Alpine Start Advising Response to Proposed Amendment 3 to the .COM Registry Agreement Greg Rafert, Ph.D. February 14, 2020
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Alpine Start Advising Response to Proposed Amendment 3 to the .COM Registry Agreement Greg Rafert, Ph.D. February 14, 2020 I. Executive Summary 1. This comment provides an economic analysis of Verisign, Inc.’s (Verisign) proposed price increase for .COM registrations. Based on my training as an economist, review of the available evidence, and experience with ICANN and the TLD marketplace, I conclude that there is no economic rationale for Verisign to increase prices for .COM and that increased prices will very likely harm consumers: In the face of heightened competition, which has been provided as one reason for increasing .COM pricing, economic theory and empirical economic studies predict that a firm would typically lower, not increase, prices. To my knowledge, Verisign has not provided a rationale as to why increased competition would require it to increase prices for .COM. Verisign’s gross profit and operating margins have grown significantly over time and are currently high relative to other firms. While not demonstrative as to whether Verisign has market power in the TLD Alpine Start Advising 1 marketplace, they do suggest that changes in Verisign’s costs are not driving Verisign’s interest in increasing prices for .COM. An increase in the price of .COM registrations will harm consumers worldwide, as consumers are unlikely to switch to other, less expensive TLDs due to the high costs associated with switching from a .COM domain. While Verisign may argue that it will use increased revenues from .COM price increases to further improve the security and stability of the internet, thus benefiting consumers, this is unlikely. In particular, even though Verisign’s net income has continued to grow, reaching approximately $612 million in 2019, Verisign’s R&D and capital expenditures have remained constant. 2. Finally, the argument that .COM is facing increased competition from new gTLDs and ccTLDs is not supported by the available evidence. .COM enjoys a dominant position in the TLD marketplace, which will allow Verisign to continue increasing prices (if permitted to do so), thus harming consumers. 3. I first describe my qualifications that are relevant to this matter in Section II. In Section III, I provide a brief overview of the proposed changes to Verisign’s Registry Agreement for .COM. I then detail my opinions in Section IV and summarize my conclusions in Section V. Alpine Start Advising 2 II. Qualifications 4. I am the CEO and founder of the economic consulting firm, Alpine Start Advising. I received my undergraduate degree in economics from Carleton College in 2003 and my Ph.D. in applied economics at the University of California, Berkeley in 2008. Prior to founding Alpine Start Advising, I worked at Analysis Group, Inc. as a Vice President. 5. I am an expert in industrial organization, which involves the analysis of competition and antitrust issues. As an expert in industrial organization, I have been engaged on numerous matters in which I have been asked to analyze alleged anticompetitive conduct, as well as the potential pro- and anti-competitive effects of proposed mergers. In these matters, I have assessed the likelihood of price changes and the potential impacts on consumers of such price changes. 6. I have also worked, as an independent consultant, on behalf of ICANN to analyze topics related to ICANN and the TLD marketplace. My work includes: An assessment, conducted from 2015 through 2016, of the competitive effects associated with the new gTLD program for ICANN. This study examined changes in market prices, share, and power for domain registries and registrars as a result of the program.1 Independent reviews of both the Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) and the Nominating Committee (NomCom) for ICANN.2 Both reports identified areas in which the SSAC and NomCom work well, 1 See https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/reviews/cct/competitive-effects-phase-two-assessment-11oct16-en.pdf. 2 See https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ssac-review-final-17dec18-en.pdf and https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/nomcom-review-final-05jun18-en.pdf. Alpine Start Advising 3 areas that may benefit from improvements, and whether the SSAC and NomCom are accountable to the relevant stakeholders. A review of the Trademark Clearinghouse (TMCH) in which I assessed the strengths and weaknesses of TMCH services in conjunction with the specified areas for review proposed by the General Advisory Committee (GAC). Specifically, this review was focused on the TMCH matching criteria, as well as the Claims Service and Sunrise Services.3 An analysis of the use and effectiveness of the Sunrise and Trademark Claims Rights Protection Mechanisms (RPMs) offered through the TMCH. This analysis was commissioned as part of the policy review of the RPMs chartered by the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) Council in March 2016.4 7. In addition to my work on behalf of ICANN, I have worked on numerous matters involving domain name pricing and competition within the domain name space. More broadly, I have analyzed the impacts of competition in other technology marketplaces, including broadband internet and cellular networks. III. Background – Proposed Amendment to the .COM Registry Agreement 8. Verisign, the registry operator of .COM, and ICANN announced a proposed agreement to amend the .COM Registry Agreement (.COM RA) on January 3, 2020.5 The 3 See https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/reviews/tmch/draft-services-review-25jul16-en.pdf. 4 See https://static.ptbl.co/static/attachments/191544/1540023342.pdf?1540023342. 5 See https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2020-01-03-en. Alpine Start Advising 4 stated rationale for this amendment is to “enhance the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; provide limited and transparent pricing flexibility for .COM registry services; and standardize the .COM RA by including certain technical and reporting requirements based on terms in other registry agreements between ICANN and the registry operators of other TLDs.”6 9. Importantly, the proposed amendment to the .COM RA would allow Verisign to increase the price of .COM registry services. As noted by ICANN: “Under the amended Cooperative Agreement, the Department of Commerce noted that the domain name marketplace had grown more dynamic and concluded that it was in the public interest that, among other things, Verisign and ICANN may agree to amend the .COM Registry Agreement to permit an increase to the price for .COM registry services, up to a maximum of 7 percent in each of the final four years of each six-year period (the first six-year period commenced on Oct. 26, 2018). The proposed agreement announced today updates the .COM RA to reflect those changes.”7 (Emphasis added.) 10. The stated rationale for allowing Verisign to increase .COM prices is that Verisign is facing a more “dynamic DNS marketplace”,8 in reference to .COM facing increased competition from new gTLDs, ccTLDs, and social media services. 6 See https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2020-01-03-en. 7 See https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2020-01-03-en. 8 See https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/amendment_35.pdf. Alpine Start Advising 5 11. Although Verisign currently charges $7.85 per year for a .COM registration, under the proposed amendment, Verisign could raise .COM prices to $10.26 by the end of the six-year period.9 IV. Analysis of Verisign’s Proposed Price Increase for .COM a. Summary of Conclusions 12. Based on my review of the available evidence, I conclude that there is no economic rationale for Verisign to increase prices for .COM and that price increases for .COM will harm consumers. Specifically: Economic theory demonstrates that in the face of increased competition, which is alleged to be the case for .COM, firms will typically lower prices, not seek to raise prices significantly. At the current price of $7.85 per year that Verisign charges for a .COM registration, Verisign earns high gross profit and operating margins. These margins have increased significantly during the 2009 – 2019 period, are significantly higher than a typical technology or S&P 500 firm, and will likely increase further if Verisign is permitted to increase .COM prices to $10.26 at the end of the six-year period governed by its .COM RA with ICANN. While margins cannot be used to infer whether a firm has monopoly power, Verisign’s high margins indicate that further price increases are not justified. 9 See https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2020-01-03-en. Alpine Start Advising 6 If Verisign increases the price of .COM, consumers will be harmed since individuals are unlikely to switch to other TLDs due to high switching costs, and more generally, a lack of substitutability between .COM and other TLDs. Consumers could benefit if Verisign used its higher revenues, deriving from an increase in .COM prices, to enhance the security and stability of the internet (or otherwise improve the quality of .COM), but this is unlikely given that as Verisign’s net income has grown, Verisign’s R&D and capital expenditures have not increased. 13. Finally, contrary to the argument that .COM is facing increased competition from new gTLDs and ccTLDs, I find that .COM continues to enjoy a dominant position in the TLD marketplace, which will allow Verisign to continue increasing prices, if permitted to do so, to the detriment of consumers worldwide. b. What Economics Says About the Impact of Competition on Prices 14. Economists, such as myself, have exhaustively studied the effects of competition on the prices that firms charge. This work includes both theoretical analyses that account for different market structures, which then yield testable predictions, and empirical work that uses market data to test the predictions resulting from this theoretical work.