Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security 2020

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security 2020

FOREW0RD

DRAFT FOREWORD

This report by the North American and Arc- recognizes the need to enhance the tic Defence and Security Group (NAADSN) CAF’s presence in the region over the applies NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analy- long term by setting out the capability sis (SFA) 2017 Report, created to support investments that will give our armed NATO leadership’s visualization of the forces the mobility, reach, and foot- future security environment, to Canada’s print required to project force across the Arctic security environment in its interna- region in ways that further our national tional, regional, and domestic contexts. interests. To be strong at home, we seek Highlighting the rapid rate of change, to defend the North and work with our complexity, uncertainty, and interconnect- Arctic partners to plan and coordinate edness, it reinforces the need for creative operations to enable defence, safety and and systematic thinking so that the CAF security in this austere environment. can anticipate potential threats to Canada and Canadian interests, act proactively to This report, like the 2017 NATO SFA emerging challenges, and adapt with deci- Report that inspires it, is not intended to sive military capability across the spectrum predict the future but to suggest poten- of operations to defend Canada, protect tial trajectories for several trends and Canadian interests and values, and con- highlight their implications for the Cana- tribute to global stability. dian Defence Team, its partners, and its allies. Not everyone will agree with all The Arctic, integral to Canada and an ave- of the observations, suggestions, and nue of approach to North America, neces- potentialities suggested in this docu- sitates defence across all domains enabled ment, but offering them in a transpar- by partnerships. The CAF must be pre- ent format is useful to invite deeper pared to counter hostile foreign state and reflection, discussion, and debate. By non-state actors, or respond anywhere in providing a foundation upon which our vast area of responsibility (AOR) if help to contemplate potential futures, this is requested, whether intervention for report seeks to propel future deliber- disaster relief, support in critical incidents ations beyond general descriptions of or for search and rescue in the region. well-documented trends and instead to encourage more coordinated strategies As the area’s strategic importance grows, to anticipate and respond to potential the Government of Canada continues to risks, seize opportunities, and develop increase its Arctic and northern footprint an appropriate mix of capabilities to in support of defence safety and security. respond to rapidly changing global and This effort is anchored in Canada’s defence Arinterconnectedness, and polycen- policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged. This policy trism.may increase security risks. i

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Contents DRAFT FOREWORD I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V INTRODUCTION VII

0.1 OBJECTIVES IX 0.2 METHODOLOGY IX 0.3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT X 0.4 TERMINOLOGY XVI 0.5 STRUCTURE XVI CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE 1

1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT: STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED 2 1.2 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: TOWARDS A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH 5 1.3 COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY 8 1.4 CONFLUENCE AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS 11 POLITICAL 15

2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER 17 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS 19 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 23 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 26 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 31 2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION AND POLARIZATION 34 ENVIRONMENT 39

3.1 ENVIRONMENT 41 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS 47 ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES 51

4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING 52 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 54 4.5 FISHERIES 60

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HUMAN 63

5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 65 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND URBANIZATION 67 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS 69 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES 71 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASING FRACTURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETY 74 TECHNOLOGY 79

6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT 79 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (UAS) 82 6.3 THE DEPENDENCEY ON INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ARCTIC 83 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 85 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 87 CONCLUSIONS 91 ENDNOTES 93 APPENDIX A: ARCTIC THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS 95 APPENDIX B: 2017 NATO SFA THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS 97 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 99

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FORTHCOMING

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER The aim of the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) The Arctic region represents an import- test the capabilities of NAADSN as a 2017 Report is to ant international crossroads where research network that can effectively identify trends issues of climate change, international and efficiently parcel out discrete work that will shape the trade, and global security meet…. packages to small teams, consolidate future strategic Arctic states have long cooperated on findings, and produce timely, relevant context and derive economic, environmental, and safety results to Defence Team stakeholders. issues, particularly through the Arctic implications for the Council, the premier body for coopera- Alliance out to 2035 tion in the region. All Arctic states have 0.2 CONCEPT and beyond. The SFA an enduring interest in continuing this The MINDS Policy Challenges for 2020- does not attempt to productive collaboration…. This rise 21 highlight how Canada’s defence pol- predict the future, in [commercial, research, and tour- icy “values the ability to anticipate new for the future is ism] activity will also bring increased challenges in order to better prepare neither predictable safety and security demands related for, and respond to, threats to Canadian nor predetermined. to search and rescue and natural or defence and security.” By anticipating It provides an [humanitarian] disasters to which emerging threats and challenges, and iterative assessment Canada must be ready to respond. better understanding the defence and of trends and their Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) security environment, the Defence implications to Team can provide timely and relevant understand and information to decision-makers, thus 0.1 AIM visualize the nature “allowing the Government to identify The purpose of this NAADSN activity is and understand emerging issues, of the dynamic and to analyse and apply the NATO Strategic events and crises in the global security complex security Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 findings to environment, and to respond appropri- environment. determine their applicability to Canadian ately and effectively.” NATO SFA 2017 Arctic defence and security policy and Strong, Secure, Engaged ( ), Canada’s Report, 11 to help frame a conceptual model that SSE 2017 defence policy, emphasizes how anticipates and conveys an understanding trends in global economic development of the future Arctic security environment. are shifting the relative power of states This will assist NAADSN and the Defence from the West to the East and how Team in creating indicators of changing major power competition has returned risk or threat levels. It is also designed to vii

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to the international system. “The Arctic is also becoming more relevant to the international community,” the white paper observes. With climate change “opening new access” to the region, “Arctic and non-Arctic states alike are looking to benefit from the potential economic opportunities associated with new resource development and transportation routes.” Rather than promoting a narrative of “Together the territories repre- inherent competition or impending conflict, however, the narrative points out that “Arctic sent a vast geographic area en- states have long cooperated on economic, compassing 3.9 million square environmental, and safety issues, particularly kilometers. This accounts for through the Arctic Council, the premier body nearly 40% of Canada’s landmass for cooperation in the region. All Arctic states have an enduring interest in continuing this and comprises a large part of the productive collaboration.” This last sentence longest coastline in the world, suggests that Russia (described elsewhere in with tremendous untapped the policy document as a state “willing to test economic opportunities includ- the international security environment” that had reintroduced “a degree of major power ing unparalleled natural resource competition”) does not inherently threaten development potential. The Arctic stability given its vested interests territories’ geographic expanse in the region. Accordingly, the drivers of Arctic change cited in SSE emphasize the also represent centuries of Indig- rise of security and safety challenges in the enous history, Canada’s northern Arctic rather than conventional defence identity and actual sovereignty in threats to the Arctic, thus confirming the the Arctic, both at home and on line of reasoning that has become well entrenched in defence planning over the last the international stage.” decade. Furthermore, it also highlights how international threats may pass through the - Pan-Territorial Vision and Prin- Arctic to reach targets outside of the region. ciples for Sustainable Develop- Are these assumptions correct? What do we ment (2017) anticipate being the emerging defence and security risks or threats in, to, and through the Canadian Arctic in the short-, medium- and long-term? We use NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report as a baseline to address these general questions. This NATO report visualizes a future security environment characterized by a rapid rate of change, complexity, uncertainty and interconnectedness, offering military advice and informing alliance and national defence planning processes that are based on assessments of the long-term future. The report highlights that: viii

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • polarization within and between SFA trends and Arctic defence and security states, power politics, and compe- implications across the various scales tition between major powers have (global, regional, national). Contributors increased the potential for instability were asked to identify key indicators that • state and non-state actors using might suggest changing risk or threat hybrid and cyber tools to impact levels in the defence and security domains. the security environment in the grey Where possible, the teams were also asked zone under the threshold of conflict to indicate potential time horizons. • other transnational challenges such as organized crime, climate change, and economic instability might fur- 0.3 OBJECTIVES ther deepen the uncertainty, dis- • The objectives of NAADSN’s Under- order and complexity that is now standing the Future Arctic Security called the “new normal” Environment assessment project Rather than conducting a full strategic fore- were to: sight exercise from the proverbial ground • Plan and execute a collective up, I proposed that NAADSN members test research project by leveraging the applicability of the SFA to the Canadian the expertise of the network team Arctic. Building upon a presentation that I (members, postdoctoral and gradu- gave to the Arctic Security Working Group ate fellows, and student associates). (ASWG) in Yellowknife, Northwest Territo- • Test the response capabilities of ries, in November 2019, teams were asked NAADSN to anticipate and identify to specifically analyze themes and trends emerging risks and threats to Can- across various levels of analysis: ada, provide robust analysis of these risks, and disseminate findings in a • Grand strategic threats to the inter- timely, concise, and conceptually national system with an Arctic nexus coherent way to the Defence Team. (thus best considered by start- • Produce a report on the applica- ing with general strategic analysis bility of NATO SFA trends to Arctic and then discerning if Arctic-spe- defence and security futures, with cific responses are required outside a goal of helping to develop coor- of broader defence and security dinated strategies to anticipate and postures) respond to potential risks, as well as • Circumpolar threats applying to the taking advantage of opportunities entire Arctic region (NATO) that arise from a rapidly changing, • Continental Arctic threats (eg. North complex security environment. American Arctic / NORAD; Euro- pean Arctic / NATO; Eurasian Arctic / Russia) 0.4 METHODOLOGY • Domestic Arctic threats (Canada) Small teams analyzed one theme described Although there is overlap between these in the 2017 NATO SFA (political, human, levels, we hoped that an attentiveness technology, economics/resources, and to the various scales may help to reduce environment) in detail. They then assessed analytical imprecision and conceptual the Arctic defence and security implica- sloppiness in this exercise. tions of their theme. Some teams chose to meet in person, while others convened by Teams were asked to produce a short teleconference or videoconference. Each narrative (akin to, and in some cases based team or a designated author then submit- upon, the NATO SFA theme chapters) ted a series of narrative paragraphs, akin to describing relationships between NATO ix

2020 REPORT the chapters in the SFA Report, describing analysis using professional military the relationships between the trends and judgement, academic expertise and defence and security implications. Each of outcomes of workshops, and are not these draft documents was circulated to intended to be prescriptive or neces- elicit input, suggest other considerations sarily linked to any specific capability. or implications, and offer critiques. This final report offers a consolidation of the various recommendations. 0.5 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT Like the NATO SFA, this effort is “designed As an Arctic State with forty percent of its to be a regularly updated, collaborative landmass north of 60° latitude and 162,000 and transparent effort, which encour- km of Arctic coastline, Canada’s interest ages meaningful discourse and an open in the region is obvious. Its emphasis on exchange of ideas” that seeks to identify the human dimensions of the Arctic, and “a range of defence and security impli- particularly those related to the northern cations based upon current recognized Indigenous peoples, also reflect national trends likely to shape events in the fore- realities. Canada’s three northern territories seeable future out to 2035 and beyond.” are home to just over 110,000 people more It is not intended to be predictive, but to than half of whom are Aboriginal (Inuit, identify particular trends that might influ- First Nations, or Métis). Social indicators in ence future events and have implications Canada’s Indigenous North are abysmal, for Canada. As the NATO report explained: reflecting the challenges of providing social services and infrastructure to small, The SFA does not imply a particular isolated settlements spread out over a vast or specified future. This report pro- area. Northern Indigenous peoples face vides a balanced view of the future, many challenges associated with rapid describing challenges, but also iden- changes to their homelands, including tifying potential opportunities. It threats to language and culture, erosion is based on analysis of the past to of traditional support networks, poorer help the Alliance understand today health than the rest of Canadians, and as well as visualize the future, estab- changes to traditional diet and communal lishing a bridge between the two, food practices. These challenges represent thereby enabling NATO to adapt, Canada’s most acute Arctic imperative. ensuring it remains fit for purpose. The trends and implications iden- Canadian governments have recognized tified in this report are not simply and grappled with the challenge of important short-term events and balancing the needs of Northern Canadians issues of today; they are projected with economic development and to have relevance for the next two environmental protection for fifty years. decades, describing the future secu- Under Conservative Prime Minister Stephen rity environment. They are perti- Harper (2006-15), the balance seemed nent worldwide, to developed and to tip in favour of resource development developing regions and nations. The and hard-line messaging about defending implications are derived from trend sovereignty. A more careful reading reveals that the federal government’s sovereignty- security rhetoric became more The Defence Team uses the following planning “horizons: nuanced over time, reflecting an Horizon 1 – short term (1-5 years) – so 2020-25 attempt to balance messaging that promised to “defend” Horizon 2 – medium term (6-15 Years) – so 2026-35 Canada’s Arctic sovereignty x Horizon 3 – long term (16-30 years) – so 2036-50

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ANTICIPATING emerging threats and challenges is fundamental to Canada’s security. The Defence team will improve its ability to provide timely information to decision-makers, allowing the Government to identify and understand emerging events and crises, respond appropriately, and minimize the destructive effects of prolonged conflict. – DND, Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017)

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2020 REPORT (intended primarily for domestic audiences) of his predecessor. Similarly, the federal with a growing awareness that the most government’s Arctic and Northern Policy likely challenges were “soft” security- and Framework (ANPF), released in September safety- related issues that required “whole 2019, indicates a concerted emphasis on of government” responses.1 environmental conservation and improving the socio-cultural health of Northern Although the election of Justin Trudeau’s Indigenous peoples. The decision to link Liberal party in October 2015 represented the domestic and international dimen- a significant departure from the political sions of Canada’s Arctic and Northern strat- previous government’s approach, the main egy in a single policy framework reaffirms substantive elements of Canada’s Arctic the inter-connectivity between national, policy (which have remained remarkably regional, and global dynamics. consistent since the 1970s) have not fun- damentally changed. A domestic focus SSE confirms that the Arctic remains an on Indigenous rights, conservation, and area of particular interest and focus for the health and resiliency of Northern Canada’s Defence Team. The policy high- communities has been complemented lights the region’s cultural and economic by a renewed commitment to global cli- importance to Canada as well as its state mate change mitigation and the benefits of rapid environmental, economic, and of co-developing policy with Northern social change. While this change presents stakeholders and rightsholders. Through opportunities, it has also spawned new bilateral statements with President Barack defence, safety, and security, challenges. To Obama in 2016, Prime Minister Trudeau meet those challenges and “succeed in an offered a model for Arctic leadership that unpredictable and complex security envi- placed a clear priority on Indigenous and ronment,” SSE committed the country to an “soft security” issues and abandoned the ambitious program of naval construction, classic sovereignty-focused messaging capacity enhancements, and technological

CLIMATE CHANGE, COMBINED WITH ADVANCEMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY, IS LEADING TO AN INCREASINGLY ACCESSIBLE ARCTIC. A DECADE AGO, FEW STATES OR FIRMS HAD THE ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE ARCTIC. TODAY, STATE AND COMMERCIAL ACTORS FROM AROUND THE WORLD SEEK TO SHARE IN THE LONGER TERM BENEFITS OF AN ACCESSIBLE ARCTIC – STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED, 67

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT upgrades to improve situational aware- evolution of technology globally over the ness, communications, and the ability of last decade, National Defence recognizes the CAF to operate across the Arctic. How the need for new approaches to anticipate can and should the CAF work with partners and confront threats and challenges in the to address long-term challenges in the years ahead. To remain effective in a highly Canadian Arctic, including those posed by dynamic, complex global and regional rapid climate and environmental change? environment, policymakers and planners How should Canada prepare to meet must develop mechanisms to continuously shifting power dynamics associated with test their assessments, ideas, and assump- increased “militarization,” Chinese inter- tions to ensure that they do not become est and activity, and Russian actions in the limiting or outdated. This logic underpins region? Should the Arctic be a region where Strong, Secure, Engaged, which commits Canada engages with ‘partners’ considered the CAF to: adversaries in other venues? Should Can- ada focus on threats in, to, or through the ANTICIPATE and better understand Arctic? How much attention and resources potential threats to Canada and Can- should NORAD and NATO dedicate to the adian interests so as to enhance our region, and what role should they play to ability to identify, prevent or prepare best serve the interests of Canada and its for, and respond to a wide range of allies? Beyond the military domain, what contingencies; emerging defence and security threats ADAPT proactively to emerging might Canada face in and to its Arctic over challenges by harnessing new tech- the next two decades? nologies, fostering a resilient work- The safety, security, and defence chap- force, and leveraging innovation, ter of the 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy knowledge, and new ways of doing Framework (ANPF) lays out the Govern- business ment of Canada’s objectives to ensure a ACT with decisive military capability safe, secure, and well-defended Arctic and across the spectrum of operations North through to 2030. “While Canada sees to defend Canada, protect Canadian no immediate threat in the Arctic and the interests and values, and contribute North, as the region’s physical environ- to global stability. ment changes, the circumpolar North is becoming an area of strategic international Major power competition, challenges to importance, with both Arctic and non-Arc- an increasingly fragile international order, tic states expressing a variety of economic and global shock wrought by the COVID- and military interests in the region,” the 19 pandemic invite reflections on what policy framework emphasizes. “As the Arc- assumptions in SSE should be revisited tic becomes more accessible, these states to ensure that the CAF is prepared and are poised to conduct research, transit capable of meeting Canada’s defence needs through, and engage in more trade in the now and into the future. As recent events region. Given the growing international in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya have revealed, interest and competition in the Arctic, con- state adversaries are taking actions tinued security and defence of Canada’s “below the threshold” of conventional Arctic requires effective safety and secu- kinetic warfare that could escalate into rity frameworks, national defence, and conventional, high-intensity war unless deterrence.” Canada and its allies discern proportionate ways to defend against and deter such Given the evolving balance of power, practices. The post-Cold War liberal changing nature of conflict, and rapid international system appears increasingly xv

2020 REPORT vulnerable to stresses emanating from 0.6 TERMINOLOGY both within increasingly polarized liberal democratic states and from autocratic As per the NATO SFA 2017 report, we adopt regimes issuing explicit critiques of U.S. the following definitions: hegemony and Western worldviews. The THEME. A collection of similar or NATO SFA 2017 report observes that: related trends. The world is transforming in multi- TREND. A discernible pattern or a ple, yet connected, areas at an expo- specified direction of change. nential rate. Driven mostly by rapid changes in technology, the world IMPLICATION. A significant effect is becoming more interconnected. on the defence and security of one or As people communicate within and more NATO Nations that results from across national boundaries more one or more particular trends. than ever before, the events and decisions in one region influence the lives 0.7 STRUCTURE of others across the rest of world. Age- ing populations, with their attendant We have deliberately mirrored the structure health and pension costs, are gradu- of the NATO SFA 2017 report. The first ally straining social welfare systems chapter filters the general characteristics that are already stressed with mount- of the future suggested in that earlier ing public debt in both developed report through a Canadian lens, providing and developing economies. The an overview of what recent Canadian global power shift continues toward policy documents highlight as some core multi-polarity. While an information assumptions and drivers. The subsequent society is evolving globally and eco- chapters apply the principal themes nomic globalization is intensifying, framed in the SFA Report, seek to discern nationalist reactions and anti-global- main trends of Arctic change, and derive ization sentiments are also growing. potential defence and security implications Additionally, the effects of climate for Canada. We have re-ordered the change are more evident and per- chapters, which appear as follows: vasive than ever before. While these a. Political: Includes the re-distri- developments increase uncertainty bution of geostrategic power, and complexity, they present chal- challenges to governance, non- lenges to the capacity of individual state actor influence in domestic states to manage a mounting set of and international affairs, power interconnected problems. politics, public discontent and Accordingly, contemplating strategic disaffection, interconnected- futures in Canada’s Arctic requires ness, and polycentrism. attentiveness to global, circumpolar b. Human: Includes asymmetric regional, continental, and domestic drivers demographic change, increas- - across multiple themes and domains – ing urbanization, fractured that could affect the CAF’s mission to make and/or polarized societies, gen- Canada strong at home, secure in North der norms and relations, and America, and engaged in the world to increasingly connected human promote peace and stability. networks. c. Technology: Includes rate of technology advancement, xvi

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT access to technology, global network development, dominance of the commercial sector in technological development, and dependence on certain technologies. d. Economics/Resources: Includes globalization of financial resources, geopolitical dimension of resources (rare earth elements, water, food, and energy), asymmetric change in defence expenditures, and increased global inequality. e. Environment: Includes climate change, climate adaptation and mitigation measures, water and food stresses, and natural and human-made disasters.

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2020 REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE NATO 2017 SFA REPORT (EXCERPTS) 1. The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2. The SFA is the initial phase of the 2017 Report … provides a wide-ranging ongoing Long-Term Military Transformation shared understanding of the future secu- (LTMT) efforts at Allied Command Transfor- rity environment. The SFA describes the mation (ACT) and sets the intellectual foun- future NATO expects to unfold to 2035 and dation for a follow-on report, the Framework beyond, depicted as political, social, tech- for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO). The nological, economic, and environmental FFAO looks into the interaction of trends, trends. Where trends may move in diverging identifies instability situations then devel- directions, an alternative view is provided to ops military implications. Together, the SFA maintain utmost objectivity. and FFAO are designed to improve the Alli- ance’s long-term perspective of the future security environment to support and inform the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), as well as other NATO and national processes that require an assessment of the long- term future.

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 3. The confluence of several political, public discontent and increasing challenges to social, technological, economic, and envi- governance. ronmental trends is redefining the global a. The redistribution of economic and military security context. Some trends driven by power, most notably towards Asia, contin- technological innovation may offer oppor- ues to contribute to the relative decline of tunities to address global problems. But the West. The predominance of NATO and the confluence of trends has also created the West is likely to be increasingly chal- complexity, disorder and uncertainty that lenged by emerging and resurgent powers. are now called the new normal. Western b. Non-state actors, benign and malign alike, countries and institutions, such as NATO are expected to exert greater influence and the EU, can benefit from the informa- over national governments and interna- tion provided in the document to develop tional institutions. coordinated strategies in order to respond c. Power politics and competition between to potential risks, and take advantage of major powers may intensify, increasing opportunities that arise from this new the likelihood of confrontation and con- normal. flict in the future, thus highlighting the 4. Political. Fundamental changes importance of commitment to collective in the international security environ- defence. ment, driven by power transitions among d. Alternative global governance institu- states from West to East and power dif- tions, championed by emerging and resur- fusions from governments to non-state gent powers, are likely to challenge the actors worldwide, have created strategic existing international organization as they shocks resulting in increasing instabil- seek a voice in decision-making structures. ity within the post-Cold War world order. e. Public discontent has led to increasing These shocks have contributed to greater polarization between political and social groups, further eroding trust in governments and traditional institutions.

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2020 REPORT 5. Human. Social trends that expose divergent ethical and will most profoundly shape the legal interpretations. future are asymmetric demographic b. Individuals, state actors and change, rapid urbanization and non-state actors have greater increasingly polarized societies. opportunity to exploit readily a. In societies with an ageing popu- available technologies in an lation, the demand on resources innovative and potentially dis- for medical and social welfare ruptive manner. will grow, nations’ ability to allo- c. The scale and speed of global cate necessary funds for defence networks allow individuals and and security will be increasingly groups immediate access to strained and changes in demog- information and knowledge raphy may limit recruitment for but may also enable the dis- security forces. semination of false or mislead- b. In developing countries, high ing information. Additionally, fertility rates lead to youth data will increasingly become a bulges resulting in unemploy- strategic resource. ment and insufficient edu- d. Commercial innovation has cation opportunities for the outpaced traditional defence young that will foster per- Research and Development ceived disenfranchisement and (R&D). Reductions in defence may lead to social unrest. budgets have led to over-re- c. Rapid urbanization might lead liance on commercially avail- to resource scarcity and chal- able solutions, the loss of lenge the distribution of avail- defence-focused R&D skills and able resources. may increase security risks. d. Fractured and polarized soci- e. Operational effectiveness has eties and growing intercon- become overly dependent nected human networks are on advanced technology and likely to present unprece- civilian infrastructure without dented opportunities and chal- redundant systems. Techno- lenges in the next two decades. logical advancements will continue to open new domains of 6. Technology. Technology will warfighting such as cyber and continue to shape the social, cultural, space. and economic fabrics of our societies at all levels. New and emerg- 7. Economics/Resources. Glo- ing technologies offer enormous balization has opened markets and opportunities, but also present new intensified economic integration, vulnerabilities and challenges as the while increasing the influence of world pivots towards digitalization. developing countries and straining natural resources. The advent of a. The increasing rate of technol- emerging markets has also shifted ogy advancement will challenge jobs to countries and regions with acquisition management pro- cheap labour and eroded the eco- cesses and the interoperability nomic base for the working middle between nations and institu- class in Western countries, fuelling tions. New technologies, such social inequality. as offensive cyber, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems a. An increasingly intercon- and human enhancement, are nected global financial system not yet widely accepted and will is more vulnerable to attacks xx by both state and non-state

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT actors. Through the exploitation of decentralized networks, financial origins and transactions supporting terrorism and organized crime will become less visible and traceable. b. The demand for resources will increase with population and economic growth particularly in developing countries. c. Access to and control over natural resources will play an increasing role in power politics. d. Increased inequality is a cat- alyst for migration and can have second-order effects such as fractured and conflictual societies, violent extremism, nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism. e. The existing burden on national economies will grow due to the rise in competing demands for limited resources. provide humanitarian assistance and relief with increasing 8. Environment. Environmen- frequency. tal issues are dominated by climate change and its far- reaching 9. The SFA is a collaborative effort and cross-cutting impacts. Climate drawing on expertise and resources change may also lead to increas- from NATO and partner nations, ing incidences of natural disasters. international organizations, think The demand for natural resources is tanks, industry and academia to increasing. Water and food security identify trends and implications that are growing concerns along with are likely to shape the future secu- losses to biodiversity. These stresses rity environment. The SFA is built on eco-system services may reduce upon analysis of commonalities and resilience differences in trends while focusing on the future challenges, opportuni- a. Changes to the climate will ties and other relevant implications impose stresses on current facing the Alliance. (See Appendix B ways of life, on individuals’ abil- of this NAADSN report for the list of ity to subsist and on govern- trends and implications produced in ments’ abilities to keep pace and the SFA.) provide for the needs of their populations. 10. NATO will remain the key security alliance for the Euro-Atlan- b. Natural disasters will have an tic region for the foreseeable future. increasing impact, particularly Accordingly, it behoves NATO to fur- in those areas unaccustomed ther explore and prepare for these to such events. possibilities, to best posture for a c. Governments and international dynamic future and to effectively institutions will be expected to meet its core tasks. xxi

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER ONE

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

The NATO SFA observes that, “for the Unresolved boundary disputes. New past two decades, the world has been investments in military capabilities to experiencing a period of significant “defend” sovereignty. Arctic defence changes in political, social, economic and security have emerged as a core and environmental areas substantially topic in international and domestic influenced by exponential developments circles over the past decade, spawn- in technology.” This produces a different ing persistent debates about the global security context marked by whether the region’s future is likely complexity, disorder and uncertainty. to continue along cooperative lines Readers are encouraged to look to that or transform into unbridled compe- document for general discussions of the tition and conflict…. These frame- current period of transition marked by the works are very significant in shaping rising influence of developing countries expectations for the Government of and alternative international organization Canada and for the Canadian Armed led by rising powers; an exponential rate Forces more specifically.1 of change in an increasingly complex international system; growing polarization, In most analyses on the region, climate regionalization, and fragmentation, as well change and technological advancements as globalization and interconnectedness; point to an increasingly accessible Arctic. and the proliferation of disruptive While geophysical conditions continue to technologies and the potential for strategic constrain certain activities during certain shocks. times of the year (and will so into the future), the global demand for resources, desire for Although the Arctic is a region in which efficient shipping routes, and geostrate- academics and politicians have often her- gic position of the circumpolar north por- alded as an “exceptional” space of inter- tend enhanced interest in the region. In national cooperation since the end of the imagining the future for Canada, the Arc- Cold War, it is increasingly acknowledged tic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) as an area of competition as well. As I sum- suggests that “climate change and tech- marized in 2014: nology are making the Arctic more accessible,” with diminishing sea ice “open[ing] Climate change. Newly accessible shipping routes … [and] putting the rich resources. New maritime routes. 1

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT wealth of northern natural resources within from these concerns, and we must be part reach. Increased commercial and tourism of the solution – a force for security, stability, interests also bring increased safety and prosperity and social justice in the world.” security challenges that include search and Furthermore, “climate change threatens to rescue and human-created disasters.” This disrupt the lives and livelihoods of millions echoes assumption articulated in Canada’s around the world. It also presents us with an 2017 defence policy, which emphasizes urgent call to innovate, to foster collective that “new actors are pursuing economic action, to work hand-in-hand with like- and military activities, some of which may minded partners around the world to meet pose a threat to Canadian security and this threat and defeat it, rather than stand sovereignty.” To address risk and meet passively by.” emerging threats, Strong, Secure, Engaged Within this broader context, SSE highlights recognizes that working cooperatively three key security trends that will continue with allies and partners will be essential in to shape events: the evolving balance of a complex security environment. power, the changing nature of conflict, Drawing excerpts from broader Canadian and the rapid evolution of technology. and Allied policy statements, this chap- All of these trends have direct and ter frames some general characteristics of indirect application when contemplating the future related to defence and security and imagining future Arctic security issues and threats facing DND/CAF from a environments, vulnerabilities, and forecasting perspective. Individual chap- requirements. The ANPF emphasizes that: ters provide more robust context and elab- oration of implications on specific themes The international order is not static; and issues introduced in this general it evolves over time to address overview. new opportunities and challenges. The Arctic and the North is in a period of rapid change that is the 1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT: STRONG, SECURE, product of both climate change ENGAGED and changing geopolitical trends. As such, international rules and Canada has a long-standing, institutions will need to evolve to honourable tradition of robust address the new challenges and engagement in support of global opportunities facing the region. As stability, peace and prosperity. We are it has done in the past, Canada will uniquely positioned now to further bolster its international leadership this role. Arguably, our engagement at this critical time, in partnership has never been more necessary, or with Northerners and Indigenous valued by our international allies and peoples, to ensure that the evolving partners. international order is shaped in a Canada’s defence policy notes that manner that protects and promotes economic inequality is on the rise globally, Canadian interests and values. with an attendant rise in instability and For nearly a century, Canada has invested violent extremism. Mass migration, in building and sustaining an international radicalization and hateful ideologies, weak system that reflects its values and interests, or undemocratic governance, and political carving out a functional role as a “middle polarization stress individual countries, power” to promote peace and prosperity regions, alliances, and the international around the world. The balance of power system as a whole. Strong, Secure, Engaged is shifting, however, the re-emergence of 2 emphasizes that “Canada is not immune

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT major power competition threatens to has turned to oil, gas and minerals, fish- undermine or strain the established inter- eries, shipping and Arctic governance. In national order and rules-based system. Chi- turn, this has generated debates amongst na’s rise as an economic superpower and Arctic states about non-Arctic states’ inten- its aspirations to have a global role propor- tions and their receptiveness to welcoming tionate to its economic weight, population, Asian countries in particular “into the Arctic and self-perception as the Middle King- cold.”2 dom. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s In a complex security environment char- recent declaration that liberalism is “obso- acterized by trans-regional, multi-domain, lete” affirms that the former superpower and multi-functional threats, Canada will has deviated from its early post-Cold War continue to work with its allies to under- path and its revisionist behaviour in Geor- stand the broader effects of the return of gia, Ukraine, and Syria are examples of its major power competition to the interna- willingness to test the international secu- tional system and to regions like the Arctic, rity environment. Consequently, Canada’s and what this means for Canadian defence role is less obvious in the emerging mul- relationships and partnerships. Emerg- tipolar world, which challenges the West- ing threats to North America, across all ern-designed security system, than it was domains, must be situated in the context in the bipolar Cold War order or the unipo- of continental defence and the longstand- lar moment that followed it. This creates ing Canada-US defence partnership exem- more space for emerging state and non- plified by the North American Aerospace state actors to exercise influence, including Defence Command (NORAD). This bina- in the Arctic. tional command has proven effective in The growing realization of the dispro- deterring, detecting, and defending North portionate impact of climate change on America’s approaches since the 1950s, the circumpolar region, and concomitant and it remains “the cornerstone of Cana- social, economic and environmental conse- da’s defence relationship with the US, and quences for the rest of the world, also com- provides both countries with greater con- mands global attention. Canada’s ANPF tinental security than could be achieved notes that “the Canadian North is warming individually.” NORAD commander General at about 3 times the global average rate, Terrence O’Shaugnessy told the Senate which is affecting the land, biodiversity, Strategic Forces Subcommittee in April cultures and traditions.” This rapid change 2019 that “the six decades of NORAD’s is “having far-reaching effects on the lives unmatched experience and shared history and well-being of northerners, threaten- are proving more vital than ever as we face ing food security and the transportation the most complex security environment of essential goods and endangering the in generations,” and that “this unique and stability and functioning of delicate eco- longstanding command serves as both systems and critical infrastructure.” There is a formidable deterrent to our adversar- extensive Canadian interest in how these ies and a clear symbol of the unbreakable changes affect Northern peoples and the bond between the United States and Can- environment that sustains them at local ada.” Resurgent major power competition and domestic scales, as well as the impli- and advances in weapons technology pose cations of rising international interest in new threats to continental security, how- the region. Although non-Arctic observ- ever, which require NORAD to modern- ers have traditionally confined their polar ize and evolve to meet current and future interest to scientific research and environ- threats. Both SSE and the ANPF under- mental issues, over the past decade signif- score the importance of NORAD modern- icant international interest and attention ization efforts, the integration of layered 3

2020 REPORT IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA OF A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • The global security environment transcends national borders, requiring Can- ada to help promote peace and stability abroad in order to maintain security at home. • In a global security environment defined by complexity and unpredictability, Canada requires an agile, well-educated, flexible, diverse, and combat-ready military capable of conducting a wide range of operations at home and internationally. • The interrelated nature of global security challenges puts a premium on deep knowledge and understanding. Using a range of analytical tools, Can- ada must develop sophisticated awareness of the information and operating environment and the human dimension of conflict to better predict and respond to crises. • To keep pace, Canada must develop advanced space and cyber capabilities, and expand cutting-edge research and development. • Canada must continue to be a responsible partner that adds value to traditional alliances, including NORAD, NATO, and the Five-Eyes community. • Canada must balance these fundamental relationships with the need to engage with emerging powers, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. • Canada must address the threat stemming from terrorism and the actions of violent extremist organizations, including in ungoverned spaces. • Recognizing the devastating effects of climate change, Canada must bolster its ability to respond to severe weather events and other natural disasters, both at home and abroad. • Acknowledging rising international interest in the Arctic, Canada must enhance its ability to operate in the North and work closely with allies and partners. • Canada and the United States must work closely together on NORAD Mod- ernization in order to defend North America.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT sensor and defeat systems, and improving increased competition, and risks associ- the CAF’s reach and mobility in the Arctic ated with a more accessible Arctic require a within this alliance construct. greater presence of security organizations, strengthened emergency management, Strategic forecasters must situate the effective military capability, and improved Canadian Arctic in global, regional, and situational awareness. Meeting these domestic contexts to anticipate new chal- demands necessitates a collaborative lenges, promote effective adaptations to approach among all levels of government, changing circumstances, and identify how as well as with Northerners, including the CAF should be trained and equipped Indigenous peoples, and in cooperation to act decisively with effective military with the private sector where relevant to capability in concert with its allies. Cana- ensure that the region can prosper and da’s Defence Investment Plan 2018 notes that it continues to be a zone of peace and that “Canada has an agile, multi-purpose, cooperation. combat-ready military that is operated by highly-trained, well-equipped, and profes- Canada’s defence and security policies and sional personnel.” It also emphasizes how, practices must also fit within its broader “given the uncertainty and complexity of national strategy for the Canadian Arctic the global security environment, now and and the Circumpolar North. The ANPF pro- into the future,” it must continue to build motes “a shared vision of the future where and refine “a flexible and versatile Force northern and Arctic people are thriving, that can take informed, decisive action to strong and safe.” Priorities include actions accomplish the Government’s objectives is to: essential to the military’s operational effec- • nurture healthy families and tiveness and long-term success.” communities • invest in the energy, transportation 1.2 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: TOWARDS A and communications infrastructure WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH that northern and Arctic governments, economies and communities ‘Nothing about us, without us’ is the need essential principle that weaves fed- • create jobs, foster innovation and eral, territorial, provincial and Indig- grow Arctic and northern economies enous institutions and interests • support science, knowledge and together for mutual success. research that is meaningful for communities and for decision-making Canada’s Arctic and Northern • face the effects of climate change Policy Framework (2019) and support healthy ecosystems in Anticipating and addressing twenty-first the Arctic and North century challenges requires coordinated • ensure that Canada and our north- action rather than siloed thinking in order ern and Arctic residents are safe, to leverage the broad and deep expertise secure and well-defended of the modern state and civil society. In the • restore Canada’s place as an interna- defence and security realm, SSE empha- tional Arctic leader sizes that meeting “enormous collective • advance reconciliation and improve challenges requires coordinated action relationships between Indigenous across the whole-of-government – mil- and non-Indigenous peoples itary capabilities working hand in hand Consistent with a whole-of-society with diplomacy and development.” Taken approach, SSE emphasizes the impor- together, the opportunities, challenges, tance of “exploiting defence innovation by 5

2020 REPORT ensuring that the Defence Team can tap into adopting innovative ways of delivering creativity and expertise available outside critical infrastructure services, and work- of government” and leverage the research, ing as efficiently and effectively as possi- development, and “ground-breaking con- ble to deliver results. It also means being ANPF Goal 7: The Canadian Arctic and cepts generated by academics, universities, a responsible steward of the environment North and its people are safe, secure and the private sector.” These efforts can by reducing the environmental footprint of and well-defended. Objectives: help to identify and meet the challenges National Defence, minimizing the impact 1. Strengthen Canada’s associated with emerging domains, con- of its activities on the natural environment, cooperation and collabora- ceptualize multi- and all-domain threats and managing resources responsibly.” tion with domestic and inter- across the spectrum of operations, and In a Canadian Arctic context, a key chal- national partners on safety, the need to analyze and fuse intelligence lenge will involve co-developing practical and other data at “speed of relevance.” The security and defence issues implementation plans that meet the needs Defence Investment Plan 2018 also high- 2. Enhance Canada’s mil- of DND/CAF, our allies, and of Northern lights the importance of modernizing and Canadians, in light of accelerating rates itary presence as well as pre- “streamlining the procurement process, vent and respond to safety and security incidents in the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework vision: “Strong, self-reliant people and communities working Arctic and the North together for a vibrant, prosperous and sustainable Arctic and northern region at home and abroad, while expressing Canada’s enduring Arctic sovereignty.” 3. Strengthen Canada’s domain awareness, surveillance and control capabilities in the Arctic and the North 4. Enforce Canada’s legislative and regulatory frameworks that govern transportation, border integrity and environmental protection in the Arctic and the North 5. Increase the whole-of-society emergency management capabilities in Arctic and northern communities 6. Support community safety through effective and culturally-appropriate crime prevention initiatives and policing services

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT adopting innovative ways of delivering of change “in many aspects of human society [that critical infrastructure services, and work- are] expected to continue increasing complexity ing as efficiently and effectively as possi- and uncertainty while creating concurrent opportu- ble to deliver results. It also means being nities and risks.” As the NATO SFA notes, disruptive ANPF Goal 7: The Canadian Arctic and a responsible steward of the environment technologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine North and its people are safe, secure by reducing the environmental footprint of learning, biotechnology, and autonomous systems and well-defended. Objectives: “could be considered as game changers that might National Defence, minimizing the impact 1. Strengthen Canada’s help humanity solve problems at a global level,” but of its activities on the natural environment, cooperation and collabora- and managing resources responsibly.” they also create disruption and introduce new challenges at all levels. Furthermore, new technologies tion with domestic and inter- In a Canadian Arctic context, a key chal- and their application in layered offensive and defen- national partners on safety, lenge will involve co-developing practical sive systems also give rise to moral, ethical, and legal security and defence issues implementation plans that meet the needs issues that are likely to play out in debates about 2. Enhance Canada’s mil- of DND/CAF, our allies, and of Northern Arctic defence and security as well as more gener- Canadians, in light of accelerating rates itary presence as well as pre- alized ones. General O’Shaughessy told the U.S. Sen- vent and respond to safety ate Armed Services Committee in February 2020 that and security incidents in the “geographic barriers that kept our homeland beyond the reach of most conventional threats” no longer Arctic and the North ---, and “the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall … [but 3. Strengthen Canada’s an avenue] of approach for advanced conventional domain awareness, surveil- weapons and the platforms that carry them.” What lance and control capabilities does this mean for Northern policies predicated on in the Arctic and the North the idea of the Arctic as a “distinct” homeland that is inherently conceived of as a material place rather 4. Enforce Canada’s leg- than a threat vector? How do measures to address islative and regulatory strategic threats to North America passing through frameworks that govern the Canadian Arctic relate to threats to the region or transportation, border integ- in the region? rity and environmental pro- Northern Canadian economic futures are also tied tection in the Arctic and the to global drivers in terms of supply and demand North for non-renewable resources, maritime (in)acces- 5. Increase the sibility, and climate change. The intrinsic dilemma whole-of-society emer- or contradiction between Arctic state support for gency management capabil- the exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources ities in Arctic and northern (given the direct economic benefits of doing so) communities and the desire to mitigate global climate change (with its clear effects on the Arctic) is likely to per- 6. Support community sist. The implications of heightened regional activity safety through effective and on core socio-economic areas such as population culturally-appropriate crime demographics, gross domestic product, urbaniza- prevention initiatives and tion, energy options, transportation, and commu- policing services nications remain sources of both optimism in some circles and concern in others. The Inuit Circumpolar Council’s A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sov- ereignty in the Arctic (2015) notes that “as states increasingly focus on the Arctic and its resources, and as climate change continues to create easier access to the Arctic, Inuit inclusion as active partners is central to all national and international deliberations on 7

2020 REPORT Arctic sovereignty and related questions, increase the divergence of national inter- such as who owns the Arctic, who has the ests and fuel greater differences in the per- right to traverse the Arctic, who has the ception of risks and threats.” right to develop the Arctic, and who will be Complexity and uncertainty are also defin- responsible for the social and environmen- ing features of Canada’s Arctic, reflecting tal impacts increasingly facing the Arctic.” It unique political, socio-economic, demo- also insists that states must ensure sustain- graphic, geographic, and physiographic able economic development that increases considerations. The ANPF notes that “the standards of living for Inuit, and that they qualities that make the Canadian Arctic “deflect sudden and far-reaching demo- and North such a special place, its size, cli- graphic shifts that would overwhelm and mate, and small but vibrant and resilient marginalize indigenous peoples where we populations, also pose unique security are rooted and have endured.” challenges, making it difficult to maintain situational awareness and respond 1.3 COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY to emergencies or military threats when and where they occur.” Climate change While the Canadian Arctic has histori- compounds these challenges, reshaping cally been — and continues to be — a the regional environment and, in some region of stability and peace, growing contexts and seasons, facilitating greater competition and increased access access to an increasingly “broad range of brings safety and security challenges actors and interests” (both Canadian and to which Canada must be ready to international). Accordingly, respond. – ANPF (2019) To protect the safety and security The NATO SFA notes that “the growing of people in the region and safe- number of stakeholders combined with the guard the ability to defend the Cana- interconnected nature of the international dian Arctic and North, and North system, the exponential rate of change and America now and into the future, a the confluence of trends has continued multi-faceted and holistic approach to increase the potential for disorder and is required. The complexity of the uncertainty in every aspect of world affairs.” regional security environment places The Arctic is far from immune to these a premium on collaboration amongst changes. In an increasingly complex (rather all levels of government, Indigenous than complicated) environment, “there are peoples and local communities, as too many interactions to comprehend all well as with trusted international the possible outcomes, increasing the risk partners…. of surprise or even failure.” Accordingly, Canadians must look to more comprehen- Given the high proportion of Indigenous sive approaches that accept and incorpo- people (Inuit, First Nations and Métis) rate complexity and uncertainty in world in Canada’s Arctic population, as well as affairs as a pervasive reality. Doing so will Ottawa’s acute political focus on improv- require projections that anticipate future ing Indigenous-Crown relations and pro- trends which are not simple extensions of moting reconciliation, the region enjoys a previous curves but reflect several “trajec- much higher political profile than simple tories of potential outcomes, which in turn population statistics and parliamentary will require leadership to utilize a more representation numbers might suggest. comprehensive, flexible and adaptive deci- As the Arctic Human Development Report sion-making system.” The NATO document (2015) notes, Indigenous peoples’ also suggests that “complexity is likely to “efforts to secure self-determination and 8

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Annex: Principles for the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework The principles below were developed to provide as Gender-Based Analysis Plus to assess continuing guidance on implementation of the potential impacts on diverse groups of framework. people • Decisions about the Arctic and the North • The framework will respect a distinc- will be made in partnership with and with tions-based approach to ensure that the participation of northerners, to reflect the unique rights, interests and circum- the rights, needs and perspectives of stances of Inuit, Arctic and northern northerners First Nations and Métis are acknowl- • The rights and jurisdictions of Cana- edged, affirmed and implemented da’s federal, territorial, provincial Indige- • The Government of Canada rec- nous and municipal governments will be ognizes Inuit, First Nations, and respected Métis as the Indigenous peo- • Development should be sustainable and ples of Canada, consisting of holistic, integrating social, cultural, eco- distinct, rights-bearing com- nomic and environmental considerations munities with their own histo- • Ongoing reconciliation with Indigenous ries, including with the Crown peoples, using the work of the Truth and • The work of forming renewed Reconciliation Commission as a starting relationships based on the point, is foundational to success recognition of rights, respect, • As climate change is a lived reality in the co-operation and partnership region, initiatives will take into account must reflect the unique interests, its various impacts, including its impact priorities and circumstances of each on Indigenous northerners, who continue people to rely on the land and wildlife for their • Every sector of society, from culture, traditional economy, and food the private sector to uni- security versities and colleges, • Policy and programming will reflect a the not-for-profit sec- commitment to diversity and equality, and tor, community-based to the employment of analytical tools such organizations and individual Cana- dians, has an important part to play in building a strong Canadian Arctic and North.

2020 REPORT self-government are influencing Arctic governance in ways that will have a profound impact on the region and its inhabitants in the years to come.” Countless reports highlight longstanding inequalities in transportation, energy, communications, employment, community infrastructure, health, and education that continue to disadvantage Northerners compared to other Canadians. Furthermore, poor socio-economic and health indicators also point to significant gaps between North- ern Canadian jurisdictions and their southern counterparts. Population density, poor econ- Hybrid Warfare is a military strategy omies of scale, high costs, and myriad other that employs political warfare and factors often limit the applicability or utility blends conventional warfare, irreg- of conventional economic models to Arctic ular warfare and cyber warfare with contexts. other influencing methods. Hybrid Exogenous variables also complicate the warfare can be a tactical subset of Canadian Arctic security landscape. As non- grey-zone conflict deployed under state actors and non-Arctic state actors seek certain conditions and in varying greater influence on Arctic affairs, the Gov- degrees. (DND website) ernment of Canada may face direct and indirect challenges to its legitimacy and credibility. Furthermore, increasing polarization, regionalization, and fragmentation within North American society could deepen dis- trust in conventional politics and politicians, exposing vulnerabilities that are susceptible to outside influence and can be exploited to disrupt the social fabric and sow seeds of dis- unity. A declining sense of fate control, linger- ing anxieties about sovereignty, and concerns about an increasingly complex future could also prove sources of greater uncertainty and social and political division. In an increasingly globalized information and social media environment, adversaries are likely to use disinformation and misinformation strategies to influence Canadian opinion, undermine sources of strength, and complicate decision making. The NATO SFA also notes that “although socio-economic, political and environmental changes will continue to create uncertainty at individual, organizational, local, regional and global levels, new methods and tools, in particular big data, technological literacy and AI, have the 10 potential to provide new ways of managing

UNDERSTANDING2020 THE REPORT FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT uncertainty and complexity. This will require a shift from an organizational culture that takes an incremental approach, has stove- piped working practices and waits for greater clarity, to one that has a more collaborative approach that supports bold and innovative decisions.” Current discussions about the future of North American defence and secu- Close Engagement: Land Power in an Age rity architecture, included new “ecosystem” of Uncertainty (2019) summarizes that approaches to integrating layered defences, conflict over the next 10 to 15 years will anticipate a future where NORAD might take place in the context of the following achieve all domain awareness from the sea- trends: bed to outer space and have the ability to • increasingly rapid technological fuse the data from these sensors into a com- change; mon operating picture that decision-makers • an increase in the number of can use to defend against adversarial actions.3 actors willing and able to use organized force to achieve their 1.4 CONFLUENCE AND objectives; • an ever more pervasive global- INTERCONNECTEDNESS ized information and social media In a globalized world, many of the environment; issues facing Canada, including in • increasing resource shortages the Arctic and the North, cannot be and population movements addressed effectively through domestic driven by climate change; action alone. A whole-of-government • rising economic inequality; effort that leverages both domestic • weapons systems with radically and international policy levers is increased lethality; therefore required. For example, • greater power and reach of trans- economic growth in Canada’s Arctic national organized crime; and North can be facilitated through • democratization of advanced infrastructure investments that increase weaponry; access to world markets, along with • greater proliferation of evolved trade commissioner services to help hybrid threats; businesses based in the region access • increased likelihood of great international markets and attract and power / regional power conflict, retain foreign direct investment that whether directly or by proxy, benefits Northerners and respects including an increased risk of Canada’s national interest. – ANPF nuclear conflict; and (2019) • more rapid emergence and escalation of conflicts. The Arctic is inextricably tied to the rest of Canada, to North America, and to the international system as a whole. This interconnectedness brings opportunities for communities, governance, and economic development, and also poses complex, multifaceted challenges. The Canadian Army’s capstone future land operating concept, Close Engagement: 11

2020 REPORT Land Power in an Age of Uncertainty different trends causing a multiplication (2019), highlights how “globalization, social of the effects, the outcomes of which may connectivity, climate change, and empow- be very challenging to predict but should ered non-state actors are working to blur be considered nonetheless.” Technological the distinction between homeland and advances that bring together people can overseas threats.” The complex, dynamic, also have sweeping (and sometimes highly volatile, and uncertain future operating disruptive) political, socio-economic, cul- environment, where the risk of miscal- tural, and environmental implications. New culation and escalation is acute, requires connections between people within and comprehensive approaches that can draw across national boundaries can produce upon all of the levers of national power, greater empathy and cohesion, but they including military power. Accordingly, it also provide pathways for groups harbour- emphasizes that the Canadian Army needs ing grievances and radical ideas to recruit to foster a culture and tools to interoperate and mobilize members and can threaten with joint, interagency, and multinational traditional forms of cultural expression, partners; embrace adaptability and agility; social organization, and political control. and establish robust networks while retain- Furthermore, technology is an enabler for ing the ability to operate effectively in a innovation, education, improved health degraded or austere environment. outcomes, and positive social change, but can also exacerbate gaps between people The NATO SFA notes that “confluence refers with access to advanced technology and to the interactions and intersection of training and people without such access.

ANTICIPATING emerging threats and challenges is fundamental to Canada’s security. The Defence team will improve its ability to provide timely information to decision-makers, allowing the Government to identify and understand emerging events and crises, respond appropriately, and minimize the destructive effects of prolonged conflict. – SSE 2017

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT These confluence of these factors, and Greenland ice sheet, a nuclear disaster, a many others, changes the nature of con- terrorist attack on critical infrastructure, flict. The SSE highlights the increasing or the immediate closure of other strate- prevalence of “coordinated hostile activi- gic straits around the world that force risky ties across all spheres of state power (i.e., transits of Northern sea routes on a mas- diplomatic, economic, information, mil- sive scale. itary) that are deliberately crafted to fall Other problems have long-term conse- below the traditional threshold of armed quences but the temporal or geographi- conflict.” This “grey zone” encompasses a cal horizon over which they unfold make broader and opaquer spectrum of threats it difficult to secure support for specific than established policy and legal frame- initiatives to counter them or resources to works were designed to address, and are address them, given competing priorities. difficult to identify, attribute, categorize, Climate change is the most obvious – and, and counter. “The linkages between dis- arguably, the most existential – exam- parate spheres of activity are also difficult ple facing humanity as a whole. While the to understand and can mask broader stra- overwhelming preponderance of evidence tegic objectives,” the defence policy notes. proves that climate change will have dev- “Below threshold tactics and hybrid war- astating, long-term effects on the planet, fare also introduce questions regarding the it is difficult to discern specific “tipping appropriate distribution of responsibilities points” that will cause a major disruption to respond across government, including in non-linear, complex systems. Similarly, DND/CAF’s role when defence equities are disruptive technologies, the growing role threatened through non-military spheres.” of non-state actors and super-empowered Adversaries are discerning new opportuni- individuals in domestic and international ties to attack Canada’s vulnerabilities and affairs, and violent extremism simmer- contest our narratives at all levels, “wea- ing in unexpected sectors of society all ponizing” information operations to sow require careful monitoring to ensure that confusion and discord, creating ambiguity responses do not undermine innovation or about intent, and preserving deniability. the democratic values that animate Cana- These activities are difficult to deter, detect, dian society. Continuous horizon-scanning and attribute, and calibrated responses and ongoing (re)assessment of political, must be appropriate and proportionate, environmental, economic, societal, and balancing the risk of escalation and the fail- technological trends are important to ure to deter future malicious activity. provide credible, advance warning of disruptive changes in a complex, uncertain, The NATO SFA also anticipates that “the and potentially volatile future security confluence of trends, compounded with environment. uncertainty, is more likely to create strategic shocks and problems of great magni- tude.” These strategic shocks (sometimes referred to as “black swan” events) can emanate from “a rapid, unanticipated, less predictable event, such as the 9/11 attacks,” or can be a scenario that strategists have contemplated but transpires much earlier than expected. In an Arctic context, examples could be the complete collapse of the

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL

LEAD AUTHOR: P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER; WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY JUSTIN BARNES, ALDO CHIRCOP, RYAN DEAN, SUZANNE LALONDE, AND ANDREAS ØSTHAGEN Broadening international awareness and how Canada continues to leverage exist- acceptance of the heightened impacts of ing multilateral organizations – such as the global climate change in the Arctic, most Arctic Council, Arctic Economic Council, poignantly depicted in the accelerated United Nations Commission on the Limits melting of the polar ice cap, has gener- of the Continental Shelf, International Mar- ated sweeping debates about present and itime Organization (IMO), the North Atlan- future security and safety challenges and tic Treaty Organization (NATO), Arctic Coast threats in the region. Visions of increas- Guard Forum, and the Arctic “5+5” dialogue ingly accessible natural resources and nav- on Central Arctic Ocean fisheries – to pro- igable polar passages connecting Asian, mote its interests in the circumpolar world. European, and North American markets These multilateral tools have proven resil- have resurrected age-old ideas about the ient even with the downturn in relations region as a resource and maritime fron- between the West and Russia since 2014, tier—as well as concomitant insecurities with complex interdependence sustaining about the geopolitical and geostrategic regional cooperation on search and rescue, impacts of growing global attentiveness transboundary fisheries, extended conti- to the region’s possibilities. Accordingly, nental shelves, navigation, a mandatory debates about whether the region’s future polar code, and science. is likely to follow a cooperative trend or spi- Defence cooperation, however, has felt the ral into military competition and even con- direct effects of resurgent major power flict rage on. competition internationally – perhaps Scholars have well established how a inevitably, given that five of the Arctic robust array of rules, norms and institutions Council’s eight members are NATO mem- guide international interactions in the cir- bers. The alliance’s role in explicit “Arctic” cumpolar north. This rules-based order not defence and security has been contested only advances Canada’s national interests over last decade, with Canada typically but its global ones as well, offering oppor- opposing appeals by countries like Nor- tunities to shape international agendas on way to have NATO assume a more explicit climate change, contaminants, and other Arctic role because this would unneces- environmental threats with a global scope sarily antagonize Russia (or at least play that have a disproportionate impact on the into Putin’s hands by appearing to vali- 15 Arctic. Furthermore, it is well documented date his suggestion of Western aggressive

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT intentions against Russia’s Arctic), draw discussions, it still lingers in news media non-Arctic European states more directly and public perceptions, and “purveyors of into Arctic affairs writ large, and or amplify- polar peril” continue to point to the Arctic ing the misconception that Arctic regional interests of Russia, a rising China, and the dynamics are likely to precipitate conflict United States, as cause for Canadian alarm. between Arctic states. Others have pushed Other commentators argue that there is for stronger NATO involvement to meet a no military threat to the Arctic and that heightened Russian military threat, stand defence resources should instead be up to Russian intimidation, and show directed to dealing with human and envi- strong deterrent. Since the Ukrainian crisis ronmental security issues associated with of 2014, Western concerns about Russian climate change and the region as an Indig- intentions and behaviour on the inter- enous peoples’ homeland. national stage have reinforced a popular image of that country as the wild card in A third school of thought argues that, while the Arctic strategic equation and reignited strategic deterrence continues to have an questions about regional security. Arctic dimension (and that this is best con- ceptualized at an international rather than The Canadian debate on Arctic security a regional level of analysis), Canada is not reveals various schools of thought and likely to face conventional military threats divergent threat assessments. Propo- in or to its Arctic region in the next decade. nents of the “sovereignty on thinning ice” Instead, members of this school suggest school suggest that Arctic sovereignty, that Canada should focus on building Arctic maritime disputes, and/or questions of military capabilities within an integrated, resource ownership will serve as catalysts “whole of government” framework, largely for regional conflict. They associate the directed towards supporting domestic need for military activities demonstrating safety and “soft” security missions that rep- effective control over Canadian territory resent the most likely incidents to occur in and internal waters with the preserva- the Canadian Arctic. It should also invest in tion or enhancement of the international sensors and capabilities in the Arctic that legal basis for Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. can contribute to broader defence of North This thinking underpinned the “use it or America missions, but these should not lose it” messaging that dominated during be misconstrued as capabilities needed Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s first because the Canadian Arctic itself is spe- years in office in the mid-2000s. Although cifically threatened by foreign adversaries this idea no longer dominates academic and vulnerable to attack.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER debate about Russia’s apparent “revisionist position” towards what it views as a West- Canada’s defence policy acknowledges ern-dominated international system – and that “a degree of major power competition the implications for the Arctic. Some com- has returned to the international system.” mentators cast this as a new “cold war” The United States remains the world’s only between Russia and the West, a “resump- “superpower,” but China has emerged as a tion of great-power rivalry,” and a “return “rising economic power with an increasing of geopolitics,” while others decry these ability to project influence globally” and frames as outmoded or alarmist. Accord- “Russia has proven its willingness to test the ingly, debates persist about the pace and international security environment.” More form of Russia’s military and security pos- broadly, Strong, Secure, Engaged observes ture in the region, with some experts see- how “trends in global economic devel- ing it as a dramatic build-up portending opment are shifting the relative power of Russian aggression, and others suggesting states…, creating a more diffuse environ- that its military modernization program ment in which an increasing number of represents reasonable defensive measures state and non-state actors exercise influ- aimed at protecting Russia’s economic ence.” While this shift brings benefits (such and sovereign interests in its Arctic and as the alleviation of poverty, democratiza- at addressing security and safety threats tion, and empowerment), it “has also been (such as search and rescue, safe navigation, accompanied by weak governance and and responding to natural and humanitar- increasing uncertainty.” As an extension of ian emergencies). these broader shifts and heightened global competition, the actions of a resurgent The NATO SFA Report highlights that “the power (Russia) and the increasing pres- redistribution of economic and military ence of extra-regional powers (including power, most notably towards Asia, contin- China) are likely to influence perceptions of ues to contribute to the relative decline of the strategic balance in the Arctic. We con- the West.” General Western concerns about tend that changing power dynamics in the the rise of Asia, and particularly China’s Arctic are unlikely to derive from disputes use of hard and soft power to reshape the over regional disputes over boundary dis- geostrategic power balance globally, has putes, resources, or regional governance in extended to the Arctic. China’s desire to the next fifteen years, and instead will be a access strategic resources located in the reflect of broader international forces and Arctic, the pivotal importance of maritime dynamics. Although the evolving balance commerce to Asia-Pacific economies, and of power may undermine global peace and China’s peculiar interpretations of interna- security, we also highlight that this is not tional laws and treaties all make the grow- necessarily a zero-sum game in terms of ing polar interests of this self-proclaimed Arctic regional stability. “near-Arctic state” both significant and, in some circles, disconcerting. While careful to acknowledge Russia’s rights and interests as an Arctic state, Can- IMPLICATIONS ada’s defence policy notes that country’s a. Challenges to the rule-based role in the resurgence of major power order in the Arctic. Canada is a competition globally and concomitant responsible international player implications for peace and security. Rus- committed to upholding univer- sian aggression in annexing Crimea and sal liberal values, contributing to fomenting the war in Eastern Ukraine, as peace building, and working with well as its military intervention in the Syr- allies and partners to address secu- ian civil war, has sparked international rity challenges and build resiliency. 17

2020 REPORT Some other countries, however, are focus on the surveillance and con- testing the international security trol of the Canadian Arctic will be environment and challenging the complemented by close collabo- rules-based order. Canada cannot ration with select Arctic partners, assume that the Arctic is inherently including the United States, Nor- immune to such challenges, most way and Denmark, to increase sur- likely in an indirect way. veillance and monitoring of the b. Increased requirement for coop- broader Arctic region.” eration with other actors. Strong, c. Challenges to NORAD: The United Secure, Engaged affirms the com- States is pressuring Canada and patibility between Canada exercis- its other allies to assume a greater ing sovereignty and collaborating share of the overall defense bur- with international partners. “Can- den. SSE commitments to renew ada remains committed to exercis- the North Warning System (NWS) ing the full extent of its sovereignty and modernize elements of NORAD in Canada’s North, and will con- flow from Canada’s longstanding tinue to carefully monitor military bilateral defence arrangements activities in the region and conduct with the US to jointly monitor defence operations and exercises and control the air and maritime as required,” the policy explains. approaches to the continent. Concurrently, “Canada’s renewed New commitments, however, will 18 require creative thinking and new

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT approaches about infrastructure, 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS surveillance and detection, inter- ception capabilities, and command Canadian political scientist Rob Huebert and control relationships. Further- recently argued that “a New Arctic Stra- more, despite sharing common tegic Triangle Environment (or NASTE) is security interests and concerns in forming, in which the core strategic inter- the North, Canadian and American ests of Russia, China and United States are academic and “think tank” experts now converging at the top of the world.” tend to operate in distinct spheres, He suggests that this new “great game” is often limiting the exchange of not about conflict over the Arctic but rather knowledge and the sharing of best occurring through the Arctic. “This does not practices and new ideas. make the threat any less dangerous,” he d. Challenges to NATO: Canada is suggests, “but it does make it more com- working with its NATO allies to plicated.” With tensions growing between re-examine conventional deter- Russia and the West, and China’s relation- rence. The statement in SSE that ships evolving with both the West and “NATO has also increased its atten- Russia, Huebert asserts that “the primary tion to Russia’s ability to project security requirements of the three most force from its Arctic territory into powerful states are now overlapping in the the North Atlantic, and its poten- Arctic region, producing new challenges tial to challenge NATO’s collective and threats.” defence posture” marks a mea- Huebert finds support in US Northern sured shift in Canada’s official posi- Command/NORAD Commander General tion. Despite Canada’s reticence to Terrence O’Shaughnessy’s statement to have NATO adopt an explicit Arc- the Senate Armed Services subcommittee tic role over the past decade, the on readiness in March 2020, which insists inclusion of this reference – as well that “the threats facing the United States as the commitment to “support the and Canada are real and significant,” and strengthening of situational aware- that “the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, ness and information sharing in and our oceans are no longer protective the Arctic, including with NATO” – moats; they are now avenues of approach indicates a newfound openness to for advanced conventional weapons and multilateral engagement on “hard the platforms that carry them.” Instead, security” in the Arctic with our O’Shaugnessy describes the Arctic as “the European allies. NATO is the corner- new frontline of our homeland defense as stone of both Danish and Norwe- it provides our adversaries with a direct gian defence and security policy, avenue of approach to the homeland and which also opens opportunities is representative of the changing strategic for enhanced bilateral relation- environment in our area of responsibility.” ships. How this newfound interest Blending images of “more consistently nav- in NATO’s Arctic posture interacts igable waters, mounting demand for natu- with Canada’s longstanding prefer- ral resources, and Russia’s military buildup ence to partner bilaterally with the in the region” with Russia’s ability to field US on North American continental “advanced, long-range cruise missiles - to defence remains to be clarified in include land attack missiles capable of the next decade. striking the United States and Canada from Russian territory,” O’Shaugnessy concludes that “Russia has left us with no choice but to improve our homeland defense 19

2020 REPORT capability and capacity. In the meantime, North America is through the Arctic.” In light China has taken a number of incremen- of advanced technologies and capabilities tal steps toward expanding its own Arctic that adversaries can use to strike from mul- presence.” As a solution, he emphasizes the tiple directions, the binational command importance of advanced sensors that can has turned its focus to “all-domain” aware- “detect, track, and discriminate advanced ness, improved command and control, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hyper- and enhancing targeting capabilities that sonics, and small unmanned aerial sys- can allow decision-makers to respond “at tems at the full ranges from which they are the speed of relevance.” Canada has com- employed,” as well as “detect and track the mitted to modernize the North Warning platforms - aircraft, ships, and submarines System (NWS) and to include the air and - that carry those weapons.” Evoking the maritime approaches to North America in phrase that “the Homeland is not a sanc- any effort to modernize the overall system, tuary,” he emphasizes the need for “new and is developing new space-based sys- defeat mechanisms for advance threat systems to track threats, improve situational tems - to include the advanced cruise mis- awareness, and improve communica- siles capable of striking the homeland from tions globally – and with specific applica- launch boxes in the Arctic.” tion throughout the Arctic region. The full Talk of the need to “harden the shield” to extent of its contribution to continental project a credible deterrent against conven- defence effort to detect, deter, and defend tional and below-the-threshold attacks on against or defeat threats from all domains North America anticipates new approaches remain to be determined, but its Arctic that will incorporate Arctic sensors and sys- will inevitably factor heavily given that the tems in a layered “ecosystem” of sensors, polar region remains the fastest avenue fusion functions, and defeat mechanisms. of approach to North America for various Strong, Secure, Engaged explains that “the delivery systems emanating from major re-emergence of major power competi- power competitors. tion has reminded Canada and its allies of In the “state competition” section that the importance of deterrence.” At its core, immediately precedes the discussion deterrence is about discouraging a poten- about “a changing Arctic,” SSE observes tial adversary from doing something harm- that “NATO Allies and other like-minded ful before they do it. Accordingly, a credible states have been re-examining how to military deterrent serves as a diplomatic deter a wide spectrum of challenges to tool which, in concert with dialogue, can the international order by maintaining help to prevent conflict. While deterrence advanced conventional military capabil- theory has traditionally focused on conven- ities that could be used in the event of a tional and nuclear capabilities, the concept conflict with a ‘near-peer.’” Accordingly, is also relevant in the space, cyber, infor- debates about NATO’s role in the Arctic are mation, and cognitive domains – although inextricably linked to broader discussions the means to achieve it remain less clear in about the alliance. these domains. Implications: NORAD plays a central role in the protection of North American security and has a. Increased potential of “spillover” always been closely associated with Arc- from confrontation and competi- tic defences. As political scientist Andrea tion elsewhere. Although recent Charron observes, “its crest includes a scholarship seeks to explain the broad sword facing due north, suggesting lack of direct spillover from the war that the avenue of potential attack against in Ukraine in 2014 and from ensu- 20 ing Western sanctions into general

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Arctic relations (although it has law, leading to coercion and other affected some specific ones), legit- actions that could spillover into the imate concerns linger that Russia’s Arctic or see China use the circum- “increasingly confrontational, rule polar region as a theatre for diver- breaking and assertive” behaviour sionary activities. will eventually manifest in the b. Growing requirement for new Arctic. As the prospect of Western forms of robust and credible economic cooperation fades and deterrence. Recent events in companies cut ties with Russian Ukraine, Syria, and other parts of partners, the motivations to retain the world reinforce the ongoing the rules-based approach to the importance of territory and the circumpolar region may fray. In this traditional roles of deterrence and scenario, Canada could be faced defence, with a particular focus on with an increasingly aggressive collective defence. Future conflicts, Russia, willing to use its growing however, could range from hybrid Arctic military might to challenge wars, to selective military opera- the rules secure its objectives in the tions by major powers, to precise circumpolar world. Furthermore, long-range strikes using conven- aggressive Chinese activities in tional weapons, to the use of small the South China Sea might under- mobile units in special operations mine the ability of states to peace- to disrupt communications. Can- fully manage and resolve disputes ada and its allies will have to deter- in accordance with international mine how best they can deter

2020 REPORT enemy attacks with specific, limited more strident measures that upset objectives that adversaries seek to established relationships and chal- achieve using select elements of lenge alliance cohesion. Accord- power across all domains. The Arc- ingly, Canada will need to strike a tic cannot be excluded from these balance between national and col- deliberations. lective efforts to strengthen Arctic c. Deterrence by punishment still defence and security. Furthermore, has its place. Changes in nuclear it will have to assure that over-in- strategy and the modernization of flated or misplaced fears about mil- nuclear and conventional forces by itary threats to and in the Arctic do major and regional powers, have not become strategic distractions significant implications for strate- that divert Canada’s attention and gic stability. NORAD officials’ recent defence resources from elsewhere, emphasis on the need to defeat any thus opening other windows of delivery systems or threats travel- opportunity for adversaries. ling through the Arctic (deterrence e. Discerning Russia’s Arctic think- by denial), in all domains, could ing. North American analysts must destabilize the deterrence-by-pun- deliberately consider Russia’s Arc- ishment regime that has safe- tic interests, motivations, and fears guarded North America against through more systematic and cul- a nuclear or conventional mili- turally-attuned lenses, avoiding tary attack since the early Cold the temptation to simply import War. It could also divert unnec- assumptions about that country’s essary resources from domains revisionist designs elsewhere into where defeating threats may be their assessments of the interna- essential (e.g. cyber) and to deter tional Arctic. They must also bal- below-threshold tactics and hybrid ance Russian claims that dual-use warfare in the “grey zone.” Messag- Arctic infrastructure is inherently ing associated with NORAD mod- defensive with potential offensive ernization over the next decade uses and implications for broader should be carefully situated in deterrence. Furthermore, Russia deterrence logic and clearly com- is likely to become increasingly municated to not unintentionally dependent economically upon escalate tensions with adversaries Arctic resources and politically reli- or invite strategic miscalculations. ant on its imagined ‘besiegement’ d. Nationalism and divergent risk by the West over the next decade. and threat perception. Resur- Managing polar relationships gent nationalism worldwide, requires multilateral and bilateral expressed in forms like the “Amer- engagement that reflects nuanced ica First” and BREXIT movements, understandings of defence and for- changes national risk and threat eign policies, as well as the history, assessments. This, in turn, may economic drivers, and national cul- drive some of Canada’s key allies to tures which contribute (sometimes look inwards. On the other hand, imperceptibly) to policy. divergent perceptions of Arctic f. Discerning China’s Arctic think- risks and threats could cause Can- ing. Chinese declarations that it ada’s NATO Allies to shuffle their is a “near Arctic state” and that it defence priorities, either pivoting aspires to become a “great polar 22 away from the Arctic or adopting power” indicate that the country

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT has strategic interests in the Arctic implementation of land claims and – but it does not inherently mean self-government agreements, which are that it will seek to achieve them modern forms of treaty-making, are con- through revisionist behaviour or sidered key components of this process. military force, or that the region Over the past half century, the settlement really represents a core “strate- of land claims and the devolution of gov- gic direction” for China. Instead, ernance has also seen the federal govern- its aspirations and possible ment transfer much responsibility for land behaviours must be considered and renewable resource management in as part of a larger global game in the Canadian Arctic to territorial and Indig- which the Arctic represents a minor enous governments and organizations. – but potentially important - piece. The process remains incomplete, however, and Indigenous leaders frequently high- 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND light uneven implementation of land claim RECONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS commitments and other government promises. Furthermore, Northern leaders PEOPLES express concern about a lack of capacity to Reconciliation in the North is also linked manage myriad issues (both existing and with political evolution, including the anticipated) associated with rapid regional devolution of governance and self-de- change, much of it driven or compounded termination. The negotiation and full by climate change. The northern devolution process has been

2020 REPORT underway since the early 1970s, high- and conservation areas, social and cultural lighted by the creation of Nunavut in 1999 enhancements, and infrastructure have and agreements on land and resource man- brought decision-making over land and agement with the government of Yukon territories closer to Northern communities. and the Northwest Territories. “When com- Indigenous leadership and participation bined with the signing of modern treaties within co-management structures have across much of the North and the expan- created regulatory regimes that consider sion of Aboriginal self-government, devo- Indigenous knowledge and scientific evi- lution is an integral part of an extensive dence to make decisions on wildlife man- process of regional empowerment and agement, land use, and environmental local control,” scholars Ken Coates and Greg protection. These collaborative arrange- Poelzer explain. “The process has been sur- ments will continue to evolve through prisingly smooth and without controversy, to 2035, deepening linkages between despite the complex financial, human rightsholders. resource, and other issues that have to be Respect for and reconciliation with Indig- addressed when transferring authority enous peoples lies at the heart of the to another jurisdiction. Problems remain, federal government’s agenda, and rec- however, particularly in terms of capacity onciliation is likely to be long-term pro- of northern governments to absorb the cess given the deep history and ongoing rapid transitions, disagreements about the legacies of colonialism in the region. “It is appropriate levels of funding for devolved time for a renewed, nation-to-nation rela- responsibilities, and the complex chal- tionship with Indigenous Peoples, based lenges of delivering government services on recognition of rights, respect, co-op- in the Far North.” eration, and partnership,” Prime Minister Over the last three decades, co-man- Justin Trudeau instructed to each of his agement structures that share jurisdic- Cabinet ministers after taking office in tion over lands and resources, harvesting 2015. Accordingly, Canada places the high- rights, environmental management, parks est priority on ensuring that its domestic

“Canada’s Arctic and Northern governments and communities are at the heart of security in the region. Partnership, cooperation and shared leadership are essential to promoting security in this diverse, complex and expansive area. Working in partnership with trusted international allies and all levels of government, including Indigenous communities, organizations and governments, Canada will continue to protect the safety and security of the people in the Arctic and the North, now and into the future.” - ANPF Safety, Security, and Defence chapter (2019)

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and international activities in the Arctic us” as an “essential principle that weaves acknowledge, protect, and promote Indig- federal, territorial, provincial and Indige- enous peoples’ rights—and Canada insists nous institutions and interests together for that other Arctic stakeholders do the same. mutual success” offers important guidance for what Arctic and northern people, and In May 2016, Canada officially lifted the their institutions, municipalities, organiza- qualifications to its endorsement of the tions and governments will expect in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights coming decades. It also resonates in an era of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), affirm- of reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. ing its strong commitment to welcome “Indigenous peoples into the co-produc- Implementing reconciliation is a complex tion of policy and joint priority-setting.” The process which includes recognition of Can- ANPF commits Canada “honour, uphold, ada’s colonial legacy for Indigenous peo- and implement the of Arctic and north- ples and the intergenerational impacts of ern Indigenous peoples, including those attempts at assimilation and other destruc- outlined in historic and modern treaties tive practices; the acknowledgement of and in the United Nations Declaration on and respect for Indigenous rights and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” Obli- self-determination; and supporting Indige- gations of UNDRIP include the need for nous peoples’ efforts to reclaim their iden- free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) by tity, language, culture, and nationhood. In Indigenous peoples before projects can 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau accepted the take place on lands which they inhabit or Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final have a claim. UNDRIP offers guidance on report and its “94 Calls to Action” on behalf cooperative relationships with Indigenous of Canada and committed his government peoples to states, the United Nations, and to implement the recommendations. other international organizations based In the future, Canada’s cooperation with on the principles of equality, partnership, other Arctic states and partners are likely to good faith, and mutual respect. Canada’s reflect more direct involvement of North- implementation of UNDRIP remains a work ern territorial and Indigenous governments in progress, and bringing all of its domestic and organizations. For example, pursuant and international practices into workable to its efforts to promote sustainable marine alignment with the declaration (some pro- spatial management of shared ocean areas, visions of which are subject to radically dif- Canada has committed to play an “active ferent interpretations, such as FPIC) is likely role in supporting the development of a to remain so over the fifteen years. pan-Arctic network of marine protected The Government of Canada’s dedicated areas at the Arctic Council and to partner efforts to engage Northerners (particu- with Indigenous peoples to recognize and larly Indigenous peoples) as co-creators manage culturally and environmentally of an Arctic and Northern policy vision significant areas and pursue additional that seeks to reflect their lived realities conservation measures, including those led and desires has confirmed a people-cen- through Indigenous management authori- tric strategy that places human and envi- ties.” Establishing transboundary marine ronmental security at the forefront.1 The protected areas, such as the one covering clear focus on Indigenous consultation and North Water Polynya in northern Baffin Bay leadership in policy-making also resulted between Nunavut and Greenland that the in a protracted policy-development pro- Pikialasorsuaq Commission recommended cess that cannot serve as a workable model in 2017, will entail partnerships with Inuit to discern more immediate policy needs. communities and organizations, territorial Nevertheless, adopting the ANPF idea of and foreign governments, and the Inuit Cir- 25 “Nothing about us [Northerners], without cumpolar Council.

2020 REPORT Implications: groups.” Continuing and enhanc- a. The roles and influence of Indige- ing these forms of collaboration are nous peoples in the development likely to yield important dividends. of domestic and international d. An increasing focus on Indig- policy are likely to expand over enous distinctiveness will con- the next fifteen years. Accord- tinue to promote Indigenous ingly, Canada’s declared intent to rights and self-determination and play a leadership role in circum- produce new Crown-Indigenous polar affairs is likely to become relationships through collabora- even further invested in advancing tive processes (such as negotia- domestic priorities related to social tion, facilitation, and mediation) as and economic development, envi- well as litigation. Heightened frus- ronmental protection, scientific trations with governments’ inabili- and traditional Indigenous knowl- ties to address core human needs edge, and diversity. The extent to in a timely manner are also likely which this involvement carries into to erode political cohesion, with the defence and national security the potential to inhibit prog- realm remains to be determined. ress towards achieving improved b. Indigenous and territorial gov- socio-economic outcomes. Per- ernments will expect to play key sistent “we/they” messaging may roles in the co-management of also increasingly divide Canadi- all Arctic activities and decisions. ans and lead to political friction For example, Inuit leaders consider or alienation over the next fifteen Inuit Nunangat - the Arctic waters, years. ice, and land above the treeline – to be their homeland, and assert their 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE Indigenous rights to be involved ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND in every decision relating to it. Pre- INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS sumably this includes foreign and defence affairs. The safety, security, and defence chapter of c. Reconciliation is a process in the ANPF notes that a growing interest in which all Canadian institutions Arctic affairs by non-Arctic state and non- are expected to engage. Grow- state actors has significant implications for ing awareness and concern about the evolving Arctic security environment. the impacts of colonial legacies “Easier access to the Arctic may contribute in the Arctic will colour expecta- to greater foreign presence in Canadian tions about future relationships Arctic waterways,” requiring that Canadian between Northern peoples and remain vigilant in enforcing its sovereignty governments, including the mil- over its waters and ensuring that activities itary. During the consultations in the region do not pose security or safety leading to the ANPF, Northerner risks to Canada and to Canadians. The pol- participants highlighted the Cana- icy framework also emphasizes that: dian Rangers as an important and culturally-appropriate form of com- Canada’s Arctic and natural resources munity-based military presence are attracting interest from for- in the North, and also “expressed eign states and enterprises. Foreign appreciation for the way in which investment, research, and science the Canadian Armed Forces consult have the potential to improve the 26 local communities and Indigenous lives of Northerners. However, some

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT of these investments and related are expressing commercial, scientific, and economic activities could seek to military interest in the region – and bal- advance interests that may be in ancing new economic opportunities with opposition to those of Canada. Rec- impacts that activities have on Northern- ognizing that economic growth ers, Arctic ecosystems, and defence and and investment in the Arctic sup- security – remain central international con- ports good jobs, healthy people and siderations to any Arctic policy. strong communities, there are also Narratives of China’s rising interests as a security risks associated with these “near-Arctic state” and its future designs for investments that could impact the the region are regular features in the bur- well-being of Northerners. Canada geoning literature on Arctic security and will continue to balance needed eco- governance over the last decade. Many nomic development while ensuring of these Arctic narratives cast suspicion that security in the Arctic and the at China, based on concern that the Asian North is maintained. power will seek to undermine the sover- Discerning ways to proactively engage eignty of Arctic states and co-opt regional non-Arctic states and non-state actors that governance mechanisms to facilitate access to resources and new sea routes to

The Canadian Rangers, a sub-component of the CAF Reserves in isolated northern and coastal communities, are widely celebrated as a military organization that has balanced both the needs of local communities and the federal government, and has contributed to the revitalization of cultural and traditional practices in Northern communities. The Rangers provide an important outlet for Northern Indigenous peoples who wish to serve in the defence of their country without having to leave their communities. Ranger activities allow members of Indigenous communities to practice and share traditional skills, such as living off the land, not only with people from outside their cultures but also inter-generationally within them. By celebrating traditional knowledge and skills, as well as encouraging and enabling community members to go out on the land and share their knowledge and expertise, the Rangers can play an important role in supporting the retention or expansion of core cultural competencies. In turn, the Ranger concept is inherently rooted in the idea that the unique knowledge of Northern Indigenous peoples can make an important contribution to effective military operations. It is this partnership, rooted in mutual learning and sharing, that has made the Rangers a long-term success on the local and national scale.

2020 REPORT fuel and connect its growing global empire. sources, including Asian investors, holds Other scholars have laid out the conditions the potential to increase the relative pros- under which China might play a construc- perity of Arctic regions within Arctic states tive role in circumpolar affairs and Cana- like Canada. As a source of investment cap- dian Arctic development. Positive relations ital to advance resource development proj- are inherently predicated on China respect- ects, China would have to respect the rule ing Canadian sovereignty as an Arctic state of law, Canadian regulations, and the rights and, in terms of the maritime domain, as an of Northern Canadians (particularly Indige- Arctic coastal state with extensive historic nous peoples). internal waters as well as sovereign rights Non-state actors include benign and to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and non-benign entities from Non-Governmen- extended continental shelf. This is consis- tal Organizations (NGOs), Multinational tent with international law, which China Corporations (MNCs), advocacy networks, promises to respect in its 2018 Arctic policy. transnational activists, super-empowered China’s growing interest in polar scientific or rogue individuals, and terrorist and crim- research can contribute to enhanced inter- inal organizations. As the NATO SFA notes, national understanding of Arctic dynamics, these actors exercise significant economic, particularly in the natural sciences. Height- political, or social power and influence at ened but appropriate Chinese involvement national and at international levels. In the in Arctic governance, with due respect for future, non-state actors “are expected to Arctic states, can also bolster regional sta- exert greater influence over national gov- bility. Foreign investments from non-Arctic ernments and international institutions and their role is likely to expand,” heightening the “complexity of addressing issues such as cor- ruption, social and economic inequality and effectiveness of state institutions.” Although Canada’s Northern economy remains disproportionately reliant on the public sector, the private sector is an essential driver of economic growth and prosperity, and business interests and priorities must be considered in contemplating Arctic futures. Furthermore, NGOs will continue to exert pressure and wield influence on local and regional issues, demand- ing government and corporate transparency, promoting environmental and social justice and human rights, and seeking to sway public opinion through direct and indirect action, including social media. 28 The ANPF explains that Canada

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT will “consider establishing Arctic dialogues actors’ roles in possible Arctic with key non-Arctic states and actors, futures should not just fixate where practical, to discuss issues of mutual on material gains in the region interest, … prioritize[ing] cooperation with but also considerations related to non-Arctic states and actors whose val- broader international reputation ues and scientific, environmental and/or and possible moves to distract Arc- economic interests align with the priori- tic states such as Canada. “Playing ties of Canada’s Arctic and Northern peo- by the rules” and exemplifying “Arc- ples as well as Canada’s national security tic civility” can build political capi- interests.” It also emphasizes cooperation tal to invest in other regions of the with “non-Arctic states who uphold Arctic globe that are of greater strategic and Northern values and interests, such importance. Furthermore, foreign as sustainable harvesting of Arctic wildlife behaviour should be analyzed for and the Indigenous right to self-determi- the diversionary value that it may nation.” What mechanisms government hold in a global context, rather decision-makers will use to make these than as tools for power projec- assessments, and how they will respond tion designed to secure narrow, to state and non-state actors that do not regional gains in the Arctic itself. conform to Canadian expectations or are c. Opportunities for closer coopera- deemed security risks, remains to be seen. tion with non-Arctic state actors. This includes non-Arctic state allies IMPLICATIONS and partners in multilateral con- a. Growing complexity due to texts such as NATO and regional non-Arctic state and non-state fora such as the Arctic Council, as actors articulating and assert- well as bilateral cooperation to ing interests in the Canadian advance shared scientific, environ- Arctic and circumpolar regions. mental, and/or economic inter- The huge diversity of actors that ests. These collaborative efforts fall within this category creates can be used to generate new legal a complex environment where it instruments to support sustainable is difficult to comprehend each development, heighten aware- player’s role in domestic and inter- ness of Indigenous peoples’ rights national affairs, whether their and interests, and draw non-Arctic underlying motivations are sin- states into Arctic “ways of thinking.” cere and resonate with Canadian On the other hand, science and values, and their interactions with resource development projects can other actors. Furthermore, the line serve as vectors for non-Arctic state between state and non-state actors influence activities that are not is unclear or blurred in some cases. aligned with Canadian interests or Canada and its allies will need to can serve to “normalize” a presence carefully discern what non-Arctic that may have unanticipated, long- state behaviours are supportive or term repercussions. benign, and which signal revision- d. Growing worries about the pres- ist or disruptive intent or possible ence and influence of non-Arctic outcomes, and potential risks or State-Owned or State-Controlled threats they pose to Canadian and Enterprises in the region. Largely alliance interests. state-owned or -controlled corpo- b. Analytical frameworks designed rations such as Russia’s Gazprom to anticipate non-Arctic state or China’s National Petroleum 29

2020 REPORT Corporation may not share the same incentives and goals as their private counterparts, and they may act as proxies extending the political objectives of their countries. Roger Robinson Jr.’s “Long Con” narrative posits that China’s Arc- tic strategy is “based on a term of “SHIPPING THROUGH ARCTIC WATERS IS EXPECTED art used in the confidence racket TO INCREASE, PRESENTING RISKS TO THE FRAG- – the “long con” – wherein it is ILE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT IF NOT MAN- making a sizeable investment of AGED CAREFULLY. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS capital, time, and energy over an THEREFORE ESSENTIAL FOR MANAGING THESE RISKS extended period to build a false WHILE PROTECTING COMPETITIVENESS, GIVEN THE sense of trust and achieve a more GLOBAL NATURE OF SHIPPING.” – ANPF (2019) valuable “score” at the end of the scheme.” When China sees that it has an advantage, it will turn “the dial to its hard strategy.” Robinson argues that China’s “true intention is to position itself to influence heavily, if not outright control,” Arctic energy and fishing, as well as to shape “the rules and political arrangements governing the use of strategic waterways now gradually opening due to melting ice” for its benefit. For example, investing in a mining site could secure a footprint at a strategic location adjacent a shipping route or allow for the construction of infrastructure to gather intelligence. e. Opportunities for closer cooperation with non-state actors in the Arctic. A “whole-of-society” approach to comprehensive Arctic security, as espoused in the ANPF, reflects the value of engaging con- structively with benign non-state actors. Better leveraging the capacities and expertise of NGOs and the private sector, for example, can enhance the effectiveness and effi- ciency of emergency responses. On the other hand, the actions of malign non-state actors (such as terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, and traffickers) have 30 to potential to disrupt domestic

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and international affairs and underwater noise abatement require- undermine Arctic security. ments. Furthermore, it could work to ensure that subsequent negotiations 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND correct the almost complete lack of consultation with indigenous and THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME coastal communities that marked the Since 1996, Canada has consistently previous IMO process. Other inter- referred to the Arctic Council as the national bodies, like the Arctic Coast leading body for regional coopera- Guard Forum launched in 2015, offer tion in the region. Preserving this role important venues for Arctic states to is a Canadian priority. While there is advance practical maritime coopera- no need or appetite for wholesale tion at the operational level, exempli- “reform” of the Arctic Council, Canada fying how differences in other parts of should continue to support general the world do not preclude collabora- efforts to enhance its work, particu- tion on essential missions. “With Russia’s growing drive toward increas- larly through its working groups and Despite the prevalence of misconcep- ing its domination in task forces, as well as resources to tions about the northern polar region the Arctic and with enhance the capacity of Permanent as a “last frontier” without any gov- Moscow seeing Can- Participants (PPs). Ongoing Arctic erning rules, the Arctic Ocean is sub- ada as one of its chief Council research on climate change, ject to a clear and widely-accepted adversaries in this pur- sustainable resource and ecosystem international legal regime. With 168 suit, Ottawa should be management, biodiversity, education, state parties, the United Nations Con- ready for a new surge of and connectivity also factor heav- vention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 active measures levelled ily into Canada’s international and (UNCLOS) is regarded by the interna- against Canada in the domestic priorities. tional community as the constitution near future.” – Sergey for the world’s oceans. Of the Arctic As climate change heightens inter- Sukhankin, The Western 5 states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, national commercial interest and Alliance in the Face of the Russian Federation, United States), activity in the Arctic, Canadians have Russian (Dis)Information only the United States is not party, raised important questions about Machine: Where Does but it considers much of the conven- maritime environmental protection Canada Stand? (2019) and response, safe regional transpor- tion to be customary international tation, and search and rescue. Canada law binding on all states. When senior spearheaded efforts to create a man- ministers of the Arctic 5 states met datory Polar Code through the IMO in 2008 in Ilulissat, Greenland (Kalaa- (which entered into force on 1 Jan- lit Nunaat), they committed to the uary 2017) that covers the full range law of the sea framework to ensure of design, construction, equipment, “the orderly settlement of any pos- operational, training, search and res- sible overlapping claims” and to dis- cue, and environmental protection miss ideas that the Arctic needed new matters relevant to ships operating comprehensive international legal in polar waters. Over the next fifteen regime. UNCLOS does not remove all years, Canada may play a leading role conceivable stressors, however, and in addressing some of the conten- competing claims and counterclaims tious issues deliberately left out of the to the legal status of straits, overlap- current polar code, such as the use of ping continental shelf claims and heavy fuel oil and its impact on short unsettled maritime boundaries, and lived climate forcers like black car- regulation of polar shipping are likely bon, mandatory invasive species pro- to continue to raise concern. tections, greywater restrictions, and 31

2020 REPORT Canada maintains its position on the legal the consent of the Government of Canada,” status of the archipelagic waters enclosed but added the caveat that nothing in the by straight baselines (which includes much agreement affected either state’s position of the Northwest Passage) as internal on the law of the sea in this area. This “agree waters and subject to a historic title and to disagree” arrangement remains intact, falling within its sovereignty. The United although some commentators worry States counterclaims that the passage is whether this bilateral approach will be sus- subject to the right of international nav- tainable as --- and international interest igation, including the regime of transit grows in Arctic shipping routes. passage through straits used for interna- The adoption of the International Code for tional navigation and has protested man- Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) datory reporting. In 1988, Canada and the by the International Maritime Organization United States entered into an agreement (IMO) in 2014/15 provides an international on Arctic cooperation in which the United standard for maritime safety and pollu- States pledged that “all navigation by U.S. tion prevention for ships navigating Arctic icebreakers within waters claimed by Can- waters. The Polar Code has been domesti- ada to be internal will be undertaken with cated or referentially incorpo- rated by all Arctic 5 states, and Canada and the Russian Feder- ation have retained some prior unilateral rules and procedures to protect domestic interests. Furthermore, article 234 of UNCLOS provides coastal states bordering ice-covered areas with a unique legislative and enforcement jurisdiction for pollution prevention within the EEZ not enjoyed by any other marine region. States using this power may raise environmental standards for ships without prior resort to the IMO, but must do so in a non-discriminatory manner and on the best available scientific evidence. UNCLOS provides rules and procedures for continental shelf claims through the Com- mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a scientific and technical review body for extended continental shelf submissions (i.e., extending beyond the 200-nautical mile limit) that provides rec- 32 ommendations on the outer

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT limits proposed by submitting states. To actors seek a greater role in circum- date all Arctic 5 states have conducted sci- polar decision-making systems, entific research to support claims and, with they may seek to create alternative the exception of the United States, have structures to increase their leverage made partial submissions to the CLCS. and/or ensure that their concerns Following a submission for the Northwest and/or agendas are addressed. The Atlantic continental shelf in 2013, Canada creation of the Arctic Circle assem- made a submission with respect to the bly as an alternative platform for Arctic in 2019. The extended continental Iceland, China, Alaska, and other shelf claim process has been largely coop- actors who perceived their voices erative to date. This is particularly interest- to be marginalized in Arctic Council ing given the substantial overlaps among and “Arctic-Five” coastal state meet- the Arctic states’ submissions made to the ings is a case in point. While new CLCS and the expectation of several future governance bodies or mechanisms maritime boundaries (including between can supplement and complement states located at the opposite ends of the existing channels, they can also Arctic), but reflects cooperative marine sci- compete for legitimacy and seek to entific research and data exchange, con- usurp existing structures currently sultations among the affected states prior dominated by the Arctic states. to submission, expressions of non-objec- b. Increased requirement for part- tion to submissions being entertained by nership and inclusive gover- the CLCS, common understanding that nance. Although Canada and the the CLCS recommendations to a state were other Arctic states might prefer without prejudice to other states, and the to manage northern circumpolar CLCS recommendations would be without affairs as a closed club, interna- prejudice to the future delimitation of con- tional cooperation is increasingly tinental shelf boundaries. necessary at various levels to address Arctic issues such as cli- Although Arctic sovereignty disputes mate change, fisheries beyond attracted significant political and media national jurisdictions, organized attention a decade ago, there is now gen- crime, safe shipping in interna- eral consensus that they are well-managed tional waters, space and cyber- and unlikely to generate conflict in the next space, and biodiversity. fifteen years. The low-level dispute over the c. Projecting stability beyond the sovereignty of Hans Island remains unre- Arctic region. While commenta- solved – largely because the practical stakes tors frequently refer to the danger in doing so are very low. A more substan- of heightened strategic competi- tial and longstanding dispute concerns the tion or conflict “spilling over” into maritime boundary between Canada and the Arctic, stable circumpolar gov- the United States in the Beaufort Sea, but ernance and security could have a neither country seems in a hurry to resolve positive “spill over” effect on other it given the lengthy process of defining the international relationships. This was outer limits of the extended continental part of the original intent of creat- shelves in the region. ing the Arctic Council to “socialize” IMPLICATIONS post-Soviet Russia into Western liberal internationalist norms. a. Challenges to existing regional d. Upholding the Law of the Sea. governance structures. As At this time there appears to be lit- non-Arctic states, sub-national Arc- tle to no danger that the Arctic 5 tic governments, and non-state 33

2020 REPORT states will lose faith in the conven- Russia and our respective Arctic tional and customary Law of the and Northern communities as they Sea, because they are all net ben- struggle to adapt to and thrive eficiaries. Other major maritime in rapidly changing conditions.” powers, such as China, benefit from Domestically, Canada is likely to international navigation rights In introduce low-impact corridors to Arctic waters. The adoption of the concentrate infrastructure and ser- Polar Code has promoted a sub- vices in Canadian Arctic waters, ---, stantial degree of harmonization f. Resolving Maritime Boundaries. of the national regimes for naviga- None of the Arctic 5 states appears tion, although departures are also in a rush to resolve outstanding visible and ostensibly justifiable in maritime boundaries in the Cen- part under Article 234 of UNCLOS. tral Arctic Ocean. CLCS consider- More of a concern for Canada and ation of extended continental shelf the Russian Federation is the possi- submissions is a lengthy process. bility that the United States might There does not appear to be any extend its Freedom of Naviga- tension with respect to continental tion (FONOP) Program into Arctic shelf submissions owing to good waters. While the intention of the levels of communication, cooper- United States would be to affirm ation, and common understand- its view on international navigation ing on the rules and procedures. rights in the Northwest Passage and Following completion of the CLCS Northeast Passage, it could serve to procedures, the process of nego- harden the disputes over the legal tiating extended continental shelf Canadians are increasingly turning to status of the waters concerned. boundaries where they overlap social media as alternative news sources, Given past Canadian nationalis- is expected to occur. This process believing governments and traditional tic reactions to the Manhattan could lead to friction but, more media sources as untrustworthy. Accord- (1969/70) and Polar Sea (1985) voy- likely, may produce outcomes that ingly, “independent actors use social media • Multiple actors and agencies are work- ages, a FONOP would likely have a affirm a message of mutual respect, and specialised web sites to strategically ing to counter and defend against this negative impact on bilateral Can- stability, and rule of law in the Cir- reinforce and spread messages compati- [disinformation] threat ada-US relations which could dis- cumpolar Arctic. ble with their own.” These messages tend • Governments are increasingly insist- rupt progress on core initiatives to be “anti-globalist, with a nationalist and ing that social media companies take such as North American defence anti-immigration rhetoric that attracts ele- responsibility for the content they facil- 2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION modernization. ments of both the left and right.” itate. European legislators are ahead of AND POLARIZATION e. Safe Shipping and Search and those in the US, in part because social When citizens perceive that their govern- Rescue (SAR). Despite their unilat- NATO’s 2017 Strategic Foresight Analysis media is heavily used by terrorists; ments are failing to overcome political eral requirements for mandatory (SFA) posits that political discontent arises • Some governments have moved to block impasses, this can erode the credibility or reporting and some deviations when citizens perceive that government known disinformation media streams in legitimacy of the institutions upon which from IMO safety and pollution pre- mandates fail to address political impasses. their countries, shielding their citizens the established political system is founded. vention standards, both Canada Such impasses range from chronic eco- from attempts at foreign influence; SSE notes that this can drive Canadians to and the Russian Federation are nomic crisis to persistent unemployment • Many universities and private research view alternative organizations – empow- investing in infrastructure to pro- to inefficient social and welfare systems. groups have analysed disinformation ered by social media – “as more legitimate mote safe and environmentally-re- Governments that are seen to success- campaigns, using distribution patterns than the state.” sponsible shipping. This is one area fully mitigate these impasses earn or retain and content indicators to identify bot where Canada is likely to restart credibility, while those that are perceived as The NATO SFA notes international actors networks and troll factories; and a bilateral dialogue with Russia, failing to address them lose credibility. This can harness and amplify political polar- • Specialised organisations have become given what the ANPF describes is tied to an increasingly polarized news ization through social media and the skilled at exposing false news stories and, as “common interests, priorities media that amplifies societal divisions. spreading of disinformation or ‘fake news.’ often in real time, educating the public and challenges faced by Canada, CSIS observes how politically disaffected This can undermine political and social to identify and expose disinformation. 34 – CSIS, Who Said What? The Security Chal- lenges of Modern Disinformation (2018) UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Canadians are increasingly turning to cohesion. Canada’s ANPF notes that as social media as alternative news sources, economic development prospects and believing governments and traditional perceptions of regional “accessibility” media sources as untrustworthy. Accord- draw more attention to the region, foreign ingly, “independent actors use social media actors have more incentive to engage in • Multiple actors and agencies are work- and specialised web sites to strategically subversive behaviour. CSIS notes that both ing to counter and defend against this reinforce and spread messages compati- Russia and China have “developed sophis- [disinformation] threat ble with their own.” These messages tend ticated information doctrines as part of • Governments are increasingly insist- to be “anti-globalist, with a nationalist and their strategy to… advance foreign-policy ing that social media companies take anti-immigration rhetoric that attracts ele- objectives.” Their goals range from short- responsibility for the content they facil- ments of both the left and right.” term economic advantage to undermining itate. European legislators are ahead of the political legitimacy of Canadian institu- When citizens perceive that their govern- those in the US, in part because social tions over the long-term. media is heavily used by terrorists; ments are failing to overcome political • Some governments have moved to block impasses, this can erode the credibility or IMPLICATIONS legitimacy of the institutions upon which known disinformation media streams in a. Widening North/South political the established political system is founded. their countries, shielding their citizens fault lines. Increasing polarization SSE notes that this can drive Canadians to from attempts at foreign influence; and political disaffection could view alternative organizations – empow- • Many universities and private research renew perennial strains between ered by social media – “as more legitimate groups have analysed disinformation the territories and the federal gov- than the state.” campaigns, using distribution patterns ernment. Issues include territo- and content indicators to identify bot The NATO SFA notes international actors rial control over public lands and networks and troll factories; and can harness and amplify political polar- resource revenues, resentment • Specialised organisations have become ization through social media and the about high federal transfer pay- skilled at exposing false news stories and, spreading of disinformation or ‘fake news.’ ments to the territories, and allega- often in real time, educating the public This can undermine political and social tions of governments shirking their to identify and expose disinformation. responsibilities to each other and 35 – CSIS, Who Said What? The Security Chal- lenges of Modern Disinformation (2018) 2020 REPORT to Canadian citizens. Furthermore, the independence b. Frustrations about the Non-Re- movement in Greenland could newable Resource Economy. influence Inuit political discourse in Although non-renewable resource the Eastern Canadian Arctic. While development is a key tenet of the the emergence of a similar inde- Pan-Territorial Vision For Sustain- pendence movement in Inuit Nun- able Development, the political pri- angat is unlikely in the next fifteen oritization of the economy over the years, voices calling for greater environment could lead to height- autonomy (and potentially sup- ened political tension and confron- ported by foreign interests) could tation. Similarly, greater friction undermine political cohesion in between economic regulations and the Canadian North. co-management boards could bring d. Russia as the disaffected Arc- increasing polarization. tic State. Russia is the non-liberal c. Competing Visions of Nunavut democratic nation amongst the and Inuit Nunangat. Increasing Arctic states. Growing NATO atten- frustration amongst some Inuit lead- tion to the Arctic and North Atlantic ers with the territorial public govern- in response to Russia’s revisionist ment in Iqaluit has prompted some actions elsewhere in the world has calls for the entrenchment of Inuit led Moscow to express its discon- Nunangat as a distinct political tent and invigorate popular con- jurisdiction delivering services cerns about NATO encirclement within Canada. The perceived fail- and aggression. Russia could use ure of Nunavut could undermine Arctic security as a wedge issue to the credibility of the federal state undermine and divide NATO mem- rooted in public governments bers, also placing regional gover- that serves a diverse population. nance norms and mechanisms in jeopardy.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 37

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER THREE

ENVIRONMENT

LEAD AUTHORS: JUSTIN BARNES, JACKSON BELLAMY, WILFRID GREAVES, AND P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

Climate change, combined with change has the potential for unforeseen advancements in technology, is and dangerous consequences, with one leading to an increasingly accessible recent projection (Steffen et al., 2018) pre- Arctic. A decade ago, few states or dicting that a business as usual approach firms had the ability to operate in the to GHG emissions will exceed the planetary Arctic. Today, state and commercial thresholds which maintain our familiar and actors from around the world seek stable climatic conditions. to share in the longer term benefits Climate change is occurring rapidly in the of an accessible Arctic. Over time, Arctic and will continue for the foreseeable this interest is expected to gener- future, even if Paris targets are met. Science ate a corresponding rise in commer- shows that the Arctic is warming at a faster cial interest, research and tourism in rate than the rest of the globe, with cur- and around Canada’s northern ter- rent and future implications for the region. ritory. This rise in activity will also While climate change may open new bring increased safety and security opportunities for increased access and demands related to search and res- economic activity in the Arctic, changing cue and natural or man-made disas- environmental and ecological conditions ters to which Canada must be ready also pose serious challenges, especially to respond. for Indigenous populations that rely on a Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) mixed subsistence-wage economy.

Environmental and ecological changes in The U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Envi- the Canadian Arctic are being driven pre- ronment, Climate Change, and Arctic dominantly by climate change: a globally Leadership of March 2016 articulated “a important issue that requires a global solu- common vision of a prosperous and sus- tion. Countries recently entered into the tainable North American economy, and Paris Agreement in an attempt to mitigate the opportunities afforded by advancing climate change and limit warming to 2°C clean growth.” Both countries also prom- above pre-industrial levels (ideally 1.5°C) by ised to “continue to respect and promote reducing their greenhouse gas emissions the rights of Indigenous peoples in all cli- (GHG) which are the main driver of climate mate change decision making.” Prime Min- change. Unchecked or unmitigated climate ister Justin Trudeau and President Barak 39

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Obama’s Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement state of crisis.” While the framework notes that December directed concrete actions how “partnering with communities and to ensure “a strong, sustainable and via- investing in regional infrastructure will ble Arctic economy and ecosystem, with solidify Canada’s regional presence while low-impact shipping, science based man- exercising its sovereignty,” adapting exist- agement of marine resources, and free ing and new infrastructure to withstand from the risks of offshore oil and gas activ- changing environmental conditions will be ity,” that would “set the stage for deeper expensive and difficult, compounded by partnerships with other Arctic nations, uncertainty about the timing, forms, and including through the Arctic Council.” full spectrum of climate change impacts. While the Trump administration has During the engagement process leading changed the course of the U.S. (including up to the ANPF, Northern stakeholders outright denial of climate change), these and rightsholders raised critical ques- joint statements continue to reflect Can- tions about environmental protection ada’s priorities and various commitments and response, safe regional transporta- reiterated in the ANPF and other policy tion, and search and rescue capabilities in statements. Security threats in the region the context of a rapidly changing climate. will be compounded by the effects of cli- To respond effectively to these emerging mate change and the disproportionate challenges, they called for a whole-of-gov- impact it will have on Indigenous popula- ernment approach to safety, security, and tions in the region. Northerners are already defence that would include a heightened experiencing more extreme weather CAF and Canadian Coast Guard presence in events, such as intense storms, wildfires, the region. This presence not only responds and floods, which threaten their lives and to environmental challenges, it may also property. Other climate change effects, entail a larger environmental footprint in including increasingly unpredictable the region. weather patterns, melting permafrost, and The DND/CAF code of environmental stew- changing sea ice conditions, threaten food ardship requires that the military “inte- security, inhibit transportation and travel, grate environmental concerns with other endanger ecosystems, and impede tradi- relevant concerns including those from tional practices and ways of life. operations, finance, safety, health and eco- Climate change also exacerbates emerg- nomic development in decision-making,” ing challenges with respect to critical infra- and that it “meet or exceed the letter and structure. Existing infrastructure deficits spirit of all federal laws.” SSE’s emphasis on in the Canadian North – from housing, to “greening defence” and on advancing gov- broadband access, to energy supply, to ernment commitments to be a responsible ports, airports, and roads – are linked to environmental steward resonate with the poor health and social outcomes and lim- United Nations 2030 Sustainable Devel- ited economic possibilities. For example, opment Goals, which call upon govern- transportation infrastructure connects ments to take urgent action to combat Northern communities to each other and climate change and its impacts, and to to goods and services in the south, as well protect, restore and promote sustainable as enabling economic activity and facili- use of maritime and terrestrial ecosystems. tating certain forms of access for military Accordingly, Canadians will increasingly activities. Accordingly, the ANPF empha- expect that military activities in the Arc- sizes “the need for transformative invest- tic reflect and support Canada’s expressed ments in infrastructure, rather than a intent to play a leadership role on the 40 remedial approach that only perpetuates a global stage when it comes to addressing

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT climate change, contaminants, and other environmental challenges that have disproportionate impacts on and in the Arctic.

3.1 ENVIRONMENT The ANPF notes that “the current lack of baseline data poses major challenges to evidence-based decision-making. The responsible use of data can help cultivate a better understanding of the ‘big picture’ of environmental issues, contributing to the development of informed, data-driven policy and decisions that can help Arctic and northern communities build resiliency in the face of climate change.” Accordingly, as we gain more knowledge and are better able to understand climate change in the Arctic and globally, climate modelling and predictions will become more accurate. The global impacts of climate change are readily discernable through general trends in sea ice loss, permafrost melt, and warming temperatures. The impacts of climate change on the Arctic are also highly regionalized, and the impacts of phenomenon such as relative sea level rise (a combination of the effects of actual sea-level rise and isostatic rebound) and wildfires are not experienced equally in all regions. That stated, the accelerated rate at which climate change is occurring in the Arctic is causing rapid and significant environmental and ecosystem changes across the region. The extent and thickness of sea-ice is decreasing in the Arctic Ocean. Glaciers and ice caps are also melting, contributing to sea level rise, as does thermal expansion owing to warming temperatures. Thawing permafrost is causing major changes to the landscape and threatens the integrity of infrastructure. Species ranges are shifting in response to warming, creating new ecosystems, and pest and diseases (zoonotic) are being introduced to areas where they were previously not found. 41

2020 REPORT Ongoing climate change is resulting in the infrastructure may become less accessi- reduction in the thickness and extent of ble and channels and harbours shallower, sea ice, with scientists projecting an ice- necessitating the use of ships with shal- free summer in the Central Arctic Ocean lower draughts and lighter loads. More as soon as 2050. Given that sea ice is an open water will mean increased frequency important habitat feature for marine eco- and intensity of storms which combined systems upon which many Arctic marine with sea level rise will cause larger storm species rely, changes from an ice-covered surges and more severe flooding and ero- habitat to an open water habitat for lon- sion of coastal areas. ger parts of the year are highly significant. Warming trends also result in a northward Permafrost is thawing in response to warm- shift in the ranges of more southerly marine ing temperatures, and projected warming species northwards into Arctic waters that trends suggest that permafrost will be lost they previously did not inhabit. Further- in half of the areas where currently exists more, sea ice is critical for Inuit to hunt and in the Canadian Arctic. In this case, regional move between islands. Similarly, seasonal differences in permafrost thawing and deg- travel over lake and river ice will be limited radation also correlate with regional differ- by later freeze-up, earlier break-up and ences in warming surface air temperature reduced thickness. and ground temperature, with ice-rich permafrost most vulnerable to thawing and Melting icecaps and glaciers are contrib- degradation. Permafrost thawing and deg- uting to sea level rise in the Arctic and radation on the landscape causes slump- globally. Rising sea-levels will threaten ing, erosion, settling, and collapse, with low-lying communities and coastal infra- obvious implications for current and future structure, particularly in the western infrastructure projects. Landscape changes Canadian Arctic. In the eastern Canadian may also alter surface and groundwater Arctic, isostatic rebound is lifting the land flows and distribution. In some cases, this more rapidly than sea level is rising, result- may result in the draining or creation of ing in an overall reduction in sea level. wetlands and lakes or the rerouting of riv- Where relative sea level is falling, coastal ers. All of these dynamics directly affect the

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT operating environment. Biodiversity in terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems also show a strong response to warming, with species ranges shifting and new ecosystems emerging as a result. Species that are more nar- rowly adapted to colder Arctic conditions will be less abundant and more limited in their distribution, whereas more southerly adapted species will expand to higher latitudes. Terrestrial vege- tation will show a strong and rapid response to warming, particularly in species limited by temperature gradients (rather than those limited by other factors like latitude and causing it to fail in some cases. Simply or light regimes, which may not change). trying to repair and replace failing infra- The treeline will advance northwards and structure will not adequately address the replace between 11 and 50% of all Arctic Arctic infrastructure deficit nor build the tundra, with implications for infrastructure necessary capacity for increased human and operations. presence in the region. Adding to this complexity, adaptation measures must be Conservation, including the establish- assessed regionally due to the differential ment of protected areas and the co-man- ways in which climate change is impacting agement of resources, is a key priority in different parts of the Canadian Arctic. the ANPF, and Canadian governments are likely to undertake additional measures to Inequalities between Arctic inhabitants, protect species that are important for sub- particularly Indigenous populations, sistence and conservation tourism, such as and the rest of Canadians persist. These caribou and polar bears. Certain activities inequalities, the rapid and pronounced or projects may conflict with conservation effects of climate change on the Arctic, objectives, and the vulnerability of certain and the reliance on changing ecosystems species to human activities may constrain for subsistence make Arctic peoples par- the location of infrastructure or when and ticularly vulnerable to the impacts of cli- where operations and activities are con- mate change. Socioeconomic inequalities ducted on land, at sea, and in the air. between Arctic residents and other Cana- dians means that residents have a reduced Improving resilience to climate change capacity to adapt to change and that they through investments in infrastructure and may not be able to fully benefit from oppor- equipment will be essential in the com- tunities associated with climate change. ing decades. Permafrost degradation is damaging older (legacy) infrastructure Although the transition to more efficient 43

2020 REPORT Although the warming of the Arctic and the North offers economic opportunities, which would bring much needed socio-economic development, employment and infrastructure investments that are acutely lacking in the region, higher levels of activity could bring the potential for damage to unique ecosystems and may also increase the risks associated with increased movement of people and goods, the pursuit of interests by foreign state and non-state actors in Canada’s Arctic and northern territory, and human-induced disasters. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, how a naturally-occurring or human-induced disaster in the Arctic Archipelago would place tremendous strain on the capacities of all levels of government, as well as on local communities, to support affected people and minimize the damage to affected wildlife, infrastructure, and ecosystems. - Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, security, and defence chapter (September 2019)

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and renewable energy technologies is most of climate change and increasing activity. often associated with mitigating climate Economic activities, such as non-renew- change through reducing GHG emissions, able resource extraction, also have signifi- these technologies can also be applied in cant environmental impacts that can have the Arctic to make communities more resil- a deleterious effect on human and ecosys- ient to climate change. Many communities tem health. in the Canadian Arctic rely solely on diesel generators for heat and electricity. While Implications emissions from these generators do not a. The Arctic will become increas- contribute significantly to global climate ingly accessible to a range of change, they do have more localized envi- activities Although hype about ronmental impacts and the transportation the so-called “scramble for Arc- of diesel to these communities also poses a tic resources” has proven wildly significant risk to the environment through over-inflated over the last fifteen fuel spills. Furthermore, the impacts of cli- years, climate change is expected mate change are making transporting die- to open the Arctic to a widening sel to these communities more challenging range of economic activities in the and expensive. Renewable technologies mining, oil and gas extraction, fish- may heighten community resilience to cli- ing, and tourism sectors. Both Arc- mate change, and more efficient generat- tic and non-Arctic states express ing technologies can reduce local adverse a growing interest in the region. environmental impacts associated with There will be a need to increase conventional diesel generation. The mili- capacity to respond to a variety tary and other security practitioners would of needs and incidents to support also benefit from more efficient, abundant, activity in the region. There will and reliable energy sources in the region. also be increased military use and Population growth and increasing human access to the Arctic region. Extend- activity due to climate change places ing sovereignty and security to the increased pressure and stress on the sen- Arctic and environmental protec- sitive Arctic environment and ecosystems. tion will continue to be priorities in Longstanding concerns about the fate of a changing Arctic. global contaminants in the Arctic and the b. There will be both challenges implications for human health are likely and opportunities associated to continue and grow as climate change with climate change in the Arc- introduces new contaminants into the ticArctic warming is likely to food web. Furthermore, growing human mean increased access to Arctic activity in the region will likely increase the resources. Critical infrastructure will incidence of contamination and pollution, be necessary to support economic particularly in the marine environment if activity in the Arctic and adapt to Arctic waters see a dramatic increase in traf- climate change. Infrastructure con- fic. Population growth in the Arctic will put struction and maintenance will be increasing stress on ecosystems and the challenged by environmental fac- environment, compounding the impacts tors such as thawing permafrost of climate change. The fast-growing Indig- and changing sea levels. DND/CAF enous population in the Arctic, concen- will be expected to construct and trated in settlements (and increasingly in maintain its share of infrastructure urban hubs), will put more pressure on in the Arctic, some of which will be species which are hunted for subsistence dual use. Across the Arctic, meeting which are already stressed by the impacts the needs of Arctic communities 45

2020 REPORT under changing environmental to climate change and improve conditions with existing transpor- environmental security will reduce tation infrastructure is increasingly the risk that the population of the challenging. Alternatives will have Arctic will suffer the adverse effects to be explored. Changing ecosys- of climate change. tems are a challenge for both Indig- d. Addressing climate change and enous subsistence economies and environmental issues in the Arc- ecotourism. Conservation of spe- tic could be a source of stability cies in the face of climate change in the region. Climate change is will be a significant challenge. having a disproportionate impact c. Inequalities between the Arctic on the Arctic. The Arctic is warming and the rest of Canada are com- at more than twice the rate of the pounded by the effects of cli- rest of the world and will continue mate change. There are significant to warm for the foreseeable future inequalities between the Arctic and despite efforts to mitigate climate the rest of Canada. The government change. Growing international of Canada has recently committed collaboration to address climate to addressing these inequalities in the ANPF. Populations with low levels of socioeconomic development are more likely to suffer the adverse effects of climate change. Consid- ering the inequalities that currently exist between the Arctic and the rest of Canadians and the rapid rate at which climate change is occurring in the Arctic, the population of the Arctic is at an increased risk to suffer the adverse effects of climate change in the region. Indig- enous populations which rely on subsidence hunting are especially vulnerable to ecosystem change. Investments in the region which increase adaptability and resilience

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT change and environmental issues prominent risks in Yukon and the North- in the Arctic could be a source of west Territories are forest fires and flooding. stability in international Arctic rela- In Nunavut, extreme weather emergencies tions. The willingness of countries including storms and blizzards are high. to engage in international rela- The likelihood and prevalence of natural tions to address important envi- disasters is expected to increase partly due ronmental issues in the Arctic is to escalations in the severity and preva- exemplified by the success of the lence of severe weather events; changes Arctic Council. Climate and envi- to storm seasons and storm strengths due ronmental change will be at the to lengthening periods of open water; forefront as this region warms and and cumulative effects of climate change becomes of increasing geopolitical impacts including permafrost melt, land- significance. slides, flooding, wildfires, storm surges e. Geoengineering and Runaway and coastal erosion. Since 1918, there have Climate Change. Some commen- been 34 incidents across the territories tators suggest that global geoen- that have qualified as natural disasters by gineering solutions which remove Public Safety Canada, costing an estimated carbon dioxide from the atmo- $94,503,620 and resulting in 4545 evacu- sphere or block solar radiation may ees over 14 events. be needed to stabilize the climate in the future if we do not take effec- Of the 34 disasters tracked over the 102- tive action to mitigate it. However, year period, 20 disasters (or 58.8% of total) these technologies also carry with have occurred in the past 32 years. Climate them significant risks of danger- change, along with people’s increasing ous unforeseen consequences. The exposure and vulnerability, is expected effects of either runaway climate to magnify the impact of natural disas- change or geoengineering (or ters as extreme weather events become both) would have enormous geopolitical implications globally and in the Arctic. Natural Disasters Event Group Event Type Occurrence 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS Meteorological Flood 18 A naturally-occurring or human-induced disaster in the Canadian Arctic would Hydrological Wildfire 6 place tremendous strain on the capac- Cold Event 3 ities of all levels of government, as well as on local communities, to support Storm Surge 1 affected people and minimize the damage to affected wildlife, infrastructure, Storms and Severe 1 and ecosystems (ANPF). As shown by pre- Thunderstorms vious natural disasters in the North, some Biological Epidemic 3 regional or territorial governments would likely require assistance to respond to a Pandemic 1 severe natural disasterz. Geological Earthquake 1 Emergency risks are most common at the local level, with effects of natural disasters Total 34 differing throughout the region. The most 47

2020 REPORT increasingly frequent and intense in the risking damage to already deficient infra- coming decades. structure, including road networks used for travel and transport, and for access to Natural disasters are likely to have differ- traditional food sources. The rise of severe ing effects throughout the Arctic. There weather events coupled with accelerated are regional geography and population landscape changes is making it difficult density differences across the North which to actively adapt and prepare for poten- influence the vulnerability and resilience of tial natural disasters. Additionally, the communities to natural disasters. Regions high costs of adapting current infrastruc- in the Canadian Arctic will be able to cope ture and building new infrastructure has with natural disasters differently based on proven to be a significant barrier. their location, remoteness, infrastructure, and reliance on supply networks. The remoteness of most communities in the region leave infrastructure and assets Threats from a natural disaster are ampli- exposed. A severe natural disaster would fied by a lack of infrastructure, outdated be disruptive for remote communities as or fragile infrastructure, and generally low a heavy reliance on critical infrastructure response capabilities to repair or replace and networks for supplies, energy, health- damaged infrastructure. Thawing of ice- care, and food exists. A natural disaster rich permafrost and increased coastal which interrupts or threatens the availabil- erosion also threaten coastal settlements, ity of country foods, which are integral to food security in communities outside of urban centres, through increased barriers or contamination, would require outside assistance. A natural disaster which impacts the region’s already limited communication infrastructure and transportation infrastructure would be harmful for disaster response during an emergency. Communication infrastructure is inconsistent across the North, and should the system be compromised or overwhelmed by a natural disaster or overloading during 48 an emergency

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT response, there could be a breakdown in disturbances to supply and dis- emergency response to a natural disaster. tribution systems of food, water, Responding to a natural disaster would and key resources. Changes to be challenged by limited mobility and the social-economic environment transportation in the region: less than 1% of the North, including possible of Canada’s two-lane roads are located in increases in tourism and shipping, the territories, 0.2% of Canada’s rail lines, pose additional vulnerabilities for numerous communities that can only be emergency management policies accessed by air with 10 fly-in communi- to address. ties in the Northwest Territories, one in c. Infrastructure deficits need to Yukon, and all 25 communities in Nun- be addressed. Infrastructure defi- avut. A serious natural disaster could force cits in the North have the poten- displacement or temporary relocation, tial to curtail effective emergency putting increased pressure on existing response and management. Crit- infrastructure. ical infrastructure requirements will increasingly need to consider The region has a history of biological nat- a changing demography and envi- ural disasters (as defined by Public Safety ronment to ensure continued pro- Canada), including previous instances of vision of essential services and epidemic and pandemic diseases. COVID- capabilities. Specifically, robust 19 poses a serious threat to northern critical infrastructure is required in communities and the already strained order to support communications, healthcare network in the North. Should emergency management and mili- a community become seriously impacted tary capabilities, and safe transpor- by this disease, responding to the outbreak tation in the region. would be challenging. d. Increased need for situational Implications awareness. Meteorological monitoring and communications will a. Increased requirement for become increasingly important humanitarian support. As nat- for natural disaster mitigation and ural disasters become more fre- response. Monitoring capabilities quent and impactful, cooperation of ice conditions and icebergs will between military, governmental, need to be augmented to sup- and non-governmental bodies will port the increased marine traffic be required. Trust will be needed through Northern waterways and between civilian and military enti- to proactively limit emergency ties to ensure effective strategic management response requests coordination and planning during through cohesive mitigation the execution of disaster response and prevention efforts. Canada’s operations. involvement in and obligations for b. Increased requirement to aeronautical and maritime search improve resilience. Civil and and rescue in the Arctic highlights military vulnerabilities to envi- the continued importance of inter- ronmental, climate, and natural national cooperation and Canada’s disaster-relate disturbances must ability to comprehensively respond be better understood, including to incidents.

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES

LEAD AUTHORS: ADAM LAJEUNESSE, PETER KIKKERT, ADAM MACDONALD, ALDO CHIRCOP, BRIAN BOW

Over the past several decades the Arctic development and shipping activity. has undergone a dramatic physical change. This increase in shipping and development Sea-ice loss caused by climate change has activity, along with the arrival of main- accelerated, gradually stripping away the stream Arctic tourism, has led to new and ice which has long limited shipping and expanded safety and security challenges resource development – particularly in the for the Government of Canada centred North American Arctic. The year 2019 saw around search and rescue (SAR), surveil- a September ice minimum tied with 2007 lance, aid to the civilian power, regula- and 2016 for second lowest in the satel- tory enforcement, and new constabulary lite record. The 2010 decade, as a whole, duties. New national security challenges witnessed consistently low and steadily are also expected to accompany foreign declining ice thickness and concentration. investment as state-owned companies This trend has opened the Northwest Pas- from countries like China increase their sage and the waters of the circumpolar investments in the region. North to an unprecedented extent and the result has been a significant increase The receding sea-ice and warming waters in shipping activity and growing interest in of the region may also encourage new fish- resource development. ing activity, both within Canada’s EEZ and the Arctic Basin, possibly leading to future The circumpolar economy, valued at political challenges as Arctic and non-Arc- roughly $450 billion, is undergoing large- tic states establish fisheries regulations scale but uneven growth because of sig- and agreements stretching across different nificant environmental change, new jurisdictions. technologies, and growing interest from those inside and outside the region. The Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy variation in economic development across Framework (2019) highlights the need for the Arctic is owned in part to differences in “strong, sustainable, diversified, and inclu- climatic conditions, demographic dynam- sive local and regional economies,” par- ics, levels of industrialization, as well as ticularly through increased Indigenous Arctic states’ priorities. The Canadian North ownership and participation, the reduc- has seen growing but still limited invest- tion of income inequality, the optimization ment, while the Russian and Scandinavian of resource development, economic diver- 51 Arctics are sites of large-scale resource sification (including land-based, traditional

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT economic activities), and the enhance- France, the Cayman Islands, and Norway. ment of trade and investment opportuni- These were cargo ships carrying pulp and ties. The framework also highlights the idea carbon anodes to China, private cutters, of a “conservation economy” (which makes and large cruise ships. This kind of ship- conservation an important part of local ping will likely increase as mining opera- economies) that the federal government tions expand in the Canadian North and is slowly growing in the Arctic in collabora- the need to import supplies and export tion with northern Indigenous stakehold- product rises. Cruise activity is also on an ers. How will the government approach upward trajectory, with growing interest in the debate between those who want to polar destinations leading to widespread heavily regulate resource development construction of polar vessels, purpose and those who believe regulations are build for the Arctic and Antarctic. strangling the northern economy - a conflict that the framework explicitly acknowl- Foreign government activity in Canadian edges? The consultations that led to the Arctic waters has been minimal, however ANPF highlighted “co-management of there are signs of future interest. While renewable resources … as a venue for col- American icebreaker operations in the laborative management that can help inte- Northwest Passage are covered by the grate different viewpoints,” but it remains 1988 Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agree- to be seen how this will work in practice. ment, statements by the US Navy in recent years indicate a new interest in deploying warships into the Arctic – perhaps even as 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING a challenge to Canada’s legal position. In 2018, China sent its icebreaker Xue Long Shipping activity in and through the Cana- through the Northwest Passage on short dian Arctic has see a steady increase in vol- notice, leading Canada to alter its clearance ume over the past three decades, with a processes. China has recently completed rapid acceleration becoming clear in 2015. a second icebreaker and has announced Most of the new shipping activity is centred plans for a third, nuclear-powered vessel. on fishing, cargo, and tanker craft. There This fleet would give China the capabil- has also been a dramatic increase in cruise ity to access areas of the Canadian Arctic activity, with three large ships traversing which the Canadian Coast Guard cannot. the Northwest Passage between 2017 and 2019. In Canadian waters this activity has China’s declaration to help develop “polar largely been destinational, with ships trav- silk roads” for mutual benefit appears to be elling to and from Canadian destinations, an attempt at tethering the region’s devel- rather than using the Northwest Passage opment to its larger Belt and Road Initiative as a route between the Atlantic and Pacific. (BRI), a bilaterally based economic strategy This limited use is largely due to the route’s designed to reconfigure and develop trade shallow waters, poor hydrographic sur- networks and infrastructure throughout veying, and unpredictable ice-conditions. Eurasia, largely through Chinese invest- The 2019 shipping season, for instance, ment. The United States is vocal in its dis- saw 24 transits while 2018 saw only two – approval over Chinese investment in the the result of considerable variation in ice Arctic, specifically over concerns that this coverage.1 is motivated by strategic and military considerations. Other Arctic States are mon- Of the ships entering Canadian Arctic itoring the nature, motives, and impacts waters, an increasing percentage are for- of Chinese investment on Arctic domestic eign vessels. The 2019 season included and regional politics, including possible transits from Belgium, the Netherlands, Slo- support to military goals and capabilities. 52 vakia, Bahamas, the United States, Malta,

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPLICATIONS Passage. That country’s 2019 Arc- a. Interest in the legal status of the tic policy guidelines were more cir- Arctic waters has increased as cumspect on the matter – backing the Arctic ice has receded. Since away from any outright challenge at least 1969 the United States has to Canadian sovereignty. China’s challenged Canada’s legal posi- 2019 Arctic policy statement was tion that the Canadian sections of similarly ambiguous, highlighting the Northwest Passage in its Arctic the importance of Arctic shipping Archipelago constitute historical routes without decisively weighing internal waters. This position was in on their legal status. As the sea- reiterated in the U.S. Arctic poli- ice continues to melt, and more cies of 2009 and 2013, and most states show an interest in asserting recently by Secretary of State Mike perceived transit shipping rights Pompeo in May 2019. The Commis- through the Northwest Passage, sion of the European Parliament these legal disputes may take on adopted a similar position in 2008, heightened salience. strongly implying its disagreement b. Increased shipping activity will with Canadian ownership – if not require improved situational outright challenging it. In 2013, awareness. This new capability will Germany released a national Arctic come in the form of improved sen- policy statement calling for inter- sors and satellite reconnaissance, national regulation of Arctic sea- which reflects the priorities for lay- lanes and freedom of navigation ered sensor systems articulated by in the Arctic Ocean. According to Canada and the United States in the Germans, these international terms of North American defence sea-lanes included the Northwest modernization.

2020 REPORT c. Improved situational aware- opportunity. Nunavut currently has four ness will have to be paired with active mines while the Northwest Terri- new platforms and resources. tories has three. Despite the increase in If shipping in the Northwest Pas- interest and activity over the last decade, sage continues to increase, so to mining development remains rela- will the state’s need for a presence tively subdued and the large percentage to enforce Canadian law and juris- increases in investment are taken rom a diction, and to respond to disas- low starting point and limited to a hand- ters and accidents. Large cruise ful of major projects. This slow pace stems ships offer a particular challenge, from the extremely high costs of northern and an accident involving such a operations and the limited transport and ship would require immediate and energy infrastructure in the region. large-scale response. Difficult logistics and high costs are the principal drags on northern investment; 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT however, industry specific limitations have If Arctic shipping becomes more eco- also contributed to the slow growth. The nomical, Canadian Arctic resources will collapse of oil prices over the past sev- represent a more attractive development eral years, as well as the Canadian ban on

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT offshore oil and gas drilling in 2016, have This makes China by far the largest foreign effectively ended hydrocarbon exploration operator of vessels along Russia’s NSR, and in the Canadian North for the time being. COSCO aims to become a major partner in This is unlikely to continue in perpetuity, the transport of LNG on the route. presuming that global demand for hydro- IMPLICATIONS carbon energy sources will rebound and lead to resurgent prices at some point in a. Increased Chinese shipping and the future. investment in the Arctic continues to generate concern. While By contrast, the Russian and Eurasian Arc- no explicit security threat has been tic has seen more dramatic economic tied to Chinese activity in the Arc- development, with an emphasis on oil and tic, U.S. defence policy ties China’s gas and resource extraction. Much of this presence to surreptitious efforts activity, particularly in the offshore area, to “support a strengthened, future slowed in the wake of the Russian invasion Chinese military presence in the of Ukraine as Western sanctions removed Arctic Ocean, potentially including Russian access to vital partnerships with deployment of submarines to the American and European oil companies. region.” Consequently, they have sought invest- b. Chinese investment into Arctic ment and access to technologies from else- projects could produce danger- where, particularly China. ous levels of foreign influence. All Arctic States face a dearth of develop- Given the limited economic activity ment capital. It is estimated that $1 tril- across much of Northern Canada, lion will be needed over the next two and the low levels of investment decades to fund over 900 projects across from Canadian sources, Chinese the circumpolar region. This has created investment in resource or infra- an opportunity for Chinese state-owned structure projects is an appealing companies and banks to finance much of prospect for Northerners. Such this activity, primarily in Russia and Green- investment could, however, pro- land. China’s Arctic investments from 2005- vide a Chinese state-owned com- 2017 have been roughly $1.4 trillion and pany with undue influence over largely dedicated to Russian hydrocarbon the lives and prosperity of entire projects.2 The $27 billion Yamal gas proj- regions, and even entire Canadian ect, for instance, was financed through a territories. partnership with the Chinese state-owned Despite concerns over Chinese influ- oil and gas company CNPC and the Silk ence, most experts agree that Canada will Road Fund. Concern over Chinese invest- require foreign partners and significant ment in North America is growing, leading private sector investment in addressing its American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Arctic infrastructure deficit – specifically its to openly denounce Beijing’s Arctic invest- dearth of ports, overland transportation ments in his May 2019 speech. routes, and telecommunications. The chal- Chinese shipping activity in the Arctic may lenge will be to attract investment but also increase in parallel with its investments. to create appropriate systems and mea- Both commercial Chinese shipping as well sures to manage them to ensure they do as state icebreaker activity is expected to not undermine national security or broader increase. The Chinese shipping COSCO is Canadian security relations with key allies. increasing its activity along the Northern Sea Route while are part-owners and operate nine out of fifteen Arc7 LNG carriers. 55

2020 REPORT 4.3 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC AS THE Conventional and expedition cruises RESOURCE: TOURISM to the Arctic have increased dramat- ically over the last two decades – a Tourism is on the rise throughout trend that is anticipated to continue. the circumpolar world, ranging from By 2022, at least 28 new expedition large-scale cruise ships, to sport fish- ships designed for polar conditions ing and hunting, to adventure and are expected to come into service, eco expeditions, to cultural tourism. adding to the 80 already in operation. As climate change and reduced trans- Several of these will meet Polar Class portation costs increase the acces- requirements, and the operators con- sibility of the Arctic, the number of structing these expedition vessels are cruise and tour operators involved offering trips to more remote places, in the region grows, and marketing deeper in the Arctic. For example, campaigns sell the public on the “last Ponant announced plans to dispatch chance” opportunity to see the polar Le Commandant Charcot on the first environment before it disappears, non-nuclear powered voyage to the experts anticipate that this multi-bil- North Pole in 2021. If demand con- lion dollar industry will continue to tinues to rise, the cruise industry may expand. The massive tourist boom also consider consistently employing experienced by Iceland over the last larger ships in the region to boost decade is also driving tourists to look profits. While cruise ship traffic in the for other, less crowded Arctic destina- Canadian Arctic is much less than tions, including Greenland and Sval- in the European Arctic and in the bard. In light of these trends, Canada’s waters off Greenland, it has experi- Arctic and Northern Policy Framework enced a 70% increase in expedition identified tourism as one of the key cruise tourism over the last decade pillars of northern development mov- – although severe and unpredictable ing forward. ice conditions have led to route and voyage cancellations.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT While the media tends to focus on cruise aground in Nunavut’s Kitikmeot tourism, there has also been a signifi- Region. In both situations good sea cant increase in cultural, adventure, and and weather conditions prevailed, eco-tourism in the Arctic – everything which allowed passengers to be from sport fishing and hunting, to hiking, successfully offloaded. The pos- dog-sledding, and ski trips, to bird-watch- sibility of future MROs demands ing, camping, and Northern Lights tours. improved situational awareness, A wide array of these kinds of activities are interdepartmental cooperation, offered in the Canadian North – many by training and exercises, and the local companies. Independently owned use of community-based assets and operated pleasure craft, generally sail- as force multipliers. Increased SAR boats and motor yachts, are also carrying cases from small-vessel tourism tourists into the waters of Canada’s Arctic and adventure tourism should also Archipelago. These vessels represent the be anticipated. fastest growing shipping sector in Nun- b. An expanding tourism indus- avut, with a 400% increase over the last try calls for strong communi- decade. ty-based SAR and emergency response assets: Through the There are indications that heightened tour- Oceans Protection Plan, the Cana- ism is starting to generate greater infra- dian Coast Guard is currently structure investment around the Arctic. expanding the Coast Guard Aux- Airport renovations are currently under- iliary in the Arctic, is applying the way in Nuuk and Ilulissat to attract nonstop Indigenous Community Boat Pilot international flights from North America Program to northern communi- and Europe. The deep water port currently ties, and has established an inshore under construction in Iqaluit and the port rescue boat station at Rankin Inlet. proposed for Nome, Alaska, have also been These community-based assets tied, in part, to the expansion of cruise have already been used to respond tourism. to incidents involving small-ves- Please note that, although this section sel tourism and their importance was written before COVID-19 pandemic will grow with increased human travel restrictions led to the cancellation activity in the region. Future invest- of the 2020 summer cruise tourism season ments in initiatives along these in the Canadian Arctic, we anticipate that lines, which seek to address safety it will resume following the discovery of a concerns and build local capacity, vaccine. are likely. c. Cruise tourism increases the IMPLICATIONS risk of environmental pollu- a. An expanding tourism indus- tion, calling for increased local try increases the risk of human- and regional environmental made disasters and amplifies response capabilities: Commu- SAR requirements: In the last three nity members have been vocal decades, several marine incidents about their concerns over the envi- involving cruise ships in Canada’s ronmental pollution that could Arctic waters could have escalated result from a cruise ship running into Mass Rescue Operations. Two aground in the Arctic. Currently, notable examples include MV Clip- limited fuel and oil spill response per Adventurer (2010) and Akade- capabilities exist in the North, mak- mik Ioffe (2018), both of which ran ing response to such an incident 57

2020 REPORT even more difficult. and infrastructure can be used to d. An expanding tourism industry address the challenges created by and small vessel tourism raise a increased tourism. wide range of regulatory, safety, f. Arctic tourism highlights Cana- and security issues: Increased da’s international commitments tourist activity in the North pro- and responsibilities: The Arctic duce challenges to Canada’s regu- Search and Rescue Agreement (for- lations, increased criminal activity, mally the Agreement on Coopera- ranging from illegal immigration tion on Aeronautical and Maritime and human trafficking to bootleg- Search and Rescue in the Arctic) ging, and a range of safety issues, is an international treaty con- from outbreaks of disease on cruise cluded among the member states ships to missing passengers. It is of the Arctic Council that coordi- particularly difficult to regulate and nates international search and res- monitor pleasure craft, which com- cue coverage and response in the munity members have reported region, establishes the areas of for breaking environmental reg- responsibility for each state, and ulations, illegal hunting, stealing ensures that states will aid one archaeological artefacts, and sell- another in situations that demand ing alcohol in dry communities. cooperation and collaboration. Canadian agencies will have to Pursuant to this agreement, Can- ensure that the legislative and reg- ada is likely to continue to engage ulatory frameworks that govern with Arctic partners through the transport are followed in the North, Arctic Council’s Emergency Preven- preserve the integrity of Canada’s tion, Preparedness, and Response Northern borders, and bolster the (EPPR) Working Group and the clearance process of pleasure craft Arctic Coast Guard Forum, as well looking to operate in Canada’s Arc- as bi-national and regional SAR tic waters. exercises. e. An expanding tourism industry g. As the world’s largest source of demands close interdepart outbound tourism, China is likely mental cooperation, partner- to dominate Arctic tourism: This ship with Northern commu- had led to pushback in several nities, and relationships with Arctic states – for instance, local private industry: To effectively opposition to the plans of Chinese regulate increased human activ- entrepreneur Huang Nubo’s plans ity in the region and address the to build luxury resorts in remote array of safety and security impli- parts of Iceland and Svalbard led cations this creates, federal and to the rejection of these projects. territorial departments will have Given China’s complex relationship to adopt a whole-of-government with several Arctic states, China’s approach, engage with Northern- role in Arctic tourism will continue ers, and work with private industry. to raise security concerns, partic- In the case of an emergency, such ularly as China is now among the as a Mass Rescue Operation, these top three source countries for tour- partners will have to work together. ists to the North and the number of Government agencies will need Chinese tourists is likely to grow in to work with private industry to the future. 58 establish how industry assets

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 4.4 THE CONSERVATION ECONOMY that there will always be ‘places that are theirs.’” Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Frame- work highlights the idea of a conservation The most explicit application of the con- economy (which makes conservation an servation economy in the Canadian Arc- important part of local economies) that tic has come with the creation of the the federal government is slowly grow- 109,000-square-kilometre Tallurutiup ing in the Canadian Arctic in collaboration Imanga National Marine Conservation with northern Indigenous stakeholders. Area (Lancaster Sound). The Qikiqtani Inuit The Qikiqtani Inuit Association’s vision for Association, with the support of Parks Can- a conservation economy entails “economic ada and the Government of Nunavut, has wealth derived from local natural resources established a Guardians program to mon- in a way that respects and preserves Inuit itor and manage the protected area. (An Qaujimajatuqangit, meets local needs Inuit Guardians program has also been and restores rather than depletes natural established for the Wrecks of HMS Erebus resources and social capital.” Within such a and HMS Terror National Historic Site near system, Indigenous peoples assume roles Gjoa Haven, Nunavut.) The federal gov- and responsibilities in “environmental and ernment has also provided $76.5 million wildlife monitoring; vessel management; toward building community harbours in emergency preparedness and response, Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to support the search and rescue and tourism.” Support developing conservation economy in the for a conservation economy should also region. Other initiatives, like the Inuit-led include the development of local marine Nunavut Inuit Marine Monitoring Program and community infrastructure. Mary Simon which collects information on shipping suggests that a conservation economy “will activities, environmental conditions, and support communities and individuals in wildlife, are likely models for future initia- regaining land-based life skills, reconnect tives led by Northerners that embody the with their cultural traditions, collect indige- ANPF vision of strong partnerships. nous knowledge, and have the confidence 59

2020 REPORT IMPLICATIONS 4.5 FISHERIES a. Enhanced situational awareness, It is uncertain how climate change will marine monitoring, and emer- impact the Arctic’s fisheries over the next gency response capabilities: two decades. Changing environmental Given Northern residents’ knowl- conditions could lead to fortuitous condi- edge of the land and presence in tions for some fish stocks, cause commer- potential high traffic areas, as well cially valuable species to shift to higher as the political commitment to latitudes, lengthen fishing seasons, and improve Indigenous-Crown rela- open new fishing grounds. The arrival of tions, the Government of Canada Atlantic mackerel in Greenland is a prime is likely to increasing partner with example of the possibilities – between Indigenous organizations and com- 2011 and 2014 it moved from 0% to 23% of munities to fund and support com- the island’s fisheries exports.3 On the other munity-based program to improve hand, climate change could also dimin- situational awareness and bolster ish species due to new predators, invasive the on-the-ground intelligence species, and other changes to the marine available to federal and territorial environment, including increased ocean agencies responsible for safety and acidity. Cost of travel to remote areas in the security portfolios. These groups High Arctic might also outweigh the possi- also represent potential assets for ble revenues from a catch.4 emergency response. Currently, the Canadian Arctic has had little exposure to large-scale commercial

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT fisheries, although certain projections for which community-based fish- have forecast that climate change might eries provide an important source increase the number of commercially valu- of country foods. New commer- able species in the region. The Government cial opportunities associated with of Nunavut has listed commercial fisheries fisheries are likely to generate as a vital pillar of its economic develop- significant domestic and interna- ment plan. Fishing operations are expand- tional interest, thus amplifying the ing for turbot, Arctic char, and northern importance of scientific research shrimp (at this point mostly in Baffin Bay, and monitoring in partnership with Davis Strait, and Hudson Bay and Strait), Northern community members. and other communities such as Gjoa b. Illegal fishing: Monitoring ille- Haven, Taloyoak, Cape Dorset, and Qikitar- gal or “dark fishing” activities will juaq are establishing test fisheries. require effective situational awareness and surveillance as Canada’s Several international and domestic ini- Arctic waters and adjacent parts of tiatives have set moratoriums on fishing the Arctic Ocean become increas- activities in parts of the Arctic Ocean. In ing accessible. 2014, for instance, the Inuvialuit Regional c. The political and jurisdictional Corporation, the Inuvialuit Game Coun- challenges of fisheries expan- cil, the Fisheries Joint Management Com- sion: The potential expansion of mittee, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada commercial fishing activity in Can- agreed that, while small-scale communi- ada’s EEZ and in the Central Arc- ty-based fisheries should be encouraged tic when the current moratorium in the Beaufort Sea, large-scale offshore expires could lead to political chal- operations should be barred. The agree- lenges and jurisdictional issues as ment prevents the start of commercial new regulations and agreements fisheries in over 831,000 square kilometres are developed between Arctic and of the Canadian Beaufort. On the interna- non-Arctic states. Countries with tional level, a December 2017 agreement large and efficient fishing fleets, (signed in October 2018) between Canada, such as Japan and China, are likely Russia, the United States, Greenland, Nor- to seek a major role in the devel- way, China, South Korea, Iceland, Japan opment of Arctic fisheries, height- and the European Union set a moratorium ening the jurisdictional complexity on commercial fishing in the Central Arctic involved in regulating regional fish- and launched a joint program of scientific ing activities. research in the region to ascertain the sustainability of a fishery. The agreement takes a “proactive and precautionary approach” to future fishing activities in the area and “RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: RESPONSIBLE, SUSTAIN- provides a framework for the establish- ABLE RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND JOB CREATION ment of conservation and management IS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE TERRITORIAL ECONO- measures and the participation of Arctic MIES. INDIGENOUS OWNERSHIP, INVESTMENT AND Indigenous peoples. PARTICIPATION IN THE RESOURCE INDUSTRY ARE KEY TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS SECTOR. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS PROJECTS PROVIDE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND a. Food security in Inuit Nunangat: EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN COMMUNITIES The prospective expansion and AS WELL AS DIRECT INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION IN sustainability of Arctic fisheries are SUPPLY AND SERVICES BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.” a direct concern to the 53 coastal - PAN-TERRITORIAL VISION AND PRINCIPLES communities of Inuit Nunangat FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2017) 61

2020 REPORT

CHPATER FIVE

HUMAN LEAD AUTHORS: JUSTIN BARNES AND P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

Strong, self-reliant people and commu- subsistence hunting and gathering nities working together for a vibrant, and societal changes brought on by prosperous and sustainable Arctic and modernization have resulted in an northern region at home and abroad, increase in prevalence of chronic dis- while expressing Canada’s enduring eases such as diabetes, hypertension, Arctic sovereignty. – Arctic and North- obesity and cardiovascular diseases. ern Policy Framework (ANPF) Vision In addition, child abuse, alcohol abuse, (2019) drug abuse, domestic violence, suicide, unintentional injury are also associ- The rapid pace of change in the Arctic ated with rapid cultural change, as presents new challenges to the health and well as loss of cultural identity and wellbeing of residents across the circum- self-esteem. polar world. As a 2010 Circumpolar Health Survey observed: The report notes that improvements in transportation infrastructure and commu- Living conditions are changing from nications technologies (such as the inter- an economy based on subsistence net and telemedicine), which are linked to hunting and gathering to a cash- globalization, connected previously iso- based economy. Across the circumpo- lated communities to larger urban centres. lar north there is increasing activity Increased connectivity has also introduced towards sustainable development via new vulnerabilities to infectious diseases local resource development and wid- (such as influenza, acute respiratory infec- ening involvement in the global econ- tions, and antibiotic-resistant pathogens) omy. The influence of such changes which might be imported into the Arctic by on the physical health of Arctic resi- visitors to the region. Furthermore, trans- dents on the one hand have been pos- boundary environmental contaminants itive, resulting in improved housing which originate in mid-latitude industrial conditions, a more stable supply of and agricultural regions of the world con- food, increased access to more west- tinue to migrate to the Arctic via atmo- ern goods, and decreases in morbidity spheric, river and ocean transport. Their and mortality from infectious diseases. subsequent bio-magnification in Arctic However, changes in lifestyle brought food webs and appearance in subsistence on by the move away from traditional 63

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT foods pose great concerns to Northern- ers. Furthermore, climate change is intro- ducing new economic and health threats “WHO WE ARE AND WHERE WE LIVE: THE TOTAL to Arctic communities, with the most vul- POPULATION OF THE TERRITORIES IS CURRENTLY nerable people likely to be those following SOME 113,000 PERSONS, WHICH IS ABOUT 1% OF a traditional lifestyle close to the land in CANADA’S POPULATION, LIVING IN 75 REMOTE remote communities. Direct health-related AND RURAL COMMUNITIES. THE TERRITORIES impacts might include more injuries, hypo- ARE HOME TO A VAST AND RICH DIVERSITY OF thermia, and frostbite related to travel, CULTURES AND LANGUAGES, WITH INDIGE- unpredictable ice and weather conditions, NOUS PEOPLES MAKING UP 86 PERCENT OF THE and heat stress in summer. Changes in access to safe drinking water and to coun- POPULATION OF NUNAVUT, 50 PERCENT IN THE try foods due to shifting migration pat- NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND 25 PERCENT IN terns of species also raise concern amongst THE YUKON.” - Pan-Territorial Vision and Princi- Northerners. Canada’s Arctic is experienc- ples for Sustainable Development (2017) ing all of these dynamics. In framing her 2017 report proposing a new Shared Arctic Leadership Model, Inuit leader Mary Simon highlighted that the Canadian Arctic continues “to exhibit among the worst national social indicators for basic wellness” and that, despite “all the hard-earned tools of empowerment, … many individuals and families do not feel empowered and healthy.” Many statistics bear out her observation about poor living standards. For example: • 50% of Inuit households do not have acceptable housing, and the incidence of core housing need in the NWT is the second highest in Canada (with almost one in five households reporting the need for adequate, accessible and affordable housing). • There is almost a ten percent gap between NWT residents and other Canadians about their perceived physical and mental health, with Indigenous populations reporting significantly poorer health and mental health. • In 2019, Nunavut had the highest unemployment rate in Canada (13.4%), with Yukon the lowest at 3.6%. • High rates of alcoholism, sexual and physical abuse including domestic violence, criminal incarceration, and 64 suicide.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • In 2016, the tuberculosis rate highest rate of population growth in all of amongst Inuit was over 290x higher Canada from 2001 - 2017, and it is expected than that of the Canadian-born to remain the highest in the territories and non-Indigenous population. grow by 31% from 37,667 in 2017 to 48,042 • As a 2017 study by the Conference in 2035.1 Board of Canada on “How Canada Diverse populations of Inuit, First Nation, Performs” observed, Canada’s north- and Métis citizens in Canada’s northern ter- ern territories generally fall behind ritories and provincial norths also give the the Canadian average on measures regions distinct characteristics. According of equity (eg. poverty, income dis- to 2016 census data, Indigenous peoples tribution, gender and racial wage represent 23.3% of the Yukon’s population, gaps) and social cohesion (eg. unem- 50.7% of NWT, 85.9% of Nunavut, 91.4% of ployment rate, homicides, suicides). Nunavik, and 90.2% of Nunatsiavut. Given these challenges, it is not surpris- ing that the federal government adopted Opportunities and challenges also stem “strong Arctic and northern people and from the North’s comparatively youthful communities” as a central theme for its population compared to the rest of Can- co-developed Arctic and Northern Policy ada. In Nunavut, for example, the median Framework. Although the overall popu- age is just over 26 (compared to just over lation of Canada’s northern territories is 40 in Canada as a whole). Providing oppor- small compared to the northern popula- tunities for education, employment, and tions in other Arctic states, it includes sub- competitive wages in a comparatively stantial Indigenous populations that face underdeveloped region dominated by pub- distinct historical, cultural, and socio-eco- lic sector employment is likely to remain a nomic challenges. First Nation, Métis, and significant challenge for governments. Inuit populations in Northern Canada are Education and skill development will con- culturally diverse, but also share demo- tinue to pose significant challenges in the graphic features that distinguish them from North. Many reports identify early child- non-Indigenous populations. Longstand- hood education, improvements in ele- ing inequalities generate political pressure mentary, secondary and post-secondary for Northerners to receive comparable ser- education, and access to higher educa- vices, opportunities, and standards of liv- tion as essential preconditions to improve ing as those enjoyed by other Canadians. Cultural Identity Aboriginal First Métis Inuk Non- 5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE Identity Nations Aboriginal There is uneven population Yukon 23.3 19.1 2.9 0.6 76.7 growth across Canada’s North, Northwest 50.7 32.1 8.2 9.9 49.3 and this is expected to con- Territories tinue over the next fifteen years. In 2016, the popula- Nunavut 85.9 0.5 0.5 84.7 14.1 tion of Yukon was 37,860 and Nunavik is projected to grow by 19.5% 91.4 1.0 0.2 90.0 8.6 to reach 45,230 in 2030. The Nunatsiavut 92.0 1.0 1.4 89.4 8.2 Northwest Territories is projected to grow by only 3.5%, Labrador 8.9 5.5 1.5 1.4 91.1 from 44,469 in 2016 to 46,026 in 2035. Nunavut had the 65

2020 REPORT “Youth across the Arctic understand that education is a portal to opportunity. They aspire to a quality education equivalent to other Canadians: an education that also reaffirms the central role of their culture and Indigenous languages in their identity as Canadians. A new Arctic Policy Framework, if it is to sep- arate itself from many previous documents on the future of the Arctic, must speak to these young voices in this era of reconciliation.” – Mary Simon, A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model (2017)

socio-economic and health indicators. The colleges and universities are unlikely to significant disparity in education levels compete with the breadth and depth between the North and the rest of Canada of academic and professional programs (e.g. 34% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat aged 25 available at well-established Southern to 64 have a high school diploma compared institutions. to 86% of Canadians in the same group) continues to limit opportunities for North- Implications erners. Furthermore, persistent differences a. Differences in population dis- between Indigenous and non-Indigenous tributions continue to strain education rates (e.g. 74% of Northwest Ter- resources. Providing the same or ritories non-Indigenous residents aged 25 similar levels of services across the to 64 years old had a postsecondary certifi- North has proven to be challeng- cate, diploma or degree, compared to 43% ing for governments, and this is of Indigenous peoples) expose ongoing expected to continue. The diverse divisions within the Northern population. population of the North also have differing needs, values, and priori- Persistent economic, social, and gender ties which require a situation-based inequalities, limited employment oppor- approach, rather than blanket poli- tunities, and environmental concerns cies which cover the entire North. could drive potential out-migration from b. Youth disenfranchisement could the Canadian North over the next two worse health indicators, increase decades. As Northerners look to other parts political instability, and lead to of Canada for education and employment out-migration. Northern young opportunities, the North could continue people’s frustration with under-ed- to experience a “brain drain” with which it ucation and lack of training oppor- has struggled for decades. Ongoing efforts tunities, unemployment and by the Territories to expand post-second- underemployment, and disenfran- ary education options for Northerners in chisement could lead to instability the region are likely to help curb some of if their realities and needs are not this out-migration, but economies of scale acknowledged or met. Additionally, 66 mean that comparatively small Northern

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT migration of educated youth out of population and have the high- of the North is likely to continue est percentages of non-Indige- because of a comparative lack of nous residents, the highest levels diversity in employment opportu- of education, and their economies nities in the Arctic. are primarily dedicated to provid- c. Conflict could arise due to differing ing services to their surrounding political, economic, and environ- areas; mental interests within the Inuit, 2. isolated and/or remote communi- Métis and First Nations communities are primarily Indigenous, have ties and between Indigenous groups the highest percentages of over- and the federal government. Differ- crowded housing, highest unem- ing employment opportunities and ployment rates, and lowest levels prospects across the north, includ- of formal education; and ing factors involved with land claim 3. communities established for negotiations and impact and benefit the resource-extraction indus- agreements, could increase friction try have, over time, been estab- “Canada sees a future between groups over priorities and lished as company towns to in which the peo- desired futures, thus eroding politi- support resource extraction activ- ple of the Arctic and cal and social cohesion. ities. These communities are in North are full partic- decline, however, as fly-in/fly-out ipants in Canadian work camps have become increas- 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND society, with access ingly popular and as existing to the same ser- URBANIZATION resource-dependent communities vices, opportunities gradually converge with Indige- Over the last century, scholar Marlene Laru- and standards of liv- nous communities.2 elle observes that three primary drivers led ing as those enjoyed to waves of settlement and urbanization in Half of the world’s population is now urban- by other Canadians. the Circumpolar Arctic: 1) industrial activi- ized and the United Nations predicts that This ambition will ties; 2) the militarization of the Arctic; and by 2050, 85.9% of the developed world and require greater effort, 3) the development of regional adminis- 64.1% of the developing world will live in focus, trust and col- trative centres. The first driver, large-scale cities. About two-thirds of the global Arctic laboration amongst industrial activities (including fishing, for- population lives in urban conditions, and partners.” estry, energy, and mineral extraction) led Indigenous peoples are progressively mov- to the establishment of small cities and Arctic and Northern ing from smaller to larger settlements for towns across the Canadian North. The con- Policy Framework educational and job opportunities and for struction of military infrastructure during (2019) amenities which smaller settlements lack. the Cold War (particularly the DEW Line) Canada’s North is following this trend, with played a significant role in drawing many most of the territorial populations in Yukon Inuit into coastal settlements in the 1950s and NWT concentrated in their capital cit- and 1960s. Since that time, access to social ies (70% in Whitehorse and 50% in Yellow- services, public jobs, and other enticements knife), while 78% of Nunavummiut live in and inducements have drawn Northerners the 24 communities outside of Nunavut’s increasingly into urban centres. capital city of Iqaluit. Canadian scholars Chris Southcott and The populations of many smaller settle- Valoree Walker categorize three main types ments are expected to decline over the of communities in the Canadian North: next two decades, leading to questions 1. urban centres such as White- about their viability and further out-mi- horse, Yellowknife, and Iqaluit gration. Whitehorse is expected to grow to contain the largest concentrations 78.5% of Yukon’s population by 2030, and 67

2020 REPORT Yellowknife’s share of NWT’s population is expected to increase to 52.3% by 2030. Unlike the other territories, Nunavut has a deliberate policy of diffusing public sector jobs to smaller communities outside the capital of Iqaluit, which has only 21% of the territory’s population. Thus, while Iqaluit is In addition to the recognition of rights and inno- expected to grow, Nunavut’s population vative forms of governance and collaboration, distribution is projected to remain similar up to 2035. reconciliation in Canada’s Arctic and north means closing the socio-economic gaps that exist between Implications Arctic and northern Indigenous peoples and other a. Urbanization and changing set- Canadians. Canada will work with Indigenous gov- tlement patterns could change ernments and organizations, territories, provinces the distribution of services. As and other partners to close these gaps.” - Arctic and urban centres grow and smaller Northern Policy Framework (2019) remote settlements shrink, the distribution of services to smaller communities could become increasingly expensive and difficult. Officials at national and regional levels need to be aware of centralizing and urbanizing trends and anticipate their effects on services. Furthermore, questions remain about the economic role of large settlements in supporting diversified economic growth in Northern regions. b. Rapid urbanization and resource scarcity could exacerbate pressures on already strained and expensive food networks in the North. As more people move into urban centres, urban Northerners may rely less on country foods and become increasingly dependent on other food networks. Interrup- tions to food networks, the high costs of food, and an increase in the consumption of processed foods could lead to increased food insecurity and other health issues. c. Urbanization could lead to the concentration of illicit activities and vulnerabilities. More concentrated criminal activities could necessitate a greater role for the 68 RCMP, as well as other defence

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and intelligence partners. Further- Frequently cited infrastructure needs more, settlements and urban cen- include broadband connectivity, housing, tres which rely heavily on outside energy infrastructure, improved charting networks are vulnerable to natural and mapping, port facilities, better airport and environmental disasters from facilities, and all-season roads to access human activities (e.g. cruise ships, communities and mineral resources. The resource extraction) and from deterioration of existing community and impacts of climate change on com- transportation infrastructure, which is munities and infrastructure. vulnerable to thawing permafrost and extreme weather events, further com- 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS pounds the issue. The Conference Board of Canada explains Implications that deficits in critical infrastructure keep a. Poor community infrastruc- communities isolated, inhibit the deliv- ture limits northern develop- ery of health and social services, and limit ment and inhibits the delivery of economic opportunities. For example, essential services such as health limited broadband access in Nunavut and care and education. Commu- NWT restrict their citizens’ ability to par- nity infrastructure, along with air ticipate in the digital economy or to take and ground transport and energy advantage of e-learning opportunities. infrastructure, is needed to attract “Given that new workplace skills, such as investment and facilitate business problem-solving in technology-rich envi- development in order to grow the ronments, depend on access to adequate Arctic economy and raise the stan- computing infrastructure and connectiv- dard of living for Arctic residents. ity,” the report notes, “many remote North- Discerning new models to entice ern and Indigenous communities continue these investments should be a pri- to be at an economic disadvantage.” ority over the next fifteen years. b. Strategic investments in North- The ANPF echoes many Canadian studies ern telecommunications infra- that highlight the need for “transformative structure are likely to support investments” in Arctic and Northern infra- improved education outcomes, structure, “rather than a remedial approach open economic opportunities, that only perpetuates a state of crisis.” stimulate Northern-based innova- For example, the Territorial governments’ tion and technology, and improve Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustainable Devel- the well-being of Northern Cana- opment conceptualizes large-scale infra- dians (particularly those living in structure investments as foundational to physically isolated communities) creating economic opportunity and pros- over the next decade. This form of perity for communities. In turn, the ANPF connectivity may also have signifi- highlights how communities and organiza- cant effects on identities and social tions desire “partnerships and opportuni- cohesion (discussed below). ties to play an active and constructive role c. Addressing Arctic infrastructure in infrastructure investments through … gaps invites investments in “dual- financial partnership, as well as the devel- use” capabilities that enhance opment of business capacity and skills.” defence and security as well as Accordingly, federal investment in north- social and economic applications. ern infrastructure seeks to leverage private Clean, affordable energy options, sector investment and is often justified in improved transportation links, terms of regional economic development. 69

2020 REPORT Social and Economic Inequity in Inuit Nunangat Many Inuit face social and economic inequities that impact our health and wellbeing Inuit Nunangat All Canadians

52% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat 9% of all Canadians live in live in crowded homes*1 crowded homes*1

34% of Inuit aged 25 to 64 in 86% of all Canadians aged 25 to Inuit Nunangat have earned a high 64 have earned a high school diploma1 school diploma1

70% of Inuit households 8% of all households in Nunavut are food insecure 2 in Canada are food insecure 3

$23,485 The median $92,011 The median before before tax individual income for Inuit tax individual income for non-Indigenous in Inuit Nunangat 1 people in Inuit Nunangat 1

30 The number of physicians per 119The number of physicians 100,000 population in Nunavut 4 per 100,000 population in Urban Health Authorities 4

47.5% of Inuit in Inuit 60.2% of all Canadians Nunangat are employed1 are employed1 72.4 years 82.9 years The projected life expectancy The projected life expectancy for for Inuit in Canada† 5 non-Indigenous people in Canada5

12.3 The infant mortality rate 4.4 The non-indigenous infant 6 IMR 6 per 1,000 for Inuit infants in Canada. mortality rate per 1,000 for Canada.

* Should not be compared with crowding data for previous years. Based on the suitability definition (whether the dwelling has enough bedrooms for the size and composition of the household). The previous figure was based on the number of persons per room definition. † Should not be compared with previous life expectancy data. The figure is a national 2017 projection of life expectancy for Inuit. Previous figures were for 2004-2008 for all residents of Inuit Nunangat, including non-Inuit.

1 Statistics Canada, 2016 Census. (crowded homes: 98-400-X2016163; high school diploma 98-400-X2016265; income: unpublished custom table provided to ITK; employment: 98-400-X2016266) 2 Grace M. Egeland, Inuit Health Survey 2007-2008: Nunavut (Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, QC: Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ Nutrition and Environment, May 2010), 12. 3 Shirin Roshanafshar and Emma Hawkins. Health at a Glance: Food Insecurity in Canada (Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada, March 25, 2015). 4 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Physicians in Canada, 2014 (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Institute for Health Information, September 2015). 5 Custom table based on Statistics Canada’s Projections of the Aboriginal Population and Households in Canada, 2011 to 2036. 6 Sheppard et al 2017. “Birth outcomes among First Nations, Inuit and Metis populations.” Health Reports Vol. 28. No. 11 70

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79 www.itk.ca 3 Social and Economic Inequity in Inuit Nunangat Many Inuit face social and economic inequities that impact our health and wellbeing and robust telecommunications existing gaps, this is an outcome are examples of shared priority that the Government of Canada Inuit Nunangat All Canadians areas. This should encourage new will be hard pressed to realize over approaches to create and leverage the next fifteen years – and, even 52% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat 9% of all Canadians live in innovative technologies and mod- with promised investments, the live in crowded homes*1 crowded homes*1 ernized systems. inability to deliver on this strong d. Competition for high-cost invest- commitment is likely to continue ments in infrastructure could also to feed disillusionment with gov- 34% of Inuit aged 25 to 64 in 86% of all Canadians aged 25 to 1 divide Northerners. While public Inuit Nunangat have earned a high 64 have earned a high school diploma ernments and weaken social school diploma1 and Indigenous governments in the cohesion. Canadian North, and myriad lob- bying organizations, agree on the Poor socio-economic health indi- 70% of Inuit households 8% of all households need for infrastructure, there is no cators reflect deeply entrenched in Nunavut are food insecure 2 in Canada are food insecure 3 consensus on how to queue specific problems and legacies of coloni- priorities and where investments zation. The residential school system, relocation programs, and the The median The median before should focus. The Pan-Territorial $23,485 $92,011 rejection of Indigenous consulta- before tax individual income for Inuit tax individual income for non-Indigenous Vision for Sustainable Develop- tion over resource extraction have in Inuit Nunangat 1 people in Inuit Nunangat 1 ment suggests that “these types of had damaging effects on mental investment opportunities are not and physical health, language, about dividing the pie, but working 30 The number of physicians per 119The number of physicians culture, education, and Indige- 4 in true partnership, to make a bet- 100,000 population in Nunavut per 100,000 population in nous knowledge. High rates of Urban Health Authorities 4 ter economic pie that will achieve a broader, deeper and sustained pros- substance abuse and suicide in perity across all regions and territo- Indigenous populations have of Inuit in Inuit of all Canadians 47.5% 60.2% ries.” While this common vision of been linked to intergenerational Nunangat are employed1 are employed1 long-term payoff is inspiring, it does trauma caused by the impacts of not preclude competition for scarce colonialism. Concerns about the 72.4 years 82.9 years resources (with potential implica- erosion of Indigenous languages and cultures also factor heavily The projected life expectancy The projected life expectancy for tions for political and social cohe- for Inuit in Canada† 5 non-Indigenous people in Canada5 sion) over the next fifteen years. into Northern Indigenous peoples’ future-oriented strategies, which request government support for 12.3 The infant mortality rate 4.4 The non-indigenous infant 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES 6 IMR 6 cultural revitalization efforts. Vio- per 1,000 for Inuit infants in Canada. mortality rate per 1,000 for Canada. The ANPF boldly states that “the Govern- lence against Indigenous women ment of Canada and its partners will close and girls also remains a significant * Should not be compared with crowding data for previous years. Based on the suitability definition (whether the the gaps and divides that exist between this problem, with Indigenous women dwelling has enough bedrooms for the size and composition of the household). The previous figure was based on the region, particularly in relation to its Indige- having a much higher likelihood number of persons per room definition. of a violent death than non-Indig- † Should not be compared with previous life expectancy data. The figure is a national 2017 projection of life expectancy nous peoples, and the rest of the country. enous women, according to statis- for Inuit. Previous figures were for 2004-2008 for all residents of Inuit Nunangat, including non-Inuit. The clear and ambitious goals and objectives of this framework point the way to a tics cited in the 2019 final report 1 Statistics Canada, 2016 Census. (crowded homes: 98-400-X2016163; high school diploma 98-400-X2016265; income: vibrant, sustainable and prosperous future.” of the National Inquiry into Miss- unpublished custom table provided to ITK; employment: 98-400-X2016266) It also promises that “in our shared future, ing and Murdered Indigenous 2 Grace M. Egeland, Inuit Health Survey 2007-2008: Nunavut (Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, QC: Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ Women and Girls. Nutrition and Environment, May 2010), 12. Canada’s Arctic and North will no longer 3 Shirin Roshanafshar and Emma Hawkins. Health at a Glance: Food Insecurity in Canada (Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada, be pushed to the margins of the national The delivery of healthcare ser- March 25, 2015). community,” and that “its people will be vices is challenging in the Arc- 4 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Physicians in Canada, 2014 (Ottawa, ON: full participants in Canadian society, with tic, producing disproportionate Canadian Institute for Health Information, September 2015). access to the same services, opportunities 5 Custom table based on Statistics Canada’s Projections of the Aboriginal Population and Households in Canada, 2011 health challenges for residents of to 2036. and standards of living as those enjoyed by the region. Additional hurdles for other Canadians” (emphasis added). Given 6 Sheppard et al 2017. “Birth outcomes among First Nations, Inuit and Metis populations.” Health Reports Vol. 28. No. 11 healthcare delivery in the North 71

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79 www.itk.ca 3 include a lack of infrastructure and trained years, compared to 82.9 years for Canada’s professionals; small, often isolated popula- non-Indigenous population). tions spread out over vast distances; and High rates of food insecurity in the Arctic the need to deliver services in cultural- are exacerbated by climate change and ly-appropriate ways. Hospitals and special- environmental contamination. The three ized health services are often not available highest levels of household food insecurity locally and many people are forced to fly in Canada in 2017-2018 were in Nunavut from their home communities to access (57% of households), Northwest Territories specialized care in regional or southern (21% of households), and Yukon (16.9% of Canadian hubs. Improved medical tech- households). Housing challenges in the nologies, communications (which support North, including a lack of quality housing tele-health and other forms of remote and overcrowding, are associated with high delivery), pharmaceuticals, and treatment rates of communicable disease such as options are expected to improve the deliv- tuberculosis. In Inuit Nunangat, for exam- ery of some services over the next fifteen ple, 52% of Inuit live in crowded homes, years but are unlikely to overcome the full compared to 9% of Canadians overall. range of obstacles that lead to differentials in services between northern and southern The Conference Board of Canada also Canada. reports that costs of living and rates of poverty in the Territorial North are among Reports also highlight the severity of men- the highest in the country. Although aver- tal health challenges in Northern com- age incomes in the territorial appear to be munities compared to those in the rest high, these numbers do not factor in sig- of Canada, coupled with a lack of mental nificantly higher costs of living and goods health facilities and services at the commu- compared to southern Canada. It also nity level. The high rate of suicide among conceals the striking difference in income Indigenous peoples (particularly amongst distribution between Indigenous and youth) is a source of significant concern. non-Indigenous people in the territories, For example, the ANPF reports that the which affects related measures of social rate of self-injury hospitalizations in Labra- cohesion, including crime rates and life sat- dor is 231 per 100,000, which is three times isfaction. The Board cites the Organisation the Canadian average. Addressing men- for Economic Co-operation and Develop- tal health is a prerequisite for addressing ment’s observation that “the more unequal other social challenges and for building a society is, the more difficult it is to move strong people and communities. up the social ladder, simply because chil- Comparatively poor health outcomes in dren have a greater gap to make up.” Canada’s North are complicated by social Despite relatively high unemployment, determinants such as poor food security, crime rates, and poverty compared with overcrowded housing, high unemploy- the Canadian average, the Conference ment, and low formal education levels. Board of Canada reports that the territo- Shorter life expectancy (which is often ries measure high in life satisfaction scores. considered a fundamental indicator of a Nunavut’s rating of 8.15 places it above the population’s overall health and wellness) in Canadian average (7.98), which is partly the North reveals gaps in a range of health explained by the role of networks of family factors including access to health care, and other kinship ties that provide stabil- nutrition, living conditions and lifestyle. ity, share food, and contribute to a sense of Life expectancy in the North is notably belonging. Accordingly, culturally-specific lower than that of the rest of Canada (e.g. measures of social cohesion are particularly life expectancy for Inuit in Canada is 72.4 72 relevant in remote Northern Indigenous

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT communities, including the proportion of the population that participates in traditional activities such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and arts and crafts. Nunavut has the highest rate of Indigenous participation in traditional activities in Canada, and the Indigenous populations in both Yukon and the N.W.T. had higher rates of participation in traditional activities than the national average. Participation in these types of activities is encouraged by land- based education programs, as well as the Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Ranger program. Implications: a. Northern and Indigenous communities are particularly susceptible and vulnerable to emerging health threats. In a region with already limited resources and strained healthcare networks, responding to emerging threats such as pandemics will require more resources per capita than South- ern populations. The resource-intensity associated with delivering services to small, dispersed populations compounds the challenges of addressing social determinants of health and improving quality of life. b. Limitations or interruptions to an already strained food supply chain pose acute risks for Northern communities. Com- munities that rely on limited food distribution networks are vulnerable to a serious interruption and require outside assistance. While various Northern strategies call for increased “food sovereignty” which innovative solutions such as community greenhouses may help to support, the combination of climate change and growing populations concentrated in specific areas are likely to increase pressures on flora and fauna proximate to 73

2020 REPORT communities and heighten (rather well-being of Northerners. than reduce) dependence on supply chains that bring in food from 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASING outside of the region over the next FRACTURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETY fifteen years. c. Climate change poses a growing The NATO SFA explains that polarization can threat to the health of North- “originate from the differences in a wide ern populations. Climate change variety of areas from political (ideological, impacts on Arctic ecosystems, tra- populist/mainstream) and social (ethnic, ditional food sources, and infra- religious, racial, gender, urban/rural, young/ structure will cause various issues old, educated/uneducated) to economic for Northern communities in the (rich/poor, employed/unemployed, etc.). short, medium, and long term. Per- The common denominator is the differing mafrost melt and coastal erosion and possibly diverging interests of individ- will continue to change the land- uals.” The heightened empowerment of indi- scape of the North, affect infra- viduals, diffusion of information sources, structure, and alter transportation and interest group politics that seek advan- patterns. A changing climate and tage for specific segments rather than for environment also impact migra- society as a whole can be progressive forces tion patterns for Arctic fauna upon as well as sources of dangerous division that which Northerners rely, which can fracture social cohesion and foment could reduce food security in some extremism. regions. For communities which rely on shipments of food, health The broader phenomenon of political polar- products, and other supplies, an ization in North America and the broader increasingly unpredictable climate world has been introduced in previous could prevent or limit the use of ice chapters. By contrast, Canada’s self-image roads or waterways for the trans- as a tolerant, open society that embraces portation of needed goods. human and viewpoint diversity is an import- d. High disparities in income, for- ant source of strength. The NATO SFA notes mal education, and incarcera- that “authoritarian societies/countries may tion rates between Indigenous try to hide these unpleasant fractures and and non-Indigenous Canadians appear to be more stable, but they may living in the North are likely to shatter rather quickly; whereas democratic persist. Longstanding structural societies, because of greater transparency, factors make these disparities dif- seem to be more fragile, but are in fact more ficult, if not impossible, to over- resilient due their openness to discuss and come in the short-term. Managing address challenges/differences.” Using this expectations will be difficult. Fur- logic, Canada is likely to remain a highly thermore, the gendered dimen- resilient and cohesive society in the next fif- sions of these challenges require teen years. deliberate focus. Despite a prolif- That stated, a growing awareness and eration of new formal and informal amplification of socio-economic, cultural, institutions and groups claiming and political divisions that help to explain to offer solutions to persistent the differential social and health outcomes gaps and problems, officials will be between Indigenous and non-Indigenous increasingly pressed to discern and Canadians, if left unaddressed, may become reinforce best practices on how to an unstable fault line in the future. The 74 improve the social and economic political emphasis on reconciliation with

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Indigenous peoples which involves apologiz- geographical or ethnic determinants. The ing for past wrongs committed against them, ongoing expansion of human networks can addressing current deficits, and co-defining a also create new threat vectors which allow shared, prosperous future seeks to avoid this malicious actors (often acting under false outcome. Along similar lines, distinctions pretences) to influence and undermine between Northern and Southern Canadi- social and democratic systems. ans – and who has the right to speak about Northern issues – has the potential to margin- Implications: alize key stakeholders and rightsholders who a. Human networks in the Canadian could otherwise offer solutions and support Arctic are evolving. While images of to address core challenges. Indigenous peoples wearing traditional clothing and using traditional Connections and interactions within and tools are important representations between communities as well as with the of identities and cultural resilience, rest of Canada and the world are chang- they should be complemented by ing through influences of the cyber domain, images depicting Northerners as industry, social media, education, and glo- avid users of Facebook and other balization. These linkages are also reshaping social media, advanced technolo- definitions of spaces, places, and connections, gies, and blending traditional and producing new forms of interaction and social Western scientific knowledge. While identities that may not conform to previous the adoption of global social media

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT applications may promote the development, conservation, and erosion of place-specific forms of political representation are likely human interaction, social media to foment polarization amongst tools (such as the Instagram feed Arctic regions and groups and of Inuktitut Ilinniaqta paired with societies. This may make groups Inuktut vocabulary) can led to a increasingly susceptible to external cultural and “ linguistic renaissance.” influence and pressures seeking to b. The emergence of Arctic/North- exploit or create fractures in Cana- ern identities and Indigeneity as dian society. assets. The Arctic Human Develop- Polarization between Canadians is likely ment Report II notes that “culture, to erode social cohesion, but is unlikely to especially Indigenous culture in produce major societal disruption. Harden- the North, has increasingly become ing partisan political allegiances, peaceful a resource, both in the sense of a direct action by protesters against pipe- commodity and in the sense of a line projects, and assertions of Indige- tool that makes external recogni- nous sovereignty can be read as forms of tion easier.” This may introduce new dissatisfaction and sources of disruption, advantages to living in the North, but they can also been seen as legitimate bolster cultural resilience, and expressions of democratic freedoms. Wide- entrench distinct Arctic/Northern spread acceptance of the conventional rule identities. The growing recogni- of law in Canada is unlikely to diminish in tion of the importance of local and the next fifteen years, despite recent media Indigenous knowledge in many amplification of “defund police” and other aspects of Arctic life (including its anti-government movements. applications in education, science/ ways of knowing, and governance) Understanding the needs of youth and is likely to continue in the next fif- elderly persons. The Arctic Human Devel- teen years. opment Report II and many Northern Cana- c. Fractures in Northern Canadian dian reports highlight the need to better societies and between the North understand the socio-cultural, economic, and South may undermine trust and political roles that these segments of and legitimacy in existing gover- the Northern population current play and nance systems, alienate segments could play in the future. The ANPF includes of the population, and lessen promises to include youth more deliber- political participation through ately in devising public policy and foreign established democratic channels. policies that are reflective of their aspira- Furthermore, viewpoint diver- tions and ambitions of Arctic youth, but sity on issues such as resource mechanisms to do so remain to be defined.

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CHAPTER SIX

TECHNOLOGY LEAD AUTHORS: ANDREA CHARRON, LAURA CONRAD, ROMAN ELLIS, NICHOLAS GLESBY, NANCY TEEPLE, AND ROB HUEBERT.

A new decade means a new generation advancements across and within the Arc- of technological advancements. Public tic, especially within Canada’s Arctic; the and private innovations have led to rapid Arctic environment could both benefit societal changes (such as the uptake of from and be further harmed by technol- smartphones), affected various industries ogy; and dependency on industry to pro- via automation and, in some cases, and vide technological solutions for the Arctic influenced geographical landscapes via will be greater than elsewhere in the world. the extraction of needed resources (such Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) as the open pit tantalite mines) or by inno- are becoming increasingly relevant for vation (such as the dyke systems of the defence and security considerations, but Netherlands). also for social purposes as well. Techno- logical advancements bring both solutions The advancement and increased usage of and vulnerabilities, making cyber defence technology will continue to shape soci- an increasingly important consideration ety in the Canadian Arctic. Technologi- in enhancing security and privacy. Accord- cal advancements are being harnessed ingly, this chapter considers the technolog- to address northern and Arctic issues. ical trends that have direct relevance in the In Canada’s Arctic, however, the federal Arctic to Canada and its allies. government expects less technological development given the current lack of infrastructure and small population as well 6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY as increased challenges associated with ADVANCEMENT operating in harsh climates and the distance from larger centres where backup Interoperability among allies could present systems, parts and skilled personnel are challenges given disproportionate rates more likely to reside. This lack of critical of technological development. The North infrastructure will slow implementation American Arctic, however, is currently of new and useful technologies as they defended jointly by Canada and the U.S. emerge. via the binational North American Aero- space Defence Command (NORAD) and In the coming decades, it is expected dozens of bilateral Canada-US arrange- that the Arctic will be challenged specif- ments. In theory, interoperability is not a ically by uneven rates of technological particular challenge for Canada and the 79

Strategic Foresight Analysis 2020 U.S. Upgrading old technology and the Technological advancement makes data rate of advancement, however, is an issue. a force multiplier as well as a particular The U.S. and Canada are laggards in terms vulnerability. Offensive cyber operations of defence capabilities measured by year- against networked ground-to-aerial-to round access and projection of power space systems could result in communica- when compared to the other Arctic states, tion and system failures and are potential except Iceland. The North American Arctic threats. Both militaries desire data fusion has not required a year-round, persistent capabilities, data analytics, AI, machine presence in the form of large military learning and edge computing to outpace installations and standing armies because new threats. Neither military has these of factors assumed to make the Arctic a less capabilities at a fully-integrated and suffi- likely direct target of attack. The Arctic has ciently mature state to use them in deci- been, and is still thought to be, however, an sion-making, especially with respect to the avenue of approach, likely via the air/aero- Arctic. space domain. For needed technological advances to be In both cases for the United States and realized, cable or satellite-based high-band- Canada, despite the different sizes and width internet access is needed and gaps capabilities of the two militaries, keep- in other local infrastructure, including cell ing pace with new technology has been a towers and access to cell phones and com- problem of priority and budgets. Today’s puters, must be filled to enable significant defence challenges do not require bigger technological advancement. For example, bases or more personnel. Rather, technol- states using Unmanned Autonomous Sys- ogy is expected to be a force multiplier and tems in the Arctic without connectivity the single best predictor of deterrence in options are only able to accumulate infor- the future. mation and not distribute it. Canada’s new RADARSAT Constellation is expected to In order to deter and defeat potential generate vital data, but there are concerns threats in the Arctic, detection is key. The the data generated and analyzed cannot discrepancy between the Arctic and south- be pushed from the south and received in ern Canada in terms of surveillance and the Arctic in a timely and readable format. situational awareness is the biggest technological gap that exists from a defence Despite these identified needs, Canada’s perspective. The North Warning System Arctic is likely to experience less techno- (NWS) is increasingly obsolete and new logical development than other jurisdic- technologies, including space-based, tions owing to its lack of infrastructure, ground-based and maritime-based parts, small population, and challenges associ- are needed to augment current NWS sys- ated with operating in harsh climates and tems. Thus, both the Canadian and Amer- in areas without large cities where backup ican militaries, as well as NATO, are calling systems, parts and skilled personnel are for sensors that can detect, distract and more likely to reside. discriminate targets and have robust sens- While sensors may be the current priority ing capabilities in all domains. From the of the U.S. military, Canada requires more most sophisticated hypersonic weapons, basic systems, such as fast and reliable to small Unmanned Autonomous Systems telecommunications that will benefit both (UAS), new sensors must be able discern local residents as well as national agen- the most sophisticated as well as simple cies. Therefore, we anticipate that dual-use threats and keep pace with the new high- technology, whenever possible, will have speed decision-making tempo at the speed the greatest impact in the Canadian North. 80 of relevance.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT The rise in alarmism in response to developments in advanced weapons technology by strategic competitors that pose security threats to North America and the Arctic region must be tempered with the low risk of conflict. Accidents, incidents, and miscalculation are more likely to result from miscommunication and misperception, and be compounded by uncertainty and mistrust. Thus, technological gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) must be filled in the short-term (over the next 5-10 years) in order to provide adequate situational awareness of the region to avoid misperceiving foreign activity in the region. Implications: a. Compatibility issues and difficulties in communicating between alliance members regarding the Arctic could arise if southern areas have more advanced technology compared to the Arctic. b. Gaps in situational awareness places challenges on interoperability between militaries, via ISR gaps, which could prevent critical data from being effectively communi- cated or transmitted to relevant security and defence partners in the future. c. Near to long-term modernization of ISR capabilities – radars, sensors, satellites, and other networked systems – need to be protected from cyber operations intended to degrade, disrupt, and destroy data collection, analysis, information sharing, and communications. Due to these vulnerabilities, redun- dancy and older systems and processes not prone to exploitation by adversaries will also be needed (e.g. paper maps). d. The cyber threat against networked systems may involve adversaries using cyber capabilities to steal information and/or eavesdrop to 81

2020 REPORT gain knowledge of plans, oper- of living, the government will likely ations, and positions of CAF and need to subsidize local access and defence partners’ assets in the use to new technologies as well.1 region. These challenges impact the effectiveness of interoperability 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS among the branches of the CAF and (UAS) with its defence allies, in addition to other government department, UAS are a low-cost technology that can partners, and local governments easily be used for a wide variety of func- and agencies involved in Arctic tions, including natural disaster response, exercises and operations. environmental monitoring, search and e. Diplomacy may be needed to rescue, agriculture, or as intentional or de-escalate tensions resulting from unintentional weapons. UAS are systems the advancement of capabilities which have the capability of undertak- which enhance knowledge of the ing a predetermined or prescribed task region. Gaps in ISR could also lead with little to no human intervention. This to increased misperception of for- technology is available to state and non- eign activity in region and could state actors, including individuals, which lead to an escalation of crises oth- leads to security concerns regarding the erwise avoidable. risk of individuals using UAS for nefarious f. Local residents in the location of purposes. Militaries (including the CAF) any ground-based systems must be have deployed UAS in the Arctic for vari- involved in planning to ensure land ous purposes. The Government of Canada agreements are not violated. Given is expanding its uptake of UAS in other the cost of shipping any equip- areas as well, with Transport Canada and ment to the Arctic versus the cost Environment and Climate Change Canada releasing tenders for a variety of UAS applications in the North. While the North Warning System’s (NWS) effectiveness has been declining as men- tioned, situational awareness and monitoring of UAS has increasingly become an issue in the Canadian Arctic. UAS provide a potential opportunity to amplify a reimag- ined NWS that will be a system of systems with space-based, ground-based and maritime-based parts. Additionally, the NWS currently does not have the acuity or capability, for example, to detect UAS flying at lower speeds and lower altitudes, nor for other vehicles flying at higher speeds and altitudes. Greater use of UAS in search and rescue sce- narios may bring needed lifesaving equipment to communities and individuals in distress while providing safety experts with valuable information on the condition of 82 the injured, the terrain and the like, which

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT may save precious time prior to SAR techs change in mating and migration being deployed. UAS are also providing patterns which have second-or- opportunities for enhanced environmen- der impacts on controlling animal tal monitoring and remediation, ecosys- populations in areas, in addition to tem management, and monitoring climate changing the locations and times change impacts which could have signifi- of year for the hunting traditions cant social benefits as well. of northern peoples. The impact on wildlife has become an issue Implications: of public concern after a video a. An increase in UAS use could lead went viral in 2018 which depicted to greater surveillance capabili- a cub struggling to climb a snow ties for states in the air/near space, wall. Alternatively, if used correctly, land, and maritime domains. This UAS may help us better study and surveillance role adds to existing understand wildlife. situational awareness capabilities, provided by aviation, satellite 6.3 THE DEPENDENCEY ON INDUSTRY TO imagery, and sensors, potentially PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS filling a gap in detecting unusual phenomena in the region, includ- TO THE ARCTIC ing foreign intrusions, changing All technological improvements are highly environmental conditions, and sit- dependent on industry to develop, install, uations requiring an emergency maintain and replace the technology. response. Choke points for improvements in the Arc- b. UAS require a means to transmit tic from a technological perspective are data to operators at the speed of almost wholly dependent on industry to relevance. Transmissions of large see the cost-benefit of hours of research packets of data of both a classi- and production. Whereas the military used fied and unclassified nature are to be on the leading edge of technology vulnerable to exploitation and that was later adapted to civilian use, it is manipulation. As the usage of this now the other way around. technology in the North increases, so too does the demand for infra- The development of 5G wireless capa- structure to support its benefits bilities has resulted in a worldwide com- and regulations to manage its mercial technology race amongst China’s usage. Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia. c. Given that communities north of With Five Eyes states mulling over con- the tree line are more visible from tracts in domestic legislatures, the Gov- the air, considerations must be ernment of Canada must coordinate with made in balancing security and its international partners to ensure proper privacy in the Canadian North. interoperability with data distribution, UAS are vulnerable to exploitation while trusting the secureness and stabil- and manipulation and these sys- ity of the network. That such an important tems could be used by adversar- capability is wholly in the hands of industry ies or governments in ways that is an important consideration. violate the privacy of northern At the national level, interoperability communities. between different manufacturers of these d. UAS activity could potentially services must be regulated in order to cre- interfere with aviation and disrupt ate a private sector equilibrium in pric- local wildlife. Evidence includes a ing and connectivity. Without private and 83

2020 REPORT public cooperation, there will be vastly dif- more difficult to maintain and ferent levels of access to capabilities creat- achieve with higher prices imposed ing the potential for mass confusion and by monopolies. under-preparedness in unforeseen emergency circumstances. 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), which is ENVIRONMENT celebrating its 350th anniversary in 2020, Technology development will have a vari- is a good reminder of the challenges with ety of positive and negative implications for monopolies and sole suppliers in the Arc- the environment in the Arctic. Technologi- tic. Not only is it expensive to ship goods cal advancements could be used to more to the Arctic, but those expenses soar effectively respond to an oil spill or remove when one company has full control over harmful plastics from the Ocean. Recent pricing. Similar concerns may be drawn advancements in energy technology are from a technological development per- providing options for more renewable or spective. Due to the high cost of entry to efficient sources of energy. Although these develop in the North, one may only find a technologies are not exclusive to the Arc- few wealthy corporations with the means tic, the rate of climate change in the Arctic to begin investing. Individuals should be demands immediate solutions. Any tech- aware of the negative ramifications of pri- nology that can reduce the Canadian Arc- vate monopolies in the region. Public/ tic’s dependency on diesel as a main fuel private partnerships may help dilute the source would aid the health of residents concentration of industry monopolies and the environment. and encourage more local participation in decision-making. Technology can also some negative environmental impacts. Technology can result Implications: in more toxic waste and new generations a. Militaries are highly dependent of technology often last for a limited time on industries for technological before they become obsolete or parts mal- advancement, which can often function. While programs do exist to recycle come with unknown foreign back- e-waste, they are limited across the Arctic. ing and investors – knowing the Older technology is more likely to end up “customers’ customers” matters. in landfills or burned, which is extremely b. 5G networks creates a problem harmful to the environment. From legions with Five Eyes intelligence sharing of abandoned oil drums to leftover waste relationship regarding the security from the soon-to-be obsolete North Warn- and stability of networks. Cyber vul- ing System, waste management of old nerabilities, especially espionage, and outdated technology is an important disruption, attacks are relevant in consideration. the Arctic as communication technology infrastructure advances. Technology has aided ice scientists’ under- c. Industry monopolies could have standing of the life-cycle of ice in the Arc- notable negative implications in tic. LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is the North. Monopolies may chal- a remote sensing method that uses light in lenge interoperability between the form of a pulsed laser to measure vari- service companies needed for able distances and can be used to measure both strategic and societal pur- the thickness of ice. This means, however, poses. Access to emerging tech- that more UAS are used and more air traffic nologies elsewhere in the country control will be needed. For example, the air 84 and affordable living may become and maritime space around the Canadian

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT High Arctic Research Centre (CHARS) climate change are both issues of located in Cambridge Bay would be an area significant importance to commu- of which to concentrate traffic control sys- nities in the Arctic. With growing tems and monitoring. interest in resource extraction and tourism, any technology that can Implications: make travel more efficient will also a. With advancements in technology, help to connect communities more a growing obligation exists to iden- reliably while polluting less. tify and utilize technologies which d. Negative impacts of technology decrease pollutants and emissions, in the Arctic, including technolo- that can be applied to environ- gies that use fossil fuels and pro- mental cleanups, and can lead to duce C02 emissions or toxic waste cleaner oceans and waterways. resulting from inadequate disposal b. Technologies that increase under- of obsolete or malfunctioning standing of the age and thick- technology, would have negative ness of sea ice in the region has effects on the Arctic environment an immense ecological impact, and its communities. but also raises important strategic questions for the region. Identify- 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY ing overlap between strategic and societal challenges could increase At the regional level, the cost of living for uptake in new technologies with those living in the Canadian Arctic is much applications in both realms. higher compared to their southern coun- c. Environmental degradation and terparts despite existing government sub- sidies. Food, housing, energy, and health

2020 REPORT costs can reach exorbitant levels because often very slow.3 It is the goal of the current of distance and shipping costs. Advance- government in Canada to increase technol- ments in technology, including geodesic ogy acquisition in the Arctic over the com- dome greenhouses and better asphalt, ing years. concrete, and new composite materials, can help to address some of these import- Implications: ant social challenges. a. With research and development also comes large private commer- Access to affordable, healthy food options cial interests and vast amounts of is essential to the prosperity of any soci- financial capital. Without regula- ety, and is an important building-block for tory assistance or public develop- modernization of the North that can be ment, Canadians living in the Arctic aided by technology. At the regional level, could fall prey to unaffordable and advancements in technology can lead unsustainable pricing models lead- to greater food security via better greening to poor qualities of life. house technology, hydroponic systems b. Benefits of technology to northern and even future possibilities from cloning, individuals include improved com- which could lower the cost of food and dis- munications, faster transmission tance travelled. Greenhouses developed of data, and increase in regional, from recycled sea containers and powered national, and global engagement by renewable energy resources, such as for northern peoples. solar panels and wind turbines, like those c. An increase in access to technology in Gjoa Haven, Nunavut, could improve the could in turn lead to an increase in quality of life and have employment bene- the ability of individuals to par- fits for Arctic populations.2 ticipate in criminal activity, such The Canadian Arctic is sparsely populated as buying and selling on the dark and has a shortage of health experts. There web and in black markets. The dark is also a lack of medical training institutions web will pose challenges for law in the Arctic. Mobile clinics and diagnostic enforcement working to prevent services are an alternative to be explored. individuals or groups from facili- With the development and implementa- tating criminal activity online. As tion of high-speed broadband and satellite internet usage increases in the Arc- internet, quicker access to medical advice tic, individuals will increasingly be via tele-health and telerobotic surgery able to access the dark web or be could become more accessible. Providing influenced by misinformation and some manner of accessible medical treat- disinformation campaigns. ment is imperative for inhabitants in order d. Increased access to technology to receive diagnoses, and referrals. Access could lead to a greater ability to to prescriptions and access to more sophis- connect individuals in times of cri- ticated diagnostic equipment, however, is sis or emergency, allow for more not likely to be solved until there is suffi- training and education opportu- cient numbers of inhabitants. nities, and greater understandings of differences. More consistent Individual access to technology has sig- connections with people living in nificantly increased globally. In the Arctic the Arctic provides opportunities however, the availability of technology has for better representation in gov- been less consistent. Many individuals liv- ernment decision-making and ing in the Arctic still do not have access to improved delivery of social services broadband internet. Those that do have to the region. 86 access pay high prices for it and service is

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY states, a general investment in cyber warfare defences will be key to creating new SOLUTIONS security assurances as the nature of global An increasing dependency on technol- warfare changes and evolves. ogy to conduct certain operations has led Over-reliance on new technology could to an understanding that technology can create vulnerabilities in the Arctic. Thus, as solve most problems. In the context of the the NATO Strategic Foresight Assessment Arctic, this assumption could lead to inad- highlights, relearning “old skills” that are equate government responses to social “less vulnerable” in cases of emergency can problems that exist in the Arctic. Address- increase resilience. By working with Inuit ing high suicide rates and the prominence communities and the Canadian Rangers, of substance abuse in the Arctic requires a integrating traditional knowledge into the multi-dimensional approach as these are military lexicon can instill the CAF and OGD issues technology cannot solve alone. with knowledge of how to operate in the The world is rapidly digitizing and advanc- Arctic without being solely reliant on tech- ing in technological capabilities. With this nologies which may not always be avail- comes the concern of over-reliance on able. The uniqueness of Canada’s Arctic, these services. As technology advance- with less infrastructure and larger indige- ments begin to reshape every sector of nous populations compared to other Arctic society — power grids, wireless telecom- states, allows for new training opportuni- munications, agriculture, government, ties within the alliance for surviving and military —ensuring the protection of this operating in the North without southern imperative equipment is key. Protective technologies. assurances will provide stability, continu- Similar to the global level, exposing indi- ity of services, and reliability in cases of viduals to indigenous and Inuit cultures will unforeseen emergency circumstances. help break down longstanding mispercep- As reliance on technology continues to tions of the North. Adapting to indigenous increase, the Government of Canada must strategies of navigation and survival in the begin to prepare for adversarial targeting Arctic may serve as a research opportunity of key industries and equipment. A focus to overcome many technological vulnera- on strategic cyber-warfare defences should bilities elsewhere in Canada and abroad, be considered. In Canada and other NATO pulling Canada away from technological dependencies. 87

2020 REPORT Implications: technologies deployed and there a. The assumption that technol- could be negative impacts on pop- ogy can solve large scale social ulations that might see no govern- problems could lead to a lack of ment follow-up. development in the Arctic. At the d. Involving Indigenous peoples and national level this could lead to a integrating traditional knowledge false sense of having solved social in Arctic operations with allies is a problems or assuming that nothing reminder to the world that the Arc- else can be done to address them. tic is not a desolate wasteland, but At the regional level this could rather the homeland to rich indige- lead to resentment of the southern nous cultures. At both the regional regions and increased isolation. It and national levels, greater cooper- could also result in the presence of ation with the Inuit as partners will technology that no one knows how increase relations with the federal to use due to never being trained in government. By using traditional such areas. knowledge in conjunction with b. Over-reliance on networked sys- scientific knowledge, the Inuit will tems linking society creates vul- not only feel more respected by the nerabilities in key industries and Canadian government but may be equipment to disruption by acci- more willing to share their home- dents or individuals. land, the Arctic, with the Canadian c. Some issues cannot be solved Armed Forces and other NATO by technology – social prob- allies. lems may continue regardless of

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Related MINDS Policy Challenges

MINDS Policy Challenges for 2020-2021 investing in the right capabilities? Are reflect policy challenges for the Department there other capabilities that would of National Defence and the Canadian support Canada’s objectives in the Armed Forces (DND/CAF) and are the result Arctic? of consultations with senior leadership • Are our policies and strategies com- across the Defence Team. These challenges patible with other Arctic partners? represent key issues areas where DND/CAF How does Canada work with allies could benefit from external expertise to and partners who may have a dif- challenge or complement their thinking. ferent interpretation of the level of One challenge area is to better understand risk associated with activities in the how Canada can work with both Arctic and non-military realm? non-Arctic partners to identify and address • What is the realistic scope of responsi- risks in the Arctic, including those in the non- bility the Defence Team can assume in military realm. the Arctic, particularly given existing • Beyond the military domain, what resources? What additional resources threats exist in the Arctic? What are the might be required to meet current foreign economic and military inter- and future expectations? ests in Canada’s North? • How could climate change alter future • DND/CAF works closely with partners defence requirements in the North (e.g. government, other Canadian and how could DND/CAF address cli- partners, other Arctic countries, NATO, matic changes in the region? non-Arctic partners) in the Arctic. How • What other infrastructure does Can- can these relationships be more effec- ada need in the Arctic? How can CAF tive at delivering benefits and services? and other government departments • What is/will be the role of land, sea, leverage each other’s capabilities to air, and/or special operations forces in achieve a holistic presence and situa- demonstrating Canadian sovereignty tional awareness in the North? and exercising deterrence against • Canada has recently released the Arc- activities undermining Canadian inter- tic and Northern Policy Framework ests in the North? How do we operate (ANPF) to help focus and guide Gov- in this environment to achieve these ernment of Canada engagement in effects? the North. How does this framework • Through SSE, Canada has committed compare to similar Arctic strategic to acquiring various technologies to frameworks of Arctic and near-Arctic increase its reach and mobility in the states? Arctic. Given the changing nature of • How does Canada’s involvement with the threats in the region, including US, Five Eyes, and NATO affect other those non-military in nature, are we cooperative relationships in Arctic?

2020 REPORT

CONCLLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

“New interpretive frameworks are false correlation by conflating Arctic essential in order to respond effec- issues (those threats emerging in and tively to changes occurring in the from the region itself) with strategic region. Until these frameworks have issues that may have an Arctic dimen- been established, it may be difficult sion but are best framed at the interna- to understand what is happening tional rather than regional level. Doing in the Arctic, and provide options so may create the very misconceptions on how best to respond to crisis or that build mistrust and sow the seeds emerging threats to Canadian secu- of conflict. Dialogue and deterrence are rity or sovereignty.” – Canadian Forces compatible in a complex Arctic region Arctic Integrating Concept (2010) that features both competition and cooperation. This report sought to apply the NATO Stra- tegic Foresight Analysis (SFA) to a Canadian Accelerating environmental change, Arctic context. Academics associated with surging international interest, tech- the North American and Arctic Defence nological and social change, and the and Security Network (NAADSN) were emergence of all-domain threats have asked to identify key trends and implica- direct and indirect implications for tions that may shape the future security Canadian defence and security. So do environment in the region. This product internal dynamics within the Canadian does not purport to predict the future as North, which present both opportuni- much as to offer visualizations of possible ties and challenges for policymakers future challenges, opportunities, and rele- and practitioners. Recent efforts by vant implications for Canada and its allies the Government of Canada to co-cre- in a dynamic region that represents “an ating policies with Northerners, and important international crossroads where particularly Indigenous peoples, por- issues of climate change, international tend a future guided by a philosophy of trade, and global security meet.” “nothing about us without us.” Charting a future path also requires attentive- Canada has committed to assert interna- ness to evolving international realities, tional leadership to ensure that the Arctic where other states’ and actors’ priorities remains a region characterized by peace, and interests are not always synony- stability, and low tension where states can mous with Canada’s. Furthermore, as exercise their sovereign rights and respon- the global order continues to shift, Can- sibilities. Strategic competition outside of ada must remain attuned to the rising the Circumpolar Arctic is likely to continue power and influence of non-Arctic state to complicate relations within it, but our and non-state actors that are reshaping assessments suggest that this does not pre- Arctic affairs – and blurring the bound- clude cooperation where this serves Cana- aries between what is safety, security, da’s national and regional interests. Despite and defence and what is trade, invest- ideas from the Trump administration that ment, development, economic, social, the Arctic is a conflict-ridden region, we see and foreign policy. the opposite. Commentators often draw a 91

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 92

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ENDNOTES INTRODUCTION 1 See Lackenbauer, “‘Use It or Lose It,’ History, and the Fourth Surge,” in Canada and Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives, ed. Lackenbauer (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2011), 423-36; Lackenbauer, “Afterword,” in Franklyn Griffiths, Rob Huebert, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security and Stew- ardship (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011), 227-32; Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, eds., Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Conservatives: Key Speeches and Documents on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2006-15, Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 6 (Calgary and Waterloo: Centre for Military, Strategic and Security Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism/Arctic Institute of North America, 2016); and Lackenbauer, “From ‘Defending Sovereignty’ to Comprehensive Security in a Whole of Government Framework: Government Narratives of Arctic Sovereignty and Security in the Harper Era,” in Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic, ed. Wilfrid Greaves and Lackenbauer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2020). On this era, see also Petra Dolata, “A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper,” Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies : Revue interdisciplinaire des études canadiennes en France 78 (2015): 131-154; Klaus Dodds, “We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic,” Polar Record 47/4 (2011): 371–4; and Philippe Genest and Frederic Lasserre, “Souveraineté, sécurité, identité: éléments-clés du discours du gouvernement canadien sur l’Arctique,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21/1 (2015): 64-84. CHAPTER ONE 1 Lackenbauer to Standing Committee on National Defence, 2nd Session, 41st Parliament, 9 December 2014. 2 See, for example, P.E. Solli, E. Wilson Rowe, and W. Yennie Lindgren, “Coming into the Cold: Asia’s Arctic Interests,” Polar Geog- raphy, 36/4 (2013): 253-270; Kimie Hara and Ken Coates, eds., East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Pol- itics (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014); and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Frédéric Lasserre, China’s Arctic ambitions and what they mean for Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018). 3 See, for example, Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy and Peter M. Fesler, “Hardening the Shield: A Credible Deterrent & Capable Defense for North America” (Washington: Canada Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 2020). CHAPTER TWO 1 The process leading to the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework was a “whole of government” initiative led by Crown-In- digenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) that involved unprecedented policy-making collaboration across 33 federal departments, as well as partnerships with Northerners and other stakeholders, featuring new approaches to deep and meaningful consultation. “The days of writing up policy papers and shopping them around town for comments are gone,” director general of Northern strategic policy Wayne Walsh explained. “We were tasked with the development of a policy framework and vision from Northerners and for Northerners.” Quoted in P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “An Important International Crossroads”: Implementing Canada’s Arctic Priorities in Strong, Secure, Engaged (Toronto: Centre for National Security Studies, Canadian Forces College, 2018), 11. CHAPTER FOUR 1 R.K. Headland et. al. “Transits of the Northwest Passage of the 2019 Navigation Season,” Scott Polar Institute (December 2019). See also Jackie Dawson et. al., “Temporal and Spatial Patterns of Ship Traffic in the Canadian Arc- tic from 1990 to 2015,” Arctic 71:1 (March 2018): 19; and Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, “On Uncertain Ice: The Future of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage”, CDFAI and SPP policy Paper (December 2014), 3-4. 2 Mark E. Rosen and Cara B. Thuringer. “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security,” Center for Naval Analyses, November 2017. 3 T. Jansen, S. Post, T. Kristiansen, G. Oskarsson, J. Boje, B. Mackenzie, M. Broberg, and H. Siegstad, “Ocean warming 93

2020 REPORT expands habitat of a rich natural resource and benefits a national economy,” Ecological Applications 26 (2016): 2021–2032; and Jimena Alvarez, Dmitry Yumashev, and Gail Whiteman, “A framework for assessing the economic impacts of Arctic change,” Ambio 49 (2020): 407-418. 4 E. Sala, J. Mayorga, C. Costello, D. Kroodsma, M.L.D. Palomares, D. Pauly, U. Rashid Sumaila, D. Zeller “The economics of fishing the high seas,” Science Advances 4 (2018), 1-14; T.I. Van Pelt, H.P. Huntington, O.V. Romanenko, F.J. Mueter, “The missing middle: central Arctic Ocean gaps in fishery research and science coordination,” Marine Policy 85 (2017): 79-86 CHAPTER FIVE 1 Timothy Heleniak (2020): The future of the Arctic populations, Polar Geography, DOI: 10.1080/1088937X.2019.1707316 2 Southcott, Chris and Walker, Valoree. (2015). A Portrait of the Social Economy of Northern Canada. In Northern Communities Working Together: The Social Economy of Canada‘s North (Eds.) Christ Southcott. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS 1 Arctic Council Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic, Report: Improving Connectivity in the Arctic, Arctic Council Secretariat, 2019, pg

2 Jill Macyshon and Jonathan Forani, “‘Anything is possible’: Nunavut greenhouses bring food, jobs to tundra,” CTV News, Jan- uary 28th, 2020.

3 See “Internet Designed for Nunavut,” Qiniq, accessed 10 January 2020, https://www.qiniq.com/internet/ and “Internet Plans,” BellMTS, accessed 10 January 2020, https://www3.bellmts.ca/mts/enterprise/business+solutions/data+and+internet/ internet+plans.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

APPENDIX A: ARCTIC THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS Table 1: Summary of Technology Themes, Trends and Implications

Theme Trends Implications Technology Rate of Technological Advance a. Gaps in situational awareness which Disproportionate Rate of Advancement, challenges (inter)operability, via ISR gaps, including gaps that require upgrades to inability to communicate or transmit data aging technology for effective defence in b. advances provide faster transmission of the Arctic. data in region and between north and south c. gaps in ISR leads to increased misperception of foreign activity in region – escalation of crises otherwise avoidable Technology and the Environment a. benefits – decrease in pollutants and Environmental clean-up and renewable emissions; environmental cleanup; cleaner energy options. Lack of controls on new oceans technology poses challenges. Advances b. negative – technologies that use fossil in technology have both positive and fuels and produce C02 emissions – climate negative outcomes. change impact, including increased warming and thinner sea ice. Toxic waste resulting from inadequate disposal of obsolete or malfunctioning technology c. benefits – tech to improve observability of ice conditions contributing to improved air traffic control and monitoring d. benefits – increased food security for northern peoples improving health and quality of life Dependency on Industry to Provide a. UAS increase surveillance capabilities, Technological Solutions to the Arctic enhances early warning, filling a gap in i) Unmanned Autonomous Systems: UAS Arctic situational awareness; this capability technology is increasingly being also provides benefit to SAR employed by state and non-state actors. b. negative: UAS are vulnerable to This technology has benefits and exploitation and manipulation; these drawbacks, the latter relating to the systems could be used by adversaries or unregulated use of UAS event the government in ways that violate the privacy of northern communities c. Negative - UAS activity could potentially interfere with aviation and disrupt local wildlife

ii) Monopolies and Dependencies a. 5G networks creates a problem with Five Increasing access to Arctic populations Eyes intelligence sharing relationship by corporations investing in networks and regarding the security and stability of infrastructure. Provision of 5G networks. networks - cyber vulnerabilities, especially Systems providing Telehealth to Arctic espionage, disruption, attacks populations lacking health professionals. b. monopolies may challenge interoperability between service companies c. negative social implications – affordable living may become more difficult to maintain/achieve with higher prices impose by monopolies – unaffordable networks and basic amenities d. Telehealth: increased health training and 95 education improves the health of northern

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Theme Trends Implications populations – access to medical advice, diagnostic equipment, advice, prescriptions

a. positive – increased regional, national, iii) Individual Access to Technology: and global interconnectedness provides faster services and consistent b. negative – exposure to mis- and dis- global access. information c. potential criminal activity – Dark Web and other forms of internet-related crime d. improved reporting – communications from North-to-South; provides improved iv) Over-reliance on Technology rapid emergency response to incidents Solutions Assumed effectiveness of technology to a. over-reliance on networked systems solve all society’s problems. Approaches linking society creates vulnerabilities in that maintain Northern traditions key industries and equipment - to providing local knowledge. disruption by accidents or individuals Technological access allows for training (requirement for building resilience) in both directions – learning survival in b. some problems cannot be solved by the North technology – social problems may continue regardless of technologies deployed – negative impact on populations that might see no government follow-up c. acquisition of new technology without training in its uses could result in unused technology in remote areas (i.e. no benefits) d. traditional approaches increase resilience b. knowledge provides skills in navigating the region and survival ~ reduces misperceptions about northern peoples c. improved cooperation between federal government agencies and departments with indigenous northern peoples – local populations more willing to share homeland with CAF and NATO

FULL TABLE IS FORTHCOMING

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

APPENDIX B: 2017 NATO SFA THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS

APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF 5 THEMES, 20 TRENDS, AND 59 IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO THEMES TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 1. The redistribution of geostrategic power. The predominance of NATO and the West is a. Challenges to the rule-based world order. likely to be increasingly challenged by emerging and resurgent powers. b. Euro-Atlantic relations and Alliance cohesion challenged. c. Increased requirement for cooperation with other actors including rising powers.

2. Use of power politics. The importance of NATO has increased for collective a. Increased potential of confrontation and conflict. L defence of the Euro-Atlantic region as it is the main framework that maintains a robust b. Nationalism and divergent risk and threat perception. and appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities. c. Requirement for a robust and credible deterrence and defence.

3. Non-state actor influence in domestic and international affairs. Non-state actors a. Growing complexity due to a wide variety of non-state actors. are expected to exert greater influence over national governments and international b. Requirement for closer cooperation with non-state actors. institutions, and their role is likely to expand. c. Increased role of private actors for security. d. Increasing concerns for the protection of civilians.

4. Challenges to governance. Emerging powers are increasingly challenging a. Duplication of existing global governance structures. established global governance institutions and requesting greater roles. Existing b. Increased requirement for partnership and inclusive governance. governance structures, particularly in weak and failing states, are not sufficiently

P O L I T I C A I T I L O P e. Projecting stability beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. addressing the requirements of the broader population.

5. Public discontent/disaffection and polarization. In western countries, risks such as a. Lack of trust in governments and institutions. undermined legitimacy of the government mandate, political impasse and the difficulty of b. Increasing polarization in the West and developing countries. implementing reforms and social polarization are likely to be increased.

6. Asymmetric demographic change. The worldwide ageing populations will cause major a. Ageing populations will strain resources. challenges for some economies and government budgets. Gender inequality will further b. Youth bulges leading to instability and migration. destabilize demographic change. However, the population in countries with a high fertility Failed integration of migrants. rate will remain relatively young, as seen in Africa, thus creating a youth bulge and c. potential for migration.

7. Increasing urbanization. Urbanization is increasing at different rates globally, with the a. Increasing urbanization might lead to resource competition. highest growth rates in the least developed parts of the world, thus creating the challenge b. Ownership and control of critical infrastructure could be of providing adequate basic services and a functioning infrastructure to ensure a contested. minimum quality of life for citizens. c. Governance challenged by uncontrolled urban growth. d. Dependence of littoral urban areas on sea lines of communication. e. Increased urbanization may require NATO involvement in urban areas. 8. Fractured and/or polarized societies. Polarization of societies has become a a. Polarization causes instability and civil war. H U M A N A U M H worldwide phenomenon; however, western developed nations are particularly b. Instability along NATO’s border is causing large-scale migration. vulnerable due to increased empowerment of individuals. Polarization can also exist c. Fractures in society might undermine trust and legitimacy. between countries.

9. Increasingly connected human networks. Human networks are expected to a. Increasingly decentralized and diverse human networks. continue to be increasingly decentralized thereby allowing unforeseeable threats. b. An increasing need to understand human networks. c. The need for influencing human networks with effective and precise strategic communication is increasing.

2020 REPORT

APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF 5 THEMES, 20 TRENDS, AND 59 IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO THEMES TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 10. Rate of technology advance. The advances in technology and innovation accelerate a. Rapid development of technology challenges interoperability. as they are fuelled by continued exponential increases in supporting computing power b. Increasing legal and ethical concerns. and advances in augmented intelligence. c. The rate of technical advancement challenges acquisition and life- cycle management processes.

11. Access to Technology. The ability of individuals, non-state and state actors to access a. Access to technology enables disruptive behaviours. technology has significantly increased. b. Uncontrolled access to technology challenges existing frameworks. 12. Global network development. Global networks will increasingly enable access to and a. The increasing number of sensors, access to data and global provide information on commodities and capital assets. Global networks will increasingly networks generates operational vulnerabilities. be used for dissemination of post-truth information. b. Opportunities to exploit the sensors, data, and global networks. c. Adversaries will use global networks for dissemination of false or misleading information.

13. Dominance of the commercial sector in technological development. The a. State approaches are not keeping up with the commercial sector. advances in defence technology developments/sales and space exploration b. The Alliance will lose perishable skills that cannot be easily /exploitation by commercial sectors have taken away the monopoly that used to be held by recovered. governments.

T E C H N O L O G Y O L O N C H E T 14. Technological dependencies. Both society, and defence and security, have a. Reliance on certain technologies will create vulnerabilities. increasingly depended on certain technologies which have become essential in b. Necessity to protect critical civilian infrastructure. everyday lives. c. Over expectations from technological solutions.

15. Globalization of financial resources. An increasingly interconnected global a. Erosion of trust in increasingly fragile financial institutions. financial system makes it more vulnerable to attacks by both state and non-state b. Lack of visibility on transactions supporting criminal and terrorist actors. activities.

c. Growing interdependencies may reduce potential for interstate conflict. 16. Geopolitical dimension of resources. Emerging technologies and the a. Natural resources will play an increasing role in power politics. exploration opportunities availed by climate change may allow the discovery of mineral and b. Resource-driven crises remain a constant. energy resources in previously inaccessible and possibly disputed regions such as the c. Climate change has the potential to disrupt traditional areas of food High North. production while offering new opportunities.

17. Increased inequality. The bulk of the world’s population, the middle class, a. Differences between the ‘haves and have-nots’ will increase. particularly in western society has felt the squeeze due to stagnation in real earnings b. Increased inequality will drive migration. after inflation adjustments, loss of benefits and overall compensation as the private sector has sought to reduce expenses by outsourcing support and labour costs and by shifting to part time versus full time employment.

18. Defence expenditure challenges in the West. A majority of NATO Nations were a. Increased defence spending due to rising regional tensions and fair

E C O N O M I C S I C O M N C O E able to change a decreasing defence spending trend into an increase in real terms in burden sharing. 2016. Political and national will would be required to sustain defence expenditures in b. Realignment of expectations with national fiscal priorities. competing priorities with limited national budgets.

19. Environmental / Climate Change. The changes in climate will bring challenges and a. Increased range of activities in the Arctic due to growing opportunities. The changes to the climate impose stresses on current ways of life, on accessibility. individual’s ability to subsist and on governments’ abilities to keep pace and provide for the b. Climate and Environmental challenges to governance. needs of their populations. c. Increased requirements for environmental awareness. d. Impacts of climate change adaptation and mitigation measures.

20. Natural disasters. Natural disasters will have increasing impact, partly due to overall a. Increased requirement for humanitarian support. increases in the severity and prevalence of severe weather events, but also due to b. Unavailability of national military assets due to natural disaster. changes in the regions and times of the year where these events may occur. c. Increased requirement to improve resilience. ENVIRONMENT

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