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Snap Elections in Moldova: What Is at Stake?

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Snap Elections in Moldova: What Is at Stake? Snap elections in Moldova: what is at stake? Marylia Hushcha Moldovans will go to polling stations on July 11 to vote in the snap parliamentary elections. It is hoped that the elections will end the prolonged political crisis that has mired the country for months, if not years. The stakes are high and, as it has been put by the country’s former Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu, the outcome of the vote will ‘signal either a multi-generational move toward greater liberty or continued corruption and state capture.1’ Preceding events The current political crisis started at the end of last year, eventually leading to the snap elections in July. The presidential elections last November brought victory to reform-oriented Maia Sandu. Sandu is a relatively new political figure in Moldova. She had previously served as a high-level World Bank official and headed the Education Ministry in Moldova between 2012-2015. She formed her own party in 2016 and from June until November 2019 headed an uneasy coalition of the pro-Russian Socialist party and her own pro-European ACUM bloc. The cooperation of the two resulted in ousting of the government controlled by Moldova’s oligarch Vladimir Plachotniuc. The coalition of Socialists and ACUM broke down over the nomination of prosecutor general – a crucial step for Sandu’s attempts of fighting corruption. A year after the fall of her coalition government, Sandu won the presidential elections by a landslide against the former incumbent - Igor Dodon who is now chairing the party of Socialists. Last December, just a day before Sandu officially took office, the country’s prime minister Ion Chicu – former advisor of Dodon – resigned from his post – a few hours before he was set to face a non-confidence vote in the parliament2. While the Prime minister’s resignation made the job of the incoming president uneasy from the start, it also presented an opportunity for Sandu who eventually managed to call for snap elections. Chicu’s government was aligned with Dodon and would not have supported Sandu’s reform efforts. It is hoped that in the snap elections reformist parties will be able to build a strong coalition and thus shape a qualitatively different government in Moldova. Competing parties Moldova’s politicians have been traditionally perceived – and they also largely used this clash to their own advantage - through geopolitical lens and were characterized as either pro-Russian or pro- Western/pro-European. Igor Dodon fell in the former category – as did many previous governments (even if some of them were pro-Western in name). This election will go along the same old divides. Major competitors are the Pro-Russian Communist party of Vladimir Voronin and Dodon’s Socialists on one hand, and pro-European Action and Solidarity (PAS) – founded by Sandu and currently headed by Igor Grosu – on the other. However, geopolitics is not that central to the debate as it used to be. Sandu and PAS are clearly representing a pro-European track in word and in action. They nevertheless manage to attract traditional pro-Russian politicians’ electorate as well, as their political agenda puts emphasis on 1 https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/06/30/corruption-and-connectivity-stake-moldovas-elections 2 https://emerging-europe.com/news/moldovas-pm-resigns/ domestic reforms – desired by citizens of all political colors – and not geopolitical orientation. Secondly, as in the presidential elections in 2020, European diaspora is set to play a crucial role. Last November Moldovans living abroad spent hours queuing in front of Moldovan embassies to to be able to cast their ballot in the presidential elections. Majority of their votes went for Sandu, helping her to win in a landslide. The diaspora – a major contributor to Moldova’s GDP through remittances – is expected to show up to elections in big numbers again. What is at stake for Moldova? Reforms have virtually become a buzz-word surrounding this election campaign. And for good reasons. Moldova is in an urgent need of them. As one of the poorest countries in Europe, with almost 13% of its population living on less than $5.50 a day in 20183 - Moldova has struggled through the pandemic. The emergency has exposed the inadequacies of the health sector. Same has been known about the education system. Corruption is widespread in universities and the quality of education requires improvement. Furthermore, Moldova is facing mass emigration, with a quarter of its 2.6 million population living abroad4. One of the major causes of mass emigration is pervasive corruption that causes unemployment and hinders the country’s economic development, depriving younger generations of opportunities at home. Moldova loses about EUR 500 million due to corruption each year – an equivalent of 5% of its GDP5. The country became notorious worldwide for the money laundering schemes carried out in the 2010s when anywhere between $20 and $80 billion coming from Russia had been laundered through Moldovan banks6. Up until 2019, Moldova was virtually controlled by a single man – Vladimir Plachotniuc who largely owned the media scene in the country, influenced political leaders, including the then President Dodon, the parliament (he was the chair of the ruling Democratic Party of Moldova, PDM) and Prime Minister. Plachotniuc has also been involved in the billion-dollar fraud scandal in 20147. While his ousting in 2019 was a major advancement, state capture and lack of rule of law remain. Experts agree that lack of political will represents the major impediment to Moldova’s development and reform process. Nepotism and corruption pervade the society on all levels and through all institutions. The ‘right’ projects and initiatives often get stuck due to their poor implementation. A case in point was the implementation of MTender - an EBRD-sponsored digital procurement system aimed at ensuring transparency in public tendering. It is argued that delays and inadequacies in its implementation were due to unwillingness of public administration officials to make this system work8. Considering the scale of the problem, Maia Sandu’s principled position on corruption is admirable. In June she launched an independent body to investigate grand corruption in the country.9 However, resistance to her efforts will also be stark, as replacements of corrupt individuals in the public sector and other institutions are necessary but would be strongly resisted10. A framework for reforms? 3 https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/MDA/moldova/poverty-rate 4 https://www.md.undp.org/content/moldova/en/home/blog/2018/making-the-most-of-emigration.html 5 https://www.hertie-school.org/en/digital-governance/research/blog/detail/content/eprocurement-and-the- fight-against-corruption-in-moldova 6 https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/22/moldova-vladimir-plahotniuc-failed-revolution-not-over-yet/ 7 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-plahotniuc-crime-idUSKBN22U27T 8 https://www.hertie-school.org/en/digital-governance/research/blog/detail/content/eprocurement-and-the- fight-against-corruption-in-moldova 9 https://www.euronews.com/2021/06/08/president-of-moldova-maia-sandu-launches-committee-to- investigate-grand-corruption 10 https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/06/30/corruption-and-connectivity-stake-moldovas-elections Sandu’s efforts have already been paying off. Moldova is strongly dependent on foreign financial assistance and the serious reform track could secure more loans and assistance packages for the country. In May, Sandu managed to secure 600 million Euro recovery package from the EU11. The reform program is largely based on the Association Agreement concluded with the EU and Sandu declared its implementation as her priority. The Association Agreement (AA) aims to bring Moldova’s institutions and legal system closer to European standards. Concluded in 2014, some progress on AA’s implementation has been made, but many major reforms are still lacking. On the positive side, the EU has become the major trading partner for Moldova, with 70% of exports accounting for EU and benefitting especially the agri-food production sector and 50% of imports12. Cooperation in foreign and security policy has also been strengthened, with Moldova aligning itself with approximately 70% of the EU’s CFSP decisions.13 Nevertheless, provisions concerning the rule of law and independence of the justice sector remained largely untapped. Geopolitics and conflicts The ability of political leaders to balance among major foreign players will to a large extent determine the track of the internal political process. Moldova is a post-Soviet multiethnic country with a Romanian majority and significant portion of Russians, Ukrainians, and a Turkic language speaking Gagauz population living on its territory. It has thus been a country where interests of the EU, US and Russia oftentimes clashed. Part of its territory – Transnistrian region – is not controlled by the government in Chisinau but supported by Russia. An armed conflict between the region populated by ethnic Russians and Moldovan state erupted in 1992. A ceasefire was negotiated after several months of fighting and the conflict remained frozen ever since, with the negotiation process under the auspices of the OSCE being unsuccessful so far. Moldova is officially a neutral country which however does not prevent the stationing of the Russian troops on the territory of Transnistrian region. These realities divide Moldovan public but for the time being they seem to be less acute. The ousting of Plachotniuc in 2019 as a result of cooperation of pro-Russian Socialists and pro-European ACUM was supported by foreign players as well, including the EU, US and Russia. Consensus on Moldova by major geopolitical actors might have strengthened Sandu’s position on all fronts. It remains to be seen how long she will be able to benefit from it. Sandu promised to establish a pragmatic dialogue with all the countries, including Russia and the ‘West’, as well as to mend bilateral relations with Moldova’s two only neighbors: Romania and Ukraine14.
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