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The Virtuous Polity THE VIRTUOUS POLITY: ARISTOTLE ON JUSTICE, SELF-INTEREST AND CITIZENSHIP DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Robert Cathal Woods, MA * * * * * The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Allan Silverman, Adviser Professor David Hahm ________________________ Professor Sylvia Berryman Adviser Department of Philosophy ABSTRACT Aristotle’s classification of regimes includes a regime called polity, a correct regime in which a multitude rules. How can a multitude rule in the common interest? Aristotle’s basic answer is ‘Because they have a share of virtue and wisdom.’ Thus I ask ‘What moral qualities do the citizens of polity have?’ Answering this question leads us to consider what the functions of citizens are (Chapter 1), what broad claims are properly put forward as giving someone a claim to participate in government (Chapter 2), whether the citizens of polity are the middle class (Chapter 3), the relationship between wealth and virtue (Chapter 4), and the relationship between occupation and virtue (Chapter 5). I end by looking at the collectivity ‘argument’ (Chapter 6), where Aristotle states that a multitude of individuals with a share of virtue and wisdom can ‘come together’ and be as good in government as ‘the best few’. I find that the citizens of polity have military virtue and are at least habitually just and moderate. When the citizens are described by wealth and occupation rather than by character, those who are more wealthy and (more importantly) somewhat less wealthy, are also admissible as citizens, since some polities are mixes of oligarchy and democracy. In particular, farmers resemble the middle class closely enough to explain their admission into democratic- leaning polities. ii Dedicated to my parents. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank my adviser, Allan Silverman. I owe him a great intellectual debt for his philosophical acumen and his encouragement. He has provided an exemplary model of how to do philosophy, and this project has improved immeasurably under his guidance. I thank David Hahm. Since the very beginning of my graduate career, David has provided philosophical insight, sharp criticism, and good cheer. I thank Sylvia Berryman. Sylvia is a superb philosophical interlocutor, and I have benefited from her deep understanding of ancient philosophy and her kindness in offering it. I owe a special debt to Fred Miller. Fred’s enormous generosity, both personal and professional, has been a great help over the last few years. I am grateful for this, and for his lucid, insightful comments and discussions. For moral support and kind words I thank Andrew Arlig, Leah Blatzer, Zac Cogley, Bill Melanson, David Merli, Gill MacIntosh, Ryan Nichols, Josh Smith and Dan Farrell. The members of the dissertation seminar at Ohio State helped with Chapters 4 and 5, especially Josh Smith and Bill Melanson, and the members of departmental colloquia at Bowling Green and at Ohio State with Chapter 6. I am grateful to my early teachers, particularly Ronna Burger, who first inspired me to study Aristotle’s political philosophy. iv VITA January 19, 1972…………………………Born—Belfast, Northern Ireland 1995……………………………………….BA, (Hons.) Mental and Moral Science, University of Dublin, Trinity College 1997……………………………………….MA, Philosophy Tulane University 1997-2004…………………………………Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract..............................................................................................................................ii Dedication.........................................................................................................................iii Acknowledgments...........................................................................................................iv Vita......................................................................................................................................v Introduction.................................................................................................................…..1 1. The Common Advantage and Citizenship..............................................................12 1.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................12 1.2 The Distinction Between Ruling and Being Eligible to Rule..........................20 1.3 The Citizens and the Other Inhabitants............................................................21 1.4 On Not Being Included In The Common Advantage.....................................23 1.5 Citizens are Those Who Contribute to the Polis (Morrison)..........................25 1.6 Ruled Citizens (Keyt)...........................................................................................29 1.7 Normative Citizenship........................................................................................37 2. The Bases of Citizenship............................................................................................49 2.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................49 2.2 Claims to Rule.......................................................................................................52 2.3 Three Qualities Together.....................................................................................62 2.4 The Virtue of Rich and Poor...............................................................................67 2.5 Justice and Virtue.................................................................................................74 2.6 The Aim of Polity and Military Virtue..............................................................78 vi 3. Polity and The Middle Regime.................................................................................88 3.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................88 3.2 The Middle Regime Introduced.........................................................................91 3.3 How The Moderately Wealthy Promote a Stable Regime..............................95 3.4 Hoplite Polity......................................................................................................100 3.5 Mixed Polities......................................................................................................105 3.6 All Mixed Polities Require a Middle Class.....................................................108 3.7 Mixed Middles are Polities................................................................................114 4. Wealth and Virtue.....................................................................................................126 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................126 4.2 Character of the Moderately Wealthy.............................................................131 4.3 Wealth as the Goal of Life.................................................................................137 4.4 Generosity and Justice.......................................................................................141 4.5 Moderate Wealth and The Pursuit of Wealth................................................148 4.6 Justice and Politics..............................................................................................156 5. Social Classes and Citizenship................................................................................159 5.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................159 5.2 Citizenship and the Best Citizens (Politics 3.4)..............................................162 5.3 Manual Laborers (Politics 3.5)..........................................................................166 5.4 Occupation...........................................................................................................172 5.5 Farmers................................................................................................................180 6. The Virtue and Wisdom of The Many...................................................................189 6.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................189 6.2 Initial Analysis of the Analogies......................................................................192 6.3 Purgation.............................................................................................................199 6.4 The Best Few.......................................................................................................208 6.5 A Share of Virtue and Wisdom........................................................................213 6.6 Initial Defense of Summation of Virtues Account.........................................224 6.7 On the Dialogical Model....................................................................................227 6.8 On the Need for a Synthesizing Mind.............................................................232 6.9 A Summation Of Virtues Account...................................................................235 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................245 Bibliography..................................................................................................................249
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