Four

SAMENESS VERSUS OTHERNESS

Previous chapters disclose that the choice between otherness and sameness, itself a reaction to the colonial discourse, is the main theme of African philosophy. A philosophical debate is developing insofar as African scholars try to positively substantiate or oppose the idea of otherness. This chapter focuses on the position of those African scholars who radically reject ethno• philosophy by arguing that the defense of otherness is a sure way of perpetu• ating the marginalization of Africa.

1. Myth and Reality in African Philosophy

Remember that the debate over otherness is inextricably blended with the issue of the existence or nonexistence of a traditional African philosophy. Ethnophilosophers come out strongly in favor of the existence of African philosophy because they find the colonial denial of African philosophy highly insulting and degrading. They also assume that African philosophy must exist in a form commensurate with the particularity of Africans. Those who reject ethnophilosophy have two questions: ( 1) What is the price for the recognition of an African philosophy? (2) What kind of philosophy is recognized as being African? Since the price for having a philosophy is paid by the acceptance of otherness, Africa, they say, is better off without ethnophilosophy. On top of endorsing the colonial discourse, the acceptance of otherness alienates Afri• cans from rationality and science, the crowning evidence being the definition of negritude thinkers of the black essence by emotion. The best way to counter this detrimental outcome is to repudiate the very notion of precolonial African philosophy.

A. The Universality of Philosophy

To give an idea of the complexity of this denial of philosophy, no better way exists than to study the position of the African thinker who has initiated the crusade against ethnophilosophy, namely, Paulin J. Hountondji. Let there be no misunderstanding: Hountondji does not deny the existence of African philosophy. As suggested by the title of his main book, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, African philosophy is both myth and reality; it is not only a myth. The question of knowing what is myth and what is reality in African philosophy amounts to asking why those who talk about and practice African philosophy, instead of assuming full responsibility for their discourse, 84 AFRICA'S QUEST FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF DECOLONIZATION

"believe that they are merely reproducing a pre-existing thought through it."1 Individual thinkers claim philosophical systems because they produce them. Most abnormal, therefore, is the case of the thinker who refers to

an implicit "philosophy" conceived as an unthinking, spontaneous, collective system of thought, common to all Africans or at least to all members severally, past, present, and future, of such-and-such an African ethnic group?

As the expressions "Bantu philosophy," "African philosophy," and "black philosophy," imply, the problem with ethnophilosophy is its assumption that collective and spontaneous systems of philosophy exist. Let no one claim that such expressions as "American philosophy," "European philosophy," or "German philosophy" denote the same collective• ness. Neither of these expressions refers to the contents of a philosophy believed to be characteristic of a particular ethnic group or nationality. They indicate "the geographical origin of the authors rather than an alleged speci• ficity of content," as verified by the recognition of diverse, even contradictory philosophical views. 3 Such is not the case when ethnophilosophers speak of Bantu or African philosophy. Instead of the designation of the geographical whereabouts of individual thinkers, without the attachment of a collective meaning, what ethnophilosophers signify when they append a racial or ethnic attribute to philosophy is a metaphysical entity, a collective thinking particu• lar to a group of individuals. They have in mind an individually undifferenti• ated thinking. This notion of a collective and unconscious philosophy is clearly a contradiction in terms. Philosophy is an individual, critical, and systematic reflection; as such, it swears against the very idea of collectiveness. Are not religions, mythologies, and worldviews particularly distinguished from phi• losophy because they do not appeal to the critical awareness of the individual? In opposition to philosophy, they all solicit the spontaneous adherence of individuals to a common and transmitted credo of beliefs that is expressly protected against critical inquiry. So that, having none of the attributes by which a philosophical discourse is usually defined, what is identified as Bantu or African philosophy presents all the characters of a religious system or worldview, not of philosophy. Marcien Towa, another formidable opponent of ethnophilosophy, speaks of a "dilation of the concept of philosophy to such a point that this concept becomes coextensive with the concept of culture."4 This stretching of the meaning of philosophy to culture shows the extent to which the claim of ethnophilosophers to have established the universality of philosophy is based on the fraudulent identification of philosophy with culture.