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2008 Dereliction of : The American in and during the , 1804-1815 Jolynda Brock Chenicek

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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

DERELICTION OF DIPLOMACY:

THE AMERICAN CONSULATES IN PARIS AND BORDEAUX DURING THE

NAPOLEONIC ERA, 1804-1815

By

JOLYNDA BROCK CHENICEK

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2008

The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of Jolynda Brock Chenicek defended on April 7, 2008.

______Rafe Blaufarb Professor Directing Dissertation

______Patrick O’Sullivan Outside Committee Member

______Jonathan Grant Committee Member

______Peter Garretson Committee Member

______Maxine Jones Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My dissertation could not have been completed without significant assistance and encouragement from numerous people. First of all, my dissertation committee members, Dr. Jonathan Grant, Dr. Peter Garretson, Dr. Maxine Jones and Dr. Patrick O’Sullivan were willing to give prompt feedback and offer constructive criticism. I have learned so much from them over the years through their insightful lectures, diverse perspectives, and practical advice I am especially indebted to my major professor, Dr. Rafe Blaufarb, for his unflagging assistance throughout this entire process. He graciously agreed to help me finish my dissertation so I could achieve my goal of receiving a doctorate in history. His knowledge of the content area and his editing skills were greatly appreciated. I think the finished product is much improved as a result of his guidance and helpful suggestions. I also must thank Dr. Donald D. Horward who directed me during my coursework at Florida State University and pointed me in direction for my dissertation. He has shared his boundless enthusiasm of the Napoleonic era as well as valuable technical and academic direction. My own knowledge of the field has been greatly enhanced by working with him throughout the course of my graduate studies.

iii The ability to attend graduate school was generously funded by the Ben Weider Fellowship for the 2001-02 school year and the spring of 2007. I am also indebted to Dr. Skip Vichness for the funds to travel to the Consortium on the Era from 2003 to 2006. I received a Proctor and Mary Jones Travel Endowment in the summer of 2005 which allowed me to research in the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. For the 2002-03 school year and the spring of 2008, I had the good fortune to work with Dr. Robin Sellers by means of an assistantship in the Reichelt Program for Oral History. Finally, since spring of 2004, I have been fortunate to receive teaching assistantships which have given me the opportunity to put my love of history and passion for teaching to work. I genuinely appreciate all of the financial support I have received as I pursued my Doctoral Degree. I am indebted to the assistance given to me over the course of my research in the Special Collections of the Robert Manning Strozier Library at Florida State University. Dr. Lucia Patrick and her staff were always gracious and helpful during my long days spent in the library. I also received much needed assistance from the Interlibrary Loan Department and the Micromaterials section of the library. My fellow students in the Institute on and the have provided encouragement and strong support. Our study of Napoleon has led to thought-provoking discussions and practical feedback – thank you to Rick Black, Kenneth Johnson, Alexander Mikaberidze, Joshua Moon, Jason Musteen, and Jeff Graceffo. Also, the extended family of the Institute, including alumni and friends, has generously offered assistance, counsel, and indispensable knowledge of the field. In the History Department, I am grateful for the guidance and advice offered by Debbie Perry, Chris Pigniatello, and Anne Kozar as well as Dr. Robin Sellers, who have also provided tremendous encouragement and insight into the discipline of history. Over the years at F.S.U., I have iv made friends that have helped me enjoy this process and who share my love for history. Dr. Pam Robbins and Meghan Martinez, our Friday lunches helped get me through. Finally, I owe my ability to achieve this accomplishment to my most constant supporters – my family. My parents, C.J. and Mae Brock, have always assisted me in every one of my endeavors. I could not have attended graduate school, much less completed my dissertation, without their patience, understanding, and impressive babysitting skills. My parents-in-law, Don and Sharon Chenicek, have offered endless encouragement and unceasing excitement while I have been completing my dissertation. My sisters and their extended families have listened patiently to me through it all and always been enthusiastic supporters. My never-ending sources of inspiration have been my husband, Todd, and my two sons, Brock and Logan. They have waited patiently for “Mommy” to finish this little project, and they have made life much more fun! This Doctoral Dissertation is a product of their support, encouragement, and love.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .………………………………………………………………….…… vii

1. INTRODUCTION: The World of American …...... 1

2. A TALE OF TWO OFFICES: The Ministers versus the Consuls….....42

3. THE ESCALATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM: The Consuls Under Siege ………………………………………....……………………….….82

4. THE END OF THE EMPIRE: The Consuls at the Close of the Napoleonic Age…………………………………………………….…….…….138

5. CONCLUSION: Dereliction of Diplomacy…….…...………...….….…..197

BIBLIOGRAPHY……..……………………………………………………………..204

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH……………………………………………..….……..216

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ABSTRACT

The ascent and downfall of Napoleon had a major impact in Europe, but it also affected the new across the Atlantic Ocean, the of America. From 1804-1815, the American was caught in a diplomatic dilemma, as it attempted to remain neutral in the face of enormous pressure from Europe. Both and Great Britain, who were at war with each other, hoped to force the United States to become involved in their struggle and waged economic warfare against American trade and shipping. The American economic representatives in France, the consuls faced enormous obstacles as they tried to assist their fellow engaged in commercial ventures across the Atlantic. Over the years, the consuls engaged in skirmishes with French officials over the atrocities committed against American shipping as well as diplomatic battles with American foreign ministers and even their fellow consuls. In “Dereliction of Diplomacy: The American Consulates in Paris and Bordeaux during the Napoleonic Era, 1804-1815,” the role the consuls played in the care of American citizens abroad and the facilitation of their consular duties is examined. While the consuls remained low-level American officials, they did influence American foreign policy by keeping the leaders in Washington D.C. apprised of the economic realities of trading with Napoleonic France.

vii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE WORLD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Some people may think that history can only be forged by great states, led by great men. According to this view, the decisions that shape a nation’s destiny are made by an , precisely carried out by a specific hierarchy, ranging from the to the lowest ranking or . Since the inception of the United States of America, a strong President has single-handedly led this nation through turbulent diplomatic waters, seeking peace not only for his citizens but also for our allies and friends. Not only has this been in effect since the time of , but even with the tremendous growth of the bureaucracy serving the President, continues in the same manner today. But is this really true? Is history only shaped by the leaders at the very top of complicated, hierarchical governmental structures. While diplomacy and foreign policy might have been fashioned by the President, Emperor, or King of any given nation, oftentimes, it was the men at the lower rungs of the diplomatic ladder who actually implemented those policies. In fact, those same men enforcing foreign policy were often influenced by not only their dedication to their country but also their

1 own personal and economic ambitions. Nowhere is this truer than with the United States serving in France during the Napoleonic Era. The men serving in France from 1804-1815 were staunchly patriotic Americans living in a foreign land that had yet to fully recover from the ravages of the French Revolution. They had to keep the leaders in Washington D.C. informed of the economic situation in their cities while at the same time put into practice policies that were advantageous to American trade and commerce. This assignment proved to be vastly difficult during the reign of Napoleon. At the dawning of the nineteenth century, a new age was developing, which eventually led to the rise of the United States, at the expense of former world leaders, Great Britain and France. American statesmen, such as and , pitted the strength and independence of their new nation against the entrenched might of their European counterparts. After Napoleon’s coronation as Emperor in December 1804, the United States faced threats from two old world monarchies, those of France and Great Britain, especially from the forces and pitfalls generated by their titanic struggle. The diplomatic history of the United States vividly encapsulates the earliest stages of the formation of American foreign policy. In terms of the United States’ relationship with France, from the colonial era to modern times, there have been periods ranging dramatically from violent discord to staunch alliance. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, France was an established, powerful nation dominating most of Europe, while the United States was just beginning to demonstrate the tenacious spirit of a bold new nation. Out of respect for the essential French support during the , the United States was the first nation to recognize the new French Republic. While much emphasis has been placed upon the comparison of the American and French Revolutions, the diplomatic history of the

2 Napoleonic era still has many aspects that need to be more diligently explored. The ultimate downfall of Napoleon had a resounding effect not only throughout Europe, but also in the Americas. Without the impact of the Napoleonic Wars, would not have lost its American Empire in the years immediately following Napoleon’s defeat. The independence of America only heightened the importance of the United States of America as the leading democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, the ultimate collapse of the First Empire of France meant that the United States would, over time, mend its troubled relationship with Great Britain and further even more trans-Atlantic trade between Europe and the “New World.” This dissertation examines the American consulates in Paris and Bordeaux and the daily struggles they faced during the Napoleonic Era. It does so by looking at the actions and writings of the American consuls serving in France from 1804-1815. The United States suffered enormously due to its precarious relationship with both France and Great Britain. The United States consuls in France were daily affected by the increasingly strained Franco-American relations over the course of Napoleon’s reign. A study of the American consulates will illuminate the lowest levels of American diplomacy. How did the economic warfare affect the United States? Did the consuls in France effectively implement their duties in relation to their fellow Americans in France? Were the American consuls effective representatives of their nation in a foreign land? Finally, did the American consulates in Paris and Bordeaux have any sort of impact on American foreign policy in this time period? This dissertation will closely examine those questions. To better understand the work of the consuls in France, one must study the daily tasks and responsibilities of these officials. They faced enormous obstacles in dealing with Napoleon’s retaliatory economic warfare, waged against the British but negatively impacting American

3 trade as well. Also, the overall efficacy of the consuls in terms of their cooperation with each other as well as other American representatives abroad, primarily the American ministers in Paris, would provide insight into the true “professionalization” of the service at the earliest stages of its development. Due to the economic nature of their primary responsibilities, the American consul had frequent contact with French officials. Were these men dependable and skillful representatives of the United States? Overall, these are aspects of the American Consulates in Paris and Bordeaux that need further study. Ultimately, the downfall of Napoleon had a tremendous impact in Europe, as well as the Americas. For this reason, the history of Napoleon’s domination of Europe and his relationship with the fledgling United States of America should be briefly recounted. NAPOLEON AND EUROPE Napoleon Bonaparte was truly a product of his times. Although he showed tremendous potential as a young artillery officer, he would never have been able to climb up the ranks of the without the incredible results of the great French Revolution of 1789. Even with his brilliant military abilities, it is highly doubtful that any of his teachers or mentors could have predicted the resounding effect he would have upon France and the rest of the world. After his coup d’état of 1799, Napoleon sought to craft a French Republic that would indeed dominate the continent of Europe. For a time, his plan seemed to be coming to fruition. Although Napoleon purported to be a man of peace, France was embroiled in war for virtually his entire reign. A brief cessation of hostilities had been established with the signing of the in 1802, which ended hostilities between France and Britain. However, this proved to be only a truce rather than a real, lasting accord. These two powerful nations would not be able to solve the many disputes that

4 continuously developed over the course of Napoleon’s reign in France. War resumed between the two powers in 1803, but Great Britain did not fully enter the conflict until Napoleon invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 1808. Before Wellington’s commitment on the peninsula, Britain had been satisfied with merely funding the other nations fighting against France at various times – Russia, Prussia, and in particular. The Peninsular War proved to be a constant drain on the French Army, and it was in Spain that Napoleon suffered his first real defeat. As Napoleon advanced eastward across the continent of Europe, France’s primary foe, Britain, was increasingly concerned about the balance of power in Europe. Traditionally, Britain’s European policy had been based upon sustaining the balance of power in Europe, all the while jealously guarding its dominance over the seas. However, Napoleon’s dramatic victories over Austria, Prussia, and Russia had gained France unprecedented control over most of Europe. Austria’s defeats led directly to Napoleon’s domination of Italy. In May of 1805, less than one year after his coronation as Emperor of France, Napoleon also became the King of Italy. The loss of Austrian and Prussian influence also encouraged Napoleon to seize control over the smaller German states. In July of 1806, he proclaimed himself the protector of the Confederation of the , a composite of sixteen German states. This move led directly to the dissolution of the Holy . Francis II, the Holy , formally renounced his and became simply Francis I, Emperor of Austria. These bold moves by Napoleon further strained the already tense relations France maintained with both Prussia and Austria. Russia was an unreliable ally of France. Following the stunning defeats Russia experienced at the Battles of Austerlitz (1805), Eylau and Friedland (1807), Napoleon was confident that he had secured Tsar Alexander’s true allegiance at the famous meeting of the two Emperors which took place at Tilsit in June of 1807. While peace was secured, one

5 particular aspect of the Treaty of Tilsit proved to continually exacerbate tensions between Napoleon and Alexander, the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Although Poland had completely disappeared from the map in 1795, Napoleon seemed determined to recreate for the Polish people some semblance of a homeland. Since Poland had always been a primary interest of Russia, the Tsar believed that he would also maintain control over the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In this, his faith in Napoleon was shaken. The French Emperor had not overseen the Duchy’s creation only to have it fall into Russian hands. Napoleon repeatedly refused to promise Alexander that he would not recreate the nation of Poland. This continued to be a point of irritation between France and Russia, but what finally led to Napoleon’s decision to invade Russia was the Continental System. The continued hostilities with Great Britain led directly to Napoleon’s proclamation of the Continental System in 1806. After Britain declared a blockade of the French coast, Napoleon responded with the Berlin in November 1806, which in effect created the Continental System. Napoleon aimed to get Britain out of the war by weakening its trade with Europe and eventually America. The French Emperor declared that the British Isles were under blockade, and he expressly forbade all trade with them. Furthermore, British goods were made subject to confiscation. Not only did Napoleon intend to restrict all French trade with Britain, but his allies were also forced to abide by the Continental System. This led directly to the eventual seizure of Rome and the imprisonment of Pope Pius VII. Also, vital British shipping interests were harmed by Napoleon’s occupation of the Netherlands, which was annexed to France in 1810. Finally, Napoleon realized that war with Russia was inevitable after Tsar Alexander revoked his

6 allegiance to the Continental System and threw open his ports to British trade.1 The fact that Napoleon had amassed such an enormous empire had an impact on the United States. He had control over the vast majority of continental ports in Europe. This had a negative effect on American trade and shipping after the implementation of his Continental System. However at the beginning of his reign, the relationship between France and the United States appeared to be improving. NAPOLEON AND AMERICA What came to be known as the Quasi-war developed between the United States and France following the conclusion of Jay’s Treaty with Great Britain in 1794. The ruling , the Directory, refused to recognize the new American to France, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and even ordered him to leave the country in early 1797. The Directory also recalled its minister from the United States and Pinckney was forced to retreat to London. Finally, the French government issued numerous which allowed the seizure of American shipping by French and the condemnation of American ships and goods in French ports. Economically, the Quasi-war had a profoundly negative effect on American commerce.2 After Napoleon became the First Consul of France in 1799, he was able to end the naval skirmishes that were taking place between France and the United States. Relations that had been strained by American disenchantment with the latter stages of the French Revolution, the

1 The catalog of works on Napoleon and his era are too numerous to list. Two of the most comprehensive, general works are J. Christoper Herold’s The Age of Napoleon and Felix Markham’s Napoleon. Another useful source is Donald D. Horward’s The French Revolution and Napoleon Collection at Florida State University: A Bibliographical Guide.

2 Beckles Willson, America’s to France (1777-1927): A Narrative of Franco-American Diplomatic Relations (New York, 1928), 78-80.

7 French attacks on American ships, as well as the embarrassing XYZ Affair, seemed to be improving. The turning point came during the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, an acknowledged Francophile. The greatest expansion of American territory in history came with the conclusion of the Purchase in 1803. The French had originally settled the area in the early eighteenth century. After the disastrous Seven Years’ War, the French turned the region over to Spain. Napoleon negotiated its return, and following the failure of the St. Domingue campaign, the French Emperor decided to focus solely on Europe. More importantly, renewed hostilities between France and Great Britain in 1803 also affected Napoleon’s plans for Louisiana. Rather than reoccupy the area, he decided to profit from its sale to the United States, while at the same time, securing funds for his endless wars. As a result, his , Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (more commonly known as Talleyrand), offered to sell the territory to the United States. The treaty signed by the Americans and the French finalized the agreement in which the United States bought the for $15 million. In every way, this was the deal of the century for the Americans. Napoleon also benefited by improving relations with the United States, while at the same time, irritating the British. The open contest between France and Great Britain for dominance in Europe eventually became a problem, but as in the case of the Louisiana Purchase, a great opportunity for the United States. After the British proclamation of a blockade of Europe and Napoleon’s retaliation with the Continental System, the United States was caught between these two giants. By the decrees issued from both Britain and France, if American ships met the demands of one side, they were subject to seizure by the other. This inevitably led to direct confrontation. After the French and Americans resolved their differences, the United States declared war on Britain over the continued harassment of American ships. Now Britain was faced with war on the Continent of Europe as

8 well as against the United States. Napoleon abdicated in 1814, while the “” still raged in the United States. The United States never became directly involved in the Napoleonic Wars, but they were greatly affected by the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. These are the events that will be covered by this dissertation. AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORIOGRAPHY Studies of American diplomacy and foreign policy are abundant, encompassing a wide range of topics. In particular, my study of the American Consulates in Paris and Bordeaux during the Napoleonic era will be an addition to the surveys focusing on a brief period of history, while analyzing the nature of diplomacy at work. The study of American diplomacy has changed dramatically over the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. The earliest works, following World War I, particularly focused on broad and far-reaching histories, analyzing how “France” and the “United States” formulated their own foreign policies. In the 1960s, a new revisionist diplomatic history developed, led by the New Left historians who examined American history through the lens of the Cold War era. Finally, a new diplomatic history has evolved, and this transnational history attempts to narrow the focus as to how foreign policy was formulated. Historians in transnational history try to examine the connections between nations and bridge the gap between high-level state interactions and diplomacy as practiced at the lowest levels of the state hierarchy. This historiographical review is by no means a compilation of all studies of American diplomatic history, but rather a survey of the works that most contributed to the development of my dissertation. A study of the newly developing American diplomacy at the ground level, the consuls in France, will greatly contribute to the historiography that includes works that focus broadly on American diplomacy and foreign policy as well as studies of American relations with the French.

9 American diplomacy included the officials at the highest levels of government, the President and the Secretary of State, the ministers who represented American interests in foreign nations, and the consuls who protected American economic welfare in their foreign cities. While much has been done to examine the formulation of American foreign policy at the top of the diplomatic scale, relatively little has been achieved in the study of these low level economic representatives, the American consuls. Their achievements and failures had a marked impact in both France and the United States from 1804-1815. THE FOUNDERS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY The earliest works in American diplomatic history appeared in the inter-war period from 1919 to 1945. The historians of this era in many ways created American diplomatic history as a field and were the pioneers who examined the development of American foreign policy. Historians such as J. Fred Rippy, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Thomas A. Bailey, and Dexter Perkins were the founders of the study of American diplomacy and shaped the earliest decades of diplomatic history. The first diplomatic historians tended to view American achievements in foreign policy as triumphs of a grand and noble democracy. They generally applauded the growth of the American republic, assessed the growing prominence of the nation favorably, and idealized much of the earliest periods of American history. The founding of the nation was a tremendous achievement, wrought by sage men who held out the promise of liberty for all. While it was not always history through rose-colored glasses, these historians found much right with American domestic and foreign policy. Their focus always highlighted the highest levels of diplomacy. The studies of the Presidents, Secretaries of States, and American ministers gave an overall picture of how the United States dictated foreign policy. However, their studies rarely included the consuls and their actions in

10 terms of forwarding American interests. This was history at the state level, back to the beginning, how the “United States” and “France” interacted as nations. In many ways, this foundation of diplomatic history rested on the achievements of a very select few and did not take into account any possible interactions with lower level American officials. But their achievements created the very field of diplomatic history and laid the groundwork for future historians to follow and expand. One of the earliest works focusing on an early study of American diplomacy was authored by J. Fred Rippy and Angie Debo, entitled The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation. Using primarily American sources, Rippy and Debo examine the earliest foundations of the American policy of “non-entanglement.”3 The desire to isolate itself from further entanglements with the European powers was a closely held belief of such early American leaders as George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and even Thomas Jefferson. While many today view Jefferson as an unabashed Francophile and Hamilton as his complete opposite, a lover of all things British, the most accurate description is that these men were fierce patriots. Rippy and Debo’s work made clear that the overriding concern of President Washington and his closest advisers was following a policy of “non-entanglement.”4 Over the course of Washington’s presidency, America remained stubbornly neutral, even as war raged in Europe and the first revolutionary impetus began in France. Rippy and Debo illustrate that at the conclusion of Washington’s presidency, he had successfully steered a peaceful route that kept

3 J. Fred Rippy and Angie Debo, “The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation” In Smith College Studies in History, Vol. IX, Nos. 3 & 4: (Northampton, MA, 1924), The article is based on a collection of letters, diaries, writings and correspondence of the Founding Fathers. They used Stevens’ Facsimilies of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to American Affairs, 1773-1783, (London, 1889-1895).

4 Ibid., 1.

11 American interests at the forefront, while ensuring Americans were not swept up in European entanglements. In his farewell address of 1796, Washington continued to espouse neutrality. Rippy and Debo conclude that: The practice itself, supplemented as it has always been by adherence to neutral obligations and an insistence upon neutral rights has been accepted by other nations and constitutes a distinctly American contribution to international law.5

While this contribution would ultimately be accepted, there were still numerous complications that needed to be confronted. For instance, the neutrality of the United States throughout the violated the 1778 Treaty of Alliance between the Americans and the French. The French were genuinely unhappy about this. The American consuls in France were certainly deeply involved in the issues surrounding American neutrality. One of the preeminent scholars of American diplomacy, Samuel Flagg Bemis, has contributed several works that bear analysis. His two- volume set and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy and John Quincy Adams and the Union is a masterpiece of scholarship. The volume dedicated to American foreign policy is the most useful for this study and remains a monumental contribution to the field of diplomatic history. John Quincy Adams was intimately involved with European affairs, and his first career as a diplomatic official helped lay the foundations for a successful American foreign policy when dealing with Europe and its many travails. He himself consistently called for an “impartial and unequivocal neutrality,” aligning the nation with neither Britain nor France.6

5 Ibid., 72.

6 Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1949), 36.

12 Bemis sheds enormous light on Adams’ thoughts regarding the Emperor of France, Napoleon Bonaparte, after his downfall. Adams looked upon Bonaparte as a unique product of the French Revolution. Throughout the , he had felt that France was better off with Bonaparte than without him… [however] The conquests of the Empire led him to regard the great man as a misfortune to Europe.7

It is not surprising that the serving in France in the consular service during the Napoleonic era took a far different stance regarding Napoleon. Their very livelihood depended on the whims of this unpredictable despot. Not surprisingly, Bemis would eventually contribute his seminal work, A Diplomatic History of the United States, one of the finest rendered on the subject. His work is separated into three sections, Part I entitled Foundations, focusing on the time period necessary for this research.8 While there are numerous scholarly works that cover American foreign policy and diplomacy on a broad scale, Bemis is one of the first historians to deeply analyze both the American and French motivations in regards to international relations. He states unequivocally that the French Revolution, and consequently the wars that followed and continued into the Napoleonic era, was one of the most important events in the diplomatic history of the United States.9 The wars that raged throughout Europe gave the United States time to develop its own unique foreign policy initiative – isolationism – as well as “consolidate its newly established nationality, to

7 Ibid., 222.

8 Part II is entitled Expansion, and Part III The Twentieth Century, which ends with the coming of the Atomic Age (1955-64.)

9 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1965), 94.

13 expand its territory and resources”10 and ultimately develop the confidence necessary to issue the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The conclusion of the War of 1812, the United States’ own brief entanglement in European affairs, came at the same time as the end of the Napoleonic Wars allowing the United States to turn its attention westward and southward – to achieve manifest destiny and protect the independence of the newly freed Spanish of Latin America.11 Bemis’ intense spotlight on the highest levels of diplomacy also is featured in his monumental effort, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, a twenty volume set of which he edited the first ten. Throughout all of Bemis’ work, he emphasizes the importance of diplomacy, but his focus remains at the very top. His works use multiple archives, American and foreign. However, his research begins and ends at the level of the Presidents, Secretaries of States, and maybe even the American Foreign ministers and their foreign counterparts. Writing at the same time as Bemis, Thomas A. Bailey also contributed his own diplomatic survey entitled A Diplomatic History of the American People. While Bemis emphasized diplomacy, Bailey believed that American public opinion had a more profound impact on the development of foreign policy. His work is also more adapted to a layman’s study of American history. A very approachable book, it provides his analysis of various stages of American history and juxtaposes world events against the growth of the American nation. However, like Bemis, Bailey does not wander into the lower recesses of the diplomatic hierarchy to shine light on the efforts of the consuls. Of the 1093 pages of the latest edition of his work, only two pages mention the American consuls. He describes the two examples of American

10 Ibid., 95.

11 Ibid., 179.

14 representatives abroad, the ministers and, “the consular officers, who were stationed at consulates in important seaports or other commercial centers, There they discharged various duties, including the processing of immigration forms and sending home the clothing of dead seamen.”12 Bailey’s summation certainly does not include all of the duties of the American consuls. Another important contribution to the field of diplomatic history came from Dexter Perkins with the publication of The Evolution of American Foreign Policy in 1966. Perkins’ work is primarily concerned with the factors that led to America’s tremendous growth in the 1900s, analyzing the various reasons that led to a population explosion, growth of industrial capacity, and eventually a prominent position in terms of international relations. This slim volume covers a broad range, from the independence of the United States to the 1960s. In fact, the only important contribution noted by Perkins involving the Emperor of France was of course the sale of Louisiana. While he summarily describes the reasons for the transaction, Perkins is much more concerned by the fact that the United States had to procure a loan in order to meet Napoleon’s asking price of $15,000,000. The $10,000,000 loan was financed by a London Bank which surprisingly had received permission to fund the loan by the British government.13 This was even as Britain was preparing for renewed hostilities with Napoleon, as the Peace Treaty of Amiens had been trampled by both nations. While many of the earliest American historians, such as , author of A History of the American People, had a decidedly pro- Federalist bent, the majority of the first diplomatic historians were pro- Republican. In Bemis’ and Bailey’s works, the authors praise Jefferson

12 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 10th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1980), 9-10.

13 Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1966), 14-15.

15 and Madison for keeping the United States from aligning itself with any European power. They condemn Alexander Hamilton for his determination to foster an alliance with Great Britain. Although Madison did eventually declare war on the British, these diplomatic historians did not believe he did so with any intent of siding with France. Rather, Madison followed a steady and independent path for his nation’s defense. The work of the original diplomatic historians also included multi- archival research as well as the study of diplomatic correspondence. However, these historians do not sink to the consular level. At this point, the emphasis was still primarily on state to state interactions, and the dealings of lower level consuls did not make it into their historical studies. THE REVISIONISTS AND THE NEW LEFT A new trend in diplomatic history developed in the 1960s at the height of the Cold War era, which had a monumental impact on the study of American Foreign Policy. Revisionist historians began to criticize American diplomacy in light of a new reality of a Nuclear Age. Even the earliest eras of American history faced scrutiny from relentless young historians, determined to root out the factors that vaulted the United States to the forefront of global affairs. In particular, the New Left historians found much wrong with American foreign policy. While not all Revisionist historians were from the New Left, they were by far the harshest and most vocal critics. The New Left were critics of American capitalist society and sought to point out the disadvantages of such a system by their critique of American diplomatic history. Consequently, much of their writing focuses on the economic connection to the development of foreign policy. Every decision made by the Presidents was ultimately influenced by financial reasons more than any other. Although the United States was embroiled in a Cold War, these historians were leftist leaning and many

16 were harassed by the government for their pro-Socialist agendas. Their works were heavily influenced by the Cold War and much of their studies specifically dealt with this period, but some New Left Historians did focus on the foundation of American foreign policy. They came down hard on the founding fathers, condemning them as Idealists who intended to create their model nation while ignoring the realities of the day. Arguably the first New Left historian, William Appleman Williams, edited From to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Policy as well as wrote, The Contours of American History. He was not a specialist in early American history and his book heavily relied on previous works. This was actually common among the New Left historians. It was not even uncommon to find quotes from noted authors of fiction in Williams’ works, such as James Fenimore Cooper and D.H. Lawrence. He condemned the new nation as a republic of mercantilists, almost obsessed with expansion. Seemingly, Williams would have preferred the United States to remain the small, powerless original rather than benefit from European conflicts by expanding its territory. Too often, Williams and other New Left Historians seem to superimpose their view of their contemporary situation on the past. Rather than examining the issues confronting the early American leaders, Williams actively pursues his own agenda of determining how the United States ended up a protagonist in the Cold War. According to Williams, American mercantilism had come of age with the War of 1812.14 The war was fought only to protect American economic policy in order to protect its shipping and rights to trade across Europe. The supporters of Madison were the early merchants who fervently hoped to tilt the balance of trade in America’s favor. Williams

14 William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (New York, 1973), 197.

17 goes on to call the result of the war, “Victory disguised as stalemate.”15 Even though the war ended status quo ante bellum, the Americans were the true victors. The reasons cited for this are the fact that the United States had not lost to the world’s leading industrial power and that the war led to, “cohesion, confidence, and strength” for the youthful nation.16 Finally, the war helped American manufacturing, establishing a foundation for manufactures in addition to the agricultural and shipping industries in place. For Williams, economic factors played the greatest role in President Madison’s decision to go to war. All of the New Left historians emphasized the role of the economy in all facets of American governing policy. Walter Lafeber, essentially a Cold War expert, produced, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750, his effort to analyze the overall diplomatic history of the nation. As with Williams, we see Lafeber’s intent to correlate the contemporary position of the United States as world leader across its history to its earliest foundations. He systematically blames American commercial interests for entangling American foreign policy with the European wars taking place in the early 1800s. According to Lafeber, They [merchants] not only carried American trade, but the trade of others---especially the commerce generated by the rich British and French West Indies. As the European wars grew bloodier, this trade grew greater and the U.S. traders grew richer even as they became in reality parts of the British or French empires rather than the American system. As these traders came to care more about European than U.S. interests, they caused major problems for Washington officials between 1805-1814.17

15 Ibid., 196.

16 Ibid., 196.

17 Walter Lafeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750, (New York, 1989), 41.

18 To Lafeber, the entire blame for the War of 1812 can be placed on American merchants and their commercial empires. The theme of empire is a constant in the writings of the New Left historians, employed even before its usage is generally acknowledged following the Spanish- American War. For these leftist historians, empire was always a goal of American leaders, primarily since the expansion of the nation with the Louisiana Purchase. Lafeber writes that the greatest concern of Jefferson and Madison in 1803 was the fear that the French would attempt to develop an American empire west of the Mississippi. However, “in 1802, Jefferson and Madison devised a brilliant series of policies that finally forced Napoleon to sell not only (the primary American objective) but most of the immense area between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains.”18 Jefferson and Madison forced Napoleon to sell Louisiana! Not losses in or the renewal of European war, but the American President and his Secretary of State somehow persuaded Napoleon to part with his dream of reestablishing a French empire in America. Again, the tendency of the New Left historians to portray American leaders, even the founding fathers, as scheming mercantilists is apparent. However, Lafeber does note that the War of 1812 was America’s second War for Independence and this allowed American expansionist dreams to be fulfilled. Writing at the same time as the New Left were historians who could be considered revisionist but not to the same extent as the radical leftist historians. One of the most prolific writers in the field of diplomatic history is Alexander DeConde. He himself had been influenced by his studies under the legendary Samuel Flagg Bemis. Such preeminent historians invariably touched the next generation of American foreign policy experts and of course influenced their course of

18 Ibid., 55.

19 direction. Alexander DeConde produced A History of American Foreign Policy. At the very beginning of his book, DeConde succinctly states the overriding ambition of the United States, or any other nation for that matter, as it pursues a foreign policy, “The United States conducts its affairs with other nations to serve its own interests. The means it uses to advance those interests constitute its own foreign policy.”19 In many ways, this sentiment can be attached to the actions taken by the American Consuls in France during the Napoleonic Era. Their own actions, while intended to achieve overall political and economic goals for their country, were also heavily influenced by what they could gain personally. DeConde’s work is perhaps one of the earliest that sharply captures the intense debate among scholars over exactly what the motives behind American foreign policy were. While he does not equivocally accept either philosophy as his own, he clearly defines the differences between the proponents of idealism and realism. Power politics is at the very center of the debate. Idealists cling to the ideal that peace and justice are the ultimate goals of any foreign policy, therefore, nations should eschew any involvement in war, power politics, or struggles for dominance. Realists claim that power politics is almost inevitable, and that nations should merely aim to achieve a balance of power, ensuring that one nation does not gain complete authority over all others.20 Authors of diplomatic histories argued over which American founders were idealists and which were realists. The general notion that the Federalists were the realists and the Republicans were the dreamers has been debunked. Jefferson and Madison implemented practical policies to protect the interests of the United States of America. This

19 Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1978), 1.

20 Ibid., 2.

20 trend to classify the early founders became popular among later historians, arguing whether the Federalists were the Realists or the Republicans. Another revisionist history focusing entirely on Franco-American relations is Albert Hall Bowman’s The Struggle for Neutrality. The author interprets French actions during the Quasi-war against the United States in a much more favorable light than previous historians. While this work does end with the closing of the in American history, Bowman does provide interesting insights into the initial foreign policy of Napoleon towards the United States. He is much harsher towards the newly installed First Consul than he is to the French officials involved in the infamous XYZ Affair. He finds that Napoleon acted conciliatory towards the United States at the beginning of his term as First Consul, but this was all pretense. Bowman argues: Bonaparte was no real friend to the United States, as he was later to prove. Nevertheless, a conciliatory policy toward the United States was an essential part of his program for annihilating England. Dedicated to the advancement of his own fortunes, he would bend toward America whenever European conditions required. To Bonaparte, the United States, like the small neutrals of Europe, was again a pawn in the struggle with Great Britain for European domination.21

Certainly a damning opinion. Yet in this instance, the author seems to resort to banal interpretation, rather than recognize the obvious fact that all nations merely seek to advance their own specific agenda. Although France was the dominant nation in continental Europe at the time, this was a European conflict that predated the struggles of Napoleon Bonaparte by centuries. Bowman’s work is an estimable diplomatic history, concentrating on the high-level negotiations that took place between the United States, Great Britain, and France during the Federalist Era. At this time, more work is necessary to understand just

21 Albert Hall Bowman, The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco American Diplomacy During the Federalist Era, (Knoxville, TN, 1974), 393.

21 how these final concepts and agreements were actually carried out at the lower ranks of the diplomatic and consular system. TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY The contemporary new diplomatic history is the study of transnational history. It parallels the rise of the teaching of world history and global interactions between nations. The goal of such scholarship is to create a broader perspective from which to view diplomacy. Again, rather than examine how the “United States” interacted with “France,” transnational historians aim to examine what multiple factors and connections between nations led to the formation of foreign policy. While it is not “history from the bottom up,” transnational studies acknowledge that more than just the President determines the course of diplomacy. The very name transnational relates that there are overarching issues that either brought nations together into alliances or led them directly into war. For the Napoleonic Era, certainly some aspects of American foreign policy were influenced by the reports received from the consuls serving in France. These were men who were not at the top of the diplomatic hierarchy, and in many cases, they also made a profit from their work as commercial agents while at the same time serving the American government. So these consuls were not disinterested American citizens living in Napoleon’s empire. They were profoundly affected by the changing nature of the Franco-American economic and diplomatic relationship. In terms of transnational history, the study of the American consuls will allow us to gain a better insight into the roles played by lower-level American representatives who had a real and personal interest in furthering a harmonious relationship between France and the United States. An approach to transnational history allows a historian to examine how a nation continually evolves and provides a sense that not all of

22 American diplomacy has been solely forged by the President and his top advisers. The very expansion of the United States in the early stages of its development offers an opportunity for transnational research. The connections between the Americans, the British, and the French in this time period evolved out of each nation’s own self interests. Therefore, the ability to analyze such patterns of history can reshape a new understanding of the diplomacy of this era. Two important transnational historians, David Thelen and Christopher A. Bayly offer insightful interpretations of the new diplomatic history. In David Thelen’s article, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History,” the author examines the opportunities to integrate this new approach and offers his revised view of American history.22 Thelen relates that for too long, “nations expressed people’s identities, arbitrated their differences and solved their problems, focused their dreams, exercised their collective sovereignty, fought their wars.”23 The nation-state was the people, rather than an expression of the will of the people. Thelen argues that the very nature of national interpretation has to change due to increasing globalization, and nation-centered history will not remain relevant in contemporary society. The United States of America is at the very center of this transnational surge and a representative of the interconnectedness of a multitude of cultures. The multi-cultural nature of the American nation demonstrates the need for a new way of looking at what makes a country if not a shared history, culture and language. Important to the role of diplomatic history, transnational historians emphasize the significance of a broader perspective. It is not enough to study the actions of a

22 David Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History,” in The Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 3 (Dec., 1999), 965-75.

23 Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond,” 965.

23 President, the effectiveness of a foreign minister. We need to take the foundation of American diplomacy, built upon the works of Bemis and Bailey, and add another layer. In this reanalysis, there is room for the American consuls and other low-level American representatives to contribute to American diplomatic historiography. Christopher A. Bayly’s The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914, is an ambitious work which delves into global connections that have played a role in the development of history. His work begins at the dawning of a new age and in many instances, it seems as if he is randomly linking events in one part of the world with another. But his meaning is clear, what happens in one part of the world does impact another. One example, related to the Atlantic World, is Napoleon’s involvement in Haiti. While it is true that Napoleon had a significant impact on the small nation, conversely the turmoil caused by his invasion affected him as well. Here Napoleon’s unbeatable armies were beaten and he lost significant resources that might have been better utilized in Europe.24 The foundation of Bayly’s work rests upon his belief that the revolutionary upheavals of the late eighteenth century helped the conveyance of modern society. Ultimately, the underlying belief of transnational history is this transportation of ideas, movements, and even people. The Revolutionary Era instituted real political, social and economic changes on both sides of the Atlantic. Eventually these innovative ideas spread to other parts of the world, influencing developments which led to the creation of a modern, global society. Transnational history can contribute important new scholarship to the evolution of American diplomatic study. In accordance to this new diplomatic history, this dissertation contributes to the expanding field by

24 Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Malden, MA, 2004), 99.

24 looking at the American consuls, certainly not a focus of previous scholarship, and analyzing their actions in the face of troubled diplomatic waters and their impact, if any, on the development of American foreign policy. Finally, the interactions of these men with the Secretaries of States and American Foreign Ministers in Paris can expand our understanding of the very development of diplomacy. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMACY: THE ROLE OF THE CONSULAR OFFICE Prior to 1804, the United States was still in the process of formulating diplomatic and consular practice. Essentially, there were two periods that covered this development: the Articles of Confederation experiment and the establishment of the United States of America under the Constitution. An ally during the War of Independence, France would also play a powerful position in the United States’ establishment of consular practice following the victory over the British. At the time of the Articles of Confederation, French and American consuls were established in both countries respectively, and commercial trade between the two nations flourished. The situation, however, heavily favored the French over the Americans. The Americans did not have a cohesive economic and diplomatic system which set them at an unfavorable advantage compared to the European nations. Input from numerous founders of the United States was sought as well as freely given on the subject of the establishment of various consulates. John Jay, the first Secretary of Foreign Affairs, submitted his opinion regarding the consular situation to the September 19, 1785, as foreign policy was just being shaped. At first, it seemed that Congress was merely seeking his counsel in order to ascertain the general rules and regulations regarding the establishment of American consuls abroad and the reception of foreign consuls to the

25 United States. Jay voiced his opinion that no nation was required to accept consuls from foreign states. He went on to add, it is of more importance to other nations to have consuls here, than for us to have consuls abroad; because as it is their interest to prevent their subjects from carrying on here any trade which they may prohibit, so it must be their wish to check such attempts by having consuls and agents in all our ports to watch and give intelligence of all such infractions of their laws.25

That is not to say that he did not believe the United States needed to refrain from assigning counsels overseas; he merely sought to explain to Congress how important it was to regulate and closely observe foreign consuls living and working on American soil. As a result, Jay believed that all consuls, both American and those from foreign nations, should be amenable to the laws of the nations in which they lived and worked. An American consul living in France would then be a subject to the laws of France, including those regulating trade and debts. In another report to Congress, the Secretary informed the legislative body how best to go about assigning American consuls to foreign countries. He offered extremely specific recommendations concerning the essential placement of consular officials. According to Jay, It would be expedient to have consuls in Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Austrian and United Netherlands, Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, the Canaries, Madeira, and certain ports in the Mediterranean. That a consul general to reside at Amsterdam, should be appointed for Russia, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. That another should be appointed for Britain and Ireland, to reside at London. That another will continue necessary for France, to reside at Paris. That another should be appointed for Portugal and Madeira, & c., to reside at

25 Jay to Congress, May 13, 1785, Journals of the Continental Congress, (Washington D.C., 1904-37). It seems that Congress sought Jay’s opinion due to the fact that the of Massachusetts had recognized a foreign consul, Richard Soderstrom. Jay recommended that Congress ignore the Governor’s action and require Soderstrom to produce his commission directly to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

26 Lisbon; and that the Mediterranean ports should be for the present to be included in his consulate.26

The Secretary further expressed his views about the office of the Consul, his duties and responsibilities, and the salary attendant to such a position. Jay thought that the consul appointed by the Congress should have the power to then fill his own staff and nominate further consuls as needed for his various districts. A Consul General should be established in each primary location to oversee the other consuls working in a particular country. For example, the Consul General residing in Paris would be in a position to supervise all of the consuls working in France. Furthermore, Jay offered even more practical advice aimed at keeping the consuls honest, the [consul-general] should be independent and unconcerned in trade, and consequently receive an adequate salary; and although it would be better that consuls should be maintained and restrained in like manner, yet as the expence [sp] would be enormous, it will be necessary to permit them to trade, and receive no salaries.27

In recognition of the fact that the American nation was new to the diplomatic game, Jay conceded that it might not always be practical to establish both Resident Ministers, exclusively involved in diplomacy, and Consuls General in all of the nations with economic ties to the United States. In these cases, he suggested investing the with consular powers thereby freeing the United States from paying the expense of maintaining essentially two diplomatic residences. Furthermore, the United States would then be free to appoint Consuls

26 Jay to Congress, September 19, 1785, Journals of the Continental Congress, (Washington D.C., 1904-37). Under the Articles of Confederation, the Department of Foreign Affairs existed with a Secretary at its head. After the ratification of the Constitution, the Department of State came into existence.

27 Ibid.

27 General to states with important economic ties to the Americas, but not necessarily requiring a Resident Minister.28 By the time of his final letter to Congress directly related to American Consuls, Jay had conclusively decided that a consular office should not be a salaried position, but consuls should be permitted to trade. He further added, As to fees, he [Jay] can readily suppose, that in certain cases, it would be proper to provide for and ascertain them; but as he doubts the present power of Congress to charge either vessels or persons with the payment of them, he thinks it would be prudent in all cases to prohibit the Consuls from demanding or receiving any fees or perquisites.29

In Jay’s opinion, the Consul was permitted to trade, but not to receive

fees for his consular services, a recommendation that was ultimately

rejected.

Still, Congress did not enact Jay’s proposals. While Congress dallied, Thomas Jefferson, serving as Minister to France, urged the passage of a convention codifying the rights and responsibilities of American and French consuls. The intention of the convention for Jefferson was to protect American trade and shipping, in the hopes that American exports to France would increase. Louis XVI hoped to ensure that the American debt to France, incurred during the Revolutionary War, could be repaid, so he also desired the productivity of American commerce.30 The Convention signed by the United States and France in 1788 proved to be the most important document shaping the consular

28 Ibid.

29 Jay to Congress, October 13, 1785, Journals of the Continental Congress, (Washington D.C.,1904-37).

30 Orville T. Murphy, The Diplomatic Retreat of France and Public Opinion on the Eve of the French Revolution, 1783-1789, (Washington D.C., 1998), 114-16.

28 office in its earliest days. The actual name of the treaty was the Consular Convention and it served as the framework for the development of the American consular system. Jefferson spent much of 1788 in Paris attempting to hammer out the convention with the French. The primary goal of the United States was to ensure a favorable trade relationship with France and to establish economic representation for its citizens in various ports across France and eventually Europe. Jefferson related some of his views regarding the nationality of American consuls in a letter to Jay. While he did believe American citizens should fill the consular posts if at all possible, he did acknowledge that this was not always the case, Native citizens, on several valuable accounts, are preferable to Aliens, and to citizens alien-born. They possess our language, know our laws, customs, and commerce, have generally acquaintance in the U.S. give better satisfaction, and are more to be relied on in point of fidelity. Their disadvantages are, an imperfect acquaintance with the language of this country, and an ignorance of the organisation [sic] of it’s judicial and executive powers.31

The fact of the matter was that the United States could not always rely on a native born citizen residing in a particular port, so in some instances foreigners could hold the official position. Ironically, Jefferson, even as he was negotiating this convention, expressed his view that the establishment of American consuls was not a pressing matter, As to ourselves, we do not find the institution of Consuls very necessary. Its history commences in times of barbarism and might well have ended with them…all civilized nations at this day understand so well the advantages of commerce, that they provide protection and encouragement for merchant-strangers and vessels coming among them. So extensive too are commercial connections now become, that every mercantile house has correspondents in

31 Jefferson to Jay, November 14, 1788, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 14, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, 1958), 58.

29 almost every port…We carry on commerce with good success in all parts of the world: yet we have not a consul in a single port, nor a complaint for the want of one, except from the persons wishing to be Consuls themselves.32

Jefferson went on to add that the United States consented to enter into consular convention with the French because that nation believed consuls to be vital to its commercial interests. Jefferson’s view did seem to be an example of his idealism in action. The subsequent problems the United States faced with the Quasi-war, British impressments and attacks on neutral shipping, and Napoleon’s Continental System disproved his notion that “civilized nations” had no need for consular representation. When it came to war, the civility of nations was immediately dispensed with. The Consular Convention was signed between the United States and France November 14, 1788.33 It was the first treaty ratified by the new Congress after the ratification of the Constitution.34 Finally, legislation was enacted that specifically delineated the duties and responsibilities of American consuls. The act was based on the very same Consular Convention negotiated by Jefferson. Congress in effect finally passed the necessary legislation and simply signed the consular practices outlined in the treaty into law, however it took that august body almost four years to enact the legislation. At its inception, it seemed that Congress was solely focused on domestic issues and did not take much interest in foreign affairs. In fact, some members of Congress argued vehemently against the creation of a

32 Jefferson to the Count de Montmorin, June 20, 1788, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America, from the signing of the definitive treaty of peace, 10th September, 1783, to the adoption of the Constitution, March 4, 1789, Vol. 3, (Washington D.C., 1833-34) 421-22.

33 Jefferson to Jay, November 14, 1788, Ibid., 455.

34 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. 2 (New York, 1927), 8.

30 Secretary of Foreign Affairs as this would inevitably draw the United States into entangling alliances. The strict American policy of isolation must be followed. What did occur combined a department focused on both domestic and foreign concerns called the Department of State. Generally, the members of Congress argued that it was not necessary to have one entire department solely focused on diplomatic issues.35 Also, the first members of Congress seemed concerned that their newly established democratic nation might not be able to maintain its independence when facing intrigue from the various European courts. Essentially, they were concerned that the United States could become a pawn, as it had so many times before, in a struggle between various European nations, particularly Britain and France. In fact, a tremendous debate took place with some American legislators arguing for no foreign service whatsoever. While this seems to be a very short-sighted view, the proponents of such an initiative were merely protective of their nation’s independence. They proposed non- entanglement in European affairs. If the United States did not set up the bureaucracy for a foreign service, then it might be able to steer clear of the troubles that inevitably erupted on the continent of Europe. The leaders of the new nation, to some extent, ignored foreign affairs to the nation’s detriment. By the time Thomas Jefferson took up the newly created post of Secretary of State in the first presidential administration, the only consulate that officially existed was an office in Canton, China. By 1790, Jefferson realized that he had been correct in his insistence to allow foreigners to serve as consular officials if necessary.36 He therefore recommended that in such cases where it was

35 Rippy and Debo, The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation, 150- 51.

36 Chester Lloyd Jones, The Consular Service of the United States: Its history and activities (, 1906), 10. He was not the only American who felt this way, but the circumstances did not favor such a strict directive.

31 not possible to find a suitable candidate, a foreigner could serve in the position of Vice-Consul. He then set about finding qualified personnel for the offices waiting to be filled. Finally, in June of 1790, fourteen names were submitted by President Washington to the for commissioning as consuls.37 As four of the men submitted were foreign citizens, the Senate voted to resolve the matter officially as to the viability of appointing natives of foreign lands to American posts. It was finally decided that foreigners were eligible to serve as Vice-Consuls for the United States government. In August of 1790, after Congress had concluded its first session, Jefferson sent a circular letter to the appointed consuls expressing his frustration at Congress’s delay. Instead of sending news of legislation which would specifically outline their duties, he counseled the men on aspects of their work he wanted to clarify. First he requested the consuls to send him, report of the Vessels of the United States which enter at the Ports of your District, specifying the Name and Burthen of each Vessel, of what Description she is (to wit, Ship, Snow, Brig &c.), the Names of the Master and Owners, and Number of Seamen, the Port of the United States from which she cleared, Places touched at, her Cargo

37 Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 17, (Princeton, 1965), 244- 47. These men were Richard Harrison of Maryland for Cadiz; Edward Church of Massachusetts for Bilbao; John Marsden Pintard of New York for Madeira; of for Liverpool; William Knox of New York for Dublin; Joseph Fenwick of Maryland for Bordeaux; Burrill Carnes of Massachusetts for ; Nathaniel Barrett of Massachusetts for Rouen; Sylvanus Bourne of Massachusetts for Hispaniola; and Fulwar Skipwith of Virginia for . The following names were submitted for Vice- Consuls: Thomas Auldjo of England for Cowes; Etienne Cathalan of France for Marseilles; La Motte of France for Le Havre; and John Parish of Hamburg for Hamburg. While some of the men were foreigners, the other American consular nominations were primarily either known to Jefferson personally or nominated by other prominent Americans. There also seemed to be an idea of geographic representation as three of the consuls were from Massachusetts, three from Virginia, three from New York, and two from Maryland. Ultimately, it was Jefferson’s decision as Secretary of States as to whom to nominate to serve as American consuls.

32 outward and inward, and the Owners thereof, the Port to which she is bound, and Times of Arrival and Departure.38

Jefferson went on to add, “We wish you to use your Endeavors that no Vessel enter as an American in the Ports of your District which shall not be truly such, and that none be sold under that Name which are not really of the United States.”39 He reminded the consuls that it was solely their responsibility to ensure no ships falsely claimed to be ships of the United States. As a former Minister to France, Jefferson well knew the fragility of European peace, and he entreated the American consuls to be alert for changes which might lead to war. It was of the utmost importance to send word promptly to Washington apprising the Secretary of war clouds that might be looming. The consuls also received his express permission to dress in the uniform of the navy, comprising “a deep blue coat with red facings, lining and cuffs, the cuffs slashed and a standing collar; a red waistcoat (laced or not at the election of the wearer and blue Breeches; yellow buttons with a foul anchor, and black cockades and small swords.”40 Finally, Jefferson further advised the consuls that as representatives of the United States, they must take great pains not to irritate the leaders of the nation in which they were stationed. Their actions could significantly impact relations between the United States and the governments of those foreign nations accommodating the consuls. By 1791, Congress took up debate on the Consular Convention signed between the United States and France in 1788, and legislation was passed and approved by President Washington on April 14, 1792. At

38 Circular to American Consuls, August 26, 1790, Ibid., Vol. 17, 423.

39 Ibid., Vol. 17, 423.

40 Ibid., Vol. 17, 423-24.

33 this point, consular representation was present in most of the European capitals, the Mediterranean, and Canton, China, while Resident Ministers were primarily engaged in diplomacy with European courts. Thomas Jefferson, in his position as Secretary of State, urgently pushed Congress to finally enact the terms of the consular convention to clarify the roles and responsibilities of American consuls. By the law of April 1792, the functions and privileges of consuls serving in both the United States and France were expressly stated.41 The first and foremost duty of American consuls serving overseas was to receive the complaints or declarations of American citizens abroad, particularly, “captains, masters, crews, passengers and merchants” of ships involved in trade42 The consul would also be the American representative to oversee any personal estates of deceased American citizens in foreign lands. This responsibility entailed the consul taking inventory of the deceased’s estate, ascertaining the debts on the estate, and paying those debts. Any funds remaining would then be remanded to the United States Treasury after a period of one year.43 A consular representative was vital in dealing with merchant ships involved in trans-Atlantic trade. In the act passed in April of 1792, several duties of the consul were explicitly defined in the event of a shipwreck. Any ship stranded in a consul’s given territory would fall under the care of that consul. It would be his responsibility to take charge of the cargo and merchandise of the ship and see it returned to the rightful owner. Any expenses incurred by the consul would be deducted from sale of the merchandise by the owner of the cargo. Also,

41 , An act concerning consuls and vice consuls (Philadelphia, 1792), microfilm no. 46622.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

34 any sailors or merchants stranded due to a shipwreck also fell under the responsibility of the consul. In fact, the law stated, in cases of shipwreck, sickness or captivity, from suffering in foreign ports, it shall be the duty of the consuls and vice consuls respectively, from time to time to provide for them [the stranded sailors] in the most reasonable manner, at the expense of the United States, subject to such instructions as the Secretary of State shall give, and not exceeding an allowance of twelve cents to a man per diem.44

The consul had the right to demand that other ship captains, those whom were citizens of the United States, return the stranded men to an American port. Furthermore, if a captain refused to take on any additional men, the consul could then fine the captain the sum of thirty dollars “for each mariner or seaman so refused.”45 A final charge given to the consul in matters related to maritime activities was to assist any sailors stranded in their district after the sale of a merchant or master’s ship. If any citizen of the United States sold their vessel in a foreign port, the consul must seek return passage for all sailors who were also American citizens. This included helping the sailor find return passage on another American vessel or even providing him with funds to seek his own way home. Finally, if no other alternative could be found, the consul could resort to forcing another American captain to provide passage for the sailors. If the captain refused, the consul could “cause his ship, goods, and person to be arrested and held until he shall comply with his duty herein.”46 Harsh measures were imposed to find a safe return for American citizens. The last important aspect of the April 1792 legislation was that finally all services for which a consul could charge a fee were specifically

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

35 addressed. A consul could receive a commission for “authenticating under consular seal” any documents needed by American citizens in his district, including ships’ captains, mariners, passengers, merchants, and other travelers. For this service, a fee of two dollars could be charged.47 The act of taking possession of a deceased American citizen’s estate also could be reimbursed by commission. For this action, a sum of five percent of the gross amount on the value of the estate would be settled on the consul. In taking any commission, the consul must keep record and receipts of all transactions should it be necessary to present the documentation to the Secretary of State.48 Although arguments in favor of making a consular official a salaried position were voiced in Congress, the legislation did not appoint a salary for the office, however in one instance, Congress did grant an exception. For the troublesome post in the Barbary states, the act specified a salary of two thousand dollars annually.49 Finally, the legislation passed by Congress did not restrict any consul from taking on other roles in the districts they served. Also, there was no mention of nationality; in many instances, the consul serving the United States for a particular region might be a foreigner. There was no statement included in the act specifying that all consuls must be American citizens. Also, the consuls were not restricted from engaging in trade. In fact, many of the consuls, both citizen and foreign, also enjoyed profitable business and commercial relationships privately while also exercising the very public duties of an American consul. Obviously, a

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 The Barbary States of , , and Tunis engaged in piracy and frequently harassed American shipping in the Mediterranean. Oftentimes, the Barbary states would require payment for protection and the United States government did not want to succumb to blackmail. The situation remained unsettled until Jefferson’s presidency. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 65, 101.

36 consul who also engaged in trade risked serious charges of a conflict of interest. In this way, the position of consul would not progress towards the development of a professional corps of trained diplomatic experts. A salary, guaranteed by the American government, might have encouraged the consuls to focus solely on their obligations to their position and not rely on cushioning their meager fees with lucrative business options. This could have helped to ensure that American consuls were more concerned for their nation’s best interests rather than their financial gain. While the April 1792 act did much to shape the consular service for the turn of the century, it did not serve the purpose of instituting a system for obtaining the most talented professionals for such an important role. Many of the consuls at the time were already established in the countries in which they served through their economic dealings. In some ways, this helped the American government as these men were already familiar with the countries in which they were serving. But another aspect that cannot be diminished is the fact that these same men were profiting from their protected position as a consular official, representing the United States of America. Over the course of the nineteenth century, essentially, a spoils system developed which harmed both the diplomatic and consular service of the American nation. While the nations of Europe were professionalizing their , the leaders of the United States, in effect, rewarded key supporters with comfortable positions in diplomatic posts throughout the world. After Congress had finally legislated the official role of American consul, the Department of State further shaped the duties of the officeholder. While much of the consul’s work did consist of maritime responsibilities, perhaps the most important work lay in the field of economic representation of the United States of America. There were numerous commercial, economic and political advantages of the American consular system.

37 An interesting view of the nature of the consular office was produced by a former American consul, David Bailie Warden. Warden himself served as a Consul in Paris from 1808 to 1814 and eventually settled permanently in Europe. There, he became an historian and wrote numerous works, primarily focusing on the history of America and its institutions.50 In 1813, Warden wrote perhaps his most informative work, On the Origin, Nature, Progress and Influence of Consular Establishments. At the time the book was published, he was serving as American Consul in Paris. An intriguing study, Warden followed the development of the consular office, from the time of the Greeks to the present day as well as the establishment and growth of the American consular service. Although a bit dated, for the era, Warden documented the essential role a consul played in furthering the economic agenda of his nation while at the same time, playing the role of diplomatic and American representative in a foreign land. Warden wrote, The true employment of a minister is diplomacy, or the art of conducting public affairs with the view of attaining a great national object. The functions of a consul are quite distinct from those of a minister, even in the place where the latter resides. The former is charged with the individual commercial concerns of his country; with the prosecution of private claims, with the business of seamen, and cases of vessels seized or captured.51

He went on to enumerate the varied and indispensable tasks a consul performed on a daily basis. For American citizens living abroad, the consul was required to provide the necessary documentation for births, marriages, and deaths. He also was called upon to settle disputes over

50 Another interesting work focusing on American affairs penned by Warden is entitled A Statistical, Political, and Historical Account of the United States of North America; From the Period of Their First Colonization to the Present Day. (Edinburgh, 1819).

51 David Bailie Warden, On the Origin, Nature, Progress and Influence of Consular Establishments, (Paris, 1813), 23-24.

38 claims of American citizenship, a role of vital importance during the early nineteenth century. A further, more private responsibility involved the consul providing his opinion of the “moral and pecuniary character of his countrymen, whose object is credit, or an interest in a mercantile or manufacturing association.”52 The consul could prove to be a worthy ally or a determined foe to those Americans seeking to invest in his district. Oftentimes, as a result of his influence in his particular region, foreign residents living there would seek his counsel in order to ascertain a particular American’s economic standing and personal nature. It was always in the consul’s best interest to be honest and forthright as it would be his reputation tarnished if a business dealing went sour. Warden seemed to think that American consuls were granted some sort of in the foreign country in which they resided. This had been expressly denied in the creation of the Consular Convention of 1788. Although a 1784 convention negotiated by Benjamin Franklin had included some aspects of this type of immunity, that convention was never ratified. Thomas Jefferson, in 1788, expressly stated that the American government did not wish to grant such extraterritoriality protections to foreign officials stationed in the United States.53 For the American founders, this would seem like a weakness forced upon them by more powerful nations. Another misrepresentation of Warden’s was his belief that some debate remained over whether a consul was expressly exempt from paying taxes on himself and his personal property. While Warden seemed to see the necessity of such an exemption, Jefferson had already clarified that consuls were only exempt from such personal taxes as “poll

52 Ibid., 25.

53 Norman A. Graebner, Foundations of American Foreign Policy: A Realist Appraisal from Franklin to McKinley (Wilmington, DE, 1985), 52-3.

39 taxes, head rates for the poor,” and such.54 The personal property of an American consul was subject to taxation by the nation in which he resided. Warden also expounded upon the process established by the United States for choosing consuls to represent its economic interests. The consul was nominated by the President. There were no set requirements as to age, experience, or even nationality for the position. After being commissioned by the United States, the consul would hasten to his new post. Warden elaborated, When he arrives at the place of his residence, he presents his commission, in person, or through his minister, to the minister of Foreign Relations, who obtains from the sovereign authority, permission to exercise his functions, which is confirmed by a letter of .55

Although the consul, at the time, did not receive a salary from the government, in instances where he must advance funds for a necessary function of his office, he would be reimbursed by the Department of State. Warden passionately argued that the role of a consular official should be salaried. He brought forth a reasoned, informative argument on the benefits a set salary would bring the nation the consul served. He argued that the role of consul was a public office, and the consul’s time was not his own. Even when he was not employed in a function of his office, he was at all times a representative of the United States. When out in society, “he is obliged to answer a thousand questions concerning the nations he represents.”56 The consul’s words were then repeated throughout his district, and in this way, the reputation of the American

54 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 17, 475.

55 Warden, On the Origin, Nature, Progress and Influence of Consular Establishments , 139.

56 Ibid., 22.

40 nation was fixed in the minds of those living in the nation where that consul was stationed. While the law of April 1792 established the responsibilities of American consuls, the Department of State played an equally important role in overseeing the consuls stationed in various ports abroad. The Secretary of State communicated frequently with his consuls, thereby ensuring they understood the vital mission they had undertaken in furthering American interests overseas. Since Congress passed no more laws regulating the consuls, it was in the hands of the Secretary of State to establish consular practice, settle differences among his diplomatic representatives, and assess the effectiveness of the American diplomatic and consular corps. As the United States developed and attempted to form a cohesive foreign policy, the first President, George Washington, in his Farewell Address of 1796, offered sage advice regarding entanglements with foreign nations. He cautioned the young republic about the dangers of foreign intrigues and alliances: The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.57

The ability of Washington’s successors to follow his prescribed path would certainly be tested throughout the Napoleonic Era.

57 Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History (New York, 1968), 174, Washington’s Farewell Address, September 17, 1796.

41

CHAPTER TWO

A TALE OF TWO OFFICES: THE MINISTERS VERSUS THE CONSULS

THE CONSULAR OFFICIALS SERVING IN FRANCE In the period 1804-1815, there were eight consular offices in France: in Paris, Bordeaux, Calais, Le Havre, Marseilles, Nantes, Napoleon-Vendée, and La Rochelle. Paris was the center and the entire consular structure revolved around the capital. The most important port in terms of Franco-American trade was Bordeaux. Situated along the Atlantic Coast, this port was the primary commercial center facilitating American exports to France. Therefore, these two cities played an important role in the exchange of French and American products in this time period. The men serving as consuls for the United States were, for the most part, businessmen themselves and acknowledged Francophiles. As a group, they had lived in France for a number of years engaged in foreign trade. While they certainly claimed to be first and foremost patriotic Americans, over the course of their tenures, many of them showed their frank admiration for France and Napoleon.

42 These consuls serving in France during the Napoleonic Era were not men from the American Revolution generation. Those founding fathers and war heroes, such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, were serving in the Presidential Administrations, Congress, or even sent as Resident Ministers serving at the prestigious European courts. It is even difficult to find the names of such men as Fulwar Skipwith, William Lee, David Bailie Warden, and Isaac Cox Barnet in the personal correspondence of the leaders of the United States in this era. The men serving as consuls in France occupied the lower levels of the diplomatic hierarchy. In traditional history, the notion has been that men at the highest levels, men such as the founding fathers leading the United States in its formative years, acted independently to determine the foreign policy that the United States would follow. That view has now been rejected. The leadership in Washington D.C. relied on the common, every day reports they received from the men in steady contact with foreign government officials and populations, men such as the consuls serving in France. Each played an essential role in establishing and maintaining trade, protecting the rights of American citizens in France, and sending vital intelligence to Washington D.C. regarding the political and military situation of France during the First Empire. Their names are scattered throughout the numerous Consular dispatches sent from France to Washington D.C. during the Napoleonic Empire. While the consul was not a diplomatic officer, diplomacy was key to the success of all American representatives serving in France. The consul was a purely economic official who played an important part in representing the United States’ interests in France. How he conducted himself in that role greatly affected his ability to achieve his goals. The Consul serving in Paris at the beginning of the First Empire, in 1804, was Fulwar Skipwith, a merchant from Virginia. He first became involved in commercial enterprises with his interest in the tobacco trade.

43 Because of his business and trade experience in Europe, Skipwith was eventually appointed Consul to Martinique in 1790. As a result of the turmoil surrounding the French Caribbean in the turbulence of the French Revolution, Skipwith had to leave Martinique in 1793. During the French Revolution, a stand-off between Monarchists and Republicans in Martinique threatened the stability of the island. At the same time, a slave insurrection further complicated the situation.1 Skipwith decided to return to the United States in hopes of a more promising diplomatic post. By 1794, he was sent to France to serve as the Secretary of the American in Paris under a new American Minister to France, . Monroe, the current Resident Minister, recognized his diligence and organizational skills, and rewarded him by elevating Skipwith to the office of Consul-General, There being no consul at Paris, and the service of such an official being indispensable, he appointed to the office provisionally Mr. Skipwith, subject to the approbation of the President, who had accompanied as Secretary of Legation, a citizen of excellent understanding, perfect integrity, and great worth, whose appointment was confirmed by the President and who retained the office during Mr. Monroe’s mission and long after its termination.2

James Monroe had great respect for Skipwith and the two men remained on excellent terms throughout Monroe’s tenure and after. Under President Jefferson, Skipwith was appointed to the office of Commercial Agent in Paris. After the Convention of 1800 was signed between the United States of America and France, all consuls serving in

1 David Geggus, “The Slaves and Free Coloreds of Martinique during the Age of French and Haitian Revolutions: Three Moments of Resistance,” in The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion, edited by Robert L. Paquette and Stanley L. Engerman (Gainesville, FL, 1996), 287-89.

2 Stuart Gerry Brown, ed., The Autobiography of James Monroe (Syracuse, NY, 1959), 66.

44 France were to be known as Commercial Agents. It is believed this alteration in title was because of the position held by Napoleon Bonaparte at the time, First Consul of France. In no way was the name change a demotion. As a Commercial Agent, Skipwith continued in his capacity as a consular official, serving the interests of United States citizens living abroad at the time.3 For all intents and purposes, the offices remained completely the same, simply the title had changed. In fact, by the time the First Empire was proclaimed in December of 1804, all commercial agents were again referred to as consuls.4 The Consul at Bordeaux, William Lee, had been appointed to his position by President Jefferson in 1801. Lee, a commissions agent since the age of 18, had experience working in Boston before traveling to France, Great Britain, and Holland to further expand his business knowledge. By a curious coincidence, Lee married Susan Palfrey in 1794, whose own father had been appointed as the first consul to France from the United States in 1780. Sadly, his vessel was lost at sea, and Colonel William Palfrey never reached his destination.5 Lee attained his position of Consul at Bordeaux because of the influence of several influential and powerful friends such as Elbridge Gerry, George William Erving, and James Monroe. Lee, a Francophile who had traveled on the continent, looked to embark upon a lucrative career in Bordeaux. Since consuls had no set salary, he would be able to earn commissions for his work as a private commercial agent while at the

3 C. Edward Skeen, John Armstrong, Jr. 1758-1843 (Syracuse, 1981), 69-70.

4 For the purposes of this dissertation, the term consul, rather than commercial agent, will be used to avoid confusion.

5 Mary Lee Mann, ed., A Yankee Jeffersonian: Selections from the Diary and Letters of William Lee of Massachusetts (Cambridge, 1958), 2.

45 same time representing the government as a consular official in Bordeaux. 6 David Bailie Warden, in contrast, was born in Ireland and completed his education at the University of Glasgow, graduating in 1797. As a fervent nationalist, he threw his support behind a revolt against British rule in 1798 and subsequently was arrested and imprisoned. He chose to exile himself in America and was allowed to leave Ireland for the United States in 1799. While serving as a tutor at Kingston Academy in New York, he made the acquaintance of General John Armstrong and eventually joined the General’s personal household as private tutor to his children.7 When General Armstrong was appointed to replace Robert R. Livingston as Resident Minister in Paris in 1804, he requested that Warden remain with the family and join them in their move to Paris. However, Warden would no longer be the respected academic tutor, but rather the Secretary of the American Legation in Paris. As a result of his initial foray into the diplomatic world, before departing for Paris, Warden decided to became a citizen of the United States. While in Paris, he continued his life-long scientific study, even enrolling in the École de Médecine de Paris with a view to embarking upon a career in medicine. Although he continued in his post as secretary, when Warden learned of Skipwith’s resignation, he asked Armstrong to recommend him to President Jefferson for the position of Consul. Warden seemed to be the

6 Ibid., 53.

7 Francis C. Haber, David Bailie Warden, A Bibliographical Sketcfh of America’s Cultural in France, 1804-1845 (Washington, 1954), 1-5. Haber produced this brief forty page sketch of Warden. It is most useful for its bibliography which lists the thirty-four historical and scientific studies and translations that Warden produced in his time in Europe. Warden translated a variety of French works such as Jean Francois Callet’s Tables of Logarithms and the Abbé Henri Grégoire’s An Enquiry concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature of Negroes.

46 perfect candidate for the post, due to his relationship with General Armstrong and his familiarity with the city, and as such, he was temporarily appointed to the position of Consul in August of 1808 and later confirmed by the Senate in 1811.8 Throughout the Napoleonic Era, the Paris consular office was a breeding ground of political and diplomatic intrigue. Fulwar Skipwith sparred with both Livingston and Armstrong. Warden would become involved in quarrels with the consul at Bordeaux, William Lee, and the final American minister of the time period, William H. Crawford. What seemed to occur between the ministers and consuls was a diplomatic rivalry. The men serving in these positions provided essential and timely intelligence to the leaders in Washington D.C. If a consul overstepped his boundaries, the minister invariably believed that he was trying to encroach on duties above his office. As the minister position was a superior appointment, the men appointed to it felt the need to keep the consuls in their places by emphasizing that fact. Both offices were vitally important to the diplomatic channels as well as establishing effective commerce between France and the United States. Therefore, a harmonious working relationship between the two would have forged a cohesive diplomatic structure which might have been able to improve the fractured relationship between Napoleon and the Americans. Unfortunately, the diplomatic sparring between the ministers and consuls only served to further weaken America’s diplomatic standing in the French nation. THE PARIS CONSULAR OFFICE UNDER FULWAR SKIPWITH By 1804, a monumental year in French history in which Napoleon established the Bonaparte dynasty for France and crowned himself Emperor on December 4, 1804, the situation between France and the

8 Ibid., 10-11.

47 United States of America seemed to be improving. In fact, the United States had settled its differences with both Great Britain and France. The unpopular but ultimately successful treaty John Jay had negotiated with Great Britain in 1794 helped to reestablish trade between the upstart nation and its former colonial master. And the United States and France seemed to be enjoying a harmonious, diplomatic relationship. One of the first matters settled by Napoleon upon his ascension to the office of First Consul following his coup d’état of November 1799 was his attempt to bring peace to the French nation. The situation with the American republic, at the time of the coup, fell just short of open warfare. He began overtures towards the United States to seek an end to the undeclared hostilities that existed between the two nations. Outwardly antagonistic towards each other, from 1798-1799, France and the United States of America had been embroiled in what has been termed a “Quasi-war” falling just short of openly declaring hostilities against each other. However, Napoleon could claim success here as the Convention of Môrtefontaine settled the differences between the two nations.9 The only issue that remained to be settled was how would American losses suffered during the Quasi-war be compensated. The Convention of Môrtefontaine was ratified by France July 31, 1801 and by the United States Senate December 21, 1801. The Convention between France and the United States sought, a firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a true and sincere Friendship between the French Republic, and the United States of America, and between their respective countries territories, cities, towns, and people without exception of persons, or places.10

9 Clifford L. Egan, Neither Peace Nor War (Baton Rouge, 1983), 9-10.

10 Convention of Môrtefontaine, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/france/fr1800.htm.

48 The new Convention between France and the United States met with a warm reception throughout the American republic as it did away with the Treaty of Alliance of February 6, 1778, which had bound the two nations together since the era of the Revolutionary War. The leaders of the United States had felt bound and constricted by the terms of the previous treaty and believed that the new convention respected the rights and independence of their new nation. As President of the United States, Jefferson truly appreciated the treaty as a fair and reasonable measure that gave his nation an equal status with one of its former colonial settlers, which, in truth, he believed that the with Britain did not. Another reason for Jefferson’s favorable reception of this treaty, unlike his rather strenuous objections to the Jay Treaty, was the acceptance of both nations of the “Free ships make free goods” international maritime standard. Specifically, Article 14 of the Convention stated: It is hereby stipulated that free ships shall give a freedom to goods, and that every thing shall be deemed to be free, and exempt which shall be found on board the ships belonging to the citizens of either of the contracting parties, altho’ the whole lading, or any part thereof should appertain to the enemies of either, contraband goods always being excepted. It is also agreed in like manner, that the same liberty be extended to persons, who are on board a free ship.11

While this may seem to be the standard, accepted practice of the day, it was not. The Jay Treaty did not treat the American republic with the same respect in this situation as the Convention did. In fact, this would prove to be a major catalyst on the eve of the War of 1812, particularly the issue of impressment of American sailors to serve on British ships. In reality, the French and British attitudes towards the United States

11 Convention of Môrtefontaine, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

49 and its independence made a deeper impression on President Jefferson than his so-called bias towards France. Although a policy or action might seem to favor France over Great Britain, the President acted only out of concern for his nation and its best interests. Throughout Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, he would be accused of partiality towards France as well as Napoleon, of course, at the expense of Great Britain. While it is true that Jefferson served in France as Resident Minister and participated actively in the social life it had to offer, first and foremost, Jefferson remained a patriotic and loyal American. While he may have harbored resentments towards Britain for its actions preceding and during the Revolutionary War, the United States’ third president was a pragmatic man. He realized the necessity of encouraging friendly relations with all European nations. Furthermore, he intended to see his new nation benefit from an increasingly advantageous economic relationship with any nation that sought to promote trade with the United States. Throughout his presidency, he oversaw the appointment of consuls throughout France, Europe, and even the Far East, policies which only continued under his successor, President James Madison.12 Moreover, Thomas Jefferson saw France as an important balance to Great Britain in both Europe and the United States. For the United States’ benefit, Jefferson hoped that the two European powers would serve to increase America’s fortune. Since Great Britain and France seemed to be constantly engaged in struggles for dominance13 in Europe

12 William D. Morgan and Charles Stuart Kennedy, The U.S. Consul at Work (New York, 1991), 4-5.

13 Although peace had been signed between France and Great Britain with the Treaty of Amiens in 1801, by 1803, hostilities between the two nations had resumed. France and Great Britain would remain at war until the final battle of the Napoleonic Wars, Waterloo, in June, 1815.

50 and on the seas, neither nation could meddle in American affairs. As a result, the United States would profit from increased trade as well as true independence from any European master. If, and when, either Great Britain or France prevailed over the other, it was Jefferson’s sincere hope that the United States would then be a strong enough power to maintain its complete independence and control over its domestic and international affairs. Consequently, as a result of Jefferson’s alleged French partiality, those who served under him, especially in France, were also accused of putting their admiration for that volatile nation before the interests of the nation they were sworn to serve. Again, these were false allegations. The Consuls throughout France, men such as Fulwar Skipwith and William Lee, were indeed patriotic American citizens, who just happened to also be successful businessmen. While they did hold France in great esteem, they also appreciated the financial benefit they received from their economic relationship with that nation. These consuls only wanted to see the diplomatic side of the Franco-American relations improve to further increase trade and profits for both nations. The most important article of the Convention to directly impact the American consuls was the language of Article X. This expressly gave the men serving in this position their rights to practice in France: It shall be free for the two contracting parties to appoint commercial agents for the protection of trade, to reside in France, and the United States … Before any Agent shall exercise his functions, he shall be accepted in the usual forms, by the party to whom he is sent, and when he shall have been accepted and furnished with his exequatur, he shall enjoy the rights, and prerogatives of the similar Agents of the most favored nations.14

14 Convention of Môrtefontaine, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

51 As a result of the Convention, all consular officials in both France and the United States had to be presented and reconfirmed in their respected offices. The Convention proved to be controversial in two respects. First it abrogated all previous treaties with France, which caused some measure of alarm in the United States. Also, it did not in any way solve the problem of spoliation claims made by Americans who had suffered enormous losses during the Quasi-war with France. 15 The one issue that prolonged the negotiations for the Convention for almost one year was in fact that same issue of indemnities. The French absolutely refused to both do away with the treaties of the past and also pay the claims of American citizens. Napoleon astutely observed that this would lessen France’s prestige by agreeing to such demands.16 Yet another momentous achievement in Franco-American diplomacy was needed to settle the issue of American claims. With the United States and France settling diplomatic differences, the outlook for continued improvement in the relationship between the two nations seemed possible. When the United States learned that Napoleon had negotiated the return of Louisiana from Spain to France on the very same day the Convention of Môrtefontaine was concluded17, the leaders in Washington D.C. were considerably alarmed. As destiny seemed to favor improved Anglo-French relations in 1801, Jefferson understandably thought that an increased French presence in Louisiana

15 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Jefferson and France: An Essay on Politics and Political Ideas (New Haven, 1967), 88-9.

16 Bowman,, The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Diplomacy during the Federalist Era, 409-11. Bowman’s work is the best account of the detailed negotiations that took place to secure the Convention of Môrtefontaine.

17 Willson, America’s Ambassadors to France (1777-1927, 84.

52 could only harm the independence of the new American republic. Yet again, fate seemed to intervene. Hostilities between Britain and France resumed in 1803, and Napoleon hastily abandoned his plan to regain control of the French Caribbean island of St. Domingue (now Haiti). While this reprieve assured the independence of St. Domingue, it also served to ease American and French tensions which had been threatened to escalate since Napoleon had reclaimed Louisiana. Napoleon determined to focus his efforts on establishing French supremacy across the continent of Europe. Therefore, he found it necessary to abandon his hopes for Louisiana and simply decided to sell the land outright to the United States. This remarkable achievement not only doubled the size of the United States, it also provided Napoleon with much needed revenue. He planned to use the proceeds from the Louisiana purchase to fund his continued dominance of Europe and planned invasion of Britain. With the purchase of Louisiana, the president of the United States sincerely believed that the improved diplomatic relationship between his nation with both Britain and France ensured economic and domestic tranquility. In fact, Jefferson fully intended to focus the majority of his presidential duties to consolidate America’s hold on its newest possession. Exploration, cartography, and research of the Louisiana addition figured prominently in the mindset of many in Washington D.C. Jefferson, perhaps foolishly, hoped America could remain above any European entanglements for the remainder of his time as President of the United States. When Napoleon agreed to sell the Louisiana Territory to the new nation across the Atlantic, finally, American merchants could seek recompense for their losses at the hands of the French. Under the terms of the Louisiana Purchase, France agreed to settle upon the United States of America, “80,000,000 francs ($15,000,000). Part of this sum,

53 $3,750,000 was to go to the American creditors of France.”18 The two nations jointly created a Council of Liquidation which sought to reconcile the claims of American citizens affected by the marauding navies and merchant ships during the quasi-war. Merchants from the United States had lost small fortunes in terms of vessels and property seized when the nations were in direct confrontation. After Napoleon had brokered peace with the United States, any citizen could make a claim for their specified losses to the Board that was composed of American officials who reported their findings to the French Department of the Treasury. In April of 1803, three American citizens were appointed to the American Board of for the Council of Liquidation. John Mercer, Isaac Cox Barnet, and William Maclure were given the important task of determining which claims had merit and deserved compensation. The process involved their study of each particular case as well as input from the Paris Consul, Fulwar Skipwith. After the process was completed, the American Commissioners would report to the Director General of Liquidation, Jacques Defermont, who would then consult the French Treasury Minister, François Barbé-Marbois, and payment would be rendered to the claimants.19 The Consuls of the United States, particularly those serving in Paris, were often called upon to assist claimants in their pursuit of lost property before the Board. In many instances, the consuls ably assisted American citizens in successful claims, but at times, the consuls would refuse assistance if they felt the claim was unjustified or false. For this reason, the consul could be harassed, threatened, or publicly embarrassed by unsatisfied potential claimants. It was in this circumstance that Fulwar Skipwith found himself in 1804, as the Board

18 Willson, America’s Ambassadors to France, 91.

19 William Maclure, “To the People of the United States,” in Selected Americana from Sabin’s Dictionary of books relating to America, from its discovery to the present time (Louisville, KY, 1978), microfilm #2828.

54 was still deliberating. Because of the strained relationship between Skipwith and the current Minister to France, Robert R. Livingston, the consul quickly found himself in a painfully embarrassing diplomatic situation. Skipwith, in his consular dispatch to Secretary of State James Madison, claimed to have continually treated Minister Livingston with the highest and utmost respect: I have been fully sensible, and am now as sensible as a man can be of the deference, duty, and respect I owe to him [Livingston] as Minister and Representative of the United States. I have not yet ceased to feel that harmony and not discord between his public proceedings and mine here is the return that I at least own our government for the trust it had confided to my care.20

In Skipwith’s frank and earnest opinion, respect was not always returned by the Minister. Unfortunately in February of 1804, Livingston paid a diplomatic call to François Barbé-Marbois, the Minister of the Treasury under Napoleon, and found the French official meeting with his consular counterpart, Fulwar Skipwith. Livingston, who seemed to enjoy fomenting his rancorous relationship with Skipwith, embarrassed the consul in the presence of Minister Marbois. Quite plainly, he did not believe Skipwith had the necessary rank and privilege to be meeting diplomatically with such a high-ranking official of the First Empire. While this is patently untrue, Livingston also did not realize that Skipwith had met socially with Marbois, and the two men frequently crossed paths in Parisian society. In point of fact, Livingston felt Skipwith’s actions in meeting with the Treasury Minister showed a marked lack of respect for his position as Minister Resident. Another important point remained that Skipwith did in fact have the right to meet with the Treasury Minister. As he doggedly pointed out

20 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 7, 1804, Skipwith to Madison.

55 to Livingston in subsequent communication, he possessed the right to consult with French officials in his role as consul of the United States under the 10th Article of the Convention of Môrtefontaine. In this particular situation, Skipwith found it necessary to consult Marbois regarding specific claims that had been made by American citizens which he did not believe were justified.21 Although Skipwith was in the right, Livingston refused to acknowledge the fact. In a letter to the consul, the minister related the circumstances as he remembered them. I shall give you a plain relation of the facts as they dwell in my memory…I called upon the Minister about a particular business, and to my upmost surprize [sic] found you with him with the Convention in his hand. He told me when I came in, that he was glad I was come, that you had applied to him for an explanation of, I think, the 10th Article, and that we would read it together if I approved.22

The heart of the matter was that, to Livingston’s way of thinking, Skipwith had gone over his head. Skipwith had applied directly to a French official rather than consult with the minister who could then seek clarification for the consul. This sentiment was clearly expressed by Livingston. I was very much surprised that Mr. Skipwith should apply to him upon such a subject, since he was not the Minister of the United States, but an agent appointed under the Convention by me, and held that appointment during my pleasure. That I was the Minister of the United States, and that if any explanation were to take place between the two Govts. it would be only thro’ me and not thro’ an inferior agent.23

21 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 25, 1804, Skipwith to Livingston.

22 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, February 20, 1804, Livingston to Skipwith.

23 Ibid.

56 According to Livingston, Skipwith was an “inferior agent” with absolutely no power to consult directly with a French government official, certainly not the Minister of the Treasury. The minister could not tolerate Skipwith’s attempt, in his point of view, to vault himself into the upper echelons of Parisian society. Livingston’s haughty reply contained a couple of incorrect assertions. First, Skipwith was not an agent appointed by a foreign minister. He was a consul of the United States appointed directly by the President. Second, he did not serve at the pleasure of the minister, but yet again, at the pleasure of the President. Livingston did not have the power to appoint a consul, nor could he summarily dismiss one. Such action could only by taken by the President of the United States. As a result, Livingston reprimanded Skipwith and seemed to continue to work against the consul for the remainder of his time in Paris. The haughty disposition of the minister and the injured countenance of the consul led to further strain the relations between these two American representatives. Skipwith, in his dispatch to Secretary Madison, believed that he was fully in the right in meeting with Minister Marbois. He further alluded to the fact that as the consul of the United States in Paris, it was his particular duty to confer with the Council of Liquidation to ensure that each and every claimant met the requirements for pecuniary settlement. He continued his justification to Madison with his belief that as consul he was “positively and exclusively to certify the claims that ought to be admitted to liquidation.”24 Skipwith went on to enumerate the various offenses that he had suffered as a result of his dogged determination to strictly follow the letter of the law in respect to the Convention and the Council.

24 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 7, 1804, Skipwith to Madison.

57 The individual that holds that office [consul], because it places him alone and unsupportable in direct conflict with the designs and interests of a set of the most interested, artful and corrupt men that ever disgraced our country. Men who by gross and shallow means of flattering the Minister, blinded by insatiable vanity, do with his approbation, if not under his criminal patronage, daily heap calumny and insult upon both the Board and myself for the undisguised purpose, should neither misrepresentation nor the avowed efforts of the Minster succeed in obtaining our removal, of securing the ultimate decision of the French Government in favor of certain claims of great amount, not embraced by the Convention.25

In a rebuttal to Livingston, in which Skipwith attempted to explain his motivation behind the private meeting with Minister Marbois, the consul claimed to seek clarification on some terms of the Convention of Môrtefontaine. In particular, he sought the Minister’s advice on the proper application of the 10th Article of the Convention in relation to various American claimants. Finding himself treated with disdain by Minister Livingston, Skipwith addressed his relationship with Marbois, He is, as well as yourself, Sir, a very polite Gentlemen, and I can assure you, was never rude to me, and though I own to you here that I should feel flatter by a closer acquaintance with him than I have really had … I had sometimes been in his company at his own lodgings and elsewhere many years before your arrival at Paris, and though your memory had taught you to believe you never saw me in his society, I must permit myself to remind you of the honor I had of dining at his house, in company with you, a very few days after your arrival [in Paris as Resident Minister in 1801] and of the same honor I have received twice since.26

While it is undeniable that Skipwith must have taken some pleasure from reminding Livingston of such particular details of his acquaintance with Minister Marbois, the truth of the matter remained that Skipwith did have the authority and the legitimate responsibility to

25 Ibid.

26 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 25, 1804, Skipwith to Livingston.

58 meet with the Napoleonic Minister of the Treasury. As so many economic duties and responsibilities fell to the consular official, Skipwith found it his task to meet with various Treasury officials, members of the Council of Liquidation, and even French and American businessmen in his pursuit of the validity of claims made after the Convention was signed in 1800. A failed claim by an American merchant was at the root of the disagreement between Livingston and Skipwith, and was also the reason behind Skipwith’s meeting with Minister Marbois. The American claimant, James Swan, had failed to achieve his goal of obtaining recompense for lost claims during the quasi-war. Skipwith, as consul, did not serve directly on the Board, but he frequently appeared before the body to give evidence for or against the validity of a particular claim. In the instance of Swan’s claim, Skipwith sided against the merchant, who also happened to be a rival commercial agent. This quarrel between Skipwith and Swan continued to fester for years, eventually leading to physical intimidation and violence. The injured claimant, Swan, also found support from other Americans living in Paris, and the men made sport with damaging the consul’s reputation to the detriment of Skipwith and Livingston’s working relationship. They circulated rumors about Skipwith that although he was unwilling to support Swan’s claim, he himself had made a tidy profit of 111,000 francs from his own claim before the Board. Skipwith, of course, addressed this attack directly to Secretary Madison, and went on to add, “I mention it because there is an extravagant falsehood, which is now circulated here, and may now by the same malicious spirit be propagated in the United States both respecting me and the Board.”27 The consul reiterated that it was his strongest desire to combat such lies

27 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 7, 1804, Skipwith to Madison.

59 and maintain and uphold his reputation as well as the respect owed to the Council of Liquidation. Further circumstances continued to drive Consul Skipwith and Minister Livingston apart. In March of 1804, shortly after the Marbois incident and the Swan accusations, Livingston sent for Skipwith to meet with him at his Paris residence. The details of the meeting were scrupulously transmitted in a Consular dispatch to Secretary Madison. Skipwith proved to be a steadfast and determined correspondent, rarely missing an opportune chance to send letters across the Atlantic to the newly established capital of Washington D.C. Livingston started the meeting in a rather menacing manner, seating Skipwith close by, then pulling his chair directly up to that of the consul’s, so the two men could face each other directly.28 Obviously this was Minister Livingston’s rather clumsy attempt to intimidate Skipwith. He proceeded to charge the consul with two infractions that would have constituted flagrant misuse of his consular office and appointment. Skipwith claimed to be astonished at such a blatant and provoked attack so soon after the altercation over the Swan claim and his meeting with Minister Marbois. The first charge directed against Skipwith regarded the actions of the consul concerning an American captain by the name of Nathan Haley.29 Livingston claimed to have knowledge of Skipwith’s gross misconduct in the Haley affair towards both the French and American governments. According to his sources, in 1798, Skipwith procured for Captain Haley a French Commission and a Letter of Marque. In his dispatch to Secretary Madison, Skipwith claimed, About ten years ago, an American vessel called the Mary, commanded by a Captain Haley, was captured by a French cruiser and brought into the Port of Brest. I was then Consul-General

28 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 29, 1804, Skipwith to Madison.

29 Ibid.

60 here. Captain Haley sent me his papers as did all American captains in his situation and employed my intercession with this Government for the relief of his vessel, in which I succeeded. I then heard no more of him until a year or two afterwards.30

However, Skipwith did later learn that Haley had been captured by the British and spent some time in captivity in a British armed vessel. Skipwith wrote that Livingston accused him of knowingly intervening for Haley with the full awareness that Haley intended to outfit a in order to secure the return of his own ship, the Mary. While this might not have technically been illegal, Livingston went on to add that Haley had addressed the Council of Liquidation in order to recoup the loss of his ship. Furthermore, it was speculated that Skipwith and Haley were plotting together to split the reward from the Council. In that same meeting, Livingston further accused Skipwith of aiding a known privateer, Thomas Melville Jr., a native of Boston, Massachusetts. The Minister claimed that the consul knowingly gave Melville an improper certificate, giving the privateer freedom to act with the full protection of the United States government. Skipwith believed Melville to be innocent of the charge, but added in his dispatch, Livingston’s informants tell him that Mr. Melville was concerned in privateering. Our minister now seeks to destroy me because by his conduct he has forced me to remind him of his multiple faults. Two or three individuals are cooperating with him because they expect to obtain my office.31

After such accusations and recriminations, the meeting did not end pleasantly.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

61 After their hostile tête-à-tête, Livingston followed up his personal attack with a churlish letter to the American consul. He reiterated the various claims against Skipwith and concluded with a series of brusque, provoking questions which he demanded be answered without delay. Everything about the overall tone and structure of the letter clearly showed that Livingston fully believed Skipwith to be guilty of the charges leveled against him. In the letter, Livingston asked, Were you chief of the Bureau of Commissions during the year five? Do you know Captain Haley? Had he a Commission and a Letter of Marque? Who handed it in? Who introduced him to you? Who recommended him? To whom was the Commission delivered when made out?32

The questions continued in this vein over the course of an entire page. Livingston purposely took an aggrieved approach to his demands of Skipwith, in order to further intimidate the consul as well as ensure the hasty reply he sought. Finally, he seemed to reinforce Skipwith’s belief that the minister intended to strip him of his consular authority by adding, “I should be wanting in my duty if I did not cause your Exequatur to be withdrawn and suspend your consular powers.”33 Livingston believed that Skipwith had full knowledge of Melville’s notorious reputation as a privateer and still gave him certification to sail under the protection of the United States of America. The minister concluded with his assertion that, “nothing but a sense of duty prompts this inquiry.”34 Skipwith, admittedly, felt as if he were being attacked from all sides. Here was a circumstance in which a fellow American representative serving in France had taken such a marked and heated

32 Consular Despatches from Paris, March 2, 1804, Livingston to Skipwith.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

62 dislike of him, he scarcely knew how to rectify the matter. However, Skipwith proved to be a wily and determined adversary. By the time he received Livingston’s demands, Skipwith had already set about getting the evidence he needed to clear his name in connection to Captain Haley and his actions towards Melville. First, he applied to M. Cottreau, who had served as Secretary General of the at the time in question. His service for Haley in 1798 was, in fact, an example of Skipwith fulfilling his duties as American consul, attempting to secure the interests of Americans overseas.35 He even managed to make contact with his supposed partner in crime, Captain Haley, who made sworn testimony that Skipwith had only assisted his procurement of a French Commission in 1798, and that the two men had never before or since worked together under any financial arrangement. Skipwith noted the particular evidence he sent to Secretary Madison in a dispatch dated March 5, 1804. He sent copies of his request for a declaration from the former Secretary General of the French Navy, M. Cottreau, a letter from an American businessman in Paris, Henry Waddle, and a signed declaration from his supposed collaborator, Captain Nathan Haley.36 The consul was unable to secure a declaration from M. Cottreau and as he explained to Secretary Madison, with the current political climate in France, Cottreau did not feel comfortable making such a declaration in writing. What Skipwith had hoped to achieve was a letter from the former Secretary stating that to the best of his knowledge the consul had represented the Captain to the French Navy offices immediately after his vessel had been captured and that was the extent of their relationship. It seemed rather presumptuous that Skipwith

35 Consular Despatches from Paris, March 1, 1804, Skipwith to Livingston.

36 Consular Despatches from Paris, March 5, 1804, Skipwith to Madison.

63 would expect the French official to attest to the entire scope of his relationship with the Captain. Even if that had been the only circumstance in which Cottreau saw them together, how would he know the full extent of their working association?37 Waddle, the American businessmen, related in his letter to Skipwith that Cottreau was uncomfortable making that pledge in writing. However, with his next correspondent, Captain Haley himself, Skipwith was amply served. In his sworn testimony, Haley accused “a band of ruffians” with stirring up the controversy to besmirch Consul Skipwith’s reputation, and he further added that those ruffians were in fact “English agents.”38 Haley fully backed Skipwith’s representation of their relationship. He stated that he had been introduced to Skipwith in Paris after the loss of the Mary, and the consul had escorted him to the Department of the Navy to state his case for recompense. Furthermore, he had sought, before his departure from France a few days later, Skipwith’s assistance in the legalization of some documents and had paid the consul two dollars for his service. He firmly attested, “I recollect paying you two dollars, and I do sware [sic] that was all the money that you ever received from me – directly or indirectly.” 39 The last piece of evidence Skipwith submitted to Madison in order to clear his name from the slurs and aspersions cast by Livingston was a sworn declaration from Thomas Melville Jr. The testimony given by Melville had a date of September 20, 1798. In the document, Melville stated the full course of his business in Europe, noting that he had departed, “Boston 9 June 1795 on the ship Sally of Boston, bound for Haven and Hamburgh [sic]. Arrived in Haven 17 July, part of cargo

37 Ibid.

38 Consular Despatches from Paris, March 1, 1804, Haley to Skipwith.

39 Ibid.

64 disposed at Haven and the rest at Hamburgh [sic].” He also stated that the object of his leaving the United States was of a speculative nature in commerce, occasioned by the war in Europe and the opportunities offered by it to neutrals to acquire a practical knowledge of business in the different commercial places and to use his property to the advantage, which the event of war offered for his enterprise.40

The consular dispatch concluded with the sworn certificate that Skipwith had then presented to Melville which gave him protection as a citizen of the United States of America. In truth, these types of certificates were merely routine responsibilities of American consular officials. In times of war, particularly with the uncertain nature of the conflict developing between France and Great Britain, shippers of all types relied on such protection for their livelihood. The consular certificates were proof that these merchants were citizens of the United States and therefore neutral in the war. While such documentation did not always provide complete protection, because of France’s acceptance of the “Free ships make free goods” rule, it should have at the very least provided that cargoes could not be easily seized and declared contraband. Although this flurry of letters across the Atlantic cleared Skipwith’s name, Livingston was not yet satisfied in his personal battle with the consul. Before he departed France to return to the United States, he added one further insult, particularly designed to harm Skipwith where it would smart the most. He sent the consul a dispatch informing Skipwith that he had hired an assistant “to perform certain official duties.”41 According to the consul, Livingston then informed him that he thought it

40 Consular Despatches from Paris, March 5, 1804, Skipwith to Madison.

41 Consular Despatches from Paris, April 7, 1804, Skipwith to Madison.

65 necessary to “appropriate one half of the salary that had been allowed” to Skipwith.42 Justifying his outrage to Madison, Skipwith immediately informed the Secretary of State of Livingston’s perfidy and added how much this would hurt him in his capacity as consul of the United States of America in Paris. While Minister Livingston did not share with the Secretary of State all that had passed between himself and Skipwith, in late March 1804 he did send a series of dispatches to Madison relating the circumstances of the feud that had developed between himself and the consul. He wrote, “Enclosed are some letters that have passed between Mr. Skipwith and me. They sufficiently explain themselves and I shall make no comment upon these.”43 Livingston included letters which detailed the escalation of the quarrel from the Marbois incident to his accusation of fraud against Skipwith. Livingston also addressed his reduction of the consul’s salary. He noted, I would only observe that the President having left it in my discretion to fix the salary of Mr. Skipwith as agent of prizes at any sum not exceeding 2000$ I was induced to go to the extent of the allowance because at the time there were many prize causes defending, and when they ceased as at present to be of any consequence, no new cases arising and the old requiring little or no particular attention on his part, I still continued the allowance upon account of a number of cases which were constantly amassing under the French laws of trade.44

Here Livingston contradicts himself. First he said there were few cases, then he mentioned a number of cases still continued to occur. But the

42 Ibid.

43 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, March 31, 1804, Livingston to Madison.

44 Ibid.

66 point of this communication was to justify his retaining a personal secretary and splitting Skipwith’s salary with him. Yes, he did have the right to diminish Skipwith’s salary, but he had not been given permission to grant the prize cause agent’s income to another official. Yet again, Skipwith would be satisfied. The Secretary was in fact outraged that Livingston had arbitrarily denied Skipwith his salary. While the Consular Convention had not particularly assigned a set salary for consuls, the practice had begun as soon as consuls were appointed across the globe. In fact, upon receiving the office of Secretary of State, Madison had informed President Jefferson of the salaries of various diplomatic and consular officials, and he himself had set Skipwith’s salary at $2000.45 This was noted as his salary as consul and agent of prize causes. As a result, Skipwith normally received $2000 annually from the minister in Paris. After Livingston’s actions, his salary would have been reduced to just $1000 a year. In a letter to James Madison, the President marveled at the temerity of Livingston, I am at a loss to know by what authority, he undertook to give a part of Skipwith’s salary to an additional Secretary for a purpose not included in the business allotted to Skipwith. Not possessing here the arrangements transmitted him, I can not decide positively but I suspect that he has consulted in the measure, his feelings rather than his instructions.46

Furthermore, Jefferson commented on the “quarrelsome disposition” of Minister Livingston, noting that he had, “quarreled with every public agent with who he had anything to do. Thus he quarreled with his colleague Monroe, his Secretary of Legation Sumpter, our Consul at

45 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, December, 1801, The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776-1826, Vol. 2, ed. James Morton Smith (New York, 1995), 1213.

46 David B. Matten, J.C.A. Stagg, Ellen J. Barber, Anne Mandeville Colony, Angela Kreider, and Jeanne Kerr Cross, ed., The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, Vol. 7, (Charlottesville, 2005), 591-2 & 535.

67 Paris, Skipwith, with the Commissioners.”47 Secretary of State Madison found in favor of Skipwith, and the Consul saw his salary returned to its appropriate sum. The Paris consul only had to continue his working relationship with Robert Livingston until the fall of 1804. Livingston had resigned his post as American minister and only awaited the arrival of his successor. In a final insult to Skipwith, Livingston wrote to Madison, “notwithstanding my wish to go at an earlier period, I found it impossible in the state of our affairs, as I knew no person with whom I could leave the charge.”48 He added that he could not bear to leave the American citizens in Paris and the French government to the care of Mr. Skipwith. Skipwith hoped his relationship with the newly appointed Resident Minister would be considerably less rancorous than the one he had with Minister Livingston. When the Revolutionary War hero, General John Armstrong, arrived in Paris in November 1804, to serve as Resident Minister of the United States, Skipwith had served in the position as consul since 1798. The consul was an American businessman who was very well connected throughout France, had married into a French family, spoke French fluently, and seemed to be a natural choice for an American economic representative in Paris. Armstrong was none of the above. First of all, he was in no way a trained diplomat. In this instance, the United States lagged far behind the older, established nations of France and Britain in terms of developing a professional, diplomatic service. Admittedly, none of the diplomatic services could rival the professional nature of the French service as it existed under the Bourbons. However, the Americans did not even realize how Europeans

47 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, August 18, 1804, The Republic of Letters, Vol. 2, 1338.

48 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, August 28, 1804, Livingston to Madison.

68 conducted the art of diplomacy. To be a presence on the world stage, an American diplomat must have the money to go out in society as well as the social skills commensurate with such activities. By all accounts, the general was a taciturn man who extremely disliked social interactions. He was further hampered by the fact that he could not speak French. In fact, his only claim on the office seemed to be his revolutionary war experience and his unflagging devotion to the Republicans and the President. Although Armstrong was in essence the foremost American ambassador in France upon his appointment, at that time, the office did not come with a hefty salary. Given that he was not naturally an outgoing man, Armstrong also did not really have the funds necessary to socialize in the highest circles of France. This is further illustration that the American diplomatic agents were not quite professionalized as of yet. To be an effective representative, the American ministers and consuls needed to be adequately funded so that they could participate in French society, for that was where true diplomacy occurred. Skipwith’s social and business ties and Armstrong’s relative solitude combined to ensure that the working relationship between the two men would not be harmonious. The two American officials did enjoy an amicable working relationship for the first two years of Armstrong’s tenure as Resident Minister. Notwithstanding the fact that Armstrong was Robert Livingston’s brother-in-law, he did not come to Paris intending to hold the same personal grudges as his relative. However, the quarrel with James Swan that had continued to plague Skipwith erupted and caused a schism to develop between Armstrong and the consul. In mid-1805, Skipwith requested personal leave from his position in Paris to return to the United States. In his place, he assigned Isaac Cox Barnet, a friend and fellow consul from Le Havre. The issue with Swan simply did not die, but once again, presented itself as a nuisance.

69 Barnet, serving in Skipwith’s stead, bore the brunt of the recrimination for failing to support Swan in his claim before the Council of Liquidation. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that Barnet sought to clear his name by writing to the Gazette de France in response to allegations that had been printed in that paper by Swan and his allies. On July 14, 1806, Barnet sent his account of the relationship between Skipwith, Swan, and himself to the newspaper. Barnet had found himself accosted by Swan and his associate, Michael O’Mealy, in the very front of Armstrong’s residence in March of 1806. Blows were exchanged, and Barnet saw to it that O’Mealy was charged with assault by the French police. The matter ended up in court. Barnet claimed that he, “demanded damages to the amount of 3000 [francs] to be applied to the use of the Hospital of Paris.”49 As a result of the suit, O’Mealy was found guilty and order to pay the reparations. After the attack, Swan and O’Mealy castigated both Skipwith and Barnet in the press, and the temporary consul felt it necessary to defend his position and his honor publicly. Although such matters should have remained in the private domain and not aired publicly, particularly in a foreign country, such actions only emphasized the fact that many of the officials serving in the diplomatic service were not the professional diplomats they should have been. In the Gazette de France, Barnet added that since he was “a public functionary, as well as the Father of a family of four children, [he was] justified in not descending to a level with a Desperado in compliance with the sometimes mistaken laws of honor.”50 With such displays of pettiness publicly submitted for all of France to witness, Minister Armstrong felt compelled to intervene in the matter directly. Rather than

49 Consular Despatches from Paris, July 14, 1806, Barnet to the Gazette de France.

50 Ibid.

70 supporting the public official which had due cause to believe he would receive the Minister’s support, instead Armstrong finally committed to Swan’s faction. He even sought assistance for Swan and O’Mealy’s claim and had O’Mealy released from jail after his altercation with Barnet.51 Both Skipwith and Barnet took this as a personal affront, and upon his return to Paris in April of 1806, Skipwith notified Madison of Armstrong’s alliance with Swan. Skipwith also went on to claim that the only reason Armstrong had determined to support Swan in his claim was because Swan and his supporters had flattered the minister to such an extent to gain his favor.52 At this point, the antagonistic nature of Armstrong and Skipwith’s relationship settled into course, and the two American officials would continue to work at cross purposes for the duration of Skipwith’s tenure in Paris. BORDEAUX: WILLIAM LEE, CONSUL OF THE UNITED STATES In southwestern France, the city of Bordeaux played an important role in shipping and commerce. A self-described “Yankee Jeffersonian,” William Lee, held the office of consul in Bordeaux.53 He had arrived in Bordeaux to serve officially as Consul in 1801, and could boast his experience working in France as a merchant from 1796 to 1798. With his knowledge gained as a businessman trading both in the United States and across Europe and his steadfast dedication to Jefferson, Lee seemed an ideal choice to serve as consul in the turbulent years ahead. In 1804, Lee had served as American consul for three years. He had a strong working relationship with Secretary Madison in Washington

51 C. Edward Skeen, John Armstrong, Jr., 70.

52 Consular Despatches from Paris, July 24, 1806, Skipwith to Madison.

53 In fact, his great granddaughter, Mary Lee Mann, took that name as the title of her collection of his personal writings and letters.

71 D.C., Minister Livingston, and Consul Skipwith in Paris. He frequently corresponded with the Paris office as well as the Department of State to keep both locations familiar with the American trade and commerce ongoing in Bordeaux. With Skipwith embroiled in personal struggles and tensions in Paris, Lee seemed to fulfill the duties of consul in an orderly, efficient manner. As the minister and consul squabbled and traded acrimonious dispatches, Lee sent letters across the Atlantic relating the problems American shippers faced in the renewed warfare between France and Britain. In the very first dispatch Lee sent to Madison in 1804, he detailed a problem suffered by the captain of the American merchant ship, the Joseph and Phoebe. Apparently, the ship’s cargo had been seized by the French government without cause. The captain of the ship had also been summarily jailed. When the proprietors of the ship complained to Lee, he began a thorough search to ascertain how the French could possibly justify such a seizure of a neutral ship.54 He wrote to Minister Livingston in Paris to seek his assistance and counsel. Finally, he learned that the French declared the Joseph and Phoebe to have sold some of its cargo in Great Britain, and therefore, the ship had lost its protection as a neutral vessel.55 To the French, this was sufficient reason to seize the ship’s cargo and imprison its captain as their nation was embroiled with war against Great Britain. Already, the Americans were becoming pawns in the ugly war developing between the French and the British. Throughout 1804, Lee continued to confront issues that developed with the French as a result of the escalating naval warfare. In May 1804,

54 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, April 10, 1804, Lee to Madison.

55 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, August 10, 1804, Lee to Madison.

72 he sent a refusal to the Commissary General of Police of Bordeaux to turn over two American sailors that the French claimed were, in fact, British agents. I regret that it is not in my power to comply with your demand to deliver into your hands the first and second mates of the ship Three Sisters of Charleston who have been denounced to you as Englishmen…This will appear perfectly just if you will have the goodness to turn to the Convention concluded between the United States and France in the Year IX, the 14th Article.56

This article justified Lee under the tenet, agreed to by both France and the United States, that “Free ships make free goods.” That same article also protected people traveling on those “free ships.” While Lee was well within his rights to refuse the request of the French police, the article did not protect sailors who were “in actual service of the enemy.” Obviously the French could claim that those shipmates were actually in service of the British. Lee concluded his letter to the French Commissary with his plea for the police to exercise a bit more “prudence and caution” in their eager pursuit of supposed enemies of the state. He seemed to be implying that his patience as an official of the United States government was waning.57 Lee also took seriously the charge issued by Jefferson in his very first Consular circular that all United States’ consuls should do their utmost to keep the Secretary of State informed of political changes and the state of affairs in their appointed countries. By August 1804, Lee wrote to the Secretary of State that not all of France was jubilant over Napoleon’s new title. Upon learning of the Senate’s request that Napoleon assume the mantle of Emperor of the French, Lee wrote,

56 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, May 4, 1804, Lee to the Commissary General of Police.

57 Ibid.

73 As this goes by a private hand permit me to observe that the new order of things in this country grows more and more into disrepute – perhaps due to the Revolution, no party has ever been more unpopular than the present reigning one and it is the opinion of judicious, thinking men that a change will be wrought by some means or other.58

While Lee has been since branded as a complete and utter Francophile, blinded to the increasingly dictatorial conditions of that nation, such written statements seem to belie such sentiments. Lee was first and foremost a patriotic American and absolute partisan of Thomas Jefferson. Although he enjoyed his favored status as an American consul in France, he did not foolishly accept all of the propaganda issued in 1804 which seemed to suggest that the entire nation fervently wished for Napoleon to become Emperor. He warned the Secretary of State that not everyone was happy with the current regime and that some intended to do what they could to undermine the new Bonaparte dynasty. Lee’s opinion was echoed across the Atlantic, and the President himself seemed to express the same sentiments regarding Napoleon’s ascension to the Imperial throne of France. After dining with the President, John Quincy Adams noted that Jefferson did not favor the changes taking place in France. During the evening, Jefferson related a tale to the audience regarding the presentation of the new Imperial French minister in November of 1804. According to Adams, Jefferson was, Displeased by the profusion of gold lace on his clothes…[Adams] asked if he had brought his Imperial credentials, and was answered he had. Mr. Jefferson then turned the conversation towards the French Revolution, and remarked how contrary to all expectations this great bouleversement had turned out. It seemed as if every thing in that country for the last twelve or fifteen years

58 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, August 10, 1804, Lee to Madison.

74 had been a DREAM; and who could have imagined that such an ébranlement would have come to this?59

In an unexpected twist, William Lee also encountered Captain Nathan Haley in the latter months of 1804. Lee wrote to Madison of his problems with Captain George Haley of the ship Brutus. He informed Madison that the Captain, having had a dispute with his mate Benjamin Franklin Leavens of Boston, respecting the amount of wages due the latter, they had recourse to me for an adjustment when, according to the rules of the office I called in two impartial American Captains, who assisted me in rendering the judgment against the Captain.60

Nathan Haley, the brother of George, was in fact the owner of the Brutus and did not agree with the judgment to award Leavens his wages. Due to Nathan Haley’s refusal to pay Leavens’ wages, the situation took a complicated turn. Leavens learned that the Haley brothers did not intend to pay him, so he wrote a fairly threatening letter to George Haley. As a result, the Haleys informed the Commissary General of Police in Bordeaux that Leavens was operating in France as a British agent. Instead of gaining the Commissary General’s sympathies, apparently the French official was already “well acquainted with the characters of some of the parties engaged in this disgraceful business, did not think fit to give into their purposes” and instead wrote a letter to Consul Lee.61 Lee felt compelled to intervene on behalf of the disgraced sailor, because even though the Commissary General did not appear to believe the Haleys’ claim, the police official had to act upon activities that were supposedly committed by an accused British spy. He called a meeting of

59 Diary of John Quincy Adams, November 23, 1804, 24-25.

60 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, November 14, 1804, Lee to Madison.

61 Ibid.

75 both Leavens, who had since been arrested by the French, and the Haleys upon which Lee insisted that the brothers offer their proof that Leavens was indeed working for the British. As their claim had been a complete falsehood, the Haleys were unable to offer any legitimate proof save for an acquaintance’s testimony. The consul found in Leavens’ favor, and the sailor was released from prison. However, this came at a cost. According to Lee, “As it is he is regarded by the Citizens as a suspected person, his reputation is injured, and I have seen times in France when he would under such imputations be in danger of losing his life.”62 Finally, in 1804, Lee warned Madison that the escalating war between France and Britain was already affecting the commerce and trade of the United States. As Spain had also declared war on Britain, Lee learned that France had allowed the exportation of grain to Spain, and this led to increased activity in the port of Bordeaux. Furthermore, In consequence of the war between England and Spain, several privateers have obtained permission to fit out at this port, under Spanish colours, provided they can obtain foreign seamen. Some of the American sailors having left their vessels in order to engage with them.63

In order to limit such activities and calm the situation, Lee assured the Secretary of State that he fully supported the efforts of the police in Bordeaux to impose a nightly curfew. Over the course of 1805 and 1806, tensions continued to escalate between the United States and both Britain and France. Napoleon hoped to control the situation and create an atmosphere of distrust between the new republic across the Atlantic and its former colonial master. He sought to ease his problems on the continent, which he blamed on the

62 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, November 14, 1804, Lee to Madison.

63 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, November 29, 1804, Lee to Madison.

76 continued British funding of the continental nations of Austria and Prussia. Napoleon also hoped to draw the Americans into a war with Britain. If this was the case, Napoleon only further aggravated the situation by continuing to harass American shippers and merchants, leading the Americans to retaliate in kind. Such manipulation by the Emperor would not lead the United States to declare war on Britain, but instead to consider war with France. For his part, the President of the United States expressed only satisfaction that, for its part, the American republic had remained above such hostilities. Jefferson wrote, We have seen with sincere concern the flames of war lighted up again in Europe, and nations with which we have the most friendly and useful relations engaged in mutual destruction. While we regret the miseries in which we see others involved let us bow with gratitude to that kind Providence which, inspiring with wisdom and moderation our late legislative councils while placed under the urgency of the greatest wrongs, guarded us from hastily entering into the sanguinary contest, and left us only to look on and to pity its ravages.64

But how much longer the United States could remain above the fray remained in question. FRANCE V. BRITAIN: THE UNITED STATES IN THE

MIDDLE Although the United States diplomats serving in France and throughout Europe could not predict the actions of the Emperor, they frequently sought to rationalize his actions as positive for the American government. Even ministers serving at the Court of St. James in Great Britain attempted to reasonably assess Napoleon’s changeable diplomacy, allowing that it was more than encouraging for the United

64 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 8, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York, 1892- 1899) 272.

77 States. While serving as Resident Minister in London, James Monroe observed to Secretary of State Madison, The situation of the United States, in respect to all these Powers, is, in every view, a very favorable one. So circumstanced are they, respectively, that while we have the means of doing each irreparable injury, all are interested in preserving the relations of peace and friendship with us; and none have it in their power to do us comparatively equal harm.65

Perhaps foreshadowing the future difficulties the United States faced with Napoleon’s Continental System, Monroe further added, Victorious by land, France has scarcely a ship at sea, and is, therefore, interested in the prosperity of our commerce. Victorious at sea, Great Britain finds herself compelled to concentrate her force so much in this quarter, with a view to her own security, that she would not only be unable to annoy us essentially in case of war, but even to protect her commerce and possessions elsewhere which would be exposed to our attacks.66

In 1805, as Napoleon’s victories across Europe continued, it became increasingly clear to the American consuls serving in France that Napoleon would not be content to allow Britain to dominate the seas and interfere in affairs on the continent. Since the British Navy sailed supremely in the Atlantic and along the coasts of Europe, Napoleon determined that France would dominate the continent in terms of politics and economics. The fact that the Americans were not formally aligned with the British against the French did not seem to matter. Any means of getting British goods into Europe must be stopped, including American shipping and trade.

65 Peter D. Eicher, ed., “Emperor Dead” and Other Historic American Diplomatic Dispatches (Washington D.C., 1997), 67.

66 Ibid., 67.

78 By 1806, Napoleon sought the downfall of Great Britain by attacking its wealth and economy. It was his intention to bring about Britain’s economic ruin by blockading the European coasts, preventing British goods from reaching the ports along the continent. After the disastrous Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, the Emperor recognized that the powerful Royal Navy would continue its dominance over the Atlantic. As a result, he focused his attentions on the continent, determined to consolidate his control over the economies of European nations, effectively shutting out the British. With the issuance of the Berlin Decree by Napoleon in 1806, William Lee, serving in Bordeaux recognized the threat of the Continental System to American interests. Writing to his wife, Susan, Lee warned, The decree of the Emperor has thrown everything into the greatest confusion, and privateers are now fitting out here to attack American commerce. The first article declares the British Islands in a state of blockade. Therefore all vessels bound to England, or that may have cleared out for England, and a market will be taken and brought into France, if Gen. Armstrong does not procure some modification of this decree, which it is not probable he will be able to do.67

On a curious note, Lee warned his wife that all letters in English would not be permitted in French post offices, therefore, she should write to him in French. Although he was a fluent French speaker, Lee could not write in the language, so he would use his secretary for correspondence. The Berlin Decree caused tremendous confusion and consternation in the Americas. The language of Napoleon’s imperial order did not seem to leave any doubt that the Americans would be completely at the mercy of the French. The decree placed all of Britain under blockade, and further stated, “No vessel coming directly from England, or from the English colonies, or having been there since the publication of the

67 William Lee to Mrs. Susan Palfrey Lee, December 9, 1806, A Yankee Jeffersonian, ed. Mary Lee Mann, 64.

79 present decree, shall be received into any port.”68 At first, those ports were only in France, but as Napoleon’s armies marched eastward across Europe, he intended to close every port on the continent to the British. This was the very first stage of the Continental System. Lee quickly recognized that the Berlin Decree, while seemingly aimed at the British, also would have a negative impact on American shipping. If American ships even docked in Great Britain, their cargo could be lost as prize goods in France. As a result, any American ship used to transport British goods could be targeted by the French as an enemy ship, leaving its cargo vulnerable to seizure. Finally, Lee warned his wife that the situation was so dire, they must be prepared to return to the United States at a moment’s notice. Lee concluded, Our Government has but three things to do: 1st to declare in favor of France; 2nd to declare in favor of England; or 3rd to put on an embargo. This latter is probably what they will do to avoid a war and such a measure would put an end to our resources.69

Although the consul did not know it at the time, Lee astutely predicted the very course President Jefferson chose in the hope of preventing a full- scale war. At the same time as Lee was writing of such worrisome diplomatic crises, General Armstrong, the Resident Minister in Paris, sought to assure the President and Secretary of State Madison that the actions of the French were in no way harmful to American trade. How Armstrong came to this conclusion seemed to be extraordinary. There was no such language in the decree which specifically excluded the United States of America from the dictates of the Emperor. Armstrong believed that he

68 Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New York, 1963), The Berlin Decree, 199.

69 William Lee to Mrs. Susan Palfrey Lee, December 9, 1806, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 66.

80 had enough influence in Paris to turn the economic rivalry between Britain and France into a financial windfall for the United States. The Resident Minister in Paris immediately sought the counsel of the French Minister of the Navy and Colonies to determine whether or not the United States would be held accountable to the Berlin Decree. Armstrong sought clarification on the “language of the Imperial Decree of the 21st of November 1806,” which Napoleon issued after his triumphant entrance into Berlin, hence the name Berlin Decree.70 Armstrong received a harsh reply. Any American vessel that first visited a British port would be seized upon its entry into a French port.71 By the end of 1806, little doubt remained that the United States must choose a course to dictate its response to the encroachments of both the French and British upon its neutral rights. Thomas Jefferson, who had been so profoundly denounced time and again as a partisan of France, would have to demonstrate his allegiance to the American nation. As President, Jefferson must determine what path the United States would follow – war, the potential loss of independence, or some economic punitive action. Whatever path he chose was fraught with complications and obstacles. Washington’s lofty ideal to rise above the fray of European entanglements must have haunted Jefferson as he deliberated on the United States’ response to unprovoked British and French attacks. As the noted Jefferson historian, Lawrence S. Kaplan, wrote, “the only rights of neutrals were those maintained by force. But force must be active or passive. The former was war, and a neutral at war ceased to be neutral.”72

70 Despatches of the United States Ministers to France, December 24, 1806, Armstrong to Madison.

71 Despatches of the United States Ministers to France, December 24, 1806, Decres to Armstrong.

72 Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927), 47. Sears cites Kaplan in his book.

81

CHAPTER THREE

THE ESCALATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM: THE CONSULS UNDER SIEGE

After the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, British and French interference in American shipping and trade seemed inevitable. This caused the United States consuls no small amount of apprehension. From 1807 to 1812, the American consuls serving throughout the Napoleonic Empire experienced frustration and disappointment after the establishment of Napoleon’s Continental System. American shipping and trade were seriously hampered during this time period, and attacks on American ships by both French and British privateers proved especially harmful to the United States economy. Throughout the perils of the Continental System, the American consuls attempted to assist American ships, captains and seamen as well as protect American shipping interests against the vicissitudes of economic warfare. After Napoleon’s proclamation of the Berlin Decree in November, 1806, the British formalized their own blockade of the French coasts with an Order in Council in January 1807. The United States seemed perilously on the verge of succumbing to the harsh realities of war.

82 From November 1806 to the summer of 1807, the American officials serving in France, particularly Armstrong had reason to believe that the United States would not suffer economically because of the implementation of the Continental System. Armstrong believed that he had gained assurances from French officials that the Continental System was not directed against the United States. While this fact remained true, the United States would suffer enormously as a result of the steadily escalating war the Emperor waged against the British. This system, Napoleon’s economic war on Great Britain, had its inception in failed schemes: Napoleon’s failure to recoup the losses in the “New World,” his failure to build a navy to rival the British, and his failure to gain control of the English Channel in order to launch a massive invasion of the British Isles. After these failures, Napoleon finally conceded that as he could not face the British directly on the field of honor, he must do all in his power to weaken the British where it would do the most harm – in the wealth of its middle and merchant classes. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM While economic rivalry had certainly played its part in the centuries of warfare between the French and the British, the Continental System marked a sharp departure. Napoleon believed that by controlling continental Europe he could effectively cut off British trade. The Continental System was based on a volley of Imperial Decrees which built this unruly system into a towering configuration of economic warfare. The Continental System did not spring from the mind of the Emperor fully formed, without any variance over the course of its existence. The French, in their unceasing struggle with the British, continued to sculpt and reshape the system over the remainder of the Napoleonic Wars. How did the United States get caught in the tangled schemes of the two European combatants? The answer is simple – due to its steady and

83 even increasing trade with both nations. Although Armstrong consoled the leadership in Washington D.C. with assurances that the Emperor did not mean any harm to the United States, the escalating war soon began to affect American shipping and trade. By the summer of 1807, Armstrong continued a steady correspondence with the French officials directly concerned with the economic blockade, such as the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Madison emphasized in his instructions to Armstrong that such communication was vital for the leadership in Washington D.C. to better understand the situation as it stood in Paris: The explanations given you by the Minister of the Marine [Navy] were seen by the President with much pleasure, and it only remains to learn that they have been confirmed by the express authority of the Emperor. We are the more anxious for this information, as it will fortify the remonstrances which have been presented at London against the British order of January 7th.1

Little did Secretary Madison know that he merely foreshadowed the ongoing struggle that would take place between the French and the British with the United States caught in the middle. American diplomats were constantly entreating both sides to put an end to the economic warfare, threatening to side with one against the other and continuing to use the possibility of some settlement with one to lead the other to negotiate. What could have been an economically advantageous situation for the United States failed to pan out. The United States did not capitalize on the tensions between Great Britain and France for its own gain. Throughout 1807 and 1808, the British and French traded economic sanctions like fencers delivering and parrying thrusts. By the summer of 1807, Napoleon had secured an alliance with the behemoth of eastern Europe, Russia. After the defeat of the Russians at Eylau and

1 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Volume III, 242.

84 Friedland, Napoleon and Tsar Alexander met at Tilsit. Here these two leaders, of the east and west, essentially divided Europe between them. Although he was not aware of it at the time, Napoleon had met a European leader his equal. However, in June 1807, the Emperor of France believed he had made a strong and steady friendship that would favor both nations. At Tilsit, he persuaded Alexander to join his Continental System, securing yet another nation in his effort to destroy Britain economically. Many have since pointed to Napoleon’s trust in Alexander as a major factor in his downfall, as he would eventually become disillusioned with the Tsar, necessitating the disastrous invasion of Russia. In Bordeaux, the consul, William Lee summarized the Tilsit alliance succinctly; “It is said that the two Emperors have divided Europe. Alexander is the Emperor of the East and Napoleon of the West.”2 Although it would not remain so, the close relationship that seemed to have formed between the two emperors could only have a negative effect on American diplomatic efforts. As Napoleon believed himself to be secure in his control over Europe, he did not need to concern himself with allaying the fears of the American diplomats in France that the United States might suffer from the tightening restrictions of the Continental System. Meanwhile in Paris, Armstrong held out hope that a face to face meeting with Napoleon would allow him to plead the Americans’ case successfully. Finally in August 1807, Armstrong had the opportunity to advance the concerns of President Jefferson. Armstrong, never strong in the social graces, witnessed firsthand the power and presence of Emperor Napoleon. He wrote to Madison:

2 William Lee to James Madison, July 23, 1807, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 70.

85 We had yesterday our first audience of the Emperor since his return to Paris. Happening to stand near the minister of Denmark, I overheard His Majesty say to that minister, ‘So M. Baron, the Baltic has been violated.’ The minister’s answer was not audible to me, nor did it appear to have been satisfactory to the Emperor, who repeated, in a tone of voice somewhat raised and peremptory, ‘But, sir, the Baltic has been violated.’ From M. Deyer he passed to myself and others, and lastly to the ambassador of Portugal, to whom, it is said, he read a very severe lecture on the conduct of his court. These circumstances go far to justify the whispers that begin to circulate, that an army is organizing to the south for the purpose of taking possession of Portugal, and another the north for a similar purpose with regard to Denmark.3

Finally in October of 1807, General Armstrong officially informed the consuls of France that the Berlin Decree, which he had long assured would not be applied to the United States, was “about to be literally executed.”4 He forewarned Consul Lee in Bordeaux that once the British learned that the United States would be subjected to the dictates of the Berlin Decree, he could expect increasing retaliation from that quarter as well. No doubt in the escalating warfare, the British would increase their attacks against American shipping. The United States remained caught between the two European behemoths, which were both determined to force the Americans to pick a side in their on-going struggle. Furthermore, he counseled that all American ships currently in French ports should be ordered to return to the United States as swiftly as possible. By December 1807, it had become clear that the United States faced a great peril as it attempted to maneuver the hostile diplomatic waters of Europe. Lee confirmed to Secretary Madison that the British had retaliated against Napoleon’s Berlin Decree with an Order in Council placing all of Europe under blockade,

3 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. III, 243.

4 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, October 6, 1807, Armstrong to Lee.

86 It appears by this that the blockade is to take immediate effect, which much alarms us here for the fate of the sixteen vessels that left this last week for the United States. The measure is considered as very hostile to the United States, and it is believed the English intend carrying in as much American property as they can capture under the persuasion that they will make better terms by this means with us.5

Lee also added that he had instructed all American ship captains to remain in port at Bordeaux, but the seamen seemed disinclined to do so. Many of these ships’ captains had weathered uncertain waters before and did not want to risk failure and ruin when they needed to turn a profit and protect their own economic interests. The United States continued to suffer from British and French economic warfare. All neutral nations, the United States foremost among them, learned that the old maxim of “free ships make free goods” no longer applied. While Napoleon appeared to be on course to strangle British trade on the continent, he did not show diplomatic genius in dealing with the United States. The ideal situation would have been a Franco-American alliance aimed at destroying British trade with the Americas, yet ensuring continued American trade with Europe. Napoleon would have benefited from a war between Great Britain and the United States. If he had aligned himself with the Americans against the British and stopped his attacks on American shipping, the British might have resorted to desperate measures to neutralize the United States. The United States would have been forced into a war against Great Britain to protect its trade and commerce. However, this ran counter to President Jefferson’s plans for the American economy. Unlike the Emperor, Jefferson did not seek the downfall of Britain. Rather, he hoped to see American trans-Atlantic

5 William Lee to James Madison, December 10, 1807, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 71.

87 trade grow and flourish. This meant that he could not choose to ally his nation with either France or Britain. He sought, instead, to find a fair and diplomatic course that might succeed in mitigating American losses in the interim.6 Napoleon formalized his attack against neutral ships with the Milan Decree of December 1807, giving Jefferson further proof that an embargo might be America’s only option. In this decree, the Emperor proclaimed that any ship that had traded with the British lost its protection of neutrality and would be subject to seizure by the French.7 The Milan Decree stated, Every ship, to whatever nation it may belong, that shall have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or to a voyage to England, or shall have paid any tax whatsoever to the English government, is thereby and for that alone, declared to be denationalized, to have forfeited the protection of its king, and to have become English property.8

While the Berlin Decree had declared that the coast of Great Britain was in a state of blockade, the Milan Decree went one step further. If any vessel, including those of neutral countries, cooperated or traded with the British, it would lose its protection and be subject to seizure by the French. By this point, the United States had no real protection on the high seas, as both the British and French coasts were in essence blockaded. Madison expressed frustration at Fulwar Skipwith, the American Consul at Paris, for not informing him of Napoleon’s latest Imperial

6 Henry Blumenthal, France and the United States: Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789- 1914 (Chapel Hill, 1970), 20-21.

7 Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New York, 1968), The Milan Decree, 201-02.

8 Ibid., 201-02.

88 Decree. He complained of Skipwith’s inaction to the President.9 As consul, Skipwith’s primary responsibility was overseeing American economic and commercial interests. To neglect to inform the Secretary of State of such important diplomatic circumstances failed to impress Madison regarding Skipwith’s abilities. President Jefferson was compelled to make swift and bold decisions, designed to protect the economic interests of his young nation and its constituents. The only palatable path seemed to be that of economic nationalism – an embargo. Although the embargo proved to be unpopular in certain regions of the United States, Jefferson and his advisers in the capital believed that such action was warranted in order to protect American commerce, trade, and even its independence. The most vehement protests against the embargo developed in the Northeast, an area dependent on trans-Atlantic trade. The merchants and captains in the Northeast enjoyed a fruitful economic partnership with Great Britain and did not want to see their profits suffer because of Jefferson’s embargo.10 On December 22, 1807, Jefferson announced an embargo which affected American trade with both France and Great Britain. The embargo stated, “Be it enacted, that an embargo be, and hereby is laid on all ships and vessels in the ports and places within the limits of jurisdiction of the United States, cleared or not cleared, bound to any foreign port or place.”11 With the embargo, Jefferson hoped to protect American shipping interests in the short run, while at the same time, establishing his nation’s commitment to the protection of neutrals in

9 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, March 15, 1808, The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776-1826, Vol. 3, ed. James Morton Smith (New York, 1995), 1515.

10 Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, 146-47.

11 Commager, ed., Documents of American History, 202-03.

89 times of war. A supreme irony of Jefferson’s embargo was that it effectively cut off British trade with the United States, denying Great Britain yet another outlet for its goods since the continent of Europe was denied to British shopkeepers and merchants. While this should have placated the Emperor since the diminishing of trade with North America seemed to be of primary importance to ruining Britain’s economy, it did not prove to be the case. Although Jefferson’s actions did ultimately prove harmful to the British, Napoleon actually resented the President’s actions since the Americans also included the French in the embargo. The supposedly Francophile American President had by this time lost his former admiration for both Napoleon and the French nation. By the time the embargo went into effect, Jefferson remarked, I never expected to be under the necessity of wishing success to Buonaparte [sp]. But the English being equally tyrannical at sea as he is on land and that tyranny bearing on us in every point of honor or interest, I say, ‘down with England’ and as for what Buonaparte [sp] is then to do with us, let us trust to the chapter of accidents. I cannot, with the Anglomen, prefer a certain present evil to a future hypothetical one.12

With this remark, Jefferson mentioned the argument given by the Federalists that Napoleon was a tyrant who could not be trusted. The pro-British Federalists heartily denounced Jefferson’s actions as ruinous only to American trade with the British and unfairly favorable to the French. They added that the threat of Napoleon was greater than that posed by the British. The arguments between Jefferson’s Republicans and the Federalists harkened back to the earliest days of the United States when Alexander Hamilton and Jefferson quarreled over which Old World nation should be America’s primary trading partner. Hamilton, of course, favored the British, while Jefferson sought to establish closer ties to the French.

12 As quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Jefferson and France: An Essay on Politics and Political Ideas (New Haven, 1967), 125-26.

90 The feud that broke out between political factions in Washington D.C. renewed the old Federalist-Republican rivalry. Men who rallied around the President were denounced as Napoleon’s fools and pro- French even to the detriment of their own nation. Those who opposed Jefferson’s actions generally were staunch Federalists who favored close economic ties to the British and supported better relations and trade with Great Britain. While Jefferson’s embargo proved to be more harmful to the British than the French, it was not by design. In reality, he had no remaining choices. Even the son of his occasional political rival, , noted that the embargo might be the only option left to Jefferson. John Quincy Adams wrote, “under the decrees of France and Great Britain dooming to capture and confiscation all our ships and cargoes trading with either of those powers, we had no other alternative left but this, or taking our side at once in the war.”13 By the Napoleonic Era, Jefferson had lost much of his admiration for France, or at least the France of the despot Bonaparte. The President had admired the French for their initiative following the outbreak of the French Revolution and even permitted himself to believe that they might have been influenced by the actions of the Americans some years before. However, no partiality existed on his part anymore. He had only love for his own country and a strong desire to protect the United States, its economy and trade, and its very independence. While the merchants of the United States were not pleased with the embargo, they acquiesced to the dictates of the President. However, within a few months, it became apparent that the real losers in the embargo were the Americans. American shipping and trade were

13 John Quincy Adams to John Adams, December 27, 1808, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 3, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York, 1914), 168.

91 strangled as both the French and the British attacked and sequestered ships, all in the name of enforcing Jefferson’s embargo.14 Since Napoleon would benefit from strained Anglo-American relations, it might seem as if he would advance a policy reversing his attacks on American interests. This was not the case. He only continued to confuse diplomatic negotiations rather than simply settle his differences with the United States. He had his Minister for Foreign Relations, Jean-Baptiste Nompère de Champagny, write to the American Resident Minister, General Armstrong, to seek an alliance with the Americans. In his letter, Champagny wrote, war exists then in fact, between England and the United States, and His Majesty considers it as declared from the day on which England published her decrees. In that persuasion, His Majesty, ready to consider the United States as associated with the cause of all the powers who have to defend themselves against England, has not taken any definitive measures towards the American vessels which may have been brought into our ports; he has ordered that they should remain sequestered until a decision may be made thereon, according to the disposition which shall have been expressed by the Government of the United States.15

With this communication, Napoleon attempted to redirect American ire against him toward Britain. Of course, the British were harassing and illegally confiscating American ships and goods, but so were the French. With Britain’s increasingly volatile Orders in Council, Napoleon supposed that the Americans might be in favor of allying themselves with the strongest continental power in Europe. All the while, Napoleon, of course, ignored his own flagrant disregard for the “free ships make free goods” maxim and harassment of American ships.

14 Leonard D. White, “The Embargo.” In The Causes of the War of 1812, edited by Bradford Perkins (New York, 1962), 32-33. While trade and commerce across the Atlantic were greatly impacted by the embargo, manufacturing achieved significant growth in that time period.

15 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. III, 249.

92 He did not address the Berlin or Milan decrees, let alone raise the possibility of their revocation. Instead he continued to manipulate the situation by stating that he believed a state of war existed between the United States and Great Britain. In actuality, American shippers and merchants were becoming increasingly hostile towards Jefferson’s embargo. So much so, in fact, that before he left office at the end of his second term, the Embargo Act was rescinded. It was replaced with a non-intercourse act, signed on March 1, 1809, which forbade trade with France and Britain only.16 Although Jefferson had defied the old order with the new weapon of embargo, ultimately, he had to concede defeat, leaving the problem of how to protect the American economy to his successor, James Madison. By the end of Jefferson’s Presidency, the situation in France seemed to be improving. After over two years of fruitless negotiations, Armstrong believed that he was on the cusp of a diplomatic breakthrough. Champagny, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, seemed to agree with him that America’s merchant ships, as neutrals in the war between Britain and France, should not be molested: France admits the principle that the flag covers the merchandise. A merchant vessel, sailing with all the necessary papers (avec les expeditions) from its Government, is a floating colony. To do violence to such a vessel, by visits, by searches, and by other acts of an arbitrary authority, to violate the territory of a colony; this is to infringe on the independence of its Government. The seas do not belong to any nation; they are the common property of mankind, and the domain of all.17

Champagny acknowledged the substance of Jefferson’s and Madison’s ongoing arguments regarding the attacks on American neutral ships. Leaders in the United States, as well as European nations who had

16 “The Embargo” by Leonard D. White, in The Causes of the War of 1812, 36.

17 American States Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. III, 325.

93 hoped to avoid choosing sides in this latest struggle between France and Great Britain, had continually stressed the neutrality of their ships, the freedom of the seas, and the importance of sustained trade even in time of war. Britain, as the dominant naval power, steadfastly refused to concede any measure which might restrict its ability to defend itself on the seas. The matter was not easily settled. Although Champagny seemed to yield to significant points the Americans had made, he knew that Napoleon would not back down while Britain still wielded such tremendous maritime advantage. According to Champagny: France acknowledges in principle the liberty of the commerce of neutrals and the independence of maritime Powers. She has respected them until the moment when the maritime tyranny of England (which respected nothing) and the arbitrary acts of its Government have forced her to measures of reprisal, which she has adopted, but with reluctance. Let England revoke her decisions of blockade against France; France will revoke her decree of blockade against England… American commerce will then have regained its liberty, and it will be sure of finding favor and protection in the ports of France.18

Yet again, the United States found itself squeezed by the two feuding nations. According to the French, it was the responsibility of the United States to bring Great Britain to some kind of accord. Once Britain had rescinded its Orders in Council, France would follow suit by withdrawing its imperial decrees. John Quincy Adams noted the small likelihood that the United States would be able to gain economic and trade concessions from the British which would bring French and British attacks on American shipping to end. While he applauded the French efforts to end the escalating trade war, he also declared that if the United States must rely on the British Cabinet for some sort of remedy, the prospects for

18 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. III, 326.

94 peace were, “remote and precarious indeed.”19 The idea that the neutral nation that had been violated by the warring factions should be the one to find the path to peace seemed incredible. The United States did not play any role in the creation of the Continental System or the continued feud between France and Britain. But now according to Champagny, the Americans must find a way to bring the catastrophic economic struggle to an end. THE PARIS CONSULATE IN TURMOIL By the summer of 1807, Isaac Cox Barnet, the Consul at Le Havre, had stepped in to fulfill the duties of the Parisian Consulate while Fulwar Skipwith paid another visit to the United States. In many ways, Skipwith had returned to America in order to put space between himself and the Minister in Paris, General John Armstrong. The situation between the minister and consul remained tense. Armstrong seemed to have a difficult time maintaining peace with the consul, no matter who it was. Barnet frequently gave voice to his frustration with and disappointment in the minister in his detailed dispatches to the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. Before he returned to Le Havre, he engaged in two small battles with the rancorous minister, both concerning money. The first problem arose over the matter of disbursements. Barnet reported to Secretary Madison that through Armstrong’s own inaction, three American sailors from the French Brig Le Papillon, who had been shipwrecked off the coast of Brest found themselves languishing in a French prison. He had attempted to secure their release, but learned that he would be financially responsible for the cost of the men’s subsistence from the date of their capture through the date of their

19 John Quincy Adams to Sylvanus Bourne, November 28, 1809, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 3, 361.

95 release.20 The consul did not have access to the resources necessary for such expenditures and had to obtain funds from the minister’s account. After Barnet had written two letters to Armstrong regarding the plight of the captured Americans, he finally received an answer not from the minister but from his private secretary, David Bailie Warden. After much wrangling, Barnet achieved his goal of obtaining the funds to gain the release of the American sailors.21 Clearly, from the tone of his dispatches, Barnet was particularly affronted by having to correspond with Armstrong’s private secretary rather than with the minister himself. This would prove to be a wily tactic of the minister to frustrate and aggravate the consuls in Paris. He would have Warden write “by the Minister’s Directions” on his correspondence with the Consulate. In many ways, this was another example of an American foreign minister ensuring the consuls knew they were indeed inferior officials. The second contest between Minister Armstrong and Consul Barnet, the consul dubbed “A Tale of a .”22 The circumstances surrounding this controversy border on the comical. It revolved around a stranded and destitute sailor in Rouen named Edward Richards. He had written to the consul in Paris informing Barnet of his precarious circumstances, requesting financial assistance. The American Minister held the purse strings so tightly that Consul Barnet scrupulously checked each and every expenditure with Armstrong to ensure he would receive reimbursement. When Barnet informed the minister of Richards’ situation, he received a letter from Warden again, rather than the minister. In extremely exaggerated language, Warden informed Barnet

20 Consular Despatches from Paris, October 28, 1807, Barnet to Madison.

21 Ibid.

22 Consular Despatches from Paris, September 1, 1807, Barnet to Madison.

96 that Armstrong had decided for the consul to issue the destitute sailor a passport to come to Paris where, The Minister will give him a Guinea – perhaps you may be able to receive another for him among your acquaintances. He does not come under that description of persons who are entitled to receive a pecuniary supply from the government of the United States.23

The minister could not have worded this decision in a more insulting manner. Barnet already held Armstrong in contempt, now he believed the minister was in fact negligent in his official duties as a representative of the United States of America. The matter did not end with this rude and condescending letter. The denouement came with Richards’ arrival in Paris and subsequent journey to the Armstrong residence. He wrote to Barnet in September of 1807 to inform the consul that although he had been promised financial assistance from the minister, none was forthcoming. Upon his entrance into the Armstrong home, Richards was met by David Bailie Warden who informed him that the minister “having already given Richards more than two Louis he would not pay the…demand.”24 In fact, the only money Richards ever received from the American government came from Isaac Cox Barnet and not the minister of the United States. Minister Armstrong seemed to find great enjoyment in contrariness which only served to heighten the tensions between his own office and the Consulate. As a result, much of the correspondence between the two offices during Barnet’s tenure involved bickering over financial compensation. THE DISMISSAL OF FULWAR SKIPWITH Although the issues related to the Continental System were perhaps the most important faced by the American consuls abroad since

23 Consular Despatches from Paris, August 9, 1807, Warden to Barnet.

24 Consular Despatches from Paris, September 14, 1807, Richards to Barnet.

97 the inception of their nation, the dire circumstances did not generate much excitement in the Parisian consulate during Fulwar Skipwith’s tenure. By far the greatest priority for Skipwith was simply to maintain his position as consul. By the end of 1807, the consul was embroiled with the resident minister of Paris, General John Armstrong. The hostilities that began with Armstrong’s support for Swan over Skipwith continued to fester even after Skipwith took a leave of absence to return to America. The final break between Skipwith and Armstrong had already begun as Skipwith returned from a second trip to the United States in November 1807. At this point, the feud would become glaringly public. Yet again, the matter at hand related to claims before the Council of Liquidation. Fulwar Skipwith himself had presented claims that he had suffered during the Quasi-war when he was serving as Consul at Martinique. The claims had made it through the liquidation process and had been fully approved while Skipwith was in America. Upon his return to Paris, Skipwith was informed that the Council of Liquidation had retracted his claims due to an error. 25 While the Council did have this right, in all probability Armstrong played some role in influencing the French to reexamine Skipwith’s claims. Skipwith soon discovered that he would receive only partial payment of his claim. At this point, Skipwith determined to salvage his claim, undermine Armstrong’s relationship with President Jefferson, and revitalize his own sullied reputation. Skipwith had also been informed that Armstrong was now in business with his steadfast rival, James Swan. This particularly piqued Skipwith’s interest as the State Department had summarily decreed that no American diplomatic representatives could benefit from claims

25 Skeen, General John J. Armstrong, 70.

98 commissions.26 Finally, Armstrong had even gone so far as to place Swan on his council of advisers, according him rights and privileges associated with such a superior appointment. To Skipwith, the working relationship between Armstrong and Swan was a betrayal of trust and cooperation beyond measure. Yet again, the claims of James Swan played a significant role in the rancor between the consul and the minister. Perhaps Skipwith could not abide the idea that Swan would have his claims readily awarded while he, an official of the United States government, would have his own reversed because of Minister Armstrong. The rivalry which had commenced between the two commercial agents inevitably influenced Skipwith’s actions and spilled over into his correspondence with the minister. This public feud perfectly illustrated the dangers that could arise when the consul mixed his official government duties with private business dealings. Skipwith inevitably allowed his overriding concern for his own finances to take precedence over his responsibilities to his government. The consul refused to let the matter of the claims settlement rest. Armstrong sharply and publicly rebuked Skipwith for his recriminations against him and set about engineering the downfall of the American consul. He had earlier in the year written to James Madison of Skipwith’s actions as consul and denounced him for being too concerned with his own financial situation rather than that of the United States.27 He outlined to the Secretary of State that Skipwith only troubled himself with attracting as much business as possible and even abused his official position in order to enrich himself. Not only did he complain to the

26 As Consul, Skipwith did not collect commissions on claims for which he argued before the Council of Liquidation. He did receive commissions for all of his other responsibilities as a commercial agent.

27 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, March 2, 1807, Armstrong to Madison.

99 American leadership in Washington D.C., but Armstrong also decided to bring the feud before the French Council of State. Skipwith, at the same time, had denounced Armstrong for favoring some claims over others and further stated that only those who craftily curried favor with the Minister were ever likely to receive pecuniary compensation. Such strong accusations could not long be ignored. Although Jefferson and Madison had no intention of favoring one side or the other, finally the French government entered the fray. After studying the claims of Skipwith and the justifications of Armstrong, the French Council of State determined that it was Fulwar Skipwith who had abused the privileges of his office. They accused the consul of using his official position to further the claims he wished to succeed; exactly the charge Skipwith had hurled at Armstrong. It was also implied that Skipwith had lost part of his own claims due to fraud rather than simple error. Finally, the Council further recommended to Emperor Napoleon that he demand of the United States government the recall of Fulwar Skipwith as Consul at Paris. Until Napoleon made his ultimate decision, the Council suspended all communication between the consul and the French government.28 As far as Skipwith was concerned, the matter had not come to an end. He wrote an impassioned memorandum to the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. defending his actions and taking issue with the form and nature of the Council of State’s declaration against him. He argued that instead of demanding his recall, the Council should have simply removed his exequatur which would have effectively negated his official responsibilities. While he still would have lost his position as consul, he would not be forced out of France and humiliated in such a manner. He defended himself against Armstrong’s charge that he had abused his

28 Consular Despatches from Paris, November 7, 1807, Proclamation of the Council of State.

100 office in order to advance the claims of some before the Council of Liquidation while ignoring those he did not support. Here Consul Skipwith provided a worthy and honest answer. He did not pick and choose which claims to present to the Council of Liquidation. He stated that he submitted all claims that were made by Americans for financial recompense, of which there had been several hundred.29 His final impassioned plea for intervention from the United States came forth in the closing paragraph of the dispatch. He wrote, It will still be more painful to Mr. Skipwith, residing in France since 14 years, married into a respectable family to find himself dismissed like a criminal or a seditious person, from a country in which untill [sic] now he has only received thanks and merits of approbation.30

Although he seemed to admire the merits of his office more than he should, he believed that he had the experience and qualifications necessary to continue in his duties as consul of the United States. At the very same time that Skipwith worded his impassioned plea for assistance and understanding, Madison faced enormous obstacles due to the capricious nature of Napoleon’s foreign policy. In February 1808, Madison exhorted Armstrong to press the neutral rights of the United States with the emperor as, “It is certainly neither less the duty nor the true policy of the Emperor of the French, so to vary his Decree, as to make it consistent with the rights of neutrals and the freedom of the seas, and particularly with his positive stipulations with the United States.”31 This remained the Americans’ chief aim: to press both France and Great Britain to obtain their confirmation of neutral rights and the freedom of the seas.

29 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 23, 1808, Skipwith to Madison.

30 Ibid.

31 Notes to the Ministers of the United States, February 8, 1808, Madison to Armstrong.

101 Armstrong found in his conversations with the Emperor and his ministers no reason to hope for any positive diplomatic accord. He wrote in reply to Madison that although Napoleon had expressed his desire to find some way to grant immunity to the United States from the November Decree (the Berlin Decree), the minister did not see any real steps being taken.32 Throughout the spring and summer of 1808, Skipwith wrote numerous dispatches back to Washington D.C. defending his job performance, denigrating the character and credibility of General Armstrong, and essentially imploring the Secretary of State to allow him to remain in his position as consul. Skipwith should have known that he was facing an extremely perilous struggle; nevertheless he did his best to emerge victorious. In April, he learned of the specific charges made against him by General Armstrong to the Council of State. Curiously, the Council had refused to specify exactly what offense he had committed that warranted such an unprecedented intervention by the French government. He was instead informed by a confidential source that Armstrong had charged Skipwith with the abuse of his office of Consul in order to obtain payment of fraudulent claims and using forged signatures.33 Against this, Skipwith attempted a spirited defense in order to restore his good name and character. In the midst of the struggle to retain the consular office, Skipwith exerted some effort to justify his hold on that post. He kept up a steady flow of correspondence informing the American government across the Atlantic of the situation developing in France because of the deprivations of the Continental System. It seemed almost as if he was trying to prove

32 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, March 9, 1808, Armstrong to Madison.

33 Consular Despatches from Paris, April 14, 1808, Skipwith to Madison.

102 his worth to the leaders in Washington D.C. While he may have been attempting to ignore his own dire situation, Skipwith continued his duties as if his own recall had not been recommended by the French! He wrote to Secretary Madison: The effects of the embargo in our country are severely felt. Its continuation will produce murmurs among many of our fellow citizens, but like good medicine to some disorders, it is well applied to our Body politick and will I am persuaded prove wholesome by leaving it more frugal and consequently with the commencement of more internal strength.34

Even as he maintained his calm and attempted to rise above the fray, Skipwith learned that his fate was sealed. In a final jab at General Armstrong, Skipwith happily forwarded a letter he received in his last month in Paris from the Resident Minister serving in Madrid, George W. Erving. The frustration felt by Erving emanated from his dispatch as he desperately implored Skipwith to send him some news regarding the situation as it stood between the United States and France. Erving complained to Skipwith that it was unclear, whether General A. does not feel under any obligation to write, or does not choose to concern himself by writing, I know not, but the fact is that I have not a line from him, not even in reply to the letter by which I requested to know something about the dispatch said to have been brought by M. Lewis.35

Armstrong’s complete disregard for Erving’s situation suggested the minister’s indifference to anyone’s plight but his own. Erving, serving in Madrid which was newly conquered by the French, sought some reassurance regarding his own situation as well as that of his nation’s standing in Europe. After two letters, he realized that he was not to

34 Consular Despatches from Paris, June 20, 1808, Skipwith to Madison.

35 Consular Despatches from Paris, June 1, 1808, Erving to Skipwith.

103 receive any response from the minister, so instead he appealed to Skipwith for some correspondence and reassurance. By the summer of 1808, Fulwar Skipwith’s tenure as American Consul at Paris was at an end. He received formal notification of his recall as Consul from Secretary of State James Madison on July 21, 1808.36 He regretted deeply the loss of his official position, the besmirching of his reputation, and the necessity of returning defeated and dejected to the United States. He could console himself with the knowledge that he had attempted a worthy defense in the face of enormous obstacles. Even such a seasoned statesman as James Monroe, the frequent European diplomat and future Secretary of State and President, believed Skipwith to be “an honest persecuted man.”37 In fact, Skipwith owed his position of consul to Monroe who had appointed him provisionally to the office when Monroe represented the United States as Minister at Paris. Consequently, from their close working relationship, Monroe esteemed Skipwith “a citizen of excellent understanding, perfect integrity, and great worth.”38 As a consul, did Fulwar Skipwith carry out the duties and responsibilities of his office with honor and conscientiousness? Yes. Was he overly concerned about his own financial and diplomatic situation? Yes. Could he have expended more effort in keeping Washington D.C. as informed of the economic and political situation as he did his many squabbles? Yes.

36 Consular Instructions, July 21, 1808, Madison to Skipwith. Unfortunately no copies of letters from the United States Secretary of State to the consular representatives from June 17, 1811 to January 2, 1816 are available. The letters from that time period seem to have disappeared.

37 James Monroe to Nicholas Biddle, January 7, 1809, The Writings of James Monroe, including a collection of his public and private papers and correspondence now for the first time printed, Vol. 5, ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton (New York, 1901), 85.

38 Stuart Gerry Brown, ed., The Autobiography of James Monroe (Syracuse, 1959), 66.

104 In short, Skipwith maintained the duties of his office, but he was perhaps not the right official at the right time. In such an uncertain situation, with a reticent, unsociable minister who did not speak French, a worldly and learned consul could have been a useful ally and partner. Skipwith was not. He concerned himself too much with justifying his actions as consul and minutely cataloging the offenses committed against him by the ministers serving in Paris. During the Napoleonic Era, the United States desperately needed a professional serving in the essential position of Consul at Paris, a man unlike Fulwar Skipwith. THE NEW PARIS CONSUL: DAVID BAILIE WARDEN In David Bailie Warden, the United States had a scholar, steeped in the study of France and the who could hold the office of consul respectably. For his part, Warden had relished the learned society available in France. At the end of his diplomatic career, he remained in France where he wrote close to over thirty works on historical and scientific topics. In one of his books, Warden thus described the presidency of Thomas Jefferson during such troublesome political and economic times: Though assailed on all sides by clamour and abuse, and tempted to violence by the natures of the crisis, he never swerved from that course which the justest views of the constitution, and a paramount sense of public duty, dictated…Time has fully sanctioned the maxims of Mr. Jefferson’s administration. Indeed, both he and those who acted with him were sensible.39

Could Warden possibly intend to include himself in that group of sensible men who served under Thomas Jefferson? In his first dispatch to James Madison in September of 1808, Warden thanked the Secretary effusively for his congratulations on his

39 David Bailie Warden, A Statistical, Political, and Historical Account of the United States of North America; From the Period of Their First Colonization to the Present Day (Edinburgh, 1819), 488-89.

105 appointment as Consular pro tempore. In order to justify his worthiness for the position, Warden immediately set about apprising himself of the situation of the ships seized at the various ports of France awaiting trial at the Council of Prizes in Paris. The Council of Prizes, which adjudicated all matters regarding seized ship and cargoes, had steadily found against the United States since November of 1807, when the Imperial Decrees were first enacted against American shipping. The first judgment which went against an American ship was the case of the Horizon. The Horizon had been shipwrecked off the coast of France in May 1807, and subsequently seized by French authorities. While the Council of Prizes did not condemn the ship, but returned it to its Captain, the court claimed the cargo as it had “come from manufacture or English territory…they shall be confiscated for use of the state.”40 According to the French, the reason for the seizures could be directly attributed to the pernicious practices of the British. Champagny wrote to Armstrong that the Emperor felt deeply the suffering of the Americans and regretted such actions as they harmed American trade and commerce. However, he could not stand by and let the British control the entire Atlantic trade. The Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote frankly: But it is not to France; it is to England that these inconveniences to individuals ought to be imputed. She it is, who has given the example of measures, unjust, illegal, and infringing on the sovereignty of nations. To oblige her to renounce them, it has become necessary to combat her with her own arms.41

By April 1809, Warden reported to Madison that the situation for the seized ships remained dire. By that point in his tenure, all ships that

40 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, November 12, 1807, Armstrong to Champagny.

41 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, November 24, 1807, Champagny to Armstrong.

106 had been sent before the Council had been condemned. Warden sought the reason for the continued convictions against American ships. He informed Madison that: The motive for the condemnation generally is that the Imperial Decrees of blockade have been infringed. The members of this court insist that the vessels taken since the period when the American embargo was generally known must be navigating by British consent or British protection, and consequently ought to be condemned.42

A typical case settled by the Council of Prizes could be found in the decision regarding the Neptune. Warden wrote to Madison that the ship had been condemned and the captain ordered to pay 12,000 francs for himself and twelve sailors arrested when the ship was seized. The captain had managed to escape but the sailors were still being held in prison until the settlement on the ship had been paid.43 In May 1809, Warden sought assurance from the newly inaugurated President Madison about the permanence of his official position. He wrote a congratulatory letter to the new President and also requested that he continue to serve the new leader as Consul at Paris. He reiterated his qualifications for the office such as his fluency in French and the acquaintances he had secured with Frenchmen serving on various bureaus, courts, and councils throughout Paris. He further related his proficiency with the laws of France as well as the duties of the office of Consul.44 For his part, the former President, Thomas Jefferson, esteemed and admired Warden for his strong work ethic. He wrote of the consul:

42 Consular Despatches from Paris, April 14, 1809, Warden to Madison.

43 Ibid.

44 Consular Despatches from Paris, May 1, 1809, Warden to Madison. He followed up his request of Madison the next day, May 2nd, with a similar letter to the new Secretary of State, Robert Smith.

107 He is a perfectly good humored, inoffensive man, a man of science and I observe a great favorite of those of Paris…his memoirs and proceedings in the cases of vessels seised shew [sic] this. He is an interesting man, perfectly modest and good, and of a delicate mind.45

Unfortunately, Madison did not reassure him that his situation had been made permanent. He continued on in his precarious and temporary position. THE EFFECTS OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM IN BORDEAUX In Bordeaux, William Lee had a keen interest in protecting his office and his family in turbulent times while at the same time defending American interests in France. He had a good working relationship with Fulwar Skipwith in Paris, and even instructed his wife who was in Paris in April 1807 to seek the consul’s assistance in obtaining funds, “draw on him or call on him as our friend Skipwith shall think best.”46 He further exhorted his wife to do her best to influence Skipwith in a matter which most intimately affected his public affairs: Take an opportunity to do away to Skipwith the idea of my office being profitable. Even if it was so, I should try to make people believe otherwise. But the fact is, my dear, it will not support us without great frugality…When Fenwick had the office, 400, 500, even to 633 vessels entered per year. Now last year only 150 will enter. Thus, if the office was then worth 30,000 francs, it cannot be worth half that now. I have only bills of lading and certificates of drawback. In short 15,000 francs, my dear, is the very extent of the produce of the office.47

45 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, December 8, 1810, The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776-1826, Vol. 3, 1660.

46 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, April 18, 1807, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 69.

47 Ibid., 70.

108 Lee had several reasons for such instructions to his wife. First, the Continental System had severely curtailed the number of ships that could make port in Bordeaux without harassment from either British or French vessels. In truth, the office was not as profitable as it once had been. Although he might have overstated the “frugality” which they surely practiced, he still enjoyed an excellent commission for an American representative serving in Napoleonic France. Second, the very nature of the appointment of diplomatic officials such as ministers and consuls caused great anxiety. As Jefferson had warned when the office of consul was first created, many American citizens abroad would vie for a limited number of appointed positions. Naturally, a cautious and shrewd merchant such as Lee knew that it would be better to pretend his office was not prosperous in order to dissuade possible contestants for his position. Third, Lee considered himself a proud and patriotic American and supporter of his President, Thomas Jefferson. He did not want his strong relationship with Washington D.C. endangered as a result of a bit of reckless gossip in Paris that the consul of Bordeaux profited perhaps a little too much from his official position. In his position as consul, Lee related the difficulties already imposed by the Continental System and subsequent British reprisals. He reported to Madison of one ship, the Elias, which had been captured by the British, while another vessel had been refused at La Rochelle because the French believed it to have made port in Britain.48 By February 1808, Lee fully understood the implications of Napoleon’s Continental System and attempted to better inform the leadership in Washington D.C. of its ruinous effects. He sent a detailed memorandum to the Secretary of State naming the ships that had been captured and detained in France since the Berlin and Milan Decrees. In his letter, Lee listed twenty-nine ships which had been seized in France

48William Lee to James Madison, December 10, 1807, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 71.

109 since the inception of the Emperor’s economic warfare. He reported the details of each ship, including the ship’s name, port of origin, captain’s name (if known), and the reasons for its detention. Lee’s memorandum alerted the officials in Washington D.C. of the serious nature of French condemnations, such as: Brigt. Charleston of New York, Captain Newman. This vessel sailed from New York with a Cargo for St. Sebastian, on her passage was boarded by a British ship of war and permitted to proceed. She arrived at St. Sebastian, discharged her Cargo came to Bordeaux in ballast for a freight, after being in port many days was seized by the Government for having been boarded by an English vessel.49

Another grievous offense was reported regarding the ship James Madison of New Orleans which had also been boarded by the British. As a result of this offense, the ship having discharged its cargo and “after being loaded and ready for sea was seized at Bordeaux for having been boarded.”50 Several of the ships captured by French armed vessels were not even destined for France, but for locations such as London, Amsterdam, Cadiz, and Cork. Throughout 1808, Lee fretted over the number of unprincipled French privateers, excited at the thought of capture and financial reward, outfitting in his port to pursue American ships. The Berlin and Milan decrees gave such vessels carte blanche to plunder and fill their coffers with American produce, manufactures, and raw materials. The President understood that the effect of Napoleon’s decrees in the ports of France threatened the very freedom and neutrality of all American shipping.51 Lee’s official dispatches, sent at regular intervals back to the capital of the United States, contained more than just commercial and

49 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, February 13, 1808, Lee to Madison.

50 Ibid.

51 Thomas Jefferson to General John Mason, 1807, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 11, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington D.C., 1903), 401.

110 trade information. He faithfully executed his duties to keep the leadership in Washington D.C. informed of progress and circumstances taking place in the nation in which he served. In March of 1808, he reported that the Emperor had created a new nobility based on service and accomplishment. While the American minister serving in Paris would be better situated to report such important political changes, Lee felt it incumbent upon himself to keep the leadership in Washington D.C. apprised of any political and military developments in France. In the very first circular sent by the Secretary of State to all American consuls, Jefferson had asked them to keep Washington apprised of important political, military, and economic developments in the nations in which they served. Throughout his dispatches, he continued to relate such changes at frequent intervals. Furthermore, he described the effect of the Continental System on the city he represented. Lee found the port of Bordeaux an empty and desolate place. He described how much change had taken place as a result of the blockade and subsequent embargo. A port once bustling with ships of all sizes and traders of all nationalities now stood empty except for two fishing schooners, a rather depressing sight for the consul. He also allowed that the economic warfare had not only caused tensions within France, but throughout Europe as well. He described the “despair and misery” felt from the “Baltic to the archipelago.”52 The deprivations suffered by the people of not only France but Europe as well should have foreshadowed the downfall of Napoleon’s Continental System. The people suffered for a variety of reasons. They could not get the goods and produce they wanted. Also, merchants and traders were beginning to feel the impact on their profits. Finally, the population simply did not understand why they had to suffer in order for Napoleon to bring about the downfall of Great Britain.

52 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, March 26, 1808, Lee to Madison.

111 As the Consul at Bordeaux, Lee scrupulously attempted to gain the release of American vessels. Several captains, armed with certificates authenticated by Lee, traveled to Paris to plead their cause directly with the Minister of the Navy. For his part, Lee reported one such instance of a Captain Connell, of the ship Charleston Packet, effectively securing his vessel for release. Subsequently, the consul wrote to Secretary Madison of his success and Connell’s agreement to return several distressed sailors from France to the United States. Lee happily stated, “I have furnished them with provisions, and government has nothing for these passages, it having been agreed on between Captain Connell and myself, that if I procured the release of his vessel he was to give them their passages.”53 By the same dispatch in November 1808, Lee related to Madison a new threat to the embargo of President Jefferson. He hoped to hear very soon from Washington D.C. that United States consuls in France would be required to inspect the papers of all American ships found in their ports. He believed: A determination of this nature would have done but little or no injury to our merchants and put a stop to the nefarious practices of the English who send scores of American vessels from their ports whose owners never saw America, and whose papers are manufactured in London.54

Lee also knew that the embargo currently in place was flagrantly violated by fellow Americans. He found in his port American schooners sailing under the colors of European nations such as Denmark and France. He listed five currently in Bordeaux in November of 1808 and assured Madison that he would attempt to discern the true origins of the all the vessels in his port.

53 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, November 1, 1808, Lee to Madison.

54 Ibid.

112 Another result of the tensions between the United States and France was an increasing number of prisoners of war detained on French soil.55 Throughout his dispatches, the care and concern that William Lee exhibited for his captured fellow Americans remained evident. He frequently asserted to Secretary Madison that he did all in his power to obtain their release and if not that, at least their detention in Bordeaux where he would be nearby. This very situation he described to the Secretary of State regarding three Americans named Captain Devise, Herbert Reading, and Nathaniel Rogers. Their schooner, the Dromo, had been captured by a French armed ship and burned. According to Secretary Madison, “The burning of neutral vessels detained on the high seas, is the most distressing of all the modes by which belligerents exert force contrary to right; and, in proportion as it is destitute of apology, ought at least to be the promptitude and amplitude of the redress.”56 The men from the Dromo were taken to Bayonne with the intention of their being sent to Paris as prisoners of war. Upon learning of their situation, Lee was able to obtain the agreement of the general overseeing the prisoners that they could remain in custody in Bordeaux while their case awaited trial.57 Because of his location in Bordeaux, William Lee reported in early November 1808, to the government in Washington D.C. of the build up of

55 Although France and the United States were not technically at war, William Lee continually refers to these captured sailors as “Prisoners of War.” Thomas A. Bailey noted in A Diplomatic History of the American People, “Even worse in some respects than British impressments was Napoleon’s imprisonment of the crews of confiscated ships. The New York Evening Post reminded its readers that American sailors had been ‘robbed and manacled…and marched without shoes to their feet or clothing to their backs in the most inclement weather some hundreds of miles into the interior of France; lashed along the highway like slaves, treated with every possible indignity, and the immured in the infernal dungeons of Arras or Verdun.’” 142.

56 Notes to the Ministers of the United States, July 21, 1808, Madison to Armstrong.

57 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, November 1, 1808, Lee to Madison.

113 troops in his city, destined for the Iberian Peninsula. Although French troops had captured Madrid and Napoleon had replaced the Bourbons of Spain with his brother Joseph, after the capitulation of French troops at Bailen Napoleon believed he needed to conquer Spain personally. So he amassed a grand coalition of troops in November 1808 to march into Spain. Lee wrote of this massive build-up of troops and also alluded to the inevitable subjugation of the Spanish as well: The Emperor is now in this city on his way to join the army. The quantity of troops, artillery, wagons &c which are continually passing is incredible. He will head an army, it is said, of 300,000 men, composed chiefly of veteran troops. The Spanish have been so very inactive in allowing the French to concentrate their forces (which they incautiously had distributed in small detachments all over the kingdom), and to throw in this great reinforcement before they struck a decisive blow, that there is now scarcely a judicious man to be found who is not of the opinion that the conquest of that country and Portugal will very shortly be achieved.58

He also reported to the Secretary his unease concerning his friend and fellow American diplomat, George Erving, currently serving in Madrid. Lee had learned from Erving’s last communication with him that an attempt had been made on his life. Within a month, Lee, as well as many others, believed that the final conquest of Spain was complete. Although Joseph had already been crowned King of Spain in 1807, Napoleon planned a triumphant return for his brother in order to restore him to the throne. In a dispatch dated December 17, 1808, Lee wrote: After three or four battles which you will find detailed in the several bulletins accompanying this, the Emperor has entered Madrid where it is said he is occupied in arrangements for the crowning of his brother…It is scarcely possible to believe the Spaniards will be able to resist this force, the conquest therefore of that country appears certain…and the minds of Frenchmen begin

58 Ibid.

114 now to be occupied in endeavoring to divine what the future conquests are to be.59

A grave miscalculation on Lee’s part but not unlike what countless others throughout America and Europe believed by the end of 1808. Little did anyone know that Napoleon had just embarked upon one of the most significant mistakes of his entire military and political career. While Napoleon foresaw the submission of the Iberian peninsula, instead he started a draining war that led to the participation of the British in European continental warfare. War, a constant throughout Napoleon’s reign, remained a central concern of all diplomats serving in his empire. With one nation supposedly vanquished, all eyes turned towards the next inevitable confrontation. Lee surmised in a dispatch to Madison that since the situation in Spain had been settled, the French troops were free to march eastward. According to Lee, war with either Austria, Turkey, or Germany might be imminent.60 Such was the situation of France throughout Napoleon’s reign, which nation must be subdued next? Throughout his detailed dispatches, Lee frequently informed the Secretary of State of the economic and commercial situation in Bordeaux. In early 1808, he found the merchants of Bordeaux greatly agitated, certain that war with the United States was inevitable. If war with France were avoided, surely war with Britain would be the result. The question remained, had Napoleon’s economic policies had the expected outcome? Were British merchants suffering because of the continental blockade? Many Americans voiced their doubt. Writing from

59 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, December 17, 1808, Lee to Madison.

60 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, March 17, 1809, Lee to Smith.

115 the court at St. Petersburg, Adams foreshadowed that the Continental System only helped the British, “doing more good than harm.”61 With the uncertainty of the times, Lee informed Secretary Madison that the merchants were doing everything in their power to secure the property of American associates against possible seizure.62 As Lee himself was a merchant as well as an American Consul, he knew well the danger American businessmen faced throughout Europe in such uncertain times. He echoed the sentiments of the President as Jefferson observed that the embargo was the only sensible course as “the whole world is laid under interdict by these two nations, and our vessels, their cargoes and crews, are to be taken by the one or the other…if, therefore, on leaving our harbors we are certainly to lose them, is it not better, as to vessels, cargoes and seamen, to keep them at home?”63 During the tense years of the embargo, Lee’s informative dispatches did much to inform the leadership in Washington D.C. of the troubles and turmoil experienced in France because of Napoleon’s aggressive economic blockade. In December of 1808, Lee wrote: The commercial state of this country remains the same. The distress in the seaports particularly in this city is very great. The poverty of the people lessened so very considerably the consumption of foreign articles, particularly colonial produce, that they have diminished more than half in price which has caused the ruin of a crowd of speculators and increased the want of confidence.64

61 Allan Nevins, ed., The Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845: American Political, Social and Intellectual Life from Washington to Polk (New York, 1929), 75.

62 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 16, 1808, Lee to Madison.

63 Thomas Jefferson to General John Mason, 1807, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 11, 402.

64 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, December 17, 1808, Lee to Madison.

116 One change in the Emperor’s position regarding American shipping Lee noted by the end of 1808. In terms of sequestering American ships that had violated both Napoleon’s Imperial decrees and the American embargo, Lee learned that “some of our vessels have obtained permission to put to sea with Cargoes under French colors but I have thought these expeditions out of all rule as respects their American character that I have refused to deliver their papers.”65 Lee found the very thought of an American vessel sailing under the colors of another nation abhorrent to his patriotic feelings. This is another example of the consul displaying his allegiance to the United States. Lee did not want Americans sailing under the flag of a different nation while American shipping was suffering from the effects of the Continental System. He was also concerned with harming his reputation as an honest consul and merchant. He felt that such underhanded dealings could only serve to cheapen the character of any man who engaged in such reprehensible practices. The ruinous diplomatic policy of Napoleon continued unabated throughout 1809. In May 1809, Lee reported to Secretary Madison that fourteen American sailors had been arrested by the French and even impressed into service, a situation not unlike the most egregious offenses perpetrated by the British. Lee immediately wrote to Auguste Bergeron, the Navy Commissary Principal at Bordeaux, to press for the release of the American sailors: As this measure is hostile to the rights of American citizens and if persisted it will be regarded by the Government of the United States as a great outrage, calculated to excite the sensibility of every American, I have to request in the most formal manner that you will repair the injury you have done by the very injudicious manner, by immediately releasing these men.66

65 Ibid.

66 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, May 10, 1809, Lee to Bergeron.

117 Lee learned that the American sailors had been arrested on the streets of Bordeaux and sent to serve on a French corvette. The Navy Commissary Principal Bergeron tried to manipulate the situation, claiming the men were French sailors since they had recently disembarked from a schooner, Swallow, sailing under the French colors. However, the men had been discharged from service for several days before they were unceremoniously arrested. The situation played out over the course of a month. After being contacted by Lee, the Commissary released six of the men, and of course, this did not satisfy Lee. Lee soon learned that the remaining eight men were black sailors, and Bergeron would not release them until Lee assured him that the consul would facilitate their return to the United States. On May 25, 1809, Lee assured the Minister that he had secured passage for the eight black sailors, and the men were released into his custody.67 The relief of American sailors left destitute by the economic warfare of the French and the British remained a significant issue in the United States for some time. The consuls throughout Europe worried about the amount of funding required to care for the stranded sailors. In some cases, they had to pay a fine to get the men out of prison. They might have to give the sailors money for subsistence until they could arrange transportation back to the United States. The problem reached such a level that by the end of 1810, President Madison reported to Congress that “the funds which had been provided by law, for the relief and protection of destitute American seamen, in foreign countries, have been rendered this year inadequate to their contemplated object, by the extensive seizures of our vessels in Europe”68 At the end of 1810, the

67 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, May 13, 1809, Lee to Bergeron, and May 25, 1809, Lee to Bergeron

68 James Madison, Message from the President enclosing a Report of the Secretary of State, Relative to the Inadequacy of the Funds, December 12, 1808, Washington D.C.

118 consuls of the United States had paid out 75,500 dollars for the relief of American sailors stranded in Europe. As a result, for the year 1811, the Secretary of State, Robert Smith, requested 100,000 dollars for the funding of destitute seamen.69 Throughout 1809, Lee frequently received news that the diplomatic situation had changed and that Napoleon favored the normalization of relations with the United States. These rumors would continue, unfounded, until the very end of the First Empire. One such circumstance found Lee writing to Secretary Madison that he had received, “upwards of a dozen letters from Paris by the mail of today” which “mention that his Imperial Majesty has revoked his Decrees in favor of Holland by opening the ports of that country to neutrals.”70 He even commented upon the fact that such rumors had affected the price of colonial produce. The tenuous situation as it existed between the United States and France engendered strong resentment against colonial products in France.71 While such gleanings did not prove to be accurate, the situation throughout France remained tense, not only for the American diplomats but also the French population. The American seamen and merchants were not the only ones suffering from the diplomatic wrangling between France and the United States. French dissatisfaction with the Continental System also had a negative effect on Napoleon’s enforcement of his economic policy. The people, although loyal and patriotic French citizens, did not understand why they should sacrifice daily necessities and precious luxuries because Napoleon had decided to blockade the

69 James Madison, Message from the President, December 12, 1808.

70 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, June 17, 1809, Lee to Madison.

71 Allan Nevins, ed., The Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845: American Political Social and Intellectual Life from Washington to Polk (New York, 1929), 75.

119 European coastline from the British, which led to the construction of the Continental System. From Bordeaux, Lee provided valuable information regarding the state of the merchant trade, the mood and temperament of the citizenry, and military news. Lee faithfully administered his duties and responsibilities as American consul. He assisted stranded and even imprisoned sailors, and at the same time, attempted to secure the cargo and vessels of American captains and merchants who had lost their property as a result of Napoleon’s Imperial decrees. Lee also tried to ameliorate the situation for his fellow Americans in Bordeaux, many of whom were merchants facing an uncertain future. In short, he effectively carried out the duties of his office with efficiency, precision, and zeal. A BORDEAUX CONSUL IN PARIS For a period of five months, from November 1809 to March 1810, Lee had cause to travel to Paris. He was contributing his engineering skills in presenting a design of a bridge that was to be constructed over the Garonne River running through Bordeaux.72 From Lee’s letters and dispatches, the effect Paris could have on a provincial consul was clearly evident. For much of the Napoleonic Era, it seemed that the consuls stationed in Paris were merely vain and grasping, only seeking to firmly secure their hold on their officially appointed position. However, it might have been that the city itself, centered in politics and intrigue, caused these men to lose sight of their official duties and focus only on bettering themselves and their financial situations. Lee, in just five short months, learned that Paris was a social center, full of gossip and parties where it was possible to lose some sense of perspective.

72 A Yankee Jeffersonian, 76.

120 Already the lure of Paris called. In a private letter to his wife, he informed her that, “I have written [Joel] Barlow73 to apply for the General Consulate for me. The salary is 10,000 francs per annum and the perquisites will amount to as much more if well managed.” He added in a postscript that this news was secret, “Not a word of this to any one for your life. The place you know is vacant. Warden only acts.”74 Here of course, Lee referred to the dismissal of Fulwar Skipwith and the appointment of David Bailie Warden as temporary consul in his stead. Obviously, Lee did not believe that Warden would be able to achieve the position permanently and subsequently also applied for the post. Unfortunately for Lee, Warden did attain his object, and Lee remained Consul at Bordeaux. Lee certainly did succumb to the pleasures that Paris had to offer. He seemed to feel buoyed by his presentation of the bridge design and the fact that this brought him to the attention of many notable Parisians. He related to his wife, “The Americans are much astonished to see me noticed by these great men. There certainly has never been an American here more noticed. To-day I am engaged with the Comte de Molé; on Wednesday I dine with the Minister of the Interior.”75 From this self- important proclamation, Lee demonstrated how quickly one could lose perspective, and his ego seemed to swell under the notice and attention which seemed to abound in the capital. Here in the center of France, a provincial American diplomat would need to guard against such

73 Joel Barlow was the newly appointed Resident Minister in Paris, sent to replace General John Armstrong.

74 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, November 23, 1809, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 78.

75 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, November 27, 1809, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 85. Mathieu-Louis Molé was the director of French roads and bridges and an adviser to Napoleon. Molé was one of the converts from the ancien regime serving the Emperor.

121 temptations or risk becoming too involved in the political manipulations and scheming which would only harm one’s reputation. The letters Lee sent home during his five months in Paris, free of the decorum necessitated by official government dispatches, underscore his humor and enjoyment at witnessing the grand spectacle that was Napoleon’s court. In one light-hearted letter to his daughter Susan, he retorted, You know, perhaps, that we have as many kings in Paris as can be found in two packs of cards. And perhaps you will add as many knaves. There is the King of Saxony, of Holland, of Westphalia, of Naples, of Württemberg, of Italy (vice Roi) and the new Spanish monarch is on his way here. What Napoleon is going to do with them all I cannot imagine. I expect, before he has finished with them, he will make one of them his coachman to drive him to the senate, legislative body &c.76

He also referenced that, “If Gen’l Armstrong had been in vogue at court,” he might have received a closer inspection of the Napoleonic society. As the situation stood, Armstrong had never made any effort to socialize in Paris, which in turn angered the Emperor himself. Napoleon put forth some effort to have the taciturn minister recalled. Accordingly, Napoleon had his Foreign Minister, the Duc de Cadore, write John Quincy Adams, currently serving as Minister to Russia, to express the Emperor’s continued frustrations with the General. Napoleon instructed Cadore to “charge the Duc de Vicence to tell Mr. Adams that we have here an American minister who says nothing; that we need an active man whom one can comprehend, and by whose means we could come to an understanding with the Americans.”77 Although such complaints were

76 William Lee to Miss Susan Palfrey Lee, December 6, 1809, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 91.

77 Quoted in Henry Adams, History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, Vol. 5, (New York, 1889-1891), 252.

122 submitted, the United States government did not recall General Armstrong. Lee expressed similar sentiments in a personal letter to his wife, where he attempted to outline the deficiencies of Armstrong as a minister: General Armstrong in my opinion does very wrong in not going to court, and I am also of opinion that if he would use a little address that our affairs with this Government would be in a much better train. He has been invited to all the fêtes, but give for answer that he is sick or that he is going a journey. I like him as a man very much, but he is not made for a minister to a court like this. As he does not go to court, I cannot be introduced, as it would be improper for me to accept those offers of presenting me which have been made, whilst he is here.78

As an observant man, Lee summarized the shortcomings of John Armstrong as a Minister to the court at Paris. In fact, his appointment in Paris was probably one of the most ill-conceived of the early republic. In no other capital was social standing and court attendance so important. As superficial as it might be, the America’s minister absence from official court functions seemed an insult to the Emperor. Official business was conducted at the parties and fêtes constantly taking place in Paris. Since Armstrong refused to participate socially, he would never be the official who could smooth over the rocky relationship which had developed between France and the United States. Although Lee astutely summed up Armstrong’s inadequacy as minister, he also seemed to resent the fact that this did not give him the opportunity to attend social gatherings. The problem of the Continental System continued to hound American shipping, as Lee noted that Napoleon had ordered all American ships in northern ports to be confiscated. The further weaknesses of the economic embargo were highlighted by the reality that out of the 100

78 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, December 10, 1809, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 93.

123 ships sequestered, eighty were really British ships in possession of forged papers which claimed they were American.79 Even though American ships were harassed and captured at an alarming rate, the British believed that American vessels had a better chance of making landfall in France or along the European coastline blockaded by the French. As a result, forgery became a matter with which the consuls and diplomats serving in France were forced to contend. From his vantage point as the new Minister to Russia in St. Petersburg, Adams sagely noted that, Emperor Napoleon’s experiment had now been three years in operation, and that in the midst of the most wasteful expenses, of the grossest internal mismanagement, of the most unfortunate expeditions, in short of every thing that could baffle the hopes of the people of England, and exasperate them against their own government, no petitions, no clamors for peace were heard.80

If the point of the Continental System were to effect a change in the British government, to starve the thriving merchants of Britain, to cause the leadership in London to revise their policies against Napoleon, the experiment had failed. Although it caused much hardship in Great Britain, the British government survived and ultimately brought about Napoleon’s downfall. While in Paris, Lee enjoyed the many social activities afforded daily in the French capital. The formality that persisted in Napoleon’s new court almost as a carryover from the ancien regime amused the frankly American consul. To the Europeans, Napoleon’s new court was a “usurper’s” creation. To a patriotic American such as Lee, the court provided much insight into the establishment of the Bonaparte Dynasty.

79 Ibid., 94.

80 John Quincy Adams to Robert Smith, January 7, 1810, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 3, 377.

124 In many ways, Napoleon’s creation of an Imperial Court solely rested on his ability as a conqueror. Napoleon felt the need to prove himself to the older conventional monarchies across Europe. Therefore, he built the foundation for his new court on the court of Louis XVI and the Bourbon Court of Versailles. An Emperor needed a court to maintain his control over France and demonstrate to the populace through pomp and circumstance the establishment of a new dynasty for the nation. As one who owed all of his success to his military victories, Napoleon hoped the formation of an Imperial Court might prove to the monarchs of Europe that he intended a new order for France.81 Lee found occasion to relate to his daughter the precise and formal ceremony that surrounded even an official duty such as visiting the Minister of the Interior: Nothing can be more ridiculous than these visits. Your carriage arrives at the entrance of these hotels in the file, and you take your turn at descending from it. You pass the servants’ hall, where laced lackeys are crowded together, and you enter the antechamber, where the huissiers [gentlemen-ushers] (a higher order of domestic, who are dressed in black with swords and bags) take your name and hand it to another who bawls it out to another and so you go on from one splendid apartment to another, and by this time you arrive at the saloon of reception. Your name arrives also, but nine times out of ten so distorted that it has no relation to you. Thus to-night I was announced: Le Colonel Americain, Le Consul, Le Général Americain.”82

Early in January of 1810, Lee had reason to relate that the affairs between France and the United States would soon be settled. Supposedly, some in the inner circle of Napoleon were pushing the Emperor to come to an agreement with the American government.

81 Philip Mansel, The Eagle in Splendor: Napoleon I and His Court (London, George Philip), 11-21.

82 William Lee to Miss Susan Palfrey Lee, December 27, 1809, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 100.

125 However, that good news soon turned sour. By January 13, Lee sounded this alarm to his wife: Our American affairs have taken a darker shade again, and the dispatches which Gen’l Armstrong has just received from the United States will deepen it. Some of the Emperor’s best ministers are highly in favor of an arrangement with us; but his Majesty, influenced by some interested persons about him, does not appear friendly. The question is before him. He is studying it, and he may decide as most of his enlightened men wish, but I doubt it, notwithstanding all that has passed. Gen’l Armstrong thinks I ought to abandon all mercantile projects and solicit a good place in which I could live handsomely and be respected. I feel almost inclined to it, for the uncertain state of things does not please me.83

The situation must have been dire for Lee to consider completely giving up his livelihood and retiring from trade. With the continued strain between France and the United States, Lee found himself despairing of making a profit in such troubled times. Throughout Europe, diplomats speculated over the cause of Napoleon’s rancor against the United States. John Quincy Adams was informed in St. Petersburg that Napoleon pursued his single-minded policy against the wishes of many of his closest advisers. He believed there was “perhaps something of personal feeling in this.”84 Adams went on to speculate that Napoleon did not care for , nor did he appreciate his disreputable status in the United States. The leaders in Washington D.C. also felt the frustrations of dealing with Napoleon and his vacillating foreign policy. Madison wrote, “The late confiscations by Bonaparte comprise robbery, theft, and breach of trust and exceed in turpitude any of enormities not wasting human

83 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, January 13, 1810, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 107.

84 John Quincy Adams to William Eustis, February 28, 1810, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 3, 403.

126 blood.”85 Equally frustrated at home and abroad, the United States continued in its quest for the respect of neutral rights and free trade. Lee, in his letters home, reflected on the dangers of such a government as existed in France, solely reliant on the whims and humors of a tyrant. Although many in his government desired renewed trade with the United States, and he at one time or another would remark upon it himself, Napoleon’s temper seemed to dictate his response. Lee noted how Napoleon would vacillate between proposing opening commerce with the United States and seizing vessels from ports such as San Sebastian and Naples.86 In a meeting with the Minister of the Interior, the Comte de Montalivet, Lee remarked that if peace could not be attained with France, then war might be the alternative. He learned from the minister that “The Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Police, the , and some other leading men,” were determined to avoid such a confrontation and were using their influence with the Emperor to persuade him to come to terms with the Americans.87 Even with such assurances from the minister, Lee also believed that under the French system of government, essentially a dictatorship, perhaps such diplomacy was impossible. In fact, he was leaning towards the belief that America might even settle with Britain before France. Since his arrival in Paris in November of 1807, to the end of January 1808, 120,000,000 francs worth of American property had been sequestered by the French government. Lee knew that his fellow Americans were suffering, but they were powerless to do anything about it.

85 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 25, 1810, The Republic of Letters, Vol. 3, 1617.

86 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, January 16, 1810, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 108-9.

87 Ibid., 109.

127 While in Paris, Lee prodded General Armstrong, to venture into Parisian society. He was elated that his efforts finally paid off, and the minister and the consul attended a masque ball held by the King of Naples, , the brother-in-law of Napoleon. He noted that the minister, while finely educated and militarily fit, did not have the necessary social manners to recommend himself: He enjoys this thing, but does not know how to go about it. When he got his mask on last night, he could not see for want of his spectacles. These were put on over mask and all. He found them a difficulty in taking snuff, and by frequently lifting up his mask for this purpose, he pushed his wig off into the back part of his domino… This is the first ball of any description he has been to since his arrival in Paris.88

Lee, perhaps blinded by his own admiration for the French and even the Emperor himself, found fault only with Armstrong. He found Armstrong’s greatest weakness, notwithstanding his total lack of social graces, to be his failure to communicate in French. Lee’s view was that, “an American minister, thoroughly acquainted with the interests of the two nations, and with the language, by having access to the Emperor, could do almost anything.”89 Albeit his opinion proved to be rather simplistic and naïve, however, he did summarize one factor that troubled American relations with France. The ministers who were chosen to attend such a prestigious European court did not have to meet any professional qualifications such as ability to speak the language or historical knowledge of the foreign relationship with that nation. In fact, there were no specific criteria to determine who should best serve at what foreign court. The United States had no professional trained to serve as the best representatives the young nation had to offer to the Old World nations. The untried and untested ministers

88 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, January 29, 1810, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 111. By January 1808, General Armstrong had resided in Paris for almost four years.

89 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, February 5, 1810, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 113.

128 sent to Paris, and even London, suffered from their complete lack of training and education in diplomatic relations. Perhaps the youth of the United States did not so much harm the new republic as did its untrained and ill-chosen diplomatic representatives. Another possibility, however, is that the United States leaders purposely chose General Armstrong in an effort to keep the relationship with France on a steady, but not overtly friendly level. Frankly, if William Lee were America’s minister in France, the United States would have been locked into a binding alliance with Napoleon and immediately thrust into a European entanglement. This was precisely the situation President Madison did not want to occur. In May 1810, the American diplomats in France were shocked to learn of a new, even more unfavorable edict issued by Napoleon, the Rambouillet Decree. In said decree, Napoleon announced: After the 20th May following, vessels under the French flag, which shall arrive in the United States, shall be seized and confiscated as well as their cargoes; 2d, That after the same epoch, no merchandise or produce, the growth or manufacture of France or her colonies, can be imported into the said United States from any foreign port or place whatsoever under the penalty of seizure, confiscation, and a fine of three times the value of the merchandise; 3d, That American vessels cannot go to any port of France, of her colonies, or dependencies.90

For Consuls Lee and Warden, the Rambouillet Decree would be the death knell of any business dealings in France. How would they conduct business and trade without any ships? If the French would not allow American vessels into the ports of France, how would the consuls sustain their livelihood? The matter remained unsettled. Finally, in August of 1810, General Armstrong believed that he had managed a valuable diplomatic coup. He sent a dispatch informing the new Secretary of State, Robert Smith, that the newly titled duc de

90 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. III, 384.

129 Cadore, formerly Champagny,91 had sent him a letter announcing the formal revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees by Napoleon himself. The Duke formally notified Armstrong that: Now Congress retrace their steps, they revoke the act of the 1st of March; the ports of America are open to French commerce, and France is no longer interdicted to the Americans; in short Congress engages to oppose itself to that one of the belligerent Powers which should refuse to acknowledge the rights of neutrals. In this new state of things, I am authorized to declare to you, sir, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after the 1st of November they will cease to have effect.92

While Armstrong seemingly had cause to celebrate, Champagny ominously added a telling footnote. He reasoned that the decrees were revoked so long as, “The English shall revoke their orders in council, and renounce the new principles of blockade, which they have wished to establish; or that the United States, conformably to the act you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English.”93 Champagny’s sudden reversal did not prove to be an accord at all. The very wording of his chosen communication should have made it clear that the situation remained the same. He stated that it was in the hands of the United States to “cause their rights to be represented by the English.” Had not the Americans been attempting to do this all along? In point of fact, it was not only the British who did not respect the neutral right of the Americans, but the French, too. Finally, the French simply announced that the Imperial decrees of Napoleon would be revoked when, and only when, the British revoked their Orders in

91 Upon the creation of a new Imperial Court, most of Napoleon’s high officials, ministers and marshals received grand to announce their elevated status. Champagny became the duc de Cadore.

92 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. III, 386-87.

93 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. III, 387.

130 Council. That same standard had been the point of negotiation throughout the duration of the Emperor’s Continental System. So nothing had changed at all. General John Armstrong essentially had given up attempting to settle the differences between France and the United States and returned to the United States in September, 1810. He found himself out of favor with both Madison and Jefferson and believed his own political and diplomatic career was at an end. William Lee, overjoyed at the appointment of his close friend and associate, Joel Barlow, as the new Resident Minister in Paris, agreed heartily with this new selection. First of all, the Barlows and the Lees were old friends and acquaintances. Second, Barlow, unlike Armstrong, did not eschew the social obligations which came with his office and was also an intellectual with a strong affinity for the French language. Third, Barlow came with knowledge of the French and their history, having spent the period from May 1788 to August 1804 traveling throughout France and Europe. He had been an early proponent of the French Revolution, even receiving honorary citizenship from the French National Convention in 1792.94 Fourth, Lee was pleased to find that he had been appointed as acting secretary of legation for Barlow and would serve in both Paris and Bordeaux, continuing there as consul.95 By this point, David Bailie Warden had finally been confirmed as the permanent Consul at Paris.96

94 Arthur L. Ford, Joel Barlow (New York, 1971), 27-38.

95 A Yankee Jeffersonian, 117. Lee was also pleased to see that General Armstrong’s reputation had been sullied by his removal from office. He wrote to his wife that, “Gen’l Armstrong has conducted so like the devil in the United States as to lose all his standing. He has attacked every one and among the rest me. I gave him as good as he sent, and he sued me for defamation, claiming $100,000 damages. He has retired to his farm in the state of New York, detested by all the friends of the administration.” 140.

96 Consular Despatches from Paris, March 16, 1811, Warden to Monroe.

131 Joel Barlow was an excellent choice to replace General John Armstrong as Minister to France. He had vast experience of that nation, and he was a close friend and supporter of both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The stark confusion that reigned following Armstrong’s departure from France threw a veil over the American leadership’s understanding of Napoleon’s true intentions. Although Champagny had stated that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked, the matter did not seem to be settled. , the outgoing Secretary of the American Legation in Paris, reported that while the understanding was that the decrees were revoked, the situation on the ground did not match those statements. He reported in spring 1811 that French privateers were still capturing American ships and seizing the cargo and goods which they carried.97 Even the President of the United States, James Madison, remained unclear as to whether the Imperial Decrees had been revoked. In October of 1810, the President attempted to reassure his minister to the Court of St. James, that General Armstrong had received a letter from the duc de Cadore, “which states an actual repeal of the French Decrees,”98 This should have provided American diplomats in London powerful ammunition to use in negotiations with the British. Therefore the mission of Joel Barlow was clear – to settle the situation accordingly and ensure that the United States’ neutral rights and the freedom of the seas were secure. Specifically, Madison hoped that a seasoned veteran such as Joel Barlow could see to it that the Emperor would actually

97 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, October, 1, 1810, Russell to Monroe.

98 Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, Vol. 8, (New York, 1900-10), p. 120.

132 implement a new policy towards the United States and cease the attacks on American shipping.99 Barlow was instructed to ensure that the French were following the orders of the duc de Cadore. Secretary of State James Monroe informed Barlow that: It was presumed that this system had been abandoned some time since, as a letter from the Duc de Cadore, of …, to Mr. Russell gave assurance of it. Should it, however, be still maintained, you will not fail to bring the subject without delay before the French Government, and to urge its immediate abandonment.100

By this point, the economic warfare, far from ceasing, threatened to escalate. By no means was the Continental System disbanded. While the United States acted in good faith and withdrew its restrictions against French trade, those remaining against the British were still in effect. The British refused to revoke their Orders in Council until the French lifted their blockade.101 The status quo remained. In September of 1811, Christopher Meyer, the secretary of the Bordeaux office, reported to Washington D.C. that Lee had arrived in Paris with the newly appointed minister.102 Lee gloried in what he believed would be a complete alteration in the relationship between France and the United States as a result of Joel Barlow’s appointment.

99 James Woodress, A Yankee’s Odyssey: The Life of Joel Barlow (Philadelphia, 1958), 275-76.

100 James Monroe to Joel Barlow, July 26, 1811, Life and Letters of Joel Barlow, LL.D.: Poet, Statesman, Philosopher1811, ed. Charles Burr Todd (New York, 1886), 264.

101 James Monroe to Augustus J. Foster, July 23, 1811, The Writings of James Monroe, Vol. 5, 357.

102 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, September 27, 1811, Meyer to Monroe. Lee and Barlow arrived in Paris September 19, 1811. Lee had spent from July 1810 to September 19, 1811, across the Atlantic in the United States of America. Curiously, David Bailie Warden also returned to Paris on the same voyage as Barlow and Lee after a visit to the United States.

133 He accompanied Barlow to his very first audience with Emperor Napoleon in November of 1811 and related a fascinating and detailed accounting of the proper ceremonial procedure executed by the new minister: The ceremony of this presentation is very stiff. I conducted Mr. Barlow in my full dress to the Salon des Ambassadeurs, where he was visited by, and I was presented to Comte Ségur and the Duke of Bassano, who left the minister to learn the Emperor’s pleasure, when two under Maîtres des Cérémonies in their garbs and with their black velvet, ivory headed canes, threw open the doors and received from my hands the Minister. They conducted him to the head of the stairs, where he was received by the Grand Maître des Cérémonies, who conducted him to the door of the Emperor’s cabinet, where he was received by Prince Cambacérès, who presented him. The Minister made one bow on entering, another halfway of the room, and a third when he approached his Majesty. At this moment he addressed him in a very few words, much to the purpose, and the Emperor answered in a very flattering way, by saying he was gratified in receiving as Minister of the United States a character so highly distinguished, and whose opinions and writings were so friendly to France.103

The absurdity of the ritual was not lost on the patriotic American. Lee, firmly steeped in republicanism and federal virtues, described the scene minutely but could hardly suppress his incredulousness at the formality of such a simple task as the presentation of a minister to a foreign leader. The formal presentation did not end the ritual. Since his introduction to the Emperor was complete, Barlow was now required to open his home to dignitaries for three days, and he accordingly also had 180 official visits to make himself. Lee himself enjoyed the honor of a formal presentation to the Emperor on December 2, 1811. Finally, he had achieved his goal of gaining the Emperor’s notice and seeing the American minister in Paris well received. As he added gloatingly in a

103 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, November 17, 1811, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 143.

134 letter to his wife, Barlow’s ready acceptance into Parisian society would “kill that drill Sergeant Armstrong.”104 As 1811 ended, the Americans in Paris awaited further knowledge of just how well Minister Barlow had been accepted. The tensions had clearly not abated since the United States had not been able to settle its differences with Britain, therefore the French decrees had not been formally revoked. By the end of 1811, the French in many circumstances operated as if all colonial goods were of British origin, including the produce and manufactures of the United States.105 In early 1812, they received an answer but not the one for which they hoped. As Lee noted to President Madison, The hopes of the merchants and manufacturers have been buoyed up for several weeks under the expectation that commerce would revive with the United States. They will soon be disappointed, and if Congress would increase their vexations by laying similar restricting duties on French brandies, wines, and manufactured goods as the Emperor has laid on imports from the United States, it would have an excellent effect here. It would shut up their last resource, and create a general discontent.106

Lee provided valuable insight into the French population’s attitude towards a peace agreement with the United States which would end the economic struggle between the two nations. He acknowledged that it was not only American tradesmen and merchants who labored under such hostile conditions, but the French as well. Both American and French merchants desired renewed trade without the threat of seized goods and lost profits. He believed that although the French were loyally bound to Napoleon, they desperately desired free and open trade with the United States of America.

104 William Lee to Susan Palfrey Lee, December 3, 1811, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 149.

105 Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 4, 250.

106 William Lee to James Madison, January 1, 1812, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 150.

135 After Barlow’s establishment as Resident Minister in Paris, Lee was free to return to Bordeaux to his wife and children. He had not accomplished his goal of achieving the post of Consul in Paris; that position was instead permanently awarded to David Bailie Warden, over General Armstrong’s strident objections. Therefore, Lee intended to continue his trade at Bordeaux in the hope that his good friend, Joel Barlow, could somehow accomplish a diplomatic coup and return some semblance of peace to the trade and commerce which had ceased to flourish between the United States and France. By 1812, the threat of war between France and Russia dominated Napoleon’s attentions, and the issue of his Continental System proved to be the driving force yet again. Since Napoleon had not yet been persuaded by Barlow’s proposals for ending French capture of American ships, the American consuls did not know when, if ever, the two nations might come to an accord again. Lee wrote to the President in a private and confidential letter and tried to give Madison some perspective regarding the present situation in France. Both the British and French continued to harass American ships, but neither nation intended to provoke the Americans into a declaration of war. So far Napoleon had adroitly manipulated the situation and maintained his assertion that the British were still the guiltier party of the two. However, American leaders in Washington D.C. were reaching a breaking point, and the only question which truly remained was would the United States declare war solely on Great Britain or include the French in said declaration? Napoleon had instituted a new licensing system, permitting ship captains and merchants to purchase licenses which allowed them to bypass the Continental System and trade anywhere along the French coasts. At first, Lee thought this plan might work in France’s favor, allowing Napoleon, “to calculate with a certainty how to supply the wants

136 of his treasury.”107 Therefore, the Emperor could allow licenses to be distributed only to merchants which traded in items desirable to the French. From 1807 to 1811, the situation between France and the United States had only continued to deteriorate. Perhaps if the United States had had an effective minister in Paris in the early stages of this diplomatic and economic contest, the young nation would not be at such a disadvantage by 1812, torn between two Old World giants, unsure of which nation it could trust. The leadership in Washington D.C. finally recognized the fact that diplomacy would be the key to any settlement of trade and commercial issues, so the next diplomat chosen to replace General John Armstrong was an intellectual with a ready grasp of France and more social inclination, Joel Barlow. Finally, the hopes of America’s merchants hinged on a diplomat who seemed better poised to initiate a true and lasting peace. The Consuls of the United States, Lee in Bordeaux and Warden in Paris, witnessed and participated in the final stages of the diplomatic struggle which continued into 1812, a fateful year for Napoleon and his newly established Bonaparte dynasty.

107 William Lee to James Madison, May 24, 1812, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 160.

137

CHAPTER FOUR

THE END OF THE EMPIRE: THE CONSULS AT THE CLOSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC AGE

By 1812, the consuls, as well as all American diplomatic officials in France, realized the precarious nature of Franco-American affairs. Napoleon’s capricious manner and his inability to achieve a lasting peace required the consuls to face uncertainty on a daily basis. In the waning years of his reign, the desperate struggle faced by the Emperor to retain his crown led to an increasingly frustrating relationship with the United States of America. Although General Armstrong believed he had attempted a diplomatic coup by ensuring the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees threatening American economic interests, he had in essence been fooled. Rather than revoke the decrees, Napoleon’s Foreign Minister, the duc de Cadore, had insisted the Americans achieve a diplomatic victory over the British first. If the United States could ensure that the British lifted their blockade against the continent of Europe, then and only then would the Emperor revoke the Imperial Decrees.

138 By the time Joel Barlow arrived on the Parisian scene in September 1811, the Americans fully understood the reality of the diplomatic state of affairs. The consuls in France reported that ships continued to be seized, the Council of Prizes condemned and confiscated American ships and cargoes, and the new American minister would be responsible for settling the differences between the two nations. What two American ministers had failed to achieve, a true accord between the United States and France, was left in the hands of Joel Barlow. In order to better understand the intricacy of diplomatic relations with Imperial France, a letter written by the former American Secretary of Legation, Jonathan Russell, provided a purely American perspective of the dictatorial Napoleon: He has no policy by his power – and to make this power felt and feared he is obliged often to display it in acts of oppression and injustice…Our relations with a country governed in this way must, I fear, at best be precarious and uncertain…[W]hat security can we have for the permanency of any arrangement which depends on the single will of a spoilt child of fortune who regards neither the sanctity of principle or the decency of forms.1

“A spoilt child of fortune,” this was an intriguing analysis presented by Russell. Of course, a truer narrative had not yet been written about Napoleon. For all intents and purposes, he was the most successful “soldier of fortune” of all time, relying on the turmoil of the Revolutionary Era to maintain his position. The determination to cling to what he had gained governed every aspect of Napoleon’s political, economic, military and social policies. Russell’s succinct summation encapsulated the enormous difficulties facing the consuls in France and the diplomats representing the United States in facing such an enigmatic leader as

1 Eicher, ed., “Emperor Dead” and Other Historic American Diplomatic Dispatches, 60, Russell to Monroe. Russell wrote the letter after assuming the office of Secretary of Legation to London in 1813.

139 Napoleon. Historians still attempt to decipher the mystery of his foreign policy. More insight into Napoleon’s interest in commercial ventures can be gained from the writings of John Quincy Adams. A frequent European traveler and diplomat, by 1812 Adams was serving as the American Minister to the court of Tsar Alexander of Russia. In a private conversation with Count Karl Robert Nesselrode, an adviser to the Tsar, Adams and Nesselrode discussed the vacillating character of Emperor Napoleon in terms of diplomacy. Although Adams assured the Count that the relationship between France and the United States seemed to be mending, Nesselrode warned the American of the Emperor’s fickle nature: He did not think that the permanency of anything to which he should assent concerning commerce could be relied upon. Every resolution, every act was the result of an impulse of the moment – the effect of an occasional impression. Today the impression was of one sort and the measure corresponded with it; tomorrow the impression would be of an opposite nature and the measure would follow that too. To make them consistent was not in the nature of the man.2

Adams and Nesselrode also attempted to come to an understanding about Napoleon’s commercial war. Here the Russian adviser provided an intriguing analysis regarding Napoleon’s seeming disgust with the merchants of Great Britain. According to Nesselrode, “He never considered commerce as an interest in which all mankind was concerned. He saw in it nothing but the trade of a certain class of individuals.”3 The summation of Napoleon’s views of commerce perhaps explained why the Emperor always seemed to look down upon the merchants of Britain. He frequently spoke with disgust about starving

2 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 4, 297-98.

3 Ibid., 298.

140 the British merchant class which could then lead to a change in government. He believed the merchants and traders held that much clout in Britain and despised that nation for it. After all, the business of Napoleon was making war, which he seemed to believe filled the coffers of France as effectively as commerce and trade. PARIS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE END Joel Barlow was a former army chaplain who had penned the epic poem, The Columbiad, and dedicated it to the King of France who had assisted the Americans during the Revolutionary War, Louis XVI. A former commercial agent himself, he had spent many years in France even experiencing the fall of the Bastille and the outbreak of the French Revolution.4 For his great intellect and discernment, Barlow had been hand-picked by President Madison to embark on his most ambitious mission yet, to achieve a lasting peace with Napoleon and France. Upon his arrival in Paris in 1811, William Lee, the Consul at Bordeaux, had attended to his introduction into Parisian society. He could also rely upon the counsel and assistance of David Bailie Warden, the newly confirmed Consul at Paris, as Warden was well known in many intellectual circles as a result of his scholarly pursuits. Joel Barlow also had a new Minister of Foreign Affairs with whom to contend. The duc de Cadore had retired and Napoleon had appointed Hugues Maret, the duc de Bassano, as his replacement in April 1811. Maret was a determined Bonapartist, a sycophant unabashedly committed to the Empire. When Barlow first reached Paris, he attempted to negotiate with the new Foreign Minister, the duc de Bassano, and sought an audience with the Emperor. For a time, his overtures were rebuffed and Barlow had to console himself with platitudes offered by the French Minister

4 Willson, America’s Ambassadors to France (1777-1927), 102-05.

141 that an accord could be reached between the French and the Americans. In truth, Barlow could not have arrived at a more complicated time. Napoleon, intent on preparations for a war with Russia, had no time for diplomacy nor negotiations. He had ensconced himself with his army, training for a fateful invasion that could either secure the breaches in his Continental System or give the Russians an opportunity to instigate the downfall of the French Emperor. On December 31, 1810, Tsar Alexander had flouted the terms of the Tilsit agreement by opening his ports for trade with the British. At the famous meeting in 1807, Alexander had agreed to support Napoleon by joining the Continental System against Great Britain, in spite of the fact that this would be detrimental to Russian trade. After Napoleon’s further encroachments into eastern Europe and his refusal to acknowledge openly that he had no intention of recreating Poland, Alexander had reached his limit. He renounced his pledge to Napoleon, and Russia and Britain renewed diplomatic relations and international trade.5 Finally, in October of 1812, Barlow received a definitive response from the Duc de Bassano, ensuring him that Napoleon had determined to make peace with the Americans. Maret wrote to Barlow: Your government has desired to see the epoch of this arrangement draw near. His Majesty is animated by the same dispositions, and willing to assure to the negotiation a result the most prompt, he has thought that it would be expedient to suppress the intermediaries, and to transfer the conference to Wilna [Vilna].6

Joel Barlow hastened to respond to Maret’s directives and set forth for Vilna October 26, 1812. A letter from his wife, Ruth Barlow, to the President’s wife, Dolly Madison, bespoke her husband’s anxious

5 Alan Palmer, Napoleon in Russia (New York, 1967), 25-6.

6 The duc de Bassano to Joel Barlow, October 11, 1812, Life and Letters of Joel Barlow, L.L.D., 270.

142 inclinations to settle the Franco-American dispute, “His journey will be long and cold, 650 leagues, half the way through a country of bad roads and almost destitute of everything. He set off, however, with great courage and high raised expectations of succeeding to his wish, and to the satisfaction of our Government.”7 Unfortunately, the hopes of Barlow met with little satisfaction. Napoleon had undertaken his most disastrous single campaign. By the end of 1812, the French army was in full retreat. The reports from the retreating officers sounded an ominous turn. The aide-de-camp to Napoleon’s brother, King Joseph of Spain reported on the turmoil and confusion that engulfed the retreat. Colonel Desprez wrote: The army when I quitted it, was in the most horrible misery. For a long while previously the disorder and losses had been frightful; the artillery and cavalry had ceased to exist. The different regiments were all mixed together; the soldiers marched pell-mell, and sought only how to prolong mechanically their existence. Nevertheless, large as is the number of prisoners, that of the dead exceeds it.8

The Minister first learned of the disastrous consequences of the Russian campaign after the Duc de Bassano received a dispatch from the Emperor in which Napoleon wrote that he was returning to France. Furthermore, he wanted Bassano to follow and also informed him that the treaty for the Americans had been lost. Joel Barlow who had hoped to accomplish the seemingly impossible task of gaining concessions from the French Emperor left Vilna to return to Paris in December of 1812. He would not make it back to the French capital. The Barlows learned of the minister’s death in January 1813. His body would remain in Poland as the situation remained too dangerous

7 Ruth Barlow to Dolly Madison, n.d., Life and Letters of Joel Barlow, L.L.D., 273.

8 John S. C. Abbott, The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with His Brother Joseph Sometime King of Spain, Vol. 2, (London, 1855), 245.

143 for his fellow travelers to attempt any means of transporting him across the frozen landscape. In February of 1813, Mrs. Barlow’s sister, Clara Baldwin, informed Dolly Madison of the death of Joel Barlow. The minister’s sister-in-law implied that Barlow was reluctant to go to Vilna and dreaded the journey, a sharp contrast to the sunny outlook of his wife the previous October. Clara Baldwin wrote: The death of Mr. Barlow is attended with almost every circumstance of aggravation which can be combined. He undertook the journey to Wilna with a reluctance he could not conquer; before he yielded he was assailed by all the great men here with every argument likely to shake his firmness; and convinced at last that his duty to his country required it, and that his Government would blame him if he did not go, he could say no more.9

A touch of asperity also could be found in her letter as Baldwin added, “He may justly be considered as another of (Napoleon’s) victims.”10 One enigmatic note sounded in the letter in reference to the sadness of the American community in Paris in response to Minister Barlow’s death. She informed the President’s wife that all of the community wore mourning dress “with the exception of W—.”11 Perhaps this was a reference to Consul Warden in Paris, anxiously awaiting news regarding the control of the American legation in France? The greatest calamity of all remained the fact that Joel Barlow should never have undertaken such a treacherous journey at all. As a foreign dignitary assigned to the court of Napoleon, Minister Barlow

9 Clara Barlow to Dolly Madison, February 16, 1812, Life and Letters of Joel Barlow, L.L.D., 282.

10 Ibid., 283.

11 In a consular dispatch dated January 17, 1813, written by Barlow’s personal secretary to William Lee, consul at Bordeaux, the mystery of which American citizen by the initial of “W.” who had refused to dress in mourning for Joel Barlow was revealed. The guilty party was, of course, Warden.

144 deserved far greater respect and recognition from the Emperor. Napoleon was intently focused on preparing for and waging war against the Russians, and Barlow had not negotiated the salient points necessary to a new treaty of commerce between the United States and France. A war zone was certainly not the place to undertake diplomatic negotiations. BORDEAUX AT THE END OF THE FIRST EMPIRE Before Barlow undertook his dangerous and fateful mission, William Lee remained in Bordeaux, ignorant of his good friend’s doom and even the disaster of the Russian Campaign. In October of 1812, Lee wrote to the Secretary of State, James Monroe, in Washington of Napoleon’s victory at Borodino.12 While he declared the battle to be a decisive one in favor of the Emperor, the losses for the French were heavy and the outcome could be considered at best a draw. The Russians had not entirely lost and the French had failed to deliver a punishing blow. Not all of the consul’s information was accurate. Lee also reported to Secretary Monroe that Alexander had even sent word to Napoleon that the Tsar desired peace and would even consent to compliance with the Continental System. Alexander’s offer was summarily rejected by the French Emperor who declared, “he [Napoleon] would not stop short of and that he intended to quarter two hundred thousand troops in Russia at the expense of the Nobles for their having forced Alexander with the war.”13 The consul also related France’s reversal of fortune in Spain, with Marshal André Massena in retreat and a new round of conscription ordered to replenish the Grandé Armée for the coming contests in both Russia and Spain.

12 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, October 2, 1812, Lee to Monroe.

13 Ibid.

145 In terms of the long-awaited commercial treaty between France and the United States, Lee had nothing favorable to announce. He fretted: It is inconceivable that the Emperor has as yet done nothing in favor of our commerce – our vessels coming here with licenses are detained three, four, and even six months before they are permitted to enter and clear, during that time many of the cargoes remain unsold as no prudent merchants will purchase until he is certain the merchandize will be admitted.14

The population of Bordeaux remained dissatisfied with the current state of affairs between France and the United States. Lee knew of Joel Barlow’s continued negotiations with the duc de Bassano and hoped the Minister would be able to come to a favorable agreement with the French. The minister also actively worked to assist the American cause by providing William Lee with letters of marque to outfit American privateers at Bordeaux. Lee used three for the Brig Herald under Captain Clayton of Baltimore, the Brig Oriental under Captain Lee also of Baltimore, and the Ship Volant under Captain Penley of Boston. Since the United States’ declaration of war with Great Britain, Congress had authorized the issuance of letters of marque on June 26, 1812. The term letter of marque at first referred to the papers that were issued to a privateer giving it rights to capture enemy vessels, but over time came to refer to the private armed vessel itself. The privateer then had the right to seize enemy ships and their cargo which could then be sold as profit for the captain and crew of the privateer.15 By December of 1812, Lee had been informed of Barlow’s perilous mission to the front lines of the Russian campaign. He worried for his friend’s safety but also fervently wished for a resolution to the Franco-

14 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, October 2, 1812, Lee to Monroe.

15 John Philips Cranwell and William Bowers Crane, Men of Marque: A History of Private Armed Vessels out of Baltimore During the War of 1812 (New York, 1940), 16-7.

146 American economic entanglement. Lee readily admitted in a dispatch to the Secretary of State, “He [Barlow] is very sanguine of success and from myself having been quite the unbeliever for several months past I now entertain great hopes of his coming to a prosperous arrangement.”16 From his long acquaintance with Barlow, Lee believed this minister was the one who could resolve the differences of the two feuding nations and restore economic prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. Already the news of the disastrous retreat echoed across Europe and reached Consul Lee in Bordeaux. Lee could hardly countenance such reports and chose to believe the French propaganda that the Emperor had merely “retrograded” from Moscow to Smolensk in order to set up winter headquarters. The Emperor planned his next foray into Russia with his final destination centered on St. Petersburg. Finally, Lee could account that the French had met with success in the recovery of Spain, particularly Madrid, from the British.17 Lee had a couple of reasons for his glee over the British reversal of fortune. He was a patriotic American and his nation had just entered into a war against Great Britain. Second, Lee rejoiced in the triumphs of Napoleon and felt a real attachment to the French cause. By early 1813, the Russian debacle could no longer be explained away or ignored. Instead, from his port city of Bordeaux, the consul chose to focus on the Emperor’s military genius. For Lee, the fact that Napoleon’s grip on his Empire had become tenuous was simply inconceivable. He therefore dutifully reported to Secretary Monroe that Napoleon in a stirring and emotional address before the French Senate announced, “In three months I will have victory, peace, or death.”18

16 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, December 1, 1812, Lee to Monroe.

17 Ibid.

18 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 9, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

147 Such words voiced by the Emperor had the desired effect; Lee noted that the spirit in France had been uplifted and fully anticipated that a general peace could be attained between the French and the aggrieved nations of Europe. Just a few days later, on January 10, 1813, Lee had reason to believe that a settlement had been reached between the Emperor and Minister Barlow. He forwarded his belief that Barlow was expected to be in Paris from Vilna by the 12th and that the Duke of Bassano had already returned. The rumors reaching Bordeaux of the settlement had already seen the market for colonial produce and goods rise sharply upon such reports. With the war raging between the Americans and the British, Lee could not relate all that he had learned in terms of the state of the Grandé Armée and Napoleon’s present situation for fear that his letter might fall into the hands of the British enemy. 19 THE QUARREL BETWEEN PARIS AND BORDEAUX Finally in mid-January, Lee began to fear for the safety of his friend and fellow diplomat, Joel Barlow. He could not account for the Minister’s continued absence from Paris. He knew that the last letter had been received by Mrs. Joel Barlow on December 17, 1812. Finally he heard that his friend had taken ill on his return journey to Paris, and on January 14 wrote to the Secretary of State that: Mr. Barlow is no more. He died on the 26th December at a small town 7 leagues from Cracovie [Cracow] with an inflammation of the lungs, so suddenly that he had no time to make any arrangements – everything was ready for the treaty to be signed. God knows what will become of us all. I long foresaw what would be the end of such journey which I never would have advised.20

19 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 10, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

20 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 14, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

148 The “sanguine” hopes of Minister Barlow had not come to fruition and Lee no longer could ignore the reality that the French and Americans remained at odds over the economic situation. Lee knew that Barlow had appointed his nephew, Thomas Barlow, to serve in his stead as secretary of legation, but feared the inexperienced youth would need assistance. He vacillated over the proper course of action to pursue: immediately repair to Paris to pay his respects and render any accommodations he could or remain in Bordeaux to attend to his consular duties. Upon further distressing news from Paris, he could no longer put off his choice. Minister Barlow’s private secretary, Joseph Marcadier, kept Lee informed of the distressing and alarming state of American diplomatic affairs in Paris. His first letter, dated January 15, notified Lee that the Consul of Paris, David Bailie Warden, had immediately called upon the Barlow residence upon learning of the death of the minister, not to offer his condolences but to collect the ministerial seal and papers. Therefore, Marcadier felt it incumbent upon William Lee to hasten to Paris since he “had been presented by Mr. Barlow to the Emperor and you are acknowledged at the Exterior relations as Secretary of Legation.”21 This first notice was followed daily by pleas for William Lee to immediately set forth for the French capital in order to assist the family. Warden, the Consul in Paris, remained insistent in his demands for the passports, books, and documents of Minister Barlow, demands which Mrs. Barlow looked upon as indelicate and disruptive. Not only did Warden harass the Barlow household, he also took measures to concentrate American diplomatic powers in his hands. In an increasingly alarmed fashion, Marcadier wrote to Lee, Mr. Warden to take precedence of all the other Consuls whose commissions are older than his, has created himself Consul

21 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 15, 1813, Marcadier to Lee.

149 General and chargé d’affaires of the United States. All the Americans are enraged and have joined in a letter to the Duke of Bassano on the subject in which they say he is not an American, that he has not been regularly naturalized, and does not enjoy this confidence of the President.22

Nativism had reared its ugly head. For the fact remained that Warden was not a native citizen of the United States, a detail that did not render him ineligible for his present position nor the current office to which he aspired. Because of Thomas Jefferson and his prudent wisdom concerning the situation of the United States at the time of the consular offices, the office was not limited only to American citizens.23 In fact, Mrs. Barlow refused to allow the American citizens living in Paris who were outraged over Warden’s actions to forward their letter to the Duke of Bassano for fear that it implied a censure of the United States Government. Marcadier also explained to Lee that Minister Barlow had fallen out of favor with David Bailie Warden before his departure for Vilna and as such had left the tasks of issuing American passports and the care for distressed seamen to the Consul at Le Havre, Isaac Cox Barnet.24 Before departing for Paris, Lee wrote to the duc de Bassano to seek some sort of guidance following the death of the American minister and to offer his assistance in such a confusing situation. He informed the Duke: Being by date of Commission addressed to his I. & R. Majesty, the oldest Consul in France, having been presented as Secretary of Legation to his Majesty and your Excellency and enjoying the confidence of my Government, the personal friendship of the President of the United States and Secretary of State, if your

22 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, Janary 17, 1813, Marcadier to Lee.

23 Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 17, (Princeton, 1965), 244- 46.

24 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 17, 1813, Marcadier to Lee.

150 Excellency would think it advisable, I will immediately repair to Paris and take charge of our affairs.25

Lee informed the French government of his intentions before his own. William Lee wrote on January 22 to inform Secretary Monroe that he intended that very day to set forth for Paris to take charge of the affairs of the United States as Secretary of Legation, “which it appears is the wish of the Duke of Bassano.”26 Here Lee inserts a false claim. Not once in the several letters from Marcadier to Lee did the former secretary to Minister Barlow relate that the Duke of Bassano had expressed his desire for Lee to assume control of American representation in Paris. Perhaps Lee believed that he had been initially assigned the position as Secretary of Legation upon Barlow coming into office and could render service to the Barlows in their current sufferings. But he was not summoned to Paris by any French official. In fact at the same time Lee decided to depart for Paris, David Bailie Warden was seeking an audience with the Duke of Bassano. He sought to assure the Duke that he could manage the affairs of the American ministerial office until a suitable replacement was named by the President. On February 23, 1813, Warden received the recognition of the Duke to correspond with him as the American representative in Paris. The very same day Warden sent a circular to all of the consuls in France informing them of the current state of affairs.27 Upon his arrival in Paris, Lee found that the fears of Marcadier were fully founded. Warden had received the recognition of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duke of Bassano, to correspond with the

25 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 21, 1813, Lee to the duc de Bassano.

26 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 22, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

27 Consular Despatches from Paris, January 23, 1813, Warden to Monroe and Consular Circular.

151 government as the sole representative of the United States serving in Paris. In this respect, Warden continued to hound the Barlows for the release of the ministerial seal, cipher, and official documents.28 To better ascertain the wishes of the French government, Lee felt compelled to seek an audience with the Duke of Bassano. His request received a favorable reply, and Lee had the opportunity to meet with the French Minister. What he learned was troubling. Lee reported, “He informed me that as he understood I had no commission as Secretary of Legation, he had chosen Mr. Warden to communicate with him from his being Consul General of the United States and residing on the spot.”29 Lee’s letter angrily highlighted the passage stating that Warden was Consul General of the United States, for this was patently untrue. A contest between Lee and Warden developed for the control of American affairs in Paris. Lee found himself flummoxed by the capriciousness of the Parisian consul. He had never been appointed to the position of Consul General. Warden had finally received his commission as Consul at Paris in 1811, removing the pro tempore nature of his first appointment, but that had been the extent of the munificence of President James Madison. The contrast between the two offices was significant and Warden’s preemptive assumption of the title Consul General worried William Lee more than any of his previous maneuvers. A Consul General in consequence was a superior appointment to the office of Consul. If it were true that David Bailie Warden had been appointed to this higher office, then he would in fact be superior to all American consuls currently serving throughout the Napoleonic Empire. He would be in charge of men who had more experience in commercial and diplomatic affairs and were also citizens of the United States of America. The position of Consul General held much power over the other

28 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 29, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

29 Ibid. Lee had underlined the above phrase.

152 consuls whose official capacities and rank were equal no matter where they served in Europe. The consul at Paris was equal to the consul at Bordeaux who was equal to the consul at Berlin and so on.30 If it were indeed true that David Bailie Warden had been appointed as Consul General by the President, he would have accomplished a diplomatic coup over consuls with more experience, knowledge, and consequence. Lee had great cause to be discomfited by the apparent elevation of Warden and sought vigorously to ascertain if he had in fact received such a commendation. Lee appealed for some resolution from the Secretary of State. He wrote to Monroe that Joel Barlow had appointed his own nephew, Thomas Barlow, American Secretary of Legation upon Lee’s own return to Bordeaux. As a result, Lee sought to remind Monroe that “a consul can take no political or diplomatic character on the death of a Minister when a Secretary of Legation is on the spot.”31 Lee also informed the Secretary that Warden had taken from Isaac Cox Barnet the assignment given to him by Barlow for the issuance of passports and care of distressed seamen. The state of affairs remained in turmoil. Since Warden did not have the official papers and seals of the minister, he could not properly care for the American citizens stranded in France and in need of assistance. The duel between Warden and Lee for control of the Paris office threatened the peace of the diplomatic corps serving in France. Lee felt enormous frustration in trying to discharge his duties in a situation fraught with intriguing and complications. By the beginning of February, he wrote to Monroe, “what with Warden’s intrigues, D[aniel] P[arker]’s maneuvers, the distress of the ladies of this [Barlow] family, and the

30 Consular Instructions of the United States, August 1, 1801, Consular Circular.

31 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, January 30, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

153 state of affairs, I am fairly sick and tired.” The Daniel Parker to whom Barlow referred was a family friend of the Barlows, an American citizen living in Paris. He had amassed a fortune and gained the ear of the French government. Gossip in Paris held that Parker was the true American minister to France.32 Parker seemed to enjoy exacerbating the situation, keeping the women of the Barlow household in a constant state of uncertainty. Warden’s intriguing, as Lee wrote of it, continued to get stranger and stranger. The Paris consul made an angry visit to Mrs. Barlow and upon finding opened dispatches addressed to the minister demanded of her, “by what authority she opens and mutilates the dispatches of our government,” and he threatened “in the future no dispatches shall fall into her hands to prevent the secrets of the Government being known to improper persons.”33 Warden had taken the matter too far. To call upon a woman who had just lost her husband and accuse her of sharing vital government secrets with unworthy people crossed the line of civility and respect due to a grieving widow. Furthermore, Warden knew that Mrs. Barlow was being advised by William Lee and other Americans living in Paris. The harassment he inflicted upon the Barlow family was completely unjustified. Warden did not understand the stance the Barlow family had taken nor did he calmly accept Lee’s interference in the affairs taking place in Paris. He informed the Secretary of State that the motive of the Barlows was, to cut off my correspondence with the Consuls, and thereby prevent the execution of my duties. The pretensions of Mr. Barnet, Mr. Lee and Mr. Thomas Barlow to the title of Secretary of Legation and Chargé d’affaires have been successively rejected by the Duke

32 J.E.D. Shipp, Giant Days or the Life and Times of William H. Crawford (Americus, GA, 1909), 106.

33 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, February 1, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

154 of Bassano, who refuses to correspond with any other American agent other than myself.34

The pride Warden took in writing that final sentence jumps from the pages of his dispatch. He had been seduced by the honors and respect that came with a higher post and had no intention of allowing William Lee or Thomas Barlow to undermine his authority. Warden did not succeed in his quest. The Barlow family retained the minister’s government possessions until the installation of a new minister at Paris. The minister’s nephew, Thomas Barlow, maintained that he had been appointed the American Secretary of Legation by the late minister. Therefore, he did have the right to keep the ministerial documents, and Warden had no recourse against this action. THE FEUD BETWEEN PARIS AND BORDEAUX ESCALATES By February 1813, Lee had to return to his consular duties in Bordeaux. He kept James Monroe informed of the current state of negotiations between the United States and France. He reported on rumors that had reached him regarding the topic of indemnities and the settlement of American spoliation claims. A key component of negotiations was the President’s insistence that American losses caused by the Continental System be reimbursed. Of course for Napoleon, the idea of such compensation was unacceptable. Furthermore, Lee wrote, It is said they intend to offer you commercial advantages which they consider equivalent to indemnities, but the instability of all such arrangements in the present distressed state of Europe and during our contest with Great Britain, will not perhaps be satisfactory to the President.35

American commerce and trade had not been the only victim of Napoleon’s economic warfare. The merchants of Bordeaux, and even the

34 Consular Despatches from Paris, March 10, 1813, Warden to Monroe.

35 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, February 17, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

155 formerly thriving port city itself, had been completely ruined by the collapse of trans-Atlantic trade. Colonial trade had been the mainstay of Bordeaux’s commerce, and the turmoil of the French Revolution started the port city’s decline. The central port along the Atlantic Coast, of primary importance to Franco-American trade, distributed to the United States brandy, wine, and manufactured goods. Between 1792 and 1795, the slave revolts in the French Caribbean and the war with the British had a ruinous effect on foreign trade.36 Any hope the populace had of a recovery during the First Empire was trampled after the institution of Napoleon’s Continental System, and yet again trans-Atlantic trade was the most affected. The numbers tell the story. From 1801 to 1804, the number of American ships that docked at Bordeaux significantly declined. In 1801, 173 American ships were registered at Bordeaux. At its peak in 1807, there were 197. From 1808 to 1810, that number dropped to approximately twenty-one each year. The lowest point was 1814 when only eleven American ships arrived at the port.37 Bordeaux would never recover. Even after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the city would be reduced to a regional and national port.38 The rancor between Lee and Warden continued to escalate over the course of 1813. In one bitter note, Warden complained that Lee had not corresponded with him about American commercial interests since his return to Bordeaux. Also he related to Lee that he had officially reported

36 Alan Forrest, The Revolution in Provincial France: Aquitaine, 1789-1799 (Oxford, 1996), 246-47.

37 Silvia Marzagalli, “A Vital Link in Wartime: The Organization of a Trade and Shipping Network Between the United States and Bordeaux, 1793-1815,” in Merchant Organization and Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660-1815, edited by Olaf Uwe Janzen, (St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1998), 206-07.

38 Louis Bergeron, France Under Napoleon, translated by R.R. Palmer (Princeton, 1981), 168-69.

156 the detention of the ministerial seals, cipher, and documents to the higher authorities in Washington D.C. He fervently condemned Lee’s meddling in the situation and admonished the Bordeaux consul for behaving unprofessionally. Warden added, “It is unfortunate for the honor and interests of the United States, that agents, bearing their commission should abandon their post to aid in proceedings fraught with mischief and unexampled in the annals of Diplomacy.”39 For Warden to rebuke Lee for dishonorable conduct was ironic since the Parisian consul had spent the better part of the months following Barlow’s death harassing the minister’s family and widow. The conduct of neither consul did credit to the reputation of the United States of America. To this attack on his character, Lee responded with a letter filled with anger and disgust. He first stated that he had no choice but to respond to the accusations listed in Warden’s “injudicious and unmerited” dispatch.40 He refuted point by point each of Warden’s attacks. First, Warden had accused Lee of using the deceased minister’s cipher in correspondence with the Secretary of State, which Lee assured him was untrue. He used his own personal cipher in his correspondence. Second, Warden had insinuated that the Barlows had invited William Lee to Paris after the death of the minister to oppose him for control of the Paris offices. Here Lee replied eloquently, “How the ‘honor and interests’ of the United States can possibly be injured by my visit of condolence to the affected family of my departed friend, I cannot imagine.”41 Third, Warden had accused Lee of using Barlow’s ministerial seal for his dispatches. Again Lee assured him this was patently untrue.

39 Consular Despatches from Paris, February 5, 1813, Warden to Lee.

40 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, February 18, 1813, Lee to Warden.

41 Ibid.

157 He claimed not to have seen the ministerial seal since leaving Barlow’s cabinet to return to his post at Bordeaux. At this point, Lee decided to turn the tables on Warden and accused the Paris consul of dishonesty and subterfuge. He inquired how long Warden had been Consul General of the United States. He went so far as to ask Warden why he had not sent a circular to all of the consuls serving in Napoleon’s empire informing them of his elevation in status. Finally Lee sought from Warden the specific details of his appointment, such as when the President had appointed him Consul General. Finally he added that if it were indeed true that Warden was the American Consul General for France, he would treat him with all the proper respect and deference which the office required. Lee summed up his chief objection to Warden’s impudent actions by referring to a previous American diplomatic embarrassment, the XYZ affair. After the American envoys William Pinkney, , and Eldridge Gerry returned from Paris to the United States, the Americans were left without representation in Paris. As a result, according to Lee, The then Consul of the United States in union with a very respectable citizen undertook to carry on a correspondence with the Directory for which they were highly censured by all parties in America and in consequence of which Congress passed a Law interdicting all our Citizens at home or abroad from holding any unauthorized correspondence with a foreign government touching the interests of the United States under the penalty of five thousand Dollars and an imprisonment of three years.42

Regarding the precedent of diplomatic , Lee proved to be better versed in proper form and etiquette than Consul Warden. Without any news of a possible replacement for Barlow from the United States, both Warden and Lee attempted to perform their consular duties while still antagonizing each other and behaving most undiplomatically. On February 19, 1813, Lee irately informed Secretary

42 Ibid.

158 Monroe that David Bailie Warden had been announced as the Minister of the United States at a soirée of Marshal Jean Mathieu Philibert Sérurier’s. The indignation this aroused in William Lee highlighted the Bordeaux consul’s own frustrations over the circumstances. In truth, Lee had been angling for the position of Consul at Paris since the dismissal of Fulwar Skipwith in summer of 1808. Lee and many other Americans in France did not believe Warden to be a true American citizen. The fact that he had fled Ireland as a young revolutionary and sought refuge in the United States did not recommend him to the core group of Americans who did not believe that non-citizens should hold diplomatic posts. While Lee had seemed to accept Warden’s confirmation upon Barlow’s appointment, his ire at Warden’s presumptuous actions in Paris proved that the pain of loss had not yet receded. The United States still suffered from the Continental System and the war against Great Britain in 1812. Although the United States had experienced both British and French attacks on its commerce, President James Madison had led Congress in a declaration of war against only Great Britain on June 18, 1812.43 While both nations had continued to infringe upon the neutral rights of American shipping, the British went even further by the impressment of American sailors and citizens for service on British vessels. After repeated demands that impressment cease and the Orders in Council be revoked, the Americans resorted to war to make their rights respected. The turmoil on the seas kept the consuls occupied with assisting American seamen, captured American vessels, and condemned ships and cargoes. In March 1813, Lee wrote to Secretary Monroe of the ship Criterion from New York, “which was captured by the enemy and recaptured by the letter of marque Volant,” a ship out of Boston.44 He

43 Reginald Horsman, The War of 1812 (New York, 1969), 24.

44 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, February 22, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

159 assured Monroe that he would oversee the salvage of the ship and the sale of its cargo. Lee also proudly noted that an American letter of marque, the True Blooded Yankee, had recently captured as many as eight British ships, and one of those ships and its cargo was valued at over $200,000. A particularly important aspect of the consul’s job in this time of uncertainty and war was the oversight of prize vessels and goods. The privateers of the United States waged their own economic war against the ships of Britain, seizing vessels and selling their cargo which served to enrich the privateers and hurt Britain’s commerce. There was a proper course of action to follow involving the sale of prize vessels and cargo. Once a prize vessel reached a port in a foreign nation such as France, a French prize official such as a chancellor or marshal would take charge of the ship. For American prizes, the consul in the port could assist in the sale of the prize vessel. A judgment would be necessary to affirm that the ship was indeed an enemy vessel and then the sale of the prize could commence.45 The majority of the profits went to the captain and crew of the privateer, the very reason for the growth of the number of these private vessels during the War of 1812. The prize agent who handled the sale would receive a commission. The United States government also received a portion of the proceeds from the sale.46 At the time of the Revolutionary War, the United States Congress published specific instructions regarding privateers and the issuance of letters of marque in times of war. With these instructions, Congress informed the captains and privateers of the proper course of action in capturing the enemy’s ships. In accordance with Congress’s instructions, the captain was to, “bring such ships and vessels as you

45 Men of Marque, 21.

46 Edgar Stanton Maclay, A History of American Privateers (New York, 1899), 7.

160 shall take, with their guns, rigging, tackle, apparel, furniture, and ladings to some convenient port or ports; that proceedings may thereupon be had, in due form of law, concerning such captures.”47 Once the War of 1812 began, American consuls in various European ports were charged with the tasks of dispersing the prize vessels along with their cargo. Of course, the American government received a percentage of the spoils from the captured ships and the consuls received a hefty commission for their efforts. In the case of the Criterion, Lee had a difficult situation with which to contend. This case was not a simple prize vessel sale. Here there was disagreement between the two ships’ captains regarding the proper course of action. Per the standing instructions to consuls of the United States, Lee’s office did not come with judicial powers. According to the consular instructions: To remove a misconception which seems to have partially taken place, you are advised that no judicial authority belongs to your office, except what may be expressly given by a law of the United States, and may be tolerated by the government in whose jurisdiction you reside.48

A dispute had arisen between the captains of the Criterion and the Volant regarding the sale of the Criterion’s cargo. Since it was an American ship, Captain Waterman of the Criterion claimed the proceeds from the sale of the ship’s cargo. However, Captain Penley of the Volant claimed the Criterion’s cargo for himself and his crew. The matter was laid before William Lee in Bordeaux. He hastily reassured Secretary Monroe in a dispatch that he had come to a resolution on the matter, but that he would acquiesce to the judgment of the Secretary if he had been in error. In the case of the Criterion, Lee decreed that the net proceeds would be

47 Act of Congress, Instructions to the captains and commanders of private armed vessels which shall have commissions or letters of marque and reprisal, May 2, 1780.

48 Consular Instructions of the United States, August 1, 1801, Consular Circular.

161 halved by the captains and crews of both ships. Of course, the United States would also receive its portion from the sale of the cargo.49 The settlement Lee adjudicated proved to be fair and accepted by the leadership in Washington D.C. He was also reinforced in his actions by a decision that was made by Napoleon regarding American ships and prize vessels brought into French ports. Warden wrote to Lee that all merchandise brought into France aboard prize vessels captured by Americans would be “received and treated in the same manner as if they arrived on board of French corsairs.”50 With the ruling, the consuls officially received the sanction of the French government to administer the sale of prize vessels and cargo. The desperate situation Napoleon faced across Europe finally seemed to have galvanized the Emperor to attempt some reconciliation with the United States. While Warden and Lee had not yet settled their differences regarding the Paris consul’s assumption of the title Consul General, another issue developed which brought the feud between the two consuls into the public domain. The root of the problem was money. On June 29, 1813, William Lee wrote a letter to Warden informing him that an American ship, the President, commanded by Commodore Rodgers had captured a British Brig, the Maria and docked at Bayonne. Commodore Rodgers had actually captured three British ships, but two had been recaptured by the British, and only the President had made it safely into harbor at Bayonne. The Commodore was not on board the President, but he had the captain of the ship relate to Lee that the prize was for the Paris Consul, Warden. However, Lee noted to Warden: As this vessel falls within my District I shall pass judgment on her, make the sales, remit the proceeds to you and credit you with half the commissions. I hope you will see this, that fairness and

49 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, April 17, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

50 Consular Despatches from Paris, May 4, 1813, Warden to Lee.

162 liberality which I have endeavored to show towards my colleagues in all my transactions.51

Although Lee believed that he had acted with all “fairness and liberality” on this occasion, Warden did not feel the same way. A fight broke out between the two consuls over the prize vessel’s cargo and the commissions for its sale. Lee believed he was justified in splitting the commission with Warden because he thought, “the Commodore has taken these steps from the idea that you are Consul Général,” a false assertion according to Lee.52 Upon learning of Lee’s actions regarding the prize vessel, Warden immediately fired off a dispatch declaring that Lee had no power to act in his stead. The prize vessel and its cargo were to be dispatched by another commercial house in Bordeaux, that of Messieurs Morton and Russell. Furthermore, Warden attacked Lee for opening a parcel that had arrived in Bordeaux which Lee was to have forwarded on to Paris. When Warden received the two packets, the seals were broken and the contents of the package disturbed. He admonished Lee, “This circumstance is of importance to our Government, whose seal ought to be sacred, and you are requested to inform me, by whom it was violated, when, and from what person you received those packets.”53 Warden also accused Lee of withholding letters that were to have been sent on to Paris. The animosity and dislike the consuls had towards each other seemed to radiate from each of their dispatches as they crisscrossed France.

51 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, June 29, 1813, Lee to Warden.

52 Ibid. Lee used the French usage of the term “general” by including the accents.

53 Consular Despatches from Paris, July 6, 1808, Warden to Lee. Warden had underlined the above phrases.

163 Lee soon received a letter from the commercial agents in Bordeaux whom Warden had employed to take charge of the President’s cargo for him.54 The commercial house of Messieurs Morton and Russell was a French agency in direct competition with William Lee. Lee felt all the force of the insult that Warden would choose his direct rivals to operate in his stead. This is yet another example of the conflict of interest that occurred as a result of consular officials also plying a commercial trade. While William Lee was expected to put the official business of the United States before his own, this was not always the case. Although Lee undoubtedly was angered by Warden’s imperious actions and rude demeanor, the fact that the Paris consul intended to deny him a claims commission caused the consular feud to escalate even further. William Lee wrote another angry letter to Warden after the Paris Consul had accused him of tampering with his mail and government packages. Lee seemed to have reached a decision of how to handle the increasingly acerbic nature of Warden’s communications with him. He had at last determined how to maintain his composure in the face of such condemnation. Lee informed Warden, There is nothing so disgraceful to public officers, as to be disputing and quarreling in a foreign country. To put an end therefore to all the unmerited attacks…I beg leave to state that on all public affairs of moment, I will rapidly answer your letters, however peremptorily or disagreeable their style, but in all matters of minor importance when you assume the tone of a drill sergeant and appear to lose sight of that civility you owe to me as a Colleague, I shall make no reply.55

The issue of minor importance to William Lee was Warden’s missing letters. Of course to Warden, the issue was of monumental significance and he did not intend let the matter drop. He continued his steady

54 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, July 9, 1813, Morton and Russell to Lee.

55 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, July 17, 1813, Lee to Warden.

164 barrage of insulting letters to the consul at Bordeaux, informing Lee that he would assume the position of a drill sergeant as, “the first duty of a drill sergeant is to make his men walk straight.”56 In order to hasten the sale of the prize cargo, Lee informed the Minister of Commerce and Manufactures, Jean-Baptiste Collin the Comte de Sussy, of his intention to fix the sale for July 25, 1813. Once again, Warden had already pleaded his case before yet another French official. Lee received an irate note from the Comte de Sussy which accused the Bordeaux Consul of acting as commercial agent for this case without any authority whatsoever. The French Minister went further in stating, Mr. Warden, Consul general, has exposed to me, that the President and the Senate of the United States, having put all prize causes under his special control and that Commodore Rodgers having rendered him responsible for the Maria and her cargo he had authorized Messieurs Morton and Russell, merchants at Bordeaux to act as his agents in the sale of the same.57

The anger and frustration William Lee must have felt at this point can be readily understood. Warden had usurped the position of Consul General, a position which had not been assigned to any American consul serving in Napoleon’s France. Furthermore, he had convinced the French government that he was indeed Consul General which gave him greater notice and authority than Lee. Warden also received the commission of the prize vessel the Maria because Commodore Rodgers believed him to be Consul General of the United States. The Paris consul had no proof to offer that he had been appointed to a higher office, yet he received accolades and rewards in spite of this. This greatly increased Lee’s resentment towards Warden.

56 Consular Despatches from Paris, July 23, 1813, Warden to Lee.

57 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, July 19, 1813, the Comte de Sussy to Lee. The minister had underlined the above phrases.

165 The newly appointed American minister to France, William H. Crawford, a Georgia Senator who had to resign his seat in order to accept the post at Paris, arrived in July 1813. He had been sent with specific instructions in relation to the settlement of the differences between the United States and France. First the question of indemnities for American losses under the Continental System must be resolved to the satisfaction of the United States. Although Napoleon did not want to discuss the possibility of indemnities, the leadership in Washington D.C. insisted this was a key point that must be included in any agreement. Another issue Crawford had to settle was the investigation of the so-called St. Cloud decree. Mysteriously, the French had presented this decree, dated April 28, 1811, which supposedly formally revoked the Berlin and Milan decrees. After General Armstrong had left Paris, the issue had remained unsettled. While Joel Barlow had supposedly seen the decree, it could not be discovered in the archives of the American Legation in France, therefore it was imperative that Crawford sort out the confusing set of circumstances.58 Were the Berlin and Milan decrees in fact revoked? Why did American shipping still suffer from French abuse? Crawford had not inherited an easy task. After Crawford’s arrival in Paris, both Lee and Warden rushed to inform him of the other’s perfidy. Their dispatches arrived before the minister within a few days of each other; Warden’s was dated August 1, 1813 and Lee’s July 26, 1813. Both consuls hoped to gain the sympathies of the newly installed minister, laying before him the entire history of the feud from the death of Joel Barlow to the turmoil surrounding the sale of Commodore Rodgers’ prize vessel.

58 American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, July 12, 1813. In fact, the St. Cloud decree proved to be a forgery, a decree predated April 28, 1811, but not presented to the United States until Joel Barlow’s tenure as American minister. Napoleon attempted to hide his duplicity by presenting this document after the fact stating that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked, when in reality they had not.

166 Lee attempted to salvage his reputation before the American minister. He tried to explain that he had supported the Barlows in their claim that Warden was not to take charge of the minister’s possessions. The consul claimed that he became involved in the situation because he believed that either he or Thomas Barlow should fulfill the vacancy until a replacement arrived. Lee tried to put the matter behind him on his return to Bordeaux but found even greater troubles following his receipt of Commodore Rodgers’ prize vessel. He had never before met with such extraordinary circumstances, of one consul interfering in the district of another. The unceasing tirades which Warden heaped upon him made Lee even more determined to follow his own course of action and complete the sale of the prize. Finally, Lee wrote with some exasperation to Crawford, I will confess to your Excellency that as a native American educated in my country, descending from one of the oldest and most respectable families, and with more connections in the United States than perhaps any other man, to be thus calumniated by an adventurer who was obliged to fly from his own country, and has not lived long enough in mine to be legally naturalized is insupportable.59

Here Lee, as other Americans before him, admitted to some measure of nativism. How could he, with his background and numerous connections, be found at fault while an “adventurer” could arrive from nowhere and usurp the office of Consul General from other consuls with longer service records? To Lee, it was simply unfathomable. Warden’s letter outlining his actions following the death of Minister Barlow attempted to gloss over his harassment of the widow Barlow and her family. He wrote, I hope that you will find therein all that delicacy, humanity, and even sympathy could inspire for a woman in misfortune…Here I shall say nothing of individuals, who, in the midst of these scenes

59 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, July 26, 1813, Lee to Crawford.

167 of grief, have coldly calculated their particular interests; who, with a false pity…with talent enough to find in the misfortunes of another, new sources of advancement.60

Was Warden referring the William Lee or himself? Here the Paris consul engaged in the most egregious duplicity. He had been the one to continually harass the grieving family, accuse the widow of tampering with official government letters, and rush before the French government to gain its approbation. William Lee had indeed been an old friend of the Barlow family, with an acquaintance that went back twenty years. Warden also attempted to justify his assumption of the title Consul General by explaining that it had been necessary to assist in the discharge of his public duties at the highest levels of government. He also defended this measure by claiming that it had been the title given to Fulwar Skipwith during his tenure in Paris. While Skipwith originally held the title of Consul General, after the Convention of Môrtefontaine, Skipwith was only consul at Paris. Warden furthermore explained that he had learned through a friend in Washington D.C. that the President intended to approve his use of the title, which “offered no real advantage except that of facilitating the means of being useful to my Countrymen.”61 Crawford attempted to defuse the situation while at the same time perform the duties of his office. He assured both Warden and Lee that he needed time to come to some sort of resolution regarding the struggle between the two Consuls. In a letter dated July 27, 1813, Crawford wrote to Lee, Upon the subject of the controversy between you and Mr. Warden, I can say nothing at the present moment. I will however examine the subject as early as possible, after I shall be received by the

60 Consular Despatches from Paris, August 1, 1813, Warden to Crawford.

61 Ibid.

168 French Government; and if my interposition should eventually be necessary it shall be exerted, according to the convictions which that examination shall produce.62

He sounded a warning, however, by informing Lee that his justification for his claim that he should represent the government upon the death of Joel Barlow was judged by the President as inadmissible. At the same time he did not validate Warden’s pretensions to the ministerial duties either. According to Crawford, President Madison had been under the impression that Thomas Barlow had been appointed Secretary of Legation by the late minister, and he would be functioning as a temporary substitute until the United States government could furnish a permanent replacement.63 Again Crawford assured Lee that the matter would be resolved in the fairest possible manner. But despite Crawford’s attempts to calm the dispute, it only got worse after his arrival in Paris. In a major escalation, both Lee and Warden attempted to involve the duc de Bassano in their quarrel. Lee sought Bassano’s intervention in the case of the British Brig Maria. Although he had been warned by Warden not to go forward with the sale of the ship’s cargo and had been accused of overstepping his boundaries by the Comte de Sussy, still Lee intended to pursue his own object. For Lee to appeal directly to a French minister regarding a matter that was purely a dispute between two American officials was indeed singular. As Warden would have been happy to declare, this action was unexampled in the “Annals of diplomacy.”64 To bring the matter before the Duke was to expose the actions of the American consuls to both the French

62 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, July 27, 1813, Crawford to Lee.

63 Ibid.

64 Warden had claimed Lee’s behavior was “unexampled in the Annals of diplomacy” in a consular dispatch dated February 15, 1813.

169 government and public. Lee, who was so quick to recite the standing instructions and consular history to Warden, should have known that the consuls had been specifically instructed in a consular circular of August 1, 1801: It will be best not to fatigue the government in which you reside, or those in authority under it, with applications in unimportant cases. Husband their good dispositions for occasions of some moment; and let all representations to them be couched in the most temperate and friendly terms, never indulging, in any case whatever, a single expression which may irritate.65

Lee related the entire sorry affair to the Duke, including the acrimonious letters and accusations that had flown between Paris and Bordeaux. He concluded his letter by informing the French minister of his overall decision regarding the sale of the prize vessel’s cargo, I have therefore proceeded as in duty bound, to the adjudication and sales of the Commodore’s prize, and have desired Mr. Warden, to send me a proof of his agency from the Commodore, in which case, I will remit him the Commodore’s proportion of the proceeds…I hope your Lordship will accord me that support I am intitled [sic] to and that you will not interpose your authority in this case any further than by ordering the discussion between Mr. Warden and myself left to the decision of our own Government.66

Lee claimed the Duke did not need to intervene in American affairs, but he sought such interference by arguing his case directly to the French minister. While Lee called for the assistance of the French minister, Warden was also in communication with French officials at the highest levels of government. He had also related to the Duke the background of his argument with Lee and attempted to sway the French government to support his claims. The Duke leaned on the Principal Commissary of the

65 Consular Instructions of the United States, August 1, 1801, Consular Circular.

66 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, July 26, 1813, Lee to the duc de Bassano.

170 Navy at Bordeaux to send word to Lee that he did not have any rights to the President’s sale. Lee received a letter from this official duly informing him of the Duke’s warning.67 Finally in August of 1813, William Crawford came to a decision. The judgment was as convoluted as the case which it settled. In a written verdict intended for publication in France and the United States, Crawford ruled in favor of William Lee. According to Crawford, Commodore Rodgers had no right to consign the sale of his prize vessel to one particular agent, in this case David Bailie Warden. Also since the Commodore did not know which port his prize vessel would reach, he must then allow that whoever was serving as consul in that port would administer the sale of the vessel and its cargo. Crawford decided, “If the jurisdiction of the case belongs to him [the consul], that jurisdiction gives him authority to perform every act necessary to carry the law in complete expectation.”68 Since Consul Lee represented the United States at Bordeaux, he would act in the best interests of his nation to discharge the prize vessel and its cargo, distribute the proceeds to the captain and crew, and remit a portion of the sale to his own government. Lee’s conduct was declared “legal and correct” by the United States government.69 He found also that Warden had overstepped his boundaries in his declaration that he was Consul General. He admonished Warden. “The Office of Consul General is unknown to the laws and practice of the United States. Mr. Warden is Consul at Paris.”70 Finally Lee was

67 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, August 6, 1813, Bergeron to Lee.

68 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, August 13, 1813, Circular from the minister to the American Legation.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

171 victorious; an official of the United States government had acknowledged that Warden had indeed usurped the position of Consul General. However on one very significant point, Warden was vindicated. Crawford acknowledged that Warden was the chief consular authority for all prize cases in France. Therefore, since Commodore Rodgers had intended the prize for him, Warden would receive the commission from the sale of the ship and cargo. Lee had been judged correct in the affair, and although the Commodore could not prevent Lee from making the sale, he could determine who would receive the financial reward as his consular representative. The judgment of Crawford did not settle the matter to either Warden’s or Lee’s satisfaction. Both men continued to justify their behavior in order to sway the minister’s opinion. As a result of the public nature of the consuls’ disagreement, William Crawford did not find the conduct of either consul worthy of praise. He decried the fact, “that the interference of the French government has been invoked in this case. The American functionaries in foreign countries ought to look to their own Government for the adjustment of every contest among themselves, especially those arising from their official transactions.”71 Both consuls were aware of the fact that the United States government did not look with favor on its public officials airing their petty grievances before a foreign audience. Privately, Crawford had much to lament in the conduct of both American consuls. Upon his arrival in Paris, Warden had sent his bills requiring payment to the new Minister. Crawford had rejected Warden’s claim for a hired coach because the consul “had incurred his expense by placing himself in a situation which the government had not given him.”72 Even after his judgment had been rendered he complained that

71 Ibid.

72 J.E.D. Shipp, Giant Days or the Life and Times of William H. Crawford (Americus, GA, 1909), 106.

172 both Lee and Warden continued to disturb him with their problems. He particularly found Warden obnoxious and wrote that he, was ignorant and arrogant, full of duplicity, obsequious to his superiors and insolent to his inferiors…If I know him right, and I believe I do, he acts always by indirect means. He never marches directly up to an object, even if it will answer his purpose as well.73

Although Crawford seemed to favor Lee’s side, he had not been pleased with the Bordeaux consul’s behavior either. He still did not understand Lee’s actions in writing to the duc de Bassano when he first learned of Joel Barlow’s death and even after Crawford had arrived in Paris. He noted of William Lee: his conduct in this affair has been excessively vexatious. He has been guilty of prevarication and, indeed, manifest falsehood…instead of acting openly and sincerely to put an end to the matter, he wrote to the Duke of Bassano, who was at Dresden, intending, through his influence, to evade the force and effect of my decision…my opinion of him was wholly changed.74

The quarrel between the two American consuls did credit to neither. Both were presented to the American government as preening, grasping hypocrites, claiming to look out for the best interests of their nation when in reality they only looked out for themselves. Throughout 1813, Warden and Lee allowed their differences with each other to poison their relations. The American consuls’ ability to do their task was greatly diminished. Nonetheless, both consuls continued to work for American interests in many cases. Lee reported back to Washington D.C. of prize vessels’ arrivals and condemnations of American shipping. Warden sent news to the Secretary of State about cases before the Council of Prizes. However, the vast majority of the dispatches they sent across the Atlantic contained their defenses for

73 Ibid., 112-13.

74 Ibid., 113.

173 their actions in the case of the ministerial office and the sale of Commodore Rodger’s prize vessel. The amount of paper that was wasted by these men as they attempted to gain the sympathies of the leaders in Washington D.C. was absurd. Had they expended their energies in actual consular duties, more American interests could have been served rather than merely their own. THE END OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA While the consuls concerned themselves with the fight for diplomatic control, the downfall of the Emperor seemed to be at hand. Already the disaster of the Russian campaign had become clear to the United States in early 1813. John Quincy Adams, still serving in St. Petersburg as Resident Minister to Russia, wrote of the tremendous losses suffered by the French, which he estimated at 300,000 men. Most estimates put the French losses at almost 500,000.75 Furthermore, he noted the overall impact of the campaign on the invincibility of the Emperor, The spell of the Emperor is not yet totally dissolved. His friends yet cherish a vague and general hope, and his Enemies feel an involuntary fear that his transcendent Genius (so they term it) will yet burst forth, chain down Fortune at his feet, and range the world again, conquering and to conquer. I see no substantial ground for such a hope or such a fear. The highest probabilities now are that his fall will be as great as his elevation has been extraordinary.76

Adams further observed that as Napoleon had gained his empire with his exploits on the battlefield, he found himself in a precarious situation, “The empire of Napoleon was built upon victory alone. Defeat takes away

75 Palmer, Napoleon in Russia, 259

76 Eicher, “Emperor Dead,” 72.

174 its foundations, and with such defeat as he is now suffering it would be nothing surprising to see the whole fabric crumble into ruins.”77 As Napoleon returned to France to mount a defense of his empire, all around him support seemed to crumble. Defections from key allies, British gains in Portugal and Spain, and the weariness of the French population all pointed to defeat. Even the Emperor himself lamented to his brother Joseph, “France is invaded, all Europe is in arms against France, and above all against me.”78 One last desperate ploy of Napoleon’s even included the United States as a participant. According to Adams, in early 1813, Napoleon proposed a Congress of all warring powers, including the United States, to converge at Prague for peace negotiations.79 The other European powers, emboldened by the weakened state of the Emperor and his forces, did not respond to his call. Such rumors even reached William Lee in Bordeaux who hoped that Napoleon might yet retain his hold on France. Napoleon could not conclude a peace with the nations of Europe that had lost so much to him over the years. In November 1813, Lee wrote to Washington, informing Secretary Monroe of the Emperor’s desperate situation. The defection of the Saxons, Bavarians, and others had begun and the Grandé Armée seemed on the verge of collapse. Lee described the situation: In the army depression, distrust, and jealousy reign. In the Nation a spirit of disorganization and discontent prevails which threatens the subversion of the Government. The patriotism of the people is exhausted and the physical force of the Nation destroyed at a moment when the combined armies of the Peninsula are at the

77 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 4, 408.

78 The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon with His Brother Joseph Sometime Kind of Spain, Vol. 2, 255.

79 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 4, 496-97.

175 Walls of Bayonne and the allies have penetrated to the borders of Holland and the Banks of the Rhine.80

While American leaders such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison no longer had the same respect and admiration for Napoleon, clearly Lee found the losses of the French army disheartening. He admired Napoleon and loved the . Lee mourned the passing of the First Empire as all around him France succumbed to the chaos. By early March 1814, the situation in Bordeaux seemed dire. As Lee wrote to Secretary Monroe: In the state of confusion and despair which surrounds me, I have only time to say that the enemy is but a few leagues from us; that all the authorities except the have evacuated the city. I have dispatched all our vessels down the river, some loaded, some partly loaded and others in ballast, with all their crews, to profit of the first occasion to put to sea.81

A dedicated Bonapartist to the end, Lee offered his reassurance that the Emperor would, in the end, prevail, “Many reports of peace are circulating and of the defection of Austria, which however do not appear to me to merit much confidence, though I think myself the Emperor will succeed in driving his enemies out of France.”82 A hopeful assertion that would not be met. Lee, always proficient in sending detailed dispatches keeping the leadership in Washington D.C. informed of the situation in his port, hastened to alert Monroe that the British had successfully captured Bordeaux on March 12, 1814, under the command of Marshal William Beresford. He described the situation as calm, “a perfect tranquility or

80 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, November 25, 1813, Lee to Monroe.

81 William Lee to James Monroe, March 4, 1814, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 163.

82 Ibid., 163.

176 rather stupor.”83 Of course, a regime change must occur. So the mayor of Bordeaux “threw his decorations of the Legion of Honor, under his feet, and took that of St. Louis with a white sash.”84 The relics of Napoleon must give way to the decorations of the Bourbons. He recounted with disgust how the entire city of Bordeaux had surrendered without firing a single shot to a British force of less than 5000 men. He also acknowledged that everywhere was seen the white cockade of the Bourbons as the entire populace attempted to do away with their former allegiance to Napoleon. The general concert of Europe intended to impose on France a faded and diminished dynasty and reduced borders. American observers in Europe, such as Adams, predicted such circumstances even as Napoleon attempted to retain control: According to all present appearance the catastrophe of the French Revolution is at hand. The Bourbons will at last be restored, not as the Stuarts were in England by the spontaneous and irresistible voice of the nation, but by the dictates of a foreign coalition…careful to reduce her [France] within dimensions which will carry with them what they may consider as a guaranty of future tranquility.85

Adams also noted that the French populace had so wearied of war that they no longer fought with the same vigor and dedication of previous campaigns. As to his duties as Consul, Lee proudly reported that he had managed to assist all American vessels in their escape from the port and “not a vessels of ours fell into the hands of the enemy, and a million and

83 William Lee to James Monroe, March 20, 1814, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 163.

84 Ibid., 163.

85 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 5, 20. Adams wrote of this to his father, John Adams, in February of 1814 before Napoleon’s surrender and the Allied armies’ capture of Paris.

177 a half dollars at least has been saved to our citizens.”86 Lee simply hated the British, not only for their continued harassment of his own nation but also for their unceasing war against Napoleon. He rejoiced in any setback the British incurred, and if he could impede their progress into France, he was satisfied. In April 1814, Napoleon abdicated the throne of France. The First Empire was finished. Although admirers of Napoleon, such as William Lee, genuinely mourned the passing of an age, many Americans had lost their admiration for the Emperor. Thomas Jefferson, in retirement at Monticello, wrote, I think the downfall of Bonaparte a great blessing for Europe, which never could have had peace while he was in power. I believe the restoration of the Bourbons is the only point on which France could be rallied, and that their re-establishment is better for that country than civil wars, whether they should be a peaceable nation under a fool or a warring one under a military despot of genius.87

No longer could Jefferson be considered a blind partisan of France. He fully understood the genius and the tragedy of Napoleon and thought France in a better position without him. While the consul remained in Bordeaux and attempted to continue the functions of his office, Lee even published a short book outlining the grievances of the United States against Great Britain. The book he titled Les États-unis et l’Angleterre. He sent a copy to the Secretary of State of whom he exhorted. “I beg you will read it with indulgence, particularly that part relating to the Bourbons, which the authorities here insisted on my inserting before they would permit me to print it.”88 From this

86 William Lee to James Monroe, March 20, 1814, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 164-65.

87 Thomas Jefferson to William Short, August 20, 1814, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 18, 283.

88 William Lee to James Monroe, December 20, 1814, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 166.

178 comment, Lee illustrated to Monroe that the returning Bourbons had firmly regained control of the machinery and bureaucracy of the state of France. In Paris, David Bailie Warden had also been engaged in writing histories and sent copies of his book on consular establishments to the President, the Secretary of State, and other leading government figures.89 By 1814, Warden realized that he did not have the confidence of the American Minister at Paris. Although he attempted to maintain his composure and perform his regular duties, he seemed to be aware that his future was uncertain. In May of 1814, Warden hastened to assure the leaders in Washington D.C. that his credentials had been accepted by the newly returned Bourbons. He also warned Secretary Monroe that “it appears the British government have decided to send, to the United States, some of the regiments of Lord Wellington.”90 The conquerors of Napoleon intended once and for all to demonstrate their superiority, this time on American soil. Shortly after Warden’s reassurances to his government, he learned that William Crawford intended to dismiss him from his consular post. He had raised the ire of the President by his actions following the death of Joel Barlow. Warden received a letter from the Secretary of the American Legation in France in May of 1814 in which he was informed that he was to be dismissed from his position of consul. He immediately wrote to the American Minister, William Crawford, decrying his removal from office. He sought to learn from Crawford who exactly had ordered

89 This was Warden’s book entitled On the Origin, Nature, Progress and Influence of Consular Establishments published in Paris in 1813. He dedicated the book “To the President and the Senate of the United States.”

90 Consular Despatches from Paris, May 5, 1814, Warden to Monroe.

179 his dismissal – the President, the Secretary of State, or the American Minister in Paris? Warden did not intend to surrender his consular post without a struggle. As a student of history and politics, Warden argued his points eloquently. He informed Crawford, A minister cannot suspend the functions of a Consul without a particular act of his Government to this effect, and the document ought to be exhibited. A minister is superior in dignity to a Consul, but the former, according to the American Constitution and laws, has no control over the functions of the latter, which are quite distinct and independent.91

Warden also noted to Crawford, “Your repulsive manner towards me ever since your arrival at Paris made me so particularly attentive to circumstance which might incite your displeasure, that I deprived myself of almost every kind of intercourse with official characters and diplomatic circles.”92 Like Fulwar Skipwith before him, Warden only debased himself further in his desperate attempt to retain his post. He went so far as to inform Crawford that since Napoleon had abdicated, the American minister had lost his authority from the United States government, and therefore he could not remove Warden from the consular position until new instructions arrived. Crawford duly informed him that his removal had been requested because of his actions following the death of Mr. Barlow, his assumption of the title Consul General, and his very public quarrel with William Lee regarding the sale of Commodore Rodgers’ prize vessel. Furthermore Crawford flatly refused to present Warden with any official documentation ordering his resignation.93 Crawford wrote to Secretary

91 Consular Despatches from Paris, June 6, 1814, Warden to Crawford.

92 Ibid.

93 Despatches from the United States Ministers to France, June 12, 1814, Crawford to Monroe.

180 Monroe that Warden planned to report to the President of the minister’s apparent abuse of power. In every respect, Warden’s actions throughout the year 1813 were judged to be erroneous and even detrimental to the nation which he served. However Warden did not agree; he intended to defend his actions vigorously and salvage his reputation. Not satisfied with Crawford’s reasoning, Warden sought clarification and maybe even exoneration from both the Secretary of State and the President. In a dispatch dated June 10, 1814, Warden wrote to James Monroe that Crawford’s actions were “an abuse of delegated authority.”94 He complained that the minister refused to communicate to him the official document ordering his dismissal and yet again argued that Crawford did not have such authority as a result of the late change of government in France. He further noted that he had the right to petition his government and appeal to the leaders in Washington D.C. for judgment in this matter. What Warden wanted was for Monroe to intercede on his behalf, and he hoped that Crawford was acting of his own authority thereby perhaps without the consent of the Secretary of State. On July 21, 1814, he submitted to President James Madison his defense and made a last plea for understanding. He acknowledged that he had finally received from the Minister an adequate response regarding his removal from office. He had learned that the official reason given for his dismissal was that he had continued to correspond with the French government and attend court after Crawford’s arrival in Paris. Warden argued that although he had received letters from the duc de Bassano, he had requested that the French government now direct their correspondence to the new American minister. In response to his request, Warden was informed that, “until Mr. Crawford was acknowledged [by the French government], the minister could not do

94 Consular Despatches from Paris, June 10, 1814, Warden to Monroe.

181 otherwise then correspond with Mr. Warden as the only accredited agent of the United States at Paris.”95 So Warden believed that his continued correspondence with the French Foreign Minister was the only proper course of action given the fact that Crawford had not yet presented his credentials to the Duke and the Emperor. Warden also defended himself against the charge that he continued to attend court even after Crawford’s arrival in Paris. Again, the consul tried to deflect criticism. He argued that he sent all formal court invitations directly on to Minister Crawford. He further noted that he did dine with Empress Josephine and attended some of her evening parties, but he did not believe this was in any way disrespectful to Crawford since, “she was not considered as having any connection with the Court.”96 But Warden did acknowledge dining at St. Cloud and attending the theater at the request of the duchess de Montebello, first lady of honor to Empress Marie-Louise. Warden had written to Crawford to tell the minister of his invitations and did not believe at the time that he had acted in error. He listed four events that he had attended just after Crawford had settled in Paris, but again sought to justify his actions by his claims that he merely acted in the best interests of his nation. Little did Warden know that his efforts were in vain. President Madison had been shocked by Warden’s greedy aspirations for higher regard, and the consul’s reckless grab for power after the death of Joel Barlow had diminished the President’s regard for him. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison wrote of Warden, Be assured he is not the man he passed for with all of us originally. His apparent modesty and suavity cover ambition vanity avidity (from poverty at least) and intrigue…on the death of

95 Consular Despatches from Paris, July 21, 1814, Warden to Madison.

96 Ibid.

182 Barlow, and the scuffle for the Charge of our affairs, the mask fell off entirely. He behaved bad to Mrs. Barlow, and having made himself acceptable to the French Govt… he seized, with their concurrence, the station for which he had as little of qualifications as of pretensions.97

By August 1814, Warden had given up any hope of retaining his post, although he continued to send notes filled with bitterness and acrimony to the American Minister Crawford. Arguments over the delivery of consular seals and papers and the discharge of Warden’s account took up the majority of Warden’s time. He learned that Crawford refused to settle his accounts until he had surrendered all accoutrements of his office. Crawford had also accused Warden of withholding letters written by the duc de Bassano that should have been turned over to the minister upon his arrival in France.98 For the last time, Warden defended himself against such recrimination. By September of 1815, Isaac Cox Barnet had been appointed to the office of Consul at Paris and served in that post until his death in 1833. The post of Consul at Paris proved to be a contentious appointment during the Napoleonic Era. Both Fulwar Skipwith and David Bailie Warden became so enamored of the office that they spent the majority of their time justifying the reasons they should retain their position rather than simply discharging their consular duties. A quarrel with the American Minister serving in Paris also proved to be their downfall. Warden had allowed his standing with the French government following Joel Barlow’s death to elevate his expectations to such an extent that he had trouble giving way to William Crawford. He relished

97 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 23, 1814, The Republic of Letters, Vol. 3, 1751-52.

98 Consular Despatches from Paris, August 2, 1814, Warden to Crawford.

183 his opportunity to dine with the duc de Bassano, socialize with Empress Josephine and attend theater with Empress Marie-Louise. Warden was a learned and sociable man, fluent in French and involved in many societies in Paris. To serve in the capacity of a minister meant that Warden had attained entrée into the highest levels of the French government and society. He did not relinquish such prestige and power easily. Warden settled into an easy existence in Paris, writing and participating in various learned circles. Throughout the remainder of 1814, Lee and his family lived in uncertainty, fearful of reprisals from the returning Bourbons. For Lee, a fervent admirer of Napoleon, the situation seemed hopeless. For the French, uncertainty and tumult reined. According to the consummate European observer, John Quincy Adams: After all the bloody tragedies which have been acting on the face of Europe these two and twenty years, France is to receive the law and constitution from the most inveterate of her enemies. She abused her power of prosperity to such excess that she has not a friend left to support her in the reverse of her fortune. What the present coalition will do with her is yet very uncertain, but there is no question in my mind that they will do with her what they please.99

The situation in Bordeaux remained in turmoil and the entire country seemed at a loss. Sentiments diverged wildly: some favored the Royalists, some Bonaparte, and still others embraced republicanism. The mayor of Bordeaux reported to Paris that placards had been torn down in Bordeaux which read, “Down with the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies! Let’s have no more of Napoleon! Long Live the Republic!”100 In October, two merchants in Bordeaux were arrested for

99 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 5, 8.

100 Edgar Leon Newman, Republicanism During the Bourbon Restoration in France, 1814-1830 (Chicago, 1969), 37.

184 attempting to sell engravings of Napoleon and by December the city seemed to be alive with rumors that increased activity in Elba had been reported. Although the consul at Bordeaux remained a frank admirer of Napoleon, other Americans found hope for France in the new opportunities granted by his exile. Thomas Jefferson, from his retirement, still avidly followed the conditions in France and wrote to his friend Du Pont de Nemours that France had, got back from Robespierre and Bonaparte, to your anti- revolutionary condition. You are now nearly where you were at the Jeu de Paume on the 20th of June 1789. The King would have then yielded by convention freedom of religion, freedom of the press, trial by jury, habeas corpus, and a representative legislation.101

By the end of 1814, peace seemed to have settled over Europe and the Americas. The Peace of Ghent, ending the War of 1812, was signed December 24, 1814. Napoleon had been exiled to Elba, no more to wage war against the nations of Europe. The former President, Thomas Jefferson, who had attempted an embargo to combat Napoleon’s Continental System ruminated over what the conflicts had achieved, And have our commercial citizens merited from their country its encountering another war to protect their gambling interests? That the persons of our citizens shall be safe in freely traversing the ocean, that the transportation of our own products, in our own vessels, to the markets of our choice, and the return to us of the articles we want for our own use, shall be unmolested, I hold to be fundamental, and the gauntlet that must be forever hurled at him who questions it.102

101 Thomas Jefferson to Du Pont de Nemours, February 28, 1815, The Correspondence of Jefferson and DuPont de Nemours, ed. Gilbert Chinard (London, 1931), 210-11.

102 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, June 10, 1815, Jefferson’s Letters, ed. Willson Whitman, 309.

185 According to Jefferson, the United States had withstood the vicissitudes of the machinations of Napoleon and war with Britain, the consequence of which was increased commercial freedom and recommitment to international trade. William Crawford remained in Paris and even attempted to settle the Americans outstanding differences with the restored Bourbons over trade and neutral shipping. He was presented to Louis XVIII and instructed to negotiate with the newly installed Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prince de Bénévent, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, a survivor of the French Revolution, the Directory, the First Empire and now a servant to Louis XVIII.103 With renewed vigor and excitement, Lee hastened to report to Secretary Monroe the return of Napoleon in March of 1815. The fateful One Hundred Days had begun. Already Bordeaux was rife with speculation; some of it true, much of it false. Although Lee had been informed, correctly, that Napoleon had made landfall from Elba in southern France, wild rumors circulated: Private accounts however state that one of his generals is at the head of this band, while he [Napoleon] has landed in Italy, and is at the head of thirty thousand men at Milan, directing his march to Switzerland, from whence he is to proceed to Bavaria, Mayence and down the Rhine, where he will be joined by Prince Eugene. Murat and Prince Charles of Austria, it is said, are at the head of powerful armies to second him, and it is reported that a number of generals and several regiments of the line have gone over to him.104

The Royalists were thrown into turmoil by the return of the man they had declared a “usurper.” The King’s nephew, the duc de Angoulême

103 Chase C. Mooney, William H. Crawford 1772-1834 (Lexington, KY, 1974), 64-5.

104 William Lee to James Monroe, March 12, 1815, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 166.

186 was in Bordeaux at the time of Napoleon’s arrival and had to retreat in order to organize the King’s forces.105 What could have made Napoleon suppose that the French would welcome his return and respond with “Vive l’Empereur” once more? Here Lee gave a creditable and accurate response. He noted to Monroe that while King Louis XVIII had been growing in the estimation of the French populace, the majority of the people had watched the return of the French exiled nobles, some of whom had fled at the first outbreak of revolution in 1789, with disgust. Particularly the remainder of the royal family remained extremely unpopular with the French. The fact that the Bourbons were supported by the very nations which had waged war against the French for over two decades also caused great unease across France. It seemed to the great majority of the French populace that Louis XVIII and the returning émigrés sought to reverse the advances that had been attained as a consequence of the French Revolution. They sought to bring back the ancien regime and not even acknowledge that a Revolution had taken place in their country. If the Bourbons could have sought counsel from the sage of Monticello, Thomas Jefferson might have been able to lead them along the path of reconciliation. While Jefferson was pleased that Napoleon had been removed from France, he feared the Bourbons might not be able to reestablish themselves as the rightful rulers of France. In a letter to the French hero of the American Revolution, the marquis de Lafayette, Jefferson wrote that France was free of Napoleon for now. But this may depend on the wisdom and moderation of the restored dynasty. It is for them now to read a lesson in the fatal errors of the republicans; to be contented with a certain portion of power, secured by a formal compact with the nation, rather than,

105 Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, translated by Lynn M. Case, The Bourbon Restoration (Philadelphia, 1966), 94.

187 grasping at more, hazard all upon uncertainty, and risk meeting the fate of their predecessor, or a renewal of their own exile.106

At first many throughout Europe and the United States feared that with the return of Napoleon, France might descend into civil war. James Monroe, a former American minister to France himself and present Secretary of State, noted, “if Bonaparte has been received with such unanimity as to prevent a civil war, the foreign war, if one takes place, will be confined principally to England, and probably be of short duration.”107 By the end of April, Lee informed Monroe, There are now no fears of a civil war. The Royalists of the day are like the Royalists at the commencement of the Revolution; irresolute and cowardly when in the minority, weak, sanguinary and vindictive when in power. Napoleon is more firmly seated on his throne than ever…He will become the Washington of France.108

Yet again, Lee proved to be susceptible to his own love for France, colored by his own Yankee patriotism and his fervent admiration of Napoleon. He painted a cruel but accurate view of the Royalists in France, but then attempted to envelop Napoleon in the venerable cloak of wisdom ascribed to George Washington. Napoleon did not prove to the Washington of France. Nor were the Bourbons. They had chosen the path of least resistance, escape, just as they did at the outbreak of the French Revolution. Shortly after the fall of the Bastille, Louis XVI’s brother, the Comte d’Artois fled the turmoil of revolution. At the same time the King attempted to escape in 1791, his brother, the Comte de Provence,

106 Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis de Lafayette, February 14, 1815, Thomas Jefferson Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York, 1984), 1361.

107 James Monroe to Alexander J. Dallas, May 28, 1815, The Writings of James Monroe, Vol. 5, 329.

108 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, April 25, 1815, Lee to Monroe.

188 successfully led his family out of France. The Comte de Provence returned to France from exile in 1814 as Louis XVIII. These were the men who intended to reclaim the throne following the downfall of Napoleon. Many in France believed that the universal enmity for the returning émigrés would have led to another revolution. According to John Quincy Adams, who was in Paris for a portion of the Hundred Days, Armand de Caulaincourt, the duc de Vincenze and former minister of Napoleon had informed him, A revolution had been rendered unavoidable by the misconduct of the Bourbons; that with the exception of a handful of emigrants, who had been twenty years carrying on a war against their country, the dissatisfaction had been universal. If the Emperor had not returned there would have been in less than six months an insurrection of the people, the operation of which would have been dreadful; that by the Emperor’s return it had been affected without a drop of blood shed.109

Again Jefferson, from Monticello, lamented the return of Napoleon. He found the situation even more tragic since, “I see no definite term to the despotism now re-established there, and the less as the nation seems to have voluntarily assumed the yoke, and to have made, of an usurper, a legitimate despot.”110 For France to once again embrace the man who had brought such tumult and tragedy to Europe seemed irreconcilable to the former French Minister and President of the United States. The Hundred Days ended in tragedy and defeat for the Emperor. The final effects of Napoleon’s attempt to regain his glory as Emperor of France smoldered in the ruins of Waterloo. A short note was sent from the former American Secretary of Legation in France, now serving in the

109 Allan Nevins, The Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845, 161.

110 Thomas Jefferson to Du Pont de Nemours, June 6, 1815, The Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson and DuPont de Nemours, 221.

189 same capacity in London. Jonathan Russell wrote to the President of the United States, The Emperor commenced the campaign with some prospects of success. These, however, were followed by a dreadful reverse – and the army under him was, it may be said, annihilated near Brussels in an attack of the English under Wellington. No estimate of the loss has yet been made. Conjecture rates it from 50 to a hundred thousand men.111

The actual losses of the French numbered about 25,000 but the loss for Napoleon was immeasurable. If only Napoleon could have taken to heart the judgment of the seasoned European diplomat, John Quincy Adams, when he commented, “how happy it would be for the tranquility of mankind, if it were possible that the will for peace could be inspired into his heart!”112 His most significant defeat spelled the downfall of the Bonaparte dynasty. From Waterloo, Napoleon faced an even harsher exile, banished to the tiny island of St. Helena in the Atlantic Ocean to spend the remainder of his days in lonely contemplation. For his part, William Lee intended to take part in a scheme to slip Napoleon out of France and sail him across the Atlantic to spend his exile in the United States. Captain Charles Baudin, a French naval officer, was part of the plan, and he awaited the arrival of Napoleon after Waterloo. Baudin wrote to Lee in July 1815, that their attempt had been thwarted by the Emperor himself. Napoleon had surrendered to the British. All our efforts to save Napoleon from the humiliation of falling into the hands of the English are now to no purpose; for he has on the 15th instant, delivered himself up, with the whole of his attendants and baggage, to the English squadron off Rochefort. Poor France is now in a very miserable situation, torn by savage enemies and divided between two parties, one of which ascribes the whole of our

111 Eicher, “Emperor Dead,” 75.

112 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 4, 297.

190 evil to the folly of the Bourbon, the other to the ambition of Buonaparte, and are equally both in the right and in the wrong at once. God know alone how to extricate us! For national spirit is no more to be relied upon.113

Lee wrote on the envelope which contained Baudin’s letter, “We were one hour too late.” The Napoleonic Era had ended. After Napoleon’s final defeat, Consul Lee reported a worsening of circumstances for Americans in Bordeaux. He felt threatened and even feared for the safety of his family. The White Terror promised to punish anyone perceived to be pro-Bonaparte, thus anti-Bourbon. Lee received threatening letters by mail and even heard cries outside his home of, “À bas les Américains! Vive les Anglais!” Here Lee admitted that he came under assault because he had, “been known for my attachments to Frenchmen, and my animosity to the British Government during their inhuman and disgraceful war against my just and upright Government.”114 The consul particularly attracted denunciation and provocation because of the book he had published detailing British offenses against the United States during the War of 1812. Lee remained a true and patriotic American. Lee wrote to the Prefect of Bordeaux requesting attention to the matter and even special protection for his family. Lee took great pains to avoid criticizing the Frenchmen with whom he had lived and worked side by side for almost fifteen years. Instead the consul related his belief that the situation was being exacerbated by “a certain party of foreigners” which of course referenced the British freely circulating in Bordeaux after the downfall of Napoleon.115 Tensions remained high between the British

113 Charles Baudin to William Lee, July 16, 1815, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 158.

114 William Lee to the Prefect of Bordeaux, August 14, 1815, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 168.

115 Ibid., 168-69.

191 and the Americans. Although the Peace of Ghent had been signed, Lee found in Bordeaux that the situation did not ameliorate over night. There were still many questions to be answered regarding the current state of affairs for American shipping, and the dilemma of American claims for losses incurred under the Continental System was still before the French government. Lee found the present government out of touch with the majority of the French population. In one dispatch to the Secretary of State, Lee wrote, “The Royalists are bent on a contre revolution, and two thirds of the two chambers being now composed of this party, it is much to be feared that France will again be deluged in blood.”116 He also found wisdom from unexpected sources. He related to Secretary Monroe one anecdote involving Joseph Fouché, former Minister of Police under Napoleon. Fouché reported to Louis XVIII that “all attempts to establish the ancient Regime in France will end in the ruin of Louis, and the final destruction of the dynasty of the Bourbons.”117 The former spymaster of Napoleon had never before uttered such fateful and accurate words. The turmoil lasted throughout 1815. As late as September, Lee reported that a mob had surrounded his home and attempted to forcibly remove an eagle placed over his door. The unrest continued for several days until Lee called upon the leadership of Bordeaux for protection. Again the consul did not blame the loyal French, even those who had switched their allegiance from Bonaparte to Bourbon. Rather Lee blamed: An Anglo-Royal faction composed of the renegade English, Irish, Russian, Austrian, and Dutch houses, who all hate us, and are for assassinating all who do not go the same lengths as themselves. The enmity of this faction towards me arises chiefly from the

116 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, September 23, 1815.

117 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, September 27, 1815.

192 publication of my book against their idol, the English Government.118

Although Lee did not seem to hold the French population accountable for his troubles, he could not claim the friendship of the royal family. He learned that his name had been stricken from a list of foreign consuls invited to a ball given by the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême. Also he feared that the Duke and Duchess were not favorably inclined towards the United States, but at the same time Lee admitted that he had not yet ascertained the attitude of Louis XVIII.119 Lee continued in his capacity as consul of the United States, tending to the American citizens living and working in his district. In October 1815, the Bourbons added to the turmoil experienced by Americans settled in Bordeaux. Lee reported to Monroe that Americans had been called upon for military service, required to pay a 72 percent tax on their real estate or their patent as merchants, and also pay a contribution to the War loans, called military contributions. He argued on behalf of his fellow Americans, particularly regarding the military contributions. He informed Monroe that he had advised the American merchants in Bordeaux to pay the tax on their real estate or profession, but he believed that as foreign merchants they should not have to contribute to lowering the debts incurred by France in its wars. Lee wrote to the prefect in his district to argue his claim that Americans should be exempt from the war loans. He wrote in defense of one American merchant, Thomas Andrews. The prefect, M. Tournon, did not succumb to the pleas of the consul. He indignantly responded, Mr. Andrews has exercised for a long time the profession of a merchant in Bordeaux. He enjoys the protection of the Government and the advantages of our Commercial Laws. He

118 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, September 26, 1815, Lee to Monroe.

119 William Lee to Henry Jackson, September 20, 1815, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 173.

193 submitted as a merchant to pay the personal tax imposed on his profession. How then can he be exempt from the other public charges equally imposed on the same profession?120

Lee’s request that the Americans pay the tax on their profession helped the Prefect make his argument that they should also remit the sum allocated for military contributions. The merchants were not exempt from the taxes or the contributions and would have to pay the charges allocated by the French government. By the end of 1815, the circumstances in France had greatly altered. The French had grown weary of the conquerors of Napoleon and their plundering of French treasure. Lee could report to Secretary Monroe that public opinion throughout the nation had dramatically shifted and he no longer had cause to fear for the safety of himself and his family. In fact, the consul seemed to take delight in the sinking of the British in the eyes of the French. He took the opportunity to relate to Monroe one anecdote involving Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, “the English are getting quite into discredit from the imperious conduct of Lord Wellington at Paris. He was lately hissed out of the opera from having favored the Allies in plundering the Museum, and having dared to take possession of the King’s box at the opera.”121 Of course a love affair between the British and the French could not endure indefinitely. For the consuls in Paris and Bordeaux, the end of the Napoleonic Era marked a change in the diplomatic relations of France and the United States, The Continental System, a failure and persistent miscalculation of Napoleon’s, came to an ignominious end, and the United States no longer had to suffer the attacks that had come with it. Without the formidable foe, Napoleon, the relationship between the two

120 Consular Despatches from Bordeaux, October 23, 1815, Lee to Monroe.

121 William Lee to James Monroe, October 20, 1815, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 175.

194 nations settled into a comfortable indifference. Trade between the United States and Europe only continued to flourish which allowed the newly developing manufacturing centers of the northeast to strengthen and prosper. The end of the struggle against the British and the French saw the United States emerge as a robust nation, secure in its independence and aware of its potential for growth and financial rewards. Without the interference of Napoleon, the leadership in Washington D.C. could settle its differences with both the British and the French. The consuls throughout France and Europe relished the opportunity to hasten the economic triumph of the United States, eager to partake of the riches afforded them by the new opportunities for trade. However, Consul Warden in Paris and Consul Lee in Bordeaux, two American diplomats who had survived the tumultuousness of the Napoleonic era, would not serve in their posts to see their reward. Warden’s dismissal in the summer of 1814 was a direct result of his political machinations and underhanded dealings following the death of Minister Barlow. William Lee chose his removal from France. By 1816, Lee had grown weary of the constant struggle and turmoil he faced day in and day out in Bordeaux. He wrote to the President in February a letter of resignation: The confidence you have reposed in me, by continuing me for so many years in this office, has been highly flattering, and has proved my greatest consolation in all the painful occurrences I have of late experienced in this city, which has now become peculiarly disagreeable, from the alarming state of party spirit, and the great influence of a predominant foreign faction.122

He sought to continue his private commercial house in Bordeaux, but Lee had determined to resign the position of consul and even attempted to recommend one of his business colleagues to the President to succeed

122 William Lee to James Madison, February 16, 1816, A Yankee Jeffersonian, 178.

195 him. In 1816, Lee was able to return with his family to the United States of America. He settled in Washington D.C., accepting governmental appointments to first the War Department, then the Department of Treasury. Did the United States ever recoup its losses in trade and commerce due to Napoleon’s economic warfare? Yes, in 1831 under the newly installed duc d’Orleans. A convention was signed between the United States and France in 1831 which settled American claims by appropriating 25,000,000 francs to be paid to the United States for payment to the claimants.123 The money would be paid by France in six annual installments and finally the United States had some vindication in their struggle against Napoleon. Although the money did not cover all losses that resulted from the attacks on American trade, some manner of compensation at last settled the differences that still plagued Franco- American diplomacy. The end of the Napoleonic Era did not bring perpetual peace and prosperity to Europe and America. It did offer the chance for nations across the Atlantic an opportunity for change. Without the specter of Imperial domination, the United States and the nations of Europe could focus on internal issues, oversee the growth of domestic industry, and for the United States in particular, the expansion and exploration of its vast territory. The American consuls that had served in the Napoleonic Empire were witnesses to an exhilarating period and lived to see the United States develop and prosper.

123 Willson, America’s Ambassadors to France (1777-1927), 175-79.

196

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION: DERELICTION OF DIPLOMACY

With the end of the Napoleonic Era in 1815 came the end of the United States’ troubles on the high seas. No longer did the consuls in France worry over attacks on neutral shipping and their commercial interests. After the downfall of Napoleon, the diplomatic relationship between France and the United States normalized. The consuls could now focus on their main objective, increasing the trade between the two nations to the advantage of each. Throughout the history of the United States’ interactions with Napoleon, the young nation had to face enormous diplomatic obstacles and ultimately went to war again with the British to reinforce its independence. The War of 1812 would not have happened without the interference of Napoleon. For a man so cloaked in greatness, so victorious on the battlefield, his foreign policy did not have the same touch of genius. According to John Quincy Adams: The Emperor Napoleon says that he was never seduced by prosperity; but when he comes to be judged impartially by posterity that will not be their sentence. His fortune will be among the wonders of the age in which he has lived. His military talent and genius will place him high in the rank of great captains; but

197 his intemperate passion, his presumptuous insolence, and his Spanish and Russian wars, will reduce him very nearly to the level of ordinary men.1

In fact, Napoleon’s perplexing foreign policy led to the very disasters that ultimately undermined his regime. For the consuls serving the United States during the French First Empire, they needed all of the skills at their disposal to handle shifting economic fortunes and troubled diplomatic relations. After the settlements rendered following the Convention of Môrtefontaine and the Louisiana Purchase, it appeared that the agreement reached in the United States’ favor ushered in a new era of prosperity and understanding. The United States industry had just begun its expansion in the Northeast and the promise of free shipping would expand American trade and commerce. From their official government positions, the consuls had the opportunities to oversee tremendous advantages to American shipping. In the immediate aftermath of the creation of the Council of Liquidation, the consul serving in Paris, Fulwar Skipwith had the primary responsibility of assisting with American claims before the American Commissioners. While he sincerely applied himself to the cause, attempting to ascertain the credibility of individual claims, Skipwith also allowed his own personal prejudices to get in the way. The consul fought to guarantee payment of his own claim while almost zealously working to defeat the claims of a personal business rival. In the end, Skipwith allowed such petty quarrels to interfere with the duties of his office, became a nuisance to French officials and ensured his own downfall. In terms of collegial relationships, Skipwith had a good working relationship with the consuls throughout France. With the ministers serving in Paris, Skipwith could not claim similar cordial relations. The

1 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 5, 10.

198 fault was not solely his own. The ministers, who had been appointed to more prestigious appointments, felt any act of initiative on Skipwith’s part meant that he was overstepping his boundaries as a consul. He quarreled with Livingston over his meetings with senior French officials and with Armstrong over his zeal in pressing his claims before the Council of Liquidation. While he was scrupulous regarding his consular duties, such dogged determination to defend his actions and pursue his own agenda ultimately doomed his consular career. David Bailie Warden also learned the price of advancing beyond his sworn duties as a consul. Upon the death of Joel Barlow, Warden presumptively assumed control over the American legation in France and unconscionably harassed the minister’s family. Although the fracas that developed between Warden and William Lee specifically related to the settlement of a particular prize case, in truth Warden was irritated with the Bordeaux consul for not accepting his recognition as the American official charged with communicating with the French government. Lee interfered particularly in this matter, writing twice to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the duc de Bassano, to offer his own services as intermediary. He also continually plagued the leadership in Washington D.C. regarding the matter, pressing his own seniority as a consul to recommend him to act in the minister’s stead. Warden and Lee continued to exacerbate the fragile situation until the installation of a new American minister, William H. Crawford. Crawford was left to his own initiative regarding the crisis and ultimately sided with Lee against Warden. While Warden did receive pecuniary gain from the sale of the prize vessel, his presumptuous actions and grasping nature did not recommend him to the new minister. Crawford oversaw Warden’s removal from office and as Skipwith before him, Warden was left to ruminate over his failure to navigate the tumultuous diplomatic waters of Paris.

199 Of all the consuls serving in France during the Napoleonic Era, William Lee in Bordeaux most effectively served his government in his official capacity. He undertook to complete his duties as consul as outlined in the standing instructions to consuls to the best of his abilities. He kept the leadership in Washington D.C. informed of actions taken by the French government both politically and militarily. He cared for distressed seamen, attempted to protect American shipping, and provided services for American merchants living in Bordeaux. Although he did become embroiled in the conflagration that erupted between himself and Warden, for the most part Lee tried to remain above such needless bickering. But when his reputation was attacked, he could not let such offenses pass without justifying his actions and protecting his reputation as an honest government official. In this time period, honor and reputation meant everything. Perhaps the actions of Fulwar Skipwith, Isaac Cox Barnet, David Bailie Warden, and William Lee can be better understood in this context. A slur upon one’s honor, in some instances, led to duels and death. If your reputation was in tatters, who would engage your commercial services or pay you a decent wage for your professional acumen? In every instance, the consuls defended themselves against anything that might harm their standing in society. The Napoleonic Era proved to be a contentious time for American diplomacy and trade. Napoleon had seemed to usher in a new era following the Convention of Môrtefontaine, his imperious action in establishing the Continental System ultimately drew the United States into his economic war against Great Britain. Undoubtedly, the United States would not have declared war on Great Britain if not for the interference and machinations of Napoleon. American shipping and commerce suffered as a result of the effects of the Continental System, the attacks on American vessels, and its weak position, caught between two behemoths, Great Britain and France.

200 As Napoleon’s star began to dull and his military successes began to reverse, his policy towards the United States became more magnanimous. However, he did not settle his differences with the Americans either in the period of 1813-1814 as he fought to maintain his throne or in 1815 when he returned for the ill-fated Hundred Days. Not even the restored Bourbon Dynasty would honor the claims of the United States for losses suffered during the Continental System. Only after the installation of the Citizen King, the duc d’Orleans, did the American government finally achieve compensation for its citizens seized ships and property. The political and economic situation did not provide the American consuls in Paris and Bordeaux with a harmonious climate for diplomacy. The Napoleonic Era tested the will and patience of all American officials serving throughout the vast reaches of the First Empire. During the tense period of the Continental System, the attention the consuls gave to their own economic standing rather than that of their country’s demonstrated the need for a professional diplomatic service. Although this was not realized until the twentieth century, the foundation of consular duties and responsibilities had been fashioned in the earliest period of American history. The fact that these men could participate and gain from trade while at the same time serving in American governmental capacity clouded the murky state of affairs even further. The American government had not yet learned the advantages that would be gained by employing professional consular officials whose sole responsibilities would be their service to their government. Ultimately, did the American consuls in France discharge the duties of their office with dignity and proficiency? The answer is not quite simple. While they did assist stranded sailors, oversee prize cases, and communicate frequently with their government, they did not always follow through on their diplomatic responsibilities. The Paris consuls resorted to underhanded tactics, at times, in their relations with the

201 American ministers in Paris. The working relationship between the two offices ceased to function several times over the course of the Napoleonic Era. This certainly did not foster diplomatic accord among the American delegation serving in France. Also, a revolt between two consuls at the end of the era did much disservice to both men’s reputations at home and abroad. Such public wrangling over money disgraced the function of the consular office. The action of both David Bailie Warden and William Lee in seeking the interference of the French government in a private matter between two American officials was unconscionable. This was not their finest moment. Overall, the consuls did have a relatively minor impact on the formation of American foreign policy. When the consuls effectively corresponded with the Secretary of State, they passed on vital economic communications and kept the leaders in Washington D.C. apprised of the trade situation in France. Without such useful intelligence, the American leaders would not know to what extent Napoleon’s Imperial Degrees were implemented and how the climate either favored or not American commerce. After all, the United States did go to war in 1812, but not with France. While the consuls did not have any effect on matters such as diplomatic negotiations, they provided needed intelligence which helped the American government formulate its response to Napoleon and his vacillating diplomacy. The Napoleonic Era ended with finality American fascination with France. President Jefferson, a former American minister to France, grew to intensely dislike the French Emperor. While he had avidly watched the advancement of republicanism following the advent of the French Revolution, with the ascension of Napoleon, Jefferson despaired of true liberty for France. After Napoleon’s ignominious fall from grace, Jefferson rejoiced. He compared the Emperor to Robespierre, noting Robespierre met the fate, and his memory the execration, he so justly merited. The rich were his victims, and perished by

202 thousands. It is by millions that Buonaparte destroys the poor, and he is eulogized and deified by the sycophants even of science. These merit more than the mere oblivion to which they will be consigned; and the day will come when a just posterity will give to their hero the only pre-eminence he has earned, that of having been the greatest of the destroyers of the human race.2

No longer could Jefferson’s enemies claim the former president to be a partisan of the French over his own nation. The consuls who served in Napoleon’s Empire were first and foremost proud and patriotic Americans. Although they all claimed admiration for Napoleon, for the most part their primary interests remained the advancement of their own careers and fortunes. Of all the consuls, William Lee perhaps remained the most partial regarding Napoleon and his power. He followed the advancement of Napoleon with an admiring fascination while consequently observed his downfall with a mixture of pity and regret. Even as late as March 1814, Lee wrote confidently, “I think myself the Emperor will succeed in driving his enemies out of France.”3 Lee’s faith in Napoleon was misplaced and just a few weeks later, the Emperor had abdicated his throne. The diplomatic and economic relationship between the United States was dramatically tested throughout the history of the First Empire. While the American consuls serving in France met with some successes as well as failures, they played an important role in protecting the trade and commerce of the United States. They represented American claims for losses, argued for the rights of American shipping interests, and at the same time sought to protect their own economic standing. By the end of the First Empire, Franco-American diplomatic relations remained tense and would not ease until the settlement of American losses incurred under Napoleon’s Continental System.

2 Peterson, Thomas Jefferson Writings, 1271-272.

3 A Yankee Jeffersonian, 163.

203

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jolynda Brock Chenicek was born in Tallahassee, Florida, on September 9, 1972 and grew up in Chattahoochee, Florida. Mrs. Chenicek graduated from Chattahoochee High School in 1990 as the valedictorian of her senior class. She graduated from Florida State University in 1994 with a Bachelor of Science in Social Science Education. For six years, she taught at Belle Vue Middle School in Tallahassee and achieved National Board Certification in Early Adolescence/Social Studies-History in 1999. Mrs. Chenicek received a Ben Weider Fellowship from the Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution to work towards her Master’s degree at Florida State University in 2001-2002 and her Doctoral degree in Spring 2007. She received her Master’s Degree in History in April, 2003 and her thesis was entitled, “Napoleon’s Military Court: The Marshals’ and Their Wives.” She has also presented papers at the Consortium for the Revolutionary Era in 2003, 2004, 2005 and at the 2005 Conference of the Napoleonic Alliance. She is married and has two children.

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