Air America at the Bay of Pigs by Dr

Home , Antonio Maceo Airport, Bay of Pigs, Brigade 2506, Fort Randolph (Panama), Guatemalan Air Force, Nicaraguan Air Force

Air America at the Bay of Pigs by Dr. Joe F. Leeker

First published on 11 August 2008, last updated on 15 March 2021

Retalhuleu airfield (“Rayo Base”) in 1960/1 (US Government photograph)

A) Preparations at Retalhuleu: dropping supplies to Cuban rebels in 1960/1 Already in late 1959, the CIA began plotting to overthrow Fidel Castro, when it had become clear that the Cuban leader embraced Soviet-style Communism. Before Major Aderholt left for Okinawa in January 1960, he already worked on the air portion of a CIA plan to invade Cuba, in which he identified the Alabama National Guard to train aircrews of Cuban exiles. But this plan, which called for bombers and sustained air strikes, was cancelled.1 On 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower officially set the wheels in motion ordering the CIA to organize, equip and train a group of Cuban exiles in a foreign country for future guerrilla operations. “A number of paramilitary cadres” were to be trained at “secure locations outside the U.S.” and equipped with “a small air supply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation”.2 In January 1960, negotiations for a Panama training site began,3 and after receiving “$25,000 of sterile arms”, the Panama training base “was activated 11 May. […] Training in Panama began in June”.4 “In mid-June [1960] 29 Cubans had arrived in Panama to begin training in small-unit infiltration.”5 Indeed, “small unit cadres were trained at Fort Randolph in the Panama Canal Zone for infiltration, the establishment of commo activities, and sabotage.”6 Other locations in the Panama Canal Zone used for a short

1 Trest, Air Commando One, pp. 9+83. 2 CIA proposal of 16 March 1960, approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 60, reprinted in Peter Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified. The secret CIA report on the invasion of Cuba, New York (The New Press) 1998, pp.103-5, plus Tab. A-C. 3 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, §8, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, p.25. 4 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, §22, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, p.28. 5 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, §31, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, p.29. 6 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 1, p.56 (quotation) + III, pp.45, 47, 83/4, and 92, readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol3.pdf , plus photos of Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132537.pdf .

time in 1960 were the training site of Fort Sherman and France airfield.7 All of these locations were abandoned, when the Finca “Helvetia” (JMTRAV) in Guatemala became available for training in the summer of 1960.8 Apparently, this was the original purpose of Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez of Panama, the CIA front that later seemingly “owned” the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación aircraft.9 The original plan called for air drops of ammunition and arms to anti-Castro groups and for on- the-beach-landings of small groups of Cuban exiles only. Then, in the course of 1960, the plan was expanded to provide for a real invasion of Cuba,10 which was to become Operation Pluto, the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Originally, the CIA code for the entire operation was JMARC, but in the summer of 1960, it changed to JMATE.11 Even before that tentative invasion of April 61, Air America aircraft were involved in the preparation of this invasion. In July 1960, the first CIA instructors arrived in Guatemala.12 As to the air drops, the Presidential briefing paper of August 1960 outlined the plan of operations as follows: “The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in three areas of Cuba: Pinas del Rio, Escambray and Sierra Maestra. These groups will be organized for concerted guerrilla action against the regime.”13 It is known that most of the pilots who flew in the Bay of Pigs operation against Cuba in April 1961 were Cuban exiles who had been engaged by the Double-Check Corporation.14 A list of all Cuban pilots involved in that operation can be found in document no. 141164 published on the CIA’s website.15 Already in August 1960, Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez of Panama had announced to Air Asia Company Limited that they wanted to

7 “Panama was involved marginally in the Agency’s anti-Castro effort. Forts Randolph and Sherman in the Canal Zone were the sites initially selected for PM and communications training for the cadres which were to help organize the dissident elements inside Cuba; and ‘France airfield’ in the Zone also was used by Agency aircraft during the course of the project” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 1, pp.iii/iv, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part1.pdf . 8 “The initial group of paramilitary trainees was transferred to the Guatemala Base from Panama after two months of training. By 23 August there were 78 paramilitary trainees, 34 communications trainees, and nine staff and contract employees.” (“Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, § L8, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, p.91). Trainees from Ussepa Island, Florida had already arrived at “Helvetia” in early July (Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs declassified, Chronology, p.273). 9 It had been founded in August 1959 as a CIA proprietary airline for eventual support in Latin American crisis situations, especially in Cuba (“Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, §B5, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, pp.24/5). 10 “In late summer 1960, the concept of covert operations begins to shift from infiltrating teams to wage guerrilla warfare to an amphibious operation involving at least 1,500 men who would seize and defend an area by sea and air assault and establish a base for further operation.” (Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs declassified, Chronology, p.275). “On 4 November 1960 WH/4 took formal action to change the course of the project by greatly expanding the size of the Cuban paramilitary unit and redirecting its training along more conventional military lines” (“Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, §45, in: Kornbluh, cit., p.32). 11 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, vol. I, part 1, p.5, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 12 Fursenko / Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, p.83. 13 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § B36, p. 14, that is p. 22 on the website. 14 Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p. 126, and https://archive.org/stream/nsia-CubaBayofPigs/nsia- CubaBayofPigs/Cuba%20Bay%20Of%20Pigs%2007_djvu.txt . Paramilitary trainees were recruited by the FRD military staff, in cooperation with the CIA’s Miami Base (“Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, §46, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, p.32). 15 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141164.pdf .

purchase four of Air Asia’s C-46s. So in their letter dated 12 August 60, Air Asia offered them Conditional Sales Contracts for 4 C-46s at a price of $ 75,000 each. Air Asia would ferry the aircraft “to an airport designated by you in North America” at $ 1,25 per statute mile, adding: “We offer certain of our technical personnel and ferrying crews for the inauguration of your operation of these aircraft.”16 By September 60, two “squadrons” of transports (C-46s and C-54s), were being put together. Two out of four Air America C-46s17 and two Agency C-54s from Florida arrived at Retalhuleu, Guatemala (code-named “JMADD” by the CIA and called “Rayo Base” by the Cubans), in September 60. According to CIA historian Jack Pfeiffer, the initial 2 TB-26s that arrived in September 60 “had been borrowed from the DC Air National Guard, and subsequently were returned to the DC Air National Guard”.18 Then 2 dual control TB-26s of the Guatemalan Air Force were delivered to JMADD;19 a third dual control TB-26 later arrived from Eglin AFB, Field Three.20 Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, with whom Air Asia had a long-time contract,21 also served as cover, as all former Air America aircraft used in the anti-Castro operation were registered to them probably since autumn 1960. Indeed, after an initial discussion about the type of attack aircraft to be used – US Navy AD-5’s or USAF B-26’s –, the Special Group decided on 21 July 60 that it should be the B-26. Immediately, CIA’s DPD announced “a cost analysis to compare the merits of bringing in 8 B-26’s from the Agency’s Far Eastern activities to Project JMATE with the cost of acquiring B-26’s from Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona.”22 On 29 July 60, the Agency requested “that 10 B-26 aircraft be reclaimed from surplus storage and placed in the following combat configuration: … with eight .50 caliber machine guns in the nose […].”23 When the Air Force notified the Agency that “four B-26’s configured ‘in

16 Letter dated 12 August 1960, written by Air Asia to Los Hermanos, preserved at UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4; the C-46s offered were manufacturer’s serial numbers 22252 (B-870), 22362 (B-864), 22366 (B-866), and 22451 (B-850). In his letter to George Doole dated 16 September 60, Vice-President Operations Robert Rousselot explains that they had selected B-866 as the 4th aircraft for Los Hermanos, because it was the only cargo C-46 owned by Air Asia that remained, while the other C-46s were plush aircraft and were used for the “Around-the-Island” service (B-856) or under the Booklift contract (B-844, B-846, B-848, B-854, B-858, and B- 860) in September 60 (Letter dated 16 September 60, sent by Robert Rousselot, Vice-President Operations, to George Doole, Managing Director, at UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4). 17 C-46s B-850 and B-864 departed Tainan on 3 September 60 and arrived at Oakland on 6 September, B-866 left Tainan on 18 September and arrived at Oakland on 21 September, and B-870 left Tainan on 24 September and arrived at San Antonio on 30 September 60; the point of hand-over for the C-46s was San Antonio (Memorandum dated 7 October 60, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4). At that time, the paperwork for 3 of the C-46s had not yet been ready for transaction (Memorandum dated 24 October 60, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4). So, B-850 was officially deregistered only on 19 October 60, B-864 of CATCL was deregistered on 21 September 60, reregistered to Air Asia as B-874 the same day and deregistered on 19 October 60, while B-866 and B-870 were deregistered on 3 November 60 (Memorandum dated 15 November 60, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). The aircraft were deleted from all Company reports as follows: B- 850 and B-864 on 7 September 60, B-866 on 23 September 60, and B-870 on 29 September 60 (Memorandum dated 21 November 60, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4). 18 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.43, footnote *, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 19 Possibly F.A. Guatemalteca TB-26s “404” and “408” (Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.91). 20 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.48, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11; Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.65. 21 List “Aircraft status” of 7 July 64, in: UTD/Kirkpatrick/B1F1. The termination date is given as “indefinite”. 22 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.32/3, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 23 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.36, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf .

accordance with your requirement’ would be available from Kelly Air Force Base on 30 August 1960”, but that the USAF did not want to be drawn into a covert operation by a direct transfer from USAF stocks, the CIA’s DPD replied that Agency people would ferry the aircraft from Kelly AFB “black”24 to the “Latin American covert training location”.25 Without indicating any names, DPD’s head Col. Stanley W. Beerli then added that the cover story for the B-26s would be that they were owned by Los Hermanos and that they were the same 8 B-26’s that were once CEECO-owned and maintained by Air Asia at Tainan: “Once the aircraft had departed Kelly Air Force Base, they would proceed ‘black’ to a Latin American covert training location for training of indigenous crews. At this location and at all times after the delivery of the aircraft to the site, the aircraft will be owned by a foreign Agency proprietary organization. This organization will have purchased the aircraft from another US Commercial company who [sic] had owned and maintained the aircraft at a location in the Far East. An inquiry into the history of the aircraft ownership would reveal that they were originally purchased in the Far East from Air Force surplus a number of years ago, and subsequently sold to a New York broker who in turn sold them to a Latin American company. It would be further explained that the aircraft proceeded direct from the Far East to the Latin American site.”26 Apparently, the USAF rejected that idea, so that CIA’s DPD returned to their original request of B-26s coming from storage. Already on 19 August 1960, they had requested 10 B- 26s from Tucson-Davis Monthan storage. Interestingly, on 16 January 61, USAF Col. Leroy F. Prouty, Office of Special Operations, complained to the DPD that “as of this date, six of these aircraft have been picked up; but four still remain on an Air Force Base in the US.”27 The reason for this delay probably was that in the meantime, the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación had been allowed to use the B-26s delivered in the summer of 1960 to the Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca (FAG).28

24 This probably means via Opa Locka, FL, which had been chosen “as the point of origin (and the terminus) for black flights – for bodies and supplies – to Guatemala” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.60, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 25 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.39/40, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . It seems that the B-26s offered for pick-up at Kelly AFB were the ones that eventually went to the Guatemalan Air Force, ferried by crews that worked for the Bay of Pigs Project (see note 209). 26 Memo for Asst. to Secretary of Defense (Spl. Ops.) from Stanley W. Beerli, 19 Sep 60, quoted in: Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.40, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 27 “In compliance with an earlier request for B-26 aircraft, ten were made available to meet an early deadline. At the time of this request, 19 August 1960, it was stated that these aircraft would be removed from the military base to a designated civilian airfield, and then would exit the US. As of this date, six of these aircraft have been picked up; but four still remain on an Air Force Base in the US.” (L.F. Prouty, Memo dated 16 January 61 to the DPD, quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960- April 1961, part 1, p.41, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 28 “At the dedication of the base (JMADD) [on 13 September 1960, Guatemala’s President] Ydígoras pointed out that the airfield was being renovated to provide protection for the northwest border of Guatemala and to provide a training base for new B-26’s which were being acquired under the Military Assistance agreement with the United States” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 1, pp.11/2, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part1.pdf ). All this was an “open-ended oral contract which had been in effect since the initiation of the project in Guatemala” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 1, p.26). As early as May 1960, President Ydígoras had agreed to support the Bay of Pigs operation (Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs declassified, Chronology, pp.268+272).

“The C-46 aircraft – like most of the JMCLEAR29 aircraft – were nominally owned by [blank; read: “Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez SA”], a legal [blank; read “Panamanian”] corporation and, also, an Agency proprietary. The aircraft were leased to Manuel F. Goudie, and, in turn, by Goudie to the Cuban exile organization, the FRD30. The C-54 work horses which were used to transport the bulk of the troops and materiel from Florida to Guatemala during the training period were similarly under the nominal cover of [blank; read: “Los Hermanos”]. Unlike the C-46’s which actually belonged to [blank; read: “Air Asia Co Ltd”], but had conditional sales papers showing the ownership by [blank; read: “Los Hermanos”], the C-54’s (with the exception of two of the aircraft)31 were leased from the United States Air Force. [...] Monthly cost for rental of [blank; read: “Los Hermanos”] aircraft – 4 C-46’s, 8 B- 26’s, 2 C-54’s, and 2 Helios – as of early November [1960] was nearly $ 35,000 a month. All of the aircraft, of course, were presumably leased to Señor Goudie, the FRD’s finance man in Miami.”32 The transport pilots were trained by Air America pilots Connie Seigrist and William Beale33 who had ferried Air America C-46 B-864 from Taipei to San José, Guatemala, between 3 and 9 September 60 and then on to Retalhuleu, Guatemala, and training began with the C-46s.34 Later, former Air America pilot Douglas R. Price joined the training team at Retalhuleu. The flight training first consisted of landings and emergency procedures and was carried out at San José FAG airbase.35 Doug Price and Ken Milan had ferried another Air America C-46 from Taiwan to Guatemala.36 Eddie Sims, Frank Hughes, Bill Welk, and Hal Wells were also reported to have been among the ferry crews.37 The “Personnel Strength Report” of 17 October 1960, which notes the origin of the personnel working at JMADD, but only by their pseudonyms, also mentions a “William Belt” (HBILKA Operations Officer), a “George Standard” (HBILKA Maintenance Chief), and a “William P. Casey” (HBILKA Maintenance Supply).38

29 JMCLEAR stands for Air Operations during the Bay of Pigs Operation (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.10, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 30 FRD means Frente Revolucionario Democrático. 31 However, the Agency’s air arm, that is “DPD had five C-54s available” in September-October 1960 (Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.54). These 2 C-54s were Agency-owned, while the other 3 Agency-owned C-54s apparently only served as reserve aircraft. 32 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, pp. 52 and 55/6 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 33 Their pseudonyms were “Connie Simpson” and “William Wells” (“Personnel Strength Report”, Cable dated 17 October 60 from MADD to “Director”, CIA document no. 0000141138, published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141138.pdf ). 34 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, pp.113/4; Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.64. 35 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, pp.113-16; Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.64. 36 E-mail dated 12 October 2006, kindly sent to the author by Doug Price. 37 Interview with George Stevens conducted by Prof. William Leary at Santa Barbara, CA on 11 September 1985, written resume, at: UTD/Leary/B43F5. 38 “Personnel Strength Report”, Cable dated 17 October 60, CIA document no. 0000141138, published at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141138.pdf. HBILKA is the CIA code for the CAT Inc-Air America complex.

Several C-46s and C-54s at Retalhuleu airfield in 1960/1 (US Government photograph)

Retalhuleu air base, which was used to supply the Cuban exile force39 that was training in the mountains on the Pacific Coast of Guatemala at “Trax Base”,40 was located 33 miles from the Pacific coast and 3 miles from Retalhuleu.41 Before the construction of Retalhuleu base was completed in mid-September 1960, the C-54s coming from Opa Locka (code named JMFIG)42 landed at San José, Guatemala, and the pilots were housed at “Helvetia” (code named JMTRAV)43, a coffee plantation located close to Retalhuleu at over 2,800 feet above sea level and owned by Roberto Alejos, the right-hand man to the president of Guatemala. The cover story for the pilots was that they were supposed to be American construction technicians.44 Connie Seigrist arrived at Retalhuleu airfield with his C-46 in mid-September 1960 just during the opening ceremony, and as there were many media people, the real purpose of “Rayo Base” had to be hidden. He recalls: “Beale and I flew 864 (the B- had been removed) to Retalhuleu arriving at a scheduled precise time during the opening ceremonies. The Agent that had briefed us beforehand wanted us to keep a low profile due to cameras of the news media covering the event and, most important, to let the ceremonies be a Guatemalan affair. As soon as we parked, the Agent opened the cabin door, placed a very large stalk of bananas that had been put aboard in San Jose directly in the cabin door to be seen but also so no one could climb aboard, and then he descended the steps to become available to answer any questions if asked. At this point I can’t recall if it was former Agent Morales from Phoenix or Col. Tony Batres from the Guatemalan Air Force that was performing this duty. I do remember they both were very busy seeing all was orderly concerning the aircraft. President Ydigoras of Guatemala was in charge of the ceremonies

39 The CIA code for these Cuban exile forces was “JMARC”. In Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2 (readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ), i.e. in the source references to the entire volume, several Memos refer to “JMARC Paramilitary Activities”, e.g. a Memo for Chief/WH/4/Air(DPD), dated 6 December 60, from J.D. Esterline (“sub: Estimated Requirements for Transport Aircraft Support of JMARC Paramilitary Activities [JMC-0227])” quoted in note 69 on p.461. This was probably a request for aircraft to be used for paratroop training. 40 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.17; Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.45. 41 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.51. 42 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.134 of the text (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). JMATE’s Forward Operations Base at Miami, which also had a photo interpretation center for post-strike analysis, had the code name JMASH (ib.pp.31 and 98 of the text). 43 See Jack Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.107 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 44 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.41/2, 51.

assisted by his wife, and a few other dignitaries. The President completed the ceremonies very quickly. Tony came back aboard and instructed us to leave. I looked out where the President and his entourage were standing. I stated if we start our engines we are really going to dust them off. Tony said never mind that consideration because some of the group and news media are talking about getting aboard. The President doesn’t want them to know but he doesn’t want them to board and has quietly instructed me to tell you to leave immediately. We did that, started engines, dusted the group unmercifully, took-off, and returned to San Jose with our stalk of bananas. The next day the news media reported we had just flown the first load of bananas from Retalhuleu to the USA.”45 Later, in case of an emergency landing, the crews had to say that they worked in Guatemala for a freight company owned by Mr. Roberto Alejos and that that company was engaged in transporting fish to the USA.46

Retalhuleu’s maintenance and service area in 1960/61 (US Government photographs)

The C-46s: The four original C-46s received from Air America – B-850, B-864, B-866, and B-870; another Air America C-46, B-858, appeared in Guatemala only once47 – were soon struck by several accidents and had to be supplemented by C-46s from other sources: In March 1961, Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez informed Air Asia that C-46 msn 22366 (former B-866) had been destroyed by a crash with subsequent fire. As a first reaction, on 4 April 61, Air Asia requested immediate payment of the remaining balance of $ 51,000 for this aircraft, and in a second letter also dated 4 April 61, Air Asia offered Los Hermanos to sell them another C-46, that is serial no. 32942 ex 44-77546.48 This aircraft (N9894Z) had been bought by Air America’s and Air Asia’s Managing Director George Doole from Southern Air Transport on 31 March 61.49

45 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.48, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 46 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.77. 47 Hagedorn, Central American and Caribbean air forces, p.148, where a photo can be found on p. 143. On 29 May 61, B-858 was operated out of Bangkok into Laos (Vientiane Daily Flight Operations Log of 29 May 61, in: UTD/Lewis/B2F6). 48 Two letters dated 4 April 61, both sent by Air Asia’s Amos Hiatt to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez (both in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). 49 Memorandum dated 20 April 61, sent by Managing Director George Doole to the Company’s Treasurer Amos Hiatt (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4).

Brigade C-46 “857” (ex B-850), taken by Harold G. Martin, probably at Opa Locka in 1960 (with kind permission from The Air-Britain Trust)

Memorandum dated 20 April 61, sent by George Doole to Amos Hiatt (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4)

The existence of further C-46s within the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación becomes evident only from documents referring to transactions that occurred after the operation. These C-46s comprised manufacturer’s serial numbers 32992,50 33451,51 22343,52 and 33445.53 Probably

50 N9935Z, ex 44-77596, said to have been exchanged with Southern Air Transport for serial no. 22451, that is former B-850 (Memorandum dated 20 October 61, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). 51 N9895Z ex 44-78055 of Jaime Camargo, which later became B-918. According to the letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the Director General de Aeronáutica Civil of Panamá to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, C-46 44-78055 had been regd. to Los Hermanos as HP-314P, but was deregistered on 24 October 61. For the sale to

all of Los Hermanos’ C-46s were officially registered in Panama, with known registrations being HP-314 (former B-866),54 HP-314P (former N9895Z),55 HP-315 (former N91293 and 44-78049),56 HP-316 (former B-850),57 and HP-322P (former N9459Z).58 No Panamanian registrations are known for C-46s B-864,59 B-870,60 and N9935Z. These registrations were needed as cover for future re-registration of the aircraft on the civil aircraft market: Prior to the operation they were indicated to the Civil Aviation Administration of their country of origin, and after the operation they were needed for re-registration in that country.61 They were probably not used for radio contact. Doug Price recalls: “Our flights down there were usually without contact to Air Traffic Control. At such time that we would go to Mexico City or Managua, we would contact local tower when we were in voice contact range with whatever aircraft ID we had at the time. I think that the one time I went to Mexico City, our flight had been pre-approved by the Mexican Government. Flights to Miami were prearranged.”62 During their operation out of Retalhuleu, the C-46s themselves received three- digit serials that were more or less arbitrary, but were to make them look like Fuerza Aérea

Air Asia see the letter dated 20 November 61 by Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez to Air Asia. Both documents can be found in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4. 52 N9459Z ex 44-78520 of Aviation Sales Engineering Association (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 110) had been registered to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez as HP-322P, but was deregistered on 24 October 61 (Letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the Director General de Aeronáutica Civil of Panamá to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). 53 N91293 ex 44-78049 of C-46 Parts Inc. was reported to have been registered to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez as HP-315 in 1962 (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 100); as only a 1960 registration date makes sense for a Bay of Pigs player, the date should read 1960. 54 C-46 B-866 (msn 22366) was sold by CATCL to Air Asia CoLtd on 24 October 60 (Letter by A. Hiatt dated 24 October 60, in: UTD/CIA/B9F1; Bill of sale dated 24 October 60, in: UTD/CIA/B9F1); already on 20 October 60, it had been sold to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez SA, Panama (Contract no. 60-074 of 20 October 60, mentioned in Air Asia’s letter of 4 April 61 to Los Hermanos, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4) and regd. to them as HP-314 (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p.111). 55 Letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the Director General de Aeronáutica Civil of Panamá to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4. 56 C-46 44-78049 was reported to have been registered to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez as HP-315 in 1962 (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 100); see note 53 above. 57 Between 20 October 60 and 9 March 61, Air America / Air Asia C-46 B-850 (msn 22451) was officially registered to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez as HP-316 (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p.114). 58 Letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the Director General de Aeronáutica Civil of Panama to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4. 59 C-46 B-864 (msn 22362) was sold by CATCL to Air Asia CoLtd on 7 September 60 (Bill of sale dated 7 September 60, in: UTD/CIA/B9F1; Letter by A. Hiatt dated 11 November 60, in: UTD/CIA/B9F1), for use against Cuba; on 20 October 60, it was sold to Los Hermanos (Contract no. 60-074 of 20 October 60, mentioned in Air Asia’s letter of 4 April 61 to Los Hermanos, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). 60 C-46 B-870 (msn 22232) was sold by CATCL to Air Asia CoLtd on 24 October 60 (Letter by A. Hiatt dated 24 October 60, in: UTD/CIA/B9F1; Bill of sale dated 24 October 60, in: UTD/CIA/B9F1), and to Los Hermanos already on 20 October 60 (Contract no. 60-074 of 20 October 60, mentioned in Air Asia’s letter of 4 April 61 to Los Hermanos, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). 61 This becomes evident by the fact that, in order to register former Los Hermanos C-46 HP-314P as B-918 with Air Asia, the certificate of deregistration in Panama was requested by the Civil Aeronautics Administration of Taiwan (Letter dated 9 October 61, by the CAA of Taiwan to Air Asia, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). 62 E-mail dated 23 July 2008, kindly sent to the author by Douglas Price.

Guatemalteca aircraft: B-850 is known to have become “857”,63 and B-864 simply became “864”.64 On 6 November 60, C-46 “292” was used for a flight to the Escambray Mountains.65 Other C-46 tail numbers known from the actual invasion are “877”, “875”, “788”, and “855”.66 And it is believed that “1887”, or at least “887”, the serial that was traditionally said to be the manufacturer’s serial number (MSN) of former Los Hermanos C-46 B-918 (ex 44- 78055) throughout the records of Air Asia and so on, was really a pseudo-Guatemalan Air Force tail number used on this aircraft by the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación for operations out of Retalhuleu. The reason for this assumption is that the identity also given for C-46 “serial no. 44-78055” in two documents issued by Los Hermanos on 1 and on 20 November 1961 is “MSG 1887”,67 not MSN 1887, but Air Asia and all the others who dealt with that aircraft took it as MSN 1887. The fact that “MSG 1887” was repeated in 2 documents excludes that it was simply a typing error for MSN 1887. The meaning of MSG is unknown, but maybe it stood for something like “Military Serial [US] Government” or “Military Serial Guatemala”, which would make sense in the case of a C-46 formerly operating in fake Guatemalan Air Force colors out of Retalhuleu, Guatemala.

The two Los Hermanos documents referring to C-46D “Serial No. 44-78055 MSG 1887”: Bill of Sale to Air Asia dated 1 November 1961 and Letter to Air Asia dated 20 November 61 (both documents preserved in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4)

63 A photo taken by Harold G. Martin was published in Hagedorn, Central American and Caribbean air forces, p.146, where the identity is given on p. 148. 64 In the section about the Bay of Pigs of his autobiography preserved at UTD/Leary/B21F11, Connie Seigrist notes: “3 September 1960 – Capt. Beale and I departed Taipei for Oakland flying C-46 B-864. […] 6 September – We landed in Oakland. […] 7 September – we arrived in San Antonio. […] 9 September – We received our dispatch release and departed San Antonio shortly after dark. We arrived over San Jose around two in the morning. […] Starting from here onward in the operation I was not permitted to record a personal flight log. […] about a week later. Beale and I flew 864 (the B- had been removed) to Retalhuleu” (pp.47/8). 65 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.76. 66 “Listing of mission results with attached listings” of 1961, that is document 141186 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf . 67 Bill of sale of C-46 “Serial no. 44-78055” dated 1 November 61, from Los Hermanos to Air Asia, and letter dated 20 November 61 sent by Los Hermanos to Air Asia, both in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4.

As to the flight training, Connie Seigrist recalls: “Shortly after we had moved from San Jose to Retalhuleu the Cubans started arriving. They had been living in a camp in the hills nearby in basic training waiting for the airfield to open to start their flying. We (Beale and I) started training the Cuban transport pilots as soon as they arrived. All but a couple had never flown C-46s before. An Agency sponsored Air Force unit arrived from Field Three of the Eglin Florida Air Force Complex. Their purpose [was] to administer the training syllabus, monitor aircraft maintenance procedures, dispatch covert night aerial delivery flights over Cuba when directed, and be in command of the Retalhuleu Base Flight Operations in coordination with the Cuban unit while acting under the direct control of the Agency. […] The parking ramp was the last part of the airfield to be constructed. […] We never had enough space on the new hard ramps, [so we] began parking the C-46s in the summer dry hard dirt downhill from the buildings. The seasonal rain forced us to move back later and squeeze in on the hard ramps around the other aircraft which caused lots of parking problems and unproductive man hours wasted while towing aircraft around.”68 Former C-54 pilot Albert Persons describes Retalhuleu air base in a similar way: “The one runway ran northwest and southeast. Not only was it barely wide enough to accommodate a C-54, the runway had a slight crown in it to provide an additional challenge; and at 4,800 feet, with temperatures in the 90s, it would have been illegal back home for a C-54 at gross weight. There was no “go, no-go” decision to worry about. If an engine failed on takeoff, the runway was not long enough to continue on three engines, nor was it long enough to get the aircraft stopped before plunging through the fence and down the hill at the far end of the field. As we used to say, the “go, no-go” decision was made when we left the penthouse. The southeast end of the runway was 150 feet higher than the opposite end, enough of a grade to make it necessary to take off downhill and land uphill. Aircraft were parked on the taxi strip cum ramp. They were lined up nose to tail like elephants in a circus. Sometimes there were as many as six in the line. There was no way to turn an aircraft around or to move it in any direction except straight forward.”69 While the initial flight training in the C-46s was to qualify more skilled and experienced flight crews, the next step was to train them to fly to Cuba for parachuting supplies to the anti-Castro guerrillas, especially in the Escambray Mountains near Trinidad. “As soon as we had the more experienced C-46 crews trained in a night delivery program we started them flying into Cuba at night parachuting supplies to the Cuban underground movement. Due to the limited fuel range of the C-46 we staged the departure from Puerto Barrios located on the Gulf of Mexico side of Guatemala 225 nm closer to Cuba. Usually they had enough fuel remaining after a delivery in Cuba to return directly to Retalhuleu.”70 And there was one more type of missions assigned to the C-46s and their crews, and that one was to become particularly important during the actual invasion: paratroop training. It is known that in February 61, the C-46s made 2 flights each day for such a training. The paratroop battalion was based at “Switzerland”, a farm located above “Helvetia” that was also owned by Roberto Alejos; and there was a second paratroop outpost near the city of Mazatenango. These paratroopers were to fight in the mountains of Cuba.71

68 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.48, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 69 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.45. 70 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.49, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 71 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.120.

Paratroop exercises near Retalhuleu in 1960/1 (US Government photographs)

From the very beginning, the C-46 operation out of Retalhuleu suffered a number of accidents, but not all of them ended in the destruction of the aircraft. In his letter dated 4 January 1987, Connie Seigrist, former instructor pilot of the Cubans at Retalhuleu and then Director of Air Operations at Puerto Cabezas, wrote to Bill Leary: “We had one C-46 damaged on a training flight while landing at Retalhuleu. The second C-46 was shot up over Cuba, but made it home to Guatemala. The third C-46 was lost in Guatemala on a normal flight by Gen. Reid’s pilots that had remained in Retalhuleu for house keeping after we moved to Puerto Cabezas (Happy Valley), Nicaragua. I am not really sure, but maybe the Co- pilot was killed or badly hurt in the accident. The C-46 was destroyed. The surviving pilot (an administrative pilot for the AAG) later joined us in Happy Valley […]. We needed an auxiliary field in preparation for the Invasion. […] I searched out an area of fairly level open grass land nearby that appeared it could support the weight of C-46s and B-26s. I landed the forth C-46 there and immediately it sank down into the ground. That C-46 was rendered unavailable for the Invasion because of the time involved for digging it out. I flew it to Miami after the invasion. The fifth C-46 was lost in Nicaragua on another normal flight by Gen. Reid’s pilots after Capt. Price and I left further house keeping to them in Happy Valley. No one was hurt. The C-46 was destroyed.”72 So 2 C-46s were destroyed, one in Guatemala in March 61, and the other one in Nicaragua in the summer of 1961. The first C-46 accident occurred during training at Retalhuleu, in late September 60.73 In his memoirs, Connie Seigrist describes it as follows: “The east end of the runway had an abrupt dirt shoulder starting just before the hard top layer of the landing portion. One of the C-54 co-pilots in training decided he would like to upgrade to aircraft commander on the C- 46 to be able to fly airdrop flights into Cuba. He was a nice gentleman, a former Cuban Airline co-pilot, and a fair pilot. Field Three Air Force Commander felt he should receive training for that opportunity. In his training he came in short and bent one of the landing gear

72 Letter dated 4 January 1987, sent by Connie Seigrist to Bill Leary, p.2, preserved at: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 73 This C-46 was piloted by Manuel González (Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.64/5). Jack B. Pfeiffer (Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.113, CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ) gives the following description: “Before the end of September, Manuel Gonzalez, one of the most experienced of the Cuban C-46 pilots, made such a rough landing that he damaged the landing gear in his aircraft and in the process of attempting to regain control, herniated his diaphragm, and was lost from the program.”

on the shoulder. The landing was completed after a high sailing bounce off the shoulder. There were no injuries. The aircraft was given a wheels down repair and I flew it to San Jose for major repairs.”74 Indeed, the equipment facilities at Retalhuleu only permitted to perform overnight service and ferry to overhaul. Connie Seigrist recalls: “San Jose, Costa Rica, had the nearest heavy maintenance hangar to Guatemala. We made a contractual arrangement with them for the C-46s and B-26s. In addition to training I also flew the C-46s and B-26s to San Jose for periodic maintenance inspections.”75 The second accident mentioned by Connie Seigrist seems to have involved C-46 “857”, that is former B-850,76 and may have occurred in November 60,77 although the alias of this aircraft, HP-316, was cancelled only on 9 March 61.78 Connie Seigrist describes the accident as follows: “The Cubans became aware of the night flights and laid in wait as best they could. One night they sprayed a C-46 fairly well by shooting out the landing gear on one side. No one was hit on board from the ground fire. The pilot was a good one. He flew the aircraft back to Retalhuleu and landed the aircraft without destroying it. The wing tip was replaced and a new landing gear installed.”79 The other 3 C- 46 accidents will be dealt with later, as they occurred after the strike force had moved from Guatemala to Nicaragua. For the initial training period that is for September 1960, the number of C-46s used out of Retalhuleu was three.80 It seems that these aircraft were the first 2 former Air America C-46s “857” (ex B-850) and “864” (ex B-864), which arrived in mid- September 1960, plus C-46 N91293 (ex 44-78049, msn 33445), said to have been registered to Los Hermanos as HP-31581 – believed to be the aircraft that became “292” and flew the mission on 9 November 60.82

The C-54s: The C-54s did not come from Air America but from other sources, and the first two of them arrived from Florida in September 60, probably from Eglin AFB.83 Indeed, “air facilities at Eglin Air Force Base” were used “for logistical flights to Guatemala and Nicaragua.”84 These logistical flights were coded “JMARC”, and their frequency can be seen in the Activities Reports for Operations Branch that have been released: There were “two C-

74 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.53, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 75 Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.48/9, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 76 Hagedorn, Central American and Caribbean air forces, p.148, describes the accident as follows: “B-850 is one of the aircraft that took heavy ground fire during the operation and was forced to make an emergency landing in Guatemala, where its left main gear collapsed and a wing was wrapped around utility pole. Miraculously, it survived and was repaired.” 77 This month is given by Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.94/5. 78 On 9 March 61, registration HP-316, the alias of former Air Asia C-46 B-850 (msn 22451), was cancelled as “repossessed” (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p.114). 79 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.49, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11; the pilot of the C-46 was Mario Tellechea; a more detailed description of this accident as well as photos can be found in Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.94/5. 80 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.50. 81 C-46 ex 44-78049 was reported to have been registered to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez as HP-315 in 1962 (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 100); as only a 1960 registration date makes sense for a Bay of Pigs player, the date should read 1960. 82 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.76. 83 E-mail dated 8 December 2004, kindly sent to the author by Douglas Price. 84 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.2 (= CIA document no. 0000132097), at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf .

54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” each on 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, and 25 November 1960,85 and “beginning 29 November, JMARC support flights” ran “on a schedule basis – Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. During period of non-scheduled flights, one C-54 and aircrew will remain on alert.”86 Then, there were “two C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” each on 20, 22 and 24 December 60, “one ‘black’ flight to Guatemala” each on 27 and 29 December 60, “three C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala on 3 January” 61, “one C-54 ‘black’ flight to Guatemala” plus another one to Panama87 on 5 January 61, “two C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” on 7 January 61, “two C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” on 10 January 61, “three ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” on 12 January, “two C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” on 14 January 61, “one C-124 ‘white’ flight to Guatemala” on 16 January, “two C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” on 17 January, “three C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” on 19 January, and “two C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” on 21 January 1961.88 Between 23 and 28 January 61, there were 3 C-54 black flight on 23, 2 C-54 black flights on 25, and 2 C-54 black flights on 27 January 61.89 From February 61 onwards, the numbers given by the Activities Reports for Operations Branch are less detailed: There were “four C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” in the 12-18 February 61 period, “six C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” in the 19-25 February period, “six C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” in the 25 February to 4 March 61 period, “six C-54 ‘black’ flights to Guatemala” in the 5-11 March period,90 “five C-54 ‘black’ body flights to Guatemala” in the 28 March - 1 April period, and “two C-54 ‘black’ cargo flights to Guatemala – 28-29 March.”91 The first week of April 61 was very busy, with “two C-54 ‘black’ cargo flights to Nicaragua – 4 April, […] one ‘black’ cargo flight to Nicaragua – 5 April, […] one C-54 ‘black’ cargo flight to Guatemala – 5 April, […] two C-54 ‘black’ body flights Miami- Guatemala – 6 April, [and] one ‘black’ cargo flight to Nicaragua – 7 April.”92 For the rest of April 61, we only know that there was a “continued resupply for Guatemala and Nicaragua by C-54 ‘black’ flights” between 16 and 22 April 61.93 There was one last “C-54 ‘black’ flight to Guatemala [on] 23 April”,94 and between 25 and 28 April 61, there were no less than 7 C-54 ‘black’ passenger flights home – 3 on 25 April, 1 on 26 April, and 3 on 28 April, all said to have been “from Guatemala”.95 One of these C-54 flights home apparently was the one that, piloted by Albert Persons, took a load of “mutineers” – AWOL’s, deserters, Castro agents, criminals, and people who had talked about organizing a revolt against company and brigade authority – from Puerto Cabezas to Homestead AFB in Florida.96 Additional

85 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070024-3.pdf . 86 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070025-2.pdf . 87 Probably to support “Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez” at Panama. 88 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070051-3.pdf . 89 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070062-1.pdf . 90 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070085-6.pdf . One 5 March 61, a C- 54 received heavy groundfire after a drop at the Escambray and made an emergency landing with 3 engines at Montego Bay, Jamaica (Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.123-25). Pfeiffer (Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.147), says, the C-54 landed at Kingston, Jamaica (online readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 91 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070106-2.pdf . 92 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070109-9.pdf 93 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070112-5.pdf . 94 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070112-5.pdf . 95 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070112-5.pdf . 96 Persons, Bay of Pigs, pp.103-107.

information comes from the log book of Bay of Pigs pilot René García: Most of the time, he flew C-54G “7701” on local training flights out of JMADD or on night supply drops to Cuba; so this aircraft was apparently based at JMADD. But from time to time, he also flew C-54s on training or drop missions, that appeared only once or twice in his log book, and these aircraft were apparently visitors from Florida that had brought in personnel or supplies. Such short time visitors to Retalhuleu were “6096” and “9069” on 15 November 1960,97 “764” on 17 November,98 “577” at another date probably later in November,99 plus those mentioned by René García: “7003” on 8 February, “7001” on 9 February, “7702” on 13 February, “6604” on 7 March, “6705” on 10 March, “6606” on 6 April, and “6600” on 7 April 61.100 All aircraft were C-54G’s except C-54Ds “6600” and “764”.

The C-54s mentioned in the log book of Bay of Pigs pilot René García101

The people who flew the C-54s down to Central America were “contract crews”, as Albert Persons notes: At Miami, “we waited for another hour in the airplane. Two men came in and went forward to the cockpit. We heard them talking in a foreign language – not Spanish. This was our first contact with the so-called ‘contract crews’. They were a group of pilots who, as we learned later, had come from somewhere in Southeast Asia. They were in an entirely different category from our group. Their flying activities were confined to flights between Miami and Central America to transport Cuban recruits and supplies to the training bases. There were five or six of these ‘contract’ pilots. I believe that at least two of them were Polish.”102

97 See Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 2, p.193 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ). 98 See Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 2, p.213. 99 See Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 2, p.213. 100 Pages from René García’s log book kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström (E-mail dated 24 June 2005). 101 The log book of the late René García is now in the possession of Leif Hellström who sent a photocopy of this page to the author and gave him the permission to publish it here. 102 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.40 (quotation); Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.37. “There was a total of about 20 Polish airmen at Eglin at the time, all of them ‘employed’ by Lockheed, so there should be enough of them to form at least two crews.” (E-mail dated 9 December 2009 kindly sent to the author by Franek Grabowski). Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1,

The flights from Eglin AFB to Retalhuleu were supposed to last about 6 hours and 20 minutes, have a first check point in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico (at 26°00’N 88°00’W), enter the area of Merida Beacon after 3 hours and 40 minutes, have another check point at the Mexican border to Guatemala near the ruins of Calakmul (at 17°50’N 90°00’W), then pass over Guatemala City about 6 hours after departure, before landing at JMADD after 6 hours and 20 minutes.103

Brigade C-54 flight plan Eglin AFB – Retalhuleu (JMADD) for 15 November 1960104

As to the number and identities of the C-54s, Connie Seigrist recalls: “During the Bay of Pigs […], I can remember at least 5 or 6 different DC-4s just for the Invasion. But for training and base supplying there would only be one or two on base”.105 In his letter dated 4 January 61 sent to the Chief of the CIA’s WH/4 of the Directorate of Plans,106 the Chief of

p.102 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ) confirms that some of the pilots were OSTIARIES, i.e. Polish crews coming from Wiesbaden, Germany. 103 See Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 2, p.198. 104 See Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, vol. II, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 2, p.198 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ). The aircraft involved – “LIMROT” – was C-54G “6096“, call sign ES-54-049 (see ib. p.193). 105 E-mail dated 28 January 2005, kindly sent to the author by Connie Seigrist. 106 US Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961– September 1962, Document 9, published at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d9 .

the CIA’s WH/4/PM, USMC Col. J. Hawkins, states that 7 C-54s107 were to be used for the strike and that the Florida base would be Opa Locka, open to CIA operations by that time. Indeed, Opa Locka airport, located in the north of the Miami area, was the airport from where those C-54s took off at night without either position or landing lights to bring new recruits and supplies to Retalhuleu in Guatemala.108 There was also a large Miami-based contractor called AACMF (believed to stand for “American Airmotive Corp., Miami, Florida”) that, according to the microfilms preserved at the USAF’s Historical Research Agency, did a lot of maintenance and other contract work on USAF C-54s in the late fifties and early sixties. So people living in the Miami area may have believed that the C-54s they heard at night taking off from Opa Locka109 were the same they could see at Miami during daytime. But those nightly visitors did not come from Miami airport, they came from Eglin Air Force Base. And the C-54 pilots of those supply flights to Retalhuleu did not belong to the Miami contractor, but were American and non-American contract pilots, some of whom were from South East Asia and some were from Poland; they transported the Cuban recruits to Retalhuleu.110 In the early sixties, Eglin was the home of two USAF C-54 operators: The USAF Air Proving Ground Center, which had been formed on 1 December 57,111 had five C-54s112 in the 1960/1 period, while the 48th Air Rescue Squadron (formed in 1952 and operating C-54s between 1956 and 1965)113 had six C-54s114 in the 1960/1 period. The permanent presence of these 2 units at Eglin AFB probably served as a good cover for the secret presence of a third unit that was temporarily based at Eglin’s Auxiliary Field Three (Duke Field) from the fall of 1960 to June/July 61: the 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group, Headquarters Command, Eglin, that is the very same unit, whose Detachment 2 was responsible for the secret flights to Tibet.115 So there is no doubt that the C-54s assigned to that unit in the 1960/1 period were the aircraft that were used against Cuba. Those C-54s came from a variety of units, all of them non-combat units like Air Base Wings or Training Centers. Four C-54Gs (45-565, 45-520, 45-631, and 45-636) were assigned to the 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group, Headquarters Command, Eglin, between 7 and 10 November 1960 and remained with them until June or July 61.116 And four more C-54Gs (45-550, 45-

107 Apparently, the remaining 3 Agency-owned C-54s and the 4 USAF C-54s bailed in November 1960. 108 Prados, President’s secret wars, p.184; Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.37. 109 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.21. 110 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.40. 111 See https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/433909/air-proving-ground-command/ . 112 C-54s 42-72740, 42-72528, 45-477, 45-495, and 45-629 according to microfilms nos. ACA-2, ACA-3, ACA- 4, ACA-6, ACA-11, and AVH-1 preserved at the AFHRA, Maxwell AFB. 113 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/48th_Rescue_Squadron . 114 C-54s 42-72440, 42-72555, 42-72609, 42-72747, 44-9073, and 45-632 according to microfilms nos. ACA-2, ACA-3, ACA-4, ACA-6, ACA-11, and AVH-1 preserved at the AFHRA, Maxwell AFB. 115 Trest, Air Commando One, p. 83. 116 According to microfilms nos. ACA-2, ACA-3, ACA-4, ACA-6, ACA-11, and AVH-1 preserved at the AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, the C-54Gs assigned to the 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group, Eglin, in November 1960 were: 45-565 of OKLAR (Oklahoma City Air Material Area), Tinker AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 7 November 60 (60312), back to OKLAR, Tinker AFB, on 1 June 61 (61152); 45-520 of SHTCE (Sheppard Technical Training Center), Sheppard AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 9 November 60 (60314); back to SHTCE, Sheppard AFB, on 28 June 61 (61179); 45-631 of AOT (Air Observers Training Center), Amarillo AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 10 November 60 (60315), back to AOT, Amarillo AFB, on 13 July 61 (61194); and 45-636 of AOT (Air Observers Training Center), Amarillo AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 10 November 60 (60315), back to AOT, Amarillo AFB, on 13 June 61 (61164). In Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2 (readable at

561, 45-579, and 45-611) were assigned to the 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 20 and 22 February 1961; they also remained with them until June or July 1961.117 But as the first 2 C-54s had arrived at Retalhuleu already in September 1960, that is two months before the first C-54Gs were assigned to the 1045th OETGP, they had another origin. Both of them were lost in late September and early October 1960: On the very first flight on 28 September 60 – the mission was to drop weapons and ammunition to the guerrillas operating in the Escambray Mountains118 –, one of those C-54s suffered from engine trouble, after it had been hit by antiaircraft fire, tried to return to Retalhuleu, but made a forced landing near Comitán (southern Mexico), where it was seized by the authorities.119 The crew was allowed to return to Rayo Base four days later,120 but the aircraft was still impounded in Mexico in October 61.121 Only much later, when the Fuerza Aérea Mexicana had found out that it had many irregularities, it was sent back to its operational base at Eglin in exchange for

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ), i.e. in the source references to the entire volume, a Memo for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), dated 26 October 60, from Stanley W. Beerli “sub Aircraft for Support of project CROSSPATCH (JMC-0170)” is quoted on p.461 in note 67e. This probably was the request for the first batch of USAF C-54Gs. 117 According to microfilms nos. ACA-2, ACA-3, ACA-4, ACA-6, ACA-11, and AVH-1 preserved at the AFHRA, Maxwell AFB the C-54Gs assigned to the 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group, Eglin, in February 1961 were: 45-550 of 2848th Air Base Wing, Norton AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 20 February 61 (61051), back to 2848th Air Base Wing, Norton AFB, on 25 May 61 (61145); 45-561 of 1376th CLM (Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance) Squadron, Turner AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 20 February 61 (61051), back to 1376th CLM Squadron, Turner AFB, on 29 May 61 (61149); 45-579 of 2855th Air Base Wing, Olmsted AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 22 February 61 (61054), back to 2855th Air Base Wing, Olmsted AFB, on 29 May 61 (61149); and 45-611 of OKLAR (Oklahoma City Air Material Area), Tinker AFB, to 1045th OETGP, Eglin, on 22 February 61 (61054), back to OKLAR (Oklahoma City Air Material Area), Tinker AFB, on 29 June 61 (61180). In Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ), i.e. in the source references to the entire volume, a Memo for the Secretary of Defense, dated 19 Jan. 61, from Jacob Esterline regarding “Requirement for Aircraft for Support of project CROSSPATCH” is quoted on p.459, note 53. This probably was the request for the second batch of USAF C-54Gs. 118 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.65. The USAF code for supply flights of the Bay of Pigs operation was Project CROSSPATCH. In Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ), i.e. in the source references to the entire volume, we have several references called “Aircraft Support of Project CROSSPATCH” (references nos. 43, 49-53 or 67e at pp.458-61). 119 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, pp.113/4; Hagedorn, Central American and Caribbean Air Forces, p.148; Prados, President’s secret wars, p.187. Jack B. Pfeiffer (Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, pp.113/4, online readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ) gives the following description: “A C-54, under the command of Orlando Alvarez Builla, the commander of the C-54 Squadron, with an experienced co-pilot, navigator, and radio operator – the cockpit crew claimed a total of roughly 45,000 hours of flying experience – took off to make a supply drop near the city of Trinidad in the Escambray area of Cuba. Unfortunately, they dropped their load on a power plant [add from p.115: “mistaking the lights on the power station for our ground support team”]. After a series of misadventures, they had to make an emergency landing in Mexico, near Comitán. The aircraft was confiscated by the Government of Mexico, and the crew’s release was obtained only through the intercession of Col. Antonio Batres, Chief of the Guatemalan Air Force and personal pilot of President Ydígoras Fuentes.” 120 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp. 65/6. 121 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § J 1, p.98, that is p.106 on the website.

a more regular USAF C-54.122 Those irregularities are described by Leroy Fletcher Prouty as follows: “In fact, the big transport was very special. Although it looked like any other C-54 or DC-4, a trained observer would have noted those things, and that it had unusual radios, no engine decals, and no manufacturer’s labels. It was ‘clean’, a non-attributable airplane. It had been ‘sanitized’ and was the pride of the clandestine operators’ art. It could have been flown anywhere in the world, and if it had been lost on some clandestine mission, the finder – whether he was Cuban, Congolese, or Russian – might have assumed that it had been operated by Americans, but he would not have been able to prove it. In other words, the U.S. Government, if required, could have plausibly disclaimed ownership of the plane and that it had had anything to do with the plane, its crew, and its cargo. This plane had been on many flights along the Iron Curtain borders, on leaflet drops and on electronic intelligence missions. It had been used for para-drop missions in Greece and in Jordan. It had been to the Congo and had delivered ‘black’ cargoes to the Katangese even while other U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft were flying Congolese troops and supplies against the rebels. It had been to Clark Field near Manila, flying Tibetans to and from operational training sites. It had often been to the old World War II B-29 Superfortress bomber base in Saipan where Southeast Asians were being trained in sabotage tactics and paramilitary civic action programs. But on this flight its crew had been Cuban.”123 Interestingly, besides Americans like Connie Seigrist,124 the crews of those early C-54s sometimes seemed to be Czech or Polish, and that indeed makes believe that those aircraft had often flown missions behind the Iron Curtain.125 Indeed, what in USAF records is called the 1045th OETGP, was the DPD or Development Projects Division within the CIA hierarchy, that is the Agency’s air arm, whose independence from the CIA project is complained in the “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961: “Still another important factor in the diffusion of direction and control was the insistence of the Agency’s air arm, the Development Projects Division (DPD), on preserving its independence and remaining outside the organizational

122 Prouty, The secret team, chapter 2, at https://ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/STchp2.html , p.3; Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.71. 123 Prouty, The secret team, chapter 2, at https://ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/STchp2.html , pp.1-3. Prouty had been involved in organizing aircraft for those support flights to the Cuban guerrillas. Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2 (readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ) quotes several of Prouty’s memos, e.g. in note 48 on p.458 a memo dated 9 August 60 from Leroy F. Prouty regarding “Aircraft Support of Project CROSSPATCH”. 124 In his letter dated 20 May 76 to CIA historian Dr. Jack Pfeiffer, Connie Seigrist says: “I flew many flights to Opa Locka, Florida and a few flights from Field 3 (Eglin) in western Florida, both as pilot and instructor” (in: UTD/Leary/B21F11). As he was not allowed to record his real flights (Memoirs, p.47, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11), he noted fictitious commercial flights in his log book. Already at Air America’s Washington Reunion of 2006, Connie Seigrist had told the author that his entries for the Bay of Pigs operation were fictitious, and photocopies of these pages kindly supplied by his son Steve in February 2021 confirm this point. All of these fictitious commercial flights start at Phoenix and most of them end at Miami. As the flight time given varies from 7-8 hours in October 60 to 10 ½ hours in May 61, “Phoenix” probably initially stands for Retalhuleu in Guatemala and later for Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua. If this assumption is correct, Connie Seigrist probably made 4 flights to Opa Locka (i.e. “Miami”) in October 1960, 3 in November, 1 in December, 3 in January 1961, 3 in February, 2 in March, 3 in April, 3 in May, and 3 in June 1961. The tail numbers given are also fictitious – like DC-4s N1002 and N1004, which never existed, but seem to have been inspired by CAT’s real DC-4s B-1002 and B-1004. 125 “On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that […] a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. III, p.14 (online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol3.pdf ) – apparently, this was C-54G 45-558.

structure of the project, in which it had a vital, central role, including air drops to the underground, training Cuban pilots, operation of air bases, the immense logistical problems of transporting the Cuban volunteers from Florida to Guatemala, and the procuring and servicing of the military planes. The project chief had no command authority over air planning and air operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was completely independent. […] The chiefs of air operations in Guatemala and Nicaragua were DPD representatives, independent of the WH/4 chiefs of these bases.”126 The man in charge of this unit at that time was USAF Colonel Stanley W. Beerli, working for the CIA as acting head of the CIA’s Air Branch,127 that is as chief, Development Projects Division: It was him who procured the B-26s and the C-54s for the project.128 Soon after the first C-54 had been lost,129 that is probably in October 60, a Cuban student pilot made his C-54 touch a mountain, tearing off an engine, but the instructor, Ed Smith, one of Major Aderholt’s men from South East Asia, managed to return the aircraft near to Retalhuleu, where it crash-landed on the beach.130 Connie Seigrist recalls: “The C-54 was on a night drop training flight preparing a crew for a Cuban night flight. […] Their particular training area was at the edge of the mountain range. The crew could not find the drop area and elected to fly around to search for it. In the process they flew into one of the large jungle trees with their left wing. Instead of crashing as might be expected they were able to nurse the aircraft downhill back to the ocean. I was able to talk them on the ground to air radio during their downhill flight back to the ocean immediately following their striking the tree. The American instructor informed me no 1 propeller could not be feathered and no 2 engine had stopped running. At the best it was a bad situation. There wasn’t any way the aircraft could stay aloft with two wind milling propellers, much less chance with both located on the left wing of the aircraft. […] Suddenly their radio went quiet. It was obvious they were down. I had started organizing a rescue party immediately after they first called in and also dispatched a C-46 to try locate the C-54. The C-46 called in shortly after take-off reporting they had located the C-54 still intact lying on the beach and observed some of the crew walking around. We departed instantly proceeding by road to the ocean. […] Arriving at the downed aircraft we found everyone alive and well other than being shaken up except for two crew members. The co-pilot had a back injury and the flight engineer was bruised about the head but not seriously. While things were being organized to proceed back to the vehicles, I walked to the point where the C-54 had first touched the sand. The right wing had hit the sand and the left wing had hit the water. […] The right wing had gradually dug itself about four feet deep into the sand bank where it was stopped. The wing digging in caused the aircraft to make a right pivot facing away from the water leaving the nose in the edge of the jungle and the tail toward the water. It was once in a million chances the aircraft and the crew had survived a total disaster probability. The emergency landing demonstrated superb

126 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § B 7, pp. 38/9, that is pp. 46/7 on the website; emphasis is mine. 127 Trest, Air Commando One, p.83. 128 Haas, Apollo’s warriors, p.150. 129 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.66. 130 Trest, Air Commando One, p.114; see also Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.114, online readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf .

airmanship by the American Commander.”131 This was the instructor pilot, Captain Ed Smith, one of Major Aderholt’s men from South East Asia.132 Other Americans on that C-54 were Air America kickers Miles L. Johnson and Richard A. (“Pete”) Peterson.133 But the C-54 was to remain on the beach. Former Bay of Pigs pilot Edward B. Ferrer recalls: “Champerico is a beach on the Pacific coast of Guatemala near Rayo Base. Ten years later María and I were vacationing in Guatemala and while flying over the coast saw what remained of the C-54 fuselage. It was being used as a dwelling by an Indian family.”134 Probably both of these C-54s had the same origin: they were black mission aircraft. As the USAF’s Assignment Records only list “regular” USAF aircraft, it is difficult to identify the two C-54s. However, those records do note when an aircraft leaves regular USAF service, and indeed, C-54G 45-558, which had already been temporarily transferred to “Top Secret” at Wiesbaden on 3 December 1952,135 left regular USAF service again at Clark AFB on 8 February 1957, going once more to “Top Secret”, that is to the CIA.136 This seems to have been the C-54 seized in Mexico, as its service history fits to what Fletcher Prouty said about the aircraft impounded. The C-54 that crashed on the beach near Retalhuleu was C-54G 45- 592. In December 1959, it had been one of the CIA aircraft stationed at Kadena, Okinawa,137 and it is mentioned in the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation written by CIA historian Dr. Jack Pfeiffer as the C-54G lost in October 1960.138 Indeed, before the bulk of the C-54s used in the Bay of Pigs Project arrived from USAF sources, the CIA’s DPD headed by Colonel Stanley W. Beerli planned to use only Agency- owned C-54s. As Col. Beerli claimed, “DPD had five C-54’s available” in September- October 1960,139 so that after the loss of 45-558 and 45-592, 3 Agency-owned reserve C-54s were still available. However, with only 3 Agency C-54s still available, on 26 October 60, Col. Beerli asked the DoD for “loan or bailment” of 4 C-54s on an extremely short

131 Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.53/4, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 132 See Trest, Air Commando One, p.114, with a short description of this accident. 133 Telephone interview with Miles L. Johnson conducted by Prof. William Leary on 6 July 1991, written resume, at: UTD/Leary/B43F3. 134 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.66 note 2. 135 C-54Gs “45-558, 45-567 and 45-589 were all with 7499 CMP at Wiesbaden when they were lost to "T.S. Project" on 3rd December 1952. Likewise 45-591 was lost to "Top Secret" 6th October 1952. Undoubtably all four aircraft were involved with the Iron Curtain and Berlin Corridor flights” (e-mail dated 21 January 2011, kindly sent to the author by John Davis). 136 Microfilm reel no. ACA-11, preserved at the AFHRA, Maxwell AFB. 137 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP61-00763A000200150135-8.pdf . 138 Vol. I, part 2, of Dr. Jack Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ) lists the references to the entire volume from p. 455 onwards. Under reference no. 67c, on p.460, a “Memo to Directorate of Plans, Deputy Directorate of War Plans, Hq. USAF, from Stanley W. Beerli, 2 Nov 60, sub: Loss of C-54G S.N. 45- 592 (DPD-8042-60)” is mentioned. As the previous history of this aircraft – it was with the 6605th Air Base Wing in 1956, with the 1742nd TSM Sq in 1957, and with AMCSB / SCAO, Ontario in 1958, from where it went to MAP on 3 March 59 (USAF Assignment Records, preserved at the AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, microfilm reel no. ACA-11) – does not fit to what Prouty says about the C-54 seized in Mexico, this must have been the one that crashed at Champerico beach – evidently after it had returned from MAP and gone to “Top secret”. I am very grateful to Clive Turner who brought my attention to this aircraft (e-mail dated 27 July 2012). 139 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.54 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ).

deadline140 – the first of them arriving in mid-November 1960. But what about the time before mid-November 1960? “The next day, a C-54 transport assigned to the squadron arrived” at Rayo Base.141 This was apparently one of the 3 Agency-owned reserve C-54s. Both of the 2 aircraft that brought additional supplies from the US to Retalhuleu in November 1960 – C-54D “2764” and C- 54G “577”142 – are believed to have been part of the Agency’s reserve fleet for the Bay of Pigs Project. In November 1959, Agency-owned C-54D “2764” had been based at Kadena, Okinawa:

The CIA fleet stationed at Kadena, Okinawa in December 1959 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP61-00763A000200150135-8.pdf)

But as initially, 2 C-54s were to be used for training at Rayo Base,143 2 aircraft officially owned by Los Hermanos were needed that could be leased to the Frente Revolucionario Democrático. So these C-54s also had to have a Panamanian registry. One such C-54 seems to have been the mysterious C-54G HP-320 given as ex 45-610 (msn 36063) that was reportedly registered to Los Hermanos,144 although this particular aircraft was also reported

140 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.54 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). These were the 4 USAF C-54Gs that arrived in November 1960 (see above, note 116). 141 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.68. This seems to refer to October 1960. 142 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ), p.213. 143 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.50. 144 According to Burnett/Davis/Hagedorn/Kuhn/Slack, Central American and the Caribbean civil aircraft registers, p. 29, C-54G HP-320 was registered to Los Hermanos in 1962; its identity is given as msn 36063, ex 45-610 and N4000A, and the authors add that it is believed to have been written off on 15 October 1959.

to have ditched in a small lake after take-off from NAS Jacksonville airport on 15 October 1959 due to incorrect fuel management and to have been destroyed by fire.145 So it seems to be more likely that the aircraft registered as HP-320 was another C-54G with a similar origin – and instead of 45-610, a candidate seems to be C-54G 45-620, which is mentioned in Agency papers of February 1957 as “5620”.146 However, in reality, 45-620 was with the 7168th TSM Squadron, Athens, since 12 January 1957147, so was a USAF aircraft used by the CIA only as a courier. During the 1960-61 period, 45-620 was assigned to another support squadron, the Frankfurt Rhein-Main based 7167th TSM Squadron (ACA-11). So, probably, HP-320 was simply not taken up and cancelled after the 1959 accident of 45-610. As to C- 54G “7701” – the aircraft that, according to René García’s log book, was almost permanently present at “Rayo Base” during the period between February and April 1961 as it was used for all sorts of practices (including emergencies) out of Retalhuleu on 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 February 61, and then for night supply drops to Cuba on 11 February, 1 March, 4 March, 15 March, 20 March, as well as on 9 April and on 20 April 1961,148 – this seems to have been C-54G 45- 577, whose arrival at Retalhuleu had to be waited for, as Agency-owned C-54D “2764”, which had been temporarily stationed there in November 1960, could not remain permanently as Retalhuleu’s evacuation aircraft.149 Probably, “577” received its Fuerza Aérea de Liberación tail number “7701” later in November 1960.150 The HP- registration this aircraft used with Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez is unknown. Another C-54 of the Agency’s reserve fleet assigned to the Bay of Pigs Project apparently was C-54D 42-72523 msn 10628. For on 24 October 1961, the Director General de Aeronáutica Civil of Panama confirms to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez that upon their request dated 20 October 1961, the provisional registrations for three of Los Hermanos’ aircraft had been cancelled; and one of those registrations was HP-321P, formerly assigned to Los Hermanos’ C-54 42-72523. As all the other C-54s used in the Bay of Pigs operation from November 1960 onwards were C-54G aircraft, the alias of the sole C-54D can easily be identified from René García’s log book: it was DC-4D “6600”. On 7 April 61, René García flew DC-4D “6600” for training an emergency situation (2 engines failing).151 Indirectly, this is confirmed by CIA historian Jack Pfeiffer: “Monthly cost for rental of [blank; read: “Los Hermanos”] aircraft – 4 C-46’s, 8 B-26’s,152 2 C-54’s,153 and 2 Helios – as of early

145 According to Joseph Baugher’s USAF serials for 1945 (http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1945.html), C-54G 45-610 (msn 36063) went to US Overseas Airlines on 16 Nov. 1955 as N4000A; it is said to have ditched in a small lake after take-off from NAS Jacksonville airport on 15 October 1959; according to Peter Berry / Tom Dunstall / Michael Ford / John A. Whittle, The Douglas DC-4, Brentwood, Essex (Air-Britain), 1967, p.69, it was subsequently destroyed by fire. 146 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89B00551R000200080024-5.pdf . 147 AFHRA microfilm no. ACA-11. 148 One of the Cuban pilots, René García, gave his log book to Leif Hellström who kindly sent to the author a copy of the page where García noted his C-54 flights (e-mail dated 24 June 2005). Here, García adds the Guatemalan nationality prefix “TG-” to all C-54 serials, but this is believed to have been his own interpretation. 149 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ), p.213. 150 While during regular business missions, CIA-operated C-54s mostly used an abbreviation of their USAF serial – “5620” being an abbreviation of 45-620 – the C-54s flown for the Bay of Pigs Project used their own tail numbers – there was no USAF C-54 serial ending in “7701” – and sometimes apparently changed them after some time. 151 Pages from René García’s log book kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström (e-mail dated 24 June 2005). 152 This seems to refer to the Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca B-26s used for training at Retalhuleu.

November [1960] was nearly $ 35,000 a month. All of the aircraft, of course, were presumably leased to Señor Goudie, the FRD’s finance man in Miami.”154 This means that in early November 1960, that is after the crash of the first 2 C-54s in September and October 60, 2 C-54s were still officially registered to Los Hermanos in the HP- series.

Letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the DGAC Panama to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez (UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4)

In the USAF’s Assignment Records preserved at Maxwell AFB, C-54D 42-72523 is last mentioned when it left regular Air Force service at Kadena, Okinawa on 9 February 1956 and was transferred to an unknown outfit, coded “S ATEDEPTDAF”.155 The meaning of that code is unknown, but it probably stands for: “terminated” as to regular USAF service and transferred to a “special” unit reporting directly to the “Department of Defense / Air Force.” Since that time, C-54D 42-72523 does no longer appear in the USAF Assignment Records. Before 1956, this C-54D had belonged to the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing at Kadena, Okinawa. When that unit was deactivated in 1956, most of their C-54s went to the 332nd Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special), Kadena – reportedly including 2 special

153 Apparently, only the 2 HP- registered C-54s are meant, not the 3 remaining Agency-owned C-54s that Col. Beerli had claimed to be available for the operation (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p. 54 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 154 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, pp. 52 and 55/6 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 155 Microfilm no. ACA-2 notes for 1956: 42-72523 C-54D of 581st ASL Group [that is the 581st ARCW], Kadena, leave to “S ATEDEPTDAF” on “CCL092122KADENA” (action date: 9 February 56, reporting date 12 February 56).

mission C-54s that the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing had had before, that had flown covert missions out of Taiwan during the fifties, often manned by CAT crews,156 and that in 1959/60 passed to Detachment 2, 1045th OETGP at Kadena.157 But while the later history of all the other 8 C-54s operated by the 332nd TCS in late 1956158 can be traced from the USAF Assignment Records,159 revealing that all but one160 had left South East Asia before 1960, those 2 special mission C-54s do not appear in the USAF Assignment Records – like the 2 special mission C-118s of the same unit.161 So, evidently C-54D 42-72523 was one of them. Apparently, an early idea had been to replace one of the ill-fated Agency C-54s by a C-54 flown by Civil Air Transport.162 To sum up: At Puerto Cabezas, the actual fleet comprised “10 C-54 transports”;163 these 10 C-54s are believed to have been the 2 C-54s that received HP- registrations plus the 8 C-54Gs loaned from the USAF. Occasionally, however, additional C-54s were used, as during the insurrection of the Guatemalan Armed Forces in November 1960. On 13 November 1960, an insurrection broke out in the Guatemalan Armed Forces, and on 14 and 15 November 60, Connie Seigrist and William Beale flew 2 B-26s on strafing missions.164 Upon request of Guatemala, the USAF sent a C-124 full of weapons and ammunition to Eglin AFB,165 where they were loaded onto 2 JMARC C-54Gs166 – “6096” and “9069” – and flown to Retalhuleu. These aircraft are believed to be the first 2 out of 4 C-54Gs that the USAF bailed to the CIA’s Bay of Pigs project in November 60, i.e. 45-565 and 45-520.167 When, on 15 November, Retalhuleu asked Headquarters for one of these C-54G’s to remain at JMADD “for possible evacuation,”168 the answer given the same day was no – “expect third C-54 in commission 17 Nov. Will send

156 Haas, Apollo’s warriors, pp. 80/1, 92/3. 157 Trest, Air Commando One, p.85; Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp. 44/5. 158 That is C-54s 42-72505, 42-72510, 42-72520, 42-72610, 42-72652, 42-72675, 42-72694, and 42-72753. 159 Microfilms nos. ACA-2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 preserved at the AFHRA. 160 C-54D 42-72694 was assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing, Kadena, on 2 September 60; while the card for 1961 is missing in the USAF Assignment Records, the cards for 1962-64 note: leave 18 FDM Sq, Kadena, on 62155; back to them on 62198; again to them back from maintenance at Hong Kong on 62212; to 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena, on 62304; to 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena, on 64079, current on 64182. 161 See the DC-6 file of this database. 162 In Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ), i.e. in the source references to the entire volume, a memo destined for DDP et al. and dated 7 October 60 is quoted on p.460, note 66, as “sub: Activities Program (Cost of HBILKA Aircraft) JMC-0134-60/DDP 0-5259”. This may have been a reaction to the loss of C-54G 45-592 in early October 60. HBILKA stands for CAT Inc / Air America (see Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ), vol. I, part 1, p.98). 163 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.26 (= p.33 on the web), CIA document no. 0000132097, published on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf. 164 These flights do not appear in Connie Seigrist’s log book, but are confirmed by CIA document 0000141130 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141130.pdf . For details see Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.50/1, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 165 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 1 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part1.pdf ), pp.28-52. 166 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ), pp.193/4. 167 See above, notes 97 and 116. 168 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ), p.208.

two down night of 17 Nov. Then one can be retained.”169 Still the same day, on 15 November 60, “Director” (CIA Washington) informed Eglin AFB that “acft 764 will remain MADD after cargo off load. […] Expect 764 to return Egli after delivery 577. Mission of 764 is provide evac capability. Egli insure canvas roll-up seats and safety belts installed prior departure 17 Nov.”170 In December 1959, C-54D “2764”, that is 42-72764 msn 10869, was an Agency-owned aircraft stationed at Kadena, Okinawa;171 in December 1965, it became B- 1014 of Air Asia. Apparently, C-54D “2764” was one of the Agency aircraft that had flown supplies or new enlisted men to Guatemala on 17 November 60, before all of the C-54Gs bailed from USAF were operational.172 The C-54 that was to replace “2764” as a JMADD evacuation aircraft was “577”, that is the “Agency-owned C-54G #45-577” msn 36030. In August 1961, it was transferred to the Far East173 to become RoCAF C-54G “54002”.174

Cables dated 14 and 15 November 1960 from CIA HQS (“Director”) to Eglin AFB (online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf )

As to Eglin, it was probably there that all the other C-54s to be used in the operation were “sanitized”, that is USAF markings, other insignia, engine decals, and manufacturer’s labels were removed to make the aircraft non-attributable;175 and they were given fake serials. Indeed, the serials used by the C-54s of the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación against Cuba were completely arbitrary. What we do know about those serials mostly comes from the log book

169 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ), p.212. 170 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy, part 2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ), p.213. 171 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP61-00763A000200150135-8.pdf . 172 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070024-3.pdf . 173 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00961R000100050021-8.pdf . 174 See my file Air America: Douglas C-54s within The Aircraft of Air America. 175 Prouty, The secret team, chap.2, internet version, p.1, https://ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/STchp2.html .

of one of the Cuban pilots, René García, who once gave it to Leif Hellström. Leif Hellström kindly sent the author a copy of the page where García noted his C-54 flights – with the exception of DC-4D “6600”, apparently the alias of C-54D 42-72523, they were all C- 54Gs.176 According to García’s log book, only C-54G “7701” was regularly at “Rayo Base” during the period between February and April 1961,177 as it was used for all sorts of practices (including emergencies) out of Retalhuleu on 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 February 61, and then for night supply drops to Cuba on 11 February, 1 March, 4 March, 15 March, 20 March, as well as on 9 April and on 20 April 61. Four more C-54s were also used for training at Retalhuleu: C-54G “7003” on 8 February, C-54G “7001” on 9 February, C-54G “6606” on 6 April, and DC-4D “6600” on 7 April 61. Other night drops into Cuba were made by C-54Gs that apparently were used for one mission only during that period: “7702” on 13 February, “6604” on 7 March, and “6705” on 10 March; “6609” was flown back to Miami with passengers on 22 April 61. Apparently, the C- 54s that appeared only once or twice at Retalhuleu were the aircraft that had come from Opa Locka or Eglin AFB with new enlisted men or supplies: In October 60, they arrived irregularly about 3 times a month,178 but in January 1961, there were as many as 5 C-54 flights arriving each month with new troops for Trax Base.179 As more C-54 serials are known than aircraft,180 it is likely that the C-54s changed serials after returning to Eglin AFB, perhaps during maintenance.

C-54s at Retalhuleu in 1960/61 (US Government photographs)

176 E-mail dated 24 June 2005, kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström. In his log book, García adds the Guatemalan nationality prefix “TG-” to all C-54 serials, but this is believed to have been his own interpretation. 177 Probably C-54G 45-577. 178 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.69. 179 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.105; Ferrer apparently calls Finca Helvetia (JMTRAV) “Trax Base”. 180 Known C-54 serials used during the entire Bay of Pigs operation: “6096” (on 15 November 60), “9069” (on 15 November 60), “7003” (on 8 February 61), “7001” (on 9 February 61), “7702” (on 13 February 61), “7701” (on 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11 Feb. 61, 1, 4, 15, and 20 March 61, 9 and 20 April 61 > permanent; probably ex “577”), “6604” (on 7 March 61), “6705” (on 10 March 61), “6606” (on 6 April 61), “6600” (= DC-4D, on 7 April 61, emergency training), “7107” (on 18 April 61, = invasion), “7710” (on 18 April 61, = invasion), “7711” (on 17, 18 + 19 April 61, = invasion), and “6609” (on 22 April 61, flown back to Miami with passengers). These are 14 C-54s tail numbers for 10 aircraft – not including the Agency-owned C-54 (“764”) that was temporarily assigned to the operation during the insurrection of November 1960.sing, were not included

The drops: The drops were not very successful: The first airdrop mission of arms and ammunition to guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains near Trinidad in central Cuba took place on 28 September 60; the operation was not a success, as the supplies landed seven miles from the reception area, falling into the hands of Castro’s militia instead of the those of the rebels,181 and on the return flight, the C-54 involved made an emergency landing in Mexico, where it was seized by the Mexican authorities. The paramilitary agent, on whom the project had set great store, was captured and executed.182 Returning from an unsuccessful drop mission where he had encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire, the pilot, Captain Tellechea damaged his C-46 even more during a forced landing at Retalhuleu in November 60.183 And there were also other problems: Many times, pilots were forced to make landings in Jamaica or Grand Cayman Island, or at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.184 On 18 October 60, a member of the Honduran assembly stated that thirty US transport planes with supplies and former soldiers of the Batista regime had flown to the Guatemalan bases of Puerto Barrios and Retalhuleu.185 Supply drops to guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains were resumed on 6 November 60 using C-46 “292”.186 “Of 68 missions between September 1960 and March 1961, only seven of the drops put supplies as intended in the hands of the guerrillas who were operating in various parts of Cuba.”187 Some more dates are known: “Two C-46 ‘black’ flights to Cuba [on] 29 December [1960], […] one C-54 ‘black’ flight to Cuba [on] 30 December, one C-46 ‘black’ flight to Cuba [on] 31 December, […] one C-46 ‘black’ flight to Cuba [on] 2 January [1961], [and] one C-54 ‘black’ flight to Cuba [on] 4 January.”188 “On 12 December 1960 […] a C-54 dropped leaflets in the Manzanillo area.”189 On 13 March, Capt. Ferrer flew a C-46 to the Escambray with a load of ammunition, but was chased back by heavy antiaircraft fire.190 Other known drop missions into Cuba include “one C-54 ‘black’ flight to Cuba [on] 16 February, […] one C-46 mission to Cuba [on] 26 February [1961], one C-54 one B-26, and

181 Fursenko / Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, p.64; “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is doc. no. 129914 of the CIA, readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § J 1, p.98, that is p.106 on the website. 182 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , §41, p.16, that is p.24 on the website. 183 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.94. 184 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.93. 185 Fursenko / Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, pp.65/6. 186 For that particular mission of 6 November 60 see Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.75-84. 187 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.117, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . The “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, gives different numbers: “There were four such successes in all, out of 30 missions flown up to 21 April 61. [...] The first of these took place on 30 December after numerous attempts beginning in mid-October. There were 13 unsuccessful attempts during January and February. The third success took place on 3 March, when three agents were dropped (previous attempts to drop them had been made on 7 February and 27 February). The forth successful drop was on 29 March. [...] The three cargo drops known to be successful were all made in the Pinar del Rio Province. In other words, practically all the supplies went to one small area of western Cuba. Small amounts are thought to have been received in Camaguay and Oriente, but none in Matanzas or Havana” (document no. 129914, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § J 6-8, p.100, that is p.108 on the website). 188 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070051-3.pdf . 189 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, pp.141/2 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 190 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.125.

two C-46 missions to Cuba [on] 2 March, two C-54 and one C-46 missions to Cuba on 3 March,”191 as well as “one C-54 ‘black’ […] cargo drop [to] Cuba [on] 24 April” 1961.192 According to García’s log book, C-54G “7701” was used for night supply drops to Cuba on 11 February, 1 March, 4 March, 15 March, 20 March, as well as on 9 April and on 20 April 61. Other night drops to Cuba were made by C-54Gs “7702” on 13 February, “6604” on 7 March, “6705” on 10 March,193 and “one C-46 mission to Cuba [on] 28 March” 1961.194 These flights took 11 to 14 hours from departure to return, depending on the type of aircraft used and the actual destination, making a flying distance of 1,600 to 1,800 nautical miles, return trip.195 On 31 December 60, a drop made to a Cuban agent was so different from what he had requested and had endangered his men by circling around in numerous U-turns that the agent complained to the Agency for lack of professional competence.196 “In all, about 151,000 pounds of arms, ammunition and equipment were transported by air. Not more than 69,000 pounds of this was actually dropped; the rest was returned to base. Of this 69,000 pounds, at least 46,000 pounds were captured by Castro forces, who recovered all or a large part of ten drops, compared with our agents, who recovered three.”197 “Ten missions were flown into the Escambray at the request of an agent who had no training in air reception. Twice the cargo was not dropped because the drop zone was not located, and once the plane turned back because of bad weather. On the seven occasions cargo was dropped, it was either totally or in large part recovered by the Castro forces. Three times cargo was dropped blind, three times in the wrong place, and once on the drop zone when the reception committee was not there.”198 However, the main problem seems to have been a lack of coordination. Former pilot Edward B. Ferrer recalls: “Most times, when the planes reached the prearranged DZ, there were no ground signals. Perhaps this was due to lack of coordination. It may seem slightly ridiculous, but there was absolutely no direct communication between the guerrillas and the Air Force at Rayo Base. When the guerrillas requested an air drop, they used an intelligence network operating between Cuba and the United States. The agents in the U.S. would then inform the advisors at Rayo of the date, time, and place of the scheduled drop. If, for any reason, the guerrillas had to move, there was no way for us to know.”199 “The difficulties in arriving at an understanding among all parties concerned were so great that this operation, first planned for 22 October, was re-scheduled for 13 November, run on 5 December without dropping, then scheduled for 19 December. Then this had to be changed to 25 December and finally to 30 December.”200

191 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070085-6.pdf . 192 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070112-5.pdf . 193 E-mail dated 24 June 2005, kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström. In his log book, García adds the Guatemalan nationality prefix “TG-” to all C-54 serials, but this is believed to have been his own interpretation. 194 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070106-2.pdf . 195 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.71. 196 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf, § J 3-5, pp.98-100, that is pp.106-8 on the website. 197 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § J 9, p.101, that is p.109 on the website. 198 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, § J8, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, pp.76/7. 199 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.82. 200 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, § J22, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, p.79.

But there was not only the lack of a standard procedure for air reception, but sometimes also a lack of discipline: “Policy did not allow American observers to go along on the missions to correct the errors. Pilot discipline was lacking and instructions were not followed in numerous instances.”201 Discipline among the soldiers was another problem. Former instructor pilot Connie Seigrist recalls: “Some of the Cubans from the camp in the hills in the past had managed to go AWOL [absent without leave] and get to Mexico City before apprehension. There were also a few troublesome types that required detention in Guatemala. Those requiring detention were untrustworthy security wise and for that reason couldn’t be returned to Florida where they were recruited from. A detention camp was built on the Gulf side of Guatemala in an inaccessible part of the jungle swamp for the purpose of holding the undesirables until the invasion of Cuba. There were no roads to the jungle prison. The prison was located on a high piece of uninhabited ground out in the middle of the swamp area. The only way to the prison was by boat or sea plane. I flew the PBY there twice landing on a river to take prisoners in or out. Those I flew out had taken a dim view of their situation after a short incarceration period and would repent enough to be allowed to return to the Retalhuleu area for training again. The Cubans that had maneuvered their way into Mexico City proposed another problem in which I became directly involved on one memorable occasion. Capt. Price and I were scheduled by the Agency to fly a C-46 to Mexico City to pick up the Cuban awols and bring them back to Retalhuleu. […] Evidently none of the Cubans trusted what the Commander might do with them on their return regardless of my promise. We returned to Retalhuleu without a single Cuban.”202 But the Headquarters directions of these airdrops also left much to be desired.203 In early 1961, the Agency made a study and concluded that the Cuban crews did not have sufficient experience or supervised training in clandestine paramilitary air operations to meet the project objectives and that they were too undisciplined to obey instructions or to make correct reports. This study recommended that contract American aircraft commanders be used, but it did not receive the approval and went no further.204

The B-26s: In addition to this big transport fleet and a small number of liaison aircraft,205 the most

201 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § J 11-13, pp.101/2, that is pp.109-10 on the website. Ferrer (Operation Puma, pp.116-20) reports a special lack of discipline for February 61, when the C-54 and B-26 squadrons had little to do. 202 Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.51/2, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 203 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § J 16, p.103, that is p.111 on the website. “The requests for air drops came from Cuba by radio, secret writing or telephone to Miami and then were forwarded to WH/4 headquarters, which then put in an operational request to DPD, which in turn directed the Guatemala air base to mount the flight after approval had been given by DDCI. DPD could and did release its own cables, without coordination. This cumbersome system was complicated even more by the scarcity of agent radio operators inside Cuba” (ib., § 19-20, p. 104 = p.112 on the website). 204 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is doc. no. 129914 published at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § J 31, p.107, that is p.115 on the website. 205 Reportedly, there was one AT-11 (Hagedorn, Central American and Caribbean Air Forces, p.148), but there really were 2 Helio Couriers (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.55 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ).

important factor of the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación were the B-26s. It is known that, when the Cuban exile pilots were trained for the Bay of Pigs operation at Retalhuleu, Guatemala (“Rayo Base”) between July 60 and April 61, these Cubans flew at least 6 of the 8 B-26s delivered to the Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca (FAG) in the summer of 1960.206 From photos, it is evident that they were painted in full FAG colors – René García, a Cuban pilot whose log book is in the possession of Leif Hellström, notes FAG 400, 404, 408, 412, 420, and 424 as training aircraft used by the Bay of Pigs Project at Retalhuleu. One of them, FAG 420, made a belly landing at Retalhuleu at an unknown date.207 In late March 1961, there was “one B-26 mishap” at Retalhuleu.208

The accident involving B-26 “420”, said to be at Retalhuleu (US Government photographs)

Already “on 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. III: Evolution of CIA’s anti-Castro Policies, 1959-January 1961, p.14 (online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol3.pdf). Possibly, the first Helio had gone, when the second one was involved in an accident. This was Helio Courier HP-322P (msn 525), officially regd. to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, Panama, in 1960. It was destroyed on 21 March 61: “Col. Batres [...] borrowed the Agency’s L-28 Helio. [...] In fact, the plane struck a grass covered log in the middle of a sod runway which was on the property of the President of Guatemala – not the air strip at Guatemala City. The plane was more than damaged – for all practical purposes it was ruined and, in fact, it was recommended that the aircraft be dismantled and [...] be scrapped for parts.” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.150 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf), plus part 2, p.474, note 78, for the date (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf). Apparently, the remains of the Helio were delivered to a new Guatemalan owner and rebuilt. Then it became TG-DOF around March 61 (Burnett, et. al., Central America and the Caribbean Civil Aircraft Registers, p.29) and turned up as B-861 with Air America in August 62 (see the Helio file of this database). 206 See Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, pp.89-91 for the identities of these B-26s and for the other B- 26s operated by the Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca. 207 See the photo of FAG “420” (after belly landing at Retalhuleu) in: Mario E. Overall, “Bay of Pigs: The Guatemalan connection” (10 May 2003), formerly at: http://www.laahs.com/artman/publish/article_50.shtml , now at http://www.urrib2000.narod.ru/ArticGiron2-e.html . Connie Seigrist recalls this accident as follows: “Retalhuleu became crowded during periods of flight training and B-26s would then be scheduled to fly to San Jose airfield for take-off and landing transition. One training flight the pilot neglected to lower his landing gear and landed belly-up without injuries. Again temporary repairs were made and I delivered it to San Jose for major repairs” (Seigrist, Memoirs, p.53, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11). According to Pfeiffer (Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.148/9), the accident was at San José and the repairs were made by five Air National Guard pilots at San Jose who, thereafter, returned the B-26 to Retalhuleu (see https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 208 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.147, online readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ).

All Guatemalan Air Force B-26s had come from storage at Davis-Monthan AFB,209 and it seems that after overhaul, these aircraft were ferried from Kelly AFB to Guatemala by Air National Guard people who were attached to the Bay of Pigs Project. Major Billy B. Campbell, who ran the air operations at Retalhuleu from July 1960 until early February 1961,210 said about these early B-26s: “The main fleet of B-26’s was sitting at Eglin. The ones that we had borrowed had come in through Kelly. The ones that we took down … we started off in Guatemala with two National Guard airplanes that we had borrowed from the Air Guard, Andrews AFB. So they then picked up six B-26’s out of Kelly which had been flown in and cleaned up – no markings. We flew those down to Retalhuleu.”211 In the meantime, the Brigade B-26’s destined to be used against Cuba were gathered at Eglin AFB. “By the end of December 1960, ten B-26 aircraft were available to the project.”212 So by then, the first of the “Brigade-owned” B-26s had arrived at JMADD, possibly from a stop made at Opa Locka, which was the gateway for black flights to Retalhuleu.213 As they arrived unmarked,214 they probably only had small numbers painted on the fin that allowed the crews to identify them,215 but in most cases, these numbers probably did not correspond to

Very small tail numbers on the fin of Brigade C-54s (US Government photographs)

209 Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.90. 210 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.25, online readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 211 Quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.161, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 212 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.13 CIA document no. 0000132097, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf. On 4 January 1961, Col. Hawkins claimed that “ten B-26’s […] were available to JMADD” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.143). 213 See Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.60, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 214 Major Billy B. Campbell, quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.162, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 215 Such a very small tail number can also be seen on the tail of the C-54s depicted above in the US Government photographs – but only when the photo is enlarged very much. “Except for a small registry number on the vertical stabilizer, all of our aircraft were unmarked. They carried no airline, military or other identification” (Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.111).

their future pseudo-Cuban tail numbers216 that were to be fully painted on the aircraft only at Puerto Cabezas.217 The first Brigade B-26 was ferried from Eglin to JMADD on 15 November 60 (call sign “Rascal three”) by USAF personnel.218 The same day, JMADD asked “Director” to send down 2 additional B-26s, as 2 B-26’s from JMADD that had temporarily been turned over to the Guatemalan Air Force during the rebellion were not operational.219 After the end of the rebellion, that is on 17 November, CIA Headquarters asked JMADD not to return the B-26’s to Eglin, but to return 2 Americans – probably the crew – via C-54.220 On 16 January 61, Col. Leroy F. Prouty (USAF) wrote DPD that, as to the 10 B-26s requested on 19 August 1960, “as of this date [i.e. 16 January 61], six of these aircraft have been picked up; but four still remain on an Air Force Base in the US.”221 From the log book of René García, we learn that on 25 November 60, B-26 “915” made some sort of night training at JMADD, with similar training flights on 28 November (B-26 “920”), 16 December (B-26 “925”), a long distance training on 21 December (B-26 “195” probably stranding for “915” on a 5 hour mission to Cozumel), a leaflet drop over Cuba on 1 January (B-26 “900”, officially an 8 hour flight to Key West and back) and another one on 1 February (B-26 “920”), plus several 1 hour solo test flights: “915” on 14 February, “911” on 21 and 25 February, “915” on 3 March, “928” on 13 March, “900” on 4 April, and “924” on 5 April 61.222 Of these aircraft, only “915” and “928” do appear in the official “Listing”, so were also fully painted tail numbers used during the attack. While Air America pilots Connie M. Seigrist (“Seig Simpson”) and William H. Beale Jr. (“Billy Bell”) – later assisted at Retalhuleu by former Air America pilot Douglas R. Price223 – took charge of instructing the Cuban air crews on the transport aircraft, Maj. Gen. George R. (“Reid”) Doster, commander of the Alabama Air National Guard, worked with the B-26 pilots.224 Documents published by the CIA, however, reveal that Air America pilots Connie Seigrist, William Beale, and Douglas Price also flew B-26 missions. Two of them occurred on 14 and 15 November 1960, when William Beale and Connie Seigrist flew B-26s out of

216 The tail numbers of the B-26s used during the attack can be found in the CIA document “Listing of mission results with attached listings” of 1961, that is document 141186, online readable on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf . 217 Major Billy B. Campbell, quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.162, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 218 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 2, p.199 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ). The names of the crew – “Carpenter” and “Kokoler” – are given in alias; these were Major Billy B. Campbell, Chief of Base, and an unknown USAF man (probably from the Alabama Air National Guard). 219 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 2, p.209 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part2.pdf ). During the rebellion, “by the end of October and the early part of November JMADD had completed preparations for a quick evacuation of all the aircraft and all station personnel to France Field in Panama” (ib., Vol. II, part 1, pp.31/2, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part1.pdf). 220 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 2, p.224. 221 Prouty, Memo to DPD dated 16 January 61, quoted in: Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Op., Vol. I, part 1, p.41, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . These 6 B-26s probably included “915”, “920”, “925”, and “900” mentioned in García’s log book. 222 Pages 116-118 of René García’s log book, kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström. 223 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, pp.113-16. 224 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, p.113.

Retalhuleu, Guatemala (“Rayo Base”).225 These were no training flights, however, but strafing missions flown against the insurrection of the Guatemalan Armed Forces mentioned above. Connie Seigrist recalls: “In late November or early December there was an insurrection in the Guatemalan Armed Forces aligned with the support of their eastern coast politicians in a take-over attempt of the country. Col. Batres flew down from Guatemala City on this particular afternoon to Retalhuleu for our air and ground assistance to help quell the insurrection. It came to light in his request for our assistance the Guatemala Air Force pilots under his command refused to take military action against their own countrymen and we were his last resort to help in saving the Ydigoras Government. Late at night we received permission from our Field Three Commander to assist Col. Batres. We immediately prepared three C-46s and Cuban ground troops to be flown to Puerto Barrios escorted by 2 B-26s in the early morning to arrive at daybreak. I flew one of the B-26s. Col. Batres’ instructions were for our B-26s to soften the airfield with our fire power to enable the C-46s to land with the Cuban ground troops without danger from retaliatory ground fire. The Cuban ground troops were then to take over and secure the airfield. Also in our instructions we were not to shoot into any operations or residential buildings on the airfield because Col. Batres’ intelligence source reported the local politicians unsympathetic to the revolt were being held hostage in the airport buildings and we should take all precaution not to harm them. We arrived in our B-26s as planned and proceeded to strafe and rocket gun emplacements, open sheds, revetments, thick bushes, or anyplace that could camouflage ground firing troops. By the time the C-46s arrived I was well convinced we had nullified any possible return action from the ground. Neither of our B-26s was hit by ground fire. […] The three C-46s returned to Retalhuleu and we in our B-26s landed at Guatemala City per Col. Batres’ previous instructions. We remained for the day on the City airfield to fly cover for some Guatemala Air Force C-47s landing troops on a mountain airfield located halfway to Puerto Barrios. […] I flew alone. The C-47s made their landing just before dark. They met no resistance and I returned to Retalhuleu as instructed by Col. Batres. Col. Batres instructed me the next morning to patrol the entire south coastal area from the mountains to the ocean and from the Mexico border to the El Salvador border. My instructions were to strafe anything moving on the highway or into any grouping of people. I patrolled the entire day and sighted nothing. After landing back in Retalhuleu I learned Col. Batres had flown to Puerto Barrios to negotiate with the leaders of the revolt and the revolt was over.”226 As seen above, at Retalhuleu, the Cuban students did not only have the Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca B-26s for training, but also some of the 12 B-26s that had been taken from open storage at Tucson and Davis-Monthan AFB. They had been “purchased” as surplus from storage by Intermountain Aviation on behalf of the recorded end-user, CARAMAR (Caribbean Marine Aero Corp.).227 On 22 November 60, CIA Headquarters (“Director”) cabled to Retalhuleu that JMADD should obtain “sufficient numbers from Guat AF to allow assignment of a MADD number each B-26 in present inventory. This will allow the same

225 Memorandum “JMGLOW Bonuses” of 7 September 61, that is document no. 141130 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141130.pdf . 226 Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.50/1, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 227 Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.131, note 12 B-26s that left the USAF during the second half of 1960: 44-35830 and 44-35574 on 30 and 31 August; 44-35821, 44-35698, 44-35839, and 44-35845 on 2, 3, and 9 September; 44-35420, 44-35789, and 44-35896 on 6 October; and 44-35782, 44-34415, and 44-34590 on 12 and 13 October 1960.

aircraft number utilized for each individual aircraft any time presence at MADD.”228 Apparently, this did not work, as on 25 November 1960, René García’s log book notes the first B-26 bearing the serial “915” at Rayo Base.229 This B-26 had an “authentic Cuban tail number”. It was to be used in a major air strike to be launched out of Puerto Barrios on 26 November 60, which was subsequently cancelled. What came out of it, was the drop mission of 5 December 60.230

Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca B-26s “404” and “408” used for training at Retalhuleu (US Government photograph)

René García’s log book shows B-26s with Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca tail numbers and probably also FAG colors until 23 January 1961. From 1 February 1961 onwards however – although the old FAG-marked B-26s were still used at Retalhuleu –, fake Cuban tail numbers in the “9xx”s became common at JMADD.231 At that time, “the main fleet of B-26’s was sitting at Eglin. […] So the planes were flown in, if I recall correctly, from Eglin as Air Force aircraft and flown down to Guatemala unmarked,” 232 Major Billy B. Campbell said. At least two of them were badly damaged during training at “Rayo Base”.233 The commander of the B-26 squadron was Joaquín “Pupy” Varela, and many of the daily training flights were proficiency flights: The transport aircraft would drop a number of rafts made of empty sealed 50-gallon drums lashed together into a lake about 25 miles northwest of “Rayo Base”, and the B-26s would use the rafts as targets conducting a series of machine gun and rocket drills.234 Apart from being used for training, the B-26s also flew some pre-

228 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.139, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 229 E-mails dated 23 + 30 November 2020, kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström. It was a 1.20 h local test. 230 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.140/1, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 231 E-mail dated 23 November 2020, kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström. 232 Major Billy B. Campbell, quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.162, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 233 Possibly 44-35698 and 44-34415, which remained with the CIA (Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, pp.127+ 131). 234 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.109/10.

invasion overflights of Cuba out of Retalhuleu, flights that lasted up to 8 ½ hours and were undertaken in order to drop leaflets and to test the Cuban defenses, while US listening stations in Florida and elsewhere would note all Cuban reactions.235 Known dates of such overflights of Cuba by B-26s was one B-26 mission flown on “5 December […], a resupply drop for Manolo Ray’s MRP.”236 Then, “two [B-26’s] flew a propaganda drop on 12 December 1960. They worked the western end of Cuba, from the Isla de Pinos to Cienfuegos, including Havana”,237 “one B-26 ‘black’ flight to Cuba [on] 29 December [1960], […] “one B-26 ‘black’ flight to Cuba [on] 1 January [1961]”,238 possibly the mission flown by B-26 “920” on 1 February 61,239 “one B-26 mission to Cuba [on] 27 February” and one B-26 mission to Cuba on 2 March 1961.240 Between October and the end of December 60, many propaganda drops were flown – “averaging one a week during that period.”241 “From the first of the year until the middle of March 1961 there was a significant increase in the number of air drop operations that were launched out of JMADD. All three types of aircraft available to the Brigade were employed – B-26’s, C-46’s, and C-54’s. As the number of overflights increased, so did the ground opposition in terms of small arms and anti-aircraft gunfire, to the point where in early January 1961, the DDCI, Gen. Cabell agreed that only the B-26’s would be used in propaganda drops over the city areas and that the C-46’s and C-54’s would do their prop drops in the less-inhabited parts of the island.”242 “In all, there were 23 leaflet drops between 12 December 1960 and the collapse of the Bay of Pigs Operations. About 12 million leaflets were dropped in addition to assorted publications.”243

Changes: Press curiosity: All of these activities did not remain unnoticed by the outside world: Already in late 1960, a number of reports about Trax and Rayo Base had appeared in several U.S. and Guatemalan newspapers, and so one day in early January 61, a Lockheed Constellation landed at Retalhuleu with 50 reporters from all over the Americas and Europe on board: Their purpose was to report the truth about the base. The newsmen were to arrive at 11:00 A.M., but by 9:00 A.M., the whole personnel of “Rayo Base” had left the base and was hiding in the jungle. “To justify the existence of the base, a detachment of Guatemalan soldiers was brought in. Four hours later, a scout found us and reported that the Constellation,

235 Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, pp.126-31. 236 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.141, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 237 Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.141/2, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 238 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070051-3.pdf . This was René García flying B-26 “900” – according to his log book “Guatemala City-Key West-Guatemala City”. 239 For 1 February 1961, René García’s log book lists a 9 hour night mission flown by B-26 “920” – seemingly “Guatemala City-Key West-Guatemala City”; this was probably a leaflet mission to Cuba. 240 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070085-6.pdf . 241 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.143 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 242 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, pp.143/4 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 243 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.145 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ).

with all newsmen aboard, had departed on its return trip with a ‘no-news cargo’. We stumbled back to Rayo, having covered six kilometers of steaming Central American jungle.”244 Apart from that, new American B-26 advisors arrived at Retalhuleu in January 61 – “Billy”, “Joe”, “Pete”, “Riley”, “Wade”, and “Reid”, that is people from the Alabama Air National Guard, and “Billy Carpenter”, the American commander of the base, was replaced by “Lou Rotham”.245 In February 61, there was little to do, only the C-46s practiced paratroop drops.246 In March 61, Castro organized an attack force of 50,000 soldiers and managed to conquer most of the territory formerly held by guerrillas. This meant that the C-54s and C-46s that still flew drops to the remaining guerrillas often took heavy ground fire. A particularly heavy accident occurred on 5 March 61, when a C-54 was forced to land in Jamaica: It had returned from a mission over Cuba, where one of its engines had been destroyed by heavy ground fire, and there were leaks in several of the fuel tanks. Four days later, the crew was picked up at Kingston airport by another C-54 arriving in the dark.247 What happened to the damaged C-54 is unknown, but it was probably repaired and returned.

One of the C-54s at Retalhuleu (US Government photograph)

There was still another important change that happened in March 61: The initial plan had been to stage the invasion in the vicinity of Trinidad. “Plan for Landing. The landing plan provided for simultaneous landing at first light on D-Day of two reinforced rifle companies of approximately 200 men each over two beaches southwest of Trinidad and the parachute landing of a company of equal strength immediately north of Trinidad. The remainder of the force was to land over one of the two beaches in successive trips of landing craft. Naval Gunfire. Two LCI each morning mounting eleven 50 caliber machine guns and two 75mm recoilless rifles were to provide naval gunfire support at the beaches. Tactical Air Operations. The plan provided for a maximum effort surprise strike (15 B-26) at dawn of D-1 on all

244 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.111/2. 245 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.105/6. “Billy”, “Joe”, “Pete”, “Riley”, “Wade”, and “Reid” are believed to stand for Bill Peterson, Joe Hinkle, Pete Ray, Major Riley Shamburger, Wade Gray, and Major General Reid Doster (Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.53). 246 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.120. 247 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § B 58, p.20, that is p.28 on the website. The mission is described in detail in Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.123-5.

Cuban military airfields followed by repeated strikes at dusk of the same day and at first light of D-Day against any airfields where offensive aircraft were yet operational.”248 However, the Department of State rejected this “Trinidad Plan”, because to them, it looked like a World War II invasion and would be too obviously attributable to the United States. So on or about 11 March 61, President Kennedy decided that it should not be executed and that possible alternatives should be studied. As according to the new plan, any tactical air operations were to be conducted out of an airfield on Cuba, to whom those operations could then be attributed, the Zapata Peninsula of Central Cuba with the new airfield at Playa Girón was chosen, that is the actual Bay of Pigs.249

248 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.18 (CIA document no. 0000132097, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf ). 249 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, pp.18- 21 (CIA document no. 0000132097, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf.

B) Moving to Nicaragua

Some Brigade C-46s at Puerto Cabezas (JMTIDE) in 1961 (US Government photograph)

In October 1960,250 a CIA delegation including Major Aderholt flew to Nicaragua’s president Luis Somoza-Debayle to negotiate, together with other CIA officials,251 to get Somoza’s permission to use Puerto Cabezas as a departure base for the strike force, representing themselves as businessmen from a front organization, United Fruit Company in New Orleans. Somoza said that he knew who they were and that he supported them, and so Aderholt flew with a son of Somoza to inspect Puerto Cabezas.252 In early 1961, three American contract pilots with long Agency experiences were made available from another project, while William Beale returned to Air America in late 1960.253 A number of other pilots and air-crew technicians, members or ex-members of several Air National Guards, were recruited especially for the project under cover of a commercial company.254 Already in December 1960, Captain Ferrer, who had taken command of the C-46 squadron, had asked that in addition to the 5 C-46 captains up to then based at Retalhuleu, 2 more Cubans should be checked out as C-46 captains. This explains why, probably around March 61, some changes took place in the C-46 fleet: Former B-850 was replaced by former N9935Z, and 2 more C-46s appeared on the scene: former N9895Z and former N9459Z. On 28 March 61, all Cuban overflights were suspended, because the aircraft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua,255 and in late March 61, the invasion force indeed moved from Retalhuleu, Guatemala, to Puerto Cabezas (“Happy Valley”).

250 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.12 (= p.19 on the web), CIA document no. 0000132097, readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf. 251 The head of the delegation was CIA man William “Rip” Robertson who, until 27 February 61, also organized the building up of JMTIDE, where work began in late January (Pfeiffer, Official History […], Vol. II, part 1, pp.108-33 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part1.pdf ). 252 Trest, Air Commando One, pp.8 + 113-15. 253 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.47, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 254 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 published at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § N 3, p.140, that is p.148 on the website; Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.101. 255 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 published at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § B 77, p.26, that is p.38 on the website.

It was during that period of time that 2 more C-46s were lost. The C-46 that was lost in Guatemala in March 61 in a crash with subsequent fire was former B-866 (manufacturer’s serial number or msn 22366), for in their letter dated 4 April 61, Air Asia asks Los Hermanos to send them a check about $ 51,000 for this aircraft.256 It had been in Guatemala on a normal flight by pilots that had remained in Retalhuleu for housekeeping.257 The accident seems to have occurred on 29 March 61,258 and the circumstances are well described by Jack B. Pfeiffer: “In an attempt to salvage the Helio that Col. Batres had piled up on the sod runway at President Ydigoras’s plantation, a C-46 was dispatched from MADD, with an American pilot and an American co-pilot, plus 5 Cubans and 4 Guatemalans to assist in the salvage operation. In approaching the sod field at the Ydigoras plantation, a sudden gust of wind caught the C-46 and threw the left wing tip into the top of a coconut tree, with the result that the plane, despite the best efforts of the American crewmen, hit a clump of trees, cart- wheeled, and was totally destroyed in the subsequent fire. Fortunately, however, the crewmen and all passengers on the aircraft escaped serious injury. Less fortunate however, was a Guatemalan worker who had been picking coconuts in the tree that the plane hit on its initial approach. He was killed when he fell out of the tree to the ground. Col. Batres had actually witnessed the crash, and when the father of the Guatemalan worker threatened legal action, Col. Batres covered for the Agency by saying that he had been flying the plane. The Guatemalan Air Force provided cover by claiming ownership of the plane. [blank] sought Headquarters permission to authorize $ 5,000 to settle the claims, including legal fees, of the father of the deceased worker who was threatening to go to court. Apparently this was the way the matter was finally settled.”259 The replacement, C-46 msn 32942 (former 44-77546 and N9894Z), seems to have been registered as AN-AMG, at least unofficially.260 It is unknown, when C-46s msns 32992,261

256 Letter dated 4 April 61, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4. The subsequent history of this C-46 B-866 was kindly supplied by Steve Darke from the FAA file: The remains were sold to Aviation Sales & Engineering at an unknown date, and the aircraft was rebuilt. On 20 November 61, it passed to Tormac Associates, Fort Lauderdale, FL, as N8417C, then to Gulf Air Inc., Miami, FL, on 16 March 62, and finally to Intermountain Aviation, Phoenix, AZ, on 12 July 62. 257 Letter dated 4 January 1987, sent by Connie Seigrist to Bill Leary, p.2, preserved at: UTD/Leary/B21F11. See also Letter dated 4 April 61, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4. 258 Date of the first cable referring to this accident in: Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2, p.475, note 80, readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf . 259 Jack Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, pp.151/2, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . Albert Persons (Bay of Pigs, p.54) gives a similar description: “Joe Hinkle and Al Waters were assigned a mission one day to fly a C-46 to a small, private grass airfield in the interior of Guatemala. They had to slow the aircraft down and drag it in over the tops of some palm trees growing at the approach end of the field. A wing tip clipped the top of one of the trees, and the C-46 wound up in a ball half in and half out of the woods at the far end of the field. The aircraft was totaled. Miraculously, Joe and Al got out without a scratch. Sadly, a Guatemalan native who was picking coconuts in the top of the tree they hit was killed.” 260 Davis / Martin / Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 89, note for serial no. 32942: “N9894Z Jaime Camargo 1961. Sold Mar 61 to Central Intelligence Agency and used in attempted invasion of Cuba Apr 61. AN-AMG for a few weeks in Mar 61. Officially NTU”. “On 14 Oct 60, Somoza agreed […] to permit the exile air force to use the Nicaraguan Air Force insignia during any internal flights.”(Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. II, part 1, p.106, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/bop-vol2-part1.pdf ). 261 N9935Z, ex 44-77596, said to have been exchanged with Southern Air Transport for serial no. 22451, that is former B-850 (Memorandum dated 20 October 61, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4).

33451,262 and 22343,263 were acquired by the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación, but it was probably also in March 61. For msn 32992 was a replacement for msn 22451 “857”,264 whose alias HP-316 was cancelled only on 9 March 61.265 C-46 msn 33451 could receive its alias HP-314P only, when the alias HP-314 was no longer used on C-46 msn 22366 (former B- 866), that is in March 61. And former Aviation Sales Engineering N9459Z (msn 22343 ex 44-78520) could receive its alias HP-322P only, after the first aircraft to use it, that is Helio Courier msn 525, former N4174D, had been sold as TG-DOF in March 61.266 And more C- 46s were needed for the invasion, as the strike force lost another C-46 during that period of time – although only temporarily. The new base at Puerto Cabezas was commanded by Garfield M. Thorsrud, who had already worked for CAT and for the CIA in Indonesia, with Connie Seigrist as head of the transport operations, who was assisted by former Air America pilot Doug Price, and General Doster as head of the B-26 operations.267 But the airstrip of Puerto Cabezas was not sufficient, because in case of a landing accident, the whole operation would be endangered. So Connie Seigrist argued: “We needed an auxiliary field in preparation for the Invasion. […] I searched out an area of fairly level open grass land nearby that appeared it could support the weight of C-46s and B-26s. I landed the forth C-46 there and immediately it sank down into the ground. That C-46 was rendered unavailable for the Invasion because of the time involved for digging it out. I flew it to Miami after the invasion.”268 Both of these accidents evidently happened before squadron commander Edward B. Ferrer moved his five C-46s from Rayo Base to Puerto Cabezas on 2 April 61.269

4 C-46s plus 1 C-54 at Puerto Cabezas in 1961 (US Government photograph)

262 N9895Z ex 44-78055, which later became B-918. According to the letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the Director General de Aeronáutica Civil of Panama to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, C-46 44-78055 had been regd. to Los Hermanos as HP-314P, but was deregistered on 24 October 61. For the sale to Air Asia see the letter dated 20 November 61 by Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez to Air Asia. Both documents can be found in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4. 263 N9459Z ex 44-78520 of Aviation Sales Engineering Association (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 110) had been registered to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez as HP-322P, but was deregistered on 24 October 61 (Letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the Director General de Aeronáutica Civil of Panama to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4). 264 Memorandum no. SA/P –61-142 dated 20 October 61, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4. 265 On 9 March 61, registration HP-316, the alias of former Air Asia C-46 B-850 (msn 22451), was cancelled as “repossessed” (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p.114). 266 Burnett / Slack / Davis / Hagedorn / Kuhn, Central American and the Caribbean civil aircraft registers, p.29. 267 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, pp.115/6. 268 Letter dated 4 January 1987, sent by Connie Seigrist to Bill Leary, p.2, preserved at: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 269 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.127.

Fuerza Aérea de Liberación C-54s at Puerto Cabezas in April 1961 (US Government photograph)

Apart from training at Retalhuleu and supply drops to Cuba, C-54Gs were also used to fly supply missions between Retalhuleu (“JMADD”) and Puerto Cabezas (“JMTIDE”), but these missions were flown by North American pilots like, for example, Albert C. Persons, author of the book Bay of Pigs. But the number of Americans at the camp was held to a bare minimum for security reasons; and the Americans who were there, were represented to be either tourists or adventurers.270 Training for those C-54 pilots, many of whom belonged to the Alabama Air National Guard, had already been done in Florida, as Albert Persons reports. For some time, he and his group had been trained at Fort Lauderdale: “Our purpose in Ft. Lauderdale was not how to fly four-engine aircraft […]. Our daily flights were for recurrent training designed to bring us back, hopefully, to a high degree of proficiency on a particular aircraft, the C-54, and to redevelop pilot skills required to fly the aircraft with no leeway for errors of judgment or technique under conditions that would demand maximum performance from both aircraft and crew. […] We practiced emergency procedures over and over again. In- flight fires, as well as electrical system, radio and engine failures were simulated on every training flight. Holding 35 tons of airplane straight and level with two engines out on the same side requires as much physical strength as it does skill. We spent hours flying at night, practicing approaches and landings at a small, abandoned World War II training field in the Everglades west of Miami. “Everglades International” was not only abandoned, it was also without runway lights. One flare pod was placed at each end of the runway. Landing lights on the aircraft could not be used. The runway was short. Consequently, approach speeds had to be controlled precisely, so as to touch down on the approach end of the runway, not somewhere halfway down its length, leaving insufficient runway ahead to brake to a stop before running off into the swamp. […] At Ft. Lauderdale we kept the aircraft on a ramp at the far side of the field from the airport terminal where commercial operations were conducted. […] For the final ten days before we left Ft. Lauderdale, we practiced not only emergency procedures and blacked-out approaches and landings at “Everglades International”, we also flew all over the state of Florida at an altitude of 200 feet at night, and without running lights. Even in broad daylight, flying at more than 200 miles per hour, 200 feet is awfully close to the ground. On a dark night at 200 feet you feel as if you are a part of

270 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 published at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § L 7, p.126, that is p.134 on the website.

the highway traffic. Although 200 feet will clear all natural terrain obstacles, it won’t clear them by much. And the state of Florida is studded with radio antennas that rise much higher than 200 feet. The concentration required to maintain an exact altitude to avoid flying into the ground, plus the eye strain associated with watching for the blinking red lights that marked the location of soaring antennas, left us wringing wet. In addition to the many hours we spent flying, we also spent many hours gathered around the dinette table in our apartment studying the C-54 flight manual. The flight manual contained everything there was to know about the C-54 – detailed descriptions of flight characteristics, performance charts and schematics of fuel, oil, hydraulic and electrical systems.”271 The airlift from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas was to require 10 C-54s and 4 C-46s. As C- 54 pilot Albert Persons notes: “Our job in the weeks ahead was to complete the airlift of equipment, supplies, and personnel from Guatemala to Nicaragua. We would have very little time to talk to anyone but each other, to learn anything about the ‘big picture’, or to do anything but eat, sleep and fly. Soon we established living quarters in both camps. […] In the weeks following our arrival at Mad we were engaged in a grueling schedule of almost daily flights between Guatemala and Nicaragua. We usually left Mad in the afternoon and returned in the early hours of the next morning. We flew as a crew of two pilots and a flight engineer. […] We slept when we could, sometimes at Mad, sometimes at Tide, and often in flight in one of the bunks of the aircraft. Because our flight schedules seldom coincided with camp routine on either side, our meals were often baloney and cheese sandwiches eaten in flight.”272 And that was not all: “The movement of aircraft involved not only flights from Guatemala to Nicaragua and return, but also flights of aircraft from Eglin Air Force Base to Roosevelt Roads (Puerto Rico) and thence to TIDE, or from Eglin Air Force base directly to TIDE. Inasmuch as the transfers were going to be made after dark, the problems were made even more difficult.” 273 When the day of the invasion approached, those C-54s also airlifted equipment, supplies, and personnel from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas; these flights stepped up considerably during the first week of April 61. At about the same time, a C-54 arrived at Puerto Cabezas loaded with a dozen metal boats that were to be used later to off-load the invasion troops.274 On 8 and 9 April, C-54s flown by contract crews arrived at Retalhuleu, and by mid-afternoon of 9 April 61, no less than 6 C-54s and 3 C-46s were lined up at Retalhuleu air base, ready to fly the Cuban troops to Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua on 10 and 11 April 61.275 “I made four flights from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas on Monday and Tuesday, April 10 and 11”, Albert Persons said.276 On 12 April 61, there were 3 C-54s at Puerto Cabezas.277 But the main air element in the Bay of Pigs operation were of course the Douglas B-26s. Eight more B-26s had left the USAF between 15 and 23 February 1961.278 Apparently, several of them had first been delivered to Guatemala, probably for leaflet drops over Cuba

271 Persons, Bay of Pigs, pp.34-35. 272 Persons, Bay of Pigs, pp.59-60. 273 Major Billy B. Campbell, quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.162, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 274 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.133. 275 Persons, Bay of Pigs, pp.59-69; Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.143, says “since early morning on the 14th”. 276 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.73. 277 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.75. 278 Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.131, note B-26s 44-34637, 44-34730, and 44-35411 that left on 15 February, and 44-34338, 44-35554, 44-35641, 44-35714, and 44-35732, that left on 22/23 February 61.

out of Puerto Barrios, but were then taken to Puerto Cabezas, before the transport fleet arrived. Late March 61 was probably the moment when the B-26s used at Retalhuleu for training were handed over to the Fuerza Aérea Guatemalteca. On 1 April 61, Puerto Cabezas’ “Happy Valley” base was operational.279 When the C-46 squadron moved from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas on 2 April 61, a total of 17 B-26s were apparently visible at Puerto Cabezas.280 The 16 B-26 tail numbers given in the CIA document “Listing of mission results with attached listings”281 plus 6 additional B-26 tail numbers mentioned in René García’s log book282 make a total of 22 B-26’s apparently available at the beginning of the Bay of Pigs operation, that is on 15 April 61. In an interview conducted by CIA historian Jack B. Pfeiffer in 1977, Gar Thorsrud, “who actually directed the air strikes against Cuba out of the TIDE base”283, also seems to say that 22 B-26s were available at Happy Valley on 15 April 61,284 but this wasn’t the real number, as we will see. Four more B-26s that had probably been stored at Tainan on Taiwan since 1959, were also registered to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez, Panama, probably in April 1961.285 But they never entered the battle:

279 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.162, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 280 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.129 + 132. 281 The “Listing of mission results with attached listings”, that is document no. 141186 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf ), gives 16 B-26s involved in the operation: “915”, “917”, “923”, “927”, “928”, “929”, “930”, “931”, “933”, “935”, “945”, “950”, “955”, “960”, “965”, and “985”. There are, however, also some blanks in that listing, for example for the B-26 destined to appear at Miami as the “defector”, which was painted as “933”. Jack B. Pfeiffer (Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 2, p.313 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ) also mentions B-26 “940” – apparently a tail number that could be used for aircraft using identical tail numbers. The “defector” aircraft was later taken back to Eglin AFB by a USAF pilot (Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.127). 282 A Cuban pilot, René García, whose log book is in the possession of Leif Hellström, also lists six B-26 tail- numbers that do not appear in that listing: “900”, “911”, “920”, “924”, “925”, and “940” (Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.131). These were apparently agency tail numbers used as identities, when the tail number painted on the aircraft had to be phony: During the strikes of 15 April, there were 3 different B-26s painted as “931” (according to René García’s log book, one of these “931”s was actually “940”), another 3 B-26s painted as “933”, and another 3 B-26s painted as “935”) (see below). Later, some of the high tail numbers painted on the B-26s were fakes that probably were to deceive the enemy by suggesting a bigger fleet of Brigade B-26s than it really was. For comparing the tail numbers given for some flights in the “Listing” (online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf) to those given in René García’s log book for the same flights, it is evident that the B-26 given as “985” in the “Listing” was actually “920”, and that “965” given in the “Listing” was actually “924”. To cover up that these were bombing missions flown out of Happy Valley, in both cases, the log book gives these flights as 6 hour night flights “Guatemala City-Key West-Guatemala”, for the flight of 17 April (in “985”, actually being “920”) even changing the date to 16 April, without listing any flight at all for 17 April 61. 283 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.45, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 284 Underlining that the tactical surprise on the first strike on 15 April was aimed at getting all aircraft of Castro’s air force, Gar Thorsrud said in 1977: “That’s what we were hoping to do, even with the six [sic] aircraft that went in, instead of the 22.” (quoted from: Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.215, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). Persons (Persons, Bay of Pigs, pp.77 +80+143) even thinks that 23 B-26s were available on 15 April or 21 on 17 April. 285 B-26s 44-35242 (msn 28521) was registered as HP-318 and later as HP-322; 44-34620 (msn 27899) was registered as HP-318P; 44-34682 (msn 27961) was registered as HP-319; and 44-34376 (msn 27655) was registered as HP-323 (see Burnett / Davis / Hagedorn / Kuhn / Slack, Central America and the Caribbean Civil Aircraft Registers, pp.28/9). For more details see the B-26 file of this database.

“As early as D-Day afternoon, [General Lyman] Lemnitzer and [Admiral Arleigh] Burke had pondered the use of destroyers to save those on the beach and by nightfall authorized cover from four B-26s previously assigned to Laos. The following day, four more B-26s became available, along with four T-33s286 and a few C-130s287 to deliver ammunition. Everything was ready for the drops that night, but the go-ahead order never came.”288 It is unknown if the Tainan-based B-26s, which were painted overall black, were ever ferried to Central America, but it is likely that they remained in the Far East. CIA historian Jack Pfeiffer notes: In March 61, “DPD had apparently given serious consideration – as they had in the summer of 1960 – to recalling some B-26’s from the Far East for use in JMATE, but this transfer apparently did not take place.”289 Obviously, in this case, “became available” only means that these aircraft – the 4 B-26s from the Far East, the T-33s, and the C-130s – were authorized to be used by the CIA’s Cuban Project, but not that they were really delivered to Puerto Cabezas. Anyway, Air Asia had a contract with Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez SA, whose date of termination was indefinite.290 It was at Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua that the B-26s that had been delivered were painted in the colors of the Cuban Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria. “So the planes were flown in, if I recall correctly, from Eglin as Air Force aircraft and flown down to Guatemala unmarked …and reconfigured and flown from there on into Puerto Cabezas, unmarked. Then, at Puerto Cabezas, the Cuban markings were put on them, and this is where we needed the paint.”291 Apart from that, “Headquarters also recommended to both MADD and TIDE that the specific marking which would identify Brigade aircraft from Castro’s FAR aircraft – the painting of a three foot wide blue stripe around the B-26 wings outside of the pylon tanks – might be undertaken most immediately.”292 At Happy Valley, some of the Brigade B-26s also had private morale-building “nose art”, at least temporarily.293

286 These aircraft were at Eglin, not at Puerto Cabezas, as Connie Seigrist notes: “I heard we had 2 T-33s at Eglin and 2 of our Louisiana Air Guard pilots that were with us in TIDE at that time would go fly them as cover for the B-26s. But we had lost by then. […] To have flown the T-33s at this time would have been futile” (Letter of 20 May 76 to CIA historian Dr. Jack Pfeiffer, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11). Persons (Bay of Pigs, p.102) mentions “two T-Birds” (jets), which probably means 2 T-33s, waiting at Opa Locka. 287 This was only a plan for 20 April onwards. On “19 April, JCS sent a FLASH message to Carrier Task Group (CTG) 81.8, Exclusive to Admiral Dennison, Commander of the Task Group, and to Rear Admiral Clark, Commanding Officer of the Essex. This message reads as follows: 1. TG-81.8 to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF [Cuban Expeditionary Force] forces, during period 0630 to 0730 local time, 19 April, to defend CEF against air attack from Castro forces. Do not seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack. Do not attack ground targets. Pilots carry as little identification as practicable. If necessary to ditch, ditch at sea. 2. CEF transport aircraft, to include C-46, C-54, and possibly C-130 types, are scheduled to air drop supplies to CEF forces in beachhead from 190630R[OMEO] to 190730R. Friendly B-26’s are scheduled to attack Castro tanks and forces in vicinity of beachhead, during same period” (Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 2, pp. 368/9 (online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ). 288 Jones, The Bay of Pigs, p.115. 289 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 1, p.44, note *, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 290 See “Aircraft status” as of 7 July 64, in: UTD/Kirkpatrick/B1F1. 291 Major Billy B. Campbell, quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.162, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 292 Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.160/1, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 293 Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, pp.126/7.

Fuerza Aérea de Liberación B-26 with blue stripe around the wings (US Government photograph)

According to Col. Hawkins, the “air force” based at Puerto Cabezas “included fifteen B-26 light bombers”294 – and this was probably the real number of B-26s available at Puerto Cabezas, before the “defector” B-26 sent to Miami returned to the project.295 On 9 April 61, a barely disguised USAF L-1049 Super Constellation arrived at Puerto Cabezas bringing in a dozen members of a top-level strategy conference, apparently discussing the invasion plan with some of the US advisors – but none of the Cubans had been admitted.296 In his “Narrative of air activity”, that is in memorandum no. TS-155685, Attachment A, dated 26 April 1961, Colonel Stanley W. Beerli, head of the CIA’s Development Projects Division (DPD) and commander of the Invasion’s air operations, gives the following details: “On 8 April 1961 a briefing was conducted for the Deputy Director (Plans), Acting Chief, WH-4, and Acting Chief, DPD, which outlined the proposed plan of air operations for project JMATE and Sub-Project JMFURY. Targets were as cited in DPD Air Operations Plan 200-1 with the exception that Targets 1, 2, and 3 were to be struck on D-3 as a portion of Project JMFURY. Project JMFURY297 involved target 1, San Antonio de Los Banos, two aircraft; target 2, Campo Libertad, two aircraft; target 3, Santiago de Cuba, two aircraft. On 9 April the briefing team departed Washington for JMTIDE. The purpose of this trip was to brief the combat elements of the proposed plan of activities. After two days target study at JMTIDE, a recommendation was submitted to Headquarters which recommended assignment of three

294 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.26 (= p.33 on the web), CIA document no. 0000132097, readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf. 295 “At the end of March 1961, in response to a query raised by the Office of Logistics, C.F. Welch (Chief of the Materiel Staff/DPD) noted that there were 16 B-26’s which would require maintenance and supply support for a period of 120 days from 30 March 1961. […] However, on the last day of March 1961, Mr. Bissell did order Col. Beerli to attempt to get an additional two combat-ready B-26’s to Eglin on an alert basis.” (Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.43/4 + note *, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 296 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.137/8; according to Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.76, this was on 13 April. 297 Apparently, JMFURY originally meant the entire operation against Cuba’s air force, and that action was to take place D-3, that is on 14 April 61 and not on 15 April 61.

aircraft each to Targets 1 and 2. This change was affected.”298 On 13 April 61, the crews for the first strike were selected, and air base commander “Gar” (Garfield Thorsrud) informed the pilots that this first strike would not be flown by 16 B-26s, as it had been planned all the time, but – upon President Kennedy’s special request – by only 8 B-26s.299 On 14 April 61, the ships carrying the infantry of Brigade 2506 to Cuba left Puerto Cabezas, and General Somoza, the brother of the President of Nicaragua, saluted the troops sailing to Cuba.300 As it seems, he also spoke to the pilots: “At a meeting before the Bay of Pigs, President (General) Somoza addressed the plan. His exact words were. ‘Don’t fuck it up.’”301

298 Stanley W. Beerli, “Narrative of air activity”, Memorandum no. TS-155685, Attachment A, dated 26 April 1961 (CIA document no. 141165 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141165.pdf ). 299 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.138-40. 300 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.143-45. 301 E-mail dated 12 October 2006, kindly sent to the author by Doug Price.

C) Operation Pluto, the attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961:302

Already from their base at Retalhuleu in Guatemala, some B-26s of this Fuerza Aérea de Liberación had made some overflights of Cuba, to drop leaflets and to test Cuban reactions. After transfer to Nicaragua, on Saturday morning, 15 April 61, a strike force of 8 B-26s, piloted by exile-Cuban aircrews, took off from Puerto Cabezas to start Operation Pluto, that

The Bay of Pigs: document “Listing of mission results” 303

302 Since 2011, Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, that covers the actual invasion, has been released by the CIA and can be can be read online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf as well as at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf . 303 “Listing of mission results with attached listings”, that is document no. 141186 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf .

is to bomb Castro’s air force at “Campo Libertad” west of Havana, at San Antonio de los Baños Airbase located south of Havana, and at Antonio Maceo Airport at Santiago de Cuba. A 9th CIA-owned B-26 from “Happy Valley”, painted as “FAR 933” in the colors of Castro’s air force, landed at Miami the same day, posing as a defective Cuban pilot who said to have bombed some Cuban airfields before fleeing to the United States304, to give a cover story to the real air strikes flown in Operation Pluto.305 But immediately after the attacks, Raúl Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister denounced the US involvement before the UN General Assembly, and when the US Ambassador denied Roa’s charges showing a photo of “FAR 933”, Roa pointed out that, while all real Cuban B-26s had plexiglass noses, “FAR 933” had a solid nose, so wasn’t a Cuban aircraft. This failure to make the world believe in the cover story of a rebellion inside the Cuban Air Force caused President Kennedy to immediately call off all air strikes for the next 48 hours.306

A Brigade B-26 painted as “FAR 933” at Puerto Cabezas in April 1961 (US Government photograph)

304 This defector mission had been planned on 5 April “to satisfy State Department objections” (“Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation” of October 1961, § B 79, in: Kornbluh (ed.), Bay of Pigs declassified, p.37). It became part of the actual JMFURY, which took place only on 15 April 61. Captain Zúñiga was flown back to TIDE in a C-46 (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.199-204, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf ). 305 On 15 April 61, at 7.20Z hours GMT (that is at 1.20 hours local time), B-26s “923” (“Gorilla One”, flown by Captain Gustavo Ponzoa and Navigator Rafael García Pujol) and “929” (“Gorilla Two”, flown by Gonzalo Herrera and Navigator Angel López) took off for Santiago de Cuba and inflicted heavy damage to the airfield facilities. At 7.30 hours GMT the same day, B-26s “931” (“Puma Two”, flown by Captain Daniel Fernández- Mon and Navigator Gastón Pérez), “933” (“Puma One”, flown by Captain José Crespo and Navigator Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo), and “935” (“Puma Three”, flown by Captain Osvaldo Piedra and Navigator José Fernández) took off for “Campo Libertad” near Havana, but “931” was hit and exploded, killing Daniel Fernández-Mon and Gastón Pérez, while “933” was damaged by ground fire, but could escape to Boca Chica Naval Air Station, Key West, where the aircraft was to be repaired. At 7.40 hours GMT, 3 more B-26s with exactly the same fake tail numbers – “931” (“Linda Two”, flown by Captain René García and Navigator Luis Ardois, but according to René García’s log book, he flew “940”), “933” (“Linda One”, flown by Captain Luis Cosme and Navigator Nildo Batista), and “935” (“Linda Three”, flown by Captain Alfredo Caballero and Navigator Alfredo Maza) – took off from Puerto Cabezas for a bombing mission to San Antonio de los Baños, inflicting a lot of damage to the airfield; later, B-26 “935” had to land at Grand Cayman, as he was low on fuel. But the crew was flown back to Puerto Cabezas by the CIA’s PBY. While a mission to be flown in a third “935” was aborted on 15 April, a third B-26 “933”, flown by Captain Mario Zúñiga, took off at about 9.00 hours GMT (3.00 hours local time) for Miami (“Listing of mission results with attached listings”, that is document no. 141186 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf, and “Log of tactical strikes”, Attach- ment 1 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141185.pdf – to provide for the cover story. 306 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.139-62; Jones, The Bay of Pigs, p.81; Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs declassified, pp. 3+18, note 3.

On the other hand, this first air attack had been quite successful, as most of Castro’s airplanes had been destroyed, but leaving – first of all – 3 T-33s, which had been located by a U-2 as being parked side by side on a small airbase near Santiago. So, on 16 April 61, at about 1.45 p.m., President Kennedy approved that four Cuban exile-piloted B-26s from Puerto Cabezas should bomb and destroy these three T-33s at dawn on 17 April, while they were still on the ground. But at about 9.30 p.m. on 16 April, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, telephoned General C.P. Cabell of the CIA to inform him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until they could be conducted

Fuerza Aérea de Liberación B-26s at Puerto Cabezas in April 61 (US Government photographs) from a strip on the Cuban beach.307 Col. Beerli, head of the CIA’s Development Projects Division (DPD) and commander of the Invasion’s air operations, describes this dramatic decision, which probably caused the failure of the whole operation, in a very undramatic way: “On D-1 eleven targets were assigned the B-26 strike force designed to destroy the remainder of GOC operational air capability. Between the hours of 2100 local and 0100 local during the night 16-17 April the target assignment was changed prohibiting air strike of any airfields the morning of D day. All aircraft were committed to sustain air support over the beachhead area.”308 Only late in the evening, Col. Hawkins was informed about the President’s decision: “At about 2215 on the night of 16 April, I was informed at the Command Post by Mr. Esterline, the Project Chief, that these attacks had been cancelled by order of the President on recommendation of the Department of State. Upon hearing this, I immediately telephoned Mr. Bissell, the Deputy Director (Plans), who was at the Department of State, and urged in the strongest terms that the President be immediately requested to reconsider this decision and that the possible disastrous consequences of cancelling these attacks be explained to him.”309 But the decision was not changed and all that could be done was to expedite certain measures – the ships carrying the infantry had left Puerto Cabezas already on 14 April. In spite of this change, the invasion itself had to begin as planned: In a meeting held at Puerto Cabezas at about 16.00 hours on 16 April 61, that is several hours before President Kennedy cancelled the air strikes, “Frank”, that is US Army Lt.Col. Frank Egan, the on-site

307 Prouty, JFK. The CIA, Vietnam, and the plot to assassinate John F. Kennedy, pp.121-34. 308 Stanley W. Beerli, “Narrative of air activity”, Memorandum no. TS-155685, Attachment A, dated 26 April 1961 (CIA document no. 141165 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141165.pdf ). 309 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, pp.33/4 (CIA document no. 0000132097, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf ).

paramilitary operations chief who reported to Col. Hawkins,310 had explained the plan: The landing zone was to be the Bay of Pigs close to the town of Girón. The area along the road that ran west, parallel to the eastern coast, toward the Australia sugar mill, that is Playa Larga (Long Beach), was code-named “Red Beach”. The area nearest to the road that ran east of Girón along the southern coast to the city of Cienfuegos was code-named “Green Beach”. The actual landing would take place at Girón, which had been code-named “Blue Beach”.311 The mission of the transport aircraft was to support the ground troops: “Of our six transport aircraft – five C-46s and one C-54 – two were dispatched to Red Beach, about ten miles from Girón. Each would drop thirty paratroopers together with weapons and equipment. The remaining four transports would make their drops at San Blas junction [north of Girón]. Once on the ground, the paratroopers would cover the entire intersection, facing the expected vanguard of forces sent by Castro to attack the beachhead established by the Liberation Army at Girón. There was no drop scheduled at Green Beach, since it was anticipated that the area would be under the control of the landing forces of Brigade 2506. […] our departure was scheduled for 0200 Nicaraguan time […] so the drops could take place at 0620.”312 Not long after daylight on 17 April 61, the airborne infantry company was successfully parachuted from C-46 aircraft to four of the five scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the mission of sealing off approach roads.313 A much more detailed picture is given by CIA document no. 141186, that is the “Listing of mission results with attached listings” of 1961: On 17 April 61, C-46 “855”, piloted by Captain Ferrer, flew to DZ-3 and DZ-4 and encountered light ground fire, but the drops were ok and on target. Captain Ferrer and his co-pilot Raúl Solís dropped Commander Alejandro del Valle and his paratroopers close to the San Blas junction north of Girón (DZ-3), together with their equipment. Then they returned to Girón to inspect the small local airport (DZ-4) and its runway condition, when they were attacked by a B-26 of Castro’s air force. But Captain Ferrer and his C-46 escaped and returned to Puerto Cabezas.314 The same day, C-46 “877”, piloted by Captain Navarro, flew to DZ-3 and DZ-5 and also encountered light ground fire, but again, the drops were ok and on target. C-46 “788”, piloted by Captain Luaices, flew to DZ-3, and again the drops were ok and on target. Still the same day, C-46 “875”, piloted by Captain Mario Tellechea, flew to DZ-1, DZ-2, and DZ-3; while there was no drop at DZ-1 due to enemy fighters, the drops at DZ-2 and DZ-3 were ok; at DZ-1, C-46 “875” had been attacked by a Cuban Sea Fury, but escaped to witness the Sea Fury crash at sea.315 Still on 17 April C-46 “864”, piloted by Captain Gómez, flew to DZ-1, where the drops were ok. Then on 18 April 61, C-46 “864”, piloted by Captain Edward Ferrer and coded “Elephant One”, left “Happy Valley” at 14.00 hours and flew to “Playa Girón airfield” with a full load of ammunition, but the landing was aborted due to enemy fighters.316 On 19 April 61 an unknown C-46, piloted by Captain Gómez, flew to “Playa Girón airfield”, but was recalled

310 Bohning, The Castro obsession, pp.41-44; Col. Hawkins himself was at Washington at that time, discussing the invasion with General Charles Cabell and Richard Bissell of the CIA (ib., pp.48/9). 311 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.167. 312 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.167/8. 313 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 published at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § B 91, p.30, that is p.38 on the website. 314 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.173-77. 315 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.201. 316 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.190-200.

due to enemy fighters. The same day, C-46 “864”, piloted by Captain Luaices, also flew to “Playa Girón airfield”, but the landing was aborted.317 In the evening, another C-46 piloted by Captain Manuel Navarro, landed at Girón airfield with a load of medical supplies, communications equipment, and ammunition, picked up the injured crewmember of a downed B-26 (Matías Farías) and brought him back to Puerto Cabezas.318 Also on 19 April, 3 C-46s and a C-54 tried to find and rescue the downed B-26 crews – in vain.319 That evening, 5 C-46s were parked at the flight line of “Happy Valley”.320

C-46 and C-54 missions, 17 – 19 April 1961 (“Listing of mission results with attached listings”, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf)

To sum up, no Air America crews flew the C-46s during the operation,321 but Air America furnished several of the C-46s used in the Bay of Pigs operation: As B-850 and B-866 had probably been replaced by N9894Z and N9935Z in March 61, and as N9895Z and N9459Z

317 “Listing of mission results with attached listings” of 1961, that is document 141186 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf. 318 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.214; Persons, Bay of Pigs, pp.1+85; and Seigrist, Memoirs, p.57, in: UTD/Leary/ B21F11. According to Ruiz, Diario de una traición: Cuba 1961, p.227, this was C-46 “855” flown by Macario and Blanco (info sent to the author by Gilles Hudicourt on 15 March 2014). 319 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.217. 320 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.218. 321 Memorandum “JMGLOW Bonuses” of 7 September 61, that is document no. 141130 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141130.pdf .

arrived at the same time, the 5 C-46s flown during the Bay of Pigs operation itself (“864”, “877”, “875”, “788”, and “855”) are believed to be have been B-864, B-870, N9459Z, N9894Z, and N9935Z respectively: 2 C-46s of the fleet did not participate in the invasion: One (believed to be “292”) still stuck in the sand in Nicaragua, and one (believed to be N9895Z) stayed in Florida. For throughout the invasion, Joe Hinkle and Ron Smith had been at Opa Locka with their C-46; only after the invasion, they learned that they had been there in order to fly 2 “T-Birds” if needed, but that that plan had been cancelled so that they returned to Puerto Cabezas shortly after the operation.322 Another plan that was abandoned was to use the 4 P-51 Mustangs that the Fuerza Aérea de Liberación had acquired from the Government of Nicaragua in 1961. The Mustangs were to escort the B-26s or the C-46s on their missions as fighter cover, but as their fuel capacity was insufficient, they never got into combat over Cuba.323 On 14 May 61, the last C-46 was flown from Puerto Cabezas to Miami.324 There were also four C-54s that were used during the Bay of Pigs operation: On the night of 17-18 April 61, one C-54 drop of ammunition was made at “Red Beach” and three at “Blue Beach”, and on the following night, “Blue Beach” received two drops.325 A much more detailed picture is given by CIA document no. 141186, that is the “Listing of mission results with attached listings” of 1961: On 17 April 61, C-54 “7711”, piloted by Captain Cereceda, flew to Drop Zone 3. On 18 April 61, C-54 “7711” flew to “Blue Beach” twice, piloted by Captain Valdes on the first flight and by Captain Mario Tellechea (“Falcon Two”) on the second flight. The same day, C-54 “7107”, piloted by Captain Menendes, also flew to “Blue Beach”, while C-54 “7710”, piloted by Captain Castor Cereceda (“Falcon Three”), flew to “Red Beach”. These 3 C-54s made up Operation Falcon.326 On 19 April 61, C-54 “7711” flew to “Blue Beach”.327 A different report says “that on the night of 17/18 April, seven C-54 loads were rigged and launched from TIDE. Three loads were kicked out at Blue Beach and one at Red Beach, with three aircraft failing to complete the mission because of the return of daylight and the enemy air activity. Each of these aircraft carried approximately 12,000 lbs. of ammunition so that 48,000 lbs. were actually airdropped for the forces on the beach.”328 That evening, 4 C-54s were parked the flight line of “Happy Valley”.329 One last C-54 mission was flown on 20 April 61: Captain Edward Ferrer and his crew flew 10,000 pounds

322 Persons, Bay of Pigs, pp.101/2. Connie Seigrist notes: “I heard we had 2 T-33s at Eglin and 2 of our Louisiana Air Guard pilots that were with us in TIDE at that time would go fly them as cover for the B-26s. But we had lost by then. […] To have flown the T-33s at this time would have been futile” (Letter of 20 May 76 to CIA historian Dr. Jack Pfeiffer, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11). See also Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2, pp. 390-95, published on the CIA website at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf . 323 Jack B. Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I: Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961, part 2, pp. 349-51, at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf . 324 Persons, Bay of Pigs, p.111. 325 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , § B 96, p.31, that is p.39 on the website. 326 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.209, says that he (and not Captain Menendes) flew the lead C-54 “Falcon One”: “Navigator Reinaldo Lazo, flight mechanic Héctor Hernández, and PDO’s Alberto Pérez, Luis Regalado and Chiqui Ginebra made up the rest of my crew. Jaime Bourne was to fly as co-pilot. […] We took off at 1530.” 327 “Listing of mission results with attached listings” of 1961, that is document 141186 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf . 328 Pfeiffer’s Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 2, p. 339, published on the CIA website at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf . 329 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.218.

of supplies and weapons to guerrillas in the Minas del Frío area, but when the C-54 arrived over the drop zone at about 22.00 hours, it was greeted by anti-aircraft fire, so that the C-54 returned to base with its full load.330 To sum up: No Air America crews or Air America C- 54s were involved in this operation.331 As to the bombers, on D-Day, 17 April 61, several B-26s took off from Puerto Cabezas to support the invasion forces landing on Cuba, but there, they met heavy defense by anti- aircraft fire and the three Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria T-33s and 5 Hawker Sea Furies. Especially due to the fast T-33s, 5 rebel B-26s were lost that day.332 Four B-26s arrived at Puerto Cabezas from the United States in the night of 17 to 18 April – believed to have been 2 B-26s returning from Boca Chica, Florida, plus 2 B-26s that had landed at Grand Cayman and had probably been handed over to the US at Boca Chica Naval Air Station.333 For

330 Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.219-21. 331 Memorandum “JMGLOW Bonuses” of 7 September 61, that is document no. 141130 published on the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141130.pdf . 332 On 17 April 61, at 8.30 hours GMT (that is 2.30 local time), B-26s “929” (“Lobo Two”, flown by Captain Gonzalo Herrera and navigator Angel López) and “945” (“Lobo One”, flown by Captain Pupy Varela and navigator Tomás Afont) took off for a bombing mission to “Blue Beach” (Playa Girón) and eventually also bombed the northern edge of “Red Beach” (Playa Larga). At 8.45 hours GMT, that is 2.45 local time, B-26s “930” (“Linda Two”, flown by Captain Mario Cortina and navigator Salvador Miralles) and “985” (“Linda One”, flown by Captain René García and navigator Luis Ardois; but according to René García’s log book, he flew “920”) took off for interdiction missions to the Isle of Pines, sinking 2 ships and then destroying 6 trucks on “Red Beach”. At about 12.00 hours GMT, B-26s “915”, “928” (“Gorilla Two”, flown by Captain Ignacio Rojas and navigator Esteban Bovo-Carás) plus two more took off from Puerto Cabezas for “Blue Beach” to support the troops; they shot down one of Castro’s B-26s and destroyed one truck, but while the 3 others escaped by dropping the ordnance into the sea, “915” (“Chico Two”) was shot down near “Blue Beach”, killing the co-pilot (Eddie González), while the pilot (Captain Matías Farías) survived and joined the Brigade on the beach. At 15.45 hours, B-26s “935” and “917” took off from Puerto Cabezas for “Blue Beach”, but “935” (“Paloma One”) was shot down killing Captain Raúl Vianello (navigator Demetrio Pérez bailed out), while “917” (“Paloma Two”, flown by Captain Antonio Soto and navigator Benito González) landed at Grand Cayman. At 16.30 hours GMT, 2 more B-26s took of from Puerto Cabezas for “Blue Beach”. After the mission, one of them (“Lion Two”, i.e. “940” flown by Captain Crispín García and navigator Juan M. González) landed at Boca Chica, Key West, to refuel, but as his aircraft was apparently more damaged than Crispín García had thought, he left Florida during the night in “933” and crashed in the coastal jungle of Nicaragua on 18 April, killing both men (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 2, pp.313-17, readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ); the other B-26, “923” (“Lion One”, flown by Captain Miguel Carro and navigator Eduardo Barea, who was to accompany C-46 “864” to Girón airfield), had to return to base for mechanical problems. At 19.30 hours GMT (13.30 local time), 2 B-26s left “Happy Valley” for “Blue Beach”, but both of them were shot down, and there were no survivors (killing pilot José Crespo and navigator Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo of “Puma One” as well as pilot Osvaldo Piedra and navigator Joe Fernández of “Puma Two”). Several night missions were attempted: “985” left Puerto Cabezas at 22.07 hours GMT (16.07 local time) for San Antonio de los Baños, but the blackout and heavy haze precluded the success of the mission. At 22.30 hours GMT, “927”, flown by Captain Mario Cortina and navigator Salvador Miralles, took off from Puerto Cabezas, but did not find its target and landed at Boca Chica. At 23.10 hours GMT, that is at 17.10 hours local time, a last B-26 took off from Puerto Cabezas and dropped bombs and rockets onto San Antonio (“Listing of mission results with attached listings”, that is CIA document no. 141186, online at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf, “Log of tactical strikes”, Attachment 1, that is document no. 141185 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141185.pdf with slightly different times. Additional information at Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.173-204, and Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.130). 333 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.39 (= p.46 on the web), CIA document no. 0000132097, online readable on the CIA website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf. Probably, these were 4 B-26s that returned from

according to Col. Stanley Beerli, “the aircraft which landed at Boca Chica and Grand Cayman were eventually returned to the launch base.”334 Comparing the CIA’s official “Listing of mission results with attached listings”335 with the entries given in René García’s log book, it becomes obvious that not only the first 2 waves of B-26s flown on 15 April had fake serials – identical tail numbers on several aircraft in order to impress the enemy336 –, but at least two more tail numbers given in the official “Listing” were also fakes that probably had the same purpose: For “985” (“Linda One” on 17 April) given in the “Listing”, René García’s log book shows “920”, and for “965” (“Chico One” on 18 April 61) in the “Listing”, it shows “924”.337 A pilot notes the serial he finds on the instrument panel in front of him, but the serial painted on the aircraft also has to impress the enemy. If more log books of Bay of Pigs B-26 pilots were available, probably more of the high tail numbers noted in the official “Listing” and painted on the Brigade B-26s would turn out to simply hide some lower serial numbers already known from service in Guatemala. Aerial support of the invasion lasted only to 20 April 61: On 18 April 61, B-26 “923” took off for José Marti airport at 6.30 hours GMT, that is 0.30 local time, but the darkness and heavy haze precluded the success of the mission. When reports reached Puerto Cabezas on 18 April that the troops on the beach were coming upon intense pressure, Air America pilot Connie Seigrist asked permission to lead a flight of 6 B-26s to “Blue Beach”, that is to Playa Girón. In the afternoon, Seigrist (code name “Simpson”), Air America pilot Doug Price (code name “Peters”) and four Cuban pilots took off from Puerto Cabezas and flew their B- 26s to Playa Girón, where they arrived about an hour before sunset. During that attack, the 6 B-26s destroyed a long line of tanks and trucks, a total of 30 vehicles, and killed some 900 of Castro’s soldiers.338 Connie Seigrist recalls this mission as follows: “I informed my Agency landing at Grand Cayman (“935”, i.e. “Linda Three” on 15 April, plus “917”, i.e. “Paloma Two” on 17 April) and at Boca Chica (“940”, i.e. “Lion Two”, plus “927”, both on 17 April). 334 Stanley W. Beerli, “Narrative of air activity”, Memorandum no. TS-155685, Attachment A, p.1, dated 26 April 1961 (CIA document no. 141165 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141165.pdf ). 335 “Listing of mission results with attached listings”, that is document no. 141186, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf . 336 “There also was a deception aspect built into the planned attack on the Libertad and San Antonio airfields. Two of the three B-26’s assigned to Libertad and two of the three assigned to San Antonio would bear identical tail numbers. At each airfield, two aircraft with unidentical tail numbers would make the first strikes, and then the third aircraft - with an identical tail number to one of the other aircraft would make its pass. The theory was that this would make the Cubans believe that a total of only four aircraft were engaged in the strike at San Antonio and Libertad.” (Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, pp.189/90, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . By the way, the B-26 “931” that, according to the “Listing”, René García flew out of Happy Valley on the bombing mission of 15 April 61, was actually a 6 hour flight in B-26 “940” according to his log book. To cover up the type of mission, that is bombing, the route and the date given in the log book are fakes: “Guatemala City-Key West-Guatemala” on “14 April”, but no flight at all is listed for 15 April 61. 337 Page 118 of René García’s log book, kindly sent to the author by Leif Hellström. As a cover, the log book pretends that these were operational flights Guatemala City-Key West-Guatemala City. 338 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, pp.118/9. Captain Connie Seigrist and his observer Gustavo Villoldo flew B-26 “945” (“Lobo One”), Captain Doug Price and his observer Alberto Pérez-Sordo flew B-26 “927” (“Lobo Two”), while the other 4 B-26s were “960” (“Tiger Two”, flown by Captain Gustavo Ponzoa and navigator Rafael García-Pujol), “965” (“Chico One”, flown by Captain René García and navigator Luis Ardois, but according to René García’s log book, he flew “924”), “950” (“Chico Two”, flown by Captain Mario Zúñiga and navigator Manuel Villafaña), and “955” (“Tiger One”, flown by Captain Antonio Soto and navigator Benito González). The fleet took off at 19.07Z, that is 13.07 hours local time (“Listing of mission results with attached listings” of 1961 (CIA document no. 141186) at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf

boss (Gar) that I would like to take a flight to give aerial support for our now stranded ground troops. He granted permission provided there be at least one Cuban flown B-26 with each American flown B-26. Capt. Price decided to fly. We accounted for the first two American flown B-26s in the Invasion. Four Cuban B-26 crews immediately volunteered to go with us as they also felt the ground troops should not be left to forage for themselves. […] A blue stripe on ground equipment, aircraft, or laid on the ground during the Invasion was our identification. Anything in Cuba not showing a blue stripe or panel was fair game. We six aircraft departed Puerto Cabezas and arrived over Bay of Pigs about an hour before dark. We spread, armed our switches, and test fired our guns when the coast was coming in sight. My aircraft carried eight 225 lb frag bombs, eight frag rockets, and fully armed fourteen forward firing 50 cal guns. Some others carried napalm. As we were coming over the coast I could see a convoy of vehicles coming from inland down the only road toward the beach. I knew our invading troops did not have enough ground equipment to form a convoy plus no blue stripes were visible. I decided to go straight in opening my bomb-bay doors while lining up for my dive. I set the intervolometer to release all bombs equally spaced within four seconds. When lined up on the lead tank I started my dive. When in range I released the bombs and simultaneously held down on my firing trigger while flying down the entire convoy. I turned out immediately making a 270 degree turn to come back in crosswise of the convoy to fire my rockets. I released two rockets at the tanks and watched as they ricochet of the tanks exploding into the air. I then joined pattern behind my flight. I then came around again in turn this time to fire my remaining rockets into the last three trucks in line that were towing field artillery pieces. My stores were now expended except for a few rounds of 50s for emergency and I pulled out to fly watch while the other B-26s completed their runs. We left the area as the last aircraft pulled up. The convoy looked awfully messed up as we departed, but I had my doubts that we caused much damage to the tanks. Doug’s trim system had been shot and he was having some control difficulties. I encouraged him to drop his tanks. He tried but they kept hanging on. He finally managed to get his aircraft under control. All of us took a few rounds, but no real damage and no one was injured. Later we were informed two Castro T- 33s arrived over the area in less than a minute after we departed from our strike. We arrived back over Puerto Cabezas after dark. A couple of Cube B-26s were very low on fuel. A flight of replacement B-26s from Field Three had arrived shortly before us. While landing they had run into some grazing ponies that had gotten on to the runway and the runway was closed until the ground crews could remove the bodies. It was a touch and go situation. Luckily the ponies were removed in a short time and the aircraft without much fuel remaining made it for landing just as the crew were positioning to bail out.”339 According to Connie Seigrist, “about six replacement B-26’s arrived at TIDE at the same time of evening as we (Price, myself, and 4 Cuban flown B-26’s) returned from our strike at the Bay of Pigs”340 – this would be in the evening of 18 April. There was, however, one problem, as Connie Seigrist points out: “These replacement B-26’s had ferry tanks strapped plus “Log of tactical strikes”, Attachment 1, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141185.pdf, with additional information from Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.206-09). According to Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.185, B-26 “950” (“Chico Two”, flown by Captain Mario Zúñiga) made an emergency landing at Grand Cayman Island. The total number of B-26’s that had to land at Grand Cayman was probably 3, but may have been 5 (Pfeiffer, vol. I, part 2, p.336, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237688.pdf ). 339 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.56, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 340 Seigrist quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.47.

permanently in the bomb bays. In my estimation, they were flying bombs – we never used them.”341 According to Col. Jack Hawkins, “four additional new aircraft reached the base in Nicaragua during the night”,342 that is from 18 to 19 April 1961. These late arrivers may have been included in those listed by Hagedorn / Hellström, p.131 – probably the 4 B-26s struck off charge from USAF service only on 23 February 61, that is 44-35554, 44-35641, 44- 35714, and 44-35732 – plus (perhaps) the “defector” that had been sent to Miami on 15 April. Encouraged by this success, several B-26s were sent out to support the troops at “Blue Beach” on 19 April 61: One B-26 took off from Puerto Cabezas at 0700Z (1.00 hours local time), followed by two other B-26s at 0845Z (2.45 hours local time); they successfully attacked a Cuban column after dawn. Shortly afterwards, 2 more B-26s, that had taken off at about 0900Z, appeared over the beach, flown by Alabama Air National Guard crew members Thomas “Pete” W. Ray, Riley Shamburger, Leo F. Baker, and Wade C. Gray, four B-26 instructors from Puerto Cabezas who had volunteered to fly that mission.343 Although they were supposed to receive air cover from a nearby US Navy carrier, the cover did not arrive, and the 2 B-26s were shot down, killing the four Americans. Another B-26 took off at 0900Z, this one flown by Lt. Col. Joseph L. Shannon, but returned to base. At 1030Z, that is 4.30 hours local time, 2 more B-26s, whose serials are unknown, took off from Puerto Cabezas, flown by Seigrist and Price. As they had been told before, they tried to contact the US Navy carrier, but did not receive any answer. 344 Just before they reached the beach, they were told to leave the area immediately. President Kennedy had decided against additional US involvement. At 5.00 p.m., the Castro forces overran the rebel troops on the ground.345 That evening, 7 B-26s were parked in the flight line of “Happy Valley”.346 To sum up, Air America’s contribution to the actual Bay of Pigs operation was that Air America pilots Connie Seigrist and Doug Price volunteered for several B-26 missions at the end: Connie Seigrist, whose alias in the Bay of Pigs operation was “Simpson”,347 flew B-26 “945” on mission NT-26-37 on 18 April 61, interdicting a convoy of tanks and trucks west of the beachhead of “Blue Beach” and inflicting heavy damage to the convoy; on 19 April 61, Seigrist flew again to the “Blue Beach” and encountered considerable opposition from anti- aircraft artillery and from Cuban aircraft, but the serial of his B-26 is not indicated. Doug Price, whose alias during the Bay of Pigs operation was “Peters”, flew B-26 “927” to “Blue Beach” on 18 April 61, and an unidentified B-26 on 19 April 61.

341 Connie Seigrist quoted from Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Vol. I, part 1, p.47, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001237654.pdf . 342 Col. J. Hawkins, Record of paramilitary action against the Castro Government of Cuba of 5 May 61, p.39, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132097.pdf . 343 Haas, Apollo’s warriors, p. 159; Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.214-16; “Log of tactical strikes”, Attachment 1, CIA document no. 141185 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141185.pdf . 344 “Log of tactical strikes”, Attachment 1 (CIA document no. 141185, online readable at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141185.pdf ). 345 Leary / LeSchack, Project Coldfeet, p.119. “Listing of mission results with attached listings”, CIA document no. 141186 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141186.pdf; Trest, Air Commando One, p.115. 346 Ferrer, Operation Puma, p.218. David R. Mets, Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crises, Maxwell AFB, AL (Air University Press), 1986, p.87, note 35, thinks that after all the losses and the B-26s that “were taken out of the war by various events” such as forced landings, only 4 B-26s should have been left in the evening of 19 April. But at least 4 of the B-26s had returned to base, and the B-26s that Connie Seigrist (the Director of Air Operations at Puerto Cabezas) called “flying bombs” were certainly not in the flight line. 347 E-mail dated 15 February 2004, kindly sent by Leif Hellström to the author.

In addition to the combat and air drop missions of the operation, an American-manned PBY patrolled the waters south of Cuba for a total of 57 hours during five days on air-sea rescue and communications relay duty.348 This aircraft was PBY-5A HP-289 (msn 22022), officially owned by Turismo Aéreo SA of Panama, and flown out of “Happy Valley” as “289”.349 It had been fitted with electronic equipment at Miami in early 1961 and was named

Fuerza Aérea de Liberación PBY-5A “289” at Puerto Cabezas in April 61 (US Government photograph)

“Swan Island”. Its intention was to fly at altitude around the invasion area of Cuba and to transmit radio broadcasts back to the CIA HQ at Langley, Virginia.350 The American crew of this PBY consisted of Air America pilot Don Teeters, as well as of Philip Gibbony, Philip Ingoglia, John S. Lewis, Joel F. Kilgore, Harry P. Rahm, and Joe M. Skipper. This crew flew missions in the PBY on 15, 17, 18, and 19 April 1961.351 But before that date, Connie Seigrist had sometimes flown the aircraft to deliver prisoners to the prison built in the swamps of Guatemala, or to pick them up and bring them back to the base camp.352 As my intention had only been to show how Air America personnel and aircraft were involved in the Bay of Pigs operation and not to describe the entire operation and the decisions that had been made to make it go ahead at each moment, there is no final judgment here as to who might be responsible for the failure. It seems, however, that the lack of air superiority during the entire operation was an important factor, if not the decisive one, and at the end, the lack of ammunition that the exile troops suffered from on the beach. Sometimes it seems to be difficult to coordinate the strategic necessity of force and mass with the political necessity of plausible deniability.

348 “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation”, dated October 1961, that is document no. 129914 at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000129914.pdf , Chapter N: Americans in combat, § 6, p.141. 349 See the photos in the file “83 photographs identified as JMTIDE” of 1961, i.e. in CIA document no. 133203 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000133203.pdf . 350 Legg, Consolidated PBY Catalina, p.101. 351 Memorandum “JMGLOW Bonuses” dated 7 September 1961, that is document no. 141130 at the CIA’s website at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000141130.pdf . 352 Seigrist, Memoirs, pp.51/2, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11.

D) The aftermath After the failure of the invasion, Connie Seigrist, Doug Price, “Leo Turk (an Agency maintenance employee), some Air Guard personnel, and a few Agency para-loft employees were assigned to stay on in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua as housekeepers for the Agency’s property left behind. Among our housekeeping duties we flew two C-46 flights loaded with boxes of undistributed propaganda leaflets to a safe distance from the coast out in the gulf away from sea traffic and dumped them into the sea. We also flew a few flights using B-26s to drop all the unused tanks of napalm on some exposed rocks a few miles out in the gulf. We participated in Civic Action assistance flying the C-46. A few flights were made to Managua for medical requirements or political purposes. Some other flights were made transporting teams for sport competitions such as softball. We also delivered three B-26s to the Nicaraguan Air Force on the Managua airport. The end of July 1961 Capt. Price and I left Nicaragua ending our tour there.”353 Of the 16+4 B-26s that were to reach “Happy Valley”, 8 aircraft were lost, at least 6 aircraft went to other US users, possibly including storage at Davis-Monthan AFB,354 and at least 3, if not more aircraft went to the Nicaraguan Air Force.355 While in June and July 61, the C-54Gs returned to the USAF units they had come from, and while HP-321P, the alias of Los Hermanos’ C-54D 42-72523, was cancelled from the civil aircraft register of Panama on 24 October 61,356 making believe that it returned to Kadena, PBY-5A HP-289 was delivered to Miami, where it was sold to Atlantic General Enterprises as 5Y-KUD in August 63 and then to the Caribbean Seafood Production Corp. as HR-236 in December 65 without moving from Miami, and then became N6108, TG-BIV, N5404J and ZK-PBY (not taken up), until it was lost in the Pacific Ocean on 16 January 94.357 The situation of the C-46s is more complex, although most of the survivors remained with the CIA: On 13 May 1961, Air Asia asked the Taiwan CAA to issue registrations for C- 46s serial nos. 22362 (former B-864, reregistered on paper only358 as B-874) and 22232 (former B-870), “repossessed from Los Hermanos”, for ferrying them from the United States

353 Seigrist, Memoirs, p.57, in: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 354 Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign Invaders, p.131. 355 Seigrist (Memoirs, p.57) says 3 B-26s, Hagedorn / Hellström (Foreign Invaders, p.96), believe 4 B-26s, (probably including 3 of the late arrivers: 44-35554, 44-35641, and 44-35732), and according to Persons (Bay of Pigs, p.108), the Nicaraguan Air Force received all remaining B-26s. 356 See above. 357 Robbins, Air America, p.65; Hagedorn/Hellström, Foreign Invaders, pp.126-31; Hagedorn, Central American and Caribbean Air Forces, p.148; Leary, Project Coldfeet, pp.113-19, Legg, Consolidated PBY Catalina, pp. 54 (with a photo of 5Y-KUD), 98 (including a photo of TG-BIV of Troya SA), 99 (with a photo of HR-236), and 101. The FAA’s US Civil Aircraft Register of 1 July 1969 gives N6108 (msn 22022) as owned by Steward Davis Inc., Long Beach, CA. It also flew as “24-P-4” in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora!, a photo is in Legg, Consolidated PBY Catalina, p.41; in June 1988, it was sold as N5404J, before the New Zealand Catalina Group acquired it in 1993 allocating the registration ZK-PBY. However, it ditched into the Pacific Ocean near the Christmas Islands between Hawaii and Tahiti on 16 January 94 during delivery to New Zealand as N5404J; a picture of the sinking N5404J is in Legg, Consolidated PBY Catalina, p.270. 358 As this paper work was done, when former B-864 was already flying in Guatemala as “864”, it is given here just for the record: “B-864 – Deregistration from CATCL approved 21 September 1960 on which date the aircraft was registered in the name of AACL as B-874. Sale of B-864 [to Los Hermanos] was also approved on 26 September 1960, although approval of deregistration from AACL was 19 October 1960” (Letter no. SLC-60- 681 of 15 November 1960, sent by Secretary-Legal Counsel to VPO, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4).

to Taiwan.359 On 15 May 61, C-46 no. 22232 was registered as B-914, and no. 22362 as B- 916. So Captain Ralph Adam and First Officer C. M. Pinkava were sent to Miami as ferry crew in June 61, but when B-914 arrived at Tainan on 22 July 1961 from Hawaii via Iwo Jima, the Tainan Port Inspection office found a box with fifty tommy-gun bullets on the radio bench in the cockpit – of course, Air Asia explained that they did not know anything about those bullets.360 Both aircraft returned to service with Air America, soon afterwards flying out of Bangkok.361 C-46 “857” (former B-850, serial no. 22451), the aircraft that had crash-landed probably in November 60,362 but was repaired, and whose official alias HP-316 was cancelled

Certificates of registration of Air Asia C-46s B-914 and B-916, both dated 15 May 1961 (UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4) only on 9 March 61,363 was sold to Southern Air Transport, Miami, as N74811, reportedly on 14 September 61364 – however, Air America’s Memorandum no. SA/P-61-142 of 20 October 1961 says that “S/N 22451 was exchanged with SAT for S/N 32992”,365 that is N9935Z, and such an exchange would make more sense in March 61, when alias HP-316 was cancelled,

359 Petition no. A-50-8306 of 13 May 1961, by Air Asia to the Taiwan CAA, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, reel no.4. 360 Letter dated 8 August 61, sent by the Tainan Port Inspection Office to Air Asia, and Air Asia’s reply dated 15 August 61, both in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4. 361 On 14 August 61, Air America pilot Ed Eckholdt flew B-914 out of Bangkok, and on 30 October 61, he flew B-916 out of Bangkok (both entries in: Log book of Ed Eckholdt, in: UTD/Leary/B44F13). 362 Hagedorn, Central American and Caribbean air forces, p.148, describes the accident as follows: “B-850 is one of the aircraft that took heavy ground fire during the operation and was forced to make an emergency landing in Guatemala, where its left main gear collapsed and a wing was wrapped around utility pole. Miraculously, it survived and was repaired.” November 1960 is given by Ferrer, Operation Puma, pp.94/5. 363 On 9 March 61, registration HP-316, the alias of former Air Asia C-46 B-850 (msn 22451), was cancelled as “repossessed” (Davis, Martin, Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p.114). 364 Eastwood / Roach, Piston engine airliner production list, p.149. 365 Memorandum no. SA/P-61-142 of 20 October 1961, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, reel no.4.

because in that way the fleet received a “fresh” aircraft prior to the actual invasion. C-46 serial no. 22366 (former B-866) was destroyed in March 61, and on 31 March 61, Air America’s CEO George Doole himself bought the replacement aircraft (N9894Z, serial no. 32942) from Southern Air Transport, so that this aircraft could be offered to Los Hermanos on 4 April 61366 – another fresh aircraft for the invasion. The ill-fated serial no. 22366, however, was later repaired and became N8417C with Intermountain Aviation on 12 July 62.367 Because of the two losses, Air Asia / Air America now seemed to be the owners of C- 46s msn 32942 and 32992, and indeed, Air Asia’s Memorandum no. SA/P-61-142 dated 20 October 61 states that “Documents involved in the transactions whereby the two remaining aircraft, S/N 32942 and 32992, were acquired are available,”368 although other voices were more cautious.369 As early as 3 October 61, however, Air Asia asked the CAA of Taiwan to issue a B- registration for a third C-46D to be ferried from Miami to Taiwan on or about 9 October 1961, adding that this was a replacement aircraft for the remaining two once sold to Los Hermanos: “We have agreed with the conditional sales vendee to accept a C-46D type aircraft, Serial No. 1887, in lieu of one of the aircraft delivered to that vendee by this Company by virtue of irreparable damage sustained by one of the aircraft sold by this Company to said vendee during the course of its possession of that aircraft.”370 On 9 October 1961, that aircraft was registered as B-918, just for the ferry flight from Miami to Taiwan.371 Its origin has been discussed above: Acquired probably in March 61 and given the alias HP- 314P,372 C-46D 44-78055 msn 33451 was identified in two Los Hermanos documents as “MSG 1887”, and this identity was interpreted by Air Asia and by all subsequent institutions as being the Manufacturer’s Serial Number, although it probably was the military serial used in Guatemala. As no C-46 with such a serial was used during the actual invasion, this may have been the C-46 that was sent to Florida, as it also had a US registration (N9895Z). The subsequent history of this aircraft has also been already discussed above: After it had been provisionally registered as B-918 on 9 October 61 for the ferry flight only and left the United States about 12 October 61, its alias HP-314P was de-registered on 24 October 61, then it was officially sold by Los Hermanos to Air Asia “in exchange for aircraft Curtiss C-46 Serial no. 32942” on 1 November 61, and on 8 December 61, it was definitely registered to Air Asia

366 Memorandum dated 20 April 61, sent by Managing Director George Doole to the Treasurer Amos Hiatt; two letters dated 4 April 61, both sent by Air Asia’s Amos Hiatt to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez (all documents in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4). 367 Davis/Martin/Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p.111. 368 Memorandum no. SA/P-61-142 dated 20 October 61, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4. 369 In a Memorandum dated 11 October 61 (“Aircraft listing - Aircraft Liability Insurance”, in: UTD/Fink/B2F15), Air America’s Assistant Legal Counsel Jerry Fink commented the 2 “new” C-46s as follows: “Regarding C-46 aircraft with serial numbers 32992 and 32942” [which had apparently appeared on an Air America aircraft listing for insurances – no. IM-61-475 of 7 October 1961, unfortunately lost –, which is commented by this memorandum], “this office has no current information regarding our acquisition nor any record of B registration numbers having been assigned. It is believed that action may be pending on these aircraft...” 370 Petition no. A-50-8867 dated 3 October 61, sent by Air Asia to the CAA of Taiwan, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4. 371 Notification no. AN-2-50-1372 dated 9 October 61, sent by the CAA of Taiwan to Air Asia, adding that “the Chinese registry may be used for the ferry flight only after cancellation of Panamanian registry has been secured in writing” (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4). 372 Formerly, it was N9895Z of Jaime Camargo (Eastwood/Roach, Piston engine airliner production list, p.217).

as B-918.373 So, C-46 serial no. 32942 ex 44-77546 and N9894Z that had been officially registered as AN-AMG for just a few weeks,374 was lost – apparently the one mentioned by Connie Seigrist as “lost in Nicaragua on another normal flight by Gen. Reid’s pilots after Capt. Price and I left further house keeping to them in Happy Valley. No one was hurt. The C-46 was destroyed.”375 C-46 msn 32992 (former N9935Z) ended up with LANICA as AN- AOD,376 but the confusion about who really owned that aircraft produced a strange document: a Bill of Sale dated 29 September 61, to be signed and sealed on 30 October 61, and to be officially acknowledged on 31 October 61, by which Air Asia pretends to sell C-46 S/N 32992 to Los Hermanos for $ 1,00.

Two documents that reflect the confusing property situation in October 1961: Bill of Sale for C-46 S/N 32992 about $ 1,00 and a Memorandum that tries to sum up what had happened (both documents preserved in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.4)

As to Los Hermanos’ C-46 Serial no. 22343, whose alias HP-322P was also deregistered on 24 October 61, it survived with Nicaragua’s airline LANICA as AN-AOC, until it was damaged beyond repair at Managua on 25 February 1976.377 Finally, the last C-46 for which

373 Notification no. AN-2-50-1372 dated 9 October 61 (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4); Memorandum by Jerry Fink of 11 October 61 (in: UTD/Fink/B2F15); Letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the DGAC Panama to Los Hermanos; Los Hermanos’ Bill of Sale to Air Asia dated 1 November 1961 referring to C-46D “Serial No. 44-78055 MSG 1887”; and CAA of Taiwan, Notification no. AN-2-50-1645, sent to Air Asia on 8 December 61 (all three documents in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4) 374 Davis / Martin / Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 89. 375 Letter dated 4 January 1987, sent by Connie Seigrist to Bill Leary, p.2, preserved at: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 376 Davis/Martin/Whittle, The Curtiss C-46 Commando, p.90. 377 Letter dated 24 October 61, sent by the DGAC Panama to Los Hermanos (UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4); Davis / Martin / Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 110.

a Panamanian registry (HP-315) with Los Hermanos is mentioned, former 44-78049 (msn 33445), believed to have been “292”, apparently returned to C-46 Parts Inc. and then probably to Davis-Monthan AFB. As C-46 “292” was not used during the actual invasion, this may have been the C-46 that had sunk into the sand in Nicaragua in April 61, when Connie Seigrist was looking for an auxiliary landing field: “We needed an auxiliary field in preparation for the Invasion. […] I searched out an area of fairly level open grass land nearby that appeared it could support the weight of C-46s and B-26s. I landed the forth C-46 there and immediately it sank down into the ground. That C-46 was rendered unavailable for the Invasion because of the time involved for digging it out. I flew it to Miami after the invasion.”378 Having stuck in the sand for quite a while, it may have received some damage, and that might explain why it was returned to Davis Monthan AFB for storage. A couple of years later, on 2 March 65, it was sold there minus engines, and it ended up as CC-CDI with ALFA in Chile, where it crashed on 18 July 68.379 To sum up: Air America’s contribution to the Bay of Pigs operation consisted of sending some instructor pilots and technicians, who later even flew combat missions, of sending there 4 of their own C-46s, and of financing part of the losses of transport aircraft that occurred during the operation: For only 1 C-46 (B-918) was returned as a compensation for the 3 C-46s that had been destroyed (B-850, B-866, and N9894Z/AN-AMG).

378 Letter dated 4 January 1987, sent by Connie Seigrist to Bill Leary, p.2, preserved at: UTD/Leary/B21F11. 379 Davis / Martin / Whittle, The Curtiss C-46, p. 100.

E) A new Cuban crisis in 1963: In early 1963, US President Kennedy was increasingly worried about Cuban subversion in Latin America, especially in Venezuela, and about the Soviet presence in the Caribbean. So on 15 March 63, the Special Group of the US Government authorized a small sabotage program. Through radio propaganda and fictitious letters sent to Cubans, the CIA hoped to encourage a swifter removal of the Soviet troops.380 Already in February 63 Air America wanted to sell up to 6 C-46s to the customers.381 On 8 March 1963, C-46s B-914 and B-918 were sold to USAID-Laos, and on 9 April 63, the Executive Committee of Air Asia Co Ltd agreed to sell C-46s B-846, B-854, B-858, and B-910 to Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez SA, Panama, the same company that had been used as a CIA cover during the Bay of Pigs operation, and that had offered to purchase these aircraft.382 The plan was to deliver B-854 on 15 April 63, B-846 on 1 May 63, B-910 on 15 May 63, and B-858 on 1 June 63.383 But already on 1 April 63, Los Hermanos seemed to be interested only in 3 C-46s, because that day, Air Asia asked the CAA of Taiwan to approve the sale and deregistration only of C-46s B-846, B-854, and B-858.384 By late April 63, it was clear that B-858 and B-910 would remain in use with Air America, and on 25 April 63, Air Asia’s Washington Office sent a two-page draft letter agreement to Los Hermanos, covering the sale of C-46s B-846 and B- 854 to be taken over by Los Hermanos at Tainan “on or before May 1, 1963”.385 Indeed, both C-46s were sold to Los Hermanos on 1 May 63, and so it may be assumed that these aircraft were to be used to drop propaganda material over Cuba within the new CIA sabotage program. But, on 18 May 63, the interests that Los Hermanos had in both C-46s were transferred to TASA (Turismo Aéreo SA), Panama,386 and Air Asia accepted “the latter company’s obligation in lieu of Los Hermanos”.387 By mid-July 63, the USA started a harassment campaign against Cuba, which was supposed to include a major act of sabotage every month.388 But the two C-46s remained at Tainan, probably because the détente reached by Kennedy and Khrushchev in the summer of 1963389 made it no longer necessary to use them in the Caribbean theater. It was only on 23 August 63, that both C-46s were officially registered as HP-314P (msn 33372, ex B-854) and HP-315P (msn 22215, ex B-846)390 to TASA (Turismo Aéreo SA).391 But this was for delivery only, because in their petition no. A-52-12001 sent to the CAA of Taiwan on 28 August 63, Air Asia requested “approval to fly, in ferry delivery, the said two C-46 type aircraft bearing the stated Panamanian registry

380 Fursenko / Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, p.329. 381 Minutes of Meetings of the Executive Committee of Air Asia Co Ltd of 26 February 63, in: UTD/CIA/B7F2. 382 Minutes of the Meeting of 9 April 63, in: UTD/CIA/B7F2. Negotiations to sell B-914 and B-918 to USAID had already begun by February 63 (Memorandum dated 15 February 63, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4). 383 Memorandum no. CFO-63-127-A/6 dated 3 April 63, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4. 384 Petition no. A-52-11292 dated 1 April 63, sent by Air Asia to the CAA of Taiwan, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 4). 385 Draft Letter Agreement of 25 April 63, between Air Asia’s Washington office and Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gómez SA, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4. 386 Status papers for these two C-46s as of 15 January 74 in: UTD/CIA/B56F4. 387 Letter no. WC-63-2487, sent by Air Asia’s Washington Counsel James Bastian to VPSLC, Taipei on 17 July 63 (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4). 388 Conboy / Morrison, Spies and commandos, p.59. 389 Fursenko / Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, p.338. 390 Cable sent by the DGAC, Panama, to the CAA of Taiwan in August 63, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4. 391 Burnett / Slack / Davis / Hagedorn / Kuhn, Central American and the Caribbean civil aircraft registers, p.29.

Cable of August 63 sent by the DGAC Panama to the CAA of Taiwan (UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4)

[…] as follows: from Tainan to Taipei […]; such flight would be conducted during the evening of 29 August 1963; the ferry departure of such aircraft] […] simultaneously from Taipei on the morning of 30 August 1963.”392 Aboard both C-46s were 2 Helio Couriers393 in the meantime owned by Marathon Aviation of Miami: former Air America Helio B-847 (msn 541, by then reregistered as N28927) and former VIAT XV-NAI (msn 568, officially N48702). While Air Asia also asked the CAA of Taiwan to approve the export of former B- 847, the former VIAT Helio aboard the C-46s is described only as “aircraft parts, engines”.394 A hand-written note on the petition adds that, as far as Air Asia was concerned, the delivery flight would end at Bangkok – apparently the place where the aircraft were (or were to be) taken over by the purchaser. On 5 October 63, both C-46s and both Helios were registered to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs,395 and since then, they were operated by the ARC or Aviation Research Centre, Charbatia Air Base (“Oak Tree”), India, on clandestine supply missions.396 The provisional Panamanian registrations of the two C-46s, however, were cancelled only on 10 August 1964,397 that is about a month before their Indian registry marks were also cancelled,398 because both C-46s returned to service with Air America.

392 Petition no. A-52-12001, sent by Air Asia to the CAA of Taiwan on 28 August 63, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4. 393 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, p.191. 394 Petition no. A-52-12001, sent by Air Asia to the CAA of Taiwan on 28 August 63, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 4. For details about the Helios see the Helio file of this database. 395 The C-46s became VT-DRH (former B-846) and VT-DRI (former B-854), while the Helios became VT-DRJ (former B-847) and VT-DRK (former XV-NAI). All of these aircraft were registered on 5 October 63 (Letter of 11 September 2000, sent by Charan Dass, Office of the Director General of Civil Aviation, India, to the author). 396 Conboy / Morrison, The CIA’s secret war in Tibet, pp. 188-95. 397 Burnett / Slack / Davis / Hagedorn / Kuhn, Central American and the Caribbean civil aircraft registers, p.29. 398 Registrations VT-DRH and VT-DRI were cancelled on 23 September 64 (Letter dated 11 September 2000 sent by Charan Dass, Office of the Director General of Civil Aviation, India, to the author).