UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security 2020 FOREW0RD DRAFT FOREWORD This report by the North American and Arc- recognizes the need to enhance the tic Defence and Security Group (NAADSN) CAF’s presence in the region over the applies NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analy- long term by setting out the capability sis (SFA) 2017 Report, created to support investments that will give our armed NATO leadership’s visualization of the forces the mobility, reach, and foot- future security environment, to Canada’s print required to project force across the Arctic security environment in its interna- region in ways that further our national tional, regional, and domestic contexts. interests. To be strong at home, we seek Highlighting the rapid rate of change, to defend the North and work with our complexity, uncertainty, and interconnect- Arctic partners to plan and coordinate edness, it reinforces the need for creative operations to enable defence, safety and and systematic thinking so that the CAF security in this austere environment. can anticipate potential threats to Canada and Canadian interests, act proactively to This report, like the 2017 NATO SFA emerging challenges, and adapt with deci- Report that inspires it, is not intended to sive military capability across the spectrum predict the future but to suggest poten- of operations to defend Canada, protect tial trajectories for several trends and Canadian interests and values, and con- highlight their implications for the Cana- tribute to global stability. dian Defence Team, its partners, and its allies. Not everyone will agree with all The Arctic, integral to Canada and an ave- of the observations, suggestions, and nue of approach to North America, neces- potentialities suggested in this docu- sitates defence across all domains enabled ment, but offering them in a transpar- by partnerships. The CAF must be pre- ent format is useful to invite deeper pared to counter hostile foreign state and reflection, discussion, and debate. By non-state actors, or respond anywhere in providing a foundation upon which our vast area of responsibility (AOR) if help to contemplate potential futures, this is requested, whether intervention for report seeks to propel future deliber- disaster relief, support in critical incidents ations beyond general descriptions of or for search and rescue in the region. well-documented trends and instead to encourage more coordinated strategies As the area’s strategic importance grows, to anticipate and respond to potential the Government of Canada continues to risks, seize opportunities, and develop increase its Arctic and northern footprint an appropriate mix of capabilities to in support of defence safety and security. respond to rapidly changing global and This effort is anchored in Canada’s defence Arinterconnectedness, and polycen- policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged. This policy trism.may increase security risks. i UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Contents DRAFT FOREWORD I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V INTRODUCTION VII 0.1 OBJECTIVES IX 0.2 METHODOLOGY IX 0.3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT X 0.4 TERMINOLOGY XVI 0.5 STRUCTURE XVI CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE 1 1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT: STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED 2 1.2 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: TOWARDS A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH 5 1.3 COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY 8 1.4 CONFLUENCE AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS 11 POLITICAL 15 2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER 17 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS 19 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 23 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 26 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 31 2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION AND POLARIZATION 34 ENVIRONMENT 39 3.1 ENVIRONMENT 41 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS 47 ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES 51 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING 52 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 54 4.5 FISHERIES 60 ii UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT HUMAN 63 5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 65 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND URBANIZATION 67 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS 69 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES 71 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASING FRACTURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETY 74 TECHNOLOGY 79 6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT 79 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (UAS) 82 6.3 THE DEPENDENCEY ON INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ARCTIC 83 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 85 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 87 CONCLUSIONS 91 ENDNOTES 93 APPENDIX A: ARCTIC THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS 95 APPENDIX B: 2017 NATO SFA THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS 97 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 99 iii 2020 REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXECUTIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FORTHCOMING v UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER The aim of the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) The Arctic region represents an import- test the capabilities of NAADSN as a 2017 Report is to ant international crossroads where research network that can effectively identify trends issues of climate change, international and efficiently parcel out discrete work that will shape the trade, and global security meet…. packages to small teams, consolidate future strategic Arctic states have long cooperated on findings, and produce timely, relevant context and derive economic, environmental, and safety results to Defence Team stakeholders. issues, particularly through the Arctic implications for the Council, the premier body for coopera- Alliance out to 2035 tion in the region. All Arctic states have 0.2 CONCEPT and beyond. The SFA an enduring interest in continuing this The MINDS Policy Challenges for 2020- does not attempt to productive collaboration…. This rise 21 highlight how Canada’s defence pol- predict the future, in [commercial, research, and tour- icy “values the ability to anticipate new for the future is ism] activity will also bring increased challenges in order to better prepare neither predictable safety and security demands related for, and respond to, threats to Canadian nor predetermined. to search and rescue and natural or defence and security.” By anticipating It provides an [humanitarian] disasters to which emerging threats and challenges, and iterative assessment Canada must be ready to respond. better understanding the defence and of trends and their Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) security environment, the Defence implications to Team can provide timely and relevant understand and information to decision-makers, thus 0.1 AIM visualize the nature “allowing the Government to identify The purpose of this NAADSN activity is and understand emerging issues, of the dynamic and to analyse and apply the NATO Strategic events and crises in the global security complex security Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 findings to environment, and to respond appropri- environment. determine their applicability to Canadian ately and effectively.” NATO SFA 2017 Arctic defence and security policy and Strong, Secure, Engaged ( ), Canada’s Report, 11 to help frame a conceptual model that SSE 2017 defence policy, emphasizes how anticipates and conveys an understanding trends in global economic development of the future Arctic security environment. are shifting the relative power of states This will assist NAADSN and the Defence from the West to the East and how Team in creating indicators of changing major power competition has returned risk or threat levels. It is also designed to vii UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to the international system. “The Arctic is also becoming more relevant to the international community,” the white paper observes. With climate change “opening new access” to the region, “Arctic and non-Arctic states alike are looking to benefit from the potential economic oppor tunities associated with new resource development and transportation routes.” Rather than promoting a narrative of “Together the territories repre- inherent competition or impending conflict, however, the narrative points out that “Arctic sent a vast geographic area en- states have long cooperated on economic, compassing 3.9 million square environmental, and safety issues, particularly kilometers. This accounts for through the Arctic Council, the premier body nearly 40% of Canada’s landmass for cooperation in the region. All Arctic states have an enduring interest in continuing this and comprises a large part of the productive collaboration.” This last sentence longest coastline in the world, suggests that Russia (described elsewhere in with tremendous untapped the policy document as a state “willing to test economic opportunities includ- the international security environment” that had reintroduced “a degree of major power ing unparalleled natural resource competition”) does not inherently threaten development potential. The Arctic stability given its vested interests territories’ geographic expanse in the region. Accordingly, the drivers of Arctic change cited in SSE emphasize the also represent centuries of Indig- rise of security and safety challenges in the enous history, Canada’s northern Arctic rather than conventional defence identity and actual sovereignty in threats to the Arctic, thus confirming the the Arctic, both at home and on line of reasoning that has become well entrenched in defence planning over the last the international stage.” decade. Furthermore, it also highlights how international threats may pass through the - Pan-Territorial Vision and Prin- Arctic