Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page i

Governance in the Commonwealth: Current Debates

Edited by Seth Lartey and Deepti Sastry

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© 2010 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data: A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 978-0-903850-51-3

Published by the Commonwealth Foundation Cover design by Cog Design Edited by Seth Lartey and Deepti Sastry

Views and opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the contributing authors and should in no way be attributed to the institutions to which they are affiliated or the Commonwealth Foundation.

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The citation for this publication is: Commonwealth Foundation. 2010. Governance in the Commonwealth: Current debates. 104 pp.

For further information contact: Commonwealth Foundation Pall Mall SW1Y 5HY

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E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.commonwealthfoundation.com Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page iii

Contents

List of Illustrations v

Preface vii

Acknowledgements ix

List of Acronyms x

1 Governance in the Commonwealth: Current Debates 1 Seth Lartey and Deepti Sastry, Commonwealth Foundation

2 Democratic Governance in West and Central 9 Obadiah Mailafia, Chairperson, Centre for Policy and Economic Research,

3 Consolidating Liberal in : Regime 15 Limitation and the Imperative of Reform Emmanuel O. Akwetey, Executive Director, Institute for Democratic Governance, Ghana

4 The ‘Projectisation’ of Governance: Its Implications for 23 Development Eric Ngang Ndeh Mboumien, Coordinator, North West Association of Development Organisations (NWADO),

5 Governance in the : Toward Renewal 33 Wendy C. Grenade, Lecturer, University of the West Indies,

6 Good Governance as an Anti-corruption Tool 41 Victor Hart, former Chairman, Transparency Institute (TTTI), with input from Josh Drayton

7 Minority Rights and Participatory Governance 49 Jagadananda and Kuldip Gyaneswar, Independent Researchers,

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8 Integrated Local Self-governance Through Participation 57 of the Most Marginalised and Socially Excluded Groups Asha Kotwal, General Secretary, All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch, National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, India

9 The Institutionalisation of Citizen Participation in 69 Democratic Processes in the Pacific Islands Deepti Sastry, Commonwealth Foundation, with input from Sione Faka’osi, Community Development Trust

10 People’s Participation in Democratic Reform: Lessons 77 Learned from the Community in Tonga Sione Faka’osi, Executive Director, Tonga Community Development Trust, Tonga

References 89

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List of Illustrations

Figures 4.1 Model A: The current situation for service delivery in 27 Cameroon 4.2 Power distribution among different entities that occupy 27 the social and economic landscape in Cameroon 4.3 Model B: ‘Desired’ good governance model for Cameroon 29 6.1 Ethnic composition of Trinidad and Tobago 43 6.2 The parliamentary governance chain 44 6.3 Tripartite partnership model 45

Boxes 7.1 Articles in Constitution on minority rights 51 8.1 Case study on women in Panchayats 61

Tables 10.1 2007 general election for district and town officers in 81 Tonga 10.2 Block meeting and people’s participation rate 84

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Preface

The value of civil society– engagement in the Commonwealth is well documented. As long ago as 1999 Commonwealth Heads of Government noted in the Fancourt Declaration on Globalisation and People-Centred Development ‘If the poor and vulnerable are to be at the centre of development, the process must be participatory, in which they have a voice ... good governance and economic progress are directly linked ... Good governance requires inclusive and participatory process ...’ The Commonwealth Foundation has an established track record of working in the area of citizens’ participation in governance processes. As the inter- governmental organisation mandated to support the work of civil society in the Commonwealth, the Foundation is uniquely placed to work effectively at the interface between government and civil society. The Foundation sees partici- pation not as an end in its own right, but as a means of delivering more effective development for Commonwealth people. Focus on the Commonwealth Foundation’s work became evident in 1991, when it convened the first Commonwealth NGO Forum in Harare, Zimbabwe. At the Forum, the Commonwealth Foundation was urged to consult among and NGOs in order to produce what became the Foundation’s landmark publication Non-Governmental Organisations: Guidelines for Good Policy and Practice. From then on the Foundation brought a new perspective to government/civil society relations – the aspirations of cit- izens themselves, and their views of a good society. Today, civil society organisations play a greater role in shaping national policies and delivering services. In some cases the relationship between govern- ment, the public sector and civil society has become close and there is a spirit of partnership. Civil society’s relationship with the private sector has also evolved, with each borrowing a little from the other’s way of doing things. Paradoxically, it is the view of civil society that at the same time as their contributions are being increasingly recognised by governments, their opera- tional space is being constrained by anti-terror laws and other legal restrictions, repressive policing, cultural stereotyping, suspicion and limited freedom of information. Civil society organisations today are operating in a rather complex climate. On one hand they have higher levels of visibility and influence on government and business, but on the other hand, they are under new kinds of pressures revolving around their ‘operating environment’ and the need to respond to challenges to their accountability, transparency and legitimacy. The challenge we all have is how to manage this tension creatively and in ways that strengthen both national governments and civil society. vii Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page viii

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This book is the latest in a series of governance related publications by the Governance and Democracy Programme of the Commonwealth Foundation. A compilation of presentations from the Deepening Democracy Assembly at the 2009 Commonwealth People’s Forum, held in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, this book is a collection of practitioner-led case studies highlighting key governance challenges faced by them in their own countries, through their work as civil society practitioners. These case studies are more than the musings of civil society. They are frontline experiences of civil society groups as they work in their respective thematic areas. The chapters highlight the importance of specific facets of governance, in the respective countries, as a means to demonstrate both the challenges they face as well as the work that civil society is doing to address some of the challenges. Each chapter is forward looking, with recommendations and suggestions to the public and governments about what issues need to be addressed. For clarity and context each chapter is preceded by a brief overview of the history of the specific governance theme for the region or country. The book aims to bring interesting civil society experiences to a wider audience, and to serve as a platform through which a wider audience is given the opportunity to see the important work of civil society.

Mark Collins, BA, MBA, PhD Director, Commonwealth Foundation Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page ix

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without inputs from a host of people. ToTim Shaw and Mihir Bhatt we owe great thanks for their substantive feed- back. We also acknowledge the support and encouragement from the Commonwealth Foundation’s Civil Society Advisory Committee. Kimberly Clarke untiringly helped us with the final text. We would also like to thank our colleagues at the Commonwealth Foundation for their feedback on various drafts of the manuscript. Finally, we would like to thank the authors who helped translate the idea of the book into reality and have given us a fantastic insight into the often lost world of development practice.

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List of Acronyms

AIDMAM All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch AU African Union BV Block-voting CARICOM Caribbean Community DRC Democratic of the Congo DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECPF ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework FPTP First Past the Post IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International NGO MDGs Millennium Development Goals MSC Mediation and Security Council NACC National Anti-corruption Committee (Cameroon) NCDHR National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights NWADA North West Association of Development Organisations OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States SCSP Scheduled Caste Sub Plan TSP Tribal Sub Plan TTTI Trinidad and Tobago’s Transparency Institute UN UNDP United Nations Development Programme VSO Voluntary Service Overseas WAEMU West African Economic Monetary Union WAPCCO West African Police Chief’s Committee WB

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1 Governance in the Commonwealth: Current Debates

Seth Lartey and Deepti Sastry, Commonwealth Foundation

1.1 Introduction The concept of governance has gained prominence over the past decade (World Bank 1992a; UNDP 1997; Commonwealth Foundation 1999). One only need read newspaper articles recommending greater accountability and transparency from government and other institutions to recognise public and media concern with the governance of public institutions. However, media stories are only one indication of the ‘coming of age’ of the concept and the recognition that governance is important. We are also finding that organisations such as the World Bank, regional development banks, United Nations’ bodies and various government departments are making governance a central element in their work. While the media, national and inter-governmental organisations are demonstrating an interest in governance in their work (and sometimes their organisational structure), at the same time they are trying to redefine and re- constitute the term ‘governance’ to better suit different types of organisations and contexts. With so many actors affecting people’s lives it is clear that we need different forms of governance with a variety of enforcement mechanisms (UNDP 1997). As noted by Bourne (2004), ‘this interaction [is] merely inevitable. Something national governments and other international organisa- tions are having to get used to ...’. So the definition of the term governance itself remains contested as different institutions imagine the concept with reference to the needs and rights of their constituents and their organisational structures. Knight et al. (2002: 131) offer a useful definition of the term: ‘collective decision-taking and action in which government is one stakeholder among others’. This definition encapsulates the idea that there are numerous actors participating and also implicitly recognises that the efficacy and power of actors will change and hence does not directly refer to other participants in the decision-making process. This definition is useful in light of the various uses to which the term has been put, and given the contexts and institutions that the authors discuss in this publication. Wendy Grenade, for example, distinguishes between different forms of governance – corporate, public and global – all of which have an institutional affiliation. Eric Ngang similarly reflects on the idea

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of governance in relation to the scale of operations – community, organisational or global. The definitions used by the various authors are variants of Knight et al.’s broader definition, enabling a more contextualised interpretation for the issues that they raise. However, starting from a broader definition allows us to situate the authors’ various views. As the idea then takes new meanings for various sectors and contexts it remains and will continue to remain topical as relationships between influential actors – governments, civil society, the private sector – become more complex and also more open to public scrutiny.

1.2 Governance in the 21st century The conceptual shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ is one that many would argue has resulted in a major shift in the organisation of political power (Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). They suggest that the term governance itself has germinated as the role of the nation has changed, the salience of the institution of the nation state has been challenged, and as new forms of democratic institutions and actors have emerged. With new institutions and changing relationships between actors in democratic systems the boundaries of accountability and responsibility have been blurred. With this blurring has come a demand for new thinking on governance and the distribution and accountability of power among institutions. A paper published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Governance in the 21st Century (2001), addresses some of the theoretical and political issues around governing, government and democracy. The report states that:

[...] old forms of governance in both the public and private sectors are becoming increasingly ineffective. Second, the new forms of governance that are likely to be needed over the next few decades will involve a much broader range of active players. Third, and perhaps most importantly, two of the primary attributes of today’s governance systems – the usually fixed and permanent allocations of power that are engraved in the structures and constitutions of many organisations; and, the tendency to vest initiative exclusively in the hands of those in senior positions in the hierarchy – look set to undergo fundamental changes. (OECD 2001: 3)

With these shifts from ‘old’ to ‘new’ forms of governance (whatever forms they might take) comes a redistribution of power. The shift in power from senior levels in the institutions of governance to citizens is something that we are beginning to see more frequently, through social movements, citizen-led democratic institutions and the devolution of power from central to local government. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 3

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This shift in and devolution of power is happening in many countries. Sione Faka’osi in his chapter, ‘People’s Participation in Democratic Reform: Lessons Learned from the Community in Tonga’, discusses the devolution of power from kingly lines to individual citizens as the democratic system there changed, and examines the political efficacy of giving power to individuals at the village level. Deepti Sastry’s paper, ‘The Institutionalisation of Citizen Participation in Democratic Processes in the Pacific Islands’, helps readers situate Sione’s chapter within the broader governance issue of citizen participation in the Pacific. Looking at the issue from another perspective, Asha Kotwal’s chapter examines why formalised and institutionalised legislation is inadequate to support the rights of marginalised communities in India. The chapter examines the obstacles facing marginalised communities (the Dalit community in particular) in enforcing their rights despite the existence of well-defined systems of local government and decentralised governance to support village-level political participation. The issues raised by Kotwal’s chapter are put in context by the paper from Jagadananda and Gyaneswar, ‘Minority Rights and Participatory Governance’, which examines the historical, legislative and cultural context in which minority rights have been promoted in India. Taking a principle-based approach, Victor Hart’s chapter, ‘Good Governance as an Anti-corruption Tool’, defines governance using the language of transparency to suggest that in order to address concerns of corruption in Trinidad and Tobago it is important to use tools that focus on transparency and accountability. Wendy Grenade, in her chapter ‘Governance in the Caribbean: Toward Renewal’, examines the history of democracy and governance in the Caribbean, focusing on the political culture in the region.

1.3 The role of civil society in governance As the shifts in power have taken place civil society has grown to be a powerful and important institution in both policy and decision-making as well as service delivery. In the 21st century, as the institutions and processes that shape the lives of citizens increasingly operate regionally or internationally, it is clear that civil society is all too often under-represented at these levels (Commonwealth Foundation 1999). The framework for international trade, for example, is regulated globally and the details worked out regionally, but with very little reference to civil society and few opportunities for citizens to participate. Civil society organisations are playing a greater role in shaping national policies and delivering services. In some cases the relationship between govern- ment, the public sector and civil society has become close and there is a spirit of partnership. Civil society’s relationship with the private sector has also evolved, with each borrowing a little from the other’s way of doing things. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 4

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Paradoxically, it is the view of civil society that at the same time as their contributions are being increasingly recognised by governments, their operational space is being constrained by anti-terror laws and other legal restrictions, repressive policing, cultural stereotyping, suspicion and limited freedom of information. Questions have been raised about civil society’s trans- parency and accountability. Practices have improved in regulation, reporting and governance, but these achievements are not fully recognised or embedded and there is increasing demand from governments for civil society organisations to be more accountable (Heinrich and Fioramonti 2007). The need for effective civil society–government relationships is well documented.1 Such effective relationships are instrumental in developing effectual policy that makes significant and positive impacts on people’s lives. Furthermore, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups need to have a real voice in the same processes. The Commonwealth Heads of Government noted in the Fancourt Declaration on Globalisation and People-Centred Development ( 1999) that ‘if the poor and the vulnerable are to be at the centre of development, the process must be participatory, in which they have a voice’. Both wisdom and extensive research support these claims about participation and effective relationships. Connections need to be made across civil society and with pan-Commonwealth networks to strengthen community cohesion and the quality of projects. Civil society organisations in many countries are today operating in rather complex climates. There is an emerging trend of using legislation to constrain civil society groups, especially in countries with politically challenging environ- ments. On the one hand they have higher levels of visibility and influence on government and business, but on the other they are under new kinds of pressures as a result of the ‘operating environment’ they now work in. Civil society clearly needs to respond to challenges to their accountability, trans- parency and legitimacy. Reflecting on the definition of governance by Knight et al., one challenge is how to manage this tension creatively, in ways that strengthen both national governments and civil society. The tendency in some Commonwealth countries to constrain the ability of civil society to operate has also had an impact on human rights – including freedom of expression, association and assembly, and the right to dissent. There are indications of a decline in the commitment of Commonwealth countries to promote, protect and realise citizens’ rights (Commonwealth Foundation 2007b). Importantly, women’s rights and development, as a subset of a broader focus on citizens’ rights, has been a major challenge. Gender inequality remains a major challenge, and there is consensus that the further empowerment and education of women is fundamental to development, good governance and peace. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 5

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1.4 The Commonwealth: Governance and democracy Within the Commonwealth these shifts in power between various institutions of governance are just as, if not more, pertinent. With a large proportion of the 54 Commonwealth states having citizens that live in relative poverty, the distribution of power and institutionalisation and practice of governance becomes more important. The Commonwealth has historically supported and committed to establishing democratic systems in its member countries. Implicit in this support for democratic systems is the idea that this form of government and governance is participatory and has clear lines of accountability. The Commonwealth Heads of Government have repeatedly drawn up communiqués and action plans to support and promote more effective, transparent and inclusive governance through democracy and democratic processes (Ford and Katwala 1999). The commitment to democracy and participatory governance forms the backbone of diplomatic relations within the Commonwealth and is rightly speaking to the strength of the institution. Starting with the Declaration (1971), where a commitment to democracy was articulated in the Commonwealth Principles, to the 1991 Harare Declaration which reaffirmed the earlier commitments, the Commonwealth has clearly articulated its allegiance to the principles of democracy.2 Indeed, the fundamental Commonwealth principles and values set out in the Harare Dec- laration – good governance, protection of human rights, freedom of expression, respect for diversity, opposition to all forms of discrimination, respect for the rule of law, elimination of poverty, people-centred development, and inter- national peace and security – are as relevant today as they were when first articulated. In the 61 years since the association was formed, the relevance and importance of these Commonwealth values has repeatedly been reaffirmed and consolidated. The Civil Society in the New Millennium project, a study conducted by the Commonwealth Foundation between 1997 and 1999, helped to shift the weight of the discussion about governance to its emphasis on ordinary citizens, the chief actors in civil society. The project found that citizens feel increasingly disconnected from the processes that affect their lives; affected yet disempowered by such trends as globalisation, competition and individualism; and that they want to play a more significant role in setting policy priorities. The Civil Society in the New Millennium report recognised these changes in its observations about governance. It noted that the actions of civil society are the foundation for good governance. The report characterises a trinity of actors – civil society, government and the market – as the key players operating to develop society. Its findings reflected a new consensus: citizens want a strong state as well as a strong civil society, deepened democracy and democratic culture, and an Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 6

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enlarged role for citizens; a new compact involving citizens, the state and inter- mediary organisations. Citizens, the report states, want ‘a system [emphasis added] of governance free of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, apathy, neglect, red-tape, and self-gratification by political leaders and public officials’. In other words, there should be strong and healthy connections between people and their governments (Wyman 2001). Key outputs from this body of research include the Citizens and Governance Toolkit, the Citizens Education Action Learning Guide and, more recently, tool- kits focusing on civil society accountability issues.3 One approach adopted by the Commonwealth Foundation to increasing civil society involvement in governance processes is the creation of a platform for civil society organisations to meet, share information, develop a position and facilitate input into Commonwealth and Ministerial meetings. Other work areas include projects to build the capacity of civil society organisations to advocate on issues such as human rights, accountability and transparency, trade and debt and financing for development. Evidence of the Commonwealth Foundation’s success can be seen from the recognition given to civil society organisations by Commonwealth govern- ments in various communiqués, statements and declarations and the implementation mechanisms that allow civil society to contribute to policy- making at the highest level. The Commonwealth has manifested its commitment to democratic principles through the formation of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, by providing technical assistance to countries and through election observation. The 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Coolum, , recognised the ‘links between democracy and good governance on the one hand, and poverty, development and conflict on the other’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2003: vii). We now need to take these commitments further, as the report Democracy in the Commonwealth argues (Afari-Gyan et al. 2009). The report suggests that we now need to review and reform the Commonwealth’s tools for promoting democracy, building on earlier commitments made by the Heads of Government. Specifically, the report makes recommendations, the most important of which are: Member governments should, as a matter of sovereign decision, be expected to extend a standing invitation to the Commonwealth Secretariat to: • observe all aspects of their electoral processes; • work directly with national electoral management and related bodies; • co-operate, if called upon, with the Secretary-General’s good offices work; and Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 7

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• provide support to civil society organisations to help them function effectively (Afari-Gyan et al. 2009:3). Emmanuel Akwetey’s chapter, ‘Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Ghana: Regime Limitation and the Imperative of Reform’, examines this very commit- ment to democracy and democratic principles. The chapter analyses the assumption that by adopting democratic principles and by establishing electoral commissions to oversee the delivery of a ‘legitimate’ government, the government will therefore act in a ‘legitimate’ manner and share power with opposition parties responsibly. Akwetey suggests that we need to find ways to institutionalise the shift in power between governments to ensure more effective participation and power sharing. The importance of sharing power is also raised by Eric Ngang in his chapter, ‘The ‘Projectisation’ of Governance: Its Implications for Development’. Using Cameroon as a case study, the chapter examines the role played by civil society in development and examines to what extent there is effective participation from the community level and how this participation may be promoted to ensure partnership in the development process. Obadiah Mailafia’s chapter, ‘Democratic Governance in West and Central Africa’, once again situates the previous chapters in a history of the development of democracy in the region. The chapters in this volume cover themes from the role of civil society to the effectiveness of democratic institutions in promoting participation and power sharing. It shows the spread of ‘governance’ issues in the Commonwealth and the many ways in which these issues are being tackled. It also demonstrates the conceptual complexity inherent in the notion of governance. Furthermore, it shows the impact of political, cultural, social and economic contexts on the solutions chosen by practitioners to address the issues that they face. This volume gives readers a glimpse into the issues that practitioners work with, and is therefore a good basis on which to see where future debates are heading. The hope is that this book will catalyse practitioners and policy-makers to focus on the governance concerns that are clearly important to the authors in those countries. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 8

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Notes 1 See for example Commonwealth Secretariat website (http://www.thecommonwealth.org/) for Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Communiqués (2003, 2007, 2009); Fancourt Declaration on Globalisation and People-Centred Development (1999); and Civil society statements to Commonwealth Finance Ministers (2002–2008), Commonwealth People’s Forum website (http://peoplesforum.britishcouncil.org/) for Commonwealth People’s Forum Statements (Commonwealth People’s Forum 2005, 2007, 2009). 2 See the following link for more information: http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/20723/ key_declarations/ 3 See http://www.commonwealthfoundation.com/Howwedeliver/Toolsandresources/Governance Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 9

2 Democratic Governance in West and Central Africa

Obadiah Mailafia, Chairperson, Centre for Policy and Economic Research, Nigeria

2.1 Introduction This paper provides an overview of how democratic governance in West and Central Africa has changed recently. Democracy in Africa remains largely a work in progress: a delicate experiment that requires patience and understanding if it is to mature and prosper. One important feature is the durability and spread of Africa’s ‘nominal ’. Although some countries go through elections and democratic processes the impact on governance has sometimes been minimal (Polgreen 2007). This author does not accept that there is such a thing as ‘African democracy’, as some commentators and leaders claim. Democracy is a set of processes that have certain universal, timeless features that define its character: the rule of law, the right to dissent, the right to participation and the freedom of the media and of expression. Viewed from this perspective, Africa’s genuine democracies are rather few. Chabal (2002) notes that:1

[T]he debate around the nature of the political transitions that have taken place on the continent in the last ten years turns on two questions. The first has to do with the causes of such changes: is the reform towards more pluralist polities driven by internal forces or by external factors? The second concerns the extent to which the move towards multiparty elections has furthered the cause of democracy as it is usually understood in the West: has political competition enhanced political accountability and good government? ... the most common view is that the reasons for political change are on balance, internal and that political transitions have resulted in a slow, though fragile, move towards democratic consolidation ...

The resurgence of democracy on the African continent is one of the surprising and indeed salutary developments of recent times after decades of oppression and coming in the wake of a history of military dictatorships and sometimes difficult transitions to democracy. Several factors account for this. The first is the ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s. The collapse of communism and the spread of democratic values into the former Eastern Bloc created new possibilities for developing societies. During the height of the 9 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 10

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Cold War Western governments propped up savagely repressive regimes in Africa on the pretext of protecting their allies (Thomson 2000). With the end of the Cold War, such an excuse was no longer applicable. Analysts such as Timothy Garton Ash and the late Ralf Dahrendorf have underlined the legitimacy of democratic governance as a key consequence of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Second, there was pressure from international donors for better governance and less corruption. A new and better educated middle classes emerged, armed with a personal stake in democracy, human rights and good governance. In our increasingly globalised world, the general public no longer accepts the culture of impunity that has characterised African rulers for generations (Polgreen 2007). Civil society organisations, public intellectuals and the mass media increasingly insist on good governance, human rights and accountability.

2.2 West Africa West Africa covers over 5 million square kilometres, or 17% of Africa’s total area. Its 295.34 million people make the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) the most populous regional economic community in Africa, with nearly 30% of the continent’s population. It is a culturally diverse region in terms of languages, natural resources and economic diversity. Until recently, conflict has been endemic in West Africa. In the 1990s wars in and took a heavy toll on the people and on the physical and social infrastructure. There are tensions in Niger and Guinea, following military coups in December 2008 and February 2010 respectively. In Nigeria, there has been tension in the oil-producing Niger Delta, although some semblance of peace now prevails, thanks to an amnesty that has been extended to all armed groups by the authorities. In 2003 it was estimated that 65% of West Africans lived in a conflict-ridden country (Sarr 2005). Such conflicts disproportionately affected vulnerable groups such as women and children while exerting heavy externalities on neighbouring countries.2 A study by the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU), for example, shows that economic growth in Côte d’Ivoire shrank by 2–4% in relation to the basic annualised trend of 5% during the three years preceding the violent outbreak of conflict in the country. With calm gradually returning to the region after decades of conflict, the economy has registered significant growth, which stood at 4.54% in 2008. Niger recorded the highest growth rate of 9.5%, with Togo trailing at 1.1%. Nigeria remains the dominant economy, with a population of 149 million (about 50% of the entire region) and 67% of the region’s GDP.Agriculture and the extractive sector (mainly mining) dominate economic activity. Agriculture Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 11

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accounts for over 24% of GDP, mines and quarries 19.3%, and trade and commerce 15.7%. The agricultural sector includes both food and cash crops such as cotton, cocoa and coffee, the prices of which (like minerals and petroleum) are very volatile in the global marketplace. Several factors fuel conflicts in West Africa and elsewhere on the continent. They range from the struggle over natural resources (for example oil and diamonds) to the existence of extremes of poverty, structural violence and horizontal as well as vertical inequities (Thomson 2000). However, at the root of all these problems is the absence of good economic and political governance. An encouraging development in the region has been the relative success of peacekeeping under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which played a decisive role in resolving violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau. In 1997 in Lomé, Benin, a Mediation and Security Council (MSC) was created under the auspices of ECOWAS with the mandate to take emergency decisions on peace and security matters. The Community has been a strong and credible partner to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) on matters of peace and security on the continent, where experience and competence are much valued. Strengthening those institutions is vitally important. Viable financing alternatives must be found, given the over-dependence on Nigeria for much of the funding and military personnel which may not be sustainable in the long term. ECOWAS has developed a new ‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace Building and Security’ based on lessons learned from its peacekeeping efforts in the region. This mechanism includes both an early warning system and a deployment and support system for peace building operations in countries deemed to be on the verge of conflict. The organisation has been known to be robustly pro-active in its ‘Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation’, working in collaboration with the AU and the UN. ECOWAS has also made substantial progress in the area of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DRR) programmes in respect of former combatant groups, and also in providing conflict-related humanitarian assistance. The political climate in West Africa has improved considerably during the last decade. Countries such as Ghana and Cape Verde have blazed an enviable trail in democratic governance and sound economic management. Togo and Benin and post-conflict countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone have also conducted successful democratic elections. Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana and Mali have recorded significant improvements in economic and political governance. However, fragile states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone will continue to need a great deal of confidence building to sustain the peace (Barkan 2002). Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 12

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The sub-region is also seeing increased institutionalisation of democratic norms and rejection of military coups and other non-constitutional ways of changing government. When relative calm is restored, it is important that confidence-building measures are sustained by strengthening institutions and improving livelihoods.

2.3 Central Africa Central Africa is a rich and diverse region, comprising predominantly Francophone countries and one Spanish-speaking country, Equatorial Guinea, and a Lusophone country, São Tomé and Principe. With the discovery of oil in Chad and Equatorial Guinea, their economic prospects seem brighter than ever before. Unfortunately, Central Africa seems to suffer from the proverbial ‘resource curse’ more than most other sub-regions of the continent. While West Africa is seeing the return of peace, Central Africa is still largely enmeshed in conflict, active or latent. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been engulfed in civil war for over a decade. The conflict has claimed some 5.4 million lives, with catastrophic effects on livelihoods and physical infrastructure (Shah 2010). There can be little hope of genuine democracy in the Congo until peace returns to the country. Chad, like several other countries in the region, remains a ‘nominal’ democracy. For Chad, the new-found wealth from oil has not yet translated into a qualitative improvement in living conditions, mainly due to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the political elites. During February 2010 the UN Human Rights Commission underlined ‘impunity’ as a major factor undermining democratic governance in Chad (UNHCHR 2010). One nominal democracy that has been a success (if controversial) is Gabon. The late President Omar Bongo had been one of Africa’s longest reigning ‘monarchical’ rulers, embodying the classic paradigm of the ‘African big man rule’. His death in 2009 provided hope for a new lease of life for the oil-rich country. Under rather controversial circumstances his son Ali Bongo emerged as the winner of the presidential elections, paving the way to a successful transition.

2.4 Summary and conclusions In this brief overview, I have surveyed the emergence of democratic governance in West and Central Africa. Both sub-regions have been ravaged by violent conflicts that have devastated communities and local economies. Within West Africa, we are seeing a return to peace, although the situation remains fragile in several countries. Several other West African countries have made notable democratic transitions. In Central Africa, however, the situation is tense. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 13

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Conflict remains a strong defining feature of the sub-region, with a majority of ‘nominal democracies’ that have visible democratic institutions but often function outside the remit of these institutions. The discovery of oil in several countries provides a window of opportunity, but there is no guarantee that such new-found wealth will not exacerbate simmering tensions and lead to renewed resource conflict. The international community needs to support democratic coalitions that commit to constructive transformation in West and Central Africa. Ultimately, the future of democracy rests with the citizens of Africa themselves, as they unite to insist on better governance, freedom, democracy and social justice.

Notes 1 See Bratton and van de Walle (1997) for a comprehensive discussion of these issues. 2 Until the Liberian civil war ended, for example, it was estimated that the conflict had claimed 10% of the population while a third of the remainder were refugees in neighbouring countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, it is estimated that more than 800,000 people have been displaced while over 400,000 fled the country. These displacements exert a heavy burden on both host and ‘source’ countries, disrupting local economies and eroding the reservoir of social capital and networks which enable poor and vulnerable groups to cope under desperate conditions. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 14 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 15

3 Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Ghana: Regime Limitation and the Imperative of Reform

Emmanuel O. Akwetey, Executive Director, Institute for Democratic Governance, Ghana

3.1 Multi-party elections and polarisation Analysis of post-colonial Africa’s democratisation has, for nearly two decades now, focused mainly on constitutional reform and the challenge of managing competitive multi-party electoral processes. In this process of transition from authoritarian one-party states or military juntas to competitively elected governments, the formulation and promulgation of new liberal and human- rights centred constitutions have been as important as developing the capacity of independent electoral management bodies to professionally deliver credible multi-party elections. The driving force of the transition is the idea that professionally managed electoral processes lend credibility to the electoral democratic system, engender public confidence and commitment to the system; and enhance the legitimacy of elected governments to decisively take bold measures to improve the wellbeing of their citizens with broad-based support. The idea that national elections – parliamentary and presidential – that are credible and peaceful will inject a huge dose of legitimacy that then gives elected governments the mandate to launch bold policy initiatives and govern with broad-based public support has turned out to be untrue in practice. Increasingly, credible elections alone have not been effective in facilitating inclusive democratic governance and delivering accelerated growth with pro- poor and equitable social development in the post-election period. On the contrary, they have been closely associated with anxiety over the flaring up of tensions in societies with structurally and consistently weakened national cohesion and lack of nation-building in post-colonial Africa’s multi-ethnic states. This tendency, which is often associated with political parties’ need to win elections and therefore the mandate to govern through the mobilisation of social, political and ideological bias in society, occurs every four or five years. In a multi-party political contest it is difference rather than unity or harmony in society that is mostly emphasised. This upsets the multi-ethnic, socio- cultural, class, gender, regional, political and ideological faultlines of Africa’s post-colonial nations. Closely contested elections like those held in 15 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 16

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(December 2007), Zimbabwe (April and June 2008), and Ghana (December 2008) show particularly strongly the tensions, polarisations and political dilemmas that multi-party elections inflict on heterogeneous societies. Because competitive multi-party elections periodically agitate the structural faultlines of a society and upset national cohesion in the fragile multi-ethnic African states, it is questionable whether the liberal democratic regimes to which this voting system belongs is appropriate as a political and legal- institutional framework for consolidating democracy in Africa in the 21st century.

3.2 Dominant political choice in the 21st century African governments, civil society and the international community have all declared a strong preference for the liberal democratic path of governance over the authoritarian. This preference is publicly stated in the AU Constitutive Act;1 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance;2 New Partnership for Africa’s Development;3 and the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance.4 It is consciously declared to affirm collective rejection of the post-colonial authoritarian one-party state and/or military regime as a viable framework for sustainable development in Africa. This rejection has become an important source of the consolidation of democracy in contemporary Africa. The authoritarian option exercised through military coups or through tampering with the constitutional term limits of incumbent presidents in order to keep them in power is not endorsed by the African Union or the Regional Economic Communities. Such acts are no longer tolerated and are actively discouraged through international pressure and the imposition or threat of sanctions. Thus by signing up to a set of democratic governance norms, standards and legal frameworks – including multi-party democratic elections – African governments and leaders formally and decisively broke with their authoritarian past and took a leap of faith into the future. Their decisions, it must be emphasised, were not made in isolation from the aspirations of the people. Long before the formulation or adoption of continental and regional conventions and protocols on democracy, elections and governance, the African peoples and citizens had firmly expressed their political preference for that system. In their demand through diverse political and legal struggles for the respect and fulfilment of their human rights, freedom, participation, representation and accountability they also affirmed their preference for liberal and participatory democracy and opposition to the authoritarian regimes of the past. The notion that several African countries have successfully held successive multi-party elections has been celebrated as the triumph of liberal democracy. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 17

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Multi-party elections preserve the liberal space and enable civil society and media actors to enjoy their civil and political rights and liberties. Eligible voters in particular have become confident about exercising their right to both demand accountability and vote governments in and out of power. In countries such as Ghana, where five successive national elections have been held since 1992 and two parties have alternated power after serving two four-year terms each, popular commitment to multi-party may be at an all time high. The politicians and political parties are beginning to show sensitivity and greater responsiveness to their electorate. This is happening in a way that sometimes begs the question ‘who leads whom?’ after national elections. Is it the ‘popular’ opinion canvassed by the media or the elected government’s clear political and ideological direction and control over the choice of public policies? The point is that Ghana’s five consecutive multi-party elections and active citizens’ participation in them suggest that substantial and palpable progress has occurred in the consolidation of the liberal democratic order, compared to the period between 1957 and 1992, when multi-party democratic politics and elected governments were short lived and repeatedly repressed by authoritarian governments. From one-party states to ruling military councils, democratic electoral politics has soared for nearly two decades and appears to be consolidating.5

3.3 Fragility of democratic consolidation Despite its relative peace and credibility, Ghana’s successive multi-party elections and peaceful changes of government alone are not adequate measures of the consolidation of democracy in the country. The consolidation of democracy everywhere is the joint function of credibly managed multi-party electoral processes and, thereafter, judiciously managed political and administrative change processes. There is a view that the positive spinoffs of multi-party elections have not effectively facilitated inclusive democratic governance or accelerated growth and equitable social development (Hameso 2002). Some say, they have also failed to facilitate the restoration of national cohesion in this multi-ethnic society, after repeatedly arousing tension by electioneering in each of the five presidential and parliamentary elections (Hameso 2002). In fact, the polarisation of society and politicisation of every public policy issue have become more prominent in the post-elections era, with policy dialogue, consensus-building and collaboration between the parties tenuous. Contrary to the belief that liberal democracies check and balance state power by separating and locating that power to the executive, legislative and judicial arms of state, there is evidence that in the post-elections era, elected govern- ments and ruling political parties wield a monopoly of executive power at all Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 18

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levels of governance – central, sectoral, and local, as well as political and economic. This makes almost complete the exclusion of the opposition from access to institutional resources and opportunities in the public sector economy. These features of post-elections ‘democratic’ politics are not transient; they are rather enduring and pervasive throughout the four-year term to the next election and beyond. These features are stark reminders of the zero-sum, winner- takes-all political culture that rendered post-colonial authoritarian regimes and governments repressive and illiberal. Their near totalitarian and unrestrained fondness for crushing political opposition and denying political opponents their human and democratic rights lives on. The problem, as many analysts have acknowledged, is that this culture of zero-sum politics persists as the most enduring political legacy of the authoritarian post-colonial state. It persists to the detriment of consolidating democracy fully by advancing human development inclusively within a democratic governance setting. Thus, while recent democratisation has succeeded somewhat in establishing a constitutional order that limits state power in relation to the individual citizen (for example through bills of human rights), and in distributing power in a manner that seeks to both check and balance the exercise of state power by different state organs in Ghana, the monopoly over executive power that effectively excludes political opponents and political opposition from access to the institutional resources and opportunities of the public sector shows the system’s serious limitations. On the whole, zero-sum, winner-takes-all politics has repeatedly failed to moderate or enhance management of the decentralising pressures that render national cohesion fragile in a heterogeneous and multi-ethnic society. Power politics aggravates suspicion and mistrust as well as hostility and acrimony, and it turns political rivalry into a near state of war between partisan governments and any member of society considered to be part of the opposition. Furthermore, it exploits ethnic divisions to the detriment of national unity, denying ‘opponents’ the political and economic space they are entitled to by virtue of their citizenship. It foments and aggravates the polarisation of the nation at all levels of society and governance, in both the economic and political domain. These outcomes of the zero-sum political game have far-reaching and adverse implications for human development, and need to be dealt with.

3.4 Strain on accelerated human development The period after credible national elections has also been associated with an intense feeling of insecurity and instability, especially among the outgoing political and administrative elites and the mass following. Those who lose elections feel vulnerable to economic and social insecurity as well as being cast Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 19

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into political oblivion. As some experienced politicians in Ghana have remarked, ‘being in opposition is like being condemned to hell’. This view is shared to a significant extent by the administrative elites or bureaucrats in all sectors of the state – civil service, public service and security agencies. While the bureaucrats are often afraid that their career progression could be affected, the politicians feel threatened by joblessness and impoverishment. Although some are technically qualified as professionals, for many outgoing politicians there are few opportunities to re-establish themselves in a non- political job in either the public or private sectors. In this regard the feeling that ‘being in opposition is like being condemned to hell’ is rather revealing. If elites who, without their political party labels, are well equipped to play other meaningful roles in the economic and social development of their country cannot do so after national elections, then the exclusionary fact of zero-sum politics does a great disservice to economic and social development by mismanaging or neglecting to deploy a critical segment of the most developed human resource of the nation. Similarly, if many young people are denied access to gainful employment simply on the grounds of political party affiliation or association, then the full human development of the country can only ever be sub-optimal. In the period after credible national elections a great many critical human development issues require the full deployment of the intellectual, technical, and professional competencies and resources of the critical mass of citizens if they are to be resolved effectively. Zero-sum power politics undermines such efforts and, thereby, undermines human development and total commitment to the democratic governance system that enables politicians in government to politically discriminate against their opponents as described earlier. Not sur- prisingly, opposition politicians outside parliament do not effectively partici- pate in the public policy dialogue processes that are launched by their opponents in government. In opposition, both the leaders and members of the ruling National Democratic Congress and the members of the former government (the New Patriotic Party) devoted considerable time and effort to internal elections as well as to electioneering against their opponents in government. By doing so, they devoted more time to campaigning for elections that would not take place for four years and participated less in current public policy thinking and policy-making. As opposition politicians show more commitment to mobilising bias and stirring up differences and divisions, inevitably human development will progress in this direction. Regrettably, the negative effects of the zero-sum political power game on human development in the period between elections have not been systematically researched, despite widespread displeasure with its consequence. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 20

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3.5 The new reform imperative Fortunately, growing public displeasure of the zero-sum political power game is making a compelling case for further reform of the liberal democratic political system. As described earlier, the system delivers a monopoly over executive power at all levels of governance to elected governments and ruling political parties. It is an impediment to the promotion of inclusive governance and accelerated and sustainable human development because it foments political exclusion and social polarisation as well as partisan politicisation of the national development process. Consequently, it fails to promote the judicious management of the democratic governance and human development processes of the country, both during and after the transfer of political power between governments. Although a general lack of comprehensive analysis of the full range of the challenges, risks and prospects of post-elections transition processes has hampered a full understanding of how judicious management of such transition processes can make democratic governance more inclusive, the dysfunctions of the zero-sum political game are quite clearer. The methods of exclusion vary, ranging from forced resignations, dismissals, persecution and intimidation to denial of appointments and economic opportunities to individuals and groups of people who are identified as political and ideological opponents. This practice violates the rights of citizens and diminishes the human dignity and development of individuals and groups mainly for political reasons. As a carry-over of the old authoritarian regime, the persistence of the zero- sum political game exposes a major weakness of the liberal democratic regime in the African context. The liberalisation of political space and reform of institutional arrangements to limit state power and expand the scope of freedom of individual citizens and groups through systems of separation of powers and checks and balances has fallen short of dismantling the monopoly over executive power that the zero-sum power system confers on elected governments. So far, the liberal democratic regime has effectively introduced a principle of alternation of power between political elites organised as different political parties. It has also organised the sharing of legislative power between the ruling and opposition, or majority and minority, political parties in parliament. However, what it has failed to do is to complement the alternation of political power through multi-party elections with appropriate institutional arrangements that would transform zero-sum power politics into a shared or inclusive system of executive power. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 21

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3.6 Reform of the transition management regime Since zero-sum political power is effectively exercised in the period after national elections, dismantling this power would require nothing short of a comprehensive reform of the system under which administrative and political transitions are managed. The findings of a recent review of Ghana’s experience in managing post-election transition processes since 1992 indicate that significant gaps exists between the country’s capacity to manage electoral processes credibly and effectively and its capacity to manage conflict and co-operation processes judiciously in the post-election period. The 1992 Constitution recognises the importance of an orderly changeover of government, which is one of the virtues of good governance and political accountability. The Constitution established the Electoral Commission to preside over and manage the conduct of elections in Ghana. Since its establish- ment in 1993 it has incrementally developed its institutional, human, policy, legislative, technical and financial resources to manage the electoral process. The Commission has looked both inward and outward to develop its capacity and has held five consecutive elections, coping successfully with the growing complexity of each. It has introduced conflict management mechanisms, as well as policy dialogue platforms that enable it to engage state agencies, political parties, civil society actors and the media, as well as international organisations including donors, as and when it sees fit. The Electoral Commission has, on the whole, been an effective instrument for ensuring relatively peaceful elections and change of governments. However, it looks as if the framers of the 1992 Constitution assumed that that once elections have been credible and a winner declared there would be an orderly transition from one government to another. Based on this assumption, no formal structures were put in place or proposed to deal with the transition, aside from the constitutional stipulation of when the old parliament should be dissolved and the newly elective parliament sworn in, and when the elected executive president should also take his oath and be installed. The absence of a clearly mandated state institution to oversee political and administrative transition has deprived the process of an official umpire, leaving the outgoing and the elected governments to manage the transition processes directly. The outcome has been an often chaotic, bizarre, acrimonious and confrontational transition that puts the zero-sum political power game into bold relief. Compared to the capacity to manage national elections peacefully and credibly, the country’s capacity to manage political and administrative transitions efficiently is questionable. As the exercise of zero-sum executive power gathers momentum in the interval between elections, the assumption that credible and peaceful elections will create conditions for bold development initiatives has Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 22

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been shown to have been too optimistic. And as the political conflict, tension, and breakdown of dialogue between the major political parties intensifies, the under-development, inadequacy, and ineffectiveness of the existing system for managing transitions becomes clear. This has resulted in the rather poor management of conflict and cooperation during political and administrative transitions, with adverse consequences for governance and development effectiveness after the installation of newly elected governments.

3.7 Conclusion The failure of the liberal democratic system to democratise the monopoly of executive power that the zero-sum political system epitomises is the greatest challenge to consolidating democracy fully beyond electoral mechanics in a country like Ghana. What is required is the creation of a set of principles and institutional mechanisms that effectively promote both the alternation of power through multi-party elections with the sharing of executive power through its effective devolution in the post-elections era to promote meaningful inclusive governance. It would appear that the ideal system for combining the alternation and sharing of political power in a manner that transform zero- sum politics into an inclusive governance system regime that advances human development and national cohesion in Africa’s multi-ethnic states is yet to be invented. The problematic power-sharing arrangements and the centralisation of power in federal regimes, as well as the failure to devolve power effectively in unitary states, shows how widespread is the problem with assuming that the zero-sum political power system will consolidate democracy throughout Africa. The challenge now is to move to the next step of consolidating democratic governance in Africa by thinking through and implementing appropriate institutional arrangements to effectively democratise executive power after elections and put an end to the zero-sum political system that is undermining accelerated human development in Africa.

Notes 1 See http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm 2 The full title of the ECOWAS Protocol is the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, A/SP1/12/01, adopted in December 2001 and entered into force in 2005. 3 See http://www.nepad.org/images/framework.pdf 4 See http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/African_Charter_on_Democracy.pdf 5 See for example the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, http://www.moibrahimfoundation. org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index/scores-and-ranking, accessed on 22 November 2009. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 23

4 The ‘Projectisation’ of Governance: Its Implications for Development

Eric Ngang Ndeh Mboumien, Coordinator, North West Association of Development Organisations (NWADO), Cameroon

4.1 Introduction Comments by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, reflect a growing consensus that ‘good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development’. The twin concepts of democracy and governance feature regularly in development discourse today and have been linked to many issues of global concern including aid effectiveness, climate change, and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the local level these concepts are frequently linked to issues such as access to and delivery of essential services. The phrase ‘projectisation of governance’, coined by the author and used in the title of this paper, refers to donor-driven or prescriptive approaches to promoting governance at community level. Using practical examples from community- based activities in North West Cameroon, this paper highlights how value- based governance-oriented project approaches can be tailored to address the governance concerns at community level. This chapter consists of three sections. The first section introduces the concept of governance ‘zones’. The second section gives a short background to the traditional role of civil society in Cameroon vis-a-vis the state of governance in the country. In particular it explores the current approach to governance in the different ‘zones’ (national space, organisational and community) and its consequences. In part three, the author presents a ‘desired model’ to promote good governance at community level and looks at the roles of different stake- holders in this process. The paper concludes with some recommendations to enhance the promotion of participatory governance in Cameroon as a shared value among stakeholders in the development process.

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4.2 The ‘zones’ of governance In the author’s view, issues to consider when assessing the state of governance include: • Who has influence? • Whose voice is heard, who makes decisions? • How are decision-makers held to account? Though there are many definitions for the word governance, one the author has found very useful for this paper is ‘governance is about power, relationships and accountability’ (John et al. 2003).On the other hand good governance is also an issue for all individuals, agencies and organisations (state, private sector and civil society) that hold power in making decisions affecting access to rights (VSO 2007). Thus governance in a broad sense is not only about where to go, but also about who should be involved in decision-making, and in what capacity. In this context, Graham et al. (2003) identified four governance zones: • Governance in ‘global space’, or global governance which deals with issues outside the purview of individual governments. • Governance in ‘national space’, which is sometimes understood as the exclusive preserve of government. There may be many levels: national, provincial or state, indigenous, urban or local. Governance in this sphere is concerned with how other actors, such as civil society organisations, may play a role in taking decisions on matters of public concern and how different levels of government. • Organisational governance comprises the activities of organisations that are usually accountable to a board of directors. Some will be privately owned and operated, like businesses or corporations, while others may be publicly owned, for example hospitals, schools, or government corporations. • Community governance includes activities at a local level where the organising body may not assume a legal form and where there may not be a formally constituted governing board.

4.2.1 Civil society–government relations in Cameroon The democratic wind of change that blew across Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s did not leave the state of Cameroon untouched, as new legislation was adopted for political pluralism and multi-party politics. Since 1992 the government has conducted elections for local councils (1992, 1997, 2002, and Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 25

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2007), parliament (1992, 1997, 2004), and for the presidency of the republic (1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011 (forthcoming)). The conduct of previous elections damaged confidence in electoral processes as the main way for people to choose their leaders or practice their democratic, civic and political rights, with young people feeling particularly alienated. Since the 1980s CSOs in Cameroon have become more prominent in national development processes. In addition to their traditional service provision role, now they are also pivotal actors, contributing to policy development and stimulating dynamism at the local level, all of which leads to bottom-up pressure for social change. Although seen as a countervailing power to the state and a force for people’s participation in development processes, CSOs’ actions in Cameroon have in practice been sporadic and not well co-ordinated, making it difficult to assess impact. There have also been key questions surrounding the legitimacy, credibility and accountability of CSOs in Cameroon, and the government often based their arguments for relegating CSOs to the background on a lack of accountability. Parallel to formal mechanisms of democratic government, such as elections, parliamentary representation and processes, civil society organisations are uniquely placed to convey citizens’ aspirations and needs. In addition, CSOs contribute to the debate and development of public policy through information and analysis, raise awareness about mutual rights and obligations in society, and empower citizens to participate in decision-making that affects them. This traditional role of civil society in societal transformation and nation building in Cameroon has been compromised by political and social divides. Government– CSO relationships have often been tense, dominated by political controversy and in many instances informed by agendas set by the government. Partnership principles have been largely informed by government policies, some of which are aimed at downplaying the place and capability of CSOs to be co-actors in development. Private-sector partnerships are largely driven by the private sector and governments, with occasional input from donors. Principles of inter- national partnership have not helped much in bridging this gap. For example, the principle of alignment in the Paris Declaration can be summarised as donors aligning their development assistance with the development priorities and results-oriented strategies set out by the partner country (OECD 2005). In delivering this assistance, donors would progressively depend on partner countries’ own systems, providing capacity-building support to improve these systems, rather than establishing parallel systems of their own. Partner countries would undertake the necessary reforms that would enable donors to rely on their country systems (OECD 2005). In the author’s view, this principle has sometimes been interpreted by some governments to mean that civil society organisations should align themselves to central government policies. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 26

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4.3 Prescriptive approaches to promoting governance: Current situation in Cameroon Twenty years on from the reintroduction of multi-party politics, civil society actors continue to strive to put in place measures that will enhance their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of both the ruling powers and their stake- holders. Mbuagbo and Fru (2003) note the difficulties in promoting good governance and a democratic culture. They further note that, ‘individual and collective liberties that are enshrined in the National Constitution have not yet been brought out of the pages of documents and given practical expression with civil society and the media going through the bumpy road of this democratic transition’. Attempts by the government to introduce limited democratic reforms have fallen short of expectations. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2008a and 2009) lists Cameroon’s position as 141 out of 180 in 2008, and then dropped it further down to 146 out of 180 in 2009. Looking at the key elements of governance, the situation in Cameroon appears donor driven and prescriptive. This assertion is based on baseline surveys carried out in Cameroon by the North West Association of Development Organisations from 2005 to 2006. These surveys were carried in response to concerns raised by communities in the North West Region about the lack of access to basic essential services. Information and communication flow was one-way, and communities felt that issues and concerns were not being heard by local government officials.1 Model A (see Figure 4.1) shows a typical situation for the key stakeholders in North West Cameroon – a governance process at three levels: community, organisational and national (local councils, state services, CSOs and communities). The local government and state services continue to court international donors, and international NGOs (INGOs) and other partners in development accept conditionalities imposed by the international community in order to receive maximum donor funds. Due to the power imbalance, the service delivery model is characterised by a lack of confidence and resistance, and a passiveness to good governance and democratic processes. Aid interven- tions are carried out in a multitude of ways which are not always efficient or effective. The feedback received from the survey led to the design of the ‘Participation and Governance Programme’ in Cameroon, in collaboration with Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), which aims to improve the delivery of services in the North West Region of Cameroon. While this example is based on experiences at the community level, at national level the interplay between government structures and the various stakeholders manifests itself differently, as demonstrated in Figure 4.2. The Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 27

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Figure 4.1. Model A: The current situation for service delivery in Cameroon

Model A Current situation: service delivery

Other actors

Local council CSOs and INGO communities State services

Donors

Figure 4.2. Power distribution among different entities that occupy the social and economic landscape in Cameroon

CITIZENS CITIZENS Traditions

PRIVATE SECTOR GOVERNMENT Culture MEDIA History

CIVIL SOCIETY

CITIZENS Technology CITIZENS

Source: John et al. 2003: 4

size and thickness of the circles present a picture of the relative power of the four sectors of society in Cameroon: business, civil society (including the voluntary or not-for-profit sector), government and the media. The sectors overlap because the borders of these different entities are permeable with the emergence and promotion of public–private partnerships. In Cameroon most of the power is held by the government. The private sector is also becoming Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 28

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increasingly influential. The media plays a significant role in informing citizens and contributing to shape perceptions of public policy but have less power and representation in discussions of governance. Further observable consequences of this governance approach in Cameroon include:

• General confusion, suspicion and poor understanding of governance. Often the local realities are not understood by the international donor communities, the local council or the state’s services as their interest is focused on accessing more resources externally. Thus, good governance is often mentioned in the context of processes led by key stakeholders complying with donor conditionalities.

• Decision-making is often centralised, which makes it difficult for stakeholders to be able to check effectiveness and efficiency. Often external pressure is the primary motivation for promoting governance. In Cameroon, for example, the government has created various structures to promote governance, including the National Anti-corruption Committee (NACC) and the National Governance Observatory. But is their creation about global compliance or genuine increased willingness and commitment to improve governance?

• The pressure for good governance and use of democratic approaches is most often on people and not on processes and often the people’s interest are not taken into consideration in the different processes.

4.4 Governance and democracy promoted as a shared value (desired model based on the Cameroon experience) Following the inception phase of the Participation and Governance Programme referred to in the previous section, discussions were held with the key development stakeholders in Cameroon on the best ways to enhance democratic and governance processes. This resulted in the design of what is best described as Model B, a ‘desired’ good governance model (see Figure 4.3). The aim of this model is to develop and support governance systems, structures, policies and practices that empower disadvantaged people to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. The key stakeholders in this desired model include CSOs, communities, the government (local councils and state services), the private sector and the inter- national partners and donor community. Each of these actors has roles and obligations which if respected will enhance good governance in Cameroon. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 29

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Figure 4.3. Model B: ‘Desired’ good governance model for Cameroon

Local council VOICE CSOs and communities RESPONSE State services and  private sector

INGO

Donors

Other actors

The priority for communities and civil society organisations is to be able to exercise their rights and responsibilities, and to access basic services to which they are entitled. In order for them to be able to do this, they need to be able to actively participate in mainstream decision-making processes from which they are often currently excluded. This means they need to have a ‘voice’. ‘Voice’ is about how people’s needs and demands are communicated to duty-bearers. The state is usually the main duty-bearer and is ultimately responsible for the delivery of basic services. (In cases where basic services are provided by the private sector or civil society organisations these organisations can also be considered to be duty-bearers.) Voice encompasses the ways that civil society can influence duty-bearers to develop better policy and practice that effectively address people’s rights and result in equitable access to appropriate, quality services. Such measures include complaints procedures, redress mechanisms, organised protest, lobbying and campaigning, as well as direct participation in decision-making structures and processes. There is a need for responsive and accountable government institutions that respond to the voice of the people. These institutions exist at all govern- ment administrative levels – national, regional and local. Actors include civil servants, public sector service providers, policy-makers, politicians, local coun- cillors and other elected representatives. ‘Responsiveness’ refers to the extent to which duty-bearers respond to the views, complaints and suggestions (that is the ‘voice’) of service users. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 30

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Responses may involve changing organisational structure, culture, policy, resource allocation and service delivery patterns in order to deliver more equitable, appropriate, and high-quality services. The international community (INGOs and donors) need to support this internal demand by encouraging those who should facilitate democratic processes (duty-bearers) to provide favourable environments and opportunities for the growth of democracy. For people to influence decisions that affect their lives, they need an opportunity and the space in which to express their needs and demand their rights. Duty-bearers need to be both willing and able to respond to this voice, and they need to be held accountable for their decisions and actions. In the desired model, democracy and governance can effectively be promoted with the active involvement of the people concerned, through improving their understanding and reinforcing their voices. An internal demand for democracy and good governance needs to be created, and each of the entities in Cameroon’s social and economic landscape is important in helping good governance to thrive. The absence sometimes of political will on the part of local councils and government is a major threat to true democracy and governance, and international NGOs and the donor community can help to remove this threat. All stakeholders can do this by helping decision-makers to be good listeners, sensitive to the requests of those at the grassroots, and to respond effectively to their voices. If the promotion of democracy and good governance is prescriptive through aid and seen as a response to conditionality from the international community, it absolutely enhances poor governance and the unavoidable negative impacts (Model A). Such demands need to be promoted nationally and adopted as core values by the stakeholders (Model B). In that way, the demand from the international community will complement and support the internal demand. The key point to note here is that governance approaches should be discussed and adapted to local realities and values. In addition, local councils and government institutions should be able to understand the voice of the people and have the will and inclination to respond effectively and efficiently.

4.5 What NWADO are currently doing to enhance governance based on the desired model (Model B) Promoting the ‘desired’ model at local levels in Cameroon and sharing experiences at national level has enabled CSOs to be seen as one of the key actors in promoting well-functioning democratic and governance processes. The North West Association of Development Organisations (NWADO) has been able to enhance the voices of CSOs and communities in Cameroon by Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 31

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promoting good governance as a shared value and promoting partnerships for public service delivery. In 2008, for example, NWADO initiated a process to develop a comprehensive framework to promote accountability through a Code of Ethics for Cameroon Civil Society. This process is now also being adopted nationally with the support of the Commonwealth Foundation. CSOs are appropriating this code and see it as an effective tool to enhance their accountability, credibility and legitimacy, aimed at promoting public–private partnerships. The experience is being shared with CSOs, umbrella organisations and networks in other African countries. This process will enable civil society organisations to work with local authorities and state institutions for better service delivery to citizens using the ‘desired’ approach to promoting good governance. In this initiative, better services are the major deliverables of the good governance and democratic process. The heart of the approach is organisational development that promotes debate about and demand for good governance from within civil society organisations in Cameroon. A code of conduct is also acting as a self-regulatory mechanism for organisations to share their experiences on good governance. This in turn generates credibility and improved confidence in CSOs by local authorities, who slowly begin to look at these organisations as partners in development. This process shows how effective internally driven (bottom-up) demand for democracy and governance is compared to depending on external funding or a prescriptive approach to governance which disenfranchises key stakeholders (especially state institutions) and does not make them accountable to their communities. Since the Participation and Governance Programme was introduced in North West Cameroon in 2007 there have been visible improve- ments in access to and delivery of basic essential services. Local communities have a greater say in decision-making processes at local level, and communities are also organising themselves a lot better to respond to issues that they care about. But, more importantly, the author believes that three years on there has been a change in attitude and behaviours by communities, community groups and local government officials and that there is now better collaboration between various stakeholders and mutual trust and respect.

4.6 Conclusion First, good governance should be promoted as a shared value and adopted as part of organisational culture at all levels. Good governance needs to be meaningful for local communities and this will form the basis for sound dialogue for development. Second, linkages with other local, national, and international communities should be promoted which would enable communities to share their Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 32

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development experience and values, including good governance, learning together for progress. Only thorough reform and the introduction of genuine democratic principles that incorporate the masses, especially the rural majority, could begin to entrench a strong, democratic and good-governance culture in Cameroon and Africa as a whole.

Notes 1 Model A was developed following participation in a governance survey in the North West Region of Cameroon organised by civil society organisations to assess the relationship between different stakeholders on access to, and delivery of basic services. The diagram is a visual representation of stakeholder perceptions of the relationship and power dynamics between civil society, local communities and local government. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 33

5 Governance in the Caribbean: Toward Renewal

Wendy C. Grenade, Lecturer, University of the West Indies, Barbados

5.1 Introduction This chapter explores critical aspects of governance within the member states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).1 It provides the context for the next chapter, Victor Hart’s Good Governance as an Anti-corruption Tool. Hart discusses the work of Trinidad and Tobago’s Transparency Institute (TTTI), which seeks to ‘combat corruption mainly through the promotion of transparency, accountability and good governance in both the public and private sectors’. As a caveat, I am cautious about the loose use of terms such as ‘good governance’ and ‘transparency’, which are battered and unsettled concepts. Like Parris (2008: 337) I too have grown ‘weary and wary’ of the imported buzz words that currently infest our everyday discourse. These concepts are constructed as part of hegemonic narratives that shape the contemporary neoliberal global order. Yet, I accept Kaufmann’s argument that ‘governance matters because there is a distinctive causal relationship between good governance on the one hand, [and] national growth and development issues on the other’ (Kaufmann 1999 cited in Apreda, 2005–2006: 49). Following this introduction, this chapter explores the concept of governance generally and distinguishes between corporate, public and global governance in an increasingly inter-connected world. It then analyses the strengths of and challenges to governance in the Caribbean. Finally, it suggests a new approach to governance.

5.2 Conceptualising governance Governance is a broad concept which goes beyond the notion of government. The latter is concerned primarily with the state and denotes a mix of institutions, behaviours and processes that deal with power, legitimacy, authority and the distribution of resources in the public domain. Governance, on the other hand, is a complex web. It involves the interaction of state and non-state actors who negotiate power and decision-making space to influence policy on cross-cutting issues and at multiple and overlapping levels. For conceptual clarity, this section distinguishes between corporate, public and global governance. 33 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 34

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Corporate governance refers to ‘the system by which companies are controlled, directed and made accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders’ (Demirag 1998, cited in Apreda 2005–2006: 47). The OECD developed five principles of corporate governance: ‘rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the Board’ (cited in Apreda, 2005–2006: 47). In the developing world, corporate governance is intricately linked to other dimensions of governance, given the role of the state in the economy, increasing emphasis on public–private partner- ships and dependency on foreign investment. Public governance is a form of governance that focuses on, among other things, constitutional and legal frameworks; institutional architecture; the exercise of authority, the structure of power relations and checks and balances; the process by which government officials, representatives and the judiciary are elected, appointed, monitored and replaced; the integrity of the judiciary and law enforcement; accountability, transparency, conflicts of interests and good practice; political clientelism and corruption; and interest groups, the media and political parties (see Apreda 2005–2006: 49). This chapter focuses specifically on aspects of public governance, mindful of its relationship to corporate and global governance. Global governance refers to efforts to promote global responses to global issues that states do not have the capabilities to manage on their own. Such issues include the environment, global finance and global health. It involves inter-governmental arrangements as well as relationships among state and non- state actors. Global governance is imperative in an increasingly interconnected world. Yet it is problematic, since it is underpinned by unequal power relations. Institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have advanced the global governance agenda. In the 1980s and 1990s the IMF and WB embraced ‘good governance’ as a set of principles to guide their objectives in member countries (IMF 1997; World Bank 1992a; 1992b). The Fund’s ‘good governance’ platform is largely influenced by political and ideological factors. For the IMF ‘good governance’ means fostering a path to economic growth and development, boosting market confidence, and increasing private capital inflows to ensure macroeconomic stability. The IMF’s agenda for good governance stresses public sector trans- parency, accountability and institutional reform, among other criteria. The WB has similar objectives, although perhaps with greater emphasis on development. The 1992 WB report defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development (World Bank 1992a: 1 cited in Nanda, 2006, 272). The report defines three aspects of governance: (1) the form of political regime; Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 35

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(2) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s resources; and (3) the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions. Measurements of ‘good governance’ include: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (see Kaufmann et al. 2009). These are crucial ingredients to sustain effective political and socio-economic systems. It is worth noting that in recent years the IMF and WB have come in for criticism about the democratic deficits within their own institutions and they are under pressure to apply similar ‘good governance’ principles to themselves (Woods 2000; Stiglitz 2003; Thirkell-White 2004). Developing countries are generally under pressure to apply ‘good governance’ practices to be eligible for aid, other forms of donor support and debt forgiveness. While this is important, the need for ‘good governance’ must go beyond narrow market-driven imperatives. At its core, governance must be about making a difference to people’s lives.

5.3 Governance in the contemporary Caribbean Public governance in the Caribbean is intricately linked to the political system and the quality of democracy in the region. Since independence, Anglophone Caribbean states (except 1968–1992 and 1979–83) have sustained a tradition of liberal democracy and have creatively adapted the Westminster system (Dominguez et al. 1993; Huber 1993; Payne 1993). As Munroe (2000: 239) reminds us, on all recognised comparative measures of democracy, ‘the Caribbean remains the most democratic region in the world’. Based on data from Freedom House2 for the period 2005 to 2009, all CARICOM member states except Haiti were, for the most part, classified as free (that is they scored relatively high on indices such as political rights and civil liberties). CARICOM states (except Haiti) enjoy relative political stability and experience regular constitutional transfers of power through multi-party electoral competition. During the period 2005 to 2010, 15 elections were held in CARICOM’s 14 independent member states.3 In what was generally referred to as a ‘wind of change’, nine incumbents were defeated and there were peaceful transfers of power in each case.4 For the most part CARICOM member states have written constitutions, functioning state institutions and the trappings of formal democracy. Yet the political culture undermines ‘good governance’, which is a basic element and a desirable outcome of genuine democracy. A major contradiction of the Caribbean is its ability to sustain formal democracies within a political culture that lacks a genuine democratic ethos. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 36

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While Caribbean states are classified as the most ‘democratic’ in the world, this classification is based on a narrow conceptualisation of democracy. It draws on the Schumpeterian school, where free and fair elections are the primary determinant of democracy. The debate about democracy and governance in the Caribbean has gone beyond minimalist notions of democracy. A number of scholars have critiqued the quality of democracy in the Caribbean and have questioned the Westminster model as it has evolved in the region (Munroe 1999, 2000; Ryan 1999, 2000, 2002; Hinds 2008). A deep analysis reveals deficiencies in the Caribbean’s political culture. Since independence, what has evolved in the Caribbean is an adversarial political culture. Caribbean prime ministers have excessive powers and often marginalise opposition parties, co-opt or ostracise civil society organisations and alienate citizens. This is rooted in the Caribbean’s history. According to D’Agostino (2003):

In countries that had experienced long periods of colonialism, with the attendant institutions of the plantation and slavery, it is difficult to overcome deeply ingrained authoritarian legacies in order to promote and consolidate democracy.

British rule left its imprint on the political systems in the Anglophone Caribbean, and the doctrine that ‘the Crown can do no wrong’ has been used to justify the arbitrary exercise of executive powers (Thomas 1984: 95). This situation is exacerbated by the first-past-the-post (FPTP), winner- take-all electoral system, where undemocratic outcomes can ensue. In Grenada in 1999 the incumbent New National Party won all 15 parliamentary seats, so there was no parliamentary opposition in a parliamentary ‘democracy’. In 1998 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the opposition United Labour Party amassed 54.2% of the popular vote and the ruling New Democratic Party 45.8%, yet the latter won eight seats and the opposition seven. This is one of the major distortions of the FPTP system, where a party could win the popular vote but end up with fewer seats in parliament than their opposition. What does ‘good governance’ mean when this happens? Peters (1992: 9) aptly captures the essence of the Caribbean’s political culture when he contends that what is peculiar about the Eastern Caribbean political system is the absolute authority that government inherits. He notes that government officials are able to circumvent the laws that they have enacted and to use public resources for personal gain. Peters points out that while partisan politics is a normal phenomenon in modern democracies, Caribbean governments have taken the concept to its zenith. As a result, he claims, when a party is elected to power it virtually eliminates the opposition through patronage, control of the media and legislative action where necessary. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 37

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According to Peters, these actions are in part responsible for the domination of one party for decades in most of these islands. He notes too though that the Caribbean states have tended to avoid the more repressive forms of authoritarianism that characterise many other developing states. What one has instead is a ‘benign’ or ‘lackadaisical’ constitutional dictatorship rather than a repressive one (Peters 1992: 9). He makes the point that, informed by the slavery experience, leaders know what their limits are and are often repudiated by electorates when they become too arrogant, out of touch or cross the line of what the public deems acceptable. Corruption is another major cause for concern. Hart, in this volume, refers to corruption as ‘the misuse of entrenched power for private gain’. Data from Freedom House reveal that allegations of corruption have been levelled at public officials in the Caribbean on several occasions. The publications highlight examples from across the Caribbean (Freedom House 2005–2010). Corruption is facilitated, in part, by limited checks and balances, high-handed leadership, political clientelism and lack of transparency and accountability. The Caribbean’s dependency on foreign capital also creates avenues for corruption. The Allen Stanford case in Antigua and Barbuda5 is a stark example of this. As Freedom House (2010) reports, ‘’s political rights rating declined from 2 to 3 due to the collapse of a massive fraudulent investment scheme’. This is as a result of the region’s dependency on foreign investors and its vulnerability to fraud and corruption. This dimension of corruption relates directly to the interplay between corporate, public and global governance. Corruption, in all its manifestations, punctures trust between citizens and the state, undermines state–society relations, decreases investor confidence, and can undermine tourism and other sectors of the economy. Endemic corruption threatens the well-being of the polity, economy and society.

5.4 Toward renewal Undeniably, the governance architecture in the Caribbean is inextricably linked to the political culture. While Caribbean countries benefit from formal democracy, there is need for democratic renewal (Munro 1999; 2000; Ryan 1999, 2000, 2002; Hinds 2008). A common thread in the literature is the need to reform the Westminster system; institute constitutional and electoral reforms; formulate integrity legislation; devise mechanisms for accountability; promote economic equality, and generate space for civil society. Hinds (2008) advances a power-sharing approach. These measures can have far-reaching effects in strengthening institutions and transforming the political culture of the Caribbean. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 38

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A new governance model must go beyond formal state-centric institutions and must be culturally sensitive and community focused. To address the question of citizen alienation, there is a need to foster healthy nationalisms; encourage consciousness-building movements within communities; and promote trust between citizens and the state. This will encourage transparency and greater accountability. Finally, given the small size of the Caribbean and the common threats faced by member states individually and collectively, deepening Caribbean integration is an imperative and must be a central pillar in constructing a new governance model in the region. A number of positive steps have been taken to enhance functional cooperation within the CARICOM region, particularly in the areas of disaster management, health, education and security (see Thomas 2008). As I have argued elsewhere, ‘effective regional governance arrangements are critical’ (Grenade 2008:114).

5.5 Final thoughts The broad question is whither governance in the contemporary Caribbean? This chapter broadly conceptualised governance and then focused specifically on some of the strengths and challenges of governance in the Caribbean. I argued that Caribbean citizens generally enjoy political rights and civil liberties, and that there are functioning state institutions and regular constitutional transfers of power through multi-party elections. Yet despite the trappings of formal democracy there are grave deficiencies, such as excessive prime ministerial powers, a distorted electoral system, clientelism and an alienated citizenry. When taken together, these issues can breed corruption and under- mine ‘good governance’ and transparency. This chapter offers suggestions to renew Caribbean governance, which include a transformation of the political culture; an institutional overhaul; and better cultural sensitivity, a community orientation to governance, and deepening regional integration. In the final analysis the future of Caribbean people, the relevance of Caribbean states and the viability of Caribbean economies depend heavily on the quality of governance within the region. Consequently, the work of organisations such as the Trinidad and Tobago Transparency Institution is necessary and urgent, as Victor Hart discusses in the next chapter. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 39

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Notes 1 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a regional arrangement which comprises fourteen states and one non-independent territory in the Caribbean. CARICOM member states are: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, , The Commonwealth of , The Commonwealth of , The of St. Christopher and , Grenada, Guyana, , Haiti, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. In this paper I use ‘the Caribbean’ and ‘CARICOM’ interchangeably. 2 Freedom in the World is Freedom House’s annual report, which provides comparative assessments of global political rights and civil liberties for 193 countries and a number of disputed territories worldwide. 3 General elections were held in the 14 independent CARICOM member states during 2005– 2010: St. Vincent and the Grenadines (7 December 2005); Haiti (7 February 2006); Guyana (28 August 2006); St. Lucia (11 December 2006); The Commonwealth of the Bahamas (2 May 2007); Jamaica (3 September, 2007); Trinidad and Tobago (5 November 2007); Barbados (15 January 2008); Belize (7 February 2008); Grenada (8 July 2008); Antigua and Barbuda (12 March 2009); The Commonwealth of Dominica (18 December 2009); St. Christopher and Nevis (25 January 2010); Trinidad and Tobago (24 May 2010); and Suriname (25 May 2010). It is worth noting that general elections were held in Trinidad and Tobago in 2007 and 2010 respectively and that Montserrat is a non-independent British territory. 4 Governments changed in The Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago 5 On 17 February 2009, Robert Allen Stanford, a prominent financier and philanthropist, who was a citizen of Antigua and Barbuda and the , was charged by the US Securities and Exchange Commission with fraud and multiple violations of US securities laws for alleged ‘massive ongoing fraud’ involving US$8 billion in certificates of deposits (Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allen_Stanford, accessed 13 June 2010). Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 40 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 41

6 Good Governance as an Anti-corruption Tool

Victor Hart, former Chairman, Trinidad and Tobago Transparency Institute (TTTI),* with input from Josh Drayton

6.1 Introduction The Caribbean is faced with a number of challenges regarding good governance. Notwithstanding its historical development which has led to the adoption or adaptation of many British institutions, good governance remains a challenge to the formal hierarchical structure of power relations that has dominated government policy-making and implementation in much of the region where executive control remains strong (see Grenade’s chapter in this volume). This chapter presents an exploratory framework which suggests that corruption, born of poor governance standards, could be curbed by good governance achieved through enhanced participation of stakeholders in both policy processes and the monitoring and evaluation of public and social policy. Although this chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive framework for engaging with the three stakeholders in this process – government, the private sector and civil society – it postulates that the lack of a participatory approach hinders good governance processes and results in poorly functioning systems and policies.

6.1.1 The Commonwealth Caribbean The Commonwealth Caribbean comprises the twelve politically independent former British colonies plus six Overseas Territories: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos. In August 2009 the UK suspended the Turks and Caicos’ self-government after allegations of ministerial corruption. The prerogative that belonged to the ministerial government and the House of Assembly has been vested in the islands’ governor since August 2009 for a period of up to two years. The 12 independent countries have joined with Suriname and Haiti (non- Commonwealth countries) and Montserrat to form a 15-member economic bloc called CARICOM that is currently moving towards the establishment of a single market and economy. The remaining British Territories have associate

*At the time of writing this paper Victor Hart was the Chairman of the Trinidad and Tobago Transparency Institute (2007–2010). Mr Hart stepped down as Chairman on 24 June 2010. Josh Drayton is TTTI’s Programme Officer. 41 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 42

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membership. Within CARICOM, there is an economic sub-group known as the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) comprising nine geographically close island states. A few CARICOM members are discussing some aspects of political unity for future consideration. There are differences between the Caribbean Commonwealth states but, given their shared British colonial backgrounds and similar ethnic mix and cultures, there are more things that unite than divide these countries’ citizens. Most problems that affect Trinidad and Tobago are replicated in other CARICOM states and the solutions are often similar. One such problem is the crying need for good governance.

6.2 Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago is a democracy based on the Westminster/Whitehall model, characterised by a bicameral legislature with a house of representatives (elected members) and senate (appointed), a written constitution with enshrined Bill of Rights, a ‘first past the post’ electoral system and a neutral public service. It gained independence from the UK in 1962 but retained the Queen as its head of state and a local governor general as her representative. The country became a Republic in 1976 and a president replaced the governor general. In the Commonwealth Caribbean Guyana is the only other Republic, but moves are afoot in a few other states to follow suit. The ethnic mix of Trinidad and Tobago’s population makes for an interesting example of multiculturalism at work and a generally peaceful co-existence of the races that is admired by all and is the envy of some. When oaths are being taken, in parliament and the law courts, it is common to see in use at the same ceremony the Holy Bible, the Holy Qur’an and the Bhagavad-Gita. The main races are African (40%) and East Indian (41%) (see Figure 6.1). Since independence, the otherwise peaceful political landscape in Trinidad and Tobago was disrupted on two occasions. The first, in 1970, was a grass- roots-led Black Power uprising that mimicked what was happening in USA and was supported by a Defence Force mutiny that was successfully put down. The second, in 1990, occurred when a local Black Muslim group invaded the country’s parliament and held its leaders hostage for six days (with some loss of lives), and that too was later put down by the state’s armed forces. Notwithstanding some racial tension, national elections are held peacefully every five years (maximum) and violence is rare. Trinidad and Tobago elected its first female Prime Minister on 24 May 2010, when Mrs Kamla Persad- Bissessar led a coalition called the People’s Partnership into government. The election was fought on the grounds of communication, transparency and accountability in governance and corruption (BBC News 2010). There was a Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 43

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Figure 6.1. Ethnic composition of Trinidad and Tobago

Notstated0.8% Other 0.3%

Mixed 20.5% African descent40% Chinese 0.3% White 0.6%

EastIndian descent41%

Source: CSO 2007

feeling that the government had become increasingly secretive in its dealings with the governed (BBC News 2010). Corruption had become a burning issue, yet there was very little public and transparent action to hold people to account for any wrongdoing. In that climate of poor governance several state institutions became ineffective and some appeared near collapse – all this in a country rich from oil and gas resources and with a per capita income of US$18,600 (second only in the Caribbean to The Bahamas where it is US$28,600), one of the highest rates in Latin America (Ali 2010).

6.3 The case for good governance It is important to distinguish between the terms ‘governance’ and ‘government’ because they are often misused. Governance has to do with the processes through which government achieves the will of the people, that is what a government does and how it does it. ‘Governance’ is the actual exercise of management power and policy, while ‘government’ is the instrument (usually, collective) that does it. Kjaer (2004: 191) states that there are two concepts of governance ‘... one is narrow relating to the management of networks, the other broad, referring to the process whereby rules of policy-making and implementation are set, applied and enforced’. Olsen (1978) described the relationships which exist within political systems similar to Westminster-type models in Figure 6.2. The exercise of power was based on the indirect rule of the citizens via their representatives. The legislative Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 44

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assembly represents the interest of the people and oversees the administrative decisions of the executive. The executive creates policies and is separated into two main sections which are distinct from each other: the politician and the administrator. The relationship between the two is hierarchical, with the politician at the top and the administrator at the bottom. The relationship between the administrator and the citizen was one of monopoly, where the state’s power over citizen’s lives was accepted based on indirect representation. Where the assembly acted as a check to the political directorate in the interest of the citizens, Olsen describes this as parliamentary governance.

Figure 6.2. The parliamentary governance chain

Legislative Executive assembly power

Sovereign Administrative people apparatus

Source: Olsen (1978) (Adapted from Kjaer 2004: 5621)

The system of governance in Figure 6.2 is what characterised the relationships between politicians, administrators and citizens in the Caribbean in the post- Independence era. Schmitter (1978) argues that a variance or type of governance existed whereby powerful groups were made almost permanent parts of the state’s decision-making apparatus. He defines such a system as ‘corporate governance’. Corporate governance is:

… a system of interest representation in which constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 45

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in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.

Schmitter is describing the type of relationship which exists between the trade unions and the state whereby legitimacy for agitation is granted by certifying the trade union which then negotiates with the state, for example for increases in wages (if a public organisation) or particular labour legislation. This is comparable to the model illustrated in Figure 6.3, which shows the relationship between the government, private sector and civil society – a contemporary governance arrangement. Schmitter’s views represent a challenge to the traditional monopoly of government of decision-making in the state’s interest. This is where the erosion of the centralisation, hierarchical, monopoly started.

Figure 6.3. Tripartite partnership model

Government

Civil Business society sector

In countries with accountable and transparent leadership, one sees today that governments do not wait for a case to be made to strengthen good governance as a means of combating corruption. They recognise more and more that there is a clear case for countries to fight corruption and that the antidote to corruption is transparency and accountability through good governance. However, countries sometimes have to be pushed in that direction and international regulatory frameworks and treaties and donor agencies’ requirements are often the external forces that drive this change. Of interest too is the push that comes from non-regulatory sources like investors, who today demand more information about corruption risks in a Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 46

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country before they decide to invest. This is so not only because of investors’ concerns that their investments will suffer if/when the host country engages in corrupt practices but equally importantly because their organisations could lose their reputation and may face civil and criminal law suits that could lead to heavy fines and/or imprisonment of personnel. As a result, investors are coming to expect and demand greater transparency, accountability and probity from host countries’ government leaders and public officials with whom they do business. Therefore, members of civil society must recognise and ensure that national leaders also recognise that corruption undermines the confidence of investors and donor agencies and, if they are scared away from a country, investment opportunities are lost and national economic growth is reversed with all the adverse consequences that will flow from that.

6.4 Corruption Transparency International defines corruption as ‘the misuse of entrusted power for private gain’. Whereas that definition easily fits the actions of public officials, it also fits the actions of people in the private sector who bribe public officials. Therefore, it has to be recognised that there are two sides to corruption: the demand side, often someone in the public sector who receives a bribe, and the supply side, often someone in the private sector who gives the bribe. When a bribe is paid, both sides are equally guilty, so the problem has to be tackled across the board. Corruption comes in many guises, but fraud and bribery are the most common. Since it straddles both the public and private sectors, it follows that management in both sectors need to be more aware of what constitutes corrup- tion, fraud and bribery in particular, if it is to be nipped in the bud and prevented. It is a fact that corruption kills just as HIV/AIDs kills, a fact that is too often overlooked when national priorities are being considered by government planners and donor agencies. My guess is that corruption causes more suffering in the world than HIV/AIDS and that is why there must be no let up in the fight against corruption. It is a fight that all countries must join and work co-operatively so as not to allow their citizens to succumb to the ills of corruption and not allow corrupt persons to hide stolen assets abroad. It is a fight that can be won if concerned citizens combine their efforts and employ strategies that have been developed and tested across the world by organisations like Transparency International. In addition to depriving people of life-sustaining medicines, food, water, shelter and education, corruption also retards social and economic development by trapping millions of people in poverty and misery. Furthermore, corruption Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 47

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undermines the core values of democracy and can also jeopardise sound governance and ethics in the private sector.

6.5 The challenge How real is the external challenge of corruption facing Trinidad and Tobago and its companies that operate at home, in the Commonwealth Caribbean and/or internationally? The findings of Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index 2008 (2008) survey show that internationally the challenge of corruption is very real and widespread. The survey, conducted among more than 2,700 business executives in 26 countries, showed that almost two in five respondents admitted to being asked to pay a bribe in the past year when interacting with key institutions such as customs or tax revenue authorities, the judiciary, the police, registry and permit offices, providers of basic services (telephone, electricity, water or gas), or institutions in charge of sanitary inspections. Of interest to developing countries in the Commonwealth is the BPI 2008 finding that key emerging economies are viewed as particularly risky to deal with. The findings showed India, Mexico and China slightly out-performing as home to the companies that are most likely to bribe abroad. French, Italian and Malaysian companies also ranked poorly. While one cannot paint all companies from those countries with the brush of corruption, the results are a warning to developing countries and companies to be very vigilant in their dealings with companies from those countries and to conduct proper due diligence checks. The BPI (2008) results show that some companies that may not bribe when doing business at home show no such constraints when doing business in the developing world. Therefore, the home governments of offend- ing companies also have to be encouraged by the Commonwealth host governments to reform company practices at home and redouble their efforts to enact and enforce laws on foreign bribery.

6.6 Conclusion As Trinidad and Tobago is such a small country of only 1.3 million, it is not surprising that there will be connections between private sector interests and politicians in and out of government. However, it is disappointing that no attempt has yet been made to manage these relationships. Unless a solution is found to this inherent conflict, it constrains business people who genuinely wish to serve in or support the government. Until this dilemma is resolved, certain questions must be answered. Should government be reserved only for people without business and professional interests? Would drawing an artificial line to prevent such potential conflicts of interest succeed or would it become Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 48

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yet another layer of corruption to deceive the public? Are transparency and accountability the keys to the solution? Corruption has to be fought throughout the Commonwealth due to the devastating effect it can have on a country’s development and the welfare of its citizens. Corruption is a cancer that will destroy a country if not fought with a commitment by government, the private sector and civil society with an effort at least equal to the commitment shown in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Good governance in both the public and private sectors is the main antidote for corruption and must be implemented as a planned and sustained strategy. It calls for a collaborative effort between government, the private sector and civil society that should be underpinned by respect for and observance of the principles of a truly participatory democracy. We all have to join the fight against corruption because ignoring it is not an option and it is a battle that can and must be won. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 49

7 Minority Rights and Participatory Governance

Jagadananda and Kuldip Gyaneswar, Independent Researchers, India

7.1 Introduction India is one of the most multifaceted democracies in the world. The country is comprised of people of different creeds, castes, cultures and languages. It is recognised as the largest democracy not only because of the size of the elec- torate, but also because of their multiplicity and diversity (Cohen 2000). The country is known for unity in diversity. On the one hand the country accepts diverse groups and communities, while on the other its size and the nature and number of cultural groups gives rise to the majority–minority dichotomy. The minority is not only in terms of physical numbers but in terms of their inclusion in the mainstream, participation in development, access to resources and their right to live with dignity. Along with major global governance watershed moments, India also experienced three major significant shifts. In India after post independence instead of deepening democracy, greater focus was given to establishing the division of power between the legislative, judiciary and the executive, and formulating and strengthening the constitution as a basic framework for maintaining these institutions. In Mahatma Gandhi’s words, ‘the spirit of democracy cannot be imposed from outside. It has to come from within.’ The values of democracy for India had both to be determined and to be commu- nicated to its citizens. However, in a country where minority and majority populations are clearly demarcated, realising the values of democracy has taken some time.

7.2 Minorities and democracy After decades of democratic governance there are still significant groups excluded from mainstream decision-making and political processes. Marginalised communities are largely comprised of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women and indigenous communities.1 These socio-economic/cultural groups have been excluded from mainstream decision-making for many reasons, the most important being their lack of social and economic power. Their alienation

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extends to political exclusion, societal isolation, deprivation, and developmental seclusion, amongst other forms of discrimination. Mahatma Gandhi’s notion of democracy was one where the weakest should have the same opportunity as the strongest, but unless the core issues of poverty and illiteracy are addressed structurally and institutionally, the equality as fundamental to Indian democratic society will not be realised in the immediate future.

7.3 Understanding the framework of minority rights and participatory governance India’s Constitution and the various institutions that protect minority rights provide the framework for participatory governance. The primary policies (the Constitution and its amendments) which guarantee the rights of minorities will be examined first, followed by other institutions that protect minority rights and promote inclusive governance (the National Commission for Scheduled Castes, National Commission for Women, National Commission for Minorities, and National Commission for Protection of Child Rights), to examine their role in promoting participatory governance.

7.3.1 The Indian Constitution The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution recognised the importance of enshrining the principles of equality and equity in distinct articles within the main document. The preamble states that the Constitution will secure all its citizens JUSTICE (social, economic and political), LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and promote among them FRATERNITY, ensuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation. The Constitution provided the foundation for an independent and democratic India. Equality is given primacy and is enshrined as the first Fundamental Right given to every Indian citizen. The provisions made in the Constitution were intended to unite the country’s fragmented populations and end further stratification of society. It also pays close attention to the social, economic and political rights of the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Box 7.1 elaborates on the articles in the Constitution that aim to protect minority rights.

7.3.2 73rd Constitutional Amendment The Panchayati Raj system was in existence in the country even before its independence. But it was observed that these institutions were not able to acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive people’s bodies due to a number of reasons including absence of regular elections, prolonged Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 51

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Box 7.1 Articles in Constitution on minority rights • Art 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth • Art 16: Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment • Art 243 D: Reservation of seats in PRIs • Art 243 T: Reservation of seats in Municipality • Art 330: Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People • Art 332: Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assemblies of the States • Article 338: National Commission for Scheduled Castes

suppression, insufficient representation of weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women (Seventy-second Constitution Amendment Bill, 1991). Realising the importance of having a system of local self government and to promote participatory governance, the Indian parliament in the year 1992 passed the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act – a historic piece of legislation that devolved powers and responsibilities to the Panchayats and opened up forums of participation for the marginalised groups.2 The Act lays down a three-tier structure for local self government – the village, block and district. The pertinent element for minorities in this legislation was the reservation of seats. At all three tiers of rural self-government seats were reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women as follows: • All Panchayats will have seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The number of seats reserved will be in proportion to the population of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in that Panchayat. • Within this reserved category, not less than one-third of the total number of seats will be reserved for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and/or the Scheduled Tribes. • Not less than one-third of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Panchayat will be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat. • The offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayat at the village or any other level shall be reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 52

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The other important provision made in the Act was the creation of the Gram Sabha – the village assembly. The Act defines the Gram Sabha as a body consisting of persons registered on the electoral rolls of a particular village, which falls within the area of the Panchayat at the village level. The institution- alisation of the Gram Sabha transformed the nature and practice of democracy from representational democracy to participatory democracy, at least in principle. The Gram Sabha was designed as the ‘local parliament’, with each villager, including children in some instances, potentially having a voice of their own. It was intended as a forum to deliberate on local development priorities, policy reforms and budget allocation, and for the conclusions of these deliberations to be submitted to higher authorities and implemented by the elected Panchayat representatives. It therefore was set up to empower citizens to make decisions locally. The concept of ‘participation’ was central to the system and its design. The Gram Sabha was designed to be the space in which excluded and minority groups could raise their concerns and demand their rights.

7.3.3 PESA Act: Extension to tribal areas The PESA (Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996 marked a new era in Indian democracy by making it mandatory for the states having ‘Scheduled Areas’ to give wide-ranging powers to the tribal groups on matters relating to decision-making and the development of their communities.3 It validated the customary laws, social and religious practices, and traditional management practices of community resources in the Scheduled Areas. It recognised traditional rights of the tribals over the community-owned resources viz. land, water and forests. While the Act laid the foundation for the realisation of rights of indigenous communities, the implementation and enforcement of provisions in the law has been problematic.

7.4 Reality on the ground: The translation of the legal framework Acts, rules and institutions are powerful and well developed and defined in India. However, the grassroots translation of these Acts is poor and ad hoc, especially in the poorest and most illiterate states. The main struggle that minorities face in many regions is access to natural resources, and land in particular, which is the critical condition to livelihood security and ensuring people’s self-respect and dignity in a sustainable way. Government programmes typically do not address their basic needs – access to natural resources and land – due to improper budget allocation, which is often biased against social development. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 53

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7.5 Resource allocation to ensure minority rights in India: Some critical observations Ensuring democratic growth based on the values of equality, has been the focal point of economic and political planning in India. The importance of inclusive development was demonstrated during the 1st five year plan which stated:

… the urge to economic and social change under present conditions comes from the fact of poverty and of inequalities in income, wealth and opportunity. The elimination of poverty cannot obviously be achieved merely by redistributing existing wealth. Nor can a programme aiming only at raising production remove existing inequalities. Only a simultaneous advance along both these lines can create conditions in which the community can put forth its best efforts for promoting development. (Government of India, 1951: Ch 1)

Since then the emphasis of the Government has been to ensure the growth of the marginalised communities by ensuring adequate resource allocation. Two major planning strategies were written to deal with budgetary issues relevant to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Scheduled Caste Sub Plan (SCSP) and Tribal Sub Plan (TSP). The Planning Commission guidelines suggested allocating funding to SCSP and TSP in proportion to the national population share of SCs and STs (16% and 8% respectively as per 2001 Census data). Over the years it has been observed that the difference between the planned outlay and actual allocation has been enormous. The allocations have never been near to the scale of proportion as suggested by the Planning Commission of India. Nevertheless planned allocation earmarked for SCs rose from 6.25 to 7.19% in 2010/11(BE) and for STs from 3.67% in 2009/10 to 4.43% in 2010/11. To ensure economic empowerment of the marginalised group’s two financial institutions were established. The National Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation (NSFDC) was started with the objective of financing income generating activities among the Scheduled Castes. NSFDC has disbursed Rs. 1788.85 crore (cumulative) till 31st March 2009 covering 6.20 lakh beneficiaries. The National Scheduled Tribes Finance and Development Corporation was setup in 2001 for providing concessional financial assistance to STs whose family income is up to double the poverty line income limits. It has disbursed around Rs. 800 crore by reaching over 24 lakh ST beneficiaries. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 54

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7.6 Institutional mechanisms to promote participatory governance The Constitution and Acts (mentioned earlier) together construct a framework to protect minority rights and participatory democracy. Some of the major obstacles to effectively translating the framework into practice are the level of resistance among established interests groups and the minority group’s lack of capacity, education and confidence at the local level to demand their rights as articulated in the relevant legislation. To oversee implementation and protect the interests of the minority groups numerous institutions were set up at both the federal and state level, in particular the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Furthermore the National Commission for Women, with a focus on women’s rights, is also an institutional response to the inability to put legislation into practice and ensure effective enforcement. They all have their specific constituencies, agendas and budgets, but coordinated action is necessary to address the main issues that directly affect all the minority groups, including the direct impact of globalisation, negative consequences of intense industrialisation in rural areas leading to displacement and new social issues such as human trafficking, HIV/AIDS and urban poverty, climate change and associated natural disasters, and an increased strain on natural resources availability and allocation as a result of the impacts of climate change.

7.7 Right to Information Act: A powerful tool in the hands of citizens The Right to Information Act 2005, popularly known as the RTI Act, is a more recent tool aimed at deepening democracy, reducing corruption and bringing about development effectiveness. If used well it forces local officials to deliver public services and makes the functioning of government more transparent. The challenge after five years of implementation is to ensure that the RTI Act reaches the most marginalised segments of the population – the poor and illiterate – who could most leverage its potential to access their basic rights and entitlements. The role of civil society organisations in several states has been critical to educate and support citizens in understanding their rights and filing RTI applications to challenge social injustice and government neglect. Hands-on support has been provided at the grassroots level through ‘RTI clinics’ and on- going help from volunteers trained and motivated by RTI experts and activists. Success stories are now echoed by the media, further building the confidence of ‘ordinary’ citizens that there are legal and institutional remedies that can help restore their rights, leading to a life with hope and dignity. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 55

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7.8 Conclusion The principles of equality, solidarity and unity as enshrined in the Indian Constitution will always be challenged by socio-economic disparities and deeply rooted customary practices such as the caste system. While new laws and mechanisms have been created and implemented to strengthen and supplement the constitutional framework, the actual empowerment of the most marginalised Indian people will only come from the grassroots, social movements and a rights-based approach to development. India’s civil society has always been very vibrant and has embraced ‘bottom-up’ approaches to democracy. A united civil society collaborating with government and institutional donors and engaging the citizens at large is key to mitigating the internal and external threats to the deepening of a true democracy, the real swaraj. Civil society’s role in lobbying in favour of the marginalised and oppressed has been critical, especially when it engages in positive dialogues on budget allocation and policy reforms with government. Only when the basic rights and needs of the minorities are addressed through proper representation and allocation of financial resources to meet their basic needs can they become active citizens and demand their other rights.

Notes 1 Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are recognised by the Constitution of India, and were previously called the ‘depressed classes’ by the British. SCs and STs constitute 16% and 8% of India’s population respectively, according to the 2001 Census. The numbers and proportion of the population have risen steadily since independence in 1947. 2 The Panchayat Raj is a South Asian political system prevalent in India, , and Nepal. ‘Panchayat’ literally means assembly (yat) of five (panch) wise and respected elders chosen and accepted by the village community. Traditionally, these assemblies settle disputes between individuals in villages. 3 Scheduled Areas are autonomous areas within a state, administered centrally, usually populated by a predominant Scheduled Tribe. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 56 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 57

8 Integrated Local Self-governance Through Participation of the Most Marginalised and Socially Excluded Groups

Asha Kotwal, General Secretary, All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch, National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, India

8.1 An introduction to the caste system and ‘untouchability’ Much has been written about the caste system in India. The socio-economic and political structure of caste segregation has been substantially documented, observed and debated. This chapter examines how the caste system as a form of social and economic governance has impacted the Dalit community, and how to move forward, different actors will have to take responsibility and be held accountable. The caste system is based on principles and customary rules: • It involves the division of people into social groups (castes) where rights are determined by birth and are fixed and hereditary. • The assignment of basic rights among various castes is unequal and hierarchical, with those at the top enjoying most rights coupled with the least duties, and those at the bottom performing most duties coupled with no rights. • The system is maintained through the rigid enforcement of social ostracism (a system of social and economic penalties) in case of any deviations. Inequality is the fundamental doctrine at the core of the caste system. Interestingly, it is a social practice that transcends religious boundaries; irrespective of religion individuals are often attributed castes (Tamil Nadu Women’s Forum 2007). Those who fall outside the caste system are considered ‘lesser human beings’, ‘impure’ and thus ‘polluting’ to other caste groups. They are called ‘untouchable’ and subjected to ‘untouchability practices’ in both the public and private spheres. ‘Untouchables’ are often forcibly assigned the most dirty, menial and hazardous jobs, such as cleaning human waste. The work they do often adds to the stigmatisation they already face from society. The exclusion of ‘caste- affected communities’ by other groups in society and the inherent structural

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inequality in these social relationships lead to high levels of poverty among affected population groups and their exclusion from, or a reduction in their benefits from, development processes (Gaiha et al. 2008). They are in general excluded from decision-making and meaningful participation in public and civil life. The division of society and stratification of social and economic groups is a global phenomenon not exclusively practised by any particular religion or belief system. Caste discrimination affects about 260 million people world- wide, the vast majority in South Asia. It involves massive violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. It is often outlawed in countries where it exists, but the laws are rarely implemented and the caste-bias within the justice systems largely leave Dalits without protection. In South Asia, caste discrimination is traditionally rooted in the Hindu caste system. Supported by philosophical elements, the caste system constructs the moral, social and legal foundations of Hindu society (Tamil Nadu Women’s Forum 2007). In a male-dominated society, Dalit women suffer oppression not only through caste, but also gender. Hindu scriptures, such as the laws outlined in the Manusmriti and other Vedic texts, restrict the economic, political, social, and educational opportunities of Dalit women. These laws support the political, social and economic rights of the majority population in India. Although they are a set of historical texts and laws, the texts’ principles and practices still resonate in contemporary India (Tamil Nadu Women’s Forum 2007). Dalits are ‘outcastes’, people who fall outside the four-tier system consisting of the Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vysya and Sudra castes. Dalits are also referred to as Panchamas or people of the fifth order. There are about 250 million Dalits in India (16.23% of the total population) – about 200 million people more than the total population of Europe (National Federation of Dalit Women 2009). This chapter is based on a paper presented at the 2009 Commonwealth People’s Forum which aimed to highlight the harsh reality of the disenfranchise- ment faced by Dalit women in local Panchayats (village councils). It suggests what policy and decision-makers may be able to do to find a better way forward. Using an anecdotal approach, the chapter paints a picture of the lives of the Dalit community, and women in particular. I use an analysis of caste- class-gender dynamics to focus on the cultural and material dimensions of the intersection of gender and caste discrimination to provide an insight into social relations and social inequalities in India. This analytical lens, grounded in Dalit women’s subjective experiences, highlights how these women become instruments through which the social system replicates itself and systemic inequality is maintained: violence against Dalit women is systematically used to deny them opportunities, choices and freedoms at many levels, undermining not only Dalit women’s dignity and self-respect, but also their right to Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 59

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development. An intersectional caste-class-gender analysis also fulfils the need to recognise Dalit women’s selfhood and human dignity, and make them visible to the public eye by exposing the reality of the violence and disempowerment that is inextricably interwoven into their social position. Moreover, analysing these social relations converts a one-dimensional vision of ‘difference’ into a more nuanced picture of systemic oppression and violence that enables not only policy-makers, but also women’s movements and Dalit movements, to better strategise and implement policies and programmes that protect Dalit women’s rights. These programmes facilitate wider processes of change, ensure the comprehensive eradication of caste and gender discrimination and violence, and enable Dalit women to be mainstreamed into the planned development process in India. At the international level, examining patterns of violence against Dalit women can contribute towards a human rights-based understanding of racial and gender discrimination, as interacting factors perpetuating violence against racialised and often marginalised women.1

8.2 A history of Dalit participation in the wider Indian society Direct political participation of Dalit communities began with the statutory ‘reservations’ accorded them in the state assemblies and union parliament, proportionate to their population. Legal and policy reforms in India to ensure the representation of marginalised social groups, especially Dalits and specifically Dalit women, are constitutionally mandated through these reservations (affirmative action quotas) in Panchayati Raj.2 Local government went a step further, and the 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments of 1993 reserve 33% of seats in the rural and urban governance structures for women (including Dalit women). This is a critical enabling provision for the direct political participation of Dalit women and gives them a chance to make decisions on issues that impact on their lives and to have their voices heard on larger societal issues. Since this mandate was implemented members of the government, including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, have proclaimed the impact on women of reservations in local governing bodies. In a recent statement he said ‘[it] constitutes a historic measure for gender equality. It has brought about a significant shift in public policy and in social attitudes towards women’.3 In practice these legislative measures need to be examined with a bit more caution. For example, despite the articles of the Constitution of India, the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the SC/ST (PoA) Act 1989, the rights of Dalits more generally still continue to be violated with impunity by dominant castes. For centuries, efficacy in decision-making in Indian society has been positively correlated with the caste system. Authority has been retained at the top of the hierarchy and has only marginally trickled down to those below. Dalit women Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 60

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and men, as a result of their place outside the caste structure, have been denied effective voice or space in social, economic and political decision-making processes; so much so that decisions in their private and personal lives too are also made by the dominant community (National Federation of Dalit Women 2009). A recent report by the Hindustan Times newspaper (Chauhan 2009) addresses this last point. The report emphasises that the continuing subjugation of Dalits in social and economic spheres, despite the constitutional and legal provisions against it, is clearly visible in the discrimination and harassment faced by female Scheduled Caste Panchayat leaders while discharging their public roles effectively. Another report – The State of Panchayats: 2007–2008 – prepared by H.K. Padhiari (2008) of the Institute for Rural Management (IRMA) reiterates this point. The reports state that sexual harassment and physical violence against women Panchayat leaders belonging to Scheduled Caste households is ‘widespread’. In 2002 Deepak Tiwari wrote an article called ‘Electric Chair: Dalit Women Sarpanches are Abused’ as part of a journalism competition. Deepak Tiwari documents a number of instances of oppression of Dalit women in Madhya Pradesh. Here sexual vulnerability is used by upper class men to humiliate and dominate the women. For example Mathurabai, Sarpanch (head of the Panchayat) of Gaintoli village in Morena district, is not afraid to speak of her trauma and recounted how she was stripped and beaten up for lodging a complaint against the former Sarpanch for not allowing her to perform her duties. Worse still, Guddibai from Sinalwalkala in neighbouring Shivpuri was raped by male opponents who had lost the elections. And the local network has it that hers was not an isolated case – only that Dalits are afraid to report such incidences (Karlerkar 2002). Half a century of freedom from foreign rule and self-government has not reduced poverty and social inequalities in Indian society – particularly not in Dalit communities. Instead the state and non-state mechanisms have been further exploited and used by dominant members of society (Karthikeyan 2010). There have been positive outcomes of deliberations on minority rights and voices in India, however, including the enactment of the 73rd and 74th amend- ments of the Indian Constitution, which require mandatory representation of Dalit women and men at the Panchayats and urban local government. It is important to recognise that the ‘devolution of powers’ has a lot of support in parts of South Asia, notably India. There is much talk of the 2.5 million representatives elected at various levels, and the impact it is said to be having on participation and people’s lives. Plaudits aside, it cannot be denied that this experiment has been unable to engage with the complexities of caste, gender, community and class in Indian society. Despite many instances of growing empowerment at the grassroots level, it is a sad commentary on the state of affairs that it has largely failed when it comes to minority rights (Gatade 2009). Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 61

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Box 8.1 Case study on women in Panchayats Sone Deyee, 55, elected as a Sarpanch (reserved constituency) from Ballabhgarh village, Bharatpur district, Rajasthan and her son Jal Singh, 20, have still not fully recovered from the brutal attack they were subjected to by the dominant Jat residents. In fact, the Jats wanted to teach Sone Deyee a lesson as she had refused to part with the muster rolls of labourers and records of public works executed during her tenure. Neither have the police registered a case under SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 nor the leaders of mainstream political parties bothered to pay attention to this case of miscarriage of justice. And the perpetrators of the attack are still roaming free. An added dimension to Sone Deyee’s election pertains to the uncere- monious exit of the previous occupant of the office, Hardeo Koli, who was similarly intimidated and thrashed by the same ruffians. A fact-finding team of Dalit rights activists found that Hardeo Koli was blinded as a result of the thrashing by the accused.

In reality the implementation of these constitutional amendments has been problematic, with cases of elected Dalit men and women in the Panchayat Raj being forced to sign the minute books by members of the dominant caste in villages. There are cases where the Panchayat Sarpanch is elected on paper but not given physical access to their local office or access to the local office’s records. Furthermore, more insidious forms of discrimination are practiced where the Dalit Sarpanch or ward members are forced to stand in the meetings, thus being denied respect in formal proceedings. There have even been cases where a Dalit ward member or Sarpanch has lost their life because they have raised an issue or tried to exercise their rights or authority. Numerous studies and media stories highlight the harassment faced by Dalit women elected to the Panchayat (see Box 8.1), and Padhiai (2008) reiterated this in The State of Panchayats: 2007–2008. Submitted to the prime minister in mid-2010, the report makes it clear that sexual harassment and physical violence against women Sarpanch belonging to Scheduled Caste households is ‘widespread’. An article in the Hindustan Times (2008) underlines the continuing subjugation of Dalits in social and economic spheres, despite the constitutional and legal provisions. ‘Bias runs deep, says study’ emphasises the discrimination and harassment faced by the women Panchayat leaders belonging to Scheduled Caste category while discharging their public roles effectively. This observation of the IRMA team captures a tragic suicide of Urmila, an ex-Panchayat Dalit woman leader belonging to the village of Dularia, Betul, Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 62

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Madhya Pradesh (November 2007). In her suicide note, she revealed how she was raped twice by the son of the Panchayat chief for raising her voice over misappropriation of funds meant for village development. She further explained how despite repeated applications to the police no action was taken against the perpetrators, and a First Information Report (FIR) under one of the clauses of Indian Penal Code was not registered. In fact it took six years for a report to be filed in the police station. Nobody was arrested for the crime. Frustrated over the continued denial of justice and the connivance of the Sarpanch with the local police she decided to end her life. The first arrest in this case came only after her death. Dalit women face the added obstacle of oppression based on their caste as well as their gender. These obstacles are in addition to illiteracy, poverty and dependency, which inhibit effective participation. A study on Dalit women’s participation in rural Panchayati Raj in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu shows that most (61%) of Dalit women who stand for Panchayat elections do so at the behest of their husband, family, Dalit community, political party or the dominant community (Mangoobhai et al. 2009). Only a few of them (about 15%) make a personal decision to stand. In addition to their personal limitations of illiteracy and immobility and the gender-related taboos and traditions, Dalit women face a number of hurdles because of their caste. They have few opportunities or support to improve themselves or to overcome these barriers. Many of them complete their terms being ‘benami’4 or ‘dummy candidates’; a few make an effort to act independently – but often fall back to their traditional roles. A number of cases have been reported where the dominant caste members of the Panchayat dictate that the Dalit woman’s only role is to sign papers that are sent to her and not attend the Panchayat meetings. There have also been cases where Dalit women Sarpanches fall into servile roles for other other members of the Panchayat during formal meetings. As Dalit women learn and try to fulfil their elected roles effectively, no-confidence motions or corruption charges are brought against them, removing them from the seat completely. There are also a few women who have had to sell their assets to get out of these cases and escape the complaints made against them. Despite the behaviour of the dominant castes, there is still potential for the reservation rules in to open up spaces for Dalit women and build up their leadership skills to engage in decisions that affect them and the larger Dalit community. It could catapult a large number of Dalit women into decision- making positions and roles that will impact on their thinking and perceptions in the long run. Therefore, the questions that need to be asked to advance the opportunities presented to these women through legislation are: Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 63

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• What are the opportunities for marginalised communities to meaningfully participate in decision-making processes? • What are the main stumbling blocks in this process? • Are there any positive models to build on and learn from? • What is the role of civil society groups in supporting marginalised communities? • What is role/responsibility of the government? Let us examine a story. It is the story of Renuka, a young Dalit woman who was elected as the Sarpanch in a small village in Tamil Nadu, Southern India. She had many dreams for her village and had developed activities to support the plans that she had for her village. However, the reality is that her influence and powers, as a female Dalit Sarpanch, were severely undermined in tacit ways. For example, upper caste men in the village used various subtle methods to undermine her authority. The vice president, an upper caste male, always occupied the seat designated for her and all local decision-making pertaining to her village was being carried out without her participation. Along with her husband, she made a few attempts to make her voice heard and participate, but unsuccessfully. Renuka then decided to discuss this with the Federation of Women and together they spoke up. They pressurised the government to conduct a special enquiry into this matter. Through this brief case study, let us examine the key stakeholders and subsequently discuss the roles and responsibilities of each: • The Dalit community, in particular the women, who face twin discriminations of caste and gender. • The upper caste community, particularly the male members who have grabbed the positions of power. • The local CBOs – often linked with other civil society groups including NGOs, faith-based groups, struggle groups and campaigns. • The government agencies and institutions. Let us further examine the roles of each actor: The government: • Ensure effective implementation of policies to protect the rights of the marginalised. This includes adequate policing, monitoring and protection of elected representatives. • Establish a specific office in each district to act as a support mechanism for Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 64

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Panchayat presidents from marginalised communities, including providing advice, training and information as well as monitoring their implementation of duties and interventions by others such as Panchayat members and government officials.5 • Ensure mandatory monitoring of departments and officials responsible for implementating local self-governance institutions. • Conduct regular training programmes for elected representatives on Panchayat duties and effective administrative skills. • Ensure that all institutions, including human rights bodies, police and related departments are implementing their duties without malpractice.

Civil society groups: • Strengthen programmes and advocacy to highlight the issues facing marginalised communities, especially women. • Monitor government mechanisms and highlight failures in Panchayat governance. • Conduct separate regular training on public speaking, leadership and managerial skills, problem solving and how to interact with government officials for elected Panchayat representatives and those aspiring to become elected representatives. • Initiate gender-awareness programmes specifically aimed at Dalit men, to encourage them to extend greater freedom to women in their families and to support elected Dalit women, both within and outside the Panchayats. Gender- and caste-awareness programmes should also be conducted separately for all male elected representatives as well as government officials dealing with Panchayati Raj. • Initiate a political-awareness campaign, facilitate and support discussions among Dalit elders, men, Panchayat members, husbands and male family members about the importance of Dalit women’s free and independent participation in politics. • Build within the community to ensure both the regular input of information and capacity building, which could then form part of a state- level federation. Support must be extended to the collective actions initiated by these groups, including monitoring and taking action against government and police officials who fail to protect rights to political participation. • Liaise with the media to expose discrimination faced by elected women Panchayat representatives and highlight successes and strategies employed. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 65

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• Monitor election processes and bring cases of discrimination to the Election Commission. The international community: • International human rights networks and academic institutes: Take up the cause of Dalits in local governance as a central concern, raising awareness about their activities with government officials, United Nations bodies, civil society actors and the general public. • UN states: Take up the issue of Dalit women’s effective participation in governance as a focus policy area, including through support for the implementation of monitoring and accountability recommendations made in this research and support for relevant Dalit, Adivasi and women Panchayat associations. • Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women: Prepare a report on the effectiveness of and problems faced by Dalit women in local governance and foster dialogue and debate on this issue in the United Nations system. • Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Special Rapporteur on Discrimination on the Basis of Work and Descent, and Independent Expert on Minorities: Work with local Indian organisations to take up cases of violence and discrimination against Dalit women, including in local governance structures by reporting to respective United Nations bodies and starting a dialogue with the Government of India. It is most critical that these groups come together to discuss, consolidate and strengthen the overall message. Civil society groups should be able to freely discuss the issues with both the government and the media. Open debate and discussion, it is hoped, will lead to change; public hearings could be conducted to hear the testimonies of the people, for example. The immediate needs can be discussed with the concerned officials. It is also critical for civil society groups to build strategic alliances with a coherent response and expected outcome. This collaboration is essential to build effective tools for sustainable change. Amongst the many challenges highlighted earlier, as well as the calls to action for various actors, it is also important to note a few success stories. Communities have been increasingly demanding their right to be heard, and for their rights to be protected. Rising up against the caste and social barriers, many women in Govindgarh block of Jaipur district have come forward to join the grassroots democratic process by running for the Panchayat elections. Krishna Pareek, 40, who is running for Sarpanch in Nangal Koju village, told The Hindu newspaper that the campaign had helped the women in the region Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 66

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understand the structure, procedures and responsibilities of Panchayats (Karthikeyan 2010). A co-ordinated response has, to date, helped to bring about change. But this could not be done by any one big donor, corporation or agency. It has to be a participatory process exemplifying the context in which these marginalised people live. To date the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights and the All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch have led on the work to give voice to marginalised Dalit women. The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) is a coalition of Dalit Human Rights activists, civil society organisations, journalists, and academics who are committed to ending the caste-based discrimination and ‘untouchability’ practices that deny human rights and dignity to 170 million Indian citizens – one sixth of India’s population. Established in 1998, NCDHR is a non-party-based secular platform based in Delhi and with offices in 14 other states. NCDHR performs atrocity monitoring, legal interventions, and national and international advocacy to achieve a three-pronged objective: (1) hold the state accountable for all Human Rights violations committed against Dalits; (2) sensitise civil society by raising the visibility of the Dalit problem; and (3) render justice to Dalit victims of discrimination and violence. The All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch (AIDMAM) is a forum of Dalit women committed to challenging the nexus of patriarchy, caste, culture and class oppression, exploitation and marginalisation of Dalit women. AIDMAM encourages solidarity and also has members who are non-Dalit women, Dalit men and other human rights defenders committed to protecting and promoting the rights of Dalit women under the leadership of Dalit Women. This is a quest to access and ensure Dalit women’s right to life, security, development, dignity and equality in a violence-free society. AIDMAM firmly believes that the Panchayati Raj institutions have, for the first time, mandated space for Dalit women in local decision-making processes. We believe this to be a very significant step, however without the required support and capacity, this powerful tool is completely useless. The casteist and patriarchal society only continue the cycle of oppression in different ways. AIDMAM works across India with a focus on strengthening Dalit women in rural Panchayats. AIDMAM seeks to strengthen Dalit women elected representatives in the Panchayats and activists in the districts to address violence against Dalit women at large and to enhance their leadership and performance in relation to budget provisions in the Panchayat. The objective is to triangulate the experiences and voices of Dalit women with additional inputs through study, documentation and advocacy with the state to improve both the policy provisions and implementation of the Act and ensure Dalit women’s rights and leadership in the Panchayat Raj institutions. In conclusion, empowerment through human rights frameworks will lead Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 67

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to an equitable and sustainable future … a future which has integrated, local self-governance mechanisms that include the meaningful participation of the marginalised communities. Work has already begun on this front, but it is important for each of the actors to re-examine their roles in this important process and chart a coherent and sustainable way forward.

Notes 1 J Mangoobhai, A Irudayam and Joel G Lee, Dalit Women Speak Out : A Study of Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. 2004 2 Panchayati Raj is a system of local governance comprised of three levels – the village, block and district. The village level is referred to as the Panchayat while the Gram Panchayats are the primary grassroots unit of administration. The Panchayat is a local body with elected representatives. 3 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speech at East Asia Gender Quality Ministerial Meeting, New Delhi, 6.12.2007, reported by Special Correspondent, ‘We are Committed to Providing Quotas for Women in Governance’, The Hindu, 7.12.2007. 4 Benami literally translates as ‘no name candidate’. The idea is that the name of the candidate and his/her very existence is immaterial to their being elected to these bodies. Therefore, their efficacy is almost non-existent. 5 The state government and civil society organisations hold training programmes for Sarpanches about their roles and responsibilities. These are nominal two- to three-day training courses of a general nature just designed to give them an overview. When members are new to the position these are inadequate to give them any understanding of their role, responsibilities or rights. The problems are multiplied when they are first-time entrants to these positions and the families do not have a history of participating in the power structures. There are also a number of technical details that they need to know to fulfil their role effectively in the Panchayat, and often the administrative system and the feudal elements in society turn out to be barriers that prevent Dalit women from carrying out their role effectively. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 68 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 69

9 The Institutionalisation of Citizen Participation in Democratic Processes in the Pacific islands

Deepti Sastry, Commonwealth Foundation with input from Sione Faka’osi, Tonga Community Development Trust

9.1 Introduction The structure of a democratic political system consists of the offices that politicians seek and the institutions that they use to represent and govern citizens, such as parliaments and senates. Coupled with constitutional powers conferred on these offices, a democratic system delivers a structure for both taking decisions and implementing the decisions taken. The framework is made more complex by the variety of methods used to elect political representatives. The extent to which citizens get involved in electing their political represen- tatives, and the different levels at which they can vote and get involved in decision-making, are all factors that influence the depth of citizen participation in democratic processes. Dictionary.com defines democracy as ‘government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system’. In his Gettysburg Address in 1863 Abraham Lincoln famously declared that his country would enjoy a ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people’. Clearly, the involvement of the ‘people’ is core to any understanding of democracy. Citizen involvement and participation both in these institutions and in decision-making generally can take many forms – through voting, standing directly for election, holding referendums, and so forth. There is no ‘one style suits all’ formula with regard to electing representatives, setting criteria for citizens to stand for election, or the types or manner of decision-making that citizens may be involved in. For example a small island state may find that involving citizens in a wide range of decisions through consensus building is a more effective interpretation of democratic principles. However, in countries with vast populations this form of consensus building might result in decisions never being taken. The way citizen choose to participate in different ‘democracies’ depends on the situation, with population being just one factor affecting how, why and when citizens participate. This chapter examines citizen participation through the lens of how electoral systems and voting are designed in various Pacific island countries. 69 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 70

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A key distinguishing factor of political and social processes and institutions in many of the Pacific Island countries is that of the struggle to conceptually understand individual-level political decision-making as seen through the lens of democratic voting. Voting as a demonstrable form of political engagement is how the ‘western’ concept of democracy is conceptualised. However, in many Pacific Island countries traditional forms of decision-making are not based on individual voting in their own interests but rather they build consensus collectively towards the common good – whether that is at village or family level. In many Pacific Island countries decision-making has traditionally been built around institutions like village councils or village communities. However, after independence many countries were left with colonial relics of political structures, often modelled on Westminster-style politics. Since the 1970s the Pacific Islands have had significant interaction with global audiences and political and economic systems. As a result there is a growing demand for consistency with respect to traditional forms of democratic institutions and processes, and many countries in the Pacific have been streamlining these institutions within traditional structures in their countries. Pacific Island countries have experimented with finding a balance between the democratic institutions and structures of the colonial periods and the indigenous, localised governance structures based on customary chiefs and traditional kingly lineage. This experiment with ‘tradition versus democracy’ has produced interesting forms of governance in many of the island countries but also issues related to governance, citizen participation and the political efficacy of citizens.1 The performance of governance in the Pacific has been the focus of many studies, especially from the Pacific Institute of Advanced Studies in Development and Governance, at the University of the South Pacific (now referred to as the School of Government, Development and International Affairs).2 Furthermore, civil society organisations like the Tonga Community Development Trust have also conducted primary research into the impacts of specific governance structures on voter turnout (as a proxy of citizen participa- tion) in Tonga. (The next chapter, by Sione Faka’osi, provides more detail on this.) Given the diversity of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of political participation and government in the Pacific Islands it is difficult to provide compelling evidence that notions of citizenship and citizen participation are very different between traditional and contemporary politics across the Pacific. However, almost all Pacific Island countries are trying to find a viable form of participa- tion and governance that marries traditional with contemporary. Using as an example this chapter examines how traditional political structures have fostered a particular brand of citizen participation in decision-making. It also looks at more contemporary politics in Samoa to demonstrate how traditional and contemporary forms of citizenship have been intertwined. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 71

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9.2 Electoral systems and citizen participation: The relationship The concept of ‘good governance’ is conceptually and operationally different from ‘participatory governance’, although one could argue that the latter has a role to play in determining the former. Good governance is an ideological concept, influenced by the relationship that citizens have with their governments and elected bodies. For example, citizens sometimes want the state to participate in their lives by providing essential goods and services. In such cases good governance may imply effective, universal, and good quality health and education, for example. However, good governance in a social contract where citizens want government to play a secondary role by giving consumers choices about goods and services can take the form of a state that oversees private- sector organisations that compete to sell essential services like health care. This chapter does not aim to examine what it means to have ‘good governance’ in the Pacific Islands. Rather it looks at the ways in which Samoa, as an example, has structured its democratic and electoral systems to ensure good governance through participation. In western democratic systems there is a close link between constitutional and electoral system arrangements and the citizen’s ability to participate in democratic processes. When citizens can vote for leaders the impact and influence of their vote directly determines the structures of national democratic processes (Shapiro and Macedo 2000). This relationship is further affected by how many levels of government are directly elected and the general perception among citizens that their vote influences the outcomes and final decisions in elections and electoral processes. Using this lens a country’s democratic structure has profound implications for citizen’s rights, political efficacy, and conse- quently their willingness to vote and the extent of their participation in political processes. As mentioned earlier, contemporary Pacific constitutional arrangements and electoral processes have been influenced by both colonial practices and indigenous cultures and comprise of an array of diverse structures. For example:

… the region includes a constitutional monarchy (Tonga), a state where only customary chiefs (matai ) may stand for parliament (Samoa) and a territory with a cabinet composed of three and three members appointed as representatives of the French President (Wallis and Fortuna) (Fraenkel and Grofman 2005: 261). Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 72

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9.3 A history of politics in the region The former colonies in the Commonwealth Pacific Islands use a variety of democratic and electoral systems. Some have Westminster-style political systems, former US territories have presidential systems, and French territories use party list proportional representation systems (Fraenkel and Grofman 2005). Many have elected independent representative governments for 30 or 40 years (Rich 2000: 3–4). There have been many concerns about the resilience of democracy in these Pacific Island states, however, in particular and the (Fraenkel and Grofman 2005). Many states are trying to reform their inherited electoral systems, in particular to: • Embrace their ethnic diversity and ensure effective representation across ethnic lines as well as by gender • Combine customary/local forms of leadership with colonial electoral systems • Explore the relationship between electoral laws and stability of governments • Find a balance between centralised structures and devolving responsibilities using federation-style governance • Explore whether presidential models are more useful that parliamentary models in promoting effective governance • Engage with demands for autonomy from countries such as Indonesian- controlled West Papua, for example (adapted from Fraenkel and Grofman, 2005) The history of political independence, dismantling of political structures after independence, and the resulting political frameworks vary between the Pacific Islands. Samoa, for example, gained independence first in 1962, while many of the other islands followed suit in the 1980s. Important relationships can be drawn between political change and the governance framework before independence, impacting the political structures after independence. Fraenkel and Grofman (2005) argue that independent, self-governing states like Fiji found the change after independence to be a major upheaval. Village-based lifestyles, which formed the backbone of political and social life in Fiji, were revised to manifest the democratic systems of the colonial period. States like , Fiji and the Solomon Islands only developed political parties towards the end of colonial rule. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 73

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9.4 Samoa: Citizen participation in decision-making Samoa’s chiefly system is based on both communal and extended family kinship, which is also referred to as ‘aiga. In fact the term ‘aiga includes the immediate family, all families related to the original nucleus, as well as those who are related to the family through specific forms of control that family members may have over them (Tuvale no date). At the local level, most of the country’s civil and criminal matters are dealt with by some 360 village chief councils, also referred to as Fono o Matai. This traditional legal system has been strengthened by the 1990 Village Fono Law (Karatnycky 1998). The Fono o Matai is also known as the village council and is comprised of matai, who are the executive and judicial authorities in the village. It is the primary unit of operation in Samoan life. For big decisions in the village both ordinary village members and matai go through a process of participation and deliberation. Preliminary councils are held by different groups and at these councils the single family heads exchange opinions and endeavour to come to a consensus on the situation. Some matai are actually permitted to speak at these councils without having any right to make a decision. However, the matter is eventually brought to the village council where the decision of one or more matai sili (senior matai) is final. The minor matai may discuss the matter with and endeavour to try and influence the matai sili before the council commences. The villagers who may attend to listen include untitled men, women and children. This form of governance is layered and includes deliberation by village people while allowing final decision- making to rest with village elders. Decisions are reached through consensus building while respect is maintained for the final decision, which is made in the interest of the family and the village as a whole rather than any one individual. The 2006 Census of Samoa revealed that 96% of the country’s matai were actively involved in village activities as part of their matai responsibilities. The 4% who were not active held more than one title or lived away from the village connected to their title (Samoa Bureau of Statistics 2006). Although matai may determine the outcome of cases that are brought before them, the village council’s authority is not unlimited. They involve all members of a particular family (understood in terms of kinship) when discussing important matters. Minor matters that are of interest only to the immediate village family are dealt with by them. Matai or chiefly titles are potentially available to all men or women based on their kinship and ancestry. They are not automatically passed from a matai to their children or direct descendants, but are given to those whom the extended family agree will best serve their needs while also ensuring that different branches of the family are represented. Men and women have equal rights to matai titles in Samoa, Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 74

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although the role of women in Samoan society means that there are very few female matai (Autagavaia, 2008). Samoa was the first island country to gain independence, in 1962. At that time only matai were entitled to vote and stand for parliament. In 1990 the Electoral Amendment Act introduced universal suffrage, but still only matai can stand. All 47 Samoan members of the 49-seat parliament are also matai, performing dual roles as chiefs and modern politicians. There are also two seats reserved for non-Samoans (Drage 1994: 162). The Samoan system has a unicameral legislature where the executive and the legislative arms of govern- ment are fused. The prime minister is elected by a majority in the Fono and is appointed by the head of state to form a government. The prime minister’s cabinet is appointed and sworn in by the head of state, subject to the continuing confidence of the Fono, which since the rise of political parties in Samoa in the 1980s has been controlled by the party with the most seats. Samoan political structures have been framed to draw on the traditional fono and utilising the village leaders as the representatives for a western-style democratic parliament. The chiefly titles – the matai – are still very relevant and there is still a clear line of authority and responsibility between citizens/village people and the chiefs. The line of authority is two-way, given the consensus building that is required to take place in decision making. Individual people are as much a part of the consensus building as the chiefs. However, the very concept of citizen participation and ‘citizenship’ if you will has been fundamentally altered. The contemporary structure does not address this shift, moving from citizen participation as involved in consensus building for the greater good to citizen participation as the individual vote that promotes the right of the individual.

9.5 Conclusions We still need to find a way to not only effectively fuse the traditional and Westminster-style political systems and institutions, but also to address the fundamental question that is the shift from consensus building for the greater good to individual votes that advance the cause of the individual. The question that one needs to ask is ‘How relevant is the Westminster-style model for many of these small island states, given their traditional modes of ensuring ‘citizen- ship’ in the way that we understand it in contemporary democratic systems?’ The inclusion and participation of citizens in decision-making processes is key to democracy and it is important to understand how ‘participation’ has been explored and operationalised in many of these countries to look for meaningful ways to combine indigenous and Westminster-style political institutions and work within the framework of the conceptual understanding of citizenship in these countries. This is probably one of the biggest challenges imposed on Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 75

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many of the countries by Western democracy. In conclusion it is not helpful to examine citizen participation through the lens of western democratic systems and the concept of the individual vote driven by individual rights. However, as many of these countries are working to engage with the traditional and the contemporary, the emphasis needs to be on revisiting how these hybrid structures reflect (or not) citizen’s understandings of their rights and responsibilities as it pertains to their village, their families and themselves.

Notes 1 Many authors have also highlighted the difficulty in ‘transplanting’ Western democratic systems to non-Western polities hence critiquing the very use of colonial democratic structures in countries in the Pacific. 2 See http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=846 for more information. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 76 Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 77

10 People’s Participation in Democratic Reform: Lessons Learned from the Community in Tonga

Sione Faka’osi, Executive Director, Tonga Community Development Trust, Tonga

10.1 Introduction This chapter critically assesses the significance of people’s participation in political reforms and the impact of wider democratic processes in the country on the participation of individual citizens in making decisions in their villages and local communities. Tonga is currently at a crossroads of political change and the opportunities to embed citizen participation in democratic processes are vast. The existing electoral system is a combination of ‘first past the post’ (FPTP) and block-voting (BV) systems. This chapter discusses the merits and demerits of the current electoral system and presents options for political reform. The validity of any electoral system is judged on whether or not it encourages people to vote. Prior to 1875 ‘commoners’ did not participate in any form of decision- making. The 1875 Constitution revolutionised Tonga’s political system, laying the foundation for people’s participation in electing their representatives to Parliament. Since 1957 people have voted at the local level too, electing town and district officers and establishing of village committees and councils. This chapter examines Lapaha village, where a town council was established for the first time in 2007 . This case study demonstrates both the significance of people’s participation in improving good governance at the community level and how democratic principles work in the village context. Finally, this chapter suggests that the important role played by civil society organisations in Tonga is critical to ensure that any future political reform will bring improved governance and further deepen democratic principles and processes. CSOs play an important role as ‘watchdogs’ of non-democratic institutions and poor governance practices.

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10.2 Democratisation and the search for an appropriate model for Tonga Tonga’s democratic structures and systems are different from those of its neigh- bours. Lessons learned from a comparative study of different democratic and electoral systems in the world suggest that democratisation is a process that requires time and patience. Beetham et al. (2008: 7) suggest that there is a need to understand and appreciate the context in which democratic principles are being developed and implemented. They state that ‘[d]emocracy is not achieved through elections alone. Democratic practices can be compared but not prescribed. Democracy is built from within societies. Democracy cannot be imported, or exported, but supported.’ It is therefore critical for designers of Tonga’s democratic electoral system to consider these fundamental ideas to come up with a system that is practical, sustainable and context appropriate. For Tonga it is therefore important to recognise that democratic principles should be interpreted in an appropriate and sensitive manner for the country in order for the practice of democracy to be participatory. There is no such thing as a single model for democratically elected government.

10.3 National electoral system: People’s participation and options for change The current electoral system in Tonga is a ‘plurality/majority system’; a combination of the FPTP (first past the post) and BV (block voting) systems.1 A plurality/majority system is simple, and whoever or whichever party gets the most votes wins (Reynolds et al. 2005: 35). It is commonly agreed that no single voting system is perfect. However, an ideal voting system must be inherently representative of the system of government people want, promoting both participation and political efficacy. Inherent in the ideal electoral and voting system is also an articulation of the social structure and cultural values that people wish to preserve and deem important. Finally, alongside participation, efficacy and cultural factors is the need for sustainability. An ideal voting and electoral system will, in the end, be influenced by all these factors.2 The most notable strength of the current electoral system, especially the FPTP aspect, is its simplicity – for both voters and electoral officers: voters tick the ballot paper to mark their choice.3 Voters also learn the election results immediately after the election, and finally the FPTP system helps to build strong ties between elected representatives and their constituents. There are drawbacks to the current electoral system, however, which have been raised by a variety of commentators (CEC Interim & Final Report 2009; Fraenkel 2009; Reynolds 2005; Salmond 2002). Some of the key drawbacks, Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 79

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especially for BV, include wasted votes; weak social ties; inequitable opportunities for voters; lack of choice of appropriate candidates; and lack of participation in elections. These drawbacks were apparent in the most recent general election in 2008, when only 47% of registered voters turned out to vote. It has been suggested that low voter turnout was the result of voter apathy and a general feeling of disenfranchisement. A further drawback to the current voting system is the inequity in voting opportunities: Tongatapu voters have three votes each, Vava’u and Ha’apai voters have two votes each and the Niuas and Eua have a single vote.

10.3.1 Options for electoral reform While some people would like to retain the existing FPTP/BV mixture, many other have suggested different voting systems that could be used (CEC Interim and Final Report 2009; CEC Final Report 2009; Fraenkel 2009; Salmond 2002). The most common include: • An FPTP system with single member districts • A single-transferable vote system (STV) • An alternative voting system (AV) The current global trend in electoral system reform is such that

[…] most countries that have changed electoral systems have done so in the direction of more proportionality, either by adding a PR element to a plurality system (making it Parallel or (MMP) system) or by completely replacing their old system with List PR. The most common switch has been from a plurality/majority system to a mixed system, and there is not one example of a change in the opposite direction (Reynolds 2005: 23–24).

This chapter supports an FPTP single member per constituency voting system. This means that each MP is elected to Parliament from a single constituency. It will promote democracy by: • establishing equity – one vote per voter; • strengthen social ties between MPs and voters; • encourage accountability and transparency; • strengthen the representation of people’s voices and concerns; and • encourage registered voters to vote. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 80

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10.4 People’s participation in past political reform: A historical perspective Political reform in Tonga had occurred a number of times before 1875. Most reform happened in the upper echelons of political power, however – namely with the and the nobility. There was little if no participation of the wider electorate in politics. It was not until the promulgation of the Tongan Constitution in 1875 that the foundation for people’s participation was laid down.

10.4.1 Traditional governance and political reforms Traditional governance is characterised by a concentration of power in the hands of the three kingly lines, Tu’i Tonga, Tu’i Ha’atakalaua and Tu’i Kanokupolu and their subordinate chiefs. The succession in the kingly lines was applied upon the selection of the Tu’i Tonga, as well as, other chiefly titles. It was strictly patrilineal (from father to son) until the 18th century, when it changed to collateral succession. This gave rise to claim to the titles and led to the establishment of an ‘electoral college’ which was made up of the principal chiefs of the Ha’a Ngatamotu’a and Ha’a Havea. Politics, especially the selection of traditional leaders, was strictly a chiefly business. ‘The kau tu’a (commoners) played no active part in politics. They were completely under the domination of their superiors and served them in every way’ (Latukefu 1973: 6). All political reform was focused on the ruling elite and the distribution of power at that level.4

10.4.2 The Tongan Constitution and people’s participation People’s participation in politics was first recognised during the fifth wave of political reform, as highlighted in the new Constitution in 1875, which came as a result of the civil war at the end of the 19th century.There was an important moment in this process at the end of the war in 1862 when the leader and reformer Taufa’ahau introduced the Emancipation Edict which freed commoners from the absolute powers of the chiefs.5 With the help of the Reverend Shirley Baker, a Christian missionary from London, the Tongan Constitution was promulgated in 1875. It was this Constitution that defined people’s rights and their entitlement to vote for parliamentary representatives. The Constitution also, for the first time, envisaged a three-tiered traditional socio-political structure – king at the top, chief in the middle and commoners at the bottom. Traditionally the socio-political structure was based on inheritance and the acquisition of titles, which then allowed titled individuals to exercise political power. The reformed system of government, on the other hand, provided an opportunity for commoners to have the right to elect representatives to parliament. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 81

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10.4.3 Electing town and district officers In 1930, the prime minister appointed the town and district officers as community leaders at the village level.6 They adopted the role of tauhi fonua (keeper of the land) and were responsible for keeping the peace and ensuring people were fulfilling their responsibilities at the village level. It was not until 1957 that town and district officers were elected by the people for the first time (Vuki 2009). The election was conducted under the single-member district and FPTP system. The town officer became the official elected community leader at the village level and was authorised to form village committees after the election. The village committee worked with the town officer to make decisions about village affairs. Each village has its own committee and members take office voluntarily. The district officer is the official elected community leader at the district level. All town officers in a particular district are under the jurisdiction of the district officer. A monthly fono is the formal village meeting where people are informed about government initiatives. During these meetings the town and district officers are also updated on village issues, which are then communicated to the prime minister’s office. One notable weakness in electing town and district officers is the low voter turnout. Table 10.1 below shows the results of the 2007 General Election for district and town officers.

Table 10.1. 2007 general election for district and town officers in Tonga

Electoral Registered Registered Registered Registered Registered region voters voters voters voters who voters who (number) who voted who vote did not voted did not vote (number) (%) (number) (%) Tongatapu 37,064 10,604 28.61 26,460 71.39 Vava’u 12,836 5,353 41.70 7,483 58.30 Ha’apai 8,842 2,791 31.57 6,051 68.43 Eua 4,354 1,700 39.04 2,654 60.96 Niuatoputapu 1,361 645 47.39 716 52.61 Niuafo’ou 690 258 37.39 432 62.61 Source: PMO 2009

People have freedom of choice to elect town and district officers. Once elected, the relationship between the town officer and the voters is that of direct responsibility and accountability towards each other. The main problem with the current political structure is that people do not understand the roles and responsibilities of the town and district officers. As a result they have false Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 82

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expectations and misconceptions. Furthermore, town and district officers themselves do not have clear terms of reference and there is no way to assess their performance. They are not trained and are unable to keep up with the increasing complexity of communities in Tonga. The distribution of town officers is also skewed, with one in every village regardless of size, when some large villages need more than one. As a result, town officers is some of the larger villages cannot do their job. This is where the village committee becomes useful, as they can support the town officer and mobilise the village to achieve their development aspirations.

10.5 Case study: CSOs’ role in improving community governance Establishing the Lapaha village council helped demonstrate how improved governance facilitates people’s participation in the democratic election of council members. Traditionally, members of the village committee are elected during the community fono to help the town officer respond to the community’s development needs. However, a study of the village electoral system by the Tonga Trust showed that many village committees were inactive and had a weak governance structure.7 It was clear that village committees were elected by a minority, primarily by the few people who attended the village fono. Thus, the village committee did not truly represent the community, and decisions were made by the very few who participated in the village committee. The Tonga Community Development Trust, People and Policy Project, was developed to help strengthen the governance structure of the village committee.8 The project started by working with the village committee to assess its governance structure and to identify its strengths, weaknesses and ways to strengthen the governance of the village committee. The process went hand in hand with awareness raising activities to increase people’s understanding of governance and their rights and responsibilities, and to highlight the role that governance plays as a foundation for community development. A big challenge faced by the Tonga Community Development Trust is the dependency that characterised development activities in communities. This was clear from the unwillingness of many people to actively participate in community initiatives unless there were direct monetary benefits. This behaviour was encouraged by community development aid programmes in the past, and to change this dependent behaviour the Tonga Trust developed close partnerships with selected communities to pilot innovative programmes. The aim was to encourage people to engage in sustainable activities that would address their development needs and support behaviour change. Central to the success of these community activities was people’s participation. Community development efforts are useless without the participation of local people. Lessons Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 83

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learned from the People and Policy Project shows that one of the main reasons for the failure of community development is the lack of community ownership of project activities and benefits. This is often characterised by a lack of community participation and involvement in the development process. The Tonga Community Development Trust therefore adopted a participatory approach to community development. This featured community involvement from the outset, in identifying the problem and its root causes, assessing options and appropriate solutions, developing projects and fundraising, implementing solutions, and monitoring and evaluation. One of the key elements of this development process has been the restructuring of the governance structure of village committees. The project was seen as an opportunity to re-organise the community to be productive and to achieve their collective aspirations. The community was taken through the process of realising that some of the development challenges they faced could be addressed through better co-ordination and collaborative effort. The Tonga Community Development Trust selected Lapaha in 2005 as one of the five pilot communities to participate in the People and Policy Project. Ad hoc awareness and empowerment activities were carried out in 2006 but gained momentum in January 2007. In February 2007, a -based consultancy company, the Eight Associates Ltd, came to Tonga on an assign- ment for the Government of Tonga. The company was asked to assess the governance structure of the Lapaha village committee using a tool they had developed called ‘governrite’. The governrite tool has been used to identify the strengths and weaknesses in a particular organisation and rank the effectiveness of the governance structure using the standard governance principles of participatory, transparency, responsiveness, accountability, etc. The assessment report ranked the governance of Lapaha village committee at 61% out of the total 100%. The assessment process was an eye opener to the members of the committee, and they realised that their strengths and – more importantly – their weaknesses, which was seen as an opportunity for improvement. Lapaha women’s groups planned a community drama night, based on the consultant’s report, to promote better understanding of governance issues and opportunities. The drama night’s high-profile attendees included HRH Princess Siu’ilikutapu and the New Zealand High Commissioner to Tonga Dr Michael McBryde as the Guests of Honour, members of Tonga Trust Board of Directors, and the people of Lapaha. This was HRH Princess Siu’ilikutapu’s first engagement with the People and Policy Project. She recalled that ‘watching those dramas about good governance reminded her that this might be the appropriate time to engage people’. She realised the significance and importance of the programme for the development of Lapaha. From then on, she continued to participate actively in the process, leading to the establishment of the Lapaha Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 84

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Council. Her continuous presence in community and block meetings and workshops, facilitated by the People and Policy Project, encouraged the people of Lapaha to participate actively. Alongside work with women’s groups the People and Policy Project set up an interim village committee to plan and execute a series of meetings with the people in Lapaha. Meetings and work- shops with different sections and blocks in the village were held from 8 to 21 May 2007 (‘Esau & Taumoepeau 2007). See Table 10.2 for a breakdown.

Table 10.2. Block meeting and people’s participation rate Block no. Date Time Total no. of Participation Venue households rate 3 8/5/07 6 pm 53 40 (75%) FWC Hall 5 11/5/07 6 pm 37 31 (84%) FWC Hall 2 14/5/07 6 pm 70 26 (37%) Tonunga Hall 6 15/5/07 6 pm 32 24 (75%) Church of Tonga Hall 4 16/5/07 6 pm 70 54 (77%) FWC Hall 1 21/5/07 8 pm 97 54 (56%) Tonunga Halaa Source: ‘Esau and Taumoepeau (2007)

These meetings discussed different aspects of good governance. Three represen- tatives from each block were elected through a secret vote to form the village council. The council established sub-committees for women, water, education, history and culture, land, health and disaster, agriculture, youth, sports, roads and electricity. Each sub-committee, with two elected members from the block/subsection of the village, elected a member to the Lapaha Council. The system encouraged accountability and transparency by allowing time for representatives to report to the council the needs of his/her block. At the end of the council meeting the representatives are expected to report back the results to the people in their block. This dual responsibility of council members was built into the Lapaha Council Constitution. A number of people in Lapaha have expressed their appreciation that the governance project had built bridges and helped them overcome traditional, religious and social barriers in the village. Some people were surprised to be attending workshops together with HRH Siuilikutapu. This promoted the spirit of unity in smaller blocks, in women’s groups, with the youth, and the village as a whole. The Tonga Trust People and Policy Project chose not to use external models of governance in the Lapaha community. In fact, each of the five communities who participated in the project developed their own governance model that was based on unique village social and political conditions. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 85

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The system used to elect members of the Lapaha Council was based on the common community electoral system, such as balloting by show of hands, secret voting using written papers, or by consensus. Electing representatives from the village blocks ensured that the often unheard voices of the communities are now heard by the council. At the same time, participatory decisions are passed down from the council to the people though their block or sub-committee’s representatives. This is the principle on which participatory governance was woven into the project activities. The project merely facilitated the process. As a result, the establishment of the Lapaha Council was driven by the strong leadership of HRH Princess Siu’ilikutapu and actively supported by her son, Noble Kalaniuvalu, and by the people of Lapaha, who realised that their ownership that was being built into the entire project. The elected council members were then involved in a number of workshops to build their understanding of leadership, communication and related skills. They were also given opportunities to help draft the Constitution for the town council, which outlines the governance structure and their respective responsibilities. In the end, the Lapaha Council was officially launched on 4 July 2007 by Tonga’s prime minister, the Honourable Dr Feleti Sevele, and the ceremony was attended by foreign dignitaries, government ministers, church leaders, and the people of Lapaha. This case study demonstrates that civil society organisations like the Tonga Trust have an important role to play in both improving governance and deepening democracy at the community level. The government’s support of Lapaha Council demonstrates their recognition and support for the work of CSOs in Tonga, a relationship that needs to be nurtured and strengthened.

10.6 Role of CSOs in improving governance and deepening democracy in Tonga Political reform is underway and there is clearly a need for civil society organisations to play an active role in preparing the communities to participate in the process of democratic reform. It is also important for civil society organisations to strengthen their relationships with the Prime Minister’s Office to implement the civic education and voter educational programme.

10.6.1 Common challenges for people’s participation The main challenge in the transition to a new electoral system is transforming people’s understanding of their rights and obligations in democratic processes. There are two ways to achieve mass participation in voting: first, an electoral system that is fair, equitable and restores people’s confidence that their vote counts and can make a difference, and second, a strategic communication Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 86

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programme with measurable indicators that targets apathetic registered voters to become responsible voters. Community development programmes face the same challenge of people’s lack of participation, which makes it difficult to sustain activities and benefits. The Tonga Trust’s studies show that most local communities are attracted to activities with a strong link to improving sustainable livelihoods. People face a daily struggle to fulfil family obligations such as school fees, etc., so it is vital to show people the links between civic education and development activities. Voters often ask how their votes contribute to the betterment of their own living conditions. The value of people’s rights is mostly understood in the context that it relates to direct benefits. This raises the question of the government’s performance in delivering basic services to its people. There is a belief that it doesn’t matter what system of government is in place, as long as civil servants perform. However this argument disregards the way transparency and accountability in a more democratic form of government improves civil servant performance. The new system of governance and government will have people’s elected representatives also holding ministerial portfolios in the government. Thus, the system will encourage direct accountability of the government minister and their ministry to the people who elected them. If performance does not improve, their value as a people’s representative will be tested at the next election.

10.6.2 Empowering community governance programme The establishment of a village committee, chaired by the chosen town officer, demonstrates people’s increased desire to participate in decision-making and managing local affairs. It shows that people will gradually accept responsibility and make decisions to improve their village. However, a persistent weakness can occur, where many village committees are elected by the minority, that is only those who attend the monthly village fono. This often leads to the village committee becoming inactive, with little or no representation for people’s concerns. When it goes wrong there is little or no consultation before any decision-making as village committee members do not engage people in decision-making. Often, town officers and members of a village committee make decisions before they inform the people and people feel obliged to react. Lessons learned from the Tonga Trust People and Policy Project highlight the importance of organising communities and improving their governance structures. This encourages people to participate in electing community leaders to represent their voices to government. It also encourages transparency, accountability and instils a sense of civic responsibility. By strengthening good governance and democratisation – from families to the community committee Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 87

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level – the system will encourage people to participate actively in making decisions. This enables them to participate in managing local issues that are more influential in their daily lives, e.g. village water supply, clean environment, health, food security, peace and youth and women. This is one of the strength of CSOs, empowering community through improved governance and deepening democracy.

10.7 Lessons learned The current electoral system has both merits and demerits. It is clear that it does not matter what type of electoral system Tonga has, it must warrant greater participation in voting. Lack of participation in voting in the past has created a feeling of disenfranchisement of citizens. In order to develop account- ability and trust between people and their government, they need to feel they are part of the system and that their votes make a difference. From the case study in this chapter it is clear that the division of Lapaha village into six smaller blocks encouraged people’s participation, as was evident in the high rate of participation in block meetings and voting. The method emphasises the importance of people’s participation (kau mai). Securing the support of the estate holder (noble or government) from the outset also encourages people’s participation. Experience shows that communities participate in activities that improve their livelihood in a sustainable manner. It is useful to clarify the links between understanding their civic rights and casting their vote with improving their living standards. In situations where this link is unclear there is often a lack of participation. By strengthening good governance and democratisation, from the family to the community and committee level, people are encouraged to participate actively in making decisions. This enables them to manage local issues that have greater impacts on their daily lives. Participation in local politics can be a good training ground for building confidence for potential candidates. Civil society organisations clearly have an important role to play in improving governance and deepening democratic processes and structured in Tonga.

Notes 1 The first-past-the-post system is a plurality/majority system used with a single-member district. It is commonly found in countries that have traditional ties with Britain. India, for example, is a former British colony and is the largest democracy in the world that uses the FPTP system. FPTP is recognised for its simplicity, although the winners may not necessarily represent the majority of the voters across the country. The winning candidate or party does have the highest Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 88

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number of votes in that constituency. The block voting system is a plurality/majority system used with a multi-member district. Legitimate voters have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. A good example is the voting for people’s representatives in Tongatapu, where voters are allowed to vote three People’s Representatives to Parliament. Similarly, in Vava’u and Ha’apai, voters in each area are allowed to vote two People’s Representatives to Parliament. 2 It is understood, in this rendition of an ideal voting system, that people are also ‘ideal’, hence the system is structured so that the intended outcomes enhance participation, efficacy, cultural norms and sustainability. 3 Each voter has only one choice or a single vote under the FPTP system, which is much easier to tally at the end of election. 4 The first known political leader in Tonga was ‘Aho’eitu, who unified the whole of Tonga under a single ruler, around the 10th century AD. This was the first wave of political reform in Tonga. Researchers refer to this period as the ‘dark ages’ where most work focused on nation building (Latukefu 1975). The rise of the 10th Tu’i Tonga, Momo is marked by the emergence and expansion of the Tu’i Tonga’s power to colonise some of the neighbouring Pacific islands (Latukefu 1975; Mahina 1992). This is the second wave of political reform, and took place around the 12th century AD. The second reform is also characterised by the organisation of local power structures to support the expansion of the Tu’i Tonga . The fall of the Tu’i Tonga empire was characterised by increasing power struggles and civil unrest. This led to the third wave of political reform, which took place in the 15th century.The 24th Tu’i Tonga, Kau’ulufonuafekai, officiated his younger brother, Mo’ungamotu’a, as the first Tu’i Ha’atakalaua (also known as the hau or temporal ruler). The Tu’i Tonga became known as the sacred ruler or ‘eiki toputapu (Latukefu 1995; Mahina 1992). The fourth wave of political reform took place in the 17th century, when the 6th Tu’i Ha’atakalaua, Mo’ungatonga, created the third kingly line and appointed one of his sons, Ngata, to become the first Tu’i Kanokupolu. At the same time, the responsibilities of the hau were delegated to the Tu’i Kanokupolu. 5 The Emancipation Edict in 1862 marked the gaining of liberty and freedom of common people from the absolute power of the traditional chiefs. 6 Before the outbreak of the civil war in 1797 people were living in fenced gardens and the settlement was spread throughout the country. There were no villages. During the civil war, commoners lived together with their chiefs in forts and this continued after the civil war, which gave rise to village (kolo) dwelling. The Constitution, with its revolutionary aspects of land reform, allocated town allotment in villages and tax allotment to support commoners in fulfilling their social obligation. 7 Tonga Trust is a founding member of FSPI, a regional consortium of independent development agencies located in Australia, East Timor, Fiji, , , Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, , the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Vanuatu. The Tonga Community Development Trust has been involved in community empowerment for development in Tonga for thirty years. It has worked with many communities to celebrate achievements as well as sharing common challenges. It has witnessed communities gradually developing their capacity, to the extent that they are able to drive the development process in their community. Tonga Trust’s approach to community development is similar to nurturing a child from birth until it is old enough to stand on its own two feet and walk independently. It has helped communities to increase awareness of sustainable development challenges and opportunities at different levels, learning and sharing practical skills, improving community governance and strengthening linkages with the government and development partners. It is a time-consuming process that requires both human and financial resources. However, in order to ensure ownership and sustainable development in the communities, the lessons learned point to the need for the process to be carried through properly and without short cuts. 8 People and Policy Project is a regional project funded by NZAid through the Foundation of the People of the South Pacific International (FPSPI) based in Suva. Governance final:Layout 1 26/11/10 10:28 Page 89

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