of some sort. Although, once again, poorly pleaded, the statement of claim, in my opinion, is sufficient to establish there is privity between those class members who purchased a Whirlpool machine (but not those who purchased a Kenmore machine) upon which to base a claim for breach of an express or implied warranty. The User and Care Guides would be sufficient to bring the case in line with the collateral contract or collateral warranty cases cited in Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp.. Thus, Whirlpool’s second argument fails. 177 This brings the analysis to Whirlpool’s third argument, which is supported by Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. In Murray, after Justice Reid held that there was privity between Mr. Murray and Sperry Rand, he rea- 274 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

soned that this finding made it necessary to examine the contract terms, because the contract contained a disclaimer clause. The issue then became a question of the enforcement of exculpatory clauses, but Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. was decided in 1979, when the so-called doctrine of fundamental breach was used to negate exculpatory provisions in a contract. 178 Nowadays, we know that the doctrine of fundamental breach is dead in so far as it would regulate the interpretation of contract terms. See: Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation & Highways), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69 (S.C.C.); Syncrude Canada Ltd. v. Hunter Engineering Co., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426 (S.C.C.). 179 Under Tercon Contractors Ltd., the approach to the enforcement of exculpatory provisions involves a three-stage analysis. In the first stage, the court asks whether, as a matter of interpretation, the clause applies to the circumstances. If the exclusion clause does apply, then, in the second stage, the court asks whether the exclusion clause was unconscionable at the time the contract was made. If the exclusion clause is held to be valid and applicable, in the third stage, the court asks whether the court should refuse to enforce the valid exclusion clause because of the existence of an overriding public policy (proof of which lies on the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the clause) that outweighs the very strong public interest in the enforcement of contracts. 180 Under its warranty in the User and Care Guide, Whirlpool does not cover design defects and it limited its liability to pay for parts and to correct defects in materials or workmanship, and it excluded consequential damages. The second and third versions of the warranty expressly excluded implied warranties. 181 The Plaintiffs do not sue to correct defects in materials or workmanship. They sue because they allege that the Whirlpool machines have a defective design. As a matter of contract interpretation, it is plain and obvious to me that their claim is not covered by the express warranty, that their claim is exculpated by the disclaimer language in the warranty, and there is no overriding public policy reasons (as there might be for a dangerous product) for not enforcing the express terms of the Whirlpool warranty. 182 It is equally plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs cannot imply a term inconsistent with the express terms of the contract. A term will not be implied, if the term would be inconsistent with the existing wording of the contract; the implied term must fit with the existing contract: G. Ford Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 275

Homes Ltd. v. Draft Masonry (York) Co. (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 401 (Ont. C.A.); Fort Frances (Town) v. Boise Cascade Canada Ltd., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 171 (S.C.C.); Catre Industries Ltd. v. Alberta (1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 74 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note) (S.C.C.); M.J.B. Enterprises Ltd. v. Defence Construction (1951) Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 619 (S.C.C.). 183 I, therefore, conclude that it is plain and obvious that there is no express or implied contractual claim against Whirlpool.

IV. Statutory Causes of Action 184 The Plaintiffs allege that Whirlpool breached s. 52 of the Competition Act because it made false and misleading representations. All the alleged misrepresentations are failures to disclose information. It is alleged that Whirlpool failed to disclose that the washing machines: (a) were not free of defects; (b) were not fit for the purpose intended; (c) were designed in a manner which under normal conditions, usage and applications would cause them to degrade prematurely; and (d) were manufactured in a manner which under normal conditions, usage and applications would cause them to degrade prematurely. It is the Plaintiffs’ position that Whirl- pool’s failure to advise consumers of the washing machines’ inability to adequately self-clean constitutes a misrepresentation by omission and that Whirlpool violated ss. 36 and 52 of the Competition Act. 185 The Plaintiffs plead that they relied on the misrepresentation and, but for it, they would not have purchased their washing machines. The Plain- tiffs submit that Whirlpool made the misrepresentations to the public and in so doing breached s. 52 of the Competition Act. Then, the Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to s. 36 of the Act, the defendants are liable to pay damages for the breach of s. 52. The Plaintiffs submit that they and the other Class Members are entitled to recover their full costs of investigation and substantial indemnity costs. 186 Section 52, which is contained in part VI of the Competition Act (Of- fences in Relation to Competition) provides, in part: 52.(1) No person shall, for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the supply or use of a product or for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, any business interest, by any means whatever, knowingly or recklessly make a representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material respect. 276 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

187 Section 52 creates an offence, but it does not create a cause of action. A cause of action is created by s. 36(1), which provides: 36.(1) Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of (a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part VI, or (b) the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court under this Act, may, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover from the person who engaged in the conduct or failed to comply with the order an amount equal to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any additional amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of any investigation in connection with the matter and of proceedings under this section. 188 It is significant to note that in the case at bar, there is no pleaded common express representation. The Plaintiffs, rather, rely upon a representation by omission. 189 However, relying on Williams v. Canon Canada Inc., 2011 ONSC 6571 (Ont. S.C.J.), Matoni v. C.B.S. Interactive Multimedia Inc., [2008] O.J. No. 197 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc., supra, Whirl- pool submits that a claim for misrepresentation by omission must be made in the context of some positive representation having been made and since there is none, they submit that there is no statutory claim. This argument is disputed by the Plaintiffs, who submit that the non-disclosure of material facts may by itself amount to a misrepresentation under the Competition Act. 190 In submitting that silence or the failure to disclose can constitute a misrepresentation, the Plaintiffs rely on a bulletin from the Federal Gov- ernment’s Consumer and Corporate Affairs Department that is quoted in Young and Fraser, Canadian Advertising and Marketing Law, Carswell, looseleaf, page 16, footnote 53. The bulletin states: A misleading representation may also result from the non-disclosure of material facts. A vendor is under no obligation generally to provide information about a product. In some instances, however, silence may be deemed to constitute a representation as to facts which a consumer would be entitled to assume in the absence of some information to the contrary. One example might be a failure to disclose that goods offered for sale in a retail establishment were used and not new. 191 The Plaintiffs also rely on a summary of the elements of misrepresentation under s. 52 of the Competition Act set out by Facey and Assaf, Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 277

Competition and Antitrust Law: Canada and the United States, (3rd ed.) at pp. 396-397. The authors state: Aside from the issues of intent, whether actual harm is necessary, and who may be liable, the three main elements of the general offences are largely the same for Canada and the United States: (1) there must be a representation, omission, or practice; (2) the representation, omission or practice must have been likely to mislead the public- for which the test of the reasonable consumer is employed; and (3) the representation, omission or practice must have been materially misleading... A representation is a presentation of fact- either by words or by conduct- made to induce someone to act. An advertisement is capable of expressing many representations, all of which may seek to communi- cate a primary message in addition to several subsidiary messages. However, it should be noted that a representation need not always be in the form of a statement or other communication. A misrepresentation may be that certain facts are not stated (an omission of material facts). 192 Finally, the Plaintiffs rely on in Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] S.C.J. No. 3 (S.C.C.) for the proposition that non-disclosure can be a misrepresentation. 193 In their reply factum, the Plaintiffs make the rhetorical submission, (rhetorical because it alleges a different misrepresentation by omission than pleaded) that class members would reasonably expect as consumers that the Whirlpool washing machines would operate, as washing machines had operated for decades, without the propensity to develop biofilm scrud and without the need to pay for a maintenance product (Af- fresh®). The Plaintiffs submit that by selling its washing machines without warning consumers about new and previously unknown maintenance requirements, Whirlpool made a misrepresentation under section 52 of the Competition Act. 194 In my opinion, the academic writers and Consumer and Corporate Af- fairs Department got in right and under the law of misrepresentation, in some instances silence may constitute a misrepresentation. Indeed, this is long established law. To be actionable, a representation need not be ver- bal; in addition to words, it may be expressed by gestures, or conduct. In Walters v Morgan, 3 D.F. & J. 718, Chancellor Campbell, in a famous 278 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

quote, stated that a nod, wink, shake of the head or smile could induce the belief in a non-existing fact. 195 In some circumstances, silence is communicative of meaning, but as a general rule, however, silence is not a representation, unless there is a duty of care, a statutory duty to disclose, or a fiduciary duty to speak. There have been inroads to caveat emptor, particularly as a matter of statute and by the law of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, but as a rule, vendors are not obliged to disparage their own products and, as noted by Justices Iacobucci and Major in Martel Building Ltd. v. R., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 860, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.) at para. 66, discussed below, “in many if not most commercial negotiations, an advantageous bargaining position is derived from the industrious generation of information not possessed by the opposite party.” 196 In the context of negotiating a contract, silence or the failure to disclose material facts will not ground an action for misrepresentation because there is no general duty of disclosure between negotiating parties: Peek v. Gurney (1873), L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (U.K. H.L.); Brownlie v. Camp- bell (1880), (1879-80) L.R. 5 App. Cas. 925 (Eng. H.L.); Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. (1931), [1932] A.C. 161 (U.K. H.L.); Sorensen v. Kaye Holdings Ltd., [1979] 6 W.W.R. 193 (B.C. C.A.); Gordelli Management Ltd. v. Turk (1991), 6 O.R. (3d) 521 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Marathon Realty Co. v. Ginsberg (1981), 18 R.P.R. 222 (Ont. H.C.), affd. (1982), 24 R.P.R. 155 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d (1982), 42 N.R. 180 (S.C.C.). 197 As I will discuss in the next section, since the alleged design defect in the washing machines did not make the machines dangerous, it is plain and obvious that Whirlpool was not under an obligation to disparage its own product and disclose the alleged design defect. In my opinion, it had no duty of care to disclose, no fiduciary duty to disclose, and no statutory duty to disclose. It was entitled to remain silent, and in my opinion, it is plain and obvious that it did not commit an offence under s. 52 of the Competition Act. 198 I also agree that Whirlpool was right to rely on Williams v. Canon Canada Inc., 2011 ONSC 6571 (Ont. S.C.J.). This case, which I also rely on, supports Whirlpool’s argument that it is plain and obvious that there is no viable cause of action pursuant to s. 52 of the Competition Act. 199 In Williams, the plaintiffs brought a proposed class action on behalf of purchasers of a digital camera manufactured by Canon Canada. The plaintiffs alleged that the camera had a design defect that caused them to Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 279

shut down. Among other causes of action, the plaintiffs pleaded breach of the Competition Act. They pleaded that Canon Canada had made express misrepresentations about the quality of the camera and also a misrepresentation by not disclosing the defect in the camera to consumers. Justice Strathy found that there was no misrepresentation and, accordingly, there was no claim under s. 52 of the Competition Act. At paragraph 227, Justice Strathy stated: Section 52 requires that there be a “representation.” The failure to disclose the alleged defect cannot be a “representation.” Nor would it be a “representation” if one could infer from the warranty that Canon knew of no inherent defects in the Cameras — an inference that cannot reasonably be drawn in any event. Finally, what the plaintiffs claim is a “slogan” — “You always get your shot” — which is not pleaded with any particularity, is nothing more than puffery and not an actionable representation.... I am simply unable to find that any of the pleaded misrepresentations is capable of sustaining a cause of action. 200 I conclude this section by noting that while I agree with Whirlpool’s submission that there is no tenable cause of action pleaded for breach of the Competition Act, I did not find Matoni v. C.B.S. Interactive Multimedia Inc., supra, and Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc., supra, helpful because from a factual perspective, those cases involved more than silence and non-disclosure. 201 In Matoni, Justice Hoy noted at paragraph 56 of her judgment that the plaintiffs conceded that their pleading of misrepresentation by omission was a subset of the tort of negligent misrepresentation, and thus there would have been a duty to disclose. In Griffin, the Competition Act claim was a bald allegation of misrepresentation lacking in particularity and deficient in material facts. Justice Lax concluded that it was plain and obvious that this claim could not succeed on the pleading, but she granted the plaintiffs leave to amend. I do not grant leave to amend in the case at bar as it would be purposeless.

V. Negligence Introduction 202 As I will explain in the next part of my Reasons for Decision, it is my opinion that it is plain and obvious that there is no product-liability negligence action for pure economic losses against a manufacturer for negligently designing a non-dangerous consumer product. There is settled law 280 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

of the highest authority binding on this court that indicates that the pleading in this case does not show a reasonable cause of action. 203 My conclusion about the non-recovery of pure economic losses in negligence is based on two mutually exclusive lines of argument. The first line of argument is purely jurisprudential, and, by this, I mean that I come to this conclusion by an examination of the case law that has already done the work of analyzing whether the claim is legally tenable. In my opinion, the case law is settled against the Plaintiffs’ claim. If this law is bad law, then it is up to the Legislature or the Supreme Court of Canada to change it. Until that happens, I am bound to apply it. 204 The second line of argument, which I will develop later in these Rea- sons, is based on applying first principles and determining whether a duty of care exists for negligent design of a non-dangerous product. In my opinion, applying the test for a duty of care, it is plain and obvious that a pure economic loss claim in negligence is not available for carelessly designing a non-dangerous product. For the purposes of this analysis, I will treat the Plaintiffs’ claim as being a novel claim or a possible extension of the law. My precise conclusion is that there is a prima facie duty of care, but there are policy reasons that negate a duty of care. 205 The second line of argument is not purely jurisprudential, and, by that, I mean that I come to the conclusion by applying the contemporary Canadian approach to determining whether there is a duty of care. This approach was developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in a series of decisions adapting the House of Lord’s decision in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728 (U.K. H.L.). 206 In the discussion below, I will address the Plaintiffs’ counterarguments that there are cases where the court has held that it is not plain and obvious that a pure economic loss claim of the nature being advanced by them is untenable and that the law is unsettled and developing about the scope of pure economic loss claims in negligence. In this regard, the Plaintiffs relied on: Bondy v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd., [2007] O.J. No. 784 (Ont. S.C.J.); Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2007 NSCA 70 (N.S. C.A.); Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 418 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal to Div. Ct. ref’d, [2009] O.J. No. 3438 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Barwin v. IKO Industries Ltd., 2012 ONSC 3969 (Ont. S.C.J.). 207 I will discuss all of these cases, but my general response to the Plain- tiffs’ counterarguments is the cases relied on by them are distinguishable Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 281

or not binding or wrong because they are inconsistent with higher binding authority.

Negligence and Pure Economic Loss 208 A pure economic loss is a diminution of financial worth incurred without any physical injury to the plaintiff or his or her property: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fatehi, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.), at p. 542. In 1874, in Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co. (1874), L.R. 10 Q.B. 453 (Eng. Q.B.), the English court recognized the general principle that compensation for pure economic losses, losses not connected to personal injury or property damage, are not generally recoverable in negligence. 209 The four policy considerations behind the law’s attitude to pure economic loss were explained by Justices Iacobucci and Major in Martel Building Ltd. v. R., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.) at para. 37, where they stated: 37. Over time, the traditional rule was reconsidered. In Rivtow and subsequent cases it has been recognized that in limited circumstances damages for economic loss absent physical or proprietary harm may be recovered. The circumstances in which such damages have been awarded to date are few. To a large extent, this caution derives from the same policy rationale that supported the traditional approach not to recognize the claim at all. First, economic interests are viewed as less compelling of protection than bodily security or proprietary interests. Second, an unbridled recognition of economic loss raises the spectre of indeterminate liability. Third, economic losses often arise in a commercial context, where they are often an inherent business risk best guarded against by the party on whom they fall through such means as insurance. Finally, allowing the recovery of economic loss through tort has been seen to encourage a multiplicity of inappropriate lawsuits.... 210 The matter of indeterminate liability is a particularly important policy factor. In Design Services Ltd. v. R., 2008 SCC 22 (S.C.C.) at para. 62, Justice Rothstein stated for the Court that “in cases of pure economic loss, to paraphrase Cardozo C.J., care must be taken to find that a duty is recognized only in cases where the class of plaintiffs, the time and the amounts are determinate.” As I will note later, indeterminate liability is not a factor in the immediate case. The other three policy factors mentioned by Justices Iacobucci and Major in Martel Building Ltd., however, are significant. 282 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

211 In 1964, the first major in-road on the general principal denying recovery for pure economic losses in negligence came with Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. (1963), [1964] A.C. 465 (U.K. H.L.), which established the tort of negligent misrepresentation. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to start the analysis of the law about tenable claims in negligence for pure economic losses with the 1974 Su- preme Court of Canada decision in Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 1189 (S.C.C.). 212 In Rivtow, a crane on a barge collapsed killing the crane operator. The charterer of another barge took its barge out of service in the busiest part or the season in order to have its cranes repaired. A majority of the Su- preme Court rejected the charter’s claim for the cost of repairing the defective cranes because it was a purely economic loss. Justice Bora Las- kin, in dissent, would have found the manufacturer liable for the cost of repairing the defective article that posed a danger if it was not repaired. 213 After the Rivtow judgment, the next major development in Canada was perhaps Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 (S.C.C.). This case was not a product liability case but rather concerned what is known as a relational economic loss. For present purposes, there are three significant jurisprudential contributions made by the Supreme Court in the Norsk Pacific case. 214 First, the Supreme Court recognized that there were categorical ex- emptions to the general principle that purely economic losses were not compensable in negligence. In the Norsk Pacific case, for the purposes of analysis, the Court recognized five established categories where recovery for pure economic losses was permitted; namely: (1) negligent misrepresentation; (2) negligence of public authorities; (3) negligent performance of a service; (4) supply of shoddy goods or structures; and (5) relational economic losses. Second, the Court recognized that the categories were not closed, and new exceptions were possible. Third, the Court envi- sioned that a duty of care analysis and principled approach could be used to identify new exceptions to the general principle that pure economic losses were not recoverable in negligence. 215 From an analytical perspective, the case at bar is a shoddy goods or structures case either as a member of the established class or as a novel claim. The current leading case about the recovery of pure economic losses for shoddy products, including building structures, is Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85 (S.C.C.). Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 283

216 The facts of Winnipeg Condominium were that in 1974, Bird Con- struction built an apartment building that came to be purchased by a Winnipeg condominium corporation. In 1989, a section of cladding fell off the building. The condominium corporation retained engineering consultants to inspect, and then the corporation removed and replaced the cladding at a cost in excess of $1.5 million. 217 Reversing the Manitoba Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court refused to follow the decision of the English House of Lords in D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England, [1988] 2 All E.R. 992 (U.K. H.L.), where the Law Lords had ruled that, in the absence of a contractual relationship, the cost of repairing a defective structure, where the defect is discovered before it causes personal injury or physical damage to other property, is not recoverable in negligence by a remote buyer against the original contractor or builder. The English decision was built on caveat emptor and a policy decision about the scope of tort law to the effect that it was not for tort law to create a non-contractual warranty of fitness. 218 Justice La Forest, however, concluded that with respect to a product that was dangerous, there were public policy and legal policy reasons for making the builder or manufacturer of the product liable for the costs of repairing the product before it actually caused harm. The justification for liability and for tort intruding into the realm of contract was that the product was not just shoddy but was dangerous and could cause harm to persons or property. In paragraph 12 of his judgment, Justice La Forest stated, with my emphasis added: 12..... The negligently supplied structure in this case was not merely shoddy; it was dangerous. In my view, this is important because the degree of danger to persons and other property created by the negligent construction of a building is a cornerstone of the policy analysis that must take place in determining whether the cost of repair of the building is recoverable in tort. As I will attempt to show, a distinction can be drawn on a policy level between “dangerous” defects in buildings and merely “shoddy” construction in buildings and that, at least with respect to dangerous defects, compelling policy reasons exist for the imposition upon contractors of tortious liability for the cost of repair of these defects. 219 At paragraph 33 of his judgment, Justice La Forest agreed with Jus- tice Bora Laskin’s opinion in Rivtow Marine Ltd. supra, that although courts must be careful to not provide compensation in tort for safe but 284 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

shoddy products, where the product was unsafe, there should be recovery for the cost (repair cost) of preventing harm. 220 Justice La Forest undertook a duty of care analysis of the responsibilities of a builder and concluded that if a defective product presented “a real and substantial danger” and if the defect was discovered before any injury had occurred, the builder should be liable for the cost of repairing the defect to prevent the danger from materializing. At paragraph 37 of his judgment, he stated: “Allowing recovery against contractors in tort for the cost of repair of dangerous defects thus serves an important pre- ventative function by encouraging socially responsible behaviour.” 221 At paragraph 43 of his judgment, Justice La Forest summarized the current state of the law in Canada. He stated: 43. I conclude that the law in Canada has now progressed to the point where it can be said that contractors (as well as subcontractors, architects and engineers) who take part in the design and construction of a building will owe a duty in tort to subsequent purchasers of the building if it can be shown that it was foreseeable that a failure to take reasonable care in constructing the building would create defects that pose a substantial danger to the health and safety of the occupants. Where negligence is established and such defects manifest themselves before any damage to persons or property occurs, they should, in my view, be liable for the reasonable cost of repairing the defects and putting the building back into a non-dangerous state. 222 Pausing here, it would appear that Justice La Forest was emphatically limiting recovery for pure economic losses for a negligently designed or manufactured product to substantially dangerous products. Dangerous- ness was the cornerstone of the duty of care analysis and a critical pre- condition to liability. Indeed, the defects had to pose “a real and substantial danger.” 223 However, Justice La Forest’s comment earlier in paragraph 41 of his judgment has led some to argue that he was keeping open the prospect that there could be a duty of care for the cost of repairing non-dangerous defects in buildings. In paragraph 41, he stated: 41. Given the clear presence of a real and substantial danger in this case, I do not find it necessary to consider whether contractors should also in principle be held to owe a duty to subsequent purchasers for the cost of repairing non-dangerous defects in buildings. 224 In my opinion, and as supported by the case law that I shall discuss below, it is a mistake to read Justice La Forest’s comment as supporting the proposition that there can be recovery for pure economic losses from Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 285

negligently designed or manufactured products that are not dangerous. And, in my opinion, it is also a mistake to read his statement as supporting the proposition that pure economic claims beyond repair costs or perhaps costs similar to repair costs can be recovered. Justice La Forest’s statement mentions only the cost of repair of a dangerous good as a recoverable head of damage, not economic losses generally. Thus, in the context of the case at bar, there is, in any event, no support here for a head of damages based on the diminishment in value of the washing machines. 225 The reason that it is a mistake to read Justice La Forest’s comment as leaving open the question of recoverability for pure economic losses from non-dangerous products is that before and after paragraph 41, his judgment makes it clear that he was making the comment as a foil to demonstrate that for dangerous goods there were policy issues favouring liability and there were no policy issues that would negate the duty of care for repairing dangerous goods. In contrast, there were significant policy issues that would negate liability for pure economic losses for shoddy but non-dangerous products. 226 For purely economic losses from shoddy products, the established policy was that the responsibility for the quality of a product is primarily contractual in nature and extending responsibility for quality beyond those with whom there was privity was objectionable as it would expose the manufacturer or builder to indeterminate liability. (And I would add, the exposure to liability would also engage the other policy factors identified by Justices Iacobucci and Major in Martel Building Ltd. v. R., supra.) Thus, Justice La Forest stated at paragraphs 48, 49, and 54: 48. The tort duty to construct a building safely is thus a circum- scribed duty that is not parasitic upon any contractual duties between the contractor and the original owner. Seen in this way, no serious risk of indeterminate liability arises with respect to this tort duty. In the first place, there is no risk of liability to an indeterminate class because the potential class of claimants is limited to the very persons for whom the building is constructed: the inhabitants of the building. The fact that the class of claimants may include successors in title who have no contractual relationship with the contractors does not, in my view, render the class of potential claimants indeterminate. As noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Aronsohn v. Mandara, 484 A.2d 675 (1984), at p. 680, “[t]he contractor should not be re- lieved of liability for unworkmanlike construction simply because of 286 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

the fortuity that the property on which he did the construction has changed hands”. 49. Secondly, there is no risk of liability in an indeterminate amount because the amount of liability will always be limited by the reasonable cost of repairing the dangerous defect in the building and restoring that building to a non-dangerous state.... However, in my view, any danger of indeterminacy in damages is averted by the requirement that the defect for which the costs of repair are claimed must constitute a real and substantial danger to the inhabitants of the building, and the fact that the inhabitants of the building can only claim the reasonable cost of repairing the defect and mitigating the danger. The burden of proof will always fall on the plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a serious risk to safety, that the risk was caused by the contractor’s negligence, and that the repairs are required to alleviate the risk. 54. I conclude, then, that no adequate policy considerations exist to negate a contractor’s duty in tort to subsequent purchasers of a building to take reasonable care in constructing the building, and to ensure that the building does not contain defects that pose foreseeable and substantial danger to the health and safety of the occupants. In my view, the Manitoba Court of Appeal erred in deciding that Bird could not, in principle, be held liable in tort to the Condominium Corpora- tion for the reasonable cost of repairing the defects and putting the building back into a non-dangerous state. These costs are recoverable economic loss under the law of tort in Canada. 227 Justice La Forest’s argument was that the legal policies that stood against the recovery of economic losses in negligence were inappropriate or inapplicable when a product was dangerous. His comments reveal that he was indicating that the foundations for a duty of care and also for overcoming any negating policy factors are that the product is dangerous and the manufacturer’s liability is limited to the cost of repairing a product that posed a serious risk to safety. In my opinion, it became settled law that there is not, and for good policy reasons, there should not be, compensation in tort for shoddy but not-dangerous products. 228 That the law is settled about non-dangerous products, which is the law to be applied to the case at bar, however, is not to say that the law about dangerous products is settled. Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., supra, left at least one and perhaps two areas of uncertainty or for further development. The first area of uncertainty is the scope and meaning of a “serious risk to safety.” The second area of uncertainty is what counts for a cost of repair and whether other Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 287

similar economic losses might be recoverable for a negligently manufactured dangerous product. It was because of these areas of uncertainty that the Manitoba Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment dismissing a product liability claim in Brett-Young Seeds Ltd. v. K.B.A. Consultants Inc., 2008 MBCA 36 (Man. C.A.) and said that the issues should be resolved on a fuller factual record. 229 I will return to these themes about areas for development below, when I discuss Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, (2003), [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 446 (S.C.C.) and the cases in the next section of these Rea- sons. For present purposes, I simply make the point that the areas of uncertainty in the law concern dangerous products. 230 In contrast to these areas of uncertainty, in my opinion, it is plain and obvious that for non-dangerous goods, there is no recovery in negligence for pure economic losses, save for a negligent misrepresentation claim, which is a different category for pure economic losses. 231 Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., supra, has been applied in cases binding on me, and these cases and other cases that, technically speaking, may not be binding on me, make it plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs’ negligence claim for pure economic losses for a non-dangerous consumer appliance is legally untenable. As already noted above and as the discussion below will enlarge upon, the main policy reasons for negating a duty of care are the spectre of indeterminate liability and the spectre that liability for the quality of a good is a matter for contract and property law or statute law and the intrusion of tort law would unnecessarily and undesirably interfere with commercial and property law. 232 Provided that the defective product poses a substantial danger, the manufacturer is liable for the pure economic loss of the costs of repair: Ducharme v. Solarium de Paris Inc., [2008] O.J. No. 1558 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd./Ford du Canada Lt´ee, [2006] O.J. No. 4625 (Ont. S.C.J.), affd. [2008] O.J. No. 4153 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Mariani v. Lemstra, [2004] O.J. No. 4283 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2005), [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 355 (S.C.C.); M. Hasegawa & Co. v. Pepsi Bottling Group (Canada) Co., [2002] B.C.J. No. 1125 (B.C. C.A.) (discussed below); Brett-Young Seeds Ltd. v. Assi´e Industries Ltd., 2002 MBCA 74 (Man. C.A.); Zidaric v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd., [2000] O.J. No. 4590 (Ont. S.C.J.); TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Solar Turbines Inc., [1998] O.J. No. 3594 (Ont. Gen. Div.). These cases are 288 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

authority that for product liability negligence there is no compensation for a pure economic loss unless the product is dangerous to persons or property. 233 Mariani v. Lemstra, supra, leave to appeal refused (2005), [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 355 (S.C.C.), is an example of a case binding on me that holds for recovery, the defective product must be dangerous. In this case, the Lemstras built and sold a home to Ms. Mariani. After the closing of the sale, Ms. Mariani discovered that the centre load-bearing wall was structurally unsound and that the building envelope was defective. The defects caused or allowed water penetration that could lead to mould that would make the house uninhabitable. Justice Sharpe in the Court of Ap- peal applied Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36, and at paragraph 26 of his judgment, he stated that a claim for defective construction is a claim for purely economic loss, and recovery under Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 is subject to the caveats that the structure must be dangerous, not merely shoddy, and it is only the cost of repairing the structure and restoring it to a non-dangerous state that is recoverable. 234 Although, as a matter of stare decisis, I am not bound to follow it, I am persuaded by Justice Cumming’s decision in Zidaric v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd., supra. In this case, the plaintiff purchased an allegedly defective laptop computer manufactured by Toshiba from Future Shop, a retail store. The defect in the computer could cause data loss. The defect did not make the computer dangerous. Although, the plaintiff had a claim for breach of contract against Future Shop, he sued the manufacturer Toshiba for negligence in failing to warn consumers as to the defect in the computer. Justice Cumming dismissed the action for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. He reasoned that the claim was for a pure economic loss but that the claim did not come within the principles of Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co. Justice Cumming concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was against the retailer in contract and not the manufacture in tort. In paragraph 11 of his judgment, he stated: 11. A tort is a civil wrong independent of contract. A contractual relationship can be coincidental with a relationship giving rise to a duty of care and potential liability in tort. However, as stated above, apart from the inapplicable exceptional situations, there is not recovery for a pure economic loss under tort law. In the instant situation there is the added element that, in my view, the economic loss is properly characterized as an economic loss arising from an alleged breach of contract. The claimed loss is really a result of the alleged failure of Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 289

the seller to fulfil its contractual promise. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim properly sounds entirely in contract and not in tort. 235 As already noted above, however, the Plaintiffs rely on Bondy v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd., supra; Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., supra; Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc., supra; and Barwin v. IKO Industries Ltd., supra, for the argument that it is not plain and obvious that their claim for pure economic losses is untenable. 236 In Bondy, Toshiba manufactured and sold a notebook computer that did not perform as represented. It would overheat, shut-down, and fail to perform at the anticipated 1.1 GHz processing speed. There was no allegation that the computer was dangerous. The Plaintiffs alleged that Toshiba breached a duty to produce notebooks that were of merchantable quality and fit for their intended purpose of performing in accordance with their stated performance specifications. The Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of s. 52(1) of the Competition Act (Canada). Toshiba moved to have the Plaintiffs’ claim struck out for failing to disclose a case of action and Toshiba submitted that the Plaintiffs’ cause of action was for pure economic loss for shoddy goods. 237 Justice Brockenshire dismissed the Defendant’s motion, and relying on the academic commentary of Justice Allen Linden in Canadian Tort Law, (7th ed.) and on Justice Nordheimer’s comment in Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co., [2002] O.J. No. 2766 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paragraphs 41 and 42 that the possibility exists that claims for repairs in non-dangerous situations may yet be recoverable, Justice Brockenshire concluded at paragraph 15 that “it is not plain and obvious to me that the claim of negligence in design and manufacture, particularly when combined with the alleged claim of negligent misrepresentation, and also combined with the claim of a direct relationship between the manufacturer and customer, cannot succeed.” 238 A close reading of Bondy reveals that it is not helpful to the Plaintiffs. First, as appears, it was Toshiba that characterized the Plaintiffs’ claim as for shoddy non-dangerous goods. Justice Brockenshire’s refusal to strike the claim can be explained as a refusal to accept the defendant’s charac- terization of the plaintiffs’ claim and rather a recognition that the contractual, statutory, and negligent misrepresentation claims of the plaintiffs do admit of claims for pure economic losses. Second, as I have explained above, it is to misread Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 as leaving open a pure economic loss claim for a shoddy non-dangerous 290 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

product and whatever, may have been said in Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co., supra, there is higher authority, like Mariani v. Lemstra, that is binding and that holds the goods must be dangerous for there to be recovery in negligence. 239 An examination of Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co. reveals that it also is not that helpful for the Plaintiffs. Gariepy was a proposed class action against several manufacturers of a raw material used in plastic plumbing pipes that were manufactured by others for use in potable water systems. The pipe manufactured from the defendants’ raw material was prone to leak causing damage to itself and to the homes in which it was being used. The plaintiffs alleged that the various defendants were negligent in failing to adequately test their products and in failing to properly warn class members of the limitations of using plumbing systems with pipe fabricated from the defendants’ raw material. There was no allegation that the raw material or the pipe was dangerous. The plaintiffs asserted causes of action including negligent design, failure to warn, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty. 240 In Gariepy, Justice Nordheimer’s comments about Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 were made after he had already concluded that the plaintiffs had pleaded a reasonable cause of action. The context of his comment was a discussion of the fact that some class members had experienced no leaks and so their particular claims were only pure economic loss claims. It was in that context that Justice Nordheimer quoted Justice La Forest’s comment above. Justice Nordheimer concluded at paragraph 42 that: “It would seem, therefore, that the possibility exists that claims for repairs in non-dangerous situations may yet be held to be recoverable. It is at least clear that the issue is not foreclosed.” It would appear that all that Justice Nordheimer was saying was that there was no reason to exclude class members who had not experienced leaks or had experienced leaks without attendant damage from the class for the purposes of determining whether the statement of claim disclosed a cause of action. 241 However, if Justice Nordheimer was saying something more about the scope of recovery in tort, then for the reasons set out above, I disagree with him and my opinion is that negligence claims for non-dangerous products are foreclosed. 242 Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 418 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal to the Div. Ct. refused [2009] O.J. No. 3438 (Ont. Div. Ct.) is a favourable judgment for the Plaintiffs. However, for the above reasons, I Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 291

do not agree with Justice Lax’s decision that it is not plain and obvious that there is not a negligence claim for pure economic losses for non- dangerous shoddy goods. 243 In Griffin, Dell, a computer manufacturer, sold a notebook computer along with a one-year limited warranty covering defects in workmanship and materials with the option to purchase an enhanced warranty. The plaintiffs alleged that the computers were of poor workmanship and quality and unfit for their intended purpose as they were prone to overheat- ing, power failure, inability to “boot up,” and unexpected shutdowns. They sued for negligence, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, waiver of tort, and breach of s. 52 of the Competition Act. 244 Justice Lax disagreed with Dell’s argument that the law was settled and there is no recovery in tort for defective products, unless the defect causes a substantial danger. Dell relied on Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, (2003), [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 446 (S.C.C.) and Design Services Ltd. v. R., 2008 SCC 22 (S.C.C.), but Justice Lax concluded that Hughes left the point open and that the decision in Design Services Ltd. was based on a full evidentiary record of a trial and a similar decision should not be made on a certification motion. 245 Referring to Bondy v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd., Justice La Forest’s comments in Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., and Justice Nordheimer’s comments in Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co., supra, (but with no mention of Mariani v. Lemstra, supra), Justice Lax reasoned that it was not plain and obvious that the negligence claim cannot possibly succeed. She stated in paragraph 57 of her reasons: 57. The authors of Canadian Tort Law, 8th ed. (Markham: But- terworths, 2006), Allen Linden and Bruce Feldthusen, after discussing the law in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, state at p. 475 that it is an open question whether Ca- nadian courts will extend recovery in negligence to non-dangerous defects. They divide the Canadian decisions following Winnipeg Condominium into three categories, concluding that the “recent trend” is not to allow recovery as a matter of law. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal points out in Sable Offshore Energy Inc. at para. 30 that the test is not whether the recent trend disallows recovery, but whether the claim is certain to fail. In Hughes, the court observed that on the present state of the law, the negligence claim would “likely fail”. I make the same observation about the negligence claim in this case, but likelihood of success is not the test. Given the test 292 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

that I must apply, it is not plain and obvious that the negligence claim cannot possibly succeed. 246 For the above reasons, I disagree with Justice Lax’s decision, but I can certainly understand her reluctance to foreclose the claim in circumstances where there was a certifiable claim for breach of contract to underpin an economic loss claim. 247 I also think that the defendant’s argument in Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc. was correct, which brings the discussion to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hughes v Sunbeam, supra. In Hughes, the plaintiff in a proposed class action purchased a smoke alarm that was defective and sued for a refund. He sued the manufacturers, and as noted above, he also sued Underwriters’ Laboratories of Canada (“ULC”). The Court of Appeal held that Justice Cumming was correct to strike out the claim against ULC but wrong to strike the claim against the manufacturers, against whom it was not plain and obvious that the claim for pure economic loss was untenable. 248 For the negligence claim against the manufacturers of the smoke alarm, Justice John Laskin was prepared to treat the unreliable smoke detectors as within the principle from Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co.. However, he had reservations about the eventual success of the plaintiff’s claim for a refund, as opposed to repair costs. Thus, Justice John Laskin stated in paragraphs 25 to 29 of his judgment: 25. I accept that, under the current state of the law, Hughes’ negligence claim against First Alert would likely fail. But this appeal is from a rule 21.01(1)(b) motion, where causes of action should not be barred simply because they are novel. In my view, compelling reasons exist to allow the negligence claim against First Alert to get over the rule 21.01(1)(b) hurdle. 26. The underlying rationale for permitting recovery for pure economic loss in a case like Winnipeg Condominium is safety, the prevention of threatened harm. By compensating the owner of a danger- ously defective product for the cost of repair, the law can encourage the owner to make the product safe before it causes injury to persons or property. By contrast compensation to repair a defective but not dangerous product will improve the product’s quality but not its safety. 27. This case falls on the border. A smoke detector that does not de- tect fires in time for occupants to escape injury is not itself dangerous, but relying on it is. The occupants are lulled into a false sense of Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 293

security. The threatened harm to persons or property is no less than that from a dangerous defect. In other words, the safety considerations are similar. Safety justified compensating the owner of the apartment building in Winnipeg Condominium to eliminate the dan- gerously defective cladding. Safety may also justify compensating the owner of a defective smoke alarm to eliminate dangerous reliance on it. 28. This claim thus shows that in the negligent supply of defective goods cases, the safety rationale for compensation does not always support a clear distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous defects..... The defect is not dangerous, though reliance on the product is. If safety is the rationale for recovery of economic loss in these kinds of cases, I find it hard to justify recovery in the first scenario but not the second. 29. For these reasons, I am not persuaded that Hughes’ negligence claim against First Alert discloses no reasonable cause of action. As a supplier of allegedly defective safety devices on which reliance is dangerous, First Alert may well owe a duty of care to a purchaser that is not defeated by the relevant policy considerations. This claim should not fail on a rule 21.01(1)(b) motion. Before deciding whether First Alert owes a duty of care to compensate Hughes for purely economic losses, the court should have an evidentiary record. 249 The Hughes case does not support the proposition that the law is unsettled about whether there is recovery for purely economic losses for negligently manufactured or designed non-dangerous goods. The areas of legal uncertainty identified in Hughes were about what counts for a dangerous good and about whether there were other heads of damages beyond the cost of repair. The law, however, is settled that there is no recovery for shoddy non-dangerous goods, which explains why Justice John Laskin emphasized that a defective safety device was little different from a device that itself was dangerous. 250 The Plaintiffs in the case at bar also relied on the recent judgment of Justice Baltman in Barwin v. IKO Industries Ltd., supra. The defective product in this case was roofing shingles, and in a proposed class action, Justice Baltman rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was based upon pure economic loss for a non-dangerous good. She did so for two reasons. First, it was arguable that the goods were dangerous because they threatened the safety of the houses and thus fell within the parameters of Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., supra. Second, following Gariepy, Bondy, and Griffin, there was the possibility of claims for repairs in non-danger- 294 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

ous situations. For present purposes, Barwin is distinguishable because the product was dangerous and not merely shoddy. If Barwin is not distinguishable, it follows Gariepy, Bondy, and Griffin, which for the reasons already expressed, I do not follow. 251 I concede that the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2007 NSCA 70 (N.S. C.A.) is favourable to the Plaintiffs’ argument that it is not plain and obvious that a product liability negligence claim for pure economic loss for a non-dangerous product is untenable. The case, however, is not binding on me, and I do not agree with it to the extent that it holds that the law is unsettled about non-dangerous goods and negligence claims for pure economic losses. 252 In Sable Offshore Energy Inc., the plaintiff was the operator for the owner of four offshore gas platforms. The defendant manufactured and supplied the paint used to cover the steel used on the platforms. The plaintiffs claimed that the paint system failed resulting in corrosion im- pairing the structural integrity of the platforms and making them unsafe. Notwithstanding the allegations that the paint system failure was dangerous, the defendant paint manufacturer submitted that there is no cause of action that would allow the plaintiff to recover repair costs and other economic losses for defects in the paint that did not result in a clear presence of a real and substantial danger. The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge’s decision that it was not plain and obvious that the claim was untenable. 253 I note once again in Sable Offshore Energy Inc. the phenomena of a defendant attempting to re-categorize a claim to take it outside of what is permitted by Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., supra, which phenomena by itself makes it understandable to me why a court might say that the plaintiff’s action should not be dismissed on a preliminary motion. That said, largely based on an extra-judicial essay by Chief Justice McLachlin writing about the contribution of Jus- tice La Forest, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal adopted the view that Justice La Forest had left open the recovery of pure economic loss for the supply of non-dangerous products. 254 In the “The Evolution of the Law of Private Obligation: The Influ- ence of Justice La Forest” in Johnson and McEvoy eds. G´erard V La Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 295

Forest at the Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1997 (2000) 21, at p. 41, Chief Justice McLachlin wrote: However, some have drawn from this decision that, absent danger of personal injury, the pure economic loss would not have been recoverable, thus concluding that Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 is inconsistent with the universalist approach of Anns. Construed at its narrowest, though, it may be argued that this case stands only for the proposition that pure economic loss is recoverable where danger of bodily injury is established, not that this is the only circumstance where recovery of economic loss is possible. The emphasis on a risk of personal injury has been advanced at least since Justice [Bora] Laskin’s (as he then was) dissenting judgment in Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Ironworks Engineering [1974] S.C.R. 1189. If this is so, then Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 simply left other situations to be resolved another day. Whichever view one takes, Winni- peg Condo most assuredly did not conclusively settle whether Anns stood for a universal rule of tort recovery or one limited to physical loss, subject to certain tightly-controlled broader exceptions. The analysis in the case does illustrate, however, the difficulties inherent in defining practical limits in an ostensibly universal process. 255 I read this passage from Chief Justice McLachlin’s essay as directed at a different question from the question of what was settled by the Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 judgment. It is directed at the question of whether Justice La Forest’s Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 judgment, with its apparent emphasis on dangerous goods, was inconsistent with the universalist more open-ended approach associated with the Anns v. Merton London Borough Council test for a duty of care. For what it is worth, I would interpret Justice La Forest’s judgment as being universalist and admitting the possibility of other circumstances where there might be recovery for pure economic losses but as foreclos- ing pure economic losses being recovered when goods are simply shoddy. For non-dangerous goods, Justice La Forest was well aware that there were weighty policy reasons for leaving compensation to the realm of contract and property law or to statutory regimes. 256 Although he was concerned about a different category of pure economic losses, that Justice La Forest was not leaving the door open for pure economic loss claims in negligence for shoddy non-dangerous goods is supported by what he said in Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., supra, at para. 60 about Justice Bora Las- 296 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

kin’s judgment in Rivtow Marine Ltd.. Speaking about contractual relational loss, Justice La Forest stated: [T]he Rivtow case involves significant policy considerations. The in- cursion into the broad rule is carefully justified on policy grounds. As Laskin J. notes, at p. 1222, “[t]he case is not one where a manufactured product proves to be merely defective (in short, where it has not met promised expectations) but rather one where by reason of the defect there is a foreseeable risk of physical harm from its use and where the alert avoidance of such harm gives rise to economic loss”. In Laskin J.’s view, the courts must be careful to avoid giving redress in tort for “safe but shoddy” products. Where the products are unsafe, however, tort may have a role: prevention of threatened harm resulting directly in economic loss should not be treated differently from post-injury treatment. The narrow rule barring contractual relational economic loss is explicitly left intact. 257 In my opinion, reading the argument in Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., supra, in its entirety leads to the conclusion that there must be some operative public policy factor such as promoting health and safety to justify tort’s intrusion into the realm of contract and property law, bargaining, and the consensual allocation of economic risk and there also should be some measure to avoid indeterminate liability. 258 Thus, I do not agree with Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., but more to the point, in my opinion, it does not overcome the numerous Ontario authorities binding on me that hold that there is no recovery in negligence for shoddy goods that are not sources of danger directly or indirectly. I conclude that as a matter of decided case law, it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs have not disclosed a reasonable cause of action in negligence. 259 I will, in the next section of these Reasons, consider an alternative argument that comes to the same conclusion.

Duty of Care Analysis — Design Negligence 260 In this next part of my Reasons for Decision, I will consider whether it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs’ claim for purely economic losses from the negligent design of a non-dangerous product by applying the contemporary test for determining whether there is a duty of care. For this purpose, I will assume, notwithstanding the discussion just com- pleted, that it is a matter of first instance and that the duty of care issue has not been decided by binding authority. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 297

261 The contemporary Canadian approach to determining whether there is a duty of care has been developed in a series of Supreme Court of Can- ada decisions adapting and explaining the House of Lord’s decision in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728 (U.K. H.L.). See: Nielsen v. Kamloops (City), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.); Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.); Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.); Childs v. Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.); D. (B.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Halton (Re- gion), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83 (S.C.C.); Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114 (S.C.C.); and Fullowka v. Royal Oak Ventures Inc., 2010 SCC 5 (S.C.C.). 262 The first element of a tort claim for negligence is a duty of care. As Lord Esher stated in Le Livre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 (Eng. C.A.), at p. 497, “[a] man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them.” 263 The contemporary analysis of whether a duty of care exists begins by asking whether the plaintiff and the defendant are in a relationship that the law recognizes categorically as involving a duty of care or whether the relationship constitutes a new category of claim. If the claim falls within an established category, then precedent will have established that there is a duty of care associated with the relationship between the parties: Childs v. Desormeaux, supra, at para. 14. 264 In the area of product liability, there are four established categories. First, manufacturers have a duty of care to consumers to see that there are no defects in manufacture that are likely to give rise to injury in the ordinary course of use: McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (U.K. H.L.). Second, manufacturers have a duty of care to warn consumers of dangers inherent in the use of the product of which the manufacturer has knowledge or ought to have knowledge: Hollis v. Birch, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634 (S.C.C.) at para. 20; Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) at p. 574; Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 (S.C.C.). Third, manufacturers have a duty of care in designing the product to avoid safety risks and to make the product reasonably safe for its intended purposes: Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (Ont. S.C.J.); Rentway Canada Ltd./Lt´ee v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd., [1989] O.J. No. 786 (Ont. H.C.), aff’d [1994] O.J. No. 50 (Ont. C.A.). Fourth, as discussed at length above, manufac- 298 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

turers have a duty of care to compensate consumers for the cost of repairing a dangerous product that presents a real and substantial danger. 265 It may be noted that all of these established categories are premised on the product causing harm or having the potential of causing harm to persons or property. The underlying argument is that a manufacturer has a duty of care not to design a product negligently because the manufacturer should and can fairly be held responsible for the choices it makes that affect the safety of the product. The manufacturer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to reduce any risk to life and limb that may be inherent in its design: Gallant v. Beitz (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 86 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 90; Rentway Canada Ltd./Ltée v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd., supra. 266 In the case of negligence in designing a product, the defendant is blameworthy for not designing its product in a safer manner. In Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd. (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 53 (Ont. H.C.) at p.60, Justice Smith stated: a manufacturer does not have the right to manufacture an inherently dangerous article when a method exists of manufacturing the same article without risk of harm. In this category of duty of care, whether a manufacturer breaches its duty is determined by a risk- utility analysis that measures whether the utility of the chosen design outweighs the foreseeable risks associated with the chosen design. See: Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 603 (Ont. S.C.J.); Rentway Canada Ltd./Ltée v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd., supra. 267 In Rentway Canada Ltd./Ltée v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd., supra, at p. 164, Justice Granger compiled a list of factors to consider when balanc- ing the risks inherent in the product, as designed, against its utility and cost; namely: (1) the utility of the product to the public as a whole and to the individual user; (2) the nature of the product; that is, the likelihood that it will cause injury; (3) the availability of a safer design; (4) the potential for designing and manufacturing the product so that it is safer but remains functional and reasonably priced; (5) the ability of the plaintiff to have avoided injury by careful use of the product; (6) the degree of awareness of the potential danger of the product which reasonably can be attributed to the plaintiff; and (7) the manufacturer’s ability to spread any costs related to improving the safety of the design. 268 In my opinion, the case at bar advances a novel claim for a pure economic loss claim in negligence but does not fall within the five established categories recognized in Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., supra. See also Martel Building Ltd. v. R., [2000] Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 299

2 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.) or the four established categories for shoddy goods. As the discussion in the last section reveals, the supply of shoddy goods category is an established category — but only for dangerous goods. The case at bar also does not fall within the established category for design negligence, which again is an established category only for dangerous goods. 269 The particular point here is that the decided design negligence case law does not apply and is not very helpful, even by analogy, because the critical element of dangerousness is absent in the case at bar. Thus, the various factors in Rentway Canada Ltd./Lt´ee v. Laidlaw Transport Ltd., supra, for determining a breach of the duty of care are unhelpful because they address the safety of the product and not its quality. 270 If the case does not come within an established category, it is necessary to undertake a duty of care analysis. This approach harkens back to the seminal case of McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (U.K. H.L.), where Lord Atkin stated at p. 580: [T]here must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances... The rule that you love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be — persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called into question. 271 In Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728 (U.K. H.L.), the House of Lords adopted a two-step analysis to determine whether there was a duty of care between a plaintiff and a defendant: (1) Is there a sufficiently close relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant such that in the reasonable contemplation of the defendant, care- lessness on its part might cause damage to the plaintiff? and, (2) Are there any considerations that ought to negative or limit: (a) the scope of the duty; (b) the class of persons to whom it is owned; or (c) the damages to which a breach of it may give rise. 272 As developed by the case law in Canada, if the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant does not fall within a recognized class whose members have a duty of care to others, then whether a duty of care to another exists involves satisfying three requirements: (1) foresee- 300 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

ability, in the sense that the defendant ought to have contemplated that the plaintiff would be affected by the defendant’s conduct; (2) sufficient proximity, in the sense that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is sufficient prima facie to give rise to a duty of care; and (3) the absence of overriding policy considerations that would negate any prima facie duty established by foreseeabilty and proximity. Thus, whether a relationship giving rise to a duty of care exists depends on foreseeability, moderated by policy concerns: Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728 (U.K. H.L.); Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114 (S.C.C.) at para. 4. 273 Forseeability is the touchtone of negligence law; however, not every foreseeable outcome will attract a duty of care because for liability the foreseeability must be grounded in relationship of sufficient closeness or proximity to make it just and reasonable to impose an obligation one party to take reasonable care not to injure the other: Ragoonanan Estate v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., supra at para. 41. 274 Proximity focuses on the type of relationship between the plaintiff and defendant and asks whether this relationship is so close that the defendant may reasonably be said to owe the plaintiff a duty to take care not to injure him or her: McAlister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (U.K. H.L.). Proximate relationships giving rise to a duty of care are of such a nature as the defendant in conducting his or her affairs may be said to be under an obligation to be mindful of the plaintiff’s legitimate interests: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.) at para. 49; Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 (S.C.C.) at para. 24. The proximity inquiry probes whether it would be unjust or unfair to hold the defendant subject to a duty of care having regard to the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff: D. (B.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Halton (Region), 2007 SCC 38 (S.C.C.) at para. 26. The focus of the probe is on the nature of the relationship between victim and alleged wrongdoer and the question is whether the relationship is one where the imposition of legal liability for the wrongdoer’s actions would be appropriate. See Hill v. Hamilton- Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) at para. 23. 275 The proximity analysis involves considering factors such as expectations, representations, reliance, and property or other interests involved: Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.) at para. 34; Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 301

2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) at para. 23; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.) at para. 50. Proximity is not concerned with how intimate the plaintiff and defendant were or with their physical proximity, so much as with whether the actions of the alleged wrongdoer have a close or direct effect on the victim, such that the wrongdoer ought to have had the victim in mind as a person potentially harmed: Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) at para. 29. 276 It needs to be emphasized that the proximity analysis of the first stage of the Anns test involves policy issues because it asks the normative question of whether the relationship is sufficiently close to give rise to a legal duty: Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.) at paras. 25- 30. 277 Moving on to the second stage of the duty of care analysis, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie duty of care, the evidentiary burden of showing countervailing policy considerations shifts to the defendant, following the general rule that the party asserting a point should be required to establish it: Childs v. Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643 (S.C.C.) at para. 13. Policy concerns raised against imposing a duty of care must be more than speculative, and a real potential for negative consequences must be apparent: Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) at para. 48. 278 This second stage of the analysis is not concerned with the type of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. At this stage of the analysis, the question to be asked is whether there exist broad policy considerations that would make the imposition of a duty of care unwise, despite the fact that harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct in question and there was a sufficient degree of proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant such that the imposition of a duty would be fair: Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.) at para. 37; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.) at para. 51. The second stage of the analysis is about the effect of recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations, the legal system, and society more generally: Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.) at para. 37; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 (S.C.C.) at para. 51. An adverse effect may justify negating the defendant’s duty of care. 279 In my opinion, in the case at bar, it is plain and obvious that the Plain- tiffs’ claim cannot survive the second stage of the analysis. In other words, I am prepared to assume that the relationship between the Plain- 302 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

tiffs and Whirlpool is sufficient to give rise to a prima facie duty of care. However, there are overriding policy considerations that negate the duty of care. In this regard, it is worth noting, as Justice McLachlin, as she then was, noted in Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., supra, at para. 227 and as Lord Denning noted in in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. (1972), [1973] Q.B. 27 (Eng. C.A.) at p. 36): “At bottom... the question of recov- ering economic loss is one of policy.” 280 The negating policy factors are the traditional factors that justified the traditional rule that pure economic losses are not recoverable in negligence. I repeat the quotation from the judgment of Justices Iacobucci and Major in Martel Building Ltd. v. R., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.) at p. 876, where they explain the policy reason for tort’s reluctance to award compensation for pure economic losses: The circumstances in which such damages have been awarded to date are few. To a large extent, this caution derives from the same policy rationale that supported the traditional approach not to recognize the claim at all. First, economic interests are viewed as less compelling of protection than bodily security or proprietary interests. Second, an unbridled recognition of economic loss raises the spectre of indeterminate liability. Third, economic losses often arise in a commercial context, where they are often an inherent business risk best guarded against by the party on whom they fall through such means as insurance. Finally, allowing the recovery of economic loss through tort has been seen to encourage a multiplicity of inappropriate lawsuits. 281 Before discussing the Martel Building Ltd. case in more detail, I ac- knowledge that the spectre of indeterminate liability, a commonly mentioned policy reason for negating a duty of care with respect to pure economic losses, is not a factor in the case at bar. The liability in the immediate case is not indeterminate. The members of the class economi- cally harmed can be identified; they are the owners of the Whirlpool washing machines and the amount of their losses are not unbounded. In Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 (S.C.C.) at para. 37 Justice La Forest held that the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff is critical to the policy issue of indeterminate liability, and that the issue of indeterminacy becomes of no concern when the plaintiffs’ identity is known. 282 But the spectre of indeterminate liability is only one of the policy issues that bear on whether a prima facie duty of care should be negated. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 303

In his dissenting judgment in Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., supra, Justice La Forest noted at para. 55: 55. An examination of Rivtow reveals that the concern over indeterminate liability is only one among several policy issues that arise in economic loss cases. What is particularly instructive about Rivtow Marine Ltd., rather than any wide dicta about proximity in economic loss cases, is the manner in which both judgments analyzed the policy considerations underlying the exclusionary rule. Of these, indeterminate liability was only of secondary importance. The broad rule was qualified and recovery for economic loss upheld only after a searching examination of the functions the rule served in the type of case there in question. 283 From a policy perspective, the Plaintiffs’ pure economic loss claim in the case at bar raises similar policy concerns to those in Martel Building Ltd.. In that case, Martel sued Public Works Canada for pure economic losses associated with the fact that Martel lost the opportunity to lease premises to the Atomic Energy Control Board. Martel argued that the tort of negligence should be extended to pure economic losses arising from the conduct of pre-contractual negotiations. In response, Public Works Canada argued that to extend the tort of negligence into the conduct of commercial negotiations would be an unnecessary and unsound invasion of the marketplace. It argued that Martel assumed business risks inherent in commercial negotiation and that these risks should be borne by parties and not be re-allocated through the imposition of a duty of care in tort. 284 Martel also argued that Public Works Canada had breached a duty of care in the tendering process, but for present purposes, I need not consider that aspect of Martel’s claim save to note that it was dismissed because any liability in tort was commensurate with the liability in contract and Martel had no sustainable claim for breach of contract for breach of the tendering contract. 285 For the claim that Public Works had breached a duty of care in negotiating, Justices Iacobucci and Major concluded that Public Works prima facie had a duty of care to Martel with respect to pre-contractual negotiations, and then they turned to the issue of whether there were policy considerations that negated or limited the scope of the duty of care, the class of persons to whom it was owed, or the damages to which a breach may give rise. 286 In Martel, the Supreme Court found no problem of indeterminate liability, but Justices Iacobucci and Major found five compelling reasons why a commercial party should not have to be mindful of another com- 304 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

mercial party’s legitimate interests in an arms-length negotiations. First, from society’s perspective there was no justification in interfering with the transfer of wealth brought about by negotiating a contract. (See paragraphs 61-62) Second, the imposition of liability would make illegal the socially acceptable transfer of wealth that was the purpose of bargaining and the extension of duty of care would “hobble the marketplace” and “force the disclosure of privately acquired information and the dissipation of any competitive advantage derived from it, all of which is incompatible with the activity of negotiating and bargaining.” (See paragraphs 63-67). Third, to impose a duty “could interject tort law as after-the-fact insurance against failures to act with due diligence or to hedge the risk of failed negotiations through the pursuit of alternative strategies or opportunities. (See paragraphs 68-69). Fourth, to impose a duty of care would entail the court taking on an unnecessary regulatory function already addressed by commercial law. (See paragraph 70). Fifth, to impose a duty of care would encourage needless litigation. (See paragraph 71). 287 Of the last two policy reasons, Justices Iacobucci and Major stated in paragraphs 70 and 71 of their judgment: 70. Fourth, to extend the tort of negligence into the conduct of commercial negotiations would introduce the courts to a significant regulatory function, scrutinizing the minutiae of pre-contractual conduct. It is undesirable to place further scrutiny upon commercial parties when other causes of action already provide remedies for many forms of conduct. Notably, the doctrines of undue influence, economic duress and unconscionability provide redress against bargains obtained as a result of improper negotiation. As well, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and the tort of deceit cover many aspects of negotiation which do not culminate in an agreement. 71. A concluding but not conclusive fifth consideration is the extent to which needless litigation should be discouraged. To extend negligence into the conduct of negotiations could encourage a multiplicity of lawsuits. Given the number of negotiations that do not culminate in agreement, the potential for increased litigation in place of allowing market forces to operate seems obvious. 288 The underlying policy theme of all five policies described in Martel Building Ltd. can be seen to be the view that compensation for economic losses are best regulated by contract and property law and that there must be some countervailing policy to justify tort law regulating an economic activity. This theme can also be identified in Winnipeg Condominium Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 305

Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., supra, where the court did find a policy to justify intervening in the economic sector; namely, the public policy of preventing harm to persons and property. 289 In the context of the case at bar, the same negating policy themes identified by the court in Martel Building Ltd. apply and indicate that the Plaintiffs should be left to their contractual remedies including express, implied, or statutory warranties and they should not look to tort law to negotiate a better bargain for themselves. 290 The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in M. Hasegawa & Co. v. Pepsi Bottling Group (Canada) Co., [2002] B.C.J. No. 1125 (B.C. C.A.), which is noted above as authority that there is no compensation for pure economic losses for a defective non-dangerous product, also demonstrates that there are policy reasons to negate a duty of care for pure economic losses. 291 In M. Hasegawa & Co., the plaintiff purchased bottled drinking water for resale. The bottles were contaminated by mould, and the plaintiff suffered losses exceeded $1.5 million. The trial judge found that the defective water posed no real and substantial danger to health, and applying Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., supra, the trial judge dismissed the action. On the appeal, the plaintiff argued if the case did not come within the shoddy goods class of cases, a new category for recovery of economic loss should be established in respect of food products intended for human consumption and that under the second part of the Anns test, there was no valid policy reason to negate the duty of care. Chief Justice Finch, who delivered the judgment of the Brit- ish Columbia Court of Appeal, disagreed. 292 Chief Justice Finch’s explanation for dismissing the claim sounds the theme that where the losses are purely economic, tort law should only rarely interfere with property and contract law. He stated at paragraphs 57-61: 57. The plaintiff contends that, under the second part of the Anns test, there is no valid policy reason why liability for pure economic loss should be denied in this case. With respect, I disagree. A legal rule which imposed liability for the manufacture or supply of defective, but non-dangerous, goods would create an implied warranty of product quality for the sale of commercial products, in the absence of contract. Such a rule would be an enormous change in the law, and would indeed create “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”: per Cardozo C.J. in Ul- tramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y.C.A. 1931) at p. 444. 306 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

58. I can see no good reason for adopting the test proposed by the plaintiff, and much to recommend against it. I agree with the defendant’s submissions that the law of contract and sale of goods already allocates risk for goods of poor quality, and that tort law should not interfere. 59. This case involved a commercial transaction in which quality risk was already allocated by contract.... The plaintiff did not seek an assurance of any kind from the defendant, and the defendant did not give the plaintiff any assurances as to the quality of the bottled water. 60. The plaintiff’s effort to recover its business losses from the defendant is in reality an effort to obtain after-the-fact insurance from a party which did not give a warranty at the time of the original contracts. Tort law should not be used here to disrupt the contractual allocation of risk. 293 Design Services Ltd. v. R., supra, is another case that demonstrates the policy that in the area of pure economic losses, there must be superior countervailing policy reasons to justify tort law invading the bailiwick of the law of property and contract. The issue in the Design Services Ltd. case was whether an owner in a tendering process owes a duty of care in tort to subcontractors. The facts were that the owner awarded a construction contract to a non-compliant bidder, and the subcontractors to the contractor that should have been awarded the contract sued the owner for negligence. The subcontractors could not sue in contract, because they had no privity of contract with the owner; nevertheless, they advanced a claim in tort for the economic loss they have suffered. 294 Justice Rothstein wrote the judgment for the Supreme Court dismissing the subcontractors’ action on the ground that the owner owed them no duty of care. Justice Rothstein concluded that the subcontractors were advancing a novel claim and, therefore, he undertook a duty of care analysis, and he decided that the subcontractors could not establish a prima facie duty of care for policy reasons and that had a prima facie duty of care been established it would have been negated by the spectre of indeterminate liability. 295 For present purposes, the point to note is that the proximity necessary to establish a prima facie duty of care was negated by the policy that generally speaking, tort law should leave commercial relations to be gov- erned by commercial law. Thus, Justice Rothstein stated at paragraph 56 of his judgment for the Court: 56. The fact that the appellants had the opportunity to form a joint venture, and thereby be parties to the “Contract A” made between Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 307

PW and Olympic, is an overriding policy reason that tort liability should not be recognized in these circumstances. Allowing the appellants to sidestep the circumstances they participated in creating and make a claim in tort would be to ignore and circumvent the contractual rights and obligations that were, and were not, intended.... In es- sence, the appellants are attempting, after the fact, to substitute a claim in tort law for their inability to claim under “Contract A”..... In my view, the observation of Professor Lewis N. Klar (Tort Law (3rd ed. 2003), at p. 201) — that the ordering of commercial relationships is usually in the bailiwick of the law of contract — is particularly apt in this type of case. To conclude that an action in tort is appropriate when commercial parties have deliberately arranged their affairs in contract would be to allow for an unjustifiable encroachment of tort law into the realm of contract. 296 I conclude that the century old policies of the law going back to Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co. (1874), L.R. 10 Q.B. 453 (Eng. Q.B.) against negligence law providing compensation for pure economic losses apply in the case at bar to negate a duty of care and that it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs have not pleaded a reasonable cause of action in negligence.

VI. Waiver of Tort 297 The last cause of action to consider is the claim of waiver of tort. One could write a lot about this topic, but for present purposes I can be brief. Historically, the doctrine of waiver of tort provided the victim of certain types of tortious wrongdoing with the option of foregoing (waiving) tort compensation measured by the damages suffered by the victim and claim instead disgorgement of the tortfeasor’s ill-gotten gains. The traditional view was that waiver of tort was a remedy available for certain torts. 298 Without deciding the point, Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson, supra, initiated a debate about whether waiver of tort was not just a remedial choice but rather a cause of action available for more than the traditional short list of torts for which it had been available as a remedy or perhaps for wrongdoing generally. In other words, there has been a debate about the doctrinal nature of waiver of tort and the range of its availability. There, however, has been one point beyond debating. Whether a remedy or a cause of action, for waiver of tort to be available, the defendant must have done something wrong. 308 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

299 In Aronowicz v. EMTWO Properties Inc. [2010 CarswellOnt 598 (Ont. C.A.)], supra, at para. 82, Justice Blair stated about the waiver of tort doctrine: 82. Whether the claim exists as an independent cause of action or whether it requires proof of all the elements of an underlying tort aside, at the very least, waiver of tort requires some form of wrongdoing. The motion judge found none here. No breach of contract. No breach of fiduciary duty, or duty of good faith or confidentiality. No oppression. No misrepresentation. No deceit. No conspiracy. As counsel for Mr. Grinshpan put it in their factum, “its eleventh hour insertion into the statement of claim does not provide the appellants’ claim with a new lifeline given that the record discloses no wrongful conduct on the part of the respondents in respect of any of the causes of action pleaded.” 300 In the case at bar, for the reasons discussed earlier, in my opinion, it is plain and obvious that there is no predicate wrongdoing upon which to base a plea of waiver of tort. All of the proposed causes of action are untenable and thus there is no predicate wrongdoing to support a claim of waiver of tort be it a remedy or a cause of action. 301 Accordingly, the waiver of tort claim also fails to satisfy s. 5 (1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

VII. Conclusion — Cause of Action Criterion 302 For the above reasons, I conclude that the Plaintiffs’ action fails to satisfy the first criterion for certification as a class action. Accordingly, their certification motion should be dismissed and the various causes of action should be dismissed.

3. Identifiable Class 303 My conclusion that the Plaintiffs’ action does not satisfy the first criterion for certification means that their action also fails to satisfy the remaining certification criteria. However, on the assumption that I am wrong, I will address whether or not the Plaintiffs’ action satisfies the identifiable class criterion. 304 In defining class membership, there must be a rational relationship between the class, the causes of action, and the common issues, and the class must not be unnecessarily broad or over-inclusive: Pearson v. Inco Ltd. (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 57, rev’g [2004] O.J. No. 317 (Ont. Div. Ct.), which had aff’d [2002] O.J. No. 2764 (Ont. S.C.J.). Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 309

305 The definition of an identifiable class serves three purposes: (1) it identifies the persons who have a potential claim against the defendant; (2) it defines the parameters of the lawsuit so as to identify those persons bound by the result of the action; and (3) it describes who is entitled to notice: Bywater v. Toronto Transit Commission, [1998] O.J. No. 4913 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 306 In their Reply Factum, the Plaintiffs proposed the following definition of the class, to which I have added the class period: Persons resident in Canada other than Qu´ebec who own or previously owned a Whirlpool Front Loader [purchased between 2002 and 2008]. 307 This class definition was a change from an earlier version of the class definition which, once again, with my addition of the class period, was as follows: Persons resident anywhere in Canada other than Qu´ebec who: (a) own a whirlpool Front-Loader [purchased between 2002-2008]; and/or (b) have previously owned a Whirlpool Front-Loader [purchased between 2002-2008] and who claim they paid or were charged for the cost of investigating or repairing any failure related to the Design Deficiencies. 308 During argument it was acknowledged that Whirlpool employees should be excluded from membership in the class and the definition may be amended accordingly. 309 Whirlpool submitted, however, that the proposed class definition does not satisfy the requirements of the Act. It submitted that a class definition does not meet the requirements of s. 5(1)(b) without some evidence that the proposed common issues are common to all class members. 310 While I agree that in order for a class action to be certified, there must be some common issues for the class members, I do not understand how Whirlpool’s argument is applicable to challenge the Plaintiffs’ proposed definition of the class. In other words, it seems to me that Whirlpool’s argument is misdirected, and the argument is better aimed at whether the Plaintiffs have satisfied the common issues criterion. While I would agree that if there were no common issues, a class definition would fail to satisfy the requirements of the Act, Whirlpool’s argument simply confuses the analysis. 310 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

311 Putting aside whether or not there are common issues and on the assumption that the Plaintiffs’ action has satisfied the cause of action criterion, I conclude that the action satisfies the identifiable class criterion. The proposed definition satisfies the purposes identified by Bywater v. Toronto Transit Commission, supra.

4. Common Issues I. Introduction — Common Issues 312 My conclusion that the Plaintiffs’ action does not satisfy the first criterion for certification means that their action also fails to satisfy the remaining certification criteria. However, on the assumption that I am wrong, I will address whether or not the Plaintiffs’ action satisfies the common issues criterion. 313 For an issue to be a common issue, it must be a substantial ingredient of each Class member’s claim and its resolution must be necessary to the resolution of each Class member’s claim: Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) at para. 18. 314 The fundamental aspect of a common issue is that the resolution of the common issue will avoid duplication of fact-finding or legal analysis: Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (S.C.C.) at para. 39; McCracken v. Canadian National Railway, 2012 ONCA 445 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 183. 315 With regard to the common issues, “success for one member must mean success for all. All members of the class must benefit from the successful prosecution of the action, although not necessarily to the same extent.” That is, the answer to a question raised by a common issue for the plaintiff must be capable of extrapolation, in the same manner, to each member of the class: Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, supra at para. 40; Ernewein v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., 2005 BCCA 540 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 32; Wuttunee v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd., 2009 SKCA 43 (Sask. C.A.) at paras. 145-46 and 160; McCracken v. Canadian National Railway, supra, at para. 183. 316 Common issues should not be framed in overly broad terms. It does not serve the ends of either fairness or efficiency to certify an action on the basis of issues that are common only when stated in the most general terms because inevitably such an action would break down into ineffi- cient individual proceedings: Rumley v. British Columbia, [2001] 3 Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 311

S.C.R. 184 (S.C.C.) at para. 29; McCracken v. Canadian National Rail- way, 2012 ONCA 445 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 183. 317 An issue is not a common issue if its resolution is dependent upon individual findings of fact that would have to be made for each class member: Fehringer v. Sun Media Corp., [2003] O.J. No. 3918 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at paras. 3, 6. Common issues cannot be dependent upon findings which will have to be made at individual trials, nor can they be based on assumptions that circumvent the necessity for individual inquiries: Nadolny v. Peel (Region), [2009] O.J. No. 4006 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 50-52; Collette v. Great Pacific Management Co., [2003] B.C.J. No. 529 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 51, var’d on other grounds (2004), 42 B.L.R. (3d) 161 (B.C. C.A.); McKenna v. Gammon Gold Inc., [2010] O.J. No. 1057 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 126, leave to appeal granted [2010] O.J. No. 3183 (Ont. Div. Ct.), var’d 2011 ONSC 5882 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 318 An issue can satisfy the common issues requirement even if it makes up a very limited aspect of the liability question and even though many individual issues remain to be decided after its resolution. In determining the commonality of a question, the focus is on the commonality of the question, and it is an error to focus on those aspects of the claim that would require individual determination. The comparative extent of individual issues is not a consideration in the commonality inquiry although it is a factor in the preferability assessment. See Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 51 to 65, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 50 (S.C.C.). 319 The common issue criterion presents a low bar: Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 236 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 42; Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 52; 2038724 Ontario Ltd. v. Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 1874 (Ont. Div. Ct.), aff’d [2010] O.J. No. 2683 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d (2011), [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 348 (S.C.C.). An issue can be a common issue even if it makes up a very limited aspect of the liability question and even though many individual issues remain to be decided after its resolution: Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) supra, at para. 53. 320 The Plaintiffs’ proposed common issues are as follows: (1) Did the Defendants design, manufacture, sell, import, dis- tribute, market or otherwise place within the stream of commerce in Canada, Class Machines as particularized in Sched- ule “A” to the Amended Statement of Claim? 312 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

(2) Does the design of the Class Machines facilitate the growth or accumulation of dirt, debris, scrud and/or biofilm, (as defined in para. 10 of the Amended Statement of Claim), through their intended use? (3) If the answer to (2) is yes, are Class Machines therefore defective or unfit for the purpose for which they were intended, including uses that ought reasonably to have been foreseen by the Defendants? (4) Did the Defendants know or ought to have known that the Class Machines contain the Defects? (5) Did the Defendants owe a duty of care to the Plaintiffs and the Class to warn Class Members of the Defects? (6) Did the Defendants omit and/or conceal material facts from its communications and disclosures to the Plaintiffs and the Class regarding the Defects? (7) Did the Defendants owe a duty of care to the Plaintiffs and Class Members to design the Class Machines without the Defects? (8) Did the Defendants breach a reasonable standard of care in the design, development, testing, sale, importation, distribution, or marketing of the Class Machines? (9) Did the Defendants breach the standard of care in failing to recall the Class Machines? (10) Did the Defendants: (a) make the Representations described in paragraph 39 of the amended statement of claim? (b) Were the Representations for the purposes of promoting the supply or use of a product or for the purpose of promoting a business interest: (c) Were the Representations false or misleading in a material respect? (d) Were the Representations made knowingly or recklessly? (e) Did the Class suffer loss or damage as a result of the Representations? (11) Should the Defendants pay punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages? (12) Can global damages be assessed and, if so, in what amount. (13) [Deleted in Reply Factum] Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 313

(14) Should the Defendants be required to immediately replace all machines? (15) Are the Defendants liable to account by virtue of the remedy of waiver of tort to any or all of the Class Members on a restitutionary basis for the proceeds of the sales of the Class Ma- chines? If so, in what amount, and for whose benefit is such accounting to be made? (16) Are the Defendants liable for breach of express warranty? (17) Are the Defendants liable for breach of implied warranty at common law or under the Sale of Goods Act RSO 1990 c.S.1 or equivalent in other Provinces to the effect that the Class Machines should be free from material defects and fit for their intended use? 321 For analytical purposes the common issues can be grouped into five topics. The topics are: (1) background and general questions; (2) negligence questions; (3) Competition Act and misrepresentation questions; (4) breach of contract questions; and (5) remedies questions.

II. Analysis of the Common Issues Background or General Questions 322 The background or general questions are questions 1, 4, and 6. 323 Question 1 asks whether Whirlpool manufactured the washing machines that are the subject of the class action. This issue is not disputed, and certifying it as a common question is superfluous. I decline to certify this question. 324 Question 4 asks did Whirlpool know or ought Whirlpool to have known that its front-loading washing machines contained defects. This question is unfair and not rationally connected to the Plaintiffs’ causes of action for at least four reasons. 325 First, the action is about design defects associated with the self-cleaning capacity of the machine, and, thus, the question is vague and abstract. Second, the question is unfair because it presumes that the machine con- tains defects, which is an issue to be determined. Third, the question seems to be designed primarily to fish for facts upon which to base a claim for punitive damages. Fourth, and most importantly, the question is redundant, because the substantive or relevant content of when Whirl- pool knew or ought to have known about the character or performance of the washing machines is covered by the other negligence questions and 314 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Whirlpool’s knowledge is irrelevant to the contract claims, which are strict liability civil wrongs. I decline to certify this question. 326 Question 6 asks whether Whirlpool concealed from class members what it knew about the defects in its front-loading washing machines. I decline to certify this question for the same reasons that I decline to certify question 4.

Negligence Questions 327 The negligence questions are questions 2, 5, 7, 8, and 9. 328 Question 2 asks whether the design of the washing machines “facili- tated” the growth of biofilm. In my opinion, this question is unfair, factu- ally unsupported, and does not rationally connect to the Plaintiffs’ causes of action. 329 To facilitate is to aid, help, enable, ease, and expedite. The Plaintiffs’ cause of action in negligence is not based on the front-loading washing machines facilitating the growth of biofilm. Based on the evidence, the growth of biofilm is a phenomenon that can and does occur in all types of washing machines. The Plaintiffs’ cause of action in negligence is not based on boosting the growth of biofilm, but rather on the alleged failure of the Whirlpool front-loading washing machines to self-clean to prevent biofilm from appearing in what is a favourable environment for biofilm. 330 I decline to certify question 2 but will certify two fairer questions that are rationally connected to the Plaintiffs’ cause of action in negligence. In my opinion, there is some basis in fact for the following questions, which are rationally connected to the Plaintiffs’ cause of action in negligence, have some basis in fact, and satisfy the test for commonality: A. Does Whirlpool have a duty of care to design a front-end loading washing machine that suppresses or prevents the growth of biofilm? B. Did Whirlpool, by manufacturing the washing machines that are the subject matter of this action, breach its duty of care to design a front-end loading washing machine that suppresses or prevents the growth of biofilm? 331 Question 5 asks whether Whirlpool owed owners of the washing machines a duty to warn them of defects in the washing machines. As pres- ently stated, the question is unfair because it assumes that the washing machines have a design defect, which is an issue to be determined. The Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 315

question that is rationally related to the Plaintiffs’ cause of action in negligence, which I will certify, is as follows: C. Did Whirlpool owe a duty of care to warn the owners of the machines that are the subject of this action of the extent of the capability of the washing machines to self-clean and to suppress or prevent the growth of biofilm? 332 Question 7 asks whether Whirlpool have a duty of care to design the washing machines without the defects. With the above questions, question 7 is redundant, and I will not certify it. 333 Question 8 asks whether Whirlpool breached the standard of care in the design, development, testing, sale, importation, distribution, or marketing of the Whirlpool washing machines. This class action, however, is about negligence in design not negligence in the development, testing, sale, importation, distribution, or marketing of the washing machines. The proposed question is unfair and overbroad. In any event, with the above certifiable questions, question 8 is redundant, and I will not certify it. 334 Question 9 asks whether Whirlpool breached a standard of care in failing to recall the washing machines. I decline to certify this question for the same reasons as for question 8. 335 Whirlpool relies on Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd./Ford du Canada Lt´ee, [2006] O.J. No. 4625 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 64-67; Ernewein v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., [2005] B.C.J. No. 2370 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 32-33 and Williams v. Canon Canada Inc., supra, at para. 264, to argue that Question 9 and all the common issues should not be certified. These cases were product liability cases that were not certified because a multiplicity of product models made the extrapolation of common findings impossible. See also Wuttunee v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd., [2009] S.J. No. 179 (Sask. C.A.) at paras. 146, 160. 336 In the case at bar, Whirlpool objected to the certification of any of the negligence questions on the grounds that because there were 14 different designs, there was no commonality to the questions. Whirlpool submitted that the differences in design features and related instructions necessi- tated separate trials of alleged design defects. For example, it submitted that findings with respect to one Access platform washer in 2001 could not be extrapolated or generalized to washers made in 2007 or 2008, which had different designs, features, and instructions. 337 In so far as this objection relates to the manageability of the common issues, it is a matter for the preferable procedure analysis and not for the 316 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

common issues analysis. For the present purposes of the common issues analysis, I will assume that the negligence questions are manageable. 338 It undoubtedly will be a complex common issues trial, but it remains to be seen whether, if at all, the findings about one of the model configurations can be used with respect to the other models. The Whirlpool de- signers of all of the models faced the same design challenge of sup- pressing biofilm, and Whirlpool’s position is that all of the models were designed without negligence, which means that it anticipates being able to defend across all the models. 339 It may not be easy, but it will be for the trial judge at the common issues trial to determine whether Whirlpool negligently designed all, some, or none of the 14 model configurations. Despite the difficulties this may entail, on the assumption that there is a cause of action for pure economic losses for a non-dangerous product, and on the assumption that the common issues are manageable, I am satisfied that there are common issues about design negligence and some basis in fact for that conclusion. I, therefore, certify questions A, B, and C set out above.

Competition Act and Misrepresentation Questions 340 The Competition Act and misrepresentation questions are found in question 10. Question 10 is a composite of five compound-subparts, which require separate analysis. 341 Question 10(a) asks whether Whirlpool did not disclose that: (1) the washing machines were not free of defects; (2) the washing machines were not fit for the purpose intended; (3) the washing machines were designed in a manner which under normal conditions and usage would cause them to degrade prematurely; or (4) the Whirlpool Front-Loaders were manufactured in a manner which under normal conditions, usage and applications would cause them to degrade prematurely. 342 There is no basis in fact for the third and fourth part of question 10(a), and these parts are not rationally related to the Plaintiffs’ cause of action, which is not about washing machines degrading prematurely. This class action is about design defects not manufacturing defects. The remaining part of question 10 is unfair because it assumes that the washing machines have a design defect, which is a matter to be proven. The answer to the question whether Whirlpool did not disclose that its washing machines were not fit for the purpose intended is obviously no, and this question does not advance the litigation and is simply rhetorical and argumentative. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 317

343 The question that is fair and rationally related to the Plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Competition Act, which I will certify instead of question 10 (a), is as follows: D. Did Whirlpool not disclose the extent of the capability of the washing machines that are the subject of this action to self-clean and to suppress or prevent the growth of biofilm? 344 Questions 10, (b), (c), and (d) concern the purpose and the state of mind of Whirlpool in failing to disclose the extent of the capability of its washing machines to self-clean and suppress or prevent the growth of biofilm. On the assumption that there is a cause of action for these questions (which for the reasons expressed above is not my opinion), these questions satisfy the test for common questions. I, therefore, certify the following three questions taken from question 10: E. Was the non-disclosure of the extent of the capability of the washing machines that are the subject of this action to self-clean and to suppress or prevent the growth of biofilm a false or misleading representation? F. Did Whirlpool knowingly or recklessly not disclose the extent of the capability of the washing machines that are the subject of this action to self-clean and to suppress or prevent the growth of biofilm? G. Did Whirlpool not disclose the extent of the capability of the washing machines that are the subject of this action to self-clean and to suppress or prevent the growth of biofilm in order to promote its business interest? 345 Question 10 (e) asks whether the class suffered loss or damage as a result of Whirlpool’s non-disclosure of the extent of the capability of the washing machines that are the subject of this action to self-clean and to suppress or prevent the growth of biofilm. 346 Question 10 wants for commonality. There is no basis in fact for the idea that all class members suffered a pure economic loss from owning a Whirlpool front-loading washing machine. Given that complaints would undoubtedly be substantially unreported, it still appears that some class members did not suffer any pure economic losses from owning the machines. In any event, the damages, if any, suffered by class members and the extent of those damages, if any, are individual not a common issues. I decline to certify question 10 (e).

Breach of Contract Questions 347 The breach of contract questions are questions 3, 16, and 17. 318 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

348 Question 3, which follows a negligence question, is an unfair question that does not rationally connect to the Plaintiffs’ cause of action because it conflates the breach of contract claims with the negligence claims. The fitness of the machines for their intended purpose is a contractual question and not a negligence question. Contract performance is a matter of strict liability, and if Whirlpool expressly, impliedly, or pursuant to the Sale of Goods Act warranted the fitness of its washing machines, it would be no answer that it met the standard of care of a reasonable washing machine manufacturer. 349 The proper question that is rationally related to the Plaintiffs’ contractual cause of action, which I will certify, is as follows: H. Having regard to their self-cleaning capabilities, are the Whirlpool machines that are the subject of this action fit for their intended purposes? 350 Question 16 asks whether Whirlpool is liable for breach of express warranty. The obvious problem with this question is, as already noted above, that the Plaintiffs do not specify the express warranty that was breached. However, as also noted above, the answer to this objection is to refer to the user guides that contain warranties from Whirlpool. Thus, I will certify question 16 as follows: I. Did Whirlpool breach an express warranty contained in the Whirl- pool User and Care Guides? 351 Question 17 asks whether Whirlpool is liable for breach of an implied warranty. I certify this question as follows: J. Did Whirlpool breach an implied warranty at common law or under Ontario’s Sale of Goods Act R.S.O. 1990 c.S.1 or equivalent legislation in other provinces to the effect that the machines that are the subject of this action are free from material defects and fit for their intended use?

Remedies Questions 352 The Remedies Questions are questions 11, 12, 14, and 15. 353 Question 11 asks whether Whirlpool should pay punitive, exemplary, or aggravated damages. For the reasons that I expressed in Robinson v. Medtronic Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 4366 (Ont. S.C.J.), whether a defendant is exposed to liability for punitive, exemplary, or aggravated damages is certifiable as a common issue will depend upon the circumstances of the particular class action. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 319

354 In order to award punitive damages, the court must have an apprecia- tion of: (a) the degree of misconduct; (b) the amount of harm caused; (c) the availability of other remedies; (d) the quantification of compensatory damages; and (e) the adequacy of compensatory damages to achieve the objectives or retribution, deterrence, and denunciation. The overall award, that is to say compensatory damages plus punitive damages plus any other punishment related to the same misconduct must be rationally related to the objectives for which the punitive damages are awarded (retribution, deterrence and denunciation): Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.). 355 In class actions in which liability, causation, and or damages remain to be determined, it will be premature and without purpose to certify punitive damages as a common issue. In the case at bar, these elements remain to be determined. And, in my opinion, the Plaintiffs have failed to show some basis in fact for a punitive damages award. Whirlpool’s conduct might ultimately be found to be negligent or a breach of contract or statute but there does not appear to be anything that would invoke judicial wrath to punish egregious wrongdoing. 356 I digress to editorialize that the pro forma pleading of a claim of punitive damages should not lead to a pro forma certification of punitive damages as a common issue. In the normal course, once it is pleaded, whether punitive damages are available will evolve naturally from the determination of the other issues in the litigation. This follows because the award of punitive damages is necessarily derivative from the determination of the nature and extent of the defendant’s liability. In the meantime, the certification of the plea as a common issue is a provoca- tion that calls for a passionate refutation from the defendant, all of which complicates the litigation. 357 Thus, in my opinion, the case at bar is one where it would be premature, non-productive, unfair, and inappropriate to certify question 11, and I decline to do so. 358 Question 12 asks whether global damages can be assessed and, if so, in what amount. Global damages appears to be a euphemism for aggre- gate damages under s. 24 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 or perhaps on some other basis. In my opinion, whatever their name or their source, there is no basis in fact for class-wide damages in the case at bar. 359 Section 24 is not available in the circumstances of the immediate case and the Plaintiffs have not proposed any method by which damages can be determined on a class-wide basis, nor have the Plaintiffs shown any 320 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

basis in fact for the proposition that all class members suffered some compensable pure economic loss so that damages might be assessed globally. In the circumstances of this case, the measure of loss from purchasing a shoddy product is an individual issue. If the measure of loss were the diminution of value of, there was no basis in fact for a class- wide diminution in value. If the measure of loss were the costs of reme- dying the alleged design defect, there was no basis in fact for class-wide remedial cost. I decline to certify question 12. 360 Question 14 asks whether Whirlpool should be required immediately to replace all of the washing machines. I am not aware of any jurisdiction and none was suggested to me for this remedy being available individu- ally and certainly it is not available on a class-wide basis. I decline to certify question 14. 361 Question 15, in effect, asks whether the doctrine of waiver of tort, under which Whirlpool would be liable to disgorge its profits from wrongdoing rather than paying compensation for the damages suffered by the class members, is available. 362 Whirlpool challenged the commonality of this question in the circumstances of this case, and subject to this challenge, the agreement of the parties was that this question could be certified as a common issue without prejudice to having the question decertified if the court was con- vinced on motion that the doctrine of waiver of tort was not applicable. 363 I note here parenthetically that the decertification of waiver of tort occurred recently in a British Columbia product liability case. See Koubi v. Mazda Canada Inc., 2012 BCCA 310 (B.C. C.A.). 364 In these circumstances and with the assumption that I was wrong earlier in this judgment in concluding that waiver of tort is not available (because of the absence of any predicate wrongdoing), I certify question 15 as follows, without prejudice to Whirlpool moving to have it decertified: K. Is Whirlpool liable to account by virtue of the remedy of waiver of tort to any or all of the Class Members on a restitutionary basis for the proceeds of the sales of the machines that are the subject of this action? If so, in what amount, and for whose benefit is such accounting to be made? 365 I, therefore, conclude that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the common issues criterion for renumbered and revised questions A to K, inclusive. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 321

5. Preferable Procedure I. Introduction — Preferable Procedure 366 My conclusion that the Plaintiffs’ action does not satisfy the first criterion for certification means that their action also fails to satisfy the remaining certification criteria. However, on the assumption that I am wrong, I will address whether or not the Plaintiffs’ action satisfies the preferable procedure criterion. 367 Preferability captures the ideas of: (a) whether a class proceeding would be an appropriate method of advancing the claims of the class members; and (b) whether a class proceeding would be better than other methods such as joinder, test cases, consolidation, and any other means of resolving the dispute: Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 69, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 346 (S.C.C.); Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Mu- nicipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.). 368 For a class proceeding to be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the claims of a given class, it must represent a fair, efficient, and manageable procedure that is preferable to any alternative method of resolving the claims: Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 73-75, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 50 (S.C.C.). 369 Whether a class proceeding is the preferable procedure is judged by reference to the purposes of access to justice, behaviour modification, and judicial economy and by taking into account the importance of the common issues to the claims as a whole, including the individual issues: Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 69, leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 346 (S.C.C.); Hollick v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.). 370 In considering the preferable procedure criterion, the court should consider: (a) the nature of the proposed common issue(s); (b) the individual issues which would remain after determination of the common issue(s); (c) the factors listed in the Act; (d) the complexity and manageability of the proposed action as a whole; (e) alternative procedures for dealing with the claims asserted; (f) the extent to which certification fur- thers the objectives underlying the Act; and (g) the rights of the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s): Chadha v. Bayer Inc. (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 520 322 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

(Ont. Div. Ct.) at para. 16, aff’d (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 22 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. ref’d, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 106 (S.C.C.). 371 Numerous cases have held that a class proceeding will not satisfy the requirement that it be the preferable procedure to resolve the common issues if the common issues are overwhelmed or subsumed by the individual issues such that the resolution of the common issues will, in substance, mark just the beginning of the process leading to a final disposition of the claims of class members: Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (S.C.C.) at para. 39; Abdool v. Anaheim Management Ltd. (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 453 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at paras. 134, 135; Williams v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada, [2000] O.J. No. 3821 (Ont. S.C.J.); Kumar v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 1160 (Ont. C.A.) and [2003] O.J. No. 1161 (Ont. C.A.), aff’g [2001] O.J. No. 4952 (Ont. Div. Ct.), which aff’d (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 54 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Zicherman v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Canada, [2000] O.J. No. 5144 (Ont. S.C.J.); Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co., [2002] O.J. No. 2766 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff’d [2004] O.J. No. 5309 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

II. Analysis — Preferable Procedure 372 In my opinion, in the case at bar, a class action is the preferable procedure for the resolution of common issues D, E, F, G, H, I, J, and K but not questions A, B, and C, which are the negligence questions. 373 With respect to the negligence questions, they are interconnected questions, and in my opinion, question B, the duty of care question, is unmanageable. In other words, the fact that a class action is not the preferable procedure for the resolution of question B means that it is not the preferable procedure for the resolution of questions A and C, the other negligence issues. 374 Treating the certified common issues discretely, in my opinion, there is some basis in fact for questions A, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J, and with the exception of questions A and C, these questions are all manageable and satisfy the various tests of the preferable procedure criterion. The same, however, cannot be said about question B, the breach of the standard of care issue. 375 It may be recalled that Whirlpool challenged all the negligence questions as wanting commonality because there were 14 different design configurations. I rejected this challenge in the context of the common Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 323

issues criterion on the assumption that the common issues were manageable. In my opinion, question B is not manageable. 376 The unmanageability of question B is, in part, based on Whirlpool’s challenge based on there being 14 different design configurations against which to measure whether there was a breach of the duty or care to design the front-loading washing machines. The nature of the unmanageability, however, is more profound and relates in a larger part to the assumption that there is a tort claim for negligently designing a non- dangerous product. 377 The unmanageability problem arises from the fact that as a matter of tort law, where the product is neither physically defective nor dangerous, there is no established measure for determining whether there has been a breach of a duty of care in designing the product. All of the established categories for product liability negligence, including negligence in design, are premised on the product being dangerous and the measure for determining whether there has been a breach of the standard of care in designing a product is based on the theory that the manufacturer should be held responsible for the choices it makes that affect the safety of the product. 378 The manufacturer of a potentially dangerous product has a duty to make reasonable efforts to reduce any risk to life and limb that may be inherent in its design. Whether a manufacturer breaches its duty of care in designing a product is determined by a risk-utility analysis that measures whether the utility of the chosen design outweighs the foreseeable risks associated with the chosen design. Thus, among other things, the court will consider the potential for designing and manufacturing the product so that it is safer but remains functional and reasonably priced. In the context of design negligence for a non-dangerous product, these measures, which are related to the feasibility and affordability of safer designs, have no sense, and there is no tort case law to assist in determining how to determine whether the manufacturer breached its duty to design a non-dangerous product without negligence. 379 The preferential procedure analysis in the numerous products liability cases that have been certified for dangerous or potentially dangerous products, of which the drug recall cases are perhaps the paradigm, are not helpful for a pure economic loss case for a negligently designed consumer appliance that is not dangerous. 380 The point is that if there is a duty to carefully design a non-dangerous product, then the measure of the breach of that duty would have to be 324 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

whether it was feasible and economic for the reasonable manufacturer of the product to design a qualitatively better product. The measure would be whether a reasonable manufacturer could have designed a less shoddy product. I cannot think of another measure of the breach of the duty of care and no measure of breach of duty other than the inapplicable measure from the dangerous goods cases was suggested. 381 In this last regard, I note that the report of the Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Wilson, proceeds on the basis that between 2001 and 2008 inclusive, Whirlpool could have and, therefore, in his opinion, should have designed the washing machines it eventually sold in 2009, which is the date when the class period closes. Thus, the Plaintiffs ultimately assert a defect in the quality of the machines lasting until a better machine was produced in 2009. I also note that from time to time during the argument of the certification motion, the Plaintiffs’ counsel would assert that the owners of the Whirlpool washing machines did not obtain the high quality and high performance appliance that they expected and, therefore, Whirlpool should pay compensation for selling an inferior product. 382 In my opinion, this discussion reveals that the breach of the duty of care question is unmanageable because there is no objective measure of when a manufacturer could and should have designed a better product and the breach of duty issue in the case at bar would require an analysis of 14 different model configurations. 383 Incidentally, this discussion confirms that it is a matter of the law of property and contract and of the marketplace to regulate whether an appliance manufacturer was careless in how it designed a consumer appliance and whether the product is worth what the consumer pays for it. In other words, this discussion confirms the analysis earlier that there should not be a cause of action in negligence for carelessly designing a non-dangerous product. Without the product being dangerous or without a negligent misrepresentation, the owner’s remedy for the shoddy product is in contract or in consumer protection legislation. The resort to contract law is a strict liability claim that avoids determining whether it was reasonable to design the product as it was designed. 384 In the case at bar, in my opinion, it is manageable to determine the strict liability question of whether Whirlpool breached its express or implied warranties of fitness or about the quality of the product. It is also in my opinion manageable to determine whether each of the 14 models were fit for their intended purposes. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 325

385 I would add that assuming that the action were an action about a dangerous product and having regard to the risk analysis developed to test negligence, it would have been manageable to determine whether each of the 14 models was negligently designed. However, given that the claim in the case at bar is about a duty of care to design a non-dangerous product, in my opinion, it is not manageable to determine whether each of the 14 washing machines was negligently designed. 386 I thus, conclude that question B is unmanageable and that it does not satisfy the preferable procedure test. Further, I conclude that if question B falls, it takes questions A and C with it. In other words, if this class action is not the preferable procedure for the resolution of the breach of a duty of care issue, it is also not the preferable procedure for the other negligence issues. 387 Before moving on to the last certification criterion, I note that Whirl- pool also argued that a class action would be unmanageable because whatever the outcome of the common issues trial, there would have to be individual assessments of causation, contributory negligence, and limitation periods that would be unmanageable. Given that the questions that I have certified narrow the scope of this action, I do not agree with this submission. 388 What emerges from the common issues and preferable procedure analysis is a product liability claim for breach of warranty that should not present unmanageable individual trials. I repeat Justice Lax’s eloquent rejection of a similar argument in Sauer v. Canada (Minister of Agricul- ture), [2008] O.J. No. 3419 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 66 where she stated: I consider that the ghostly spectre of unmanageability underlying the arguments presented against certification is unconvincing. As with most ghosts, it will either vanish in the daylight of case management, the direction of the trial judge, or agreement of the parties or it will return in the night to haunt this proceeding, in which case the defendant may move under section 10 of the CPA for decertification. 389 With the assumption that the cause of action criterion is satisfied, I, therefore, conclude that that the preferable procedure criterion is satisfied for questions D, E, F, G, H, I, J, and K.

6. Representative Plaintiff and Litigation Plan 390 My conclusion that the Plaintiffs’ action does not satisfy the first criterion for certification means that their action also fails to satisfy the remaining certification criteria. However, on the assumption that I am 326 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

wrong, I will address whether or not the Plaintiffs’ action satisfies the representative plaintiff and litigation plan criterion. 391 The representative plaintiff must be a member of the class asserting claims against the defendant, which is to say that the representative plaintiff must have a claim that is a genuine representation of the claims of the members of the class to be represented or that the representative plaintiff must be capable of asserting a claim on behalf of all of the class members as against the defendant: Drady v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2007] O.J. No. 2812 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 36-45; Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2003] O.J. No. 344 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 40, aff’d [2003] O.J. No. 4708 (Ont. C.A.). 392 Provided that the representative plaintiff has his or her own cause of action, the representative plaintiff can assert a cause of action against a defendant on behalf of other class members that he or she does not assert personally, provided that the causes of action all share a common issue of law or of fact: Boulanger v. Johnson & Johnson Corp., [2002] O.J. No. 1075 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 22, leave to appeal granted, [2002] O.J. No. 2135 (Ont. S.C.J.), varied (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 208 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at paras. 41 and 48, varied [2003] O.J. No. 2218 (Ont. C.A.); Matoni v. C.B.S. Interactive Multimedia Inc., [2008] O.J. No. 197 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 71-77; Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2008] O.J. No. 3070 (Ont. S.C.J.); LeFrancois v. Guidant Corp., [2008] O.J. No. 1397 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 55. 393 Whether the representative plaintiff can provide adequate representation depends on such factors as: his or her motivation to prosecute the claim; his or her ability to bear the costs of the litigation; and the compe- tence of his or her counsel to prosecute the claim: Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (S.C.C.) at para. 41. 394 In the case at bar, Whirlpool made a fulsome argument that the Plain- tiffs action did not satisfy the representative plaintiff and litigation plan criterion for certification. A great deal of this attack was really a reprise of Whirlpool’s arguments that the other certification criteria were not satisfied and that the failure to satisfy these criteria was repeated in deficiencies in the litigation plan and in the representativeness of the several plaintiffs to various causes of action. Whirlpool’s fulsome argument about this criterion also addressed a variety of issues associated with the dangerousness of biofilm which are no longer pertinent to the certification criteria. Arora v. Whirlpool Canada LP Perell J. 327

395 For present purposes, it is not necessary to set out and analyze Whirl- pool’s fulsome argument because, once again, assuming that the action satisfies the cause of action criterion, and noting that the action has been narrowed to the common questions D to K inclusive, the stinger of Whirlpool’s argument about the fifth criterion has been removed. 396 In other words, with the assumption that there are causes of action and with the narrowing of the common issues, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs are appropriate representative plaintiffs for the cause of action that would be certified. 397 Although I would have directed that an amended litigation plan be prepared to reflect the common issues and the individual issues that emerged after the certification motion, in my opinion, the current litigation plan is adequate for the certifiable common questions. 398 Therefore, with the above assumptions, I conclude that the fifth criterion for certification has been satisfied.

J. Conclusion 399 For the above Reasons, I dismiss the motion for certification. 400 If the parties cannot agree about the matter of costs, they may make submissions in writing beginning with Whirlpool’s submissions within 20 days of the release of these Reasons for Decision followed by the Plaintiffs’ submissions within a further 20 days. Motion dismissed. 328 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

[Indexed as: Guergis v. Novak] Helena Guergis, Plaintiff and V. Raymond Novak, Arthur Hamilton, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Guy Giorno, Shelly Glover, The Honourable Lisa Raitt, Axelle Pellerin, Conservative Party of Canada and Derrick Snowdy, Defendants Ontario Superior Court of Justice Docket: Ottawa 11-53210 2012 ONSC 4579 Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. Heard: July 18-20, 2012 Judgment: August 24, 2012 Civil practice and procedure –––– Parties — Capacity to sue or be sued –––– Plaintiff was former Member of Parliament and former Minister of State for Sta- tus of Women — Prime Minister removed plaintiff from caucus, from position as minister and as candidate for Conservative Party of Canada (“CPC”) on grounds of unlawful and/or criminal conduct — Plaintiff brought action for defamation and other torts against defendant Prime Minister and CPC, and others — Defendants brought motion to strike statement of claim, and issue arose as to whether CPC could be sued in tort — Unincorporated association was organization that was not legal entity separate from persons who composed it — Unincorporated association had no corporate existence or legal status — Political parties, as unincorporated associations could not be sued in tort — Claims against CPC were struck. Constitutional law –––– Status of Crown — Prerogatives — General principles –––– Plaintiff was former Member of Parliament and former Minister of State for Status of Women — Prime Minister removed plaintiff from caucus, from position as minister and as candidate for Conservative Party of Canada (“CPC”) on grounds of unlawful and/or criminal conduct — Plaintiff argued that while expulsion from cabinet was within Crown prerogative, prerogative did not insulate Prime Minister’s Office from responsibility for tortuous conduct — Plaintiff brought action for defamation, conspiracy and other torts against defendant Prime Minister and CPC, and others — Defendants brought motion to strike statement of claim, and issue arose as to exercise of Crown prerogative — Doctrine of parliamentary privilege precluded judicial review of expulsion, disqualification from caucus and other disciplinary matters pertaining to Members of Parliament — Appointment and dismissal of ministers was core aspect of Crown prerogative exercised by Prime Minister — Crown privilege could not be Guergis v. Novak 329 displaced or attacked collaterally by way of allegations or tortious conduct — When Crown privilege applied, court lacked jurisdiction to review acts protected by privilege. Torts –––– Defamation — Privilege — Absolute privilege — Miscellane- ous –––– Plaintiff was former Member of Parliament and former Minister of State for Status of Women — Prime Minister removed plaintiff from caucus, from position as minister and as candidate for Conservative Party of Canada (“CPC”) on grounds of unlawful and/or criminal conduct — Plaintiff argued that Prime Minister, chief of staff and principal secretary engaged in conversations and communications that were defamatory to plaintiff — Plaintiff brought action for defamation, conspiracy and other torts against defendant Prime Minister and CPC, and others — Defendants brought motion to strike statement of claim, and issue arose as to absolute privilege — Absolute privilege was accorded to communications within executive branch of government when statement was made by high officer of state to another officer of state; communications related to state matters; and communication was made by officer of state in course of official duty — Alleged defamatory comments made between Prime Minister and senior advisors fell squarely within absolute privilege. Civil practice and procedure –––– Pleadings — General requirements — Where constituting abuse of process –––– Plaintiff was former Member of Par- liament and former Minister of State for Status of Women — Prime Minister removed plaintiff from caucus, from position as minister and as candidate for Conservative Party of Canada (“CPC”) on grounds of unlawful and/or criminal conduct — Plaintiff brought proceedings before Canadian Human Rights Com- mission (“CHRC”) on grounds that removal from cabinet and parliamentary caucus were result of discrimination based on marital status, family status and sex — CHRC refused to deal with complaints on basis of doctrines of Crown prerogatives and parliamentary privilege that barred CHRC from exercising jurisdiction over complaints — Plaintiff brought action for defamation and other torts against defendant Prime Minister and CPC, and others — Defendants brought motion to strike statement of claim, and issue arose as to abuse of process — Issue of whether Prime Minister’s actions, in removing plaintiff from cabinet and caucus, were subject to review by court was decided by CHRC and as such created issue estoppel with respect to those individuals — It was abuse of process for plaintiff to have CHRC’s determinations on issue of Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege re-litigated. Torts –––– Defamation — Practice and procedure — Pleadings — Pleading publication –––– Improper to plead other torts together with defamation when only damages arose from allegedly defamatory words. 330 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

Civil practice and procedure –––– Disposition without trial — Stay or dismissal of action — Grounds — Action frivolous, vexatious or abuse of process — General principles. Cases considered by Charles T. Hackland R.S.J.: Avalon Rare Metals Inc. v. Hykawy (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 12514, 2011 ONSC 5569 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Black v. Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1672, 54 O.R. (3d) 215, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 228, (sub nom. Black v. Chrétien) 147 O.A.C. 141, [2001] O.J. No. 1853 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid (2005), 2005 SCC 30, 2005 CarswellNat 1272, 2005 CarswellNat 1273, 333 N.R. 314, 41 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 252 D.L.R. (4th) 529, 28 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667, 2005 C.L.L.C. 230- 016, 135 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2005] S.C.J. No. 28, EYB 2005-90618 (S.C.C.) — considered Dowson v. Canada (1981), (sub nom. Dowson v. R.) 124 D.L.R. (3d) 260, (sub nom. Dowson v. R.) 37 N.R. 127, 1981 CarswellNat 738 (Fed. C.A.) — considered Grewal v. Conservative Party of Canada (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2232, [2004] O.J. No. 2299 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) (1996), (sub nom. Harvey c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur-général)) 137 D.L.R. (4th) 142, 201 N.R. 1, 37 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876, 178 N.B.R. (2d) 161, 454 A.P.R. 161, 1996 CarswellNB 467, 1996 CarswellNB 468, EYB 1996-67337 (S.C.C.) — considered Hunt v. T & N plc (1990), 1990 CarswellBC 216, 43 C.P.C. (2d) 105, 117 N.R. 321, 4 C.O.H.S.C. 173 (headnote only), (sub nom. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.) [1990] 6 W.W.R. 385, 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, (sub nom. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.) 74 D.L.R. (4th) 321, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, 1990 CarswellBC 759, 4 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.) [1990] S.C.J. No. 93, EYB 1990-67014 (S.C.C.) — referred to Longley v. Canada (Attorney General) (2007), 231 O.A.C. 244, 165 C.R.R. (2d) 190, 88 O.R. (3d) 408, 2007 ONCA 852, 2007 CarswellOnt 7823, 288 D.L.R. (4th) 599, [2007] O.J. No. 4758 (Ont. C.A.) — considered MacAlpine v. Ontario Progressive Conservative Party (2003), 2003 Carswell- Ont 3008 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79 (2003), 232 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 9 Admin. L.R. (4th) 161, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 17 C.R. (6th) 276, 2003 SCC 63, 2003 CarswellOnt 4328, 2003 CarswellOnt 4329, 311 N.R. 201, 2003 C.L.L.C. 220-071, 179 O.A.C. 291, 120 L.A.C. (4th) 225, 31 C.C.E.L. (3d) 216, [2003] S.C.J. No. 64, REJB 2003-49439 (S.C.C.) — considered Zündel v. Liberal Party of Canada (1999), 90 O.T.C. 63, 1999 CarswellOnt 241, 60 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [1999] O.J. No. 74 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 331

Statutes considered: Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 s. 67(4) — considered s. 504 — referred to Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Generally — referred to Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 s. 5 — referred to s. 7 — referred to s. 41(1)(c) — considered Rules considered: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 Generally — referred to R. 21 — considered R. 21.01(3)(b) — considered

MOTION by defendants to strike plaintiff’s statement of claim.

Stephen Victor, Q.C., David Cutler, for Helena Guergis Robert W. Staley, Derek J. Bell, for V. Raymond Novak, The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Shelly Glover and The Honourable Lisa Raitt Peter N. Mantas, Marisa E. Victor, for Guy Giorno Wendy J. Wagner, for Axelle Pellerin Paul D’Angelo, for Conservative Party of Canada Paul Le Vay, for Arthur Hamilton and Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP

Charles T. Hackland R.S.J.: Overview 1 The moving parties seek an order striking out the Statement of Claim in this action, without leave to amend, or in the alternative, an order for particulars of the conspiracy alleged in this pleading. 2 The plaintiff is a former Member of Parliament and former Minister of State for the Status of Women. She alleges a conspiracy, as well as certain other tort claims — defamation, misfeasance in public office, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and negligence — against the defendants. The alleged conspiracy is described at para. 24 of the Statement of Claim, as follows: The conspiracy was to engage in unlawful acts in order to remove and/or justify the removal of the Plaintiff from her positions as a 332 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

member of the caucus of CPC (Conservative Party of Canada), the candidate for the CPC in the Electoral District of Simcoe-Grey, and the Minister of State for the Status of Women, in a manner deemed by the Defendants to be to their political, personal, and/or financial benefit. 3 The defendants, moving parties on this motion, are: a. The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada; b. Guy Giorno, the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, at the material time; c. Raymond Novak, the Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, at the material time; d. The Honourable Lisa Raitt, Minister of Labour; e. Axelle Pellerin, an official on Minister Raitt’s staff; f. The Conservative Party of Canada (“CPC”); g. Arthur Hamilton, a lawyer with the law firm, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP (“Cassels Brock”), who was the lawyer for the Prime Minister and the CPC, at the material time, and h. Shelly Glover, a Conservative Member of Parliament. The defendant, Derrick Snowdy, takes no part in this motion. 4 The Statement of Claim alleges that the Prime Minister’s office received a report of alleged criminal misconduct concerning the plaintiff, originating from the defendant, Snowdy. On the advice of Mr. Giorno and Mr. Novak, the Prime Minister communicated this information in a telephone call to the plaintiff in an attempt to have her resign from cabinet. According to the plaintiff, the object of the conspiracy was, “to effect or justify the plaintiff’s removal as a member of the caucus of CPC, her removal as the candidate for the CPC in the Electoral District of Simcoe-Grey, and her removal from her position as Minister of State for the Status of Women....” 5 Further, it is alleged that on April 9, 2010, the same day of the Prime Minister’s telephone call to the plaintiff, the Prime Minister, with Mr. Giorno and Mr. Novak, sent letters to the Commissioner of the RCMP and the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, repeating the allegations that the plaintiff had been involved in improper, unlawful and/or criminal conduct. It is alleged that these letters were defamatory of the plaintiff and were written in furtherance of the conspiracy engaged in by the defendants. Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 333

6 This motion to strike is brought under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. The applicable test is well-known. The court must assume that the alleged facts can be proven, and ask whether it is “plain and obvious” that the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action? See Hunt v. T & N plc, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), at para. 33.

The Issues 7 The principal submission made by the moving parties on this motion is that the conspiracy and other tort claims advanced in the action are neither justiciable nor subject to judicial process, as such claims relate to the exercise of Crown prerogative or parliamentary privilege. In addition, the moving parties argue that these issues have been previously decided, adverse to the plaintiff, by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (“CHRC”), such that this action is frivolous, vexatious, and amounts to an abuse of process. 8 The moving parties also submit that the communications between the Prime Minister and Messrs. Novak and Giorno are subject to absolute privilege and that the letters to the RCMP Commissioner and the Ethics Commissioner are not defamatory. The moving parties contend that, in any event, the communications are subject to absolute, or in the alternative, qualified privilege. 9 As such, the moving parties submit that it is plain and obvious that the alleged claims cannot succeed and should be struck from the State- ment of Claim.

Law and Analysis

Crown Prerogative 10 As previously noted, the plaintiff asserts, at para. 24 of her Statement of Claim, that the object of the conspiracy was to engage in unlawful acts “in order to remove and/or justify the removal” of the plaintiff as a Min- ister of the Crown. The plaintiff pleads that the Prime Minister, his Chief of Staff, and his Principal Secretary, were all part of this conspiracy. 11 The moving parties submit that the power to appoint or dismiss cabinet ministers at pleasure is a Crown prerogative, exercised by the Prime Minister, that is not justiciable at law. Therefore, the alleged tortious conduct, directed as it is to the removal of a cabinet minister from office, is not justiciable. 334 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

12 The plaintiff’s position is that while her expulsion from cabinet would be within the Prime Minister’s prerogative in the normal course, the Crown prerogative does not insulate the Prime Minister’s Office from responsibility for tortious conduct in relation to the plaintiff’s removal from cabinet. In the plaintiff’s submission, the fact that such tortuous conduct ultimately led to the resignation of the plaintiff from cabinet — an end which could have been achieved by the Prime Minister law- fully — does not absolve or protect the Prime Minister from liability for such tortuous conduct, on the basis of Crown prerogative. 13 The law is well settled that the appointment of Ministers and their dismissal is a core aspect of the Crown prerogative exercised by the Prime Minister. Black v. Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215 (Ont. C.A.) [Black], a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, deals with the Prime Minister’s prerogative regarding the bestowal of honours. In Black, at para. 58, the court approved Lord Roskill’s enumeration of specific exercises of the prerogative power “whose subject matters were by their very nature not justiciable”: So characterized, it is plain and obvious that the Prime Minister’s exercise of the honours prerogative is not judicially reviewable. In- deed, in the Civil Service Unions case, Lord Roskill listed a number of exercises of the prerogative power whose subject matters were by their very nature not justiciable. Included in the list was the grant of honours. He wrote, in a passage I have already referred to, at p. 418: But I do not think that that right of challenge can be un- qualified. It must, I think, depend upon the subject matter of the prerogative power which is exercised. Many examples were given during the argument of prerogative powers which as at present advised I do not think could properly be made the subject of judicial review. Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of ministers as well as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review because their nature and subject matter are such as not to be amenable to the judicial process. The courts are not the place wherein to determine whether a treaty should be concluded or the armed forces disposed in a particular manner or Parlia- ment dissolved on one date rather than another. [Underlining in original; bold emphasis added.] Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 335

14 As noted, the plaintiff contends that because, as pleaded, the Min- ister’s removal from office was the product or effect of the Prime Min- ister’s tortious conduct, the prerogative otherwise applicable does not apply to protect his conduct from judicial scrutiny. In other words, the contention is that the Prime Minister and his senior advisors can be called into court to explain and justify the Prime Minister’s removal of the plaintiff from the federal cabinet because her removal was part of a conspiracy or motivated by improper, tortious intentions. 15 I am of the opinion that the plaintiff’s contentions are wrong and, if sustained, would render meaningless this important privilege. The Prime Minister would be required to answer, in court, for the political decisions he makes, as to the membership of his cabinet. Crown privilege is an important principle of our legal system and it cannot be displaced or attacked collaterally by way of allegations of tortious conduct. There is no authority that would support the proposition that Crown prerogative is waived or is inapplicable if the otherwise protected decisions are alleged to be tortious. On the contrary, the result must be that when Crown privilege applies, the court lacks the jurisdiction to review the acts protected by the privilege. In this case, I find that it is plain and obvious that the actions of the Prime Minister, in relation to the removal of the plaintiff from cabinet, fall within Crown prerogative and this Court lacks the jurisdiction to review the tort allegations related to the Prime Minister’s actions. These actions are pleaded to be taken on the advice of the Prime Minister’s two senior advisors, Mr. Giorno, Chief of Staff, and Mr. No- vak, Principal Secretary, whose conduct in the circumstances alleged must also be protected by Crown prerogative.

Parliamentary Privilege 16 A similar analysis applies to the plaintiff’s allegation that the conspiracy was to engage in unlawful acts in order to remove and/or justify the removal of the plaintiff from her position as a member of the caucus of the CPC. The moving parties submit that decisions as to caucus membership are not justiciable at law because they are protected by parliamentary privilege. 17 Under the constitutional doctrine of parliamentary privilege, the Prime Minister, as a Member of Parliament, is immune from external review by a court or tribunal when he carries out functions that are necessary to the discharge of his legislative responsibility. The threshold question is whether the acts in question fall within the scope of the privi- 336 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

lege. If they do, the court has no jurisdiction to determine whether the exercise of the privilege was appropriate. 18 In Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, 2005 SCC 30, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667 (S.C.C.) [Vaid], the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the constitutional status of parliamentary privilege in Canada. The Supreme Court also provided important guidance in determining whether an activity falls within the protected sphere of that privilege. The Court stated that the first step in determining whether parliamentary privilege exists is to determine whether the validity and scope of the claimed privilege has been “authoritatively established in relation to our own Parliament” (Vaid, at para. 39). If the privilege has not been authoritatively established, the claim must be tested against the “doctrine of necessity,” which requires that the matter at issue is necessary for the legislature to operate. 19 Canadian courts have applied the doctrine of parliamentary privilege to find that expulsion, disqualification, and other disciplinary actions taken against Members of Parliament or other office holders fall within parliamentary privilege and are, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. 20 In Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876 (S.C.C.), a former member of the provincial legislature brought a Char- ter challenge with respect to his expulsion from the legislature for election fraud and his statutory disqualification from being re-elected. The minority judgment of the court, delivered by McLachlin J., addressed the issue of parliamentary privilege, holding that the member’s expulsion from the legislature, and disqualification from running for re-election, were matters falling within parliamentary privilege and, therefore, were not subject to review by the court. They observed that the power to dis- qualify members for corruption was necessary to the dignity, integrity and efficient functioning of the legislature. 21 I accept the submission of the moving parties that it is settled law that the doctrine of parliamentary privilege precludes judicial review of expulsion, disqualification from caucus and other disciplinary matters pertaining to Members of Parliament. A Prime Minister’s removal or sus- pension of a Member of Parliament from caucus is at the core of parliamentary privilege. 22 The plaintiff’s position is that while, in the ordinary course, the Prime Minister has the power to remove a member from caucus, an act that would be immune from review by the courts by reason of parliamentary Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 337

privilege — in this case, the tortious conduct — remains actionable even though the result of such conduct was the plaintiff’s removal from caucus. I do not accept this argument. It suggests that the Prime Minister and his senior officials can be called to account, in this legal proceeding, for the exercise of the Prime Minister’s powers to control his parliamentary caucus. This would undermine parliamentary privilege and subject this purely political decision-making to review by the courts. It is plain and obvious that the tort claims arising from the plaintiff’s removal from caucus are beyond the court’s jurisdiction and, therefore, must be struck.

Abuse of Process 23 The moving parties submit that the plaintiff’s allegations, to the extent that they arise from her removal as a Minister of the Crown and as a member of caucus, constitute an abuse of process. The moving parties submit that the plaintiff seeks to re-litigate the findings of the CHRC, in a recent decision dated November 16, 2011. In proceedings before the CHRC, the plaintiff alleged that her removal from cabinet and from the parliamentary caucus were the result of discrimination on the basis of marital status, family status and sex, contrary to ss. 5 and 7 of the Cana- dian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [CHRA]. The responding party to this complaint was the Prime Minister. A similar complaint was filed by the plaintiff against the Prime Minister’s Office and the CPC. 24 The CHRC refused to deal with the complaints under s. 41(1)(c) of the CHRA, on the basis that the doctrines of Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege barred the CHRC from exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints. Specifically, the CHRC ruled that, “all of the allegations flowing from the complainant’s former position as Minister of the Crown, would fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commis- sion pursuant to the doctrine of Crown prerogative” and “it is clear that those elements of the complaint relating to the complainant’s former position as a member of the CPC caucus would fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commission pursuant to Parliamentary privilege.” This decision was arrived at after receiving written submissions from all parties. I am satisfied that the jurisdictional issues dealt with by the CHRC, as far as they relate to Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, are identi- cal to the issues raised before this Court. 25 Based on the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77 (S.C.C.), I am of the opinion that it is an abuse of process for the plaintiff 338 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

to seek to have the CHRC’s determinations on the issue of Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege re-litigated. While I appreciate that the plaintiff bases her allegations on a tortious conspiracy and certain specific torts (rather than a human rights violation), the issue remains whether the Prime Minister’s actions, in removing the plaintiff from cabinet and from caucus, are subject to review by the courts. That issue, as it relates to the plaintiff and the Prime Minister and the senior advisors in his office, has been decided and creates an issue estoppel, at least with respect to these individuals. In other words, the ruling of the CHRC, although dealing with the Commission’s jurisdiction, was decided on general principles applicable to these two forms of privilege and apply equally to this Court. 26 In the event that I am in error in applying abuse of process principles to this case, I have independently considered the application of the Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege as discussed previously in these reasons. I respectfully agree with the CHRC’s treatment of these issues.

Removal as a Candidate 27 The plaintiff alleges that the National Candidate Selection Committee of the CPC removed her as the candidate for the CPC in the electoral district of Simcoe-Grey, and that such removal was effected at the direction of the Prime Minister in furtherance of a tortious conspiracy. The moving parties submit that even if this allegation is proven, the leaders of federal political parties in Canada are expressly authorized by statute to refuse the candidacy of any person seeking to run for that party. This Court has held that the leader of a political party has the statutory authority, pursuant to s. 67(4) of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, to refuse to endorse a candidate. In Grewal v. Conservative Party of Can- ada, [2004] O.J. No. 2299 (Ont. S.C.J.), the plaintiff argued that, pursuant to s. 67(4), the leader cannot reject candidates arbitrarily. The Court rejected such a “restrictive application” of that section and instead stated, at para. 31, that: [T]he Party [sic] determines the candidates he wishes to have repre- senting the Party. It is not for the Court to make those determinations. The Court should not interfere with a process that has been established by a Party or a process that has been established pursuant to a statute. 28 In contrast with the Prime Minister’s removal of the plaintiff from cabinet and from caucus, his refusal to endorse a candidate is contem- Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 339

plated by statute and cannot be tortious in and of itself. In theory, the refusal to endorse the plaintiff as a candidate for the CPC could be one step in a conspiracy involving tortious acts otherwise properly pleaded. Neither Crown prerogative nor parliamentary privilege directly apply. However, the Statement of Claim identifies the objects of the alleged conspiracy to be the removal of the plaintiff from cabinet, from caucus and from her position as the CPC’s candidate in the electoral district of Simcoe-Grey. While the Prime Minister’s refusal to endorse the plaintiff as a candidate could be subject to judicial review in very narrow circumstances, it is combined in this pleading with two other non justiciable matters in such a manner as to render the alleged conspiracy non justiciable as a whole. It is plain and obvious that this conspiracy claim cannot succeed and must be struck.

Absolute Privilege 29 The plaintiff alleges that the Prime Minister and his Chief of Staff, Mr. Giorno, and Principal Secretary, Mr. Novak, engaged in a series of conversations and communications, which were defamatory of the plaintiff. The moving parties’ position on this motion is that these communications, as reflected in the Statement of Claim are the subject of absolute privilege and, therefore, should be struck. 30 Absolute privilege has been accorded to communications within the executive branch of government when three conditions are satisfied: (1) the statement has been made by a high officer of state to another officer of state; (2) the communication relates to state matters; and (3) the communication is made by the officer of state in the course of his or her official duty. 31 In Dowson v. Canada (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 260, 37 N.R. 127 (Fed. C.A.) [Dowson], the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a trial judge’s decision striking the plaintiff’s statement of claim for defamation. The allegation of defamation stemmed from a statement contained in a report from a Chief Superintendent of the RCMP to an Acting Assistant Deputy Attorney General for Ontario. The ground upon which the plaintiff’s statement of claim was struck out was that the statement was protected by absolute privilege. The Court held that, the fact that the statement had been made in response to a question directed to the Solicitor General of Canada by the Attorney General for Ontario (concerning an RCMP investigation into the affairs of a political party), meant that the statement was to be regarded as a statement by the Solicitor General. The Solicitor 340 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

General, being a Minister of the Crown, was a sufficiently high officer of state to enjoy the protection of absolute privilege. That privilege also protected the senior official writing the correspondence on the Minister’s instructions. 32 In my opinion, the alleged defamatory statements made in conversations between the Prime Minister and his senior advisors, Mr. Giorno and Mr. Novak (outlined at paras. 60-64 of the Statement of Claim), fall squarely within absolute privilege accorded to officers of state and their senior advisors when communicating on matters within their official duties. The subject of the communications referenced in the Statement of Claim was the suspected improper conduct of a cabinet minister. The same rationale applies to the April 9, 2010 letter from Mr. Novak to the RCMP Commissioner and Minister Raitt’s alleged defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff, made to senior officials in the Prime Min- ister’s office.

Axelle Pellerin 33 On the facts as pleaded, the alleged defamatory statements made by the defendant, Ms. Pellerin, to Mr. Giorno are also protected by the absolute privilege recognized in Dowson. The alleged statements were made by Ms. Pellerin, an employee of the Government of Canada, working at the direction of a Minister of the Crown, to the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister. Therefore, the statements satisfy the Dowson requirement of a communication from one officer of state to another. The alleged defamatory statements related to state matters and were made by Ms. Pellerin within the scope of her duties as a federal public servant. It was in the ordinary course of affairs for Ms. Pellerin, as an employee of the Government of Canada, working at the direction of a Minister of the Federal Crown, to report to Mr. Giorno criminal conduct allegedly engaged in by another Minister of the Crown. 34 The other causes of action (conspiracy, negligence and intentional infliction of mental suffering), pleaded against Ms. Pellerin, are all based on words spoken by Ms. Pellerin; they form the subject of the plaintiff’s defamation allegations. I agree with Ms. Pellerin’s submission that these additional tort claims are “dressed up” defamation claims, inserted in the pleading for the purpose of avoiding the application of the absolute privilege defence otherwise available to this defendant on the defamation claims. As such, these tort claims are improper and should be struck. The fundamental problem applies to the tort claims (other than defamation) Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 341

pleaded against each of the moving parties. This is, in substance, a defamation action based on the words spoken about the plaintiff by each of the moving party defendants. The case law establishes that it is improper to plead other torts together with defamation when the only damages arise from the allegedly defamatory words. In Avalon Rare Metals Inc. v. Hykawy, 2011 ONSC 5569 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 15-16, this court addressed the proper approach to a motion to strike concurrent claims for defamation and negligence: It is common ground that there is no absolute bar to a plaintiff claiming damages for defamation and concurrently or in the alternative for other torts. At the same time, it is also undisputed that a claim for defamation cannot be “dressed up” as another claim to evade the defences available in a defamation action. In consequence, the questions to be determined on this motion are whether all of the pleaded causes of action are independent or whether they are subsumed under the law of defamation. In other words, do all of the pleaded claims rest on the impugned publications and do all of the damages claimed arise only as a result of those publications? [Emphasis added.] 35 The plaintiff alleges that two defamatory letters, each dated April 9, 2010, were written by Mr. Giorno to the RCMP Commissioner and by Mr. Novak to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, on the instructions of the Prime Minister. I quote these letters in full: Dear Commissioner: [RCMP Commissioner William J.S. Elliott] The Prime Minister has asked me to provide the following information on his behalf. Late last night our office became aware of the specifics of allegations made by Mr. Derrick Snowdy, a private investigator, concerning the conduct of Mr. Rahim Jaffer and the Hon. Helena Guergis. The allegations are numerous and include fraud, extortion, obtaining benefits by false pretences and involvement in prostitution. The extent of the allegations makes it impossible for me to summarize them completely in this brief letter. Our office has no first-hand knowledge of these allegations and our office has not communicated directly with Mr. Snowdy. Communica- tion was conducted through the Conservative Party’s legal counsel, Mr. Arthur Hamilton of Cassels Brock, Toronto. I have been informed that Mr. Snowdy states that he has collected evidence to corroborate his allegations and that he can be reached by 342 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

telephone at ... I understand that Mr. Snowdy says the information was already shared with the RCMP and the OPP, but I want to ensure that you are aware of it. Mr. Hamilton is also available to be contacted by members of the RCMP. He can be reached at ... If there is any more assistance that we can provide, please let me know. Sincerely, [V. Raymond Novak, Principal Secretary] Dear Commissioner: [Ms. Mary Dawson Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner] I have been instructed by the Prime Minister to provide you with the following information on his behalf. Late last night our office became aware of the specifics of allegations made by Mr. Derrick Snowdy, a private investigator, concerning the conduct of the Hon. Helena Guergis. In particular, Mr. Snowdy alleges that Ms Guergis attended meetings at which she promised to advance private business interests. Mr. Snowdy makes additional allegations about the MP’s conduct, allegations that may or may not be relevant to her responsibilities under the Conflict of Interest Act and/or the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons. Our office has no first-hand knowledge of these allegations and our office has not communicated directly with Mr. Snowdy. Communica- tion was conducted through the Conservative Party’s legal counsel. However, I am aware that Mr. Snowdy states that he has collected evidence to corroborate his allegations. I believe that Mr. Snowdy can be reached by telephone at ... Sincererly, [Guy Giorno, Chief of Staff] 36 I am of the opinion that the April 9, 2010 letters written by Mr. No- vak to the RCMP Commissioner and by Mr. Giorno to the Ethics Com- missioner, both (as pleaded) on the instructions of the Prime Minister, are neither defamatory on their face nor are they reasonably capable of bearing the implications of criminal activity suggested at paras. 52 and 79 of the Statement of Claim. I make a similar observation with respect to the Prime Minister’s statement of April 9, 2010, which is quoted at para. 72 of the Statement of Claim: Last night, my office became aware of serious allegations regarding the conduct of the Honourable Helena Guergis. These allegations relate to the conduct of Ms. Guergis and do not involve any other minister, MP, senator or federal government employee. I’ve referred the Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 343

allegations to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner and to the RCMP. Under the circumstances, I will not comment on them further.

Shelly Glover 37 The plaintiff has pleaded, at para. 84 of the Statement of Claim, that the defendant, Shelly Glover, made defamatory statements during a media interview when she stated, “I can assure you that there is far more to come out,” and, “[t]his isn’t finished.” Counsel for Ms. Glover contends that the statements clearly demonstrate that Ms. Glover was supporting the plaintiff rather than disparaging her. Counsel argues that nothing said by Ms. Glover can be taken to refer to or validate allegations in the public domain that the plaintiff had engaged in criminal conduct. Having reviewed the video and transcript of this interview, I am of the opinion that it is plain and obvious that Ms. Glover’s statements cannot reasonably bear the implications pleaded (i.e., that the plaintiff had been or was involved in criminal conduct and that reliable evidence would be made available in the future, confirming that the plaintiff had been involved in such conduct). 38 As against the defendants, Prime Minister Harper and Messrs. Novak and Giorno, the causes of action pleaded are conspiracy, defamation, misfeasance in public office, intentional infliction of mental suffering and negligence. The conspiracy and defamation allegations, as explained above, fall within the conduct protected by the principles of Crown prerogative, parliamentary privilege and absolute privilege. The Statement of Claim, at para. 56, pleads that Prime Minister Harper and Messrs. No- vak and Giorno engaged in the tort of misfeasance in public office: In addition, or in the alternative, Novak’s letter to the RCMP dated April 9, 2012 constituted misfeasance in public office, as it was prepared and sent by Novak, Giorno and Harper in an abuse of their power as public officeholders, in bad faith, maliciously and/or for the illegitimate purpose of discrediting the Plaintiff and justifying her removal from the CPC caucus and forced resignation from the position of Minister of State for the Status of Women. Though the RCMP’s criminal investigation of the Plaintiff that resulted from Novak’s letter was ultimately terminated in the Plaintiff’s favour, the Plaintiff suffered damage as a result of that letter and the misfeasance in public office of Noval, Giorno and Harper in writing the letter and trig- gering the RCMP investigation. 344 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

39 In my opinion, the Prime Minister’s removal of the plaintiff from office as a member of cabinet and caucus is not justiciable. Moreover, the letter to the RCMP Commissioner is not defamatory and is the subject of an absolute privilege. Therefore, it necessarily follows that, sending the letter cannot constitute a misfeasance in public office on the part of the Prime Minister or Messrs. Giorno and Novak. I make the same observation with respect to the allegations of misfeasance in public office against these defendants in relation to the April 9, 2010 letter sent to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (Statement of Claim, at para. 82).

Conservative Party of Canada 40 The plaintiff pleads, at paras. 105-109 of the Statement of Claim, that her removal as a candidate for the CPC in the electoral district of Simcoe-Grey contravened the principles of natural justice. Moreover, the plaintiff pleads that her removal as a candidate was done in bad faith, in contravention of a duty of care owed by the CPC to the plaintiff. It is further alleged that her removal, “was effected at the direction of Harper ... in furtherance of the conspiracy pleaded herein.” Counsel for the CPC submits that the CPC, as an unincorporated association, cannot be sued in tort. I accept this submission. The CPC relies on Rule 21.01(3)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a defendant may move before a court to have an action stayed or dismissed on the ground that, “the defendant does not have the legal capacity to be sued.” 41 An unincorporated association is an organization that is not a legal entity, separate from the persons who compose it. It has no corporate existence or legal status apart from its members, cannot hold property in its own name, and is not capable of being sued. See: Hon. Madam Justice Eileen E. Gillese & Martha Milczynski, The Law of Trusts, 2nd ed. (To- ronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2005), at p. 38. 42 The case law has consistently held that political parties, as unincorporated associations, cannot be sued in tort. In Z¨undel v. Liberal Party of Canada, [1999] O.J. No. 74 (Ont. Gen. Div.), the plaintiff sued the defendant, Liberal Party, for conspiracy. After a careful review of the jurisprudence, Chadwick J., at para. 11, held: The fact that the Elections Act of Canada provides for the Chief Agents to conduct affairs on behalf of the political parties does not vest the political parties with the capacity to sue or be sued. The Can- ada Elections Act does not go that far to provide them with that right and responsibility. It is common ground by counsel for all of the political parties that the political parties have no assets, hold no real Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 345

estate, employ no people, and as such are not a legal entity. I agree with their position and on that basis I would dismiss the claim as against the political parties. 43 More recently, in MacAlpine v. Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, 2003 CarswellOnt 3008 (Ont. S.C.J.), in relation to a similar claim, Pierce J. commented, at paras. 26 and 31: The claim is brought against the members of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party caucus and the balance of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party. The individual members are not named. Even if the claim were tenable, it would be impossible to know against whom judgment would lie, let alone against whom it could be enforced. Rule 21.01(3)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move for an order staying or dismissing an action if the defendant does not have the legal capacity to be sued. Such is the case here. It is “plain and obvious” the plaintiff cannot succeed against the On- tario Progressive Conservative Party and members of the Conserva- tive Caucus. The plaintiff confuses the provincial government with the provincial Progressive Conservative Party. 44 The common law rule that political parties, as unincorporated associations, do not have the status to sue or be sued in tort in their own name, has been affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Longley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 852, 88 O.R. (3d) 408 (Ont. C.A.) [Longley]. In Longley, certain political parties argued that s. 504 of the Canada Elections Act should be interpreted as having changed the common law, so as to permit political parties to sue or be sued in their own name. The court rejected this submission, holding that s. 504 of the Canada Elections Act clothes political parties with such status only for the purpose of proceedings under the Act. Blair J.A., speaking for the court, stated, at paras. 117 and 121: The respondents argue that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face: in the case of judicial proceedings involving a political party, the party “is deemed to be a person”. Canada submits, on the other hand, that the provisions of s. 504(a) do not infuse political parties with the status of legal entities entitled to sue or to be sued for all purposes; rather, s. 504(a) clothes them with that status only for purposes of proceedings under the Act, for example those relating to enforcement, compliance or prosecution. It follows, according to the appellant, that the political party respondents do not have the status to bring the proceedings. 346 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

I would be more persuaded by the respondents’ position if the “deemed person” provision had been placed in the portion of Act regulating the registration and activities of political parties. Were that the case, it might suggest more strongly that Parliament intended to create a free-standing right on the part of political parties to sue and to be sued, thus abrogating the common law disability of a political party, as an unincorporated association, to do so. Placing the provision in Part 19 of the Act — dealing with enforcement, offences and compliance — signals a more limited intention on the part of Parlia- ment, in my opinion, and bolsters the argument that the “deemed person” provisions of s. 504(a) are designed to give political parties the status of legal entities for the purposes of proceedings under the Act only. 45 It follows, from the holding of the Court in Longley, that it is plain and obvious that the CPC cannot be sued in tort, as the plaintiff has attempted to do in this action. The claims against the CPC (Statement of Claim, at paras. 9, 105-109), are struck on the basis that the CPC lacks the status to be sued.

Arthur Hamilton and Cassels Brock 46 The allegations against Arthur Hamilton (and his law firm, Cassels Brock) are found at paras. 45-50 of the Statement of Claim. Mr. Hamil- ton is said to have been “the lawyer for CPC and Harper” (Statement of Claim, at para. 14). The allegations against him include conspiracy, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith, breach of confidence, and negligence (Statement of Claim, at para. 2). 47 It is pleaded that Mr. Hamilton and his law firm owed a fiduciary duty and a duty of good faith to the plaintiff, requiring him to, “act with regard to the Plaintiff’s interest” and “keep and protect the Plaintiff’s confidences” (Statement of Claim, at para. 45). This was as a result of a “relationship” arising from legal advice provided by Mr. Hamilton to the plaintiff. The legal advice was provided the day prior to the conversation in which Mr. Hamilton is alleged to have conveyed the false information concerning the plaintiff’s criminality to Mr. Giorno or Mr. Novak in the Prime Minister’s office. Details of the “relationship,” the nature of the “advice” by Mr. Hamilton, and the basis for asserting that Mr. Hamilton was under a duty not to convey the information received from Snowdy to his client, the Prime Minister, is not explained. It is not explained what confidential information is referred to. It is not suggested in the pleading that the information received from Snowdy was confidential. Moreover, Guergis v. Novak Charles T. Hackland R.S.J. 347

the Statement of Claim alleges, at para. 36, as the principal allegation against Mr. Hamilton, that he spoke defamatory words about the plaintiff (being the allegations of criminal behaviour) which had been conveyed to him by Snowdy, to the Prime Minister and Messrs. Giorno and Novak. At paras. 39(c)-(e), it is pleaded, “in the alternative,” that Snowdy never communicated any such allegations to Mr. Hamilton, and this same alternative allegation is then repeated at paras. 54(d)-(f) and paras. 63(c)-(e). Finally, at para. 67, the plaintiff pleads that the Prime Minister never became aware of the allegations of criminal conduct, but falsely advised the plaintiff of such allegations in order to cause her to resign from cabinet. 48 In my opinion, the allegations are contradictory, rather than alternative allegations as pleaded. As related to Mr. Hamilton, the pleading es- sentially says that he conveyed false information about the plaintiff to the Prime Minister. In the “alternative,” it is subsequently pleaded that he did not do so, with no alternative basis of liability suggested. It is pleaded that the Prime Minister received this information from Mr. Ham- ilton and, “in the alternative,” that he did not receive this information from Mr. Hamilton. Respectfully, this is incomprehensible as pleaded. 49 Moreover, there is an almost complete absence of particulars to support the claim that Mr. Hamilton and his law firm breached the plaintiff’s confidences or as to the basis of their obligations to the plaintiff. Once again, the tort claims, other than defamation, are based entirely on the alleged defamatory communications and, as such, are “dressed up” defamation claims as currently pleaded.

Disposition 50 In summary, I am of the opinion that the conspiracy allegation and the specific torts constituting the wrongful acts alleged to constitute this conspiracy, are based on the plaintiff’s removal from office as a Minister of the Crown, by the Prime Minister of Canada. The subject of this alleged conspiracy is conduct protected by the doctrine of Crown prerogative and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The plaintiff’s removal from caucus is similarly protected from review by the doctrine of parliamentary privilege and, on the same basis, is beyond review by this Court. Accordingly, I order that the allegations of conspiracy be struck and the action dismissed as against Prime Minister Harper, Guy Giorno and Raymond Novak, without leave to amend. 348 CANADIAN CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 C.C.L.T. (3d)

51 The claim against Arthur Hamilton and Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP is struck out, with leave to amend in accordance with these reasons. 52 The claim against the Conservative Party of Canada is struck, without leave to amend as this organization is a non-sueable entity. 53 The defamation claims which are subject to absolute privilege, as identified at paras. 29-33 of these reasons, are struck, without leave to amend. The action as against Minister Raitt and Axelle Pellerin are struck, without leave to amend. 54 The defamation claims arising from the letters of April 9, 2010 to the RCMP Commissioner and the Ethics Commissioner, the Prime Min- ister’s statement of April 9, 2010, and the statements of the defendant, Shelly Glover, are struck without leave to amend. 55 The plaintiff may, if so advised, file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, consistent with these reasons within 30 days of the release of these reasons or of the final disposition of any appeal herein. The defendants may make responding amendments to their pleadings in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 56 Any of the moving parties who wish to seek costs of this motion may submit a claim in writing to this Court within 21 days of the release of these reasons and the plaintiff may respond within 21 days of receipt of the defendants’ costs submissions. Order accordingly.