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University of Hawaii' Library UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII' LIBRARY FOURTH WAVE TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENTOF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE MAY 2005 By Paul J. Smith Dissertation Committee: Richard Chadwick, Chairperson Anthony Marsella John Wilson Kate Zhou Elizabeth Davis ABSTRACT This dissertation argues that international terrorism can be understood from the perspective ofchanges within the international system, particularly since the end ofthe Cold War. The primary foundation ofthe inquiry rests on the "four waves ofmodem terrorism" theory put forth by David C. Rapoport, who argues that different types of terrorism come in various waves throughout history, and tend to reflect larger tensions within the international system. Rapoport asserts that contemporary terrorism, which is primarily religious in motivation, constitutes the fourth wave. This dissertation expands on Rapoport's fourth wave description by asserting that there are three primary drivers of this particular wave ofterrorism: 1) globalization and its attendant processes, 2) religious violence in the international system, and 3) the spread ofCBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) weapons to nonstate actors. The final chapter takes a prescriptive approach and explores ideas on how to mitigate the terrorism threat in the future. 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT iii LIST OF TABLES vii LIST OF FIGURES viii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 'Massive Intelligence Failure' 2 1.2 Rise ofthe 'New' Terrorism .4 1.3 Statement ofthe Problem 6 1.4 Objectives ofMy Study and Contributions to the Field 8 1.5 Structure ofthe Dissertation and How to Proceed 9 CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 2.1 Introduction 12 2.2 Systemic Theories on Terrorism 14 2.3 Nye's 3-Level Model Theory ofthe International System 21 2.4 Globalization Theories and Terrorism .29 2.5 Juergensmeyer's Religious Violence 4-Stage Theory 32 2.6 CBRN Proliferation and Terrorism 37 2.7 Soft-Power Theory And Prescriptive Approaches to Terrorism 39 2.8 Methodology 40 CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL SUMMARY 3.1 Introduction 44 3.2 The Challenge ofDefining Terrorism .47 3.3 Historical Survey and Rapoport's Waves 50 3.4 Premodern Terrorism and State Terror.. 51 3.5 Rapoport's First Wave-Revolutionary/Anarchist Terror 59 3.6 Rapoport's Second Wave-Anti-ColoniallNationalist Terror. 70 3.7 Rapoport's Third Wave-New Left Terror 75 3.8 Rapoport's Fourth Wave-Religious Terror 80 3.9 Controversies Associated with Fourth Wave Terrorism 86 3.10 Conclusion 92 IV CHAPTER 4: TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES 4.1 Introduction 94 4.2 The International System: its Dynamics and Actors 97 4.3 Terrorism and the International System 100 4.4 9-11 and the International System: Continuity or Discontinuity? .1 08 4.5 The Second Level ofthe Nye Model: Implications ofAQ Statements .118 4.6 Conclusion 124 CHAPTER 5: GLOBALIZATION AND THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION: THE FIRST DRIVER OF POSTMODERN TERRORISM 5.1 Introduction 126 5.2 Defining Globalization 129 5.3 Globalization: the Terrorism Enabler .134 5.4 Information Revolution Dimension ofGlobalization & Impact on Terror...137 5.5 Global Information Infrastructure as Terrorism Enablers .145 5.6 International Migration and the New Diaspora Order .149 5.7 Globalization as Cultural Invasion .156 5.8 Globalization and Marginalization: Is There A Way Forward? .162 5.9 Conclusion 165 CHAPTER 6: RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY AND MILITANCY: THE SECOND DRIVER OF POSTMODERN TERRORISM 6.1 Introduction 168 6.2 Rising Importance ofReligion in the International System 170 6.3 How Religion Shapes Terrorism 178 6.4 Implications for Terrorism and States 188 6.5 Origins ofal Qaeda Ideology: Emergence ofReligious Militancy .197 6.6 Abdullah Azzam, Maktab-al-Khidmat and the Rise ofal Qaeda 208 6.7 Conclusion 217 CHAPTER 7: THE CBRN ELEMENT IN TERRORISM: THE THIRD DRIVER OF POSTMODERN TERRORISM 7.1 Introduction 219 7.2 The CBRN Element in Terrorism 221 7.3 Terrorism and the Nuclear Threat.. 227 7.4 Post Cold War Paradigm Shift .234 7.5 Chemical and Biological Terrorism .250 7.6 Overt Acts-Additional Evidence for CBRN Use .259 7.7 How CBRN Weapons have Changed Terrorism 265 7.8 Conclusion 269 v CHAPTER 8: THE WAY FORWARD: ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES AND OTHER FACTORS SPURRING TERRORISM 8.1 Introduction 271 8.2 Identifying Root Causes ofTerrorism and the 'Enabling Environment' 273 8.3 The Range ofState Responses in Countering Terrorism .289 8.4 Failed States, Quasi States and the International System 297 8.5 Weak States, Quasi States: Pakistan and the al Qaeda Connection .302 8.6 Stopping the Tools ofArmageddon 308 8.7 A Fifth Wave? Re-examining Rapoport's Wave Theory in the Context of International System Analysis 311 8.8 Toward a Fifth Wave? 326 8.9 Conclusion 328 BIBLIOGRAPHY 330 VI LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Analysis ofRapoport's Wave Theory ofTerrorism 313 Vll LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Three Drivers ofFourth Wave Terrorism 8 2. General Structure ofthe Dissertation l1 Vlll CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION On 11 September 2001, the United States experienced the most deadly and destructive single terrorist attack conducted by nonstate actors in the country's history. Nineteen young men, mostly citizens ofSaudi Arabia, boarded four planes within the United States and drove three ofthem into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon, in Washington, DC. A fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania when passengers attempted to regain control ofthe aircraft. The individuals who perpetrated this incident acted as part of, or on behalfof, a conservative and militant Islamic terrorist organization known as Al Qaeda, which at the time was based in Afghanistan. From a tactical point ofview, the 9-11 terrorist attacks were the product of elaborate planning, particularly by one individual, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who had devised the plan after a similar plot, known as Project Bojinka, which he directed, was disrupted in the Philippines in 1995. Following his arrest, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed revealed to US interrogators that the original 9-11 plot involved the hijacking often aircraft. Mohammed and his fellow planners envisaged "striking nuclear powerplants, symbolic buildings on the west and east coasts ofthe U.S. and simultaneously exploding other planes over South-East Asia."! However, eventually the plot was scaled back out ofconcern oflogistical overreach. I Rebecca Carr and George Edmonson, "Original Plan 'to hijack 10 aircraft"', The Age (Melbourne), June 18,2004. 1 1.1 "Massive Intelligence Failure" In the days, weeks, and months following the attack, many pundits, analysts, and scholars began to question how such an attack could have occurred; one U.S. Senator described the entire events surrounding 11 September 2001 as a "massive intelligence failure.,,2 Moreover, others speculated that the world after 9-11 had fundamentally changed. In newspapers, many articles and columns revolved around a self-examining "why do they hate us" theme. In a speech to Congress shortly after the incident, President George W. Bush posed this self-examining question himself: "Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom ofreligion, our freedom ofspeech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.,,3 In addition to discussions in the popular press, many political scientists began publishing articles questioning whether terrorism had fundamentally changed the international system, and whether terrorism posed a strategic threat to states.4 Perhaps the most important question being asked during this period was why such an attack had not been predicted. A joint Congressional investigation, formed 2 This specific phrase was uttered by US Senator Richard Shelby on the CBS News Show 'Face the Nation' on 16 September 2001 (file accessed through Lexis-Nexis). 3 President George W. Bush, address to a Joint Session ofCongress and the American People, accessed from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200l/09/20010920-8.htmil on 18 December 2004. 4 For instance, Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly ofAmerican Primary: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly, v. 117, n. 1 (2002), pp. 19-36; Robert Jervis, "An Interim Assessment ofSeptember 11: What has Changed and What has Not?" Political Science Quarterly, v. 117, n. 1 (2002), pp. 37-54. 2 subsequently to determine the nature and scale ofintelligence lapses prior to the attack, noted that at certain key junctures government agencies had failed to understand the underlying threat facing them. Specifically, the inquiry revealed three critical junctures in which the 9-11 plot could have become compromised, and thus disrupted by the U.S. government. One ofthese involved in a meeting in January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, involving at least two ofthe original 19 hijackers. A second juncture occurred when Zacarias Moussaoui, reportedly a member ofthe original hijacking team, enrolled in a flight school in Minnesota under suspicious circumstances. A third occurred when a Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) agent based in Phoenix, Arizona wrote a memorandum detailing "a pattern ofsuspicious activity involving numerous Middle Eastern men seeking training in area flight schools."s However, in many respects, these were tactical matters-a more strategic question posed during that inquiry, and later in the '9/11' commission hearings,6 was why the United States had failed to recognize and appreciate the evolution ofterrorism as represented by the 11 September attack. The world had decades ofexperience with terrorism, with the United States alone possessing one ofthe most sophisticated counter- terrorism infrastructures (intelligence, legal and military) in the world; yet for some reason, this collective national and global knowledge could not prepare the world's most powerful country for the most devastating terrorist attack in its history.
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