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September 1941 Canadian Military History Volume 20 Issue 2 Article 2 2011 The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941 Terry Copp Wilfrid Laurier University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Copp, Terry "The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941." Canadian Military History 20, 2 (2011) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong September 1941 Terry Copp n 10 September 1941 the British especially the oil fields of the Dutch chiefs of staff, meeting in Abstract: In November 1941 the East Indies. After June 1940, Japan O Canadian government, reacting to a London, reversed their long standing forced the Vichy government in British request, despatched “C” Force opposition to sending additional to reinforce the garrison at Hong France to hand over bases in northern troops to defend Hong Kong. They Kong. Shortly after the Canadians Indo-China and persuaded the British authorized the secretary of state arrived, the Japanese army attacked to temporarily close the Burma Road, for dominion affairs to invite the and captured the British colony. the Chinese nationalist army’s supply The entire Canadian contingent of government of Canada to provide a route. When the Japanese signed the almost 2,000 men was either killed or “small force of one or two battalions” captured in the battle. Recriminations Tripartite Pact linking their future to reinforce the garrison at Hong began immediately as Canadians with Germany and Italy and a non- Kong. To understand the British tried to understand the reasons aggression pact with the Soviet request and the Canadian reply we behind the despatch of the force. This Union, the decks were cleared for the argument was neatly summed up by need to review developments in the navy’s program of expansion. This at Carl Vincent in his book titled, No Far East as they were understood in Reason Why. Ignoring the simplicity least was the popular theory in Japan. 1941. of hindsight, this article re-examines The major, perhaps the only, The dynamic factor was the political and strategic situation obstacle was the United States unquestionably the expansionist of 1941 to better understand the which had finally begun to react to decision-making process which led to program of the dominant groups in Japanese aggression. The occupation the despatch of “C” Force. The article Japanese society. Since we are not concludes that there were many of northern Indo-China was met by a asking a question about Japanese reasons why the Canadians were sent series of American trade embargoes imperialism we do not need to examine to Hong Kong. including a ban on the export of scrap its origins or debate its legitimacy. By iron and aviation fuel to Japan. These 1937 the Japanese Empire included China the western powers were measures had the opposite effect to Formosa (1898), Korea (1910) and quite unwilling to intervene and, the one intended; the decision makers Manchuria (1931). After Japan’s by the outbreak of war in Europe, in Japan were increasingly persuaded withdrawal from the League of Japan had conquered northeastern that only war would provide access Nations the military, particularly China and a number of coastal to the resources Japan required. the army, “came to dominate areas including Canton and the War seemed to be a viable option government to the point where it territory adjacent to Hong Kong. because of the military weakness of could effectively veto individual Neither successful military action nor Britain and the United States. Japan ministerial appointments.”1 In 1936 systematic terrorism such as the Rape could easily win a series of campaigns Japan joined the Anti-Commintern of Nanking persuaded the president in the first months of the war, go Pact aligning itself with Hitler and of China, Chiang Kai-Shek or the over to the defensive and negotiate a Mussolini against the Soviet Union. communist leader Mao Tse Tung to satisfactory peace, or so the Japanese The next year, after what is known as agree to surrender so the undeclared military argued. the Marco Polo bridge incident, Japan war against China continued. The apparent success of the began a “special undeclared war” to From the summer of 1939 to German invasion of Russia prompted gain effective control of China. mid-1941 the Japanese navy pressed the Japanese Navy to press for Despite long standing American its case for expansion to secure immediate action and in July 1941, and European involvement in the resources of southeast Asia, Japan announced a “protectorate” Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2011 20, Number 2, Spring 2011, pp.3-13. 3 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2 Churchill and Roosevelt met at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in August 1941 to discuss the war. One the topics discussed was how to dissuade the Japanese from further aggression. Ironically, Churchill was transported to the meeting aboard the battleship HMS Prince of Wales (below left) which was sunk by the Japanese along with HMS Repulse only four months later. over all of Indo-China. The United An economy less than one tenth editorials.4 More detailed information States, followed by Britain, the the size of the United States, Japan reached External Affairs and National Dominions and the Netherlands was already fully committed to Defence headquarters through froze Japanese assets and imposed a war production, could not possibly diplomatic channels.5 Everything total trade embargo including oil. compete with the industrial potential pointed to a renewed US commitment The British government sought to of the US and American planners to leadership in the Pacific. link these initiatives with a warning believed the Japanese knew this. As The British government was to Japan about the consequences of indeed they did. placed in a very difficult position future expansion. When Churchill The US Navy had also concluded by the American refusal to agree to met Roosevelt in August 1941, in the that in the event of war the Philippines a clearly phrased warning to Japan. waters off Newfoundland, he asked would be lost so there was no point From the British perspective the US FDR to agree to a joint declaration in sending reinforcements, but in was forcing Japan to choose between warning the Japanese of the July 1941 the US Chiefs of Staff war and peace while avoiding consequences of further expansion, changed their minds. If Japan was responsibility for defending the but strong isolationist sentiment in to be deterred instead of defeated most likely victims of war: Thailand, the US Congress persuaded Roosevelt it was necessary to strengthen Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. to deal bilaterally with the Japanese.2 American defences and signal the US But in the summer of 1941 US foreign American policy in the Pacific commitment to the Philippines. The policy appeared to be working. The had long been based on the recall of General Douglas MacArthur Japanese prime minister, Prince assumption that war with Japan to active service and his appointment Konoye, reorganized his cabinet on could be avoided or postponed by as commander of US (and Philippine) 16 July removing the leading pro- diplomatic and economic pressure. forces in the Far East was announced German member and replacing him This view was underwritten by with great fanfare.3 Reinforcements, with a moderate. Prince Konoye the United States Navy which had and the ultimate deterrent of the era, also proposed a direct meeting with continuously reviewed and war- B-17 “Flying Fortress” bombers, were Roosevelt. No such meeting took gamed conflict with Japan. These to be sent to the islands as quickly as place but discussions over a general studies demonstrated that, however possible. settlement began in September when successful Japan might be in the early In Ottawa and other Canadian a new Japanese emissary arrived in stages of a war, it could not win a cities these events were reported in Washington and continued until the prolonged conflict with America. front-page stories and debated in attack on Pearl Harbor. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss2/24 2 Copp: Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong We must now look more closely unhappy with this statement and to be the key to defence of the colony, at the British decisions about the replied, “The strategy of the war was under-strength and employed Far East. First, let us remember that insofar as it affected Australian co- obsolete aircraft. Churchill did not Winston Churchill and his chiefs of operation depended on the presence believe any priority could be given staff were somewhat preoccupied of capital ships in Singapore.”8 to what he called “a hypothetical with other matters in mid-1941. The Unspecified ships in the Indian Ocean problem when so many immediate German invasion of the Soviet Union were of little value to Australia. issues threatened Britain’s survival.”9 which began on 21 June threatened With this background we are The Australians, concerned with their the very survival of the Soviet state. able to reconstruct the process of own survival, did not agree. Britain could do little except expedite decision making in September 1941. It is therefore clear that the the shipment of supplies to Russia, Churchill has just returned from question of sending additional but this meant aircraft and tanks his meeting with Roosevelt which reinforcements to Hong Kong needed in other theatres must be produced the Atlantic Charter and, would never have been considered diverted.
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