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Aspects of the Historical Geography of Northeastern Syria from Middle Assyrian to Neo-Assyrian Times

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Aspects of the Historical Geography of Northeastern Syria from Middle Assyrian to Neo-Assyrian Times Originalveröffentlichung in S. Parpola / R.M. Whiting (Hg..): Assyria 1995, Helsinki 1997, S. 281-293 ROLLIG HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF NORTHERN SYRIA WOLFGANG ROLLIG Tiibingen Aspects of the Historical Geography of Northeastern Syria from Middle Assyrian to Neo-Assyrian Times urveys, excavations and historical in­ other regions and places however there have vestigations during the last three been far fewer systematic investigations, and only random finds have been made. For decennia have considerably changed S this reason a well-investigated and doc­ our picture of the historical and historical- umented place may be overestimated; its geographic setting of northeastern Syria importance seems overwhelming - although during the time of Assyrian occupation. If nothing in the primary sources points to at the beginning of this century the source such a unique situation. On the other hand, archaeological excavations were carried out material was limited to the annals of Neo- and the importance of a place demonstrated Assyrian kings and documents such as the - but the lack or scarcity of written material famous Harran Census, we now possess a precludes its identification and the histori­ wealth of documents reaching over the cen­ cal situation cannot be shown. In the exten­ turies from the 14th up to the 6th century sive and varied landscape which constitutes Be. Nevertheless our knowledge of the his­ northern Syria hundreds of talis are known but only a limited number have been exca­ torical geography of northern Syria during vated and thus remarkable places may re­ this time is limited for various reasons. main unidentified. 1. The available source material is not 3. The available source material is not uni­ equally distributed within the time-frame. form. There are "official" texts such as royal On the contrary: We possess rich source historical inscriptions - often in the fashion material from specific periods, for example of a building inscription with a historical the reigns of Tukultl-Ninurta I or Shalmane- introduction - or building inscriptions, ste­ sar III, but nothing or only very scant textual lae etc. in places which have been captured or archaeological evidence from some of the and integrated into the administrative sys­ other periods. This unequal distribution of tem of the Assyrian empire. But there are the sources has historical-political reasons also the administrative documents of the on the one hand and the accidental tradition local or of the central bureaucracy, which on the other. It depends, too, on the state of show us something about the geographical research in specific periods, i.e. the interest situation at a certain place. of the scholarly world in questions of his­ torical geography.1 4. The available source material is not yet published in full and the published texts and 2. The available source material is not archaeological results are not yet fully equally distributed in space, i.e. we know examined with respect to their contributions quite a lot about the capitals and some pro­ to historical geography. This is a well- vincial centres due to continuous excava­ known and deplorable situation. Happily, tions in Assur, Nimrud and Nineveh. In the important project of our friends here in 1 Cf. my overview on the periods of scientific interest in syrian Geography, Quaderni di Geografia Storica 5 historical geography in our discipline in "Historical Geog- (1995) 117-25. raphy - Past and Present," in: M. Liverani (ed.), Neo-As- S. Parpola and R. M. Whiting (eds.) ASSYRIA 1995 (Helsinki 1997) ISBN 951-45-7703-5 OOI ROLLIG HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF NORTHERN SYRIA Helsinki is trying to change this situation. Ta'ita and Neo-Assyrian Tabite,4 has not yet We are on the way to a better reconstruction been identified. Its situation in the northeas­ of the geographical and historical features tern part of the Habur triangle is most prob­ of this region although many problems re­ main unsolved. able. M. Wafler has restressed the possi­ bility of an identification with Tall Haml- The main concern of my paper today will dlya, where he undertook excavations, but be the stability and instability of settle­ is unable to offer proof for his proposal. The ments and political or ethnic units, the con­ just-published royal inscriptions from this tinuation of habitations or the breaking off place5 show that Tukultl-Ninurta II built of a tradition or of a settlement at specific there - but nothing else. places. I have tried to find out where long- The river Marirte has no counterpart in lasting traditions existed and natural, com­ other inscriptions and therefore is left un­ mercial or political reasons led to continu­ identified. I proposed an identification with ous habitation at a specific place. -the Gaggag or an affluent of this river6 At the moment I propose to proceed from which received its name from the extreme texts from the archive of Tall Seh Hamad/ salinity of its water. Makrisi, in later texts Dur-Katlimmu2 and to discuss first some Magarisi, has been identified with modern topographical problems which are posed by Hassaka. Although this identification can­ several of the places and rivers named in not be confirmed by textual or archaeologi­ these texts. Later on I shall discuss more cal evidence - the ancient tall is occupied general questions arising from the compari­ by a part of the modern town and the French son of Middle Assyrian and Neo-Assyrian barracks - it seems appropriate. historical geography. Naprasi remains unidentified, but is defi­ I will start with the so-called "itinerary" nitely to be found on the banks of the Habur. DeZ 2521 which was published 12 years The same holds true for Latihi, which may ago.1 Most of my identifications have been be identified with Tall Saddada, a place not accepted by scholars; some are under dis­ far from Tall Agaga which certainly bears cussion. The topographical features men­ the ruins of Sadikanni,7 a well-known seat tioned in this document are: of a provincial governor in Neo-Assyrian Ta'idu, certainly identical with Hittite times, named as Suadikani in four docu- 5 ' For the excavations at this place and the Middle Assyr­ M. Wafler, NABU 1995, N° 31. Of special interest is aru m ian tablets found there, cf., i.a., H. Kuhne, AfO 26 the reference to Na-wa-ar hal-si'" Ta-i-de4 in a docu­ (1978/79) 166-68; 31 (1984) 166-78; W. Rollig, Orien- ment found on "the floor of the large room on the north talia Al (1978)419-30; AAAS 34(1985) 189-94 and the side of the Mitanni palace" at Tall Brak: Iraq 50 (1988) final excavation reports "Berichte der Ausgrabungen Tall 105: N° 24:2f, cf. N.J. Illingworth, ibid. p. 107f. Seh Hamad/Dur-Katlimmu" (= BATSH) Bd. 1, 1991 6 For the geographical setting and some surveys in this (Hg. H. Kuhne); Bd. 2, 1995 (P. Pfalzner); Bd. 4, 1996 region cf. T. Davidson/A. McKerrell, Iraq 38 (1976) (E. Cancik-Kirschbaum). 45-65; D.J.W. Meijer, A Survey in Northeastern Syria, 3 W. Rollig, "Ein Itinerar aus Dur-Katlimmu," Damas- Publ. de lTnstitut historique-archeologique neerlandais zemer Mitteilungen 1 (1983) 279-84. de Stamboul LVIII (Leiden 1986). 4 K. Kessler, Untersuchungen zur historischen Topo­ For recent excavations at this place cf. As'ad graphic Nordmesopotamiens, TAVO Beiheft B 26 Mahmoud, "Tall 'Agaga 1982, Tall "Agaga 1984," AfO (1980) 85ff, 1 lOff; Kh. Nashef, RGTC 5 (= TAVO Beih. 31 (1984) 112-14; A. Mahmoud/R. Bernbeck/H. Kuhne/ B 7/5, 1982) 256f; G. F. del Monte, RGTC 6/2 (= TAVO P. Pfalzner/W. Rollig, "Die Ausgrabungen auf dem Tell Beih. B 7/6/2, 1992) 153. Further, cf. V. Haas/M. Wafler, 'Agaga - Sadikanni 1982," Damaszener Mitteilungen 3 "Moglichkeiten der Identifizierung des Tall al-Hami- (1988) 141-84; A. Mahmoud, "Eine neue 'Lamassu'- dlya," in: S. Eichler et al., Tall al-Hamldiya /, OBO SA Figur aus Tall Agaga/Sadikanni," in: Von Uruk nach 4 (1985) 53-76; M. Wafler, "Ta'idu, Stolica panstwa Tuttul, FS E. Strommenger (1992) lOlf; A. Mahmoud/ Mitanni," Xenia Posnaninensia 2 (1993) 4-18. H. Kuhne, AfO 40/41 (1993/94) 215-21. 282 ROLLIG HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF NORTHERN SYRIA ments from Dur-Katlimmu,8 once written sani, is not yet possible.13 sa-di-k[a]-ni.9 The identification of Dur-Katlimmu Qatun is named not only here but with Tall Seh Hamad is indisputable. As together with Sadikanni also in DeZ 3309, noted before, the continuation of settlement a document concerning the delivery of bar­ from Middle to Neo-Assyrian times in the ley. It has often been connected with Habur valley has been proved for most of Qattunan in the Mari Archives10 and ap­ these towns. pears as Qatni in the Neo-Assyrian itin­ Another text in the TSH archive can also eraries from Tukultl-Ninurta II on," earlier be used in a certain sense as an itinerary. It as a nisbat aruqat-na-a-iamci in a text of bears the museum number DeZ 3281 and Assur-bei-kala12 besides the land Mari, lists a number of cities or places, which are which will be discussed later. An identifi­ partially known from other texts from the cation with one of the talis on the lower same archive and also from contemporary Habur, namely Tall Fadgami or Tall Asam- or later texts. DeZ 3281 d 38" ANSU 6 BAN SE 'KAR-[ AMAR.UTU] DUMU a-[£>W-Sl]G5 Id 29 [ANSU] 5 BAN XXX-77j[w-Sl]G5 [ ]x 9 [ANSU] 6 BAN ar"pa-a-tu-[ ] 2 ANSU 6 BAN "'"du-un-ni^a-siur] ANSU 6 BAN "'"hu-zi-ra-nu • b ANSU 3 BAN muKASKAL-ra-a-nu ANSU 4 BAN mua-ia-a ANSU 3 BAN "ha-ba-ja-tu ANSU a-ra-zi-qu 10 7 BAN "'"bu-sa-ia-u m ANSU 1 BAN "™ni-ih-ri-a ANSU 8 BAN uruKUR ha-nu AN.TA ANSU "'"hu-um-na-hu-sa ANSU 2 BAN ]tukul-ti-Ame-er 15 [lijANSU Lia+sur-ke-td-li-ser SU.NIGIN 1 ME 33 ANSU 7 BAN SE i+na GIS.BAN hi-bur-ni a-[n]a "wsa-lu-[s]a [ni-nu-a-ia-u e-te-me-di il"[kal]-mar-tu UD 10 KAM li-mu 20 ldEN.Ll'L-SUM-IBILA This document records in the summary has imposed on the town Salusa." At the "133 homers and 7 sutu barley according to beginning and at the end of the list we find the sutu measure of the hiburnu Ninuaja'u personal names.
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