A Newsletter from Negotiation Harvard Business School Publishing and the Program on Negotiation Decision-Making and Communication Strategies That Deliver Results at Harvard Law School ARTICLE REPRINT NO. N0404D First, Empathize with Your Adversary BY SUSAN HACKLEY Related Material Here are some other products you might find useful: The Long, Hard Road to Peace Negotiation (Business Fundamentals Series) Susan Hackley Herminia Ibarra, Deborah M. Kolb, Negotiation article Michael Wheeler et al. February 2004 Business Fundamentals book Product # N0402D October 2001 Product # 1771 Bringing Negotiators to the Same Side of the Table: An Expert’s Advice Harvard Business Essentials Guide to Negotiation Roger Fisher June 2003 Harvard Management Communication Letter article Harvard Business School Press book September 2003 Product # 1113 Product # C0309B A Note on Critical Moments in Negotiation Michael A. Wheeler and Gillian Morris Note December 2001 Product # 9-902-163 For a complete list of Harvard Business For reprint and subscription information For customized and quantity orders of reprints: School Publishing newsletters: for Negotiaion: Call 617-783-7626 Fax 617-783-7658 http://newsletters.harvardbusinessonline.org Call 800-988-0866 or 617-783-7500 For permission to copy or republish: http://negotiation.harvardbusinessonline.org Call 617-783-7587 MASTER NEGOTIATORS First, Empathize with Your Adversary Former Ecuadorian President Jamil Mahuad discusses his part in ending his country’s long-standing conflict with Peru. BY SUSAN HACKLEY AMIL MAHUAD, a former mayor of Ecuador’s capital, Quito, adversary, seemingly intractable problems can suddenly feel J was elected president of Ecuador in 1998. For many years, solvable. On the other hand, when you don’t have rapport, his country had battled with Peru over a disputed border. With even small annoyances can seem insurmountable. I also as- his own skills and the aid of negotiation expert Roger Fisher, sumed that once we both understood our interests, his ac- Mahuad negotiated a historic peace agreement that earned tions would be revealed as rational behavior rather than as him a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. In an interview with personal whims. Then I could develop possible scenarios Negotiation contributor Susan Hackley, Mahuad spoke can- and theories for how he would be likely to respond. didly about his experiences as a negotiator during his tumul- tuous term as president. Even with good rapport, there were substantive differences to resolve. How did you handle them? What was the situation in Ecuador when you took office? I was psychologically open to trying innovative approaches. The country was on high alert. Troops from both countries I started a process of negotiation that allowed us to look cre- were poised at the border between Ecuador and Peru, ready atively at the problem. We met 10 times over a period of for battle. For roughly 200 years, this border had been in dis- three months in different Latin American capitals and in the pute, and fighting broke out regularly. There was a long tradi- United States. We tried many different techniques, includ- tion of the leaders of the two countries not speaking to each ing a process of facilitated joint brainstorming that encour- other. Just seven days into my presidency, I made a risky deci- aged both sides to offer options without having to commit. sion. I decided that I wanted to meet face- We took personal responsibility for find- to-face with the president of Peru, Al- Rather than confronting ing agreement. Fujimori, for example, berto Fujimori, and try to negotiate a marginalized a minister who was not on peaceful settlement to this long-standing President Fujimori as an board with what we were doing. dispute to avoid an imminent war. adversary, I sought to What were some creative solutions that you How did you approach the negotiations? understand him and developed together? Initially, we were suspicious of each his interests. The Rio Protocol of 1942 had tempo- other, though we both were mindful rarily settled a full-scale war between that the alternative to a peace agreement was continued Ecuador and Peru but did not end the disagreement over war and instability in our countries. Rather than confront- border issues. President Fujimori and I asked the guaran- ing President Fujimori as an adversary, I sought to under- tor countries of the Rio Protocol—the United States, Bra- stand him and his interests. I consulted with Roger Fisher, zil, Argentina, and Chile—to make a definitive proposal. who urged me to approach Fujimori with respect for his We convinced the congresses of both Peru and Ecuador to seniority, as Fujimori had been president of his country accept the proposal in advance, whatever it might be. In for eight years. other words, both countries, in effect, gave a blank check I went to the president and asked him for his ideas. How to the guarantor countries. Without calling it one, we en- did he think we should settle this dispute? Hearing what he tered into an arbitration process. thought would give me a deeper understanding of all the One portion of the disputed land, a key military site issues and the right to expect the same active listening known as Tiwintza, was extremely important to both from him. It didn’t mean I had to agree with his views. countries. It was the site of a historic and vitally important military victory for Ecuador, and its loss would be a blow What kind of relationship did you develop with President Fujimori? to our national identity. The creative formula proposed by I worked hard to establish rapport with him. When you the guarantors was to have Ecuador maintain one square have good rapport with the other person, even your worst kilometer of land within Peru. Under this arrangement, Copyright © 2004 by Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation. All rights reserved. 3 Interview with Jamil Mahuad (continued) Ecuador had ownership, while Peru held sovereignty. Al- I didn’t feel that I had the time, space, or clarity to begin though this was an unusual and controversial arrange- a negotiation process with all of the parties involved. In- ment, this solution satisfied the pride of both countries stead, I tried to deal with the economic problems by form- and allowed both to “keep” Tiwintza. ing the usual political alliances and imposing the will of To avoid future confrontations, both countries took a the government. large part of the disputed area and made it into a demili- Although I was making economic decisions that I tarized park owned and maintained by both nations. thought were in the best long-term interest of Ecuador, I Also included in the settlement was a treaty guaranteeing had lost the confidence of many, including the Indian peo- Ecuador’s free navigation on the Amazon, a mutual secu- ple. They formed an alliance with a sector of the military rity agreement to avoid future conflicts, and a border- who were angry at being pushed aside after the peace set- integration agreement that would stimulate economic tlement with Peru and who were suffering the effects of the development. Fujimori and I signed the peace accord in economic crisis. They stormed the presidential palace and an emotional ceremony in Brasilia on October 26, 1998. congress, overthrew the government, and established a new one, and I was forced to flee the country. Once you had an agreement, what gave you confidence that it would be sustainable? As you reflect on what happened, what can you say about your We had developed a relationship that could carry us for- leadership style? ward to a continuing partnership. When a negotiation is In my mind, a leader’s job is to invite the people to face the finished, you have a contract or an agreement. But as Roger truth and accept their role in working out a solution. Lead- Fisher likes to say, “An agreement does not resolve problems. ers can be tempted to offer false solutions to a conveniently It just creates a new framework for deal- masked reality. This can be good elec- ing with them.” You can have great docu- toral politics, but it’s a disastrous leader- ments with no practical use if you haven’t Remember that most ship style. built a relationship for the future. negotiations are In the peace process, I believe I was an We built many bridges between the effective leader. I invited the people of civil societies of both countries and iden- fundamentally about Ecuador to face a harsh reality, and they tified important infrastructure projects to were able to do this with integrity, cour- be financed by international cooperation. human relationships. age, and national honor. In contrast, the We incorporated so many individual ac- economic crisis proved too overwhelm- tors from Ecuador and Peru in the peace process that thou- ing, and it was easier to look for scapegoats than to face the sands developed a sense of proprietorship. They now have truth. personal reasons to defend the peace as their own child. What rules of negotiation have you developed for yourself? What was the effect of the peace agreement on your country? Identify your own personal style of communicating, nego- Overwhelmingly good, even spectacular in some areas. Bi- tiating, making decisions, and leading. In the beginning, national projects flourished, and we have had five years clarify and express your understanding of the situation. without border incidents. The U.S. State Department had During the process, double-check your presumptions and called the dispute between Ecuador and Peru the “longest be prepared to destroy your own hypotheses. armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere.” Also, remember that most negotiations are funda- But, ironically, peace brought problems I didn’t antici- mentally about human relationships, which vary from pate.