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The Rise of Boko Haram

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The Rise of Boko Haram Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations The rise of Boko Haram A Social Movement Theory Approach Author: Iris Visser Student Number: 5737508 MA Research Project Political Science: International Relations Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan Second reader: Dr. Ursula Daxecker Date: 25 June 2014 1 Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations The rise of Boko Haram A Social Movement Theory Approach 2 3 Table of contents Political map of Nigeria 6 I. Introduction 7 II. Theoretical framework and literature review 13 III. Methodology 34 Variables 34 Methodological issues 34 Operationalization 35 IV. Background of Nigeria 43 V. The rise and evolution of Boko Haram 51 VI. United States- Nigeria cooperation concerning counterterrorism 59 VII. A political process perspective 64 VIII. A relative deprivation perspective 75 IX. A resource mobilization perspective 91 X. A framing perspective 108 XI. Conclusion 122 Bibliography 127 Appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks 139 Number of Boko Haram attacks and resulting deaths 2010-2014 per quarter 139 Timeline of Boko Haram attacks 2010-2014 140 4 5 Map of Nigeria 6 I. Introduction Like many postcolonial states, Nigeria has a turbulent history. The country is plagued by all kinds of violence. There has been civil war,1 crime rates are high,2 communal violence is common, as is sectarian violence3 — and, often along the same lines, political violence4 — while in the south an added problem are conflicts concerning oil.5 One of the biggest problems Nigeria faces today, is that of radical Islamic violence in the north of the country. Whereas communal violence has long been an issue, the rise of radical Islamic groups such as Boko Haram, who function more like a terrorist organization, is relatively new (as it is in most parts of the world). Boko Haram is formally called Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). The name Boko Haram, which means something along the lines of ‘western education is sinful’, was given to them by neighbours of their compound in the early days of the organization’s existence.6 It is used in this thesis since it is shorter and much better known than their official name. The attacks by Boko Haram and associated violence have led to thousands of deaths since 2009.7 And although government statements sometimes suggest otherwise,8 there are no signs of Boko Haram being seriously impeded and of its violence declining. On the contrary, in the first 3 months of 2014, the radical Islamic group popularly known as Boko Haram have killed around 1500 people,9 including a large number of civilians in attacks on villages,10 and dozens of 1 ‘1970: Nigeria marks end of the Biafra civil war’, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11399157, 24 September 2010. 2 ‘Nigeria Watch: Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2011)’, Nigeria Watch, June 2011, 12-13. 3 Idem, 20-21. 4 Idem, 16-20. 5 Idem, 13-16. 6 Andrew Walker (2012) ‘Special Report 308. What Is Boko Haram?’, United States Institute for Peace, 3. 7 ‘Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Cause Humanitarian Crisis’, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-cause-humanitarian-crisis, 14 March 2014. Also see the appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks. 8 See for example: ‘Boko Haram In Disarray, Nigerian Army Reports’, SaharaReporters, http://saharareporters.com/news-page/boko-haram-disarray-nigerian-army-reports, 19 May 2013. Also see: Kees Broere, ‘Tientallen doden bij aanslag in Nigeria’, De Volkskrant, 15 April 2014. 9 ‘Nigeria: more than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in north-eastern Nigeria in early 2014’, Amnesty International. 10 ‘Boko Haram raid kills dozens in Nigeria’, AlJazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/boko- haram-raid-kills-dozens-nigeria-201421221431015516.html, last modified 12 February 2014. Also see: ‘Nigeria village attack leaves scores dead’, AlJazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/nigeria-village-attack-leaves-scores-dead- 2014216172549157111.html, last modified 16 February 2014. ‘Scores killed in attack in northeast Nigeria’, AlJazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/scores- killed-attack-northeast-nigeria-2014216221443992379.html, last modified 17 February 2014. Michael Olugbode, ‘Boko Haram Kills 210 in Borno Dawn Attack, Says Senator Ahmed’, THISDAY, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-kills-210-in-borno-dawn-attack-says-senator-ahmed/175978/, 12 April 2014. 7 school children.11 And famously, in April of that same year, they kidnapped over 250 schoolgirls from Chibok, the large majority of whom were still missing at the time of writing, two months later.12 While Boko Haram is burning down villages, Nigerian police forces respond with equally harsh methods without much consideration for whether it is actual Boko Haram affiliates or random civilians that are targeted.13 The government forces are adding to the death toll in this conflict — the earlier mentioned 1500 deaths in the first three months of 2014 included a couple of hundred people killed by government forces.14 Also when civilians are not actually targeted, the extreme measures taken to hunt down Boko Haram still cause civilian deaths and displacement.15 The Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa states have been in an official state of emergency for nearly a year, which puts little strain on the military forces. It would seem that Nigeria’s government forces’ methods are not effective, however, since attacks by Boko Haram have only increased in recent years. Especially attacks on civilian targets seem to have proliferated since this state of emergency.16 Next to the death toll caused by both Boko Haram’s attacks and the government forces’ response, there are now also 300,000 to 500,000 displaced people in the three north-eastern states.17 While the February attacks all took place in Borno state, previous attacks have happened throughout a large area of the country covering the entire north and north-eastern regions and also Abuja capital territory, adding up to 17 of Nigeria’s 36 states — although in some states there were only one or two attacks while the noth-eastern ones faced much more.18 Next to attacks on civilians, there have been a lot of attacks on the police and the military, which was the main target 11 Anouk van Kampen, ‘43 leerlingen gedood op school Nigeria bij aanval Boko Haram’, NRC, http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/02/25/29-doden-op-school-nigeria-na-aanval-boko-haram/, last modified 25 February 2014. Also see: Kayode Idowu and Fidelis Soriwei, Boko Haram kills Scores of UTME candidates in Borno’, The Punch, http://www.punchng.com/news/utme-students-killed-in-boko-haram-attacks/, 12 April 2014. 12 Jacob Zenn, ‘Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok Schoolgirls’, Combating Terrorism Center, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-and-the-kidnapping-of-the-chibok-schoolgirls, 29 May 2014. 13 ‘Nigeria police accused of victimizing Muslims’, AlJazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2014/02/nigeria-police-accused-victimising-muslims- 201421516298454963.html, last modified 15 February 2014. Also see: ‘Nigeria: Torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees by Nigerian security forces: Amnesty International’s written statement to the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council (3 – 28 March 2014)’, Amnesty International, 20 February 2014. 14 ‘Nigeria: more than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in north-eastern Nigeria in early 2014’, Amnesty International, 12. Via: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/004/2014/en/543f7ac9-6889-4f02-bf5a- d73832e04229/afr440042014en.pdf, 2014. 15 Ola’ Audu, ‘185 killed in Borno town, Baga, as soldiers, Boko Haram fight’, Premium Times, http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/130680-185-killed-in-borno-town-baga-as-soldiers-boko-haram-fight.html, last modified 22 April 2014. 16 See the appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks. 17 ‘Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Cause Humanitarian Crisis’, Human Rights Watch. Also see: ‘UNHCR concerned as hundreds flee attacks in Nigeria’s Lake Chad region’, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=531ee2736&query=nigeria, last modified 11 March 2014. 18 See the appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks. 8 especially at the start of the violence,19 and threats are also made against Nigeria’s oil refineries in the Niger Delta,20 against federal government and its president, Goodluck Jonathan, in particular.21 Also, Nigeria’s borders are porous and there are fears of a spill-over into Cameroon, where Boko Haram have already kidnapped a French family in early 2013. Recently, images of Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau surfaced in which threats were made against the US and other western countries.22 Aside from these threats and the loss of lives caused by Boko Haram, it also severely disrupts public life and harms the economy. The group’s regular attacks on schools have caused destruction and have led to the closing of over 200 schools and around 15,000 children not being able to attend school anymore in Yobe state.23 In Borno state, in March 2014 85 schools were ordered to close by officials, in fear of more Boko Haram attacks.24 As the above signals, the Nigerian government is facing a lot of difficulties in battling Boko Haram. While Boko Haram has thus far been a mostly national problem (notwithstanding some earlier mentioned spill-over into Cameroon and Niger25), other states have also voiced their concern about the violence in the north-eastern part of the country. One of the most prominent states in this is the United States, who have designated Boko Haram and its offshoot organization Ansaru as international terrorist organizations in November 2013.26 Ansaru is officially named Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan, which means ‘Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa’.27 It was founded in January of 2012 when it split off from Boko Haram because of ideological differences.28 To designate Ansaru as an international terrorist organization is more understandable than it is for Boko Haram, since it is more regionally focused (as opposed to Boko Haram’s mostly national focus).
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