THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INVISIBLE: AN INTERVIEW WITH

DAVID FRYER Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland

Marie Jahoda began formal study of psychology under Karl Buehler at the University of during the late 1920s. She proceeded to an institute for social and psychological research affiliated with the same University where she was awarded her PhD. In 1933, she became its director. She was imprisoned by the Austro-Fascist State Police for her activity in the Social Democratic Party of but, as a result of international appeals at the highest level, she was expelled from Austria, and thereby from her position, in 1937. She has spent the fifty years since then in prolific social psychological research and teaching in England and the U.S.A. She has held tenured faculty positions at (1949-1958), Brunel University, England (1959-1965), and the , England (1965-1973), where she was founding professor of the first Department of Social Psychology and was the first female professor there. She is currently Professor Emeritus at the University of Sussex. Her published research embraces organizational processes, occupational socialization, anti-Semitism and authoritarianism, mental health, research methods, and psychoanalysis. Current interests include artificial intelligence and personal construct theory. However, it is for her work on the psychological impact of unemployment that she is chiefly renowned. Her seminal research on the psychological repercussions of mass unemployment in the Austrian village of Marienthal (with and , 1971/1933), is an enduring classic of the field. A study on a comparable scale investigating a scheme intended to provide the psychological benefits of employment for unemployed Welsh miners is about to appear (‘Jahoda, in press, a 1938). Her concerns regarding the psvchological disadvantages of unemployment are illustrated in published dialogues between us (Fryer & Payne, 1984; Jahoda, 1984; Fryer, in press, a and b: Jahoda, in press, b). A stream of influential papers which summarize. integrate and extrapolate the evidence on this topic of considerable contemporary significance is still flowing from her pen. The interview took place in Professor Jahoda’s home in Sussex, England in July, 1985.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY DF: Your long involvement with social psychological research appears to have embraced a broad range of topics, Do any themes underlie them? MJ: I am very’ well aware that in my professtonal life I have dealt with very

10-i 108 D. Fryer different topics and the question of how to find a common theme has often baffled me. I think what is common is that all my work reallv starts from real problems rather than from the problems of social psychology as a science. DF: But your studies also seem to show that “real life” often is not quite as it initially appears. MJ: I do think that the problem in the human and social sciences is to make invisible things visible. This means that all the original purposes and intentions of people involved in a situation are from the beginning assumed to be not the whole story. It means that it is necessary to look at underlying mechanisms, forces, or whatever you want to call them, and not to take the “obvious”, that which is visible to the naked eye, for granted. This seems to me to be the chief task of the social sciences. DF: In your studies, what you discover repeatedly appears to be explained in terms of the broader social context. MJ: That’s right. I think that is really the ideal goal of good social psychology (of which, in my view, very little exists so far), namely to take the interaction between individual functioning and the broader social context truly seriously. A lot of social psychology is very interesting but only pays lip service to the social context and doesn’t take it as a topic for systematic analysis. Take a typical psychological theory, which is mis-named a social psychological theory, Attribution Theory. Attribution Theory says you should make up your mind about any issue by considering how often it has happened, how many other people agree with you, etc. But there are studies, particularly the very fascinating work of Kahneman 8c Tversky (e.g. 1979) that show that people don’t behave like they should behave if they lived their lives as perfect statisticians. Attribution Theory has thereby not disappeared from the scene. The discovery that people don’t actually behave that way is taken as a discovery about people rather than a reason for doing away with that normative theory. It certainly isn’t a social psycho- logical theory because it is completely impervious to whether the judge- ment is in a situation of utter personal risk or whether the judgement is just when you are talking to the greengrocer. I can’t believe that judgements in these two types of situations could follow one simple-minded normative theory of what attribution is about. Attribution Theory is really psycho- logical social psychology. What I have been after all the ttme, with more or less success unfortunately, is to keep the interaction between the social world and the functioning of the individual jointly, simultaneously, in mind. DF: How do you maintain a balance between allowing individuals the freedom to vary, as your studies show they do, and also giving sufficient weight to the very powerful social forces operating? MJ: Well, it’s darned difficult. I’m not sure that I’ve ever managed to do it to my own satisfaction. Years ago, in Washington, DC, during the McCarthy period, I did a study about the impact of this terrible problem on the The social psychology of’ the invisible 1WI

thinking of federal civil servants who were not themselves being investi- gated. In essence, what I did in that study was describe the general climate and collect individual interpretative case studies of what these people within it did. I had about fifty personal interviews with such people, and when you look at that many responses to such a threatening atmosphere, you do find some common themes. Nobody was unaffected by what happened and some people went so far as to burn their books with left-wing titles. Other people were just worried about what somebody else might say about them. So. there were lots of individual differences but there was a common awareness of threat and a common wish to do what would safeguard the individual as much as possible. It was not, of course, an ideal study and I’m not sure how really to do one. You see this task of simultaneously, analytically, thinking about the individual in society is just so darned difficult because the concepts vary, the units of observation vary, the methods vary, the tradition of thought and the theories vary. When I look at individuals, or when I look at theories and methods for the social web in any form, and try to bring them together, it makes me think that social psychology is almost too difficult to be tackled. But, then, it is also too fascinating to be left alone. So there we are: one has to try. DF: Does a fascination with a social psychological perspective on change underlie your work? MJ: That’s right. This is why I see social psychology truly as a field of its own, influenced by psychology, but not really psychology. So many wonderful psychological experiments set out to discover the invariant. Now, in real life, everything varies all the time, permanently. If you want to be nearer to the problems of the real world, you have to be interested in change, because everything you observe is in change, influenced by both the make-up of the individual person and by the major social events. DF: Turning to methodolog?, would you say your work is characterized by attempts at triangulation? MJ: I think that is terribly important, because one realizes the shortcomings of every single available method. One just has more confidence in a finding if it is broadly confirmed through a variety of approaches to the same problem. One also has more confidence if different researchers, with their different backgrounds, biases, and ideas, tackle the same subject and come out with converging results. For the individual investigator to rely on any one method seems to me, given our knowledge of the shortcomings of everything we try, a bit rash. DF: If one cannot have confidence in a single method used alone, how can one be sure that by using several such methods together one is not multiplying error? MJ: I think it’s a distinct logical possibility that this might occur. But, you see, the possible findings are innumerable. The one finding in which you believe in the end is one out of a set of very many possibilities. Unless the same errors are introduced in every single method, the coincidence of 110 D. Fryer

similar results from three different methods is really quite remarkable. The methodological difficulties in social psychology are legion and I am not aware that any one is solved in a totally satisfactory way. But, then, I also believe that the field develops through the shortcomings of any ongoing investigation and that one gets more sophisticated by having tried to capture a piece of living reality while also realizing where the shortcomings are.

EMPLOYMENT/UNEMPLOYMENT DF: Does your research on employment and unemployment suggest that the consequences of social institutions become internalized and experienced as being subjective purposes? MJ: I don’t quite agree with that interpretation. I do think that participation in institutions such as employment has a compelling influence on the nature of experience. But enormous individual differences in the interpretation of these experiences exist, of course. Everybody involved in the employment situation cannot help but have certain types of psychological experience: you have to go to your employment, you have to mix with people whom you haven’t chosen, etc. This applies to all the five latent functions of employment mentioned in my published work*, and even one that isn’t there, namely the control function that most employment prescribes from above for the employee about what he or she is supposed to be doing. Of course, there are individual variations. Whether it’s on the shopfloor or in a university, you get an assignment that’s inescapable but you interpret it as best you can, as best as it suits you. The broad category is indeed prescribed by the arrangements in the social world. What you do with that experience will, of course, vary tremendously. If there is a war, it influences every single person in the country that is at war and it is inescapable, but it’s not only an extraordinary situation like a war. If you go into a dance hall, whether you hate the affair or love it, certain types of contentful experiences are unavoidable. You hear the noise of rock music and you see people doing things they wouldn’t do in a church or a supermarket. All this is common experience enforced by the environment. Its interpretation becomes an individual matter. DF: Could you explain in more detail the notion of latent consequences of employment? MJ: Well, the latent consequences idea, which really goes back to Bob Merton, seems to me so important in the light of what we said before about making the invisible - the unplanned, the undesired, the unconsidered - visible and obvious. What I mean by talking of latent consequences of employment is that the deliberate, overt, admitted purpose of those who organize employment is, if you want to be friendly, the creation of goods and services, but if you want to be realistic, it is the making of profit. That is the

*See, for example, Jahoda (1982). The social psychology of the invisible 111

purpose that overrides everything else. But, in order to meet that purpose, the employer has to impose certain time experiences, goals, and so on, upon everybody in the enterprise. These are not considered; they are not instituted with a view of what it means for the personal experience of others They are done to serve the major motive of the whole enterprise. So what I really want, recognizing that enterprises and employment as an institution will exist for a long time to come, is that these latent consequences should be made overt, so that they can be tackled within the general organization of an enterprise. I think that human beings have some rather fundamental needs which, over the two hundred or so years of industrialism, they have learned to satisfy within an industrial environment. In terms of social policy, the nature and contact of the experience provide an agenda for the humanization of work which it very badly needs. We all know that time experience, or the profit purpose of the enterprise, or the miserable treatment that some supervisors give those whom they supervise, are often very negative experiences for the employee. Unfortunately, one of the really terrible consequences of the general, overriding concern with unemployment is that the trade unions have moved away from demands for change in the quality of working life. So many of the people in employment are so fearful of the possibility of unemployment that they themselves do not press for changes in the job even if it is a very repetitive, burdensome, disliked type of activity. Nevertheless, being in employment is more satisfying than suffering unemployment. What I have found so striking in so many cases is that even when the previous job was consciously experienced as bad, many people suffer when they are unemployed. This suffering is not only financial, even though the financial is, of course, a very serious consideration. As human beings, we all have some very basic needs which we do not formulate to ourselves. I do not think that these needs are unconscious in the Freudian sense; they are not repressed needs that one does not want to recognize. They are so taken for granted that they do not engage the explicit conscious thought of a person as long as the world is reasonably normal. Only when this taken for granted satisfaction of a need - to have a time structure for example - disappears through no action of your own does the question of how to structure your time become a conscious, deliberate problem. DF: Given that the categories of experience to which you point are enforced by social institutions other than employment, surely unemployment does not lead to lack of access to any one category but to a different sort of experience within that category? DF: For most people, it’s not easy to switch to other forms of these basic categories of experience and do it out of their own initiative when they have been used to expecting one form to be the rule of life. If a rule has been taken away, the question is, can you or can you not make another rule for yourself that meets the basic need? Take the need that I think most people have for possessing some structure to their time experience. Now, if a 112 D. Fryer

person - for whatever reason, maybe through bad experience of the industrial climate of the country - finds himself or herself unable to construct a new environment in which new rules exist that meet the need for some time structure, then he or she will suffer, feeling deprived of something assumed to be the natural order of things and which has all of a sudden disappeared. Employment, in people’s experience of themselves and their life situation, is by and large more constructive than being unemployed, even if it isn’t “good”. This makes nonsense of this very frequent talk of “voluntary” unemployment: that people just don’t want to work, that all interest in employment has disappeared, and they live happily on whatever they get from the state. I think this is quite an incorrect and pernicious interpretation of the general situation. DF: Does your account predict that even were some unemployed people to choose unemployment voluntarily they would still suffer many of the psychological consequences? MJ: Yes, unless, out of their own initiative, they could find or create situations that made possible the satisfaction of their needs for feeling needed, for doing something that had consequences beyond themselves, for being able to structure their time, and for being engaged with other people. DF: Is one thrown back on explanation at the individual level to account for that form of behaviour? Or do you think it is possible that it could be explained in terms of social structures? MJ: This illustrates Kurt Lewin’s difficult concept of circular causality. To be sure, whether a person does or does not find an alternative for the environment of employment depends very much on personal qualities and personal history. But these personal qualities and personal history have in the past been shaped by the type of environment to which the person was exposed. Before unemployment hits, you have the impact of the industrial climate on people, their social background, the opportunities they have or have not had to develop themselves fully, and you have all these in interplay with the gifts and abilities and qualities of individuals. A few can escape from the pressure that the previous environment has exercised on them, but not many. The difficult question is to decide whether the explanation for the inability to take a creative initiative should be blamed on the previous social experience or has something to do with the make-up of the individual that is relatively independent of the previous social experience.

EMPLOYING THEORY AND RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY DF: Do you believe the search for a single theory is a good idea? Or do you prefer that there should be many different theories? MJ: In thinking about the natural sciences and the social sciences, I think there is one very fundamental difference. tiIost natural scientists regard the establishment of a comprehensive theory as the desired end goal of their activities. Now, I think in the social sciences theories have more the character of tools towards the enlargement of substantive knowledge about some aspect of the world in which we live. Of course. theories are The social psychology of the invisible 1 1:3

important. In the social sciences, we have not got a theory on which a great number of practitioners are agreed that it is the best tool for thinking about the world. Since there is no theory that is a generally accepted guide for all understanding of the social world, I think that the consideration of diverse theories is a better guide to the enlargement of knowledge than selling one’s soul on a single theory. Also, social scientists are just as human as other people. When you have a favourite theory, it is very hard to liberate yourself from the bias that is involved whenever you accept one explanation for the multi-explicable phenomena of the psychological and social world. So the only safeguard really is that you have different investigators with different theoretical preferences, using their tools to study similar phenomena in the real world. DF: What more precisely do you mean by “substantive knowledge”? MJ: Take Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory. This theory, if I trivialize it, says that all human behaviour is a function of environment and personality. That may cover the universe but it doesn’t tell anybody concretely what to expect or what will happen in any concrete situation. This theory may be a very good guide for looking out in the real world, prompting one to enquire, for example, how becoming unemployed is modified by the conditions of employment and personal qualities, but it does not tell you whether the unemployed are happy when they are rid of their terrible jobs or whether they are unhappy and do not quite know what to do with themselves. Theories are theories by virtue of the fact that they cover a multitude of phenomena in different situations. What I am interested in as a social scientist is to know something about specified people and situations. That is what I call substantive knowledge. DF: What place do you think, then, that falsification of theory has in social psychology as a science? MJ: Look, if someone could come to me, like Skinner might, and say, “Kurt Lewin is wrong: behaviour is a function of the environment only, not of the personality - anybody can be operant conditioned to do anything you want,” and if he could prove this to me (although I don’t believe he could), I would then say “Alright, that theory of Kurt Lewin’s was a bad tool and I had better go over into the Skinner camp and accept that the environment can shape everybody into everything.” However, the falsification of a theory in the social sciences is actually tremendously difficult and has not been done very often. DF: At the opposite extreme from falsification of theory, what would your view be of “action research” as a species of social scientific work? MJ: Action research has so many different interpretations, it is more than just an evaluation of an actual bit of reality, it is really involving the participants in a situation in doing the research with the aim of changing that situation. I think it’s a very important part of applying social science thinking to changing actual situations, but I’m not aware that it has anywhere yet added significantly, to our knowledge about the world. In a way, its too situation bound: it’s too dependent on who the particular people and what the 114 D. Fryer

idiosyncratic social attributions of the situation are that can help or hinder a deliberate change process. DF: If significant advances in knowledge come neither from verifying or falisfying theories nor from action research, from what ground do they spring? MJ: The standard methodology books say new questions come from disagree- ment about theories or from the general field and its development. I am not convinced that this is right and I don’t think it would fit me. I think new questions come from total immersion, as far as possible, in the phe- nomenon that you are studying. In my own case, it is the personal involvement with the life experiences of people who are in the situation that gives rise to my study topic. That’s why I’m often so suspicious of the over-organized way of doing research, where there is one chap sitting at a desk, thinking it all out, devising the plan, while other people go and collect material, other people come and analyse the material, and the somebody writes a final report. This going away from the raw data of experience, looking at it only from a distance in a theoretical frame of mind, loses out on an enormously important source of insight, queries, and puzzles that strike you only when you are close to the phenomenon. Very often, such an over-organized approach reduces research to a technicality where thinking and contribution of individual minds does not count. When you have thirty people all on different steps of a research hierarchy involved in doing work, there cannot be the amount of thought contribution that you get if a researcher tries to be involved in every single process. Total immersion in the phenomenon is certainly no guarantee for coming up with meaningful new questions, but I think it’s one way that should be tried more than it is. Of course, I shouldn’t generalize. Some new questions come from seeing two approaches not fitting very well. Criticisms of one’s work is also a very good source of reformulating questions or maybe, with luck, even for finding new questions. So I have to modify what I said before: immersion in the phenomenon is not the only way. Criticism and controversy are also very important in leading to a different approach and to new question asking. This is almost admitting that different theoretical assumptions are, after all, also a way of coming to new questions. I don’t think, however, that there is a Royal Road to good question asking. I was always very much impressed with Freud in that respect because what he did, day in day out for very many years, was to involve himself in the very concrete psychological problems that his patients presented to him. This made him think, rightly or wrongly, of ways of conceptualizing the function of the human mind. Just thinking and theorizing I do not believe would ever have achieved this.

THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY DF: Do you think social psychological research is sufficiently evident in the public debate about the future of work? The social psychology of the invisible 115 MJ: No, I think it is under-rated, and in part it is the fault of the researchers. You see, so much very good social psychological research is presented and maybe even conducted only for communication with one’s own narrow professional community and not directed towards outsiders, to the community. Every discipline develops jargon, undoubtedly necessary, but with such reality-oriented research as that on employment and unemploy- ment, it seems to me there is an overwhelming obligation to present it also in forms that don’t require having taken a Methods course and learned the vocabulary of the social sciences. I think this could be changed with a deliberate communication effort on the part of the social psychological community to write with the idea, not of impressing one’s colleagues with how clever one is, but with the aim of communicating to the mind that is untrained in social psychology. In part, social psychological research does not have more effect because every person not trained in social psychology is his or her own social psychologist. Every political leader thinks that he or she knows exactly what people’s attitudes are, what motivates people, what situations should be created, and what is tolerable or intolerable. I think that common sense social psychology is in many cases quite reasonable. But as a permanent guide, it is very unreliable, even more unreliable than our beginnings at systematic knowledge about it. A third reason of why we aren’t more effective than we are is that there is relatively little good social psychology available. DF: “Good” in which sense? MJ: “Good” in the sense of truly illuminating the functioning of people in their social context. When you look over the entire area of social psychological research, the one case that’s normally mentioned as really having had significant impact on social policy is the set of studies of desegregation in the United States - the research on the segregated education of children before the Supreme Court Ruling in 1954 that outlawed segregation. Now there were some good studies there and some first rate people were involved. Everybody in the States is very proud that Footnote 11 of the Supreme Court decision quotes social science studies as showing that segregation is bad for both whites and blacks. However, there have been attacks on that research quite recently. People have said there were generalizations that were not truly justified. Other people have said the change of desegregation would have come in any case, social science and famous footnote or not. So it is a difficult field, although it’s not more difficult than life is in general.

BIOGRAPHICAL FACTORS DF: I am interested in how the events during your life - the people, the institu- tions, the accidents 2 have affected the way your research has developed. MJ: I am very much convinced that, whether we admit it or not, extra-scientific factors influence virtually everybody’s thinking, particularly in the social sciences. Maybe phyicists and astronomers are relatively free from such social influences. but even there it probably plays a role. I think personal 116 D. Fryer life history must have an influence on the way thinking develops. DF: Can you remember the factors that led you to take up and maintain a career in social science? MJ: The whole body of ideas that is assumed under the name Austro-Marxism, the political ideas and social ideas in the sense of the old social democratic party were a very strong influence. My decision to study psychology was based on my very, very deep conviction that I would one day be Minister of Education in a socialist Austria. Psychology seemed to me to be the best preparation for that job which was the one job in life that I wanted. This great illusion led me into psychology. I can’t tell you how surprised I was when I went to my first university lecture and Karl Buehler started explaining the anatomy of the ear to deal with sensation. It didn’t seem that was what I expected, but I learned better. Buehler was a great man, a great, gentle scholar. The other thing that very much influenced the direction my thinking about social psychology took was the coincidence of my very active involvement in the social democratic party in Austria and later on in the underground movement. These were the two great influences on my study of psychology. The political activity was overwhelmingly concerned with the impact of the environment on people and the psychology studies were overwhelmingly concerned with the development and the functioning of individuals and differences among them. What was new in the social psychology that emerged in Vienna in the late 20s and early 30s was exactly this: the combination not just of quantitative and qualitative thinking but of true sociological and psychological thinking. Of course, there were lots of sociologists and psychologists before us and lots of sociologists made common sense assumptions about the functioning of people and lots of psychologists ignored the functioning of society. But through the coincidence of studying one side of this interaction while being actively involved in the other side, came this combination of trying to think simultaneously about both. I think that was a very decisive influence on the way my thinking has developed. And then having to leave Austria, being expelled. I was released from prison only on condition I would leave the country immediately. We used to say when we were ironically inclined in those days, “Join the refugees and see the world”. This contact with a totally different culture, the transition from Austria to England and then the transition to America with, again, a different culture, then the transition back here, these changes in my life, which were really determined largely by world history, were a very good education for social psychology: the direct experience, the direct involvement and feeling within one’s own skin how different cultures can be, even when they speak the same languages as here and in America. When I came to England in between the great stream of German refugees who came earlier and the great stream of Austrian refugees who came later, when the catastrophe was completely clear in Austria, I started The social psychology of the invisible 117

a sort of‘ Austrian self-help organization in an effort to get visas and sponsors for Austrian refugees. That, of course, brought me into close contact with a lot of them, including some social scientists. In repeated meetings with Henri Tajfel, the experience of being a refugee became quite a favourite topic. Through my meandering life in different countries, I was struck by how much new learning you had to do to come to terms with social science development in its culturally specific way. Social compulsion to pick things up came from the cultural dominance of various ideas and was really in the end very educational. As for people, the early influence was Paul Lazarsfeld, to whom I was married for a very short time. He really had an outstanding mind and his influence - particularly in relation to quantification that would otherwise have left me cold - was, I am sure, very important. Karl and Charlotte Buehler were important, as was Freud. My own personal analyst, Heinz Hartmann, was very important. Only when I went to the States in 1945 did I become fully aware of Lewin’s work and his ideas. DF: What role do you think your gender played in your career? MJ: When I grew up, in my family and in the particular part of Austrian culture in which I grew up, the idea that a woman was to be educated and have a life outside the house as much as a man was a matter of course. And so it was also in the socialist youth movement. It did not strike me as anything special. I became chairman of some socialist youngsters’ organization. Nobody, none of the boys in the organization and none of the girls, thought about the fact that I was a woman. In that part of Austrian culture, full equality was really realized. It wasn’t quite the same thing in England. When I became Professor at Sussex, there were then something like 45 professors, and I was the only woman. For a long time, both in England and America, being a woman professor was an advantage rather than a disadvantage because there were relatively few of us and there was some consciousness that a woman should be given a chance and also a sort of complacent security: “One woman among 45 professors cannot do us any’ harm”. When one was in such a small minority, one did not present a danger to the majority. Only as more and more women came into the field, people in many universities in the States and I suppose also here, crystallized their fear that women might get too much power.

THE CONCEPT OF FIT DF: Is there a question I should have asked? MJ: You should have asked me whether I have a favourite paper of mine and I would have mentioned A Social-Psychological Approach to the Study of Culture published in Human Relations in 196 1. It develops an idea of how to identify the ethos of a community. When people do studies about communities, they go into great descriptions and say “This is the industry, and so many people live there,” and all the rest of it. But there is more in the ethos of a community than these hard background facts. It has to do with the organization of society bringing to the fore certain value concepts, and 118 D. Fryer

these are very hard to describe. Now I called my idea the concept of “the fit”. If you can identify a group of people who feel totally at home in a community, their values, which you can get by interviewing and direct questioning, are bound to reflect the values that the community empha- sizes. In the States, to give you an example, Robert Merton and I did a study of two housing projects. I first formulated the concept in the analysis of these data. In one community, it was middle aged negro women who completely identified with that community. In the other community, it was white skilled workers who said “This is my place,” in a variety of ways. From this one fact you can almost arrive at a complete description of what went on in terms of voluntary organizations, in terms of contact with the outside world, in terms of local community politics. They are totally different communities that spring to mind if you have identified two so different groups of people who are completely identified with them. It seemed to me such a good idea to move away from the relative vagueness of describing just what you thought was essential and only capturing the objective features, rather than the value emphasis in which cultures differ so enormously. DF: In which community do you feel totally at home, a sense of lit, yourself? MJ: If I want to be high falutin, I can say “I am a world citizen”. But if I want to be true, oh, I’m just a rootless refugee. DF: Thank you.

REFERENCES

Fryer D. & Payne R. (1984) Proactive behaviour in unemployment: Findings and implications. Leisure Studies, 3, 273-295. Fryer D. (in press, a) Employment deprivation and personal agency during unemploy- ment: a critical discussion of Jahoda’s explanation of the psychological effects of unemployment. Social Behauiour: an International Jounzal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 1. Fryer D. (in press, b) On defending the unattacked: a comment upon Jahoda’s Defence. Social Behauiour: an International Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 1. Jahoda M. (1961) A social-psychological approach to the study of culture. Human Relations, 14, 23-30. Jahoda M. (1982) Employment and unemployment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jahoda M. (1984) Social institutions and human needs: A comment on Fryer and Payne. Leisure Studies, 3, 297-299. Jahoda M. (in press, a) Unemployed men at work. In D. M. Fryer and P. Ullah (Eds), The experience of unemplqment. Milton Keynes, U.K.: Open University Press. (Originally published in 1938). Jahoda M. (in press, b) In defence of a non reductionist social psychology. Social Behaviour: an International Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 1. Jahoda M., Lazarsfeld P. F. & Zeisel H. (197 1) Marienthal: The sociography of an unemployed community. New York: Aldine-Atherton. (Originally published in 1933). Kahneman D. 8c Tversky A. (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica. 47, 263-9 1.