$14.95 praise for Preble CHRISTOPHER A. PREBLE is the vice president for defense and for- P E A C E, W A R, and LIBERTY eign policy studies at the Cato Institute. In its dealings with the He is the author of three books, including broader world, has the The Power Problem: How American Mil- itary Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less P E A C E, W A R, P E A C E, United States been a Prosperous, and Less Free (Cornell, 2009), “ Lapidary, lucid, and libertarian, Preble’s elegant essay diagnoses the force for liberty? Should and has coedited several other books and advanced diseases that have infected the American body politic since it be? And if so, how? monographs, including most recently Our its leaders abandoned the prudent strategies bequeathed by its Founders Foreign Policy Choices: Rethinking Ameri- from George Washington to John Quincy Adams. Global intervention has become an addiction that enervates and bankrupts the United States, WAR, ca’s Global Role (Cato, 2016) with Emma Ashford and Travis Evans. His work has while betraying the liberty it purports to spread.” To answer these questions, Peace, appeared in the New York Times, the Wash- — WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, Alloy-Ansin Professor of International War, and Liberty: Understanding U.S. ington Post, Foreign Policy, and other major Relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Pulitzer Prize–winning historian and Foreign Policy traces the history of publications, and he is a frequent guest on United States foreign policy and the television and radio. Preble also teaches “Writing logically and forcefully, Cato’s Christopher Preble uses history ideas that have animated it, and con- the U.S. Foreign Policy elective at the Uni- and philosophy to assess the trajectory of American militarism from siders not only whether America’s versity of California, Washington Center, Washington to Trump. His cost-benefit analysis is sobering, and the and policy choices have made the world and is a member of the Council on Foreign LIBERTY safer and freer but also the impact of ‘revisionist’ rules of engagement he proposes are well reasoned. Never Relations. He holds a PhD in history from more so than today, Peace, War, and Liberty demands the attention of those choices on freedom at home. Temple University and is a former com- readers across the ideological spectrum.” In this evenhanded but uncom- missioned officer in the U.S. Navy. LIBERTY promising commentary, Christopher —RICHARD H. IMMERMAN, author of Empire for Liberty Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy A. Preble considers the past, present, and future of U.S. foreign policy: @capreble “ Chris Preble continues to contribute an important perspective, chal- why policymakers in the past made lenging some conventional wisdoms and ostensibly consensual views on certain choices, the consequences COVER DESIGN BY FACEOUT STUDIO, CHARLES BROCK the basis of an admirable mix of well-grounded history and insightful COVER IMAGE 1814, MAP OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of those choices, and how the world contemporary analysis.” might look if America chose a dif- —BRUCE W. JENTLESON, Duke University ferent path for the future. Would America—and the world—be freer CHRISTOPHER A. PREBLE if America’s foreign policy were more restrained? @CatoInstitute / @Libertarianism #CatoBooks Peace-War-Liberty-DJ-MECH-v4.indd 1 2/27/19 1:36 PM Copyright ©2019 by the Cato Institute. All rights reserved. Print ISBN: 978-1-948647-16-8 eBook ISBN: 978-1-948647-17-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available. Cover design: Charles Brock, Faceout Studio. Interior design: TIPS Technical Publishing, Inc. Printed in Canada. Cato Institute 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 www.cato.org To the scholars and staff of the Cato Institute, and to our generous supporters Contents Preface . ix 1. Introduction: War Is the Health of the State . 1 Part I. A Brief History of U.S. Foreign Policy 2. The American Founders, the State, and War . 17 3. The Anti-Imperial Empire . 29 4. Imperialists Triumphant? . 41 5. The World Wars and Their Lessons . 59 6. The Permanent Warfare State . 77 7. Post-9/11: Terrorizing Ourselves . 99 Part II. The Elements of Modern Libertarian Foreign Policy 8. The Case for Skepticism . 117 9. The Problem with American Primacy . 131 10. Free Riders, Reckless Drivers, and Perilous Partners . 143 11. Forcing Freedom . 161 12. The Global Economy . 173 13. New Rules . 181 14. Promised Land . 195 Acknowledgments . 205 Notes . 207 Selected Bibliography and Recommended Readings . 227 Index . 237 About the Author . 249 vii Preface This is a short book about a big topic: foreign policy. In the widest sense, a particular country’s foreign policy pertains to the myriad ways in which that country’s people engage and interact with peo- ple and institutions from other countries. The book focuses mainly on a particular class of people who have a particular responsibility for conducting a given country’s foreign policy—chiefly its elected officials, military personnel, and diplomats. These people estab- lish and enforce the rules governing how the rest of their country’s people may or may not engage or interact with foreigners. Some of these laws are fairly innocuous and impose only minor or temporary inconveniences. For example, U.S. law prohibits me from purchasing or owning certain items covered by U.S. sanc- tions. If I’m caught breaking the law, I could be prosecuted. Collectively, the drafting and enforcing of such regulations necessitates a large and relatively intrusive state—larger, say, than a state that allowed me to purchase any good or service, from any place, regardless of the circumstances of its production or provision. But war, that most visible of all instruments of foreign policy, imposes major and oftentimes lasting effects on individuals’ lives and liberty. War today is often seen as a foreign policy failure, but it wasn’t always that way. The famed Prussian military theorist Carl von ix PEACE, WAR, and LIBERTY Clausewitz described war as the continuation of policy by other means. Even militarily strong countries, however, would gener- ally prefer to attain peacefully what could be secured by force. The reasons are fairly obvious and straightforward: War is unpredict- able. War is costly. War is violent. Policymakers, therefore, should not embark on such a course lightly or with unrealistic expecta- tions about quick success. Clausewitz spoke of friction, the fog of war, and how battle plans rarely survive first contact with the enemy. Winston Churchill, a celebrated wartime leader, was sim- ilarly mindful of war’s uncertainty. “The Statesman who yields to war fever,” he wrote in his memoir, My Early Life, “is no longer the master of policy, but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrol- lable events.”1 The liberals of Clausewitz’s day, whom today we might call lib- ertarians, had still more reasons for wanting to solve international problems by peaceful means. They knew that war often contrib- uted to the rise of state power and therefore constituted a threat to liberty. This book approaches warfare as they did: as an occasionally necessary evil, not an endeavor that should be used as a vehi- cle for promoting social change. The book is organized around a theory—or, more accurately, a set of different theories—about what best creates security and prosperity. Simply, what causes peace? And relatedly, what can we do to advance individual liberty through peaceful means? In what instances, if any, is war the appropriate recourse? And what foreign policies other than war are more effective? This book addresses these questions. x PREFACE Because I am an American, writing chiefly for an American audience, I will focus mostly on U.S. foreign policy. I believe that America’s founding generation, in particular, proposed a foreign policy broadly consistent with libertarian principles, favoring peaceful engagement through trade and cultural exchange and holding a skepticism of warfare as an instrument of policy. Despite this U.S.-centric approach, I believe that the book has insights for many people in many countries. Identifying the particular pathol- ogies that have afflicted U.S. foreign policy over time—fool- ish wars fought well, noble wars fought badly, well-intentioned restrictions on travel or trade that had unfortunate side effects, alliances created or dissolved—surely has relevance for other countries at other times. The claim that U.S. foreign policy is like that of any other coun- try comes with a crucial proviso: U.S. foreign policy is bigger—a function of our great wealth and power. The scope of any one nation’s foreign policies is shaped by that nation’s physical con- text, including its geography, and by the disposition (i.e., friend or foe) of its neighbors. Scope is also constrained by a given country’s economic capacity to engage in all aspects of foreign policy—from conducting diplomacy to waging war. Relatively small, relatively weak, or relatively poor countries must necessarily prioritize what they do. Medium- and large-sized countries also set priorities but can have more of them. Even relatively affluent countries often choose to privilege one aspect of foreign policy (e.g., trade) over another (e.g., war). Iceland’s defense budget is effectively zero, as is Costa Rica’s. The United States began as a small, weak country. Its constitution forbade a xi PEACE, WAR, and LIBERTY standing army, and it struggled in its early days to deploy forces even into neighboring Canada or Mexico. Today, the United States possesses the world’s most powerful military. That vast force is capable of deploying in many places simultaneously and even performs many of the jobs that other countries assign solely to their diplomats.