Canadian Military History

Volume 20 Issue 2 Article 2

2011

The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941

Terry Copp Wilfrid Laurier University, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh

Recommended Citation Copp, Terry "The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941." Canadian Military History 20, 2 (2011)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong September 1941

Terry Copp

n 10 September 1941 the British especially the oil fields of the Dutch chiefs of staff, meeting in Abstract: In November 1941 the East Indies. After June 1940, Japan O Canadian government, reacting to a London, reversed their long standing forced the Vichy government in British request, despatched “C” Force opposition to sending additional to reinforce the garrison at Hong France to hand over bases in northern troops to defend Hong Kong. They Kong. Shortly after the Canadians Indo-China and persuaded the British authorized the secretary of state arrived, the Japanese army attacked to temporarily close the Burma Road, for dominion affairs to invite the and captured the British colony. the Chinese nationalist army’s supply The entire Canadian contingent of government of Canada to provide a route. When the Japanese signed the almost 2,000 men was either killed or “small force of one or two battalions” captured in the battle. Recriminations Tripartite Pact linking their future to reinforce the garrison at Hong began immediately as Canadians with Germany and Italy and a non- Kong. To understand the British tried to understand the reasons aggression pact with the Soviet request and the Canadian reply we behind the despatch of the force. This Union, the decks were cleared for the argument was neatly summed up by need to review developments in the navy’s program of expansion. This at Carl Vincent in his book titled, No Far East as they were understood in Reason Why. Ignoring the simplicity least was the popular theory in Japan. 1941. of hindsight, this article re-examines The major, perhaps the only, The dynamic factor was the political and strategic situation obstacle was the United States unquestionably the expansionist of 1941 to better understand the which had finally begun to react to decision-making process which led to program of the dominant groups in Japanese aggression. The occupation the despatch of “C” Force. The article Japanese society. Since we are not concludes that there were many of northern Indo-China was met by a asking a question about Japanese reasons why the Canadians were sent series of American trade embargoes imperialism we do not need to examine to Hong Kong. including a ban on the export of scrap its origins or debate its legitimacy. By iron and aviation fuel to Japan. These 1937 the Japanese Empire included China the western powers were measures had the opposite effect to Formosa (1898), Korea (1910) and quite unwilling to intervene and, the one intended; the decision makers Manchuria (1931). After Japan’s by the outbreak of war in Europe, in Japan were increasingly persuaded withdrawal from the League of Japan had conquered northeastern that only war would provide access Nations the military, particularly China and a number of coastal to the resources Japan required. the army, “came to dominate areas including Canton and the War seemed to be a viable option government to the point where it territory adjacent to Hong Kong. because of the military weakness of could effectively veto individual Neither successful military action nor Britain and the United States. Japan ministerial appointments.”1 In 1936 systematic terrorism such as the Rape could easily win a series of campaigns Japan joined the Anti-Commintern of Nanking persuaded the president in the first months of the war, go Pact aligning itself with Hitler and of China, Chiang Kai-Shek or the over to the defensive and negotiate a Mussolini against the Soviet Union. communist leader Mao Tse Tung to satisfactory peace, or so the Japanese The next year, after what is known as agree to surrender so the undeclared military argued. the Marco Polo bridge incident, Japan war against China continued. The apparent success of the began a “special undeclared war” to From the summer of 1939 to German invasion of Russia prompted gain effective control of China. mid-1941 the Japanese navy pressed the Japanese Navy to press for Despite long standing American its case for expansion to secure immediate action and in July 1941, and European involvement in the resources of southeast Asia, Japan announced a “protectorate”

Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2011 20, Number 2, Spring 2011, pp.3-13. 3 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2

Churchill and Roosevelt met at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in August 1941 to discuss the war. One the topics discussed was how to dissuade the Japanese from further aggression. Ironically, Churchill was transported to the meeting aboard the battleship HMS Prince of Wales (below left) which was sunk by the Japanese along with HMS Repulse only four months later.

over all of Indo-China. The United An economy less than one tenth editorials.4 More detailed information States, followed by Britain, the the size of the United States, Japan reached External Affairs and National Dominions and the Netherlands was already fully committed to Defence headquarters through froze Japanese assets and imposed a war production, could not possibly diplomatic channels.5 Everything total trade embargo including oil. compete with the industrial potential pointed to a renewed US commitment The British government sought to of the US and American planners to leadership in the Pacific. link these initiatives with a warning believed the Japanese knew this. As The British government was to Japan about the consequences of indeed they did. placed in a very difficult position future expansion. When Churchill The US Navy had also concluded by the American refusal to agree to met Roosevelt in August 1941, in the that in the event of war the Philippines a clearly phrased warning to Japan. waters off Newfoundland, he asked would be lost so there was no point From the British perspective the US FDR to agree to a joint declaration in sending reinforcements, but in was forcing Japan to choose between warning the Japanese of the July 1941 the US Chiefs of Staff war and peace while avoiding consequences of further expansion, changed their minds. If Japan was responsibility for defending the but strong isolationist sentiment in to be deterred instead of defeated most likely victims of war: Thailand, the US Congress persuaded Roosevelt it was necessary to strengthen Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. to deal bilaterally with the Japanese.2 American defences and signal the US But in the summer of 1941 US foreign American policy in the Pacific commitment to the Philippines. The policy appeared to be working. The had long been based on the recall of General Douglas MacArthur Japanese prime minister, Prince assumption that war with Japan to active service and his appointment Konoye, reorganized his cabinet on could be avoided or postponed by as commander of US (and Philippine) 16 July removing the leading pro- diplomatic and economic pressure. forces in the Far East was announced German member and replacing him This view was underwritten by with great fanfare.3 Reinforcements, with a moderate. Prince Konoye the United States Navy which had and the ultimate deterrent of the era, also proposed a direct meeting with continuously reviewed and war- B-17 “Flying Fortress” bombers, were Roosevelt. No such meeting took gamed conflict with Japan. These to be sent to the islands as quickly as place but discussions over a general studies demonstrated that, however possible. settlement began in September when successful Japan might be in the early In Ottawa and other Canadian a new Japanese emissary arrived in stages of a war, it could not win a cities these events were reported in Washington and continued until the prolonged conflict with America. front-page stories and debated in attack on Pearl Harbor. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/24 2 Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong

We must now look more closely unhappy with this statement and to be the key to defence of the colony, at the British decisions about the replied, “The strategy of the war was under-strength and employed Far East. First, let us remember that insofar as it affected Australian co- obsolete aircraft. Churchill did not Winston Churchill and his chiefs of operation depended on the presence believe any priority could be given staff were somewhat preoccupied of capital ships in Singapore.”8 to what he called “a hypothetical with other matters in mid-1941. The Unspecified ships in the Indian Ocean problem when so many immediate German invasion of the Soviet Union were of little value to Australia. issues threatened Britain’s survival.”9 which began on 21 June threatened With this background we are The Australians, concerned with their the very survival of the Soviet state. able to reconstruct the process of own survival, did not agree. Britain could do little except expedite decision making in September 1941. It is therefore clear that the the shipment of supplies to Russia, Churchill has just returned from question of sending additional but this meant aircraft and tanks his meeting with Roosevelt which reinforcements to Hong Kong needed in other theatres must be produced the Atlantic Charter and, would never have been considered diverted. The Battle of the Atlantic, he believed, an agreement to issue if Major-General A.E. Grasett had and the air offensive over Germany a general warning to Japan against not suggested that the Canadian also required close attention but further expansion. He continued to government could be persuaded above all other issues the War stall on the Australian request for a to supply the troops. Grasett, as Cabinet focused on preparations fleet based in Singapore and rejected general officer commanding British for Operation “Crusader,” General proposals for further reinforcement Troops in China, had long argued in Claude Auchinleck’s desert offensive of Malaya although he and his favour of strengthening the garrison scheduled for early November 1941.6 colleagues were well aware that the of Hong Kong. Upon his retirement The situation in the Far East could Royal Air Force, which was supposed in August 1941 he had returned to not be entirely ignored especially England via Canada where he had because the Australian government “long discussions” with his Royal was pressing for action. On 31 August Military College of Canada classmate 1941 Churchill sent a “Secret and Major-General Harry Crerar, chief of Personal” message to the Australian the general staff (CGS). prime minister noting that “events The two men had studied the about Japan seem to have taken a problems of defending Hong Kong more favourable turn in the last at the Imperial Defence College in LAC PA 116456 PA LAC month…I cannot believe that the 1934 so there was a wide ranging Japanese will face the encounter and informal discussion of the issues. now developing around them. We The minister of national defence, J.L. may therefore regard the situation Ralston, joined the conversations not only as more favourable but and heard Grasett argue that “two less tense. Nevertheless,” Churchill additional battalions” would render continued, the garrison strong enough to withstand, for an extensive period the growth of our battleship strength, of siege, an attack by such forces ravages made upon the German as the Japanese could bring to bear Navy, which is now reduced apart against it.10 Grasett also learned much from Tirpitz and U-Boats, to very about the state of the Canadian army modest proportions and the measure and the concern that recruiting was we now have taken of the Italian suffering because there were no signs Navy make it possible in the near that the Canadians were likely to future for us to place heavy ships in become involved in action overseas. the Indian Ocean…before the end of According to Crerar, Grasett did the year.7 Major-General Arthur Grasett, the The Australians, who were pressing previous commander of British Troops Churchill to withdraw their troops in Hong Kong and former classmate of Major-General Harry Crerar, played a from Tobruk and concentrate their major role in facilitating the despatch Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 143359 PA Canada (LAC) Library and Archives Middle Eastern divisions under of Canadian troops to Hong Kong. Australian command, were very

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 5 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2

Two of the principal actors in the decision to send Canadian troops to Hong Kong were the minister of national defence, J.L. Ralston (left) and Major- General H.D.G. Crerar, chief of the general staff (right). This photograph was taken on the occasion of the sailing of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division to England on 2 August 1941. Major- General C.B. Price (shaking Ralston’s hand) is the commander of the division and to the right is Ernest Lapointe, minister of justice and attorney general.

a very great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and would reassure Chiang Kai-Shek as to reality of our intention to hold

LCMSDS Collection LCMSDS the island. His Majesty’s Government in Canada will be well aware of difficulties we are at present experiencing in providing forces which situation in various parts of not raise the question of Canadian the event of war with Japan, Hong the world demands, despite very participation in the defence of Hong Kong could not be held or relieved, great assistance which is being Kong but it is not difficult to see how but this proposal added credibility to furnished by the Dominions. We he developed the idea. both deterrence and the prospect of a should therefore be most grateful In London, Grasett presented his prolonged resistance. He accepted the if the Canadian Government views on the defence of Hong Kong recommendation with the provision would consider whether one or to the chiefs of staff and suggested that “a further decision should be two Canadian battalions could that the needed reinforcements might taken before the battalions actually be provided from Canada for come from Canada.11 This idea put sail.”12 this purpose. It is thought that the question in an entirely different A cypher telegram was quickly in view of their special position light. Up until then any addition to dispatched to Ottawa. It read, in part: in the north Pacific, Canadian the defences of Hong Kong would Government would in any case have had to come from Malaya and Position in the Far East now, have wish to be informed of need this was clearly impossible. Canadian however, changed. Our defences as we see it for reinforcement of troops, drawn from those based in in Malaya have been improved and Hong Kong and special value of Canada not England, would bring there have been signs of a certain such measure, even though on a a net addition to Allied strength weakening in Japanese attitudes very limited scale at the present in the area. The Americans and towards us and the United States. time. It may also be mentioned that the Chinese would welcome such In these circumstances it is thought the United States have recently concrete evidence of commitment to that a small reinforcement of despatched a small reinforcement the defence of the Far East which the garrison at Hong Kong e.g. by to the Philippines. It would be of British themselves were unwilling one or two more battalions, would the greatest help if the Canadian to provide. be very fully justified. It would Government could co-operate The chiefs of staff quickly agreed increase strength of garrison out with us in the manner suggested, and sent a memorandum to Churchill of all proportion to actual numbers and we much hope they will feel recommending that Canada be asked involved, and it would provide a free to do so. to provide a “small reinforcement.” strong stimulus to garrison and If the Canadian Government Churchill still held the view that in Colony; it would further have agree in principle to send one or

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/26 4 Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong

two battalions, we should propose the request and why did they accept deferred until the defence minister to communicate with you again it? had given his approval. Colonel J.L. as to best time for their despatch, The minister of national defence Ralston was a man of extraordinary having regard to general political was absent on 19 September and the ability, widely recognized as the situation in the Far East. telegram was first read by the acting most powerful figure in the cabinet. Signed, minister, C.G. “Chubby” Power. Ralston had commanded a battalion The Secretary of State for According to Power his immediate on the Western Front in the Great Dominion Affairs response was positive. “It struck War and was acutely aware of both me as being the only thing to do.” the sacrifices the army had made The wording of this telegram has been He contacted the CGS who agreed and the reputation it had won in criticized by C.P. Stacey, the official that Canada had a “political and that conflict. He had overcome the historian, as wrongly implying moral obligation” to assist Britain hesitations of the prime minister “that the outpost policy had been in the these circumstances. Major- and the opposition of some of his abandoned.”13 Brereton Greenhous General Crerar then discussed the colleagues to create a large army is much harsher implying that proposal with his vice chief, Major- and was determined to see that army “perfidious Albion” was deliberately General Ken Stuart and deputy chief, play a major role in the Allied war deceiving the Canadians.14 There Major-General Maurice Pope, who effort.16 Ralston could scarcely refuse is no evidence to support such supported Crerar’s assessment.15 an opportunity to employ Canadian an interpretation but the wording The War Cabinet which met on forces in any theatre. is certainly ambiguous. The key 23 September was also in favour The political case for the question is how did the responsible but Prime Minister Mackenzie King expeditionary force was summed Canadian decision makers interpret insisted that the final decision be up by Mr. Justice Duff who formed

Canadian ambassador to China, Major-General Victor Odlum, with Chiang Kai-Shek and other Chinese officials and dignitaries, 15 March 1944. LAC PA 149987 PA LAC

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 7 5 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2 LCMSDS Collection LCMSDS

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/28 6 Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong

a one man Royal Commission to East Asia would Hong Kong be an might see this second assignment investigate the Hong Kong affair. immediate target? If Hong Kong was overseas as “discrimination against attacked what role would the British them.”21 The evidence discloses various and American fleets play? If Japan The debate before the Royal reasons which appear to have lost the initial battles would Hong Commission revolved around actuated the War Committee [of Kong be rapidly reinforced? Who charges that battalions were not Cabinet]. In view of what the other knew what might happen. In Manila fully trained. The Royal Rifles of Dominions had done in Abyssinia General Douglas MacArthur was Canada were mobilized in 1940 after and Libya it was Canada’s turn to convinced there would be “no attack amalgamation with the 7/1 Hussars of help; Canada ought to share in the before spring” and was confident the Eastern Townships. A Permanent responsibility for garrisoning the that any Japanese invasion would be Force officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Pacific area, just as Australia was easily repulsed.19 Crerar could not in William James Home, MC, was assisting Malaya, the military value of fact offer advice about the military selected to command the regiment the reinforcement would be out of all soundness of a proposal, which was which included a large number proportion to the numbers involved; in essence political and strategic. of field officers with First World the arrival of the contingent in Hong With the decision made the CGS War experience. Most prominent Kong would have a great moral effect turned to the question of which units was Lieutenant-Colonel John H. in the whole of the Far East and should be selected. Crerar’s choice Price, MC, who reverted to the rank would reassure the Chinese as to the of the Royal Rifles of Canada and of major and became second-in- British intention to hold Hong Kong, the Winnipeg Grenadiers has been command of the battalion. Recruiting the moral effect of the expedition subject of much controversy. After the was done selectively throughout might operate as a sensible influence surrender of Hong Kong questions eastern Quebec and New Brunswick for the preservation of peace there; about the training and equipment of and despite an agreement that only at that juncture, in September, to Force “C” led to a Royal Commission English speaking volunteers would gain time was beyond measure which examined the question in be enlisted nearly 40 percent were important; such an appeal from the detail. The procedure followed bi-lingual Francophones.22 predominant partner in the common was that the director of military It was not easy to train for cause could not be rejected.17 training was asked to categorize all modern war in Canada during 1940- of the infantry battalions in Canada 41. The limited modern equipment The political case was clear enough in terms of their state of training. available had been used to outfit the but what of the responsibility of the The ten most advanced battalions 1st and 2nd Divisions. The Royal CGS to offer advice about the military included the nine allocated to the Rifles soundness of the decision. Crerar, 4th Canadian Infantry Division (it as we have seen, knew a good deal had not yet been converted to an had at all times their full share of about the problems of defending armoured division) and another in rifles and bayonets, an adequate Hong Kong from his days at the Newfoundland. A second group supply of light machine guns and Imperial Defence College.18 If he was were somewhat less advanced and pistols and their full scale of transport persuaded that the addition of two nine more were in a third category vehicles. They had one 2” mortar for battalions to the garrison of Hong “due either to recent employment instructional purposes; but with this Kong would by itself allow the colony requiring a period of refresher exception they had no mortars or to be defended for a prolonged training” or insufficient training, anti-tank rifles.23 period then his military judgment these Category C battalions were was certainly wrong. The problem is “not recommended for operational Two-inch mortars were made that no one could predict what would employment at present.”20 available, two per company, before happen in the event of war. Would Crerar was unwilling to take the battalion left for Hong Kong and the Japanese attack Russia? Would battalions from 4th Division and two 3-inch inch mortars, the standard they move south avoiding British quickly decided that two of the 1941 allotment, were issued to the territory? If they attacked in South Category C battalions which had mortar platoon. Mortar bombs were recently returned from garrison unavailable and were to be supplied duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica from British resources in Hong Opposite: A Japanese propaganda leaflet 24 dropped on British (and Canadian) were the best choice. Ralston’s only Kong. The fact that the Canadian troops in Hong Kong. complaint was that other battalions government had not created the which had not yet been out of Canada domestic capacity to manufacture

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 9 7 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2

Top left: Soldiers of the Royal Rifles of Canada wait at the Valcartier train station to begin their journey to Hong Kong, 23 October 1941. Middle left: Soldiers of the Winnipeg

LAC PA 116789 PA LAC Grenadiers mingle with their families before entraining for the west coast and ultimately Hong Kong, 25 October 1941. Bottom left: Civilian stevedores load military equipment aboard HMT Awatea prior to its departure from Vancouver for Hong Kong, 27 October 1941.

something as simple as mortar bombs was not commented upon by the Royal Commission. The Royals had been trained by their own officers and NCOs with little reference to the Directorate of Military Training. Garrison duty in Newfoundland interfered with advanced training but the battalion worked at company level exercises whenever it could. After the battalion LAC PA 116793 PA LAC was concentrated at St. John’s in the spring of 1941 both military training25 and sports programs were intensified. The hockey rink, boxing ring and football field were a crucial testing ground for soldiers and the junior NCOs and the vital combat leaders were usually selected from the playing field. The Winnipeg Grenadiers mobilized as a machine gun battalion at the outbreak of the war but were sent to the West Indies in June 1940 as an infantry battalion. For a year the Grenadiers garrisoned Jamaica and carried out section and platoon training. Practice ammunition was not available so the men learned the LAC PA 116794 PA LAC drills but most did not actually fire their weapons until October 1941 after the battalion had returned to Winnipeg.26 Neither the Royals nor the Grenadiers could remotely be considered “an efficient and well trained battalion” except by the standards prevailing in Canada in 1941 and this was precisely the argument put forward by the military before the Royal Commission which concluded:

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/210 8 Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong

Another Chief of the General Staff of the British Isles in the spring. Phillipines from the United States.33 in the same circumstances might Russian resistance is still strong On 14 November the “C” Force convoy perhaps not unreasonably have especially in front of Moscow and anchored in Manila Bay to rendevous taken another view. But I think the winter is now near. with HMS Danae, a cruiser which balance of practical considerations ... in order to further deter Japan, was to escort “C” Force on the final favoured the course actually taken. we are sending forthwith our leg to Hong Kong. At that moment There is therefore no good ground newest battleship Prince of Wales Washington was preoccupied with for imputing to General Crerar, in to join HMS Repulse in the Indian preparations to meet a new Japanese the matter of selecting battalions to Ocean. This is done in spite of envoy, London was absorbed by compose the expeditionary force, any protests of the C in C Home Fleet Operation “Crusader” which began error in judgement, much less any and is a serious risk to run. The on 18 November and Ottawa was out dereliction of duty.27 Prince of Wales will be noticed at of the loop. Cape Town quite soon...29 It is nevertheless evident that if One other matter must be investigated. a re-examination of the decision to When Churchill gave his approval he With Churchill now pursuing a policy send “C” Force to Hong Kong had had insisted that “a further decision of deterrence through symbolic occurred no responsible Canadian should be taken before the battalions acts there could be no question of official would have argued for its actually sail.” According to the changing the decision to send Force cancellation. Great publicity had official history, Churchill was asked “C” to Hong Kong. Indeed, Churchill been given to the decision to send a for his approval on 2 October and had informed the Australians of fleet to Singapore34 and preparations gave it. Six days later “the Chiefs of the Canadian commitment and were underway to publicize the Staff authorized the reinforcement this had greatly encouraged the reinforcement of Hong Kong. On operation to proceed”28 and shortly government in Canberra. There was Sunday 16 November, Prime Minister thereafter requested Ottawa to even a suggestion that Canada be Mackenzie King announced the provide a Brigade Headquarters and invited to send a brigade to Malaya30 arrival of a Canadian force at Hong specialist detachments before what but fortunately there was no time to Kong. The text of his statement read: was officially designated as “C” Force act upon it. sailed on 22 October. The mood in Washington was Defence against aggression actual or Neither the British chiefs of staff somewhat different. On 24 October threatened, in any part of the world nor Churchill reconsidered their the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox is today a part of the defence of every authorization in the light of the told reporters, “the Japanese have no country which still enjoys freedom. very dramatic changes occurring in intention of giving up their plans for It is in accordance with this view Japan. On 16 October Prince Konoye expansion. If they pursue that course that the Government has deemed resigned as premier and two days a collision there is inevitable.”31 The it advisable to associate Canadian later the army minister General Tojo State Department was unhappy troops with those of forces from other formed a new Japanese government. with Knox’s statement, which was parts of the British Commonwealth We now know that the Tojo Cabinet headline news in Ottawa as well as now stationed in the Orient.35 agreed on a decision to go to war New York and Washington. Evidence before the end of 1941 unless the from decrypts of Japanese diplomatic The statement was well received United States accepted Japanese cables now indicated that Japan’s throughout Canada. The Ottawa terms for peace, but this was not negotiator in Washington had been Journal, no friend of the government, understood in London or Ottawa. told that he had until 25 November was enthusiastic, informing its readers Churchill’s reaction to the to obtain an agreement and efforts “that in the defence of freedom there changed situation was summed up to produce a temporary agreement can be no such thing as regional in a “Most Secret” message to John were underway.32 This was the responsibility.”36 The Toronto Star, Curtin, pPrime minister of Australia, situation when Force “C” arrived which had carried detailed reports on 26 October: in Honolulu on 2 November. There of the deteriorating situation in the is no indication that the Americans Pacific, suggested Hong Kong “may I am still inclined to think that considered intervening to warn the prove an island Tobruk. And the Japan will not run into war… Canadians of the increased likelihood Canadians are proud to be there to unless or until Russia is decisively of war. Marine detachments from defend it.”37 The Winnipeg Free Press, broken. Perhaps even then they China were enroute to Manila and with full knowledge that one of the will wait for the promised invasion other reinforcements in transit to the city’s regiments was there, reported

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 11 9 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2 LAC PA 37419 PA LAC

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/212 10 Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong

were in Hong Kong. This is clear Ralston and Manpower for the Canadian Army” (MA Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier when the actions of the Canadian University, 1983). Canadian troops disembark in Hong government and its military advisors 17. Duff Report, p.4. Kong, 16 November 1941. are examined in the context of 1941 18. Dickson, p.98. 19. G. Bischof and R.L. Dupont, The Pacific without the benefit of hindsight. War Revisited, (New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), pp.18-20. 20. Stacey, pp.442-443. 21. Duff Report, p.21. that the Canadian expeditionary Notes 22. G.S. Garneau, “The 1st Battalion of the force was regarded as a “diplomatic Royal Rifles of Canada” (MA Thesis Bishops University). Printed in The Royal master stroke.” The editor noted 1. H.P. Willmott, Empires in Balance Rifles of Canada in Hong Kong (Sherbrooke (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), with approval that “more Canadian 1970), pp.5-6. p.51. Willmott provides an excellent 23. Duff Report, pp.26-27. troops might be sent to Hong Kong introduction to both Japanese and Allied 24. Stacey, p.449. or other bases in the Pacific.”38 On strategies in the Pacific and is the basic 25. Garneau, p.10. source for the following. 25 November the Free Press carried 26. Duff Report, p.28. 2. J.M. Gwyer and J.R.M. Butler, Grand 27. Ibid., p.146. an op-ed piece on the Canadians Strategy Vol.III (London: HMSO, 1964), 28. Stacey, p.441. in Hong Kong which was highly p.137. 29. Hudson, p.154. 3. Newspaper coverage of these events was critical of the government for failing 30. Ibid., p.146. designed to inform the Japanese. See the 31. New York Times, 25 October 1941. The same to publicize the arrival of the troops New York Times, 27-28 July 1941. story appears in Canadian newspapers. 4. See for example the Ottawa Citizen, 18 July “as a declaration before the world of 32. Gwyer and Butler, pp.256-257. 1941. where we stand if it comes to war in 33. New York Times, 28 November 1941. 5. Paul Dickson, “Crerar and the Decision to 34. Churchill’s speech on the decision was the Pacific.” The Free Press believed Reinforce Hong Kong,” Canadian Military publicized on 11 November 1941. History 2, no.1 (Spring 1994), p.104. Canadians were starved for news 35. This brief statement was reported world 6. Churchill’s preoccupation with of their national war effort and the wide. “Crusader” is especially evident in his 36. Ottawa Journal, 18 November 1941. arrival of “C” Force was a perfect correspondence with the Australian 37. Toronto Star, 17 November 1941. government. See W.J. Hudson and H.J. opportunity to “mobilize all out 38. Winnipeg Free Press, 17 November 1941. Stokes, eds., Documents on Australian support for the war.”39 The second 39. Ibid., 20 November 1941. Foreign Policy, Vol. V (Canberra, 1982). 40. Carl Vincent, No Reason Why (Stittsville, guessing would not begin until the 7. Ibid., p.92. ON: Canada’s Wings, 1981). announcement of the surrender. 8. Ibid., p.108. 9. Ibid., p.108. The public now shared the 10. Dickson, p.102. knowledge that Canadians could 11. S.W. Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol.I Terry Copp is professor emeritus be involved in a war in the Far (London: HMSO, 1957), p.81. and director of the Laurier Centre for 12. C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War (Ottawa: Military Strategic and Disarmament East. They were there to deter war Queen’s Printer, 1957), p.440. Studies. He is the author or co-author if possible and fight if war came. 13. Ibid., p. 441. of many books including Fields of When Carl Vincent wrote his oft- 14. Brereton Greenhous, “C” Force to Hong Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (2003) Kong (Toronto: Dundurn, 1997), p.16. and Cinderella Army: The Canadians in quoted study of the Canadian role at 15. Report of the Royal Commission Relating Northwest Europe, 1944-45 (2006). He Hong Kong he chose to title his book to the Hong Kong Expedition (The Duff published a previous article on the defence of Hong Kong in the Autumn No Reason Why.40 In fact there were Report) (Ottawa 1942), p.14-15. 16. There is no published biography of 2001 issue of Canadian Military History. many reasons why the Canadians Ralston. See J.R. Campbell, “James Layton

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 13 11