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Public Settlements & Investigations PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: RECENT SETTLEMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS RELATED TO ∗ MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS & INVESTIGATIONS PREPARED BY EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C. ∗ This chart summarizes publicly available information relating to select pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturer investigations and select PBM/HMO investigations/litigation related to pharmaceuticals and medical devices. It is based solely on secondary sources on file with author. For more information, please contact [email protected] or [email protected] PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: RECENT SETTLEMENTS RELATED TO MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES∗ SELECT PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS ∗ This chart summarizes publicly available information relating to select pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturer investigations and select PBM/HMO investigations/litigation related to pharmaceuticals and medical devices. It is based solely on secondary sources on file with author. For more information, please contact [email protected] or [email protected] PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS RELATED TO MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES SELECT SETTLEMENTS Pharmaceutical or Settlement Amount Date of Product Summary of Significant Medical Device Settlement Description/Allegations Manufacturer Biovail Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a subsidiary of Biovail Biovail Pharmaceuticals, $24.6 million September 2009 Cardizem LA Corp.) pled guilty to conspiracy and kickback charges and Inc. (diltiazem) to pay a criminal fine of $22.2 million to settle charges (subsidiary of Biovail with the DOJ. These charges include paying physicians Settlement first Corp.) up to $1,000 each as inducements for prescribing or announced in recommending Cardizem LA. Biovail also agreed to pay May 2008 $2.4 million in civil fines to resolve allegations that its conduct caused the submission of false claims to the United States. Biovail entered into a 5 year CIA with the OIG. CURRENT AS OF: October 16, 2009 Prepared By: Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS RELATED TO MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES SELECT SETTLEMENTS Pharmaceutical or Settlement Amount Date of Product Summary of Significant Medical Device Settlement Description/Allegations Manufacturer Bextra, Geodon Pfizer Inc. Total: $2.3 billion August 2009 Phamacia & Upjohn, Inc., a Pfizer subsidiary, charged Zyvox, Lyrica with one count felony misbranding of Bextra (relating to $1.3 billion in criminal fines Aricept, Celebrex, off label promotion of Bextra for acute pain and surgical and forfeiture Lipitor, Norvasc, pain and for dosages above the FDA approved maximum Relpax, Viagra, $1 billion combined federal levels; false and misleading safety and efficacy claims Zithromax, Zoloft, and state civil false claims made through headquarter marketing plans, sales force Zyrtec act ($668,514,830 – federal promotion, advisory boards, consultant meetings, share; $331,485,170 – promotional samples, CME events and publications states’ share) activities). Civil settlement resolves allegations that the federal FCA was violated by illegal off label promotion of Bextra, Geodon, Zyvox and Lyrica; making and disseminating unsubstantiated and false representations regarding the safety and efficacy of these four drugs; and paying kickbacks to HCPs to induce them to prescribe these four drugs. Also resolves FCA allegations relating to the payment of kickbacks to HCPs in connection with the marketing of Aricept, Celebrex, Lipitor, Norvasc, Relpax, Viagra, Zithromax, Zoloft and Zyrtec. Pfizer entered into a 5 year CIA with the OIG. CURRENT AS OF: October 16, 2009 Prepared By: Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS RELATED TO MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES SELECT SETTLEMENTS Pharmaceutical or Settlement Amount Date of Product Summary of Significant Medical Device Settlement Description/Allegations Manufacturer Aventis Total: $95.5 million May 2009 Azmacort Aventis entered into a settlement agreement to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by $49 million to the U.S. Nasacort misreporting drug prices in order to reduce its Medicaid government Nasacort AQ Drug Rebate obligations. Aventis and its corporate $40 million to participating predecessors were alleged to have “knowingly” state Medicaid programs misreported the lowest prices for its steroid-based anti- inflammatory nasal sprays between 1995 and 2000. $6 million to public health Aventis allegedly negotiated “private label” agreements service programs with Kaiser Permanente in an attempt to avoid rebate payments obligations. According to the DOJ, the agreements allowed Aventis to repackage the same drug under a new label at a cheaper price for Kaiser without offering the government aid program the same rate. An addendum to the Sanofi-Aventis Corporate Integrity Agreement with the OIG was entered into. Amgen Inc. $2.4 million March 2009 Various Amgen Inc. entered into a settlement agreement to resolve allegations that it defrauded the Kentucky Medicaid Program by inflating the average wholesale prices for prescription drugs, knowing that state Medicaid officials use those prices to calculate pharmacy reimbursement rates. The inflated prices allegedly bore no relationship to prices Amgen actually charged its customers. Similar settlements have been reached with Immuex Corp. for $145,000 and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. for $3 million. CURRENT AS OF: October 16, 2009 Prepared By: Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS RELATED TO MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES SELECT SETTLEMENTS Pharmaceutical or Settlement Amount Date of Product Summary of Significant Medical Device Settlement Description/Allegations Manufacturer An Alabama circuit court ordered Sandoz to pay the state Sandoz Pharmaceuticals $78.4 million February 2009 Various $78.4 million in compensatory and punitive damages for (owned by Novartis Inc.) falsely reporting wholesale drug prices and “marketing the spread.” $29 million compensatory damages $50 million punitive damages Eli Lilly agreed to pay civil and criminal fines totaling Eli Lilly and Company $1.415 billion January 2009 Zyprexa $1.415 billion to settle allegations that it marketed Zyprexa for off-label uses, including the treatment of elderly patients for sleep disorders, Alzheimer’s and $515 million criminal fine dementia. Eli Lilly pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge $100 million criminal of introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce forfeiture between September 1999 and November 2003, and paid a $515 million criminal fine and $100 million in forfeiture. $438 million Federal civil settlement As part of its civil settlement agreement, Eli Lilly paid $362 million state civil fines of approximately $438 million to settle allegations settlement that it caused invalid claims for payment to be submitted to various government programs including Medicaid. Eli Lilly also agreed to pay various state Medicaid programs approximately $362 million to settle similar claims. The civil settlement settles four whistleblower suits filed by former sales representatives. Eli Lilly entered into a 5 year CIA with the OIG. CURRENT AS OF: October 16, 2009 Prepared By: Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS RELATED TO MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES SELECT SETTLEMENTS Pharmaceutical or Settlement Amount Date of Product Summary of Significant Medical Device Settlement Description/Allegations Manufacturer Dey LP entered into a settlement agreement with the Dey LP and its $5 million January 2009 Various Mississippi Attorney General to resolve allegations that it subsidiary Mylan Inc. manipulated average wholesale prices and used covert discounts, kickbacks and rebates to increase market share. Teva and its subsidiary Ivax agreed to pay $7 million to Teva Pharmaceuticals $7 million January 2009 Acetaminophen the Massachusetts Medicaid program to settle allegations USA Inc. and its with Codeine, that it falsely inflated prices that were reported to national subsidiary Ivax Corp. Amiodarone, pharmaceutical price reporting services between 1997 and Carbamazepine, 2003. Cephalexin, Clonazepam, Naproxen, Sulfamethoxazole/ Trimethoprim, Albuterol, Baclofen, Clozapine Amgen and its subsidiary Immunex agreed to pay $1.7 Amgen Inc. and $1.7 million December 2008 Various million to settle charges that they defrauded Wisconsin’s Immunex Medicaid program by publishing false average wholesale prices for their products. CURRENT AS OF: October 16, 2009 Prepared By: Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURERS: PUBLIC SETTLEMENTS RELATED TO MARKETING, PRICING AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES SELECT SETTLEMENTS Pharmaceutical or Settlement Amount Date of Product Summary of Significant Medical Device Settlement Description/Allegations Manufacturer Several drug manufacturers settled allegations that they Bristol-Myers Squibb $28 million December 2008 Various fraudulently used a wholesale pricing scheme and caused Co., KV (breakdowns by company the Alabama Medicaid Agency to overpay pharmacists Pharmaceuticals, Amgen not available) and physicians for Medicaid Drugs. Inc., Roxane Laboratories, Bayer Pharmaceuticals Bayer agreed to pay $97.5 million plus interest to settle Bayer HealthCare LLC $97.5
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