Dar al ifta’ in the Digital Age Issuing Fatwas and Debate in Saudi Arabia

Inge van der Stap 5894190 3 augustus 2016 Masterthesis Richard van Leeuwen

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Contents 1. Introduction ...... 3 2. Theoretical framework and methodology...... 7 2.1 Scholarly debate on the relationship between the umara and ulama in Saudi Arabia ...... 7 2.2 Methodology ...... 15 3. Saudi Arabia, a short introduction ...... 17 3.1 Foundation and early years ...... 17 3.2 Modernizing influences ...... 20 3.3 Religious legitimation ...... 22 3.4 Basic principles of Wahhabism...... 23 3.5 Wahhabi thought on government ...... 24 4. Ifta’ in the digital age ...... 27 4.1 Traditional ifta’ ...... 27 4.2 Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia ...... 29 4.3 Contesting groups ...... 31 4.4 Digital landscape ...... 33 5. Debate between state ulama, society and non-state ulama ...... 36 5.1 Description of the website of the Permanent Committee ...... 36 5.2 Navigating the fatwas ...... 40 5.3 Social issues under debate ...... 41 6. Conclusion ...... 60 Bibliography ...... 64

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1. Introduction

In 1989 the Iranian ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa on Salman Rushdie, the author of The Satanic Verses, claiming that he had written a text against the Islam, the Prophet of Islam and the Quran. Khomeini further claimed that as a result Rushdie was condemned to capital punishment and Muslims all over the world were asked to execute this fatwa.1 As a consequence, Rushdie had to go into hiding. With this act the concept of a fatwa, although previously not unknown in the Western world, became well known throughout the world in a negative sense. In addition, the adverse connotation surrounding fatwas remains until this day as a result of the reprinting of mostly remarkable fatwas by both Western and non-Western news outlets, that through their conspicuous nature draw attention. One example is the fatwa, allegedly written by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al Shaikh in April 2015, that a man can eat his wife when extremely hungry.2 This fatwa led to some heated reactions from different human rights groups as well as to the reprinting of this fatwa in both Western and non-Western media. The Grand Mufti later denied having written the fatwa,3 but by then the damage was already done. The peculiar character of these reprinted fatwas has led to a distorted image of the fatwa in het Western world, and has obscured the real use of fatwas by Muslims in both everyday life and in politics by those in power. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an interesting country to focus on when investigating the use of fatwas in everyday life and politics alike. The government of Saudi Arabia implements an orthodox version of Islam that is known as Wahhabism. Today the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is ruled by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, one of the forty-three sons of Ibn Saud, the founder of the kingdom. He succeeded his half-brother Abdullah who died after a reign of ten years in January of 2015. The king rules the country based on the cooperation between the Saudi family, descendants of Ibn Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, and the Al Shaikh family, descendants of al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism. The entanglement between the Saudis, the royal family, and the Al Shaikhs, the most important family of religious scholars, has been the basis of power legitimacy since the first Saudi Kingdom. This alliance was first formed between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744. The current power structure

1 http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~owend/I/islam/fatwa.html 2 http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/top-saudi-sheikh-issues-bizarre-5491142 3 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2015/04/10/Saudi-fatwa-allowing-husbands-to-eat-wives-unsubstantiated- .html

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is the result of this alliance between the political power and the religious power and is crucial considering Islamic thought on politics in which the ruler is obliged to uphold the Islamic law while the ulama (religious scholars) are responsible for the interpretation and implementation of the law. In exchange, the citizens are required to obey the ruler without resistance. What is of vital importance is the fact that Saudi Arabia is more than any other country identified with Islam. It is both the cradle of Islam and the location of the two holiest places in Islam (Mecca and Medina). As a result the ruler is considered the protector of these sites (Khadim al-Haramayn, servant of the two shrines) and of the annual hajj (pilgrimage). In order to perform these tasks religious legitimation is paramount. The religious establishment gives the Saudi monarchy the legitimation that it needs in order to rule these important locations. The relationship between the umara, the royal family, and the ulama, the religious establishment, is a complex one. Different opinions exist as to what the exact nature is of the relationship and the power distribution between the two parties. This discussion focuses mainly on the political fatwas that are being produced by the Grand Mufti and the Board of Senior Ulama, the highest and most influential religious authority, in order to support governmental decisions. Of importance here is that these ulama, officially independent interpreters of the holy texts and the sharia, have been successfully incorporated into the state system. Multiple bureaucratic institutions have been set up in which the ulama have an active role. One such institution is ‘The Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions’ founded in 1971 by a royal decree and under the direct supervision of the Grand Mufti. The Committtee’s main assignment is to prepare research for the Board of Senior Ulama and issue fatwas in response to personal inquiries concerning matters of faith, ritual, financial transactions and other social norms.4 The fatwas issued by this committee therefore are exclusively related to social and religious matters and the Committee does not produce political fatwas. The work of this committee have been neglected in the discussion. More importantly, the extent to which these fatwas are debated or observed within Saudi society also has not been taken into account. So while the religious support for political decisions by the issuing of fatwas has been extensively debated, the fatwas produced by the ulama concerning socio-religious matters have never been thoroughly investigated. To fully understand and to deepen our comprehension of the relationship between the Saudi umara and ulama and the influence of the ulama on Saudi

4 Al Atawneh, M. (2010) Islam facing the Challenges of Modernity. Dar al-Ifta in the modern Saudi State. Leiden: Brill: p. 25

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society, the social-religious fatwas need to be incorporated into the discussion. Another undervalued factor are the fatwas issued by non-state ulama, who due to the growing importance of the Internet have been able to distribute their ideas more easier into society. Both factors are missing in the academic discussion on the political and social situation of Saudi Arabia and are in need of investigation. In this thesis the assumption that the binary power relationship in Saudi Arabia between the umara and the state ulama is the only power structure that needs examination will be challenged. The focus shifts from the debate between the umara and the state ulama to the debate between the state ulama and their ideas on socio-religious norms, as depicted in non- political fatwas, the non-state ulama and their convictions as can be distilled from their fatwas, and society at large where these fatwas may or may not be implemented. The main research question is; How does the content of the fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions, as published on their website www.alifta.org, compare to content of other Saudi websites, news and fatwa, where openly the same matters are being discussed and reported on? The Committee’s fatwas in question have been produced in response to questions posed by Muslims from both within and outside Saudi Arabia. Several selected fatwas have been submitted to content analysis and compared with the content of news articles and opinion pieces published on two English Saudi based websites and the content of other fatwas issued by non- state Saudi ulama. Seven social topics are being discussed in this thesis to argue that in order to understand Saudi society these elements need to be taken into account as well. With this focus on social fatwas, that are concerned with personal situations, a step away from politics is being taken and the focal point is placed solely on the social norms of the Saudi society. The fatwas subjected to analysis are not political or religious (creed or worship) of nature, but are rather centered on non-political and non-religious social issues. However, given the absolute interconnection of politics, religion and social norms in Saudi society, the suggestion to totally separate investigating Saudi social norms of politics is unrealistic. Social norms in Saudi Arabia are deeply influenced by the Wahhabi ideology. Furthermore, given the importance of fatwas as an instrument to communicate political, religious and social ideas, every fatwa is brimmed with tension and meaning. Therefore also fatwas on social matters have a political dimension and meaning and consequently this political aspect will not be ignored.

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What will remain undiscussed in this thesis is the geopolitical situation and Saudi foreign policy derived from it. The contest that Saudi Arabia received and receives on the claim to represent the right Islam and the right to speak in the name of Islam from Libya, Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah and Egypt influences domestic policies.5 The closeness of these countries adds to the feeling of vulnerability without which Saudi Arabia’s foreign policies cannot be understood.6 Discussing foreign policies is outside of the scope of this thesis, however, what is relevant to mention here is that conflicts with other radical Islamic regimes, which strikes the Saudi state at its core, have fueled a stronger emphasize on Islamic concepts in domestic policies.7 This mechanism is relevant in understanding the importance and influence of religion, the ulama and their fatwas on Saudi society. This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter Two focuses on the relationship and the power distribution between the umara and ulama in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, a short initiation into the most important features of Saudi history and the Wahhabi ideology is given in Chapter Three. This is followed by general and specific notions on ifta’ in the digital landscape in Chapter Four. Chapter Five consists of a description and analysis of the site observation and content analysis of the website of the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and legal Opinions. Chapter Six will give a conclusion.

5 Korany, B. ‘Defending the faith amid change: The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia’ in Korany, B. and Hillal Dessouki, A. (eds)The foreign Policies of Arab States. Oxford: Westview Press 1991: 313 6 Ibid: p. 314 7 Ibid: p. 322

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2. Theoretical framework and methodology.

As touched upon in the introduction, the cooperation between the royal family and the religious establishment is seen as the crucial pillar under the political system in Saudi Arabia. This chapter focuses on the scholarly debate on this union and the distribution of power between the two partners. The second part will target the methodology needed to further deepen the understanding on this relationship by adding the Internet and its influence to the debate.

2.1 Scholarly debate on the relationship between the umara and ulama in Saudi Arabia The Saudi Arabian political system rests on the cooperation between the king and his family and the ulama of the Wahhabi doctrine. This collaboration can be traced back to 1744 when Muhammad Ibn Saud, emir of the small town of Dar‘iya, met Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi revival movement. They initiated a partnership that eventually, centuries later, inspired to and facilitated the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. A more detailed elaboration on this process will be given in chapter Three. For now it is important to know is that without this alliance, that has been kept alive through the centuries, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia would not exist as it does today. This collaboration is seen as the most important part of the political system. It is argued that there exists a mutual dependency between the king and the royal family, the umara in Wahhabi political thought, on one side and the ulama on the other side in order to rule the country. In this partnership the ulama provide the umara with the much needed legitimacy as rightful rulers of the holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, as well as the rest of the country. In return for their support the ulama receive status as well as a privileged position within the Saudi society. The royal family and the ulama find each other in their mutual interest to sustain their partnership. However, they also regularly collide due to their contrasting ideas on the reasonable influence of modernity and the necessary development of society versus maintaining traditional Wahhabi social and religious norms, based on the teachings of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab. The umara, while in need of the endorsement of the ulama, dislike and reject the ulama’s right to evaluate the ruler’s policies.8 The ulama in return disagree with many of the

8 Al Yassini, A. (1983) Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. London: Westview Press: p. 50

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umara’s policies and express their dislike via fatwas and in private meetings.9 Consequently, these differences create tensions that often find their way into the open and put pressure on the cooperative nature of the alliance. The lack of transparency concerning all political aspects of society in Saudi Arabia causes that only a blurred and vague view on the collaboration can be reconstructed. Several academics have attempted to investigate and analyze this relationship between the umara and the ulama and the tensions that come with it. As a result, multiple interpretations of the power distribution between the two partners of the coalition have been formulated. Al Yassini, in his book, claims that ‘the ulama lost many of their traditional functions and became merely a pressure group limited to exerting influence over the government’s activities and policies, but never act as an autonomous center of power’.10 He sees the discovery of oil as an important push factor in the development of state jurisdiction by the umara over areas not covered by traditional sharia law and fiqh, which in turn led to the formulation of a complex structure of non-sharia administrative and legislative rules and regulations.11 The state produced non-sharia legislation, subsequently resulting in the marginalization of the ulama which led to the dependence of them on the state for their survival.12 Whereas commercial, labor and international laws amongst others are formulated by non-religious bureaucrats,13 the activities of the ulama became confined to (most of the) criminal, social and religious aspects of the sharia. Al Yassini determines that the state took over religion, and most importantly the clergy, with the purpose to bring religion in line with national interests. He claims that all the activities of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions are pushed to present the Wahhabi principles to coincide with the objectives of the state.14 The habit of legitimizing the activities of the umara by the ulama elaborates the traditional role of evaluating government policies and activities by the religious establishment. However, Al Yassini claims that the independence of these ulama has been reduced to merely non-critical confirmation most notably in the political domain.15

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid: p. 59 11 Ibid: p. 78 12 Ibid 13 Ibid: p. 79 14 Ibid 15 Ibid

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Bligh argues that an important factor in understanding this distribution of power is the internal situation of the ulama. While the cooperation continues, the ulama have undergone an important internal change; the influence of the Al Shaikh family, the family of the Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, has steadily declined.16 In contrast to the royal family, the members of the Al Shaikh family did not marry multiple times and produce a great number of male descendants, and the male offspring did not always succeed their family members as ulama.17 As a result not all of the high ranking state ulama are now members of the Al Shaikh family, a process that started already in the 1930s.18 Another consequence of the low number of children in the Al Shaikh family is the decline of intermarriages between them and the royal family, starting in the 1940s, which weakened the connection, influence and importance of the Al Shaikh family considerably.19 As so, according to Bligh, the once strong pillar of influence of the Al-Shaikh family in the Saudi coalition is gradually disintegrating20 and consequently the influence of the ulama altogether. Another important influence was the death of the late Grand Mufti Muhammad bin Ibahim bin ‘Abd al-Latif al Al Shaikh in 1969. His death was not followed by the appointment of a new Grand Mufti but instead by the creation of the Board of Senior Ulama in 1971.21 It does not necessary follow that with the decline of the Al Shaikh family the influence and power of the ulama declined, too. The Board of Senior Ulama is still the highest religious authority in charge of the interpretation of Islam and the sharia, as well as responsible for producing fatwas for the king and society alike. However, Bligh argues that the king as head of the state has much more political power than the ulama.22 The ulama are still responsible for the legal and the educational systems, even though with the creation of Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education the umara have taken a large control over these areas as well.23 Bligh further argues that the ulama are well aware of their very limited political power and the necessity to cooperate in order to survive, leading them to always side with whoever is in power.24

16 Bligh, A. (1985) ‘The Saudi religious elite (ulama) a participant in the political system of the kingdom’, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 17, no 1, pp.37-50: p. 37 17 Ibid: p. 38 18 Ibid 19 Ibid: p. 38-39 20 Ibid: p. 39 21 Ibid 22 Ibid: p. 40 23 Ibid: p. 43-44 24 Ibid: p. 49

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Kechichian has a different opinion when he says that ‘[R]religious power and authority continue to be exercised by the ulama in tandem with political figures who derive a dose of legitimacy as a result of this cooperation’.25 Although he refers here to the Muslim world in general and claims that this does not apply exclusively to the Saudi case, his argument is that the issuance of legal opinion on the Islamic sources of law (ifta’) reinforces the relationship between the political figures, umara and the ulama, which is strongest in Saudi Arabia. Although he does recognize the tensions between the interests of the umara and the ulama, he still grants the ulama more influence than Bligh does due to the fact that the umara continue to rely on the ulama for support for their policies.26 He is not wrong when claiming that every change introduced to the kingdom since the discovery of oil has been with the consent and approval of the ulama.27 While not blind to the efforts of the royal family to limit the ulama’s influence by, among other things, the establishment of the ministries of education and justice,28 he argues that the ulama are not and have never been dominated by the royal family.29 He assigns the ulama a large amount of influence over the political and social-religious spheres of Saudi society, much more than Bligh and Al Yassini do. The Saudi state has a theocratic character, according to Layish, and relies for the formulation of law and interpretation of Islam on the ulama. With this they seek religious legitimation, and in addition the state seeks to integrate the ulama into the state system to make them full partners.30 The fatwas of the ulama, especially their political fatwas, are instrumental for the stability of the Saudi state31 and as such the ulama hold a crucial position within Saudi society. However, this does not mean that Layish believes that the ulama have power or influence on the political structure or policies produced by this structure. He notices that the ulama have become an integral part of the political elite, and as such identify with the state,32 and as a result they will do anything necessary to maintain the cooperation. The umara have cultivated and nourished the relationship by not bypassing them in all matters of state, because

25 Kechichian, J.A. (1986) ‘The role of the ulama in the politics of an Islamic state: the case of Saudi Arabia’ in Int. J. Middle East Studies. Vol 18, no 1, pp. 53-71: p. 53. 26 Ibid: p. 54 27 Ibid: p. 57 28 Ibid: p. 60 29 Ibid: p. 62 30 Layish, A. (1987) ‘Saudi Arabian legal reform as a mechanism to moderate Wahhabi doctrine’ in Journal of the American Oriental Society.Vol. 107, no 2, pp. 279-292: p. 288 31 Ibid: p. 289 32 Ibid: p. 292

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the integration of the religious elite into the state is in their best interest.33 Nonetheless, the umara have proceeded to develop legislation without the cooperation of the ulama and the sharia courts, introducing non-sharia codified laws. The ulama have assisted in this by condoning and even sanctioning it as part of the jurisdiction of the umara under the denominator of siyasa shar’iyya. The sanctioning of these laws by the ulama will backfire, according to Layish, because they are unconsciously helping to undermine their own place within society. It can be concluded that modern Saudi ulama ‘have ceased to be one of the two foci of power alongside the umara’,34 though they still belong to the political elite and play an important role, especially in times of crises.35 To conclude, Layish sees the importance of the ulama for Saudi political stability but he does not grant them any political power. Korany bestows all-pervasive influence onto the ulama as he sees them having direct participation in the decision making process.36 As an even larger relevance for their accredited influence, Korany names the effect of the ulama on the social norms by their direct influence onto the political process, their monopoly over the most important ministries and through the Friday sermon.37 Especially through the Friday sermon do the ulama have a public access point to the public in which they can criticize or support certain social practices.38 With this, he argues, the religious establishment bypasses the secular components of society.39 He even goes as far as to say that ‘if the ulama have not managed to monopolize the Saudi government, they have at least created a parallel one’.40 This is clearly a different opinion in comparison to Layish and also to Bligh and Al Yassini. An outspoken Al-Rasheed claims that the Saudi state ulama have for their own survival, ever since the early nineteenth century, supported political power, which meant a moderation of their religious ideas.41 The Saudi state, controlled by the royal family, made them into an elite class with no more than a ceremonial role42 in exchange for their submission. She argues that even though it may look that way, the Saudi state is not a Wahhabi state at all, as the policies and

33 Ibid 34 Ibid: p. 729 35 Ibid 36 Korany: p. 329 37 Ibid: p. 329-330 38 Ibid: p. 330 39 Ibid: p. 330 40 Ibid: p. 220 41 Al-Rasheed, M. (2007) Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic voices from a new generation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: p. 2 42 Ibid: p. 4

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politics are determined by princes and bureaucrats who do not hold Wahhabi religious convictions as their reference point.43 In her view, the current Saudi government has organized the governing of the country in such a way, that the religious authorities have renounced their influence over political matters: ‘the Wahhabi ‘ulama contributed to the consolidation of a state that is politically secular and socially religious’.44 She sees the state as secular as, she argues, the Saudi state, the umara, govern the country without any religious notions in mind. She goes on to argue that the state left the social norms to be decided by the ulama, giving them total control over the social sphere.45 She thus concludes that the ulama have no political power at all as they left that to the umara, but do determine all social-religious norms in the country. In an attempt to analyze and understand the bilateral relationship between the umara and ulama, Al Atawneh introduces the concept of theo-monarchy, which he explains by saying that the Saudi state ‘draws power from long-standing religio-cultural norms’.46 He proposes this concept using the definition of theocracy from the Catholic Encyclopedia. According to this Encyclopedia, theocracy is a: ‘form of government in which divine power governs on an earthly human state, either in a personal incarnation or, more often, via religious institutional representatives, replacing or dominating civil government’.47 Al Atawneh thus sees Saudi Arabia as a country where divine power dominates the civil government through the religious institutional representatives. The legislative system in Saudi Arabia is divided into two parts: one is based on the sharia directly and the other is based on the concept of siyasa (political authority) and they complement each other.48 The decrees issued by the king and the umara, the civil government, are labelled as siyasa, and to make them in accordance with the sharia they need to be supported by religious fatwas.49 As the producers of these fatwas the ulama play a significant role within the social and internal policies and have a significant influence on the content of legislation and political decision.50 Al Atawneh recognizes the Saudi monarchy as a genuine monarchy accommodating Islam51 in search of a compromise between the two equal authorities

43 Ibid 44 Ibid: p. 57 45 Ibid: p. 260 46 Al Atawneh, M. (2009a) ‘Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Contemporary Saudi Arabia’ in Middle Eastern Studies vol 45. No 5, pp. 721-737: p. 721 47 New Catholic Encyclopedia in Al Atawned 2009: p.734. 48 Al Atawned 2009a: p. 729-739 49 Ibid: p. 730 50 Ibid: p. 729 51 Ibid: p. 733

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within the Saudi society. In a different article he suggests that the relationship ‘is based on an ongoing compromise between the two sides’,52 presenting it as a perfect balance and equal partnership with stability as its goal. In addition, in a third article, Al Atawneh clearly shows how the cooperation between the umara and the state ulama has been successful in opposing other religious groups and non- religious ideologies such as tribalism, nationalism and secularism.53 They use the concept of al- wala’ wa’l-bara (allegiance and enmity) for this. The concept of wala’ (allegiance) revers to the obligation to bear allegiance to Muslims only, in contrast to other alliance groups based on tribal lineage.54 Having briefly introduced the above mentioned scholars, it is clear that they come to different conclusions on the nature of the relationship and distribution of power between the umara and the religious elite of Saudi Arabia. All of the mentioned authors use examples of historical events in order to support these opinions. The support for the suppression of the Ikhwan movement in 1927, the violent ending of the occupation of the Mosque in Mecca in 1979, the introduction of radio and television as well as Internet, and the admittance of foreign troops on Saudi soil during the first and second Gulf Wars can all be interpreted as either proving the great influence and role the ulama play or rather as the opposite, the total submission of the ulama to the umara. What is not doubted is the unique and lasting cooperation between the umara and the ulama in Saudi Arabia, in which the ulama give the umara the religious legitimacy they require in order to rule the country. The nature of the Saudi state has been named theocratic, it has been called secular, and even the newly coined notion of theo-monarchistic has been attributed to it. These terms are contradictory, which makes it difficult to see how they can still be used in describing the same society. Instead, it is complicated to argue that, having Saudi Arabia as a main research topic, the state is secular as there is no legal or practical separation between religion and state. On the other hand defining it as a theocracy would prove difficult as well. In the Oxford Dictionary the definition of a theocracy it is a system of government in which priests (religious clergy) rule in the name of God.55 This is not the case in Saudi Arabia where it is clear that the king is the

52 Al Atawneh, M. (2009b) ‘Reconciling tribalism and Islam in the writings of contemporary ‘Ulama’ in Hatina, Meir (ed.) Guardians of Faith in Modern Times:‘Ulama’ in the Middle East. Leiden: Brill: p 215 53 Ibid: p. 218 54 Ibid 55 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/theocracy

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absolute head of the state and ruler of the land. The term theo-monarchy is a new addition but assumes that the state itself holds a religious and cultural identity, which is complicated for obvious reasons. Rather, a refraining from using these western concepts of secularism or theocracy would be more effective as they do not give us any usable knowledge for understanding Saudi society. Rather Saudi society should be studied using the concepts and notions they themselves use to for the explanation of their political and social system. One such important concept in Wahhabism regarding politics is the idea that a government is absolutely necessary for the implementation of Islamic law and that without an Islamic government it would be impossible to maintain the sharia. It is this concept that is used by the Saudi ulama, and particularly state ulama, as an argument to support the umara even when they do not themselves agree with the all the political decisions made.56 As a result every decision of the ulama should be seen in light of this conviction. Another important notion to use are the activities that the ulama undertake to give this religious support and legitimacy to the umara. This is done by the practicing of ifta’, the issuing of fatwas. Political fatwas are issued by the Grand Mufti and the Board of Senior Ulama in order to support governmental decisions. Traditionally, a fatwa is a non-binding judgement by a mufti written for a specific and unique situation, brought to the attention by an individual and written for that situation and individual only. Thus in theory, a fatwa has only value for the questioner and the related specific situation. Nonetheless, fatwas are being published to a larger audience, and comprise not only fatwas that support political decisions, but also fatwas that are really personal and unique. This is the result of the fact that in Saudi Arabia fatwas have developed into more than just a written judgment; they have become important instruments of political processes and the imposing of social and religious norms in addition to legal and judicial procedures.57 The fatwas are being used to communicate ideas, knowledge and norms. It is thus of great importance to investigate the way the religious establishment issues fatwas and communicates these with society at large, and to examine the response to these fatwas by the Saudi society. These fatwas are now being published online and this gives a unique window into the social norms that are being written down and communicated. By researching the

56 Al Yassani: p.79 57 Al Atawneh, M. (2010) Islam facing the Challenges of Modernity. Dar al-Ifta in the modern Saudi State. Leiden: Brill: p. xiv

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Committee’s fatwas and their reception in society a more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between the umara and the ulama can be achieved. In addition, the application of Internet has an increasing impact on how Muslims practice their religion, how Islam is presented to the world and on the self-representation of Muslim societies.58 Internet offers the opportunity to build networks, to discuss and to acquire knowledge in a way that was not possible before. It creates new communities and movements that operate as a ‘digital civil society’ in addition or in opposition to the ruling regimes.59 As such the Internet is a valid and ever growing source for investigation.

2.2 Methodology However, when investigating Internet sources and websites certain new issues concerning methodology arise. The medium Internet is still relatively new and so is the scholarly research. One of the issues to deal with is the fact that websites change their content on a regular basis and have no searchable archive available on their webpages. There are webpages that create archives60 but they rarely save the entire content of the website and rarely every day. It is therefore important to start research by building an archive, by making screen shots, printouts and save HTML pages in Word on a regular basis, in order to record alterations to the websites.61 When having done this, the analysis of the data can begin. Following Bunt this process has two distinctive steps. His methodology at the one hand focuses on the outlook and the management of the website and on the other hand on the content and material that can be found on the website. The first step is thus site observation. As a methodology it targets design, site management and technical features, in addition to ‘deep searching techniques, site tracking analysis and information management’.62 It looks into the way the website was designed and set up and how information is presented and made accessible. The second step is the analyzing of the content. This consists of analyzing design choices, investigation of links to other websites

58 Bunt, G.R. (2009) iMuslims. Rewiring the House of Islam. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press: p. 3 59 Mandaville, P. (2011) ‘Reimagining the ummah? Information technology and the changing boundaries of political Islam,’ in: Frédéric Volpi (ed.), Political Islam; a critical reader, Routledge, London / New York, pp. 331-352; p. 349 60 The website https://archive.org/web/ saves homepages randomly, but not daily and not beyond the homepage, which in the case of www.alifta.org is the Arabic version and not the English one that was investigated. 61 Bunt 2009: p. 20-22 62 Bunt, G.R. (2011) ‘Religion and the Internet’ in Clarke, P.B. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. Oxford: University press: p. 717

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and social media, the refresh rates of the content, and then, finally and most importantly, in depth evaluation and analyzing of what is published on the website.63 The research field aiming to investigate the digital world is young and its methodology and interpretive strategies have been argued to be primitive.64 This could pose a problem when using information coming from such research to make statements and draw conclusions. However, considering the increasing influence of digital communication on the non-digital world it would be impossible to ignore such a vast amount of data. In addition to the methodology developed by Bunt, the source of the data, who wrote and published it, the content, what is communicated, the target group, with whom does the source want to communicate and the objective, why does the source communicate this information, all need to be taken into consideration in order to analyze the impact and influence of the digital world and society. For the research done in this thesis, an archive was built of the website of the Committee (www.alifta.org) in order to use it for both site observation and content analyses. In addition, a Twitter account, solely for the purpose of keeping up with news and information on Saudi Arabia, was sustained. Soon it became clear that a selection needed to be made in order to reduce the amount of data to a workable amount that could be processed by one person.65 The result was the limitation of analyzing and comparing the content of the Committee’s website to two English Saudi based news websites, saudigazette.com.sa and www.arabnews.com, both Saudi based and also available in print, and the content of two Saudi non-state ulama fatwa websites, namely www.islamtoday.com and www.fatwa-online.com. A comparison was made between the content of the Committee’s website, the news websites and the fatwa websites. Before turning to the data and analyses of above mentioned websites, it is necessary to first give a short historic overview of Saudi Arabia and the religious ideology of Wahhabism that supports the state.

63 Ibid 64 Starret, G. (2007) ‘Islam in the digital age: e-jihad, online fatwas, and Cyber Islamic Environments’ (review) in History of Religions Vol. 46. No 3; pp. 268-271: p. 269. 65 Bunt 2009: p. 21

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3. Saudi Arabia, a short introduction

3.1 Foundation and early years The current ruler of Saudi Arabia is King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who succeeded his half-brother Adbullah in January 2015. This succession was merely a next step in a longer tradition in which the ruler of the kingdom is a direct descendent of the founder of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz ibn Adb al-Rahman Al Saud, known as Ibn Saud, who reunited the different regions of the Arabian peninsula except those belonging to the Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates. With this unification he secured his family’s legacy as two versions of the kingdom preceded the current one. All three are based on the same ideological cooperation between the Saudi state rulers and the religious class of scholars. This cooperation started when Muhammad Ibn Saud, emir of the small town of Dar‘iya, met Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi revival movement, in 1744. Despite the fact that the first two versions of the kingdom failed to last long, Ibn Saud eventually triumphed by successfully unifying the Najd with the Hijaz, ‘Asir and al-Hasa. This unification laid the foundation for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as we know it today. The beginning of the unification and rule by Ibn Saud has to be traced back to the eighteenth century when the Arabian Peninsula was part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman officials did not effectively control the region beyond the Hijaz, the region of Mecca and Medina, and the pilgrimage routes.66 In effect the remaining parts of Arabia, including the region of Najd, the central part of Arabia, were ruled by local chiefs who enjoyed a large measure of independence and autonomy67 without significant interference of a great emperor or sultan. In this context, in the town of ‘Uyayna, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in a family of religious scholars. His father, Abd al-Wahhab ibn Sulayman, was a renowned scholar and a follower of the small and shrunken Hanbali school of Sunni Islamic law.68 As a young man Muhammad started to be openly critical of the, in his eyes, polytheistic beliefs and practices of his fellow Muslims.69 By polytheistic beliefs he was referring to the attributing of religious powers to trees and rocks, the adoration of saints and the building and visiting of shrines and tombs of holy figures. He declared them in contradiction with tawhid (monotheism). His

66 Al-Rasheed, M. (2002) A history of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: University Press: p. 14 67 Ibid: p. 15 68 Al Yassini: p. 23 69 Ibid

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behavior and opinions angered the ulama in his hometown and he and his family were forced to leave. After this Muhammed traveled to the Hijaz in the west and Basra and Karbala in the east, and the knowledge that he gained there influenced his thinking and further strengthened him in his conviction of the accuracy of his interpretation of tawhid.70 In 1740 the father of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab died and Muhammad, now living in Huraymila with his family, adopted an even more aggressive line which led him to accept the protection of the ruler of ‘Uyayna, Uthman ibn Mu’ammar. When in ‘Uyayna, Uthman ordered the townspeople to accept the teachings of al-Wahhab, this stirred so much resistance from the established ulama that Uthman eventually gave up his alliance with al-Wahhab.71 After his eviction from his town Muhammad took refuge in Dar’iya. Dar’iya was a small settlement in Najd governed by Muhammad ibn Saud from the Al Saud clan. The Al Sauds did not have an established tribal lineage, nor could they rely on extracting surplus from the inhabitants; as a result the authority of the Al Saud did not reach outside of the small settlement.72 However the Al Sauds had ambitions. When al-Wahhab asked for refuge in Dar’iya he had, with his ideology, already gained followers, also amongst the notables, despite resistance from the established religious authority. He was becoming an established force and the Al Sauds offered al-Wahhab protection in return for his support.73 The coalition between the worldly and religious leaders was sealed in 1744 and resulted in the endorsement of Ibn Saud to extent his control outside of the small town of Dar’iya in exchange for the control of all religious interpretation by al- Wahhab.74 The alliance between a worldly leader, Ibn Saud, and a religious leader, al-Wahhab, was instigated by the fact that both parties had ambitions concerning leadership and control, but independently could not realize them. However, combining their strength did muster enough power to effectively increase their control. By declaring jihad (holy war) on their opponents and everyone who did not adhere to their strict interpretation of Islam, they could effectively defeat them.75 Ibn Saud contributed military strength, al-Wahhab the ideological justification for the armed attacks of neighboring towns and villages. The extension of control over other settlements

70 Ibid 71 Ibid: p. 24-25. 72 Al-Rasheed 2002: p. 16 73 Ibid: p. 17 74 Ibid: p. 18 75 Ibid

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was of crucial importance in order to increase the revenues, by collecting zakat (religious tax), and manpower, under the pretense of jihad, lacking in Dar’iya.76 These fighting forces then advanced first to Riyadh and other towns in Najd and were successful due to the fact that the ideology, especially the strict monotheism of al-Wahhab, was welcomed in the already conservative Najd.77 Thereafter the Saudis pushed forward into al-Hasa and the Hijaz. The eastern region of al-Hasa was successfully subdued. The resistance was greater in the west where the Hijazis ruled, but the Saudis successfully defeated them and established their hegemony.78 An attempt to extend this hegemony to Yemen failed, while the ‘Asir region to the north was successfully occupied. Despite the successes in the beginning from 1811 forward, decline set in on the first Saudi state when the Ottoman empire send Muhammad ‘Ali’s troops to end the Saudi’s advance. After seven years, the Ottomans had defeated the Saudi troops and in 1818 the Saudis surrendered after the destruction of Dar’iyah.79 This concluded the existence of the first Saudi state. The second Saudi state, which started with the capture of Riyadh in 1824, comprised of Riyadh and several towns in the Najd area, and included a reinforcement of Saudi authority in the al-Hasa region.80 It could, however, not be extended into other areas where they had previously ruled. It was not a particularly strong or large state, but it survived until 1891. In this year Muhammad ibn Rashid expelled the last Saudi ruler of Riyadh, ‘Abd al-Rahman, to Kuwait and took control of the town.81 The declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the third Saudi state, was preceded by a long period of slow but sure conquest of the current area of Saudi Arabia. From Kuwait, the son of the expelled ‘Abd al-Rahman, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Saud, known as Ibn Saud, started the Saudi’s comeback by recapturing Riyadh in 1902. The two rivals Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid continued their rivalry by holding and extending power over territory. To do so, they both entered into alliances with foreign powers. The former had an agreement with the British and the latter with the Ottomans.82 After the end of the Second World War Ibn Rashid was left weakened as the Ottomans lost the war and were not capable of providing

76 Ibid: p.18-19 77 Ibid: p. 21 78 Ibid 79 Ibid: p. 23 80 Ibid 81 Ibid: p. 39 82 Ibid: p. 41-43

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support anymore.83 After defeating Ibn Rashid, Ibn Saud went on to capture al-Hasa, the Hijaz and the region of ‘Asir, and successfully unified these regions under his rule.84 The British were of crucial importance for the conquest but did prevent expansion into Kuwait and Trans-Jordan, then British protectorates.85 In 1932 Ibn Saud declared his realm the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.86 The cooperation of the two sides of the partnership, between the umara and the ulama, was of crucial importance once again and cannot be underestimated.

3.2 Modernizing influences Since the establishment of the kingdom, the umara have undertaken multiple attempts to unify and centralize the areas of the country politically and socially in order to strengthen their control over society. The new state absorbed several feudal-tribal groupings and due to centralization the independence of these groups became restricted.87 In order to peacefully unite the different regions that were still functioning under primitive feudal tribes a strict form of religion was reinforced.88 This religion strongly focused on orthodoxy and refraining from innovations. As long as Saudi Arabia remained outside of the sphere of influence of Europe, modernization and capitalism, this was possible. However, it became increasingly difficult not to adapt to external influences which consisted of both technical means (such as radio, television, Internet, motor transport, electrical and military equipment) as well as organizational forms (ministries and departments, centralized army and education system)89 that were produced by European, modern and capitalist models. As the traditional way of collecting wealth, by raiding neighboring tribes, became unwanted and unsuccessful in the newly founded state90 an alternative source was necessary. At first the regular collection of zakat and the income from the hajj were the most important sources of revenue for the state. The tax-collectors, who gathered the zakat and hajj income, were now working for the umara and became state actors.91 In addition, a centralized army was formed where the emphasize was placed on defending the country from outside powers instead of raiding local tribes. Furthermore, the educational system was modernized by introducing secular

83 Ibid: p. 43 84 Ibid: p. 44-50 85 Ibid: p. 45-50 86 Ibid: p. 71 87 Vassiliev, A, (1998) The History of Saudi Arabia London: Saqi books: p. 287 88 Ibid: p. 287-288 89 Ibid: p. 288 90 Ibid: p. 303 91 Ibid: p. 306

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subjects, such as geography, technical drawing and foreign languages, in addition to religious subjects that were the main focus of education until that time.92 At the same time the first ministries were set up93 which facilitated the further bureaucratization of the state system. One of the major influencing factors was the discovery of oil and the subsequent oil concessions in the 1920s. Oil became the number one source of income for the Saudi State, especially after the ending of the Second World War. The umara now had large sums of income under their control that were unrelated to religion, in contrast to previous sources of income such as zakat and hajj. Consequently, they felt they had the means to influence the affairs of the country outside of the direct control and approval of the clergy. In the 1940s and 1950s most of the oil revenue was spend on domestic consumption and to enrich the members of the royal family.94 In 1950s, especially after the passing of king Ibn Saud, who towards the end of his life has difficulties tackling the problems facing the kingdom,95 the oil revenue took off and with it the modernization of the country’s political system. Saudi Arabia became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).96 Consequently, the country’s financial and economic policy underwent changes to accommodate the global system. In order to do this the king issued decrees in addition to the system of sharia legislation. With the increase in complexity of ruling the country and overseeing all decisions, the king delegated tasks to state agencies, institutions and individuals.97 From the 1950s, the state grew with new ministries, councils and institutions. This expansion of government institutions, accompanied by royal decrees, increased the jurisdiction of state structures over a larger number of social areas, also those previously under the jurisdiction of the ulama.98 The influence of the ulama also declined steadily as a result of the increase of general education of the population, the emergence of administrative state structures, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da’wa and Guidance, the increase in interaction between Saudis and foreigners and the introduction of modern media such as radio, television and

92 Ibid: p. 310 93 Ibid: p. 310-311 94 Ibid: p. 402 95 Ibid: p. 333 96 Ibid: p. 403 97 Ibid: p. 436 98 Al Yassini: p 67

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Internet. However, the ulama remained a religious force that the umara could not afford to ignore and so they remained in the dual cooperation.

3.3 Religious legitimation Of crucial importance to understand the relevance of the alliance between the royal family and the ulama in Saudi Arabia is the status of the country as the cradle of Islam. In addition, the country also holds within its borders the two holiest places in Islam, Mecca and Medina, and as a result the country is more than any other identified with Islam. The ruler of the country, the king, is considered, and presents himself, as the custodian of these sites (Khadim al-Haramayn, servant of the two shrines). Also, the ruler has the obligation to protect the annual hajj and the visiting pilgrims. Other relevant features of the country are that the population is 100% Muslim, as non-Muslims are not allowed to become permanent residents; that the majority of the population is Sunni, although a minority of Shia live in het Eastern part of the country, that the sharia is officially the law of the land and public life is dominated by the teachings of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya.99 This becomes visible in the green flag inscribed with the sword and the text: ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger’, used by Saudi Arabia. All these features contribute to the fact that the umara need religious justification in order to secure their position. Such a justification could have been obtained through lineage if the Saudi family would have been descendants of the prophet, his successors or helpers. Unfortunately for the family this is not the case. This is where the ulama, the religious scholars of Islam, come into the equation. They are the only ones who can provide the king and the royal family, the umara, with legitimacy and support needed to continue with the current situation. Ibn Saud was conscious of this fact since the beginning of his rule. He, from the beginning, focused on consolidating his power by working on this crucial relationship with the religious establishment. He ordered to have weekly meetings with the ulama in order to inform them and to get their advice regarding innovations.100 These innovations would come quickly, due to the discovery of oil and the oil concession in 1933 to the American company Standard Oil of California (SOCAL).101 With this concession and the arrival of American employees a great deal of innovations would arrive in Saudi Arabia. Considering the Islamic character of the country,

99 Vogel, F.E. (2000) Islamic law and Legal System. Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden: Brill: p. xv. 100 Al-Rasheed 2002: p. 90 101 Ibid: p. 91

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and the cooperation that is the basis for the rule of power, it was crucial that the ulama gave their support to the introduction of these innovations. When such innovations were planned to be introduced, the ulama were consulted and had leeway to alter the propositions. One example is the introduction of an income tax in 1960 where the ulama forced the umara to restrict it to foreigners.102 With the introduction of education for girls, the ulama negotiated to be responsible for the curriculum to remain their influence over the content of education (until this responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Education). Other innovations that were introduced with religious legitimation by the ulama are cars, television and Internet. The cooperation between the rulers and the ulama is of great influence on the daily life of the citizens of Saudi Arabia. The ideology of the Saudi religious class was and still is the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.103 This very conservative ideology holds distinctive features that separate it from other trends within the Islamic world. These distinctive features will be described in the section below.

3.4 Basic principles of Wahhabism Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab developed divergent theological ideas that at first made him an outcast and forced him to leave his home, but later provided him with a power base and great political influence. The historic background to his thinking consisted of two notions; first the perception that religion in Arabia had developed into the veneration of trees and tombs and other superstitions that were seen as shirk (idolatry) and bid‘a (innovation).104 Second, the political system in the eighteenth century implied that the ulama were depending for their position on the emir of the town they were living in, while the emir was in turn depending on public opinion and therefore limited by it in his choice to support a particular alim (religious scholar).105 This explains why al-Wahhab was expelled from one town, but later, when having won over public opinion, could team up with local chief Ibn Saud. Al-Wahhab’s main objective was to revive the observance of religion and therefore his actions can be characterized as a revivalist movement of which there have been numerous in Islamic history.106 His stance was that Islam was corrupted and that a return to the original

102 Vasseliev: p. 440 103 Ibid: p. 300 104 Hopwood, D. (1986)‘The Ideological Basis: Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Muslim Revivalism in Niblock, T (ed.). State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia New York: St. Martin’s press: p. 25 105 Ibid: p. 26 106 Ibid: p. 24

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orthodox version of Islam was necessary.107 One crucial fact in his thinking is the complete obedience and submission to God (‘ibada) which implies a rather rigid and unquestioning attitude towards those in power.108 Al-Wahhab’s reforms concentrated on the notions of tawhid (monotheism), tawassul (intercession), takfir (charge of unbelief), bid‘a (innovation), ijtihad (original legal opinion) and taqlid (blind imitation).109 Tawhid is a central theme that focuses on the restriction of worship to God alone as a result of his oneness. Consequently it is forbidden to rely on tawassul (intercession), intercession of trees, rocks and other objects, including the habit of ziyarat al- qubur, or the visitation of graves and erection of tombs. The purpose of visiting or praying at graves is to establish this intercession by asking favors of God via intermediators. The performance of activities that can be seen as interfering with the tawhid of God can lead to takfir. This is the doctrine that being Muslim alone is not a sufficient protection against becoming a polytheist. One must, in addition to refraining from tawassul also refrain from any kind of bid’a. Al-Wahhab considered all that was not prescribed by God bid’a and therefore forbidden. He rejected all forms of innovation that was not based on the Quran, the traditions (hadith) or the authority of the companions of the prophet. He rejected taqlid of interpretations of all madhhabs (school of Islamic jurisprudence) and instead favored ijtihad. He considered it necessary and obligatory to judge each religious question by consulting the Quran and hadiths instead of opinions of previous ulama.

3.5 Wahhabi thought on government As a result of the Islamic conviction that God’s law comprises every aspect of life, be it religion, social affairs, business, government etc., a separation between state and religion is not possible in an Islamic state.110 However, how to organize this state is not something that has been formulated in the Quran or the hadiths.111 As a consequence, it was up to the Muslims themselves to develop workable notions of statehood. In traditional Islamic thought the purpose of government in Islam is to preserve the sharia. The roots of this conviction can be found in history.

107 Ibid: p. 32 108 Ibid: p. 32 109 Al Yassini: p. 26-29 110 Ibid: p 5 111 Khan, Q. (1973) The political thought of Ibn Taymiyah. Islamabad: Islamic Research institute: p. 24.

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From 622 till his death, Muhammad was both the religious and political leader of the Islamic community, which was the ideal situation. After his death the governing of the community, due to the civil war and the disintegration of the lands of Islam, evolved into a situation where the position of the political leader was without the religious authority that the prophet had. Under Abbasid rule (750-1258), gradually a religious authority, a sort of clergy, the ulama, developed, with specialized religious functions. The ulama claimed to be the sole interpreters of the sharia, but without the religious authority ascribed to Muhammad.112 In order to meet the qualifications of an Islamic state, where there is no separation of state and religion, a collaboration between the political leader and the religious authority, in this case the ulama, is essential to meet most closely the ideal situation as it existed under Muhammad. What adds to the complexity is the absence of a head of the Islamic clergy, comparable with the pope, who formulates official religious law. The ruler can therefore take up collaboration with any religious scholar or group of scholars. The view of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was that obedience to the ruler is obligatory, in consonance with Ibn Taymiyya’s principle that religion and state should not be separated, as he ‘was convinced that Islamic duties (...) could not be fulfilled without state power’.113 In his argumentation the state is necessary in order to meet all the obligations of religion and is ‘a doctrinal as well as a practical necessity’.114 He goes even further by expressing the view that he would prefer the rule of a non-Muslim to disorder and that living one night of rule is better than sixty nights without rule.115 In this line of thought the ideal Islamic state is a cooperation of two holders of authority, namely the ulama, the religious authority, and the umara, the temporal rulers, the umara upholding the Islamic state and the ulama advising the ruler.116 It is important to note here is that according to Ibn Taymiyya the ulama do not constitute a separate clergy and do not enjoy privileges even though they occupy a high place in society; he rather claims that the people of authority are the ulama and the umara together and that the umara must rule with the advice and cooperation of the ulama.117 According to Ibn Taymiyya

112 Al Yassini: p. 9 113 Ibid 114 Khan, Q. (1973) The political thought of Ibn Taymiyah. Islamabad: Islamic Research institute institute: p. 32 115 Ibid: p. 38 116 Al Yassini: p. 30 117 Ibid: p. 137-138

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there exist two authorities that have to be followed according to their respective responsibility; the ulama in matters of worship and the umara in ‘matters of jihad, al-hudud, and similar acts…’.118 To summarize, the sharia is God’s law which is formulated by the independent ulama. While the umara’s main obligation is to protect and uphold the sharia, they are not allowed to interpret it or rule outside of it. However, how to protect the sharia and how to rule is not specified, which leaves much leeway to the ruler. In theory the umara and ulama are in an equal relationship where the umara can only rule within the sharia as interpreted by the ulama. In reality the religious authority became part of the state administration and most ulama still are closely aligned to states as a result of their posts of teachers, preachers, judges and administrators in service of state institutions.119 The balance of power is not always clear. This is also the case in Saudi Arabia where the ulama and umara work in close cooperation to maintain the political status quo but there is much debate as to the equality of the relationship (see Chapter Two). One of the tools the ulama have to influence the behavior of both the umara and the citizens of Saudi Arabia is ifta’ This tool is also handled by the independent ulama who, as a result of the growing dispersion of Internet, can spread their ideas easily. Consequently, they have become a growing influence in the relationship between the umara and the ulama in Saudi Arabia.

118 Ibid: p. 139 119 Hatina, M, (2009) ‘Introduction’ in Hatina, M. (ed.) Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: ‘Ulama’ in the Middle East. Leiden: Brill: p. 1 and Al Yassini: p. 9

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4. Ifta’ in the digital age

4.1 Traditional ifta’ Ifta’, the issuing of fatwas, has been part of the traditional role of the ulama since the beginning of Islamic history. This role of the ulama, more specifically of the mufti, is to interpret the holy texts of Islam, the Quran and the hadiths, in order to provide Muslims who are unfamiliar with the holy texts to live their lives according to their content.120 In Islam the sharia, the religious law stemming from these texts, is the most important guiding principle on how to live a righteous life. A fatwa represents an opinion, based on Islamic law, regarding an issue presented to a religious scholar by an individual. A fatwa, issued by a mufti, is a non-binding judgment, in contrast to a legal verdict made by a qadi, issued to clarify what according to the Islamic law is allowed or forbidden in a certain specific situation. A fatwa, issued to the concrete question of a Muslim to a real life human situation, is a practical implementation of the more theoretical aspects of Islamic law such as substantive law (furu ‘al-Fiqh) and legal methodology and jurisprudence (usul al-Fiqh).121 Ifta’ is embedded in rules. The mufti must be known for his piety and good conduct in addition to his knowledge. He must, when issuing fatwas, not be in a state of anger, hunger or any other state that can influence his opinion. The question must be formulated in a clear fashion, and in the case of a qadi asking, made in general terms. The mufti should also refrain from commenting outside of the scope of the question and if he does not know the answer should state this clearly.122 In the beginning of Islamic history, the issuing of fatwas was a private matter, done by muftis outside of state control123 but later on this changed. Fatwas started to acquire more importance over time, and the practice was supported by collecting fatwas and the development of them into a distinctive literary genre.124 Caliphs and sultans also noticed this and started to contract qualified muftis to serve in their government.125 Already during the rule of the

120 Masud, M.K, Messick, B. Powers, D.S. (1996) ‘Muftis, fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation’ in Masud, M.K, Messick, B. Powers, D.S.(eds) Islamic Legal Interpretation. Muftis and their fatwas. London: Harvard University Press: p. 8 121 Ibid: p. 4 122 Ibid: p. 20-26 123 Ibid: p. 3 124 Ibid: p.10 125 Ibid: p. 9

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Umayyads (661-750 CE) muftis served as legal consultants for qadis and issued fatwas on the request of governors.126 As religious scholars who are experts in Islamic theology and law, ulama are usually trained in established religious madrasas (schools) or universities. Their knowledge, piety and legal work gained them an important role in society as well as much respect and following.127 Ever since the ninth century the ulama have been a distinctive group within Islamic society whose main function has been the interpretation, promoting and passing on of religious knowledge.128 They even, as a special class, acquired religious authority comparable to that wielded by the prophet.129 Although there is no official clergy in Islam, in reality the ulama have developed into a sort of priesthood that holds the first right over religious knowledge130 following the increase of the importance of fatwas. Also, resulting from their positon as qadis and muftis, they bolstered and influenced the content of the law, religious convictions and social norms. As a result, they have always been one of the pillars of the social order.131 The umara were well aware of this influence and integrated the ulama in the state structures early on. Consequently the ulama gained a place of great influence and economic privileges.132 On the other hand were the ulama aware of their need for order to impose their vision on the world and for this they depended on the umara.133 This led them to grow out to be an elite group, that through self-reproduction formed a powerful corps, however not without being in a ‘very intimate dependency on their political patrons’.134 Since the early years of Islamic history, there has been ideological support of the ulama for the umara, for which in exchange the ulama gained a monopoly on ritual and social norms.135 Thus, the relationship between the two groups of actors consisted of a complex intermix of cooperation and dependency.

126 Ibid: p. 9 127 Moubile, N.(2014) The Clerics of Islam. Religious Authority and Political Power in Saudi Arabia. New Haven: Yale University Press: p. 1 128 Ibid: p. 2 129 Musad: p. 7-8, Moubile: p. 1-3 130 Moubile: p. 1-3 131 Hatina: p. 3 132 Ibid 133 Moubile: p. 3 134 Hatina: p. 3 135 Moubile: p. 3

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4.2 Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia In this light the relationship between the umara and the ulama of Saudi Arabia is not unique. The cooperative nature of their relationship is merely a result of centuries of Islamic history. Just as their predecessors, the Saudi ulama are trained in one of the many religious faculties that have been established over the years. And just as those before them the Saudi ulama have been incorporated into the state system and as a result grew out to be an elite group. To maintain their position they have attempted to gain the privilege to interpret Islamic law and issue fatwas. What distinguishes the Saudi situation from other Islamic countries is the significant amount of influence the ulama have on society more generally. Nowadays, the religious establishment in other Islamic counties has far less influence as a result of the process of codification of the law in these countries. During the colonial period this codification coincided with the decline of the standing of the ulama on both society and state affairs. This has not been the case in Saudi Arabia. As a result, the influence of the ulama on the law as well as on society and state affairs was and remains considerably larger in Saudi Arabia in comparison to other Islamic nations. Consequently, dar al-Ifta’ plays a significant role in Saudi society, more so than in other Islamic countries. Fatwas are the medium to formulate and communicate political, social and religious norms within Saudi Arabia and this medium is used by both state and non-state ulama.136 Fatwas are also very suitable to be used in order to adapt sharia law towards modern ideas and give practical solutions for modern times.137 Before 1953 the issuing of fatwas in Saudi Arabia took place informally.138 In 1953 the King of Saudi Arabia, king ‘Abd al- ‘Aziz Ibn Sa’ud (d. 1953) appointed Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim al Al Shaikh, as head of the dar al-Ifta’ and other religious agencies in an attempt to modernize the religious institutions.139 Shaikh Muhammad held these positions until his death in 1969. After the death of this charismatic mufti the then King Faysal did not appoint a successor. Rather he started restructuring the religious corps in response to the challenges posed by modernity.140 In 1971 he decreed the foundation of two religious institutions: The Board of Senior Ulama (Hay’at Kibar al-Ulama; BSU) and The Permanent Committee for Scientific

136 Al Atawneh, M. (2010) Islam facing the Challenges of Modernity. Dar al-Ifta in the modern Saudi State. Leiden: Brill:p. xiv 137 Ibid: p. xv-xvi 138 Ibid: p. xiii 139 Ibid: p. xiii 140 Ibid: p. xiv

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Research and Legal opinions (al-Lajna al-Da’ima lil-Buhuth al-‘Ilmiyya wal- Ifta’; CRLO).141 Since 1993, the Grand Mufti, first Ibn Baz until his death in 1999 and currently Shaikh ‘Abdul- Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad al Al Shaikh, heads both institutions. With this decision the king incorporated a large number of senior ulama, the agencies were made up of twenty-one members, into a state structure and reduced the independence of them significantly. The BSU’s duties are to issue legal opinions on matters raised by the umara and to give them a religious justification. In addition, they act as a board of advice for decrees issued by the king, in order to facilitate and legitimate them.142 This also works the other way around: BSU’s fatwas on khul‘ divorce, death penalty for drug smugglers and many other cases became state law after the approval of the king.143 The Grand Mufti is the head of the religious pyramid, with the Board of Senior Ulama directly under him. The legal status, the objectives, the formation and the name of the Board have been established by a royal decree in 1971. The CRLO is a subsection of this board. The activities and members of the CRLO are directed by the king. It is specified in Royal decree number 1/137, issued in 1971, that the members are to be appointed by the king.144 Their function, the decree noted, is ‘to express opinion based on the shari’ah regarding matters submitted to them by the wali al-amr, i.e., the king, to recommend policy on religious matters to guide the wali al-amr; and to issue fatwas to guide Muslims in the areas of aqida, ibadat, and mu’amalat’.145 The Committee publishes religious books on Wahhabism and distributes them. In addition, the Committee issues fatwas as answers to questions submitted to it by the king, government agencies, and individuals. However, the CRLO mostly concerns itself with the issuance of fatwas. It has already produced thousands of fatwas on various subjects, including rituals, marriage, culture, politics, medicine, theology, economics, sophisticated technology, food, inter-faith relations, family planning, Muslim minority sects, gender issues and even astronomy.146 Queries may be submitted either in person, by telephone or in writing and may be submitted not only by Saudis, but also by Muslims living in other countries. Answers are given directly to the questioner and

141 Al Atawned 2010: xiii-xiv 142 Ibid: p. 21 143 Ibid: p. 21 144 Al Yassini: p. 71 145 Al Yassini: p. 71 146 Al Atawned 2010: p. 25-26

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also published, in most cases, in het MBI (BSU’s quarterly journal) and in other periodicals, such as ‘al-Da’wa’ and ‘al-Muslimun’, or aired on the radio program ‘light on the way’ (Nur ala al- darb) and more recently, on the website.147 The CRLO meets on a regular basis to discuss queries and issue fatwas. Each fatwa is signed by at least three members and must be supported by a majority of the members as recorded in the royal decree.148 The CRLO is thus a committee that is part of the official state structure. The members of the Committee are working directly for the government as ulama. The Committee’s website is the newest medium used to publish and spread the fatwas and through the fatwas the socio- religious norms of the state ulama.

4.3 Contesting groups Up to now only the official ulama, incorporated into the Saudi state system have been discussed. Nowadays ifta’ has become a professional activity performed by thousands of ulama, both in the service of the umara and outside of it. This distinction is important. Both groups of ulama have been trained in the Wahhabi doctrine at one of the religious faculties that exist in the country. The difference is that the state ulama have found employment within the state’s institutions and bureaucracy and belong to the religious establishment. They have been successfully incorporated into the state structure and are therefore integrated into politics and international relations. The independent ulama do not work for or in close cooperation with the umara. This group of independent scholars have mainly adopted a more critical stand towards the state and take a confrontational position concerning religious and sociopolitical issues.149 These non-state ulama consist of multiple groups that in various ways contest the Saudi state. Some of them, the ‘Sahwis’ (the awakened), who were a prominent group in the early 1990s, have been successfully defused by a process of imprisonment and ‘rehabilitation’ by the Saudi state.150 In the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Saudi state has, in response to the violence in Saudi Arabia, successfully countered most of the radical non-state ulama.151 As a result, the non-state ulama have lost all ability to contest the umara in the political sense and have shifted to contest social changes.152 They do this by issuing fatwas that sometimes are even

147 Al Atawned 2010: p. 25-26 148 Ibid: p. 26 149 Hatina: p 1. 150 Al-Rasheed 2007: p. 81-83 151 Ibid 152 Ibid: p. 89

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more radical and conservative than those issued by the state ulama and publish them on their websites. The resistance of groups contesting the Saudi’s political dominance is a recurring event in the history of Saudi Arabia. Examples are the resistance of the Ikhwan in the 1920s, and radical Islamic groups in the 1970s (with the occupation of the Holy Mosque in Mecca as the peak of the movement), in the 1990s (in response to the arrival of foreign troops during the Gulf War) and again in 2003. What all these groups have in common is a claim that the Saudi government, the umara, is not the rightful regime for the land of Islam. The major issue is that the policies and politics of the umara are interpreted to be in serious conflict with the religious ideology propagated by the ulama and imposed on the people; what is contested is the ‘official Wahhabi religio-political discourse’.153 Simply put, the religious and social moral rules that are formulated by the religious establishment are not seen being implemented by the umara in either their politics or personal life. The claim by the umara to Islam as raison d’être for their governing is seriously questioned by these contesting groups and the ulama are being drawn into the debate due to their association with the umara. The state ulama have marginalized and excluded everybody from the political process and as a result the contesting groups have been created by the state ulama themselves.154 In addition, the many Islamic faculties built since the 1960s, where students could obtain degrees in Islamic knowledge, have increased the number of individuals with the knowledge and skill to substantially contest the state ulama.155 These Islamic contesting groups are critical of the exclusion of other members of society from political matters as propagated by the Wahhabi doctrine of total obedience to the political rulers.156 The Saudi state ulama have already made attempts to reduce the influence of competing groups and to concentrate power in the hands of the state ulama by limiting ijtihad to ‘qualified scholars’, and advocating taqlid for the rest.157 This is in clear contrast with the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya that every Muslim has the right to preform ijtihad independently. Another attempt to reduce the influence of non-state ulama was the announcement by King Abdullah in 2010 that

153 Ibid: p. 22-58 154 Ibid: p. 59 155 Ibid: p. 62-65 156 Ibid: p. 71-72 157 Al Atawneh, M. (2011) ‘Wahhabi legal theory as reflected in modern official Saudi Fatwas: Ijtihad, Taqlid, Sources and Methodology’ in Islamic Law and Society 327-355: p. 327

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fatwas are only allowed to be issued by ulama he has appointed.158 The participation of the state ulama online with their own website has to be seen in this light as well. Ever since the introduction of the Internet in Saudi a substantial part the practice of ifta’ has moved into the digital world.

4.4 Digital landscape The introduction of new media in Saudi Arabia was at first received with great suspicion by the ulama. The implementation of radio, television and Internet could only take place after endorsement by the ulama and only after they concluded it could be used for the dispersion of their own religious, educational and social ideas.159 Consequently, Internet is available in Saudi Arabia since 1999 although still heavily censored, especially for pornography and gambling and any other activities that could be in contrast to Saudi norms as interpreted by the government.160 The government wants to preserve its monopoly on information161 and started to set up websites to build a presence on the web. For example, in 1997 the websites www.alqimam.com, that published government announcements, www.mohe.gov.sa, the website for the Ministry of Higher Education, and www.islam.org.sa, for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Da’wa and Guidance were set up.162 Also, the Saudi opposition started to use the Internet and created websites and set up a presence. The first to make use of the availability and possibilities of the new medium was the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) located in London, already as early as 1994 (www.cdlr.net). After an internal dispute, out of this committee the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) was founded and in 1996 that organization also launched its own website from London (www.miraserve.com, www.islah.org).164 The Shi’a opposition also found their way to the Internet. One example is the website by the Haramayn Islamic Information Center (www.alharmain.org) located in Beirut. Currently, all these websites are no longer available, as their organizations were successfully indicated as terrorist organizations and dismantled by the Saudi umara after 2001.

158 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/08/12/116450.html 159 Al Atawned 2010:p. 119 160 Teitelbaum, J. (2002) ‘Dueling for “Da’wa”: State vs. Society on the Saudi Internet’ in Middle East Journal, vol 56, no 2, pp. 222-239: p.224 161 Ibid: p. 229 162 Ibid: p. 228 163 Ibid: p. 226 164 Ibid: p. 226

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Individual religious scholars also started to create personal websites and social media accounts. Especially many non-state ulama use social media to voice their opinions and contesting ideas. They make use of applications such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. A study by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies executed in 2012 declared the top three most followed ulama online165 to be Salman al-Odah (currently 9.090.000 followers on Twitter), Muhammad al-Arefe (15.200.00 followers on twitter) and Aidh al-Qarnee (13.300.000 followers on Twitter). These clerics, who do not work directly for the umara, are gaining influence through their online presence and have been able to do this by not provoking the umara directly.166 However, a more covert way of criticizing the umara, and by association the state ulama, is by issuing fatwas that are not in line with the umara and state ulama’s fatwas. These non-state ulama publish fatwas on their websites and social media accounts. One such fatwa website is www.fatwa-online.com, an English Saudi based website edited by Abu 'Abdullaah Mohammed Akhtar Chaudhry, who was trained in Arabic and Islamic law at the Islamic University of Medina. The website offers fatwas, biographies, texts on sects, creed and downloads. The website has news items with photos that are in circulation and change constantly. Is also has links to Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn and YouTube and other websites. It holds audio and video files containing various religious topics. Another Saudi based website is the site www.islamtoday.net that is available in Arabic, English, French and Chinese. It collects and presents fatwas and other religious texts from a wide range of Saudi ulama amongst them Salman al-Odah, Yusuf al-Qasim and Muhammad al-‘Arusi ‘Abd al-Qadir, but also state-ulama such as Board of Senior Ulama member Muhammand ibn Saalih al- ’Uthaymeen. In addition to fatwas, biographies, articles, advise and stories on various religious topics, it also offers news from around the world. All items on the website can be shared through social media. The dominant color of the website is blue and photos are part of the design. What is remarkable is that the websites does not offer a search option. The different parts of the website, including the extensive fatwa archive are not searchable and need to be browsed manually. Considering the lack of access to the official political process by non-state ulama and the limited possibilities for direct and open contest toward the umara, the fatwa websites have

165 Schanzer, J. and Miller, S. (2012) Facebook fatwa. Saudi Clerics, Wahhabi Islam and Social Media. Washington: Foundation for Defense of Democracies Press: p. 46-50 166 Ibid: p. 63

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become the place to participate in a religious, social and political debate.167 As a result, fatwas have become the concrete means to communicate ideas on religious and social norms for political purposes. As such the fatwa has become the avenue for both state and non-state ulama to negotiate the relationship between them, the state and society.168 Internet gives people and groups the possibility to present competing information. The digital world represents a new field where the state ulama have to compete with non-state ulama for the attention and acceptance of their ideas by society.169 Where, before the arrival of Internet and before that of television, the so desired monopoly by the state ulama on religious knowledge was a reality, it has now become a contested position. It has never been easier to search and find religious knowledge by going online, either directly by reading the holy sources themselves, or through numerous ulama who own their own websites. In addition, it has never been easier to communicate a contesting message to an interested audience. As a result, the decentralizating nature of the Internet has reduced the monopoly of the umara and the state ulama over information and presentation of the kingdom.170

167 Hearn, D. (1998) ‘Fatawa and Religious Discourse as an Avenue of Participation’ in The Arab Studies Journal, vol. 6/7, no 21, pp. 84-97: p. 84 168 Ibid: p. 84-95 169 Chawki, M. (2010) Islam in the Digital Age: Counselling and Fatwas at the Click of a Mouse’ in Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, vol 5, no 4, 165-180: p. 169. 170 Teitelbaum: p. 225

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5. Debate between state ulama, society and non-state ulama

Due to the growing influence of Internet and the presence of competing groups on the Internet, the state ulama needed to develop an online presence. So a website was developed for the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions. The Committee’s website, www.alifta.net, was launched in October 2007 and was initially only available in Arabic.171 At a later time the website was, for the most part, translated in English, French, Spanish, Indonesian, Turkish, Persian, Urdu and Chinese. The official motivation given by a member of the Committee for the launching of the website was the ‘quick access to fatwas on an official website’.172 One of the features of the website entails the possibility to ask questions and receive replies.173 The suspected motivation for the launching of the website was the ‘fatwa chaos’ that developed as a result of Saudi non-state ulama issuing fatwas that are not in line with the official religious establishment and as such spread confusion.174 The website can be interpreted as part of the Saudi umara and state ulama’s communication strategy in the debate that is taking place between state ulama, non-state ulama and society. Following Bunt’s methodology, first the results of the site observation will be discussed which entails a general and detailed description of the look and feel of the homepage, the search possibilities and the lay out. Secondly, the results of a thorough analysis of the content and comparison with the content of other websites, are presented using seven different social topics. On each of these seven topics the Committee has issued multiple fatwas. At the same time news articles and opinions pieces have been published in which a different implementation of these issues is presented. In addition, non-state ulama have, for most of the presented topics, also issued fatwas that are not always in line with the state ulama’s opinions.

5.1 Description of the website of the Permanent Committee The English version of the website is the point of reference; the description follows this version of the website.175 However, the most notable differences with the site’s alternative versions in different languages will not go unnoticed and will be discussed per topic, as some differences do exist.

171 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7032140.stm, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/10/07/40033.html 172 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/10/07/40033.html 173 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/10/07/40033.html 174 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7032140.stm 175 See picture title page

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The website is presented in green, the color of Islam. In addition, the website offers the possibility to change the colors to different shades of green, blue, grey and brown. Initially, the website is available in Arabic but can be altered into English, French, Spanish, Indonesian, Turkish, Persian, Urdu and Chinese. In the left corner (or right when in Arabic, Urdu and Persian) the name and logo of the Committee is clearly visible. The logo presents a mimbar (Islamic pulpit) situated below a roof of some kind. When clicking on this logo anywhere on the site it brings you back to the homepage. The homepage is divided into three parts. The top part consists of three lines. The top line has, from left to right, the logo on the left side with a link to the homepage, the possibility to add the site to your favorites and to change the color. The line below offers the different language options and the third horizontal line has buttons that give direct access to the different parts of the website which are ‘Fatwas of the Permanent Committee’, ‘The fatwas by Ibn Baz’ and ‘Browse’. When navigated to either three of the buttons a drop down menu appears that shows a range of possibilities to choose from. Both under ‘Fatwas of the Permanent Committee’ and under ‘The fatwas of Ibn Baz’ the options ‘Browse by volume’, ‘Browse by topic’, ‘Alphabetical lexicon’, ‘Contemporary fatwas’, ‘Indexes’ and ‘Browse by page number’ are given. Under ‘Browse’ you can choose ‘Topics’ and ‘Indexes’. These options are the same in all languages with the exception of Chinese that only has two options. Below this top horizontal part the website is divided into three columns. The middle column is the widest and the right and left column are of equal width. The right column is divided into three vertical parts. The top block holds two choices to click on: ‘Frequently read fatwas’ and ‘Fatwas on medical issues and the sick’. When choosing either of these buttons a list of fatwas is presented. The content of these lists does not alter, which would be expected considering that frequently read fatwas would alternate. The reliability of this list is therefore difficult to establish. The middle block has a search button in which a query can be directly entered. The lowest block shows two numbers indicating the number of online users and visitors. This column is not the same in all languages. In Arabic, for example, two more options are available in the top block. The first additional option gives access to the research journal and the second addition opens a page where multiple books can be downloaded from in PDF. Another notable difference exits between the French and the English versions on one side and the other six languages on the other side. The Spanish, Indonesian, Turkish, Persian, Urdu and

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Chinese versions have fewer options; here only the ‘Frequently read fatwas’ can be found, the other mentioned options do not exist. The other two blocks give the same information in all languages. The middle column on the homepage shows ten fatwas that are selected by the website operator to be the first fatwas to be seen. These ‘homepage fatwas’ change regularly and usually follow religious days when appropriate. In the month of Ramadan (June 2016), all the ‘homepage fatwas’ are related to Ramadan. In previous months, in April and May 2016, the fatwas were related to the corresponding Islamic months Rajab and Sha’ban. And during the month of Rabi’ al Awwal (December/January 2016) special attention was drawn to the Mawlid (prophet’s birthday). All the ‘homepage fatwas’ were related to the fact that in certain parts of the world this event is celebrated and the prohibition according to the Permanent Committee. The practice was ruled to be bid’a. In months where there were no religious related issues such as February and March 2016 (Jumada al Awwal and Jumada At-Thani) the ‘homepage fatwas’ were called miscellaneous fatwas and were indeed on a diverse range of topics such as running traffic lights, Internet cafes and hiring a maid. Here again there are differences between the different languages. The Arabic, English and French version of the website have the same ‘homepage fatwas’ and topics as described above. However, the other languages do not have Ramadan fatwas on the homepage during Ramadan but merely miscellaneous fatwas. These miscellaneous fatwas are the same on each of these six remaining language sites, but there is clearly a difference with the Arabic, English and French versions. The third and left column (right in the versions of Arabic, Urdu and Persian) is called the ‘main list’. Below are again three blocks vertically, of which only the top two are used. In the top block two topics are available to choose from; ‘Corner of the Grand Mufti’ and ‘Pillars of Islam’. When the ‘Corner of the Grand Mufti’ is selected a large selection of content written by the Grand Mufti can be found. These are digital versions of printed books, essays, fatwas and sermons (khutbah) by the current Grand Mufti Shaikh ‘Abdul-Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad al Al Shaikh. ‘Pillars of Islam’ gives access to multiple fatwas on the five pillars of Islam (‘Aqidah, Salah, Zakah, Sawm and Hajj). In the Arabic version more options are available such as ‘Fatwas on women’, ‘Fatwas on Ramadan’ and a link to submit a fatwa query. The English and French sites are the same, while the other six languages do not have these two links and the top block is empty.

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In the middle block four topics are mentioned; ‘Mailing list’, ‘Information chart’, ‘Profiles’ and ‘Site map’. For the mailing list you can subscribe by giving your email. The information chart gives possibilities to save favorite page addresses. The profiles section gives elaborate descriptions of all the members of the Committee both past and present, their life, work and death in case they are deceased. The sitemap gives a clear overview of the building blocks of the website. The Arabic version again has more options. Here you can select ‘New site’ and ‘Definitions’ and the possibility to give feedback. The English and French sites are similar in options, while the other six languages have fewer, only three instead of four, options. The website has a relatively simple design. What is remarkable when comparing it to the fatwa websites discussed earlier (www.fatwa-online.com and www.islamtoday.net) is that there are no pictures, no bright colors or leading headlines. Also, there are no advertisements or links to other websites. Moreover there are no links to social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Google+ etc. This is notable considering the design of fatwa websites of competing groups. The lay-out of the website is relatively outdated, in stark contrast to the two ‘competing’ websites that have more flashy features. Due to the fact that certain elements of the website are ‘under constriction’ and have been since the beginning of the research in December 2015, and surely before as well, and the fact that the fatwas to be selected under ‘Frequently read fatwas’ never change gives the impression that the upkeep of the website has been neglected somehow. The ‘homepage fatwas’ do alter on a weekly or monthly basis which shows that the website is maintained just no all the features of it. However, the large amount of fatwas and other texts and the existence of a huge amount of translated fatwas and texts show the great effort that was put into the initial foundation, installation and organization of the website. The initial website was in Arabic and some features, such as the filing of a question and getting a reply, exist still only in Arabic, however most features are available in the other languages as well. Especially the English and French versions of the website are extensively translated. The other six languages have fewer, but still elaborate features and possibilities. Clearly, the website also focusses on foreign Muslims who do not have Arabic as their mother tongue. The website offers the Committee the possibility to reach a much larger audience in comparison to their printed books and journals. Furthermore, it is striking that the different language versions of the website are not the same in their homepage. There is a clear divide between the Arabic, English and French editor and the other six languages.

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5.2 Navigating the fatwas The websites offers multiple ways to navigate the fatwas. All the fatwas have been organized or categorized either by volume or topic by the site’s operator. There is the possibility to browse the fatwas per index or search them using the search option. When the ordering by volume is chosen the original printed books in the hierarchy as it was put by the editor of the books can be read. When the topical search is used multiple fatwas on the same topic from different volumes and printed media can be found put together. When looking at the fatwas by the Committee the subject categories are: ‘Acts of worship’, ‘Transitions’, ‘Customs’, ‘Islamic etiquette’, ‘Usul-ul Fiqh (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence)’, ‘Creeds’, ‘Exegesis and the sciences of the Quran’, ‘The Hadith terminology’, ‘Sirah (prophet’s biography)’, ‘Sufism and Sufis’, ‘Rhetoric’ and ‘Islamic Da’wah and contemporary issues’. This is the same when the fatwas of Ibn Baz are selected. Most of the fatwas, although not all, have been given a number and via the sitemap it is possible to search for fatwas using this number. Each fatwa starts by presenting the question posed by the questioner. The questioner is always anonymous and it is never mentioned who he/she is or where the questioner is from unless the questioner mentions it in the query. The question is followed by an answer in which often texts from the Quran or hadiths are quoted in order to substantiate the answer. When such a text is used it is presented between brackets and in the color blue. Placing the mouse on the text will reveal the source of the quotation. Some fatwas are made up of more than one question. Each question is answered separately. While some fatwas consist of lengthy answers, others are completed with just a few lines. The fatwas are never accommodated with a date, however a very rough indication of time of issuing can be traced when looking at the names of the members of the Committee that collaborated to produce the fatwa. When a fatwa has been published in a book the page number is mentioned. Sometimes the fatwa occupies multiple pages. Other fatwas have footnotes that produce additional information. Each fatwa is concluded with the line: ‘May peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family, and Companions.’ At the bottom of the fatwa the members of the Committee involved in formulating and signing the fatwa are mentioned. The majority of the fatwas that can be found on the website are issued by the late Grand Mufti ibn Baz and his staff, while a minority is attributed to the present Grand Mufti.

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The topics discussed by these fatwas are very diverse and it is difficult to name them all here. Some examples are questions on offering the Tarawih (night prayer) at home during Ramadan, wearing clothes below the ankles, Allah’s foreknowledge of the past and the future, permissibility of practicing ijtihad, celebrating the Mawlid (birthday of the prophet), eating with disbelievers, the validity of salah, etc. The fatwas are concerned with either religious or social topics. Political topics are neither discussed nor mentioned. The navigating is not the most comfortable and easy going. It takes some looking around before the logic of the website and the layout becomes clear. The fatwas are to be located in different ways and in that way thousands of fatwas written and collected by the Committee over decades can be read. Because of this, the website provides a wealth of information on the convictions of the members of the Committee both past and present on social and religious topics. From these fatwas, as well as the other texts that are available on the site the ideology of the state ulama on these social and religious issues can be distilled. Most of the fatwas and other texts published have a religious and ritualistic context. The main aim is to communicate religious knowledge and to distribute this knowledge to an interested audience. However, more social related issues are also discussed. In this category mostly non-ritualistic fatwas are being answered that deal with topics such as the hiring of live-in housemaids, sports, insurance, financial products, medical interventions and others. In the area of these social issues a constant development can be witnessed in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia by following the discussion on websites, in the shoura council and the Saudi vision 2030.

5.3 Social issues under debate When investigating the content of the Committee’s website it becomes clear that the overwhelming majority of the published fatwas involve religious and ritualistic topics. However, a smaller but still considerable amount of the published fatwas contain questions and answers concerning social issues, that have religious connotations as they are based on religious texts, but are not directly related to religious traditions. These issues are also being discussed by non-state ulama and by other citizens of Saudi Arabia on various news websites. A number of these issues are presented here with the objective to shine light on a debate on these social issues that is taking place within Saudi society.

Boxing for both men and women

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One example of a social issue is boxing. Boxing as a sport is prohibited by the ulama of the Committee. This becomes clear when analyzing a small sample of fatwas regarding this topic. One such fatwa answers the short question of an Egyptian who wants to know the ruling of Islam on boxing, bullfighting and freestyle wrestling. The answer is that boxing and bullfighting are prohibited, while freestyle wrestling is allowed. For the exact motivation the Committee refers to a decree issued by the Islamic Fiqh Academy. In this decree, dated to 1987, the reason for not allowing boxing is that the fighters are hurting each other in such a way that it could lead to severe injuries.176 Also the audience will derive pleasure from these events which is also forbidden. Several texts are quoted in the answer such as surah Al-Basqarah 2:195‘...and do not throw yourselves into destruction’, 177 and surah Al-Nisa 4:29 ‘And do not kill yourselves (nor kill one another)’.178 179 A similar fatwa is included in volume 26 of the fatwas of Ibn Baz as fatwa number 16443. The question that is resolved comes from a young man from Algeria who works as a professional boxer and is informing if boxing is halal or haram. The answer is similar to the answer above; boxing is not permissible as it is dangerous.180 Also the same texts as above are quoted, in order to substantiate the answer.181 However, in a third fatwa, number 3323, the answer on a similar question is different: ‘A: Contests are only permissible when they can be sought for help in fighting Kuffar (disbelievers) like that of camels, horses, arrows, and the like of other fighting machines such as planes, tanks and submarines, whether they are held for prizes or not. Whereas if these games are not sought for help in wars like football, boxing and wrestling, it is impermissible to take part in them if the contests include prizes for winners’.182

176 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=421&PageNo=1&BookID=14 177 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=421&PageNo=1&BookID=14 178 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=421&PageNo=1&BookID=14 179 This fatwa was issued by the late Grand Mufti, ‘Abdul- ‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 180 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=10342&PageNo=1&BookID=7 181Six members of the Committee are mentioned as authors; Bakr Abu Zayd, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Al-Shaykh, member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee until 1999, since 1999 Grand Mufti and chairman of the Board and the Committee, Salih Al Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 182http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=&FatwaNumID=&ID=5605 &searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=exact&SearchMoesar=false&book ID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=allwords&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=0981111201051 10103#firstKeyWordFound

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From this response is becomes clear that boxing is prohibited, however the motivation differs. The prohibition is related to the fact that boxing is a game where the objective is not to train for protection in case of war but for entertainment and prizes.183 From the example given above, it can be concluded that the social norm communicated through the Committee’s fatwas is that boxing is a sport that is not in agreement with the sharia based on religious texts. Despite this clear prohibition by the state ulama boxing is a sport that is openly practiced in Saudi Arabia. On March 8th 2016 the Saudi Gazette published an interview with Halah al Hamrami, a Saudi citizen who, as a woman, works as a kickboxing and boxing trainer in Jeddah.184 Not without ignoring the social stigma still on women and sports, the interview focusses on the empowerment of women through sports emphasizing the possibilities of sports for women rather than the limitations posed on them by the conservative society. Also interesting to see is the amount of attention the passing of Mohammad Ali on June 4th 2016 received. Multiple articles were published on the websites of the Saudi Gazette and Arab News on the life and death of this Muslim boxer.185 Furthermore, the AIBA world boxing championship 2015, that was held in Qatar in October 2015, also received enough attention in the Saudi press. Multiple articles were published on this topic,186 whereby the emphasis was on the greatness of the event without any sign of criticism on either the dangerous elements of boxing or the prizewinning nature of the game. The prohibition of boxing is thus not by everybody accepted as the only rightful interpretation of Islamic law. The social norm presented is not generally recognized and acknowledged as the activity of boxing both as a sport and a prizewinning event is openly discussed by at least a part of Saudi society.

Swimming for women

183 The two authors of the fatwa are ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify, deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 184 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/international-womens-day/empowering-women-fight-like-girl-boxing-fitness/ 185 http://www.arabnews.com/node/934506/sports, http://saudigazette.com.sa/opinion/goodbye-muhammad-ali/ etc. 186 http://saudigazette.com.sa/sports/cubans-dominate-semis-at-boxing-worlds-in-doha/, http://www.arabnews.com/sports/news/823581

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From the Committee’s perspective it is not allowed for women to swim with other women. A fatwa,187 unnumbered, deals with this topic. The query is on swimming courses for women offered by summer centers where; ‘the officials … do not pay any attention to women's swimwear, which reveals their `Awrah (parts of the body that must be covered in public) in front of each another’.188 So the question is; are women allowed to swim and to learn how to swim wearing these immodest clothes? Note that these swimming pools are already gender segregated. The answer is no, not in these swimming pools. The restriction for swimming concentrates on the prohibition of not showing the ‘awrah, even to other women. If the woman would do the swimming at home, it would be no problem, but doing it where other women can see her is not allowed. In this fatwa a justification in the form of texts is given:189 ‘It was related by Imam Muslim that Abu Sa`id Al-Khudry reported on the authority of his father (may Allah be pleased with them both) that the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: A man should not look at another man's `Awrah and a woman should not look at another woman's `Awrah190 It was also reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said to `Aly (may Allah be pleased with him): Do not uncover your thigh, and do not look at the thigh of a living or dead person.’191

But the prohibition is taken further by not allowing any swimming pools for women. This can be distilled when analyzing fatwa number 13667 that concerns itself with the building of a swimming pool in a health center. The questioner is an engineer working for the municipality of Mecca and he is dealing with a request from a citizen to build a health center with separate male and female sections. In the female section a pool is planned. The questioner is asking the following: Q: ‘As we know there are parts of women's bodies that should be properly covered in front of other women. We told the owner of the project that he should not build this swimming pool as a means of blocking what may lead to the unlawful. It is quite possible - especially in our time - that a person who does not fear Allah- even a woman- may film women stealthily whether by still photo cameras or video cameras which are common in our time. This is a great temptation which will make this center a place for evil and temptation rather than a health center. As we know, all that leads to committing the unlawful is itself unlawful. After we explained this to the owner of the project, he asked for a Fatwa from Your Honor that confirms the unlawfulness of building this swimming pool for women. I hope Your Honor will explain the ruling of Shari`ah on this matter.

187 The fatwa is not dated but it is written by Shaikh ‘Abdul-Aziz ibn ‘Abdulah al- Al Shaikh alone, the Grand Mufti, president of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1999 and can therefore be dated after 1999. 188 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=49&PageNo=1&BookID=15 189 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=49&PageNo=1&BookID=15 190 Related by Muslim no 512, Ahmad no 11173 and Al-Tirmidly 2717 191 Related by Abu Dawud no 2732, Ibn Majah no 1449

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It should be noted that the project is still in the designing phase and not yet completed. May Allah reward you.’192

The denied citizen is thus asking for a fatwa and therefore the Committee is approached. The answer of the Committee is short and clear: ‘It is not permissible to build a swimming pool for women in this center, because preventing evils has priority over bringing benefits’.193 194 Unfortunately there is no explanation and no substantiation given with a reverence to an Islamic text, which makes the exact reason why it is not allowed hard to trace. The Committee might agree with the explanation given by the questioner but the questioner also does not elaborate on which statement or written text from the Quran of hadith his opinion is based. The Committee, and thus the state ulama, has chosen to forbid public swimming pools to be used by women to prevent an evil from happening where they could have chosen to allow it under the condition that certain swimwear is worn. This is the opinion of Sheikh `Abd Allah b. Muhammad al-Tayyâr, professor at al-Qasîm University, in his fatwa on www.islamtoday.net. In response to the question whether it is allowed for a group of women to engage in activities such as swimming, jogging, bicycle riding and other, he answers: A:‘It is permissible for a woman to engage in any such sporting activities with the permission of her guardian as long as those activities are of benefit to her and do not involve her in any of the following: 1. exposing her body to non-mahram men 2. near-nudity among other women 3. free mixing with men 4. physical harm to herself If these conditions are met, then there is nothing wrong with her engaging in sporting activities similar to the practice related about the Prophet (peace be upon him) that he engaged in footraces with `A’ishah.’195

192http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=10383&PageNo=1&BookID=7 193 Ibid. 194 The fatwa is produced by ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify, deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul- ‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 195 http://en.islamtoday.net/quesshow-11-645.htm

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So according to this non-state alim the activities can take place under certain conditions, they are not outright forbidden, which is a less strict interpretation and implementation of the same idea, namely not showing the ‘awrah to other women. In Saudi society others also have a less restricted implementation of the same idea. From analyzing the website of the Saudi Gazette is becomes clear that swimming pools are available and swimming by women is done. For example, the Ministry of Education is starting a program for schoolkids to provide swimming lessons although on a voluntary basis.196 In addition, hotels in Riyadh offer Ramadan celebrations in which the pool is part of the arrangement.197 And even more interesting is, that on June 14 2016 the Saudi Mariam Saleh Binladen set a new record by swimming 101 miles of the source of the River Thames.198 She not only swam in public, albeit, in an all covering bathing suit, but also after finishing proudly held the Saudi flag high above her head. In Saudi society there exist various ideas on the social norm of showing ones ‘awrah to other women and how to avoid this from happening, and as a result the ideas on swimming for women in public are diverse and do not necessary follow the Committee’s interpretation. No restriction has been placed on the presentation of these deviant ideas as the umara have not attempted to restrict or ban the publication of this fatwa or news articles.

Cred it cards The situation is similar when looking at the use of credit cards. Numerous fatwas and other texts can be found on the Committee’s website on various financial products. The use of credit cards is being discussed in fatwa number 17611.199 Here the questioner inquires on the permissibility of the use of a visa card called Samba issued by the Saudi-American bank. He refers to the fact that the use of such a card is spreading and explains that when a customer uses the card and does not pay the amount due within 54 days additional costs are charged. The answer to this inquiry is

196 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/schools-reviving-swimming-lessons/ 197 http://saudigazette.com.sa/business/special-ramadan-movenpick-hotel-riyadh/ 198 http://saudigazette.com.sa/world/europe/saudi-dentist-becomes-first-woman-complete-101-mile-thames-river-swim/; http://saudigazette.com.sa/world/europe/saudi-dentist-becomes-first-woman-complete-101-mile-thames-river-swim/ 199 This fatwa was issued and signed by five members of the Committee; Bakr Abu Zayd, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Al-Shaykh, member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee until 1999, since 1999 Grand Mufti and chairman of the Board and the Committee, Salih Al Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999.

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that this card is a new form of riba (usury) and therefore haram.200 It is referred to as ‘Riba of Jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic time of ignorance)’201 which is prohibited by sharia law. So the use of credit cards is connected directly to riba. A similar answer is given to the question in fatwa 3675202 in which the American Credit Card system is explained: ‘If the matter is as you have mentioned, the extra amount which the company takes is a form of Riba (Usury). It is not permissible for it to take this amount because Riba is Haram (prohibited) according to the Qur'an, the Sunnah and consensus. If this contract does not bear interest, then it is a guarantee contract, which is one of the contracts of Irfaq (things which contain lenience of providing utilities to others). If it bears interest when the payment is delayed, then it is not permissible because of what has been stated previously. It is not permissible to pay 30 dollars per year in return for this participation because this is a form of lease in return for a guarantee.’203

This fatwa also relates the use of credit cards to riba that includes any kind of extra costs related to loaning money. The same answer befalls the fatwas 5832204 and 7425205 amongst others, which are all issued under the auspice of the late Grand Mufti Ibn Baz. All four fatwas give the same response to credit cards, namely that they are harmful and involve riba and the use of them is forbidden under all circumstances. There are other opinions within Saudi Arabia. Shaikh `Abd al-Wahhâb al-Turayrî, a former professor and Shaikh at the al-Iman University of Riyadh, on www.islamtoday.com gives a slightly different answer. His response to a similar question on the use of a credit card is that the interest charged on the use of a credit card is unlawful, however when a credit card is

200 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=5037&PageNo=1&BookID=7 201 ibid 202 The fatwa is signed by four members of the Committee; ‘ Abdullah ibn Qa’ ud, member of the Board and the Committee until his death in 2005, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 203http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=true&FatwaNumID=3675& ID=5034&searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=EXACT&SearchMoesar =false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=AnyWord&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=#f irstKeyWordFound 204http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=true&FatwaNumID=5832& ID=5035&searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=EXACT&SearchMoesar =false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=AnyWord&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=#f irstKeyWordFound 205http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=true&FatwaNumID=7425& ID=5036&searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=EXACT&SearchMoesar =false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=AnyWord&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=#f irstKeyWordFound

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necessary to be used it is allowed when it is paying interest is avoided.206 Here thus again an answer is given that has a less strict interpretation of a prohibiting, in this case riba. One can use a credit card as long as riba is avoided, in contrast to the state ulama that forbid the use of a credit card altogether. Despite the strong connecting made by the ulama between credit cards and riba, the use of credit cards is a widespread practice within Saudi Arabia. As a result, credit cards are reported on and not to highlight the illegal use of them. For example, the Saudi Gazette offered an overview on the height of consumption loans in Saudi Arabia that increased with 4,5% in comparison to 2014.207 Also Arab News has multiple news articles of which an article on prize changes208 is just one example. What can be concluded is that despite the prohibition by the state ulama working for the Committee, this financial product is common place in Saudi Arabia. Also, at least one non-state alim has a different opinion, connecting the use to the responsibility of the user to avoid having to pay the interest. A similar situation arises with insurance.

Insurance Also on the topic of insurance many fatwas can be found on the website. For example, in fatwa number 2233 someone asks about a ruling on taking insurance on items such as cars, workers, goods and factories. The answer that is given is that: ‘The type of insurance mentioned in the question, known as commercial insurance, is unlawful because it involves Gharar sale (fraudulent transaction where details about the sold item are unknown or uncertain) and Jahalah sale (sale with lack of knowledge), which are not pardoned.’209 The answer mentions commercial insurance through the payment of a fee, in contrast to Islamic insurance which is based on cooperation. Here the Committee connects insurance to gharar and jahahlah, two important concepts in Islamic law.210

206 http://en.islamtoday.net/quesshow-31-865.htm 207 http://saudigazette.com.sa/business/saudi-consumer-credit-card-loans-at-sr337b-in-15/ 208 http://www.arabnews.com/prize-chance-samba-credit-card-users 209http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaSubjects.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&HajjEntryID=0&HajjEntryName=&RamadanE ntryID=0&RamadanEntryName=&NodeID=4705&PageID=5640&SectionID=7&SubjectPageTitlesID=5693&MarkIndex=5&0# Istherulingoninsurance,suchas 210 This fatwa is given by the members of the Committee ‘Abdullah ibn Qa’ud, member of the Board and the Committee until his death in 2005, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify, deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999.

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The same argument is used in fatwa 21238211 concerning health insurance. The system asked about is said to be a form of commercial health insurance, where a monthly fee is payed for services only provided when needed. The answer given by the Committee is clear: ‘The health insurance mentioned in your Fatwa request is one form of commercial insurance which is legally prohibited since it involves fraudulence, gambling and using people's money unjustly’.212 In another fatwa, fatwa 2759213, the question is on the money that is received from the insurance company after having an accident. The answer is that money received from the insurance company can be kept until the amount the person paid to the insurance company. 214 From the answers given by the Committee is becomes clear that commercial insurance is prohibited in all circumstances and that it should be avoided at all times. Sheikh Sa`ûd al-Funaysân, former professor at al-Imâm University, disagrees. In a fatwa, published on www.islamtoday.com, responding to a question about benefiting from health insurance when no Islamic alternative is available his response is: ‘At present, insurance companies are commonplace, many of them offering health insurance. It may be that having such insurance is a necessity for a man and the members of his household. Unfortunately, most of these insurance companies do not comply with Islamic Law in their mode of operation. When dealing with such companies is a matter of necessity or obligation, there will be no problem in doing so. However, when doing so is merely a matter of personal preference, it is my opinion is that the policyholder should never draw from the policy more than he has paid into it, even if his medical expenses exceed that amount’.215

From this answer can be deduced that although he is not an advocate of commercial health insurance his interpretation is less strict in comparison to the ulama of the Committee in cases where no alternative is available.

211 The fatwa is signed by Bakr Abu Zayd, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, Salih Al- Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and ‘ Abdul -‘ Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah Al Al-Shaikh, the Grand Mufti, chairman of the Board and the Committee since 1999. 212 http://alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=14540&PageNo=1&BookID=7 213 This fatwas was written and published under the auspice of Ibn Baz by ‘ Abdullah ibn Qa’ ud, member of the Board and the Committee until his death in 2005, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul- Razzaq ‘Afify deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 214http://alifta.org/Fatawa/fatawacoeval.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&HajjEntryID=0&HajjEntryName=&RamadanEntr yID=0&RamadanEntryName=&NodeID=4705&PageID=5641&SectionID=7&SubjectPageTitlesID=5694&MarkIndex=6&0#W hatistherulingoncarinsurance 215 http://en.islamtoday.net/node/621

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Meanwhile insurance is widely available in Saudi Arabia despite the clear condemnation of these commercial activities by the state ulama. On the website of the Saudi Gazette an article, which is more of an advertisement, was published on the 10% discount Tawuniya Insurance offers on annual travel insurances.216 Tawuniya Insurance Company explains on its website that they were founded in 1986 and were the first licensed insurance company in Saudi Arabia.217 Further, according to their own website they initiated a sharia committee in 2007 to make sure that all their activities comply with sharia law. This is interesting because they would not necessary need to do that. Their activities were unregulated but condoned until 2003. Since then they are legal in Saudi Arabia after the Royal decree Royal Decree No. M/32 of 3/9/2003, known as Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC), came into effect.218 Insurance companies are even openly mocked by cartoons published on the website of the Saudi Gazette. One of them shows a fat man with insurance written on his thobe running away while throwing banana peels in front of a man that shouts “Hey Wait. I’m not that old”.219 The cartoon implies that wealthy insurance companies will do anything to avoid giving insurance to people who will (too) soon claim on their insurance. However, this does not change anything about the tensions that exist between the convictions of the ulama and the umara on the permissibility of insurance. When Prince Sultan bin Abdullah in 2000, on behave of the state, inquired on a form of insurance he received a somewhat interesting reply. The question220 is about an insurance taken by foreigners driving trucks, to transport goods, into Saudi Arabia. When these drivers cause an accident they are taken to prison which leads them to lose their income and as a result they cannot pay the damages or blood money that they owe as a result of the accident. Therefore the state is asking for a system of insurance whereby the foreign truck drivers are forced to have assurance before entering the country, so that they can pay for damages and blood money when needed. The answer the prince received stated that ‘what has been mentioned in the question is considered as one form of prohibited commercial insurance, so it is not permissible to be ratified or

216 http://saudigazette.com.sa/business/tawuniya-offers-10-cut-annual-travel-insurance/ 217 https://www.tawuniya.com.sa/en/about-us/about-tawuniya 218 Marar, A. (2004) ‘Saudi Arabia: the duality of the legal system and he challenge of adapting to law to market economies’, Arab law Quarterly, vol 19(1), 91-124: p.120-121. 219 http://saudigazette.com.sa/cartoons/sa-cartoons/hey-wait-im-not-old-insurance/ 220http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=true&FatwaNumID=21563 &ID=14537&searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=EXACT&SearchMoe sar=false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=AnyWord&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword =#firstKeyWordFound

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applied.’221 222 The request is thus denied. What is also important is that the initial request was made to the Board of Senior Ulama, that usually handles questions by the umara and produces political fatwas, and then redirected towards the Committee that only issues personal fatwas. Clearly this was a way to avoid giving a negative political fatwa, framing it as a personal fatwa reduced the loss of face for the Prince. So despite the effort by Prince Sultan on behalf of the umara to get a favorable fatwa from the ulama, insurances are still illegal according to the sharia and the ulama. Nonetheless they are legal in Saudi Arabia. This is possible because the umara, at first, started to decree multiple royal decrees to handle disputes originating form financial services.223 Then in 2003, the umara introduced the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies to make the practices of insurance legal in Saudi Arabia. A new formed committee is now responsible for resolving disputes.224 The official intention of the law was to Islamize the insurance practices and make them compatible with sharia law.225 However, in reality the method of the insurance sector has not altered, therefore with this law the Saudi government legalized the insurance sector without the approval of the ulama, bypassing them completely.

Riba banks A fifth social issue on debate here is the use of services of riba banks. An unnumbered fatwa inquired whether depositing money in banks with or without receiving a profit is unlawful and if borrowing from banks and paying a profit for that loan for the sake of trade or consumption is lawful.’ The answer is: ‘Depositing money in banks and the like and putting this deposit under request or receiving it at a defined period in the future with a profit in return for depositing it is prohibited. Moreover, depositing money without getting profits in banks that deal in Riba (usury/interest) is also prohibited because, by doing so, you support them in dealing with Riba and help them in expanding their activities in this regard.’226 227

221 Ibid 222 The fatwa is signed by Bakr Abu Zayd, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, Salih Al- Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and ‘ Abdul -‘ Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah Al Al-Shaikh, the Grand Mufti, chairman of the Board and the Committee since 1999. 223 Marar: p. 120 224 Ibid: p. 121 225 Ibid 226http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaSubjects.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&HajjEntryID=0&HajjEntryName=&RamadanE ntryID=0&RamadanEntryName=&NodeID=4714&PageID=4870&SectionID=7&SubjectPageTitlesID=4924&MarkIndex=11&0 #Depositingmoneyinbankswith

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In a different fatwa working in banks is asked about. In this fatwa number 2608 the Committee answered: ‘It is not permissible for a Muslim to work in a bank that deals with Riba, even if the job that they are appointed to do is not related to the Riba-based dealings. This is because they would be assisting those who work with Riba and cooperating with them. Allah (Exalted be He) says: ...but do not help one another in sin and transgression (Quran Surah Al-Ma’idah 5:2).’228 229

And in a similar light the holding of stock in riba banks, such as the Saudi American Bank, is also forbidden by the Committee as can be read in fatwa 3134.230 231 To conclude all dealings with riba banks are forbidden by the Committee based on the Islamic notion of riba. On www.islamtoday.net slightly different opinions can be found. On the question if it is permissible to keep a bank account, Shaikh `Abd al-Wahhâb al-Turayrî, a former professor and Shaikh at the al-Iman University of Riyadh, answers that it is allowed when no Islamic bank can be found as long as one does not benefit from interest. In addition, he explains that any received interest should be given away to charity or to a needy person.232 Another fatwa answers the question whether it is allowed to work at such a bank when not directly involved with transactions. The answer provided by Shaikh Sâmî al-Mâjid, professor at al-Iman University of Riyadh, says that the money earned by people working at the bank directly involved with riba transactions is unlawful. However this is different for those not directly involved with the dealings of the bank, their job is sinful as they are helping others committing unlawful acts, but

227 This fatwa is given by ‘ Abdullah ibn Mani’, member of the Committee since 1957, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999 228 alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=5475&PageNo=1&BookID=7 229 The fatwa was signed by ‘Abdullah ibn Qa’ud, member of the Board and the Committee until his death in 2005, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify, deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 230http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=true&FatwaNumID=3134& ID=5024&searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=EXACT&SearchMoesar =false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=AnyWord&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=#f irstKeyWordFound 231 The fatwa was signed by ‘Abdullah ibn Qa’ud, member of the Board and the Committee until his death in 2005, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify, deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 232 http://en.islamtoday.net/quesshow-31-1048.htm

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the money earned is lawful, as the job itself is lawful.233 The differences with the fatwas posed by the Committee are small but still can be relevant to an individual. Again the non-state ulama give a less strict interpretation. However, despite the very clear rejection of any financial activities that include riba by the state ulama, both state and non-state commercial or riba banks are legal in Saudi Arabia. They have been legal since the Banking Control Law was introduced in 1966. This law provides a legal basis for commercial banking within the Saudi legal system.234 Furthermore, in 1987 the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes was erected to deal with conflicts related to loans, as the sharia courts refused to hear them claiming that the charging of interest made the loan unlawful.235 The law even states that it is forbidden for sharia courts to hear any cases on banking issues except when there is permission of the Minister of Justice.236 Hereby the ulama and the sharia courts have been successfully overruled in all matters relating to banking and financing. This was necessary in order to have a modern banking system at all, since sharia law forbids most of the activities of modern banks. In this field the umara have successfully circumvented the ulama as well. As banking has been legal for so long, there is no scruples to discuss this topic openly. Arab News reports on the issuing of bonus shares to stakeholders in order to raise funds by the Saudi American Bank in January 2015.237 Further, it also publishes the net profit made by the Saudi American Bank, known as Samba, every quarter.

Housemaids A different social issue is the hiring of a live-in housemaid. On the website of the Committee multiple fatwas can be found discussing the hiring of female maids to assist with housework and taking care of children. Fatwa number 12640 starts with the question of a man asking if it would be permissible for his wife, a teacher and a mother of six children, to hire a housemaid to help her to make life easier. The answer is:

‘If the situation is as you mentioned, we advise you not to hire a maid. Your wife should stay at home to bring up her children, fulfill her duties towards you, and look after her home. It is not

233 http://en.islamtoday.net/node/1860 234 Marar: p. 113 235 Ibid: p.114-115 236 Ibid: p.114 237 http://www.arabnews.com/economy/news/695621

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necessary for her to work if she has to do all that you have mentioned in your question. May Allah set right the conditions of all of us. May peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family, and Companions.’238 239

There is no substantiation given to this answer in the form of a text from the Quran of hadith, but the text suggest that the reason for this answer is that a woman and mother should stay home to take care of her family when there is no need for her to work outside of the home. A distinct opinion is presented at www.islamtoday.net by Sheikh `Abd al-Rahmân al-`Ajlân, lecturer at the Grand Mosque in Mecca. He says that a woman has a right to a housemaid when this is determined by custom; ‘if the wife is the type of woman who would typically have a maidservant according to the prevailing customs, then she will be entitled to one’.240 In opposition to the Committee’s fatwa that a wife should stay at home and do the housework, this alim mentions the right to a maid by (some) women. Both fatwas concern themselves with a similar situation; nonetheless different social norms are communicated. When discussing the question of live-in housemaids other related issues are also relevant, such as contact with a non-Muslim and the mixing of men and women. In fatwa number 11031 these issues are being addressed. The questioner inquires whether it is permissible to hire a Muslim or non-Muslim maid who does not cover her face and hands? ‘Q. Is it permissible to hire a Muslim or a non-Muslim maid that does not cover her face and hands? Is it permissible for the father and his children to look at or talk with her?’241

The answer is: ‘A: It is not permissible to hire non-Muslim servants in the Arabian Peninsula but if they are Muslims, there is nothing wrong with that when a Mahram (spouse or permanently unmarriageable relative) accompanies them. It is impermissible for a father and his children to look at the maidservant's face and hands. And, it is permissible for them to talk to her about their needs, but they should lower their gaze and she must wear Hijab (veil) and not have Khulwah (being alone with a member of the opposite sex). May Allah grant us success. May Allah's Peace and Blessings be upon Prophet Muhammad, his family and Companions.’242 243

238 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?languagename=en&BookID=7&View=Page&PageNo=1&PageID=5351 239 The fatwa has been given by three members of the Committee; ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzag ‘Afify, deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971 and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 240 http://en.islamtoday.net/node/1761 241http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=true&FatwaNumID=11031 &ID=5349&searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=EXACT&SearchMoesa r=false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=AnyWord&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=# firstKeyWordFound 242 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?languagename=en&BookID=7&View=Page&PageNo=1&PageID=5349

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In this short statement a couple of important issues are being mentioned, which are non-Muslims in Saudi Arabia, the mahram, or absence of and the risk of khulwah. The concern with non- Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the absence of a mahram is further discussed in fatwa number 16249. In this fatwa244 the owner of a hiring company that used to bring maids from outside of Saudi Arabia to the country is asking whether it is allowed to bring Muslim or non-Muslim maids without mahram into the country. The answer is similar to the previous fatwa 11031, although a bit harsher in tone concerning the non-Muslim identity of these maids. It says that ‘bringing disbelievers to the Arabian Peninsula and bringing women whether Muslims or non- Muslims without mahram is prohibited. Doing so causes harm to Muslims and exposes the entire community to many dangers. Therefore, it is not permissible.’245 No texts are given to justify this part of the answer. Added is that the money that was made from these activities is unlawful and the questioner should repent to Allah. This part is substantiated with the text: ‘And whosoever fears Allâh and keeps his duty to Him, He will make a way for him to get out (from every difficulty). And He will provide him from (sources) he never could imagine. And whosoever puts his trust in Allâh, then He will suffice him.’246 (Surah Al-Talaq 65:2-3). All three fatwas were written under the supervision of the former Grand Mufti Ibn Baz and his team and can be dated prior the death of Ibn Baz in 1999. In total three different reasons have been given why a live-in housemaid is not allowed according to the Committee, which makes it clear that such a practice is condemned by the state ulama. Despite that, the hiring of live-in housemaids is a common practice in Saudi Arabia. On the website of the Saudi Gazette many articles can be found with stories related to this topic, both positive and negative. On May 22nd 2016 an article was posted informing that the Ministry

243 The fatwa was giving and signed by Abdul-Razzag ‘Afify, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. 244 The answer was provided by five members of the Committee; Bakr Abu Zayd, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, Salih Al-Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama, ‘Abdul-Razzaq ‘Afify, deputy chairman of the Committee and member of the Board of Senior Ulama since 1971, and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Baz, chairman of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1971 till his death in 1999. Two of the men were also responsible for the previous two discussed fatwas on the same topic. 245http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaSubjects.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&HajjEntryID=0&HajjEntryName=&RamadanE ntryID=0&RamadanEntryName=&NodeID=4704&PageID=5353&SectionID=7&SubjectPageTitlesID=5407&MarkIndex=4&0# BringingdisbelieverstotheArabianPeninsula 246http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaSubjects.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&HajjEntryID=0&HajjEntryName=&RamadanE ntryID=0&RamadanEntryName=&NodeID=4704&PageID=5353&SectionID=7&SubjectPageTitlesID=5407&MarkIndex=4&0 +-+BringingdisbelieverstotheArabianPeninsula

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of Labor and Social Development of Saudi Arabia announced that the recruitment of Indonesian housemaids would take a maximum of one month after the issuing of a visa resulting from the signing of a contract with the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration. This action was taken in response to the growing demand of housemaids in Saudi Arabia.247 The mentioned contact also contains arrangements to improve the situation of domestic workers by making it possible to take action by either side when problems arise and the provisions of insurance, the right to fly home in case of emergency and to inform the Indonesian government when an Indonesian housemaid is arrested or imprisoned. An additional requirement is that the companies that recruit housemaids should be licensed.248 This in response to multiple articles and opinion pieces that have drawn attention to the bad treatment of maids within Saudi Arabia249 and the thriving black market due to the high demand for housemaids in the country.250 The countries mentioned where the maids are recruited from are Indonesia, Niger, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Somalia. These countries have dominant groups of Muslims living within their borders. Other countries of origin are Nepal,251 Cambodia252 and the Philippines,253 all non-Muslim countries, rather Hindu (Nepal), Buddhist (Cambodia) and Christian (Philippines). In addition, these housemaids are almost never accompanied by a mahram and always are in live-in housemaids, living with the family. The social norm that a Muslim woman should not go around without a mahram and the prohibition of the mixing of men and women that are not related is difficult to maintain when having a live-in housemaid, yet there is such a demand for housemaids that a thriving black market has developed. The issues concerning mahram and mixing are part of a larger debate within Saudi society concerning gender mixing and the place of women within society.

Women driving cars Women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive cars as a result of the fatwa issued in 1990 by the then Grand Mufti Abdul-Aziz bin Baz. He says that driving a car by a woman:

247 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/recruitment-market-faces-fresh-challenges/ 248 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/30-days-recruitment-indonesian-domestic-workers/ 249 http://saudigazette.com.sa/opinion/local-viewpoint/saudis-mistreat-domestic-workers/; http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi- arabia/over-60-domestic-workers-run-away-from-sponsors/; 250 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/thriving-black-market-maids/; http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/housemaids- black-market-booms/ 251 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/agreement-with-cambodia-wont-solve-shortage-of-domestic-helps/ 252 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/agreement-with-cambodia-wont-solve-shortage-of-domestic-helps/ 253 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/oct/24/the-vanished-filipino-domestic-workers-working-abroad

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‘…entails unlawful Khulwah (being alone with a member of the opposite sex), unveiling the face, careless and free intermixing (of men and women), and committing adultery which is the main reason for the prohibition of these practices. Allah’s Sacred Shari’ah (law) forbids all means leading to unlawful actions and makes them Haram (prohibited) in themselves.’ 254

The Grand Mufti says that these situations will create fitna which is why women must abstain from it. As substantiation he quotes multiple texts from the Quran such as surah Al Ahzab 33:33 which says: ‘And stay in your houses, and do not display yourselves like that of the times of ignorance, and perform As-Salât (Iqamât-as-Salât), and give Zakât and obey Allâh and His Messenger’255 and ‘O Prophet! Tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to draw cloaks (veils) all over their bodies (i.e. screen themselves completely except the eyes or one eye to see the way). That will be better, that they should be known (as free respectable women) so as not to be annoyed’ from surah Al Ahzab 33:59. In this fatwa clearly Islamic rules are used to motivate the ban. An interesting opposing opinion in this respect is Sheikh `Abd al-Wahhâb al-Turayrî’s answer in a fatwa on www.islamtoday.net that the ban on driving cars for women in Saudi Arabia is not based on Islamic law but is the result of the Islamic principle sadd al-dharâ’i` (preventing the means to evil or harm) that gives the government the opportunity to enact laws such as this ban.256 He thus claims that this ban is a matter of government rather than of Islamic law. Because of the ban families, who can afford it, hire male drivers to make it possible for women to get to work or study, which results in women being alone with these non-related males in a car. In fatwa 20395257 it is clearly stated that traveling without a mahram is forbidden; ‘It is not permissible for a Muslim woman to travel without a Mahram (spouse or permanently unmarriageable relative)’.258 In a different fatwa (17455) 259 is stated that traveling with a non-

254 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=218&PageNo=1&BookID=14 255 http://alifta.org/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=218&PageNo=1&BookID=14 256 http://en.islamtoday.net/node/587 257 The fatwa is signed by Bakr Abu Zayd, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, Salih Al- Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and ‘Abdul -‘ Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah Al Al-Shaikh, the Grand Mufti, chairman of the Board and the Committee since 1999. 258http://alifta.org/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=en&lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=&FatwaNumID=&ID=6571 &searchScope=7&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=exact&SearchMoesar=false&book ID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=allwords&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=1090971081010 32100114105118101114#firstKeyWordFound 259 The fatwa is signed by Bakr Abu Zayd, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, Salih Al- Fawzan, a member of the Board of Senior Ulama and the Committee since 1991, ‘Abdullah ibn Ghudayyan, member of the

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mahram is not allowed because this is khulwah which is prohibited.260 From these fatwas can be concluded that riding in a car with a non-mahram driver is not permitted. This assumption is substantiated by the fatwa of Board of Senior Ulama member Muhammand ibn Saalih al- ’Uthaymeen on www.fatwa-online.com. In the fatwa, ‘alone in the car with the driver’, can be read that travelling in the car with other women and the driver is allowed, on the condition that the driver is trustworthy, however, driving in the car alone with the driver is not.261 So, in addition to not being able to drive themselves, women are also not allowed to be in a car alone with a male driver. The prohibition to drive cars and the prohibition to be alone in a car with a male driver causes many complications for women in Saudi Arabia. In addition to the protest by some brave Saudi women against the driving ban that leads to imprisonment,262 these issues are also openly discussed on the website of the Saudi Gazette. Khadija Muhammad writes in her opinion piece ‘An endless circle of suffering’ on the issues with having to pay for a driver to be taken to work, that costs of having a driver taken up half of the salary and the dependency on the driver for getting around.263 Another opinion piece, ‘Seven steps to women driving’ written by Shahir Al- Nahari contains a plan to make society ready for female drivers by invoking an anti-harassment law and setting up awareness campaigns to promote the idea that women have the humanitarian right to drive.264 In Samar Mogren’s piece ‘Shoura & women driving’ the efforts of two female shoura members are being discussed in changing the Traffic Law which makes driving impossible for women.265 At this moment the fatwa that claims that women driving cars is a danger to society is being enforced by the Saudi government; women who drive are being arrested and taken to prison. A solution is hiring a male driver, but in addition to this creating khulwah, it is also expensive. Despite the enforcement of this driving ban, it is possible to openly debate the ban on the two English Saudi websites. In addition, two shoura members are bringing the topic into the

Committee and Board of Senior Ulama and ‘Abdul -‘ Aziz ibn ‘Abdullah Al Al-Shaikh, the Grand Mufti, chairman of the Board and the Committee since 1999. 260 http://alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=6558&PageNo=1&BookID=7 261 http://www.fatwa-online.com/alone-in-the-car-with-her-driver/ 262 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/13/Saudi-women-drivers-Hathloul-and-Alamoudi-released- AFP.html 263 http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/endless-cycle-suffering/ 264 http://saudigazette.com.sa/opinion/local-viewpoint/seven-steps-women-driving/ 265 http://saudigazette.com.sa/opinion/local-viewpoint/shoura-women-driving/

58 political domain, which shows the difference of opinion without Saudi society on the permissibility of female driving. From the social issues, ranging from sports to driving cars, discussed in this chapter it becomes clear that the state ulama do not have absolute power over the social domain in contrast to what has been argued. Rather, a debate emerges where state ulama’s fatwas are merely the starting point. Multiple actors respond to these fatwas by writing articles, opinion pieces or fatwas. Non-state ulama and citizens are taking part in this debate that mostly takes place online, in the digital world. This debate holds important implications to the political cooperation between the umara and the state ulama as it alters the power balance.

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6. Conclusion

Many scholars have discussed the cooperation between the umara and the ulama as the foundation of the political system of Saudi Arabia. In this debate the focus point was put on the power distribution between the two partners in the political domain, where the ulama formulate the sharia on political, religious and social issues and the umara have the responsibility and the power to rule and implement these laws and regulations. In this debate, Al Atawneh sees the partnership as a perfect balance where both parties have equal influence and power. Kechichian and Korany also ascribe the ulama the power to formulate the sharia in the domains of politics, religion and society. On the other hand, Al Yassini and Bligh have argued that the ulama have lost most of their direct power in the political field although they may still have influence, they do however argue that the ulama are dominant in the social and religious spheres. Al Rasheed claims that the ulama have no political power at all, which resulted in making the state in effect a secular state. In exchange they have been given complete power over the social and religious spheres of society, dominating Saudi society with Wahhabi ideas. Despite their various opinions, all these scholars agree that the social domain, in addition to the religious domain, always has been and still is dominated by the ulama. When looking at the situation in Saudi Arabia it is relevant to know that, more so than in other Islamic countries, the ulama use fatwas to communicate political ideas, religious knowledge and social norms and therefore these fatwas are the medium to investigate when considering Saudi Arabia. The institutions responsible, the BSU and CRLO, issue political, religious and social fatwas. However, their social norms stemming from their fatwas on social issues are not the only opinions on these matters. It would have been expected that had the ulama been given complete power over the social domain that their ideas would have been enforced and would have been the only social norm available. Yet, after having compared the content of the Committee’s fatwas, as published on their website, with the content of news websites and other fatwa websites it is becomes clear that the reality is more complex than the simple division promoted by the scholars mentioned earlier. Not all social norms, drafted by the state ulama and communicated through their fatwas, are accepted and observed without question. On the contrary, social issues are frequently debated on news websites and on these sites the ideas on these issues have taken a course away from the official ulama position. Issues as various as sports, such as boxing and swimming, financial products and insurance, the hiring of a

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housemaid as well as the position of woman as housewives and driving cars all are openly discussed online. The ulama’s influence on these online debates is very limited and restricted to their website. Further, the umara, who have the power to impose the ulama’s fatwas, do not intervene in these debates despite the fact that these news article and opinion pieces openly criticize the current social situation on these aspects. And taking into account that the Saudi Gazette and Arab News, as any other Saudi news outlet, do not offer critical independent journalism, as it has to function under strict Saudi state control, it writes and publishes what it is allowed to publish on what is allowed to happen. Therefore it can be concluded that the umara are tolerating an alternative view to that of the ulama they employ. Also, non-state ulama have the possibility to publish fatwas online that are not always in line with the opinion of the BSU or the CRLO. Despite attempts by the umara to restrict their freedom, they have taken the possibilities the Internet has to offer to spread their contesting ideas, as they lack access to the political process. The umara and the state ulama see these fatwas as a treat to their hegemony. However their attempts to fight these developments have not resulted in a satisfactory answer. One of these steps has been the creation of the website of the Committee which has been under investigation here (www.alifta.net). It was developed to set up an online presence that would offer institutionalized fatwas and information for the Saudi population and beyond. However, the current state of the website shows a lack of knowledge and skill on how to design and maintain a website that can compete with other, more sophisticated, websites. The website has a simple and somewhat outdated design and lacks connection to social media; as opposed to other fatwa websites that deploy all the possibilities software to build websites has to offer to reach an audience. The amount of information on it is large and forms a foundation yet to be met by other sites and has great potential. However, at this time the only activity is the renewal of the ‘homepage fatwa’ each month. In this way the websites cannot offer sufficient opposing force in the ‘battle of the fatwas’. That the website did not achieve what it was intended for becomes visibly by the royal decree that was issued three years after its launch, in August 2010, restricting the issuing of fatwas to members of the Senior Council of Ulama.266 The Permanent Committee was specifically mentioned by the king as the place to go for scholars and fatwas that are

266 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/08/12/116450.html

61 authorized.267 The restricting of issuing fatwas to the state ulama is a clear attempt to increase control of the independent groups and merely another step in the process started at the beginning of the Saudi state to incorporate religion and the religious scholars into the state bureaucracy. When looking at the possibilities of the Internet, it becomes clear that in the digital age the practice and landscape of ifta’ has fundamentally altered. The number of online participants has grown and easy access to information has been facilitated by the Internet, resulting in the state ulama’s loss of their monopoly on religious knowledge within Saudi society. The ‘battle of the fawas’ is a battle of legitimacy of religious knowledge and social norms as much as political legitimacy. The Internet is the front line on which this battle is fought. Therefore, in order to understand the changes both socially and politically in Saudi Arabia the Internet is an essential source for scholarly research. The loss of influence and power of the ulama on the social and political system is the result of a process that has started centuries ago. On financial issues, the ulama have been, since the 1960s, ignored by the umara and have been bypassed as the umara started to issue royal decrees to make an, according to Islamic law, illegal practice legal. This non-sharia legislation has marginalized the ulama and limited their influence. However, that does not imply that all the activities of the Committee, as well as the Board of Senior Ulama, have been pushed to comply with the umara’s actions. As shown in this thesis the fatwas of the Committee are not always in line with the umara’s ideas on financial products. Thus the ulama do not alter their religious convictions and ideas on social norms to fit with the wished of the umara. Nonetheless, their influence over the social process has been limited to stalling and delaying the inevitably. They even have assisted in giving religious legitimacy to non-sharia legislation by applying the concept of siyasa shar’iyya. The Saudi ulama have, over time, lost their traditional role of sole interpreters of Islamic law and the issuing of fatwas. As a result their monopoly on social norms has decreased in addition to their already limited influence in the political field. This thesis has shown that the ulama have lost power to enforce their ideas in the social domain. In Ibn Taymiyya’s division of power the ulama draft the sharia while the umara uphold it. But not all the ulama’s fatwas and social ideas are upheld and enforced. This shows the limited influence and power the ulama have over the umara. The loss of power in this sphere indicates a further reduced power base in the

267 Ibid.

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political domain as well, where the balance between the ulama and umara already was in favor of the umara. The ulama’s role as one of the pillars of the social order has been further limited by the umara, as the fewer influence the ulama have, the more power the umara gain. By slowly but surely diminishing the dependency on the ulama for religious legitimation, the umara are attempting to take and remain the upper hand in the political partnership.

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