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San Jose State University SJSU ScholarWorks Master's Projects Master's Theses and Graduate Research Spring 2012 CRYPTSIM: SIMULATORS FOR CLASSIC ROTOR CIPHERS Miao Ai San Jose State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects Part of the Computer Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Ai, Miao, "CRYPTSIM: SIMULATORS FOR CLASSIC ROTOR CIPHERS" (2012). Master's Projects. 246. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.qwbk-r48p https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/246 This Master's Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Projects by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CRYPTSIM: SIMULATORS FOR CLASSIC ROTOR CIPHERS A Project Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Computer Science San Jose State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science by Miao Ai May 2012 c 2012 Miao Ai ALL RIGHTS RESERVED The Designated Project Committee Approves the Project Titled CRYPTSIM: SIMULATORS FOR CLASSIC ROTOR CIPHERS by Miao Ai APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY May 2012 Dr. Mark Stamp Department of Computer Science Dr. Soon Tee Teoh Department of Computer Science Dr. Richard Low Department of Mathematics ABSTRACT CryptSim: Simulators for Classic Rotor Ciphers by Miao Ai In this project, web-based visual simulators have been implemented for three classic rotor cipher machines: Enigma, Typex, and Sigaba. Enigma was used by Germany during World War II, while Typex is a British cipher that was based on the commercial version of the Enigma. Sigaba is a relatively complex machine that was used by the Americans during the 1940s and into the 1950s. Sigaba is the most secure of the three ciphers, there was no successful attack on Sigaba during its service lifetime. Our web-based visual simulators are functionally equivalent to the actual electro- mechanical machines. Each simulator allows the user to initialize the key and encrypt or decrypt. Also, each simulator provides a web-based \play station" that allows the user to understand how these classic ciphers work by observing their internal operations when encrypting and decrypting. These simulators do not require any installation, and users can access the simulators provided they have access to the Internet. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS To my mother who raised me to be the person I am today. v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 Introduction ................................ 1 1.1 Previous Work . 1 1.2 Project Overview . 1 2 Background ................................ 3 2.1 Enigma . 3 2.1.1 Enigma Cipher Machine Overview . 3 2.1.2 Enigma Cipher Machine Components . 4 2.1.3 Enigma Encryption . 11 2.1.4 Enigma Decryption . 13 2.2 Typex . 13 2.2.1 Typex Cipher Machine Overview . 14 2.2.2 Typex Cipher Machine Components . 14 2.2.3 Typex Encryption . 17 2.2.4 Typex Decryption . 19 2.3 Sigaba . 19 2.3.1 Sigaba Cipher Machine Overview . 20 2.3.2 Sigaba Cipher Machine Components . 20 2.3.3 Sigaba Encryption . 23 2.3.4 Sigaba Decryption . 27 3 Simulators ................................. 29 vi 3.1 Components Visualization . 30 3.1.1 Keyboard Visualization . 31 3.1.2 Rotor Visualization . 32 3.1.3 Reflector Visualization . 33 3.1.4 Enigma Stecker and Lightboard Visualization . 33 3.1.5 Sigaba Index Rotor Visualization . 35 3.2 Key Setup Visualization . 35 3.2.1 Enigma key Setup Phase Visualization . 35 3.2.2 Typex key Setup Phase Visualization . 41 3.2.3 Sigaba key Setup Phase Visualization . 44 3.3 Visual Simulations for Three Classic Ciphers . 49 3.3.1 Visual Simulation for Enigma . 50 3.3.2 Simulation Visualization for Typex . 58 3.3.3 Simulation Visualization for Sigaba . 62 4 Conclusion and Future work ...................... 69 4.1 Conclusion . 69 4.2 Future Work . 70 APPENDIX A Enigma Verification ........................... 73 B Typex Verification ............................ 76 B.1 Justification for correctness of Typex reverse rotor . 76 B.2 Typex test cases . 77 vii C Sigaba Verification ............................ 80 C.1 Justification for correctness of Sigaba reverse rotor . 80 C.2 Sigaba test cases . 81 viii LIST OF TABLES 1 Five Enigma cipher rotor alternatives [9] . 7 2 Notch for Enigma cipher rotor [6] . 8 3 Eight Typex cipher rotor alternatives [20] . 15 4 Ten Sigaba cipher or control rotor alternatives [3] . 22 5 Five Sigaba index rotor alternatives [3] . 23 6 Index rotor inputs activation [3] . 24 7 Cipher rotor stepping table [3] . 24 8 A complete sample Enigma key . 41 9 A complete sample Typex key . 44 10 A complete sample Sigaba key . 52 ix LIST OF FIGURES 1 Enigma cipher [8] . 4 2 Signal goes through one cipher rotor [9] . 5 3 Signal goes through two cipher rotors [9] . 5 4 Signal goes through two cipher rotor with displacement [9] . 6 5 Enigma cipher rotor bank . 7 6 Enigma cipher rotor [10] . 9 7 Signal goes through Enigma reflector . 10 8 Real WWII Enigma stecker [15] . 11 9 Enigma diagram [16] . 12 10 Typex diagram [19] . 14 11 Typex rotor bank . 16 12 Typex rotor in forward orientation [12] . 16 13 Typex rotor in reverse orientation [12] . 16 14 Typex diagram [12] . 18 15 Sigaba cipher [25] . 20 16 Sigaba rotors [27] . 21 17 Sigaba rotor in forward orientation [10] . 22 18 Sigaba rotor in reverse orientation [10] . 22 19 Index rotor orientation [10] . 23 20 Control rotor bank . 25 21 Control and index permutations [26] . 26 x 22 Sigaba encrypt diagram [26] . 26 23 Sigaba decrypt diagram [26] . 28 24 Visual simulator entrance page . 29 25 Enigma selected . 30 26 Enigma keyboard visualization . 31 27 Typex or Sigaba keyboard visualization . 31 28 Keyboard visualization, letter D is pressed . 31 29 Keyboard visualization, space key is pressed . 32 30 An individual rotor visualization . 32 31 An individual reflector visualization . 33 32 Enigma stecker visualization, default setting . 34 33 Enigma keyboard, stecker and lightboard visualization . 34 34 Sigaba index rotor visualization . 35 35 Enigma cipher rotors setup visualization . 36 36 Enigma cipher rotors setup visualization, after setup . 37 37 Enigma reflector setup visualization . 38 38 Enigma reflector setup visualization, select Reflector 1 . 38 39 Enigma stecker setup visualization, default setting . 39 40 Enigma stecker setup visualization, de-select default setting . 40 41 Enigma stecker setup visualization, re-wire A to J . 40 42 Enigma stecker setup visualization, re-wire S to O . 41 43 Typex rotors setup visualization . 42 44 Typex rotors setup visualization, after setup . 43 xi 45 Sigaba rotors setup visualization . 45 46 Sigaba cipher rotors setup visualization, after setup . 46 47 Sigaba control rotors setup visualization . 47 48 Sigaba control rotors setup visualization, after setup . 48 49 Sigaba index rotors setup visualization . 49 50 Sigaba index rotors setup visualization, after setup . 50 51 Sigaba operation mode selection visualization . 51 52 Sigaba operation mode selection visualization, choose encryption . 51 53 Visual simulation of Enigma . 53 54 Visual simulation of Enigma, operation begins . 54 55 Visual simulation of Enigma, \Input and Output" box . 55 56 Visual simulation of Enigma, encrypt output . 55 57 Output of the Enigma Flash simulator . 56 58 Visual simulation of Enigma, decrypt output . 57 59 Enigma middle cipher rotor \double stepping" . 57 60 Enigma middle cipher rotor \double stepping", verified . 58 61 Visual simulation of Typex . 59 62 Visual simulation of Typex, operation begins . 60 63 Visual simulation of Typex, encrypt output . 61 64 Output of a Typex simulator coded using C . 61 65 Visual simulation of Typex, decrypt output . 62 66 Visual simulation of Sigaba . 64 67 Visual simulation of Sigaba, encrypt operation begins . 65 xii 68 Visual simulation of Sigaba, decrypt operation begins . 66 69 Visual simulation of Sigaba, encrypt output . 67 70 Ciphertext generated from a Windows-based Sigaba simulator . 68 71 Visual simulation of Sigaba, decrypt output . 68 xiii CHAPTER 1 Introduction During World War II, a large number of cipher machines were made and used by different countries. For example, Enigma was invented and used by Germany; Typex was developed by the British based on the commercial Enigma; and Sigaba was a superior electro-mechanical, rotor-based cipher machine created by the Americans. These classic ciphers, which once played an important role in history, represented a major achievement of human ingenuity and the technologies they used paved the way for modern computers and cryptographic systems. 1.1 Previous Work Scholars and students around the world have already done a lot of research on classic ciphers and simulators have been created as well. In 1980 Marian Rejewski published the first paper detailing the Polish cryptanalysts successes in breaking the Enigma [1]. Frank Spiess implemented a Flash simulator that visualizes the three- rotor-Enigma, including German, Polish, Italian and Spanish versions [2]. Wing On Chan and Heather Ellie Kwong both wrote papers about the Sigaba cipher, and described attacks on it [3] [4]. Geoff Sullivan and Frode Weierud have done a large amount of research on various classic ciphers, and Geoff Sullivan implemented a series of visual simulators, including Enigma, Sigaba, etc [5]. 1.2 Project Overview Certain limitations can be found in the previously mentioned simulators. For example, the Flash simulator created by Frank Spiess, only simulates the three-rotor 1 Enigma, does not include any other classic ciphers; also it does not allow the user to change Enigma's reflector within two alternatives. Another example is the series of visual simulators implemented by Geoff Sullivan. They simulate various classic cipher.
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