Saudi Arabia

Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -7325 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Web: www.csis.org/burke The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War Saudi Arabia Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al -Rodhan Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Visiting Fellow [email protected] [email protected] Working Draft for Review and Comments Revised: June 28, 2006 Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Saudi Arabia 6/28/0 6 Page 2 Introduction Saudi Arabia has the largest oil reserves in the world, the largest oil production capacity, and one of the largest gas reserves in the world. However, the importance of Saudi Arabia is goes beyond oil . Saudi Arabia dominates the Souther n Gulf, and the security of the smaller Southern Gulf states is in many ways dependent on the security Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the location of the two holiest places in Islam and the Center of the Pilgrimage. In an era where Islamist extremism and te rrorism struggle against modernization and social change for the soul of Islam, Saudi stability and progress affect the future of the entire Islamic world . Saudi Arabia also has important strategic geography. It is the biggest country in the Gulf and one of the largest in the Middle East, shown in Map 1. It has a total of 1,960,582 square kilometers compared to Iran’s 1,648,000 square kilometers, and Iraq’s 437,072 square kilometers. Saudi Arabia has borders with every country in the Gulf, except Iran: Iraq 814 kilometers, Kuwait 222 kilometers, Oman 676 kilometers, Qatar 60 kilometers, UAE 457 kilometers, Yemen 1,458 kilometers, and Jordan 744 kilometers. 1 Strategically, the Kingdom also has a coastline of 2,640 kilometers with access to the two most impo rtant sea lanes in the Middle East: 1,840 kilometers on the Red Sea and 700 k ilometers on the Gulf . Extensive coastlines on Gulf and Red Sea provide Saudi Arabia great leverage on shipping of international trade (especially oil and gas) as well as military ships through the Suez Canal , the Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el -Mandeb. The Saudi armed forces dominate the strength of Southern Gulf and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces. This makes Saudi military capabilities critical to the security of some 60% of the world’s oil reserves and over 35% of its gas. It also makes the balance of power in the Gulf a balance of the forces that Saudi Arabia and the GCC states can deploy the force of Iran, and the power projection forces available from the United States and Britain. In summary, the Kingdom’s strategic importance stems from the following factors: • A leader in the Islamic and Arab world: The Kingdom is the custodian of the two most important shrines in Islam, Mecca and Madinah. Compounded with the Kingdom’s oil wealth, Saudi’s leadership in the Muslim and Arab world has played a moderating player between Islam and the West. It is a member of important “organizations” that set the tone for regional policies and attitudes including the Arab League, the Organizatio n of Islamic Conference, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). • The largest oil reserves in the world: Regardless of whether Saudi Arabia has 25% of the world’s known reserves (260 billion barrels), Sa udi Arabia will still dominate much of the world supply. Most oil producing countries use the same methodology to calculate reserves. In broad terms, the uncertainties affecting Saudi resources affect all other major producers, particularly in the MENA reg ion. • The largest oil producer in the world: Saudi Arabia has produced 12.5% of world total production for the last decade, and has been the only oil producer that has consistently sought to maintain surplus oil production. In addition, the Kingdom still se ems to have approximately 1.5 -2.0 million barrels per day of spare capacity. It claims to be “easily capable” of producing 15 million barrels per day in the next 15 years. • An influential member of OPEC: Saudi Arabia continues to play a central role in the decisions of OPEC. Due to its immense reserves and influence over the other member states, especially the Gulf countries, the Kingdom has its weight with the organization and the ability to change production hikes or cuts. 2006 © All Rights and Copyrights are reserves to the authors. This is a chapter of a rough draft of a book that will be published by Praeger in the fall of 2006. No further attribution, quotation, or further circulation of this text should be made without the written permission of the authors. Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Saudi Arabia 6/28/0 6 Page 3 • Central to Gulf Security: Saudi Arabia has the largest and most modern military and internal security apparatuses in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia continues to play an important role in the stability of the other GCC states and in securing oil facilities from asymmetric attacks from extremists or conventional or WMD attacks from Iran. With close coordination with the U.S. military, the Kingdom has been able to ensure security in the Gulf and secure oil and gas trading lanes. In addition, the Kingdom has played a moderating role between other Gul f States and has insured Bahrain’s stability for the past several decades. Map 1: Saudi Arabia Source: CIA, 2003, available at http://ww w.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/saudi_arabia_pol_2003.jpg Saudi Strategic Dynamics Like the other Southern Gulf countries, Saudi Arab has both benefited from the strategic shield provided by the US and British presence in the Gulf, and like its neighbors it has had to deal cope the political and military backlash from some American and British actions. Saudi Arabia has always been too large, however, to face a serious threat from any other Southern Gulf states. While tensions remain will several fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia has seemingly resolved all of its significant border disputes, and its political tensions with 2006 © All Rights and Copyrights are reserves to the authors. This is a chapter of a rough draft of a book that will be published by Praeger in the fall of 2006. No further attribution, quotation, or further circulation of this text should be made without the written permission of the authors. Cordesman & Al -Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Saudi Arabia 6/28/0 6 Page 4 Qatar and the UAE do not present a risk of war. It does not face a threat from the southern Red Sea states, or from Syria and Jordan. Israel only poses a threat if it feels Saudi Arabia is likely to intervene massively in some future Arab -Israeli conflict, or is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could threaten Israel. For all of its rhetoric, I srael does not see Saudi Arabia as a significant threat or plan to fight it. Saudi forces must, however, deal the major uncertainties in its strategic position caused by the insurgency in Iraq and its uncertain political and military future. It must also w ith two potential regional threats -- Iran and Yemen. Iran is acquiring long -range missiles and may become a nuclear power. Yemen is a weak military power, but its political instability, poverty, large population, insecure borders, and constant illegal Yem eni emigration into Saudi Arabia mean that Saudi Arabia cannot ignore the risk of some Yemeni internal conflict affecting Saudi Arabia or that a new Yemeni regime might pose a future threat. Yemen has also been the source of most of the Al Qai’da in the Pe ninsula infiltration of terrorists, arms, and explosives into Saudi Arabia. Arab Saudi Arabia must also deploy forces to cover its borders with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, and defend both its Gulf and Red Sea Coasts. This means Saudi Arabia’s regular military services must defend a territory roughly the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi. The mix of potential threats Saudi Arabia faces also means that Saudi Arabia cannot concentrate its forces to meet a single threat and must normally disperse its forces over much of the Kingdom. At the same time, the Kingdom’s primary active threat comes from internal and external Islamist extremists and not from regular armies, navies, and air forces the Saudi Arabia. It has always had problems with religious extremist s fanatics that deviate from its accepted Wahhabi practices, but the rise of neo -Salafi extremism and Al Qa’ida have create a transnational threat that calls for the destruction of the Saudi Kingdom , new and far more extreme versions of Puritanism, and Sau di territory to be the core of a new theocracy or “Caliphate.” The attacks by Al Qa’ida in the Peninsula that began in May 2003 have been limited in scale, and there is little evidence such movements have any serious following, but they have been threate ning enough to force Saudi Arabia to shift some of its military forces to anti -terrorism missions, and greatly strengthen the capability of its Ministry of Interior to fighting the threat from Al Qa’ida and independent extremist groups. It national guard, police, intelligence services, and facility protection forces have all had to develop new counterterrorism capabilities, and prepare for the threat of low -level counterinsurgency warfare . These security dynamics are complicated by several factors.

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