ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | EMPLOYEE NEWSLETTER USS THRESHER EB LOST APRIL 10, 1963 A 50TH YEAR NEWS REMEMBRANCE

LEST WE FORGET

MARCH 2013 LEFT, THRESHER ON ITS CHRISTENING DAY, JULY 9, 1960.

BELOW, USS THRESHER UNDER WAY.

PHOTOS FROM THE LIFE AND LOSS OF USS THRESHER

2 | ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 THE TOP FOUR PHOTOS SHOW THRESHER ON ITS CHRISTENING DAY, JULY 9, 1960. BOTTOM TWO PHOTOS TAKEN AFTER WRECKAGE FROM THRESHER WAS FOUND SHOW THE DOME, RIGHT, AND THE UPPER RUDDER, LEFT. U.S. NAVY PHOTOS

ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 | 3 THE LOSS OF USS THRESHER – What It Means to ELECTRIC BOAT Electric Boat Employees TO HOLD BY JAMES NOONAN n April 10, the nation’s community will mark the 50th anni- COMMEMORATIVE versary of the loss of the submarine USS Thresher (SSN-593). At Electric Boat, we are commemorating this somber event with EVENTS APRIL 10 O a range of activities to remember the ship and its complement, and review the efforts we continue to make so such an event does not happen wo Electric Boat events will be held again. Wednesday, April 10 to mark the Thresher was engaged in sea trials on April 10, 1963, following an exten- T 50th anniversary of the loss of USS sive overhaul. During its initial dive to test depth, the submarine was lost Thresher (SSN-593). with all 129 U.S. Navy sailors, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and civilian com- There will be a flagpole ceremony on pany employees on board. the main yard hill beginning at 9 a.m. The central theme of this remembrance is “Lest We Forget.” These were with a Navy color guard and the Elec- the words spoken by Sen. John O. Pastore, R.I., chairman of the Joint Com- tric Boat singing group, the SubTones, mittee on Atomic Energy, at the December 1964 hearings on the loss of participating. Thresher. JIM NOONAN, director of qual- The senator further stated “The committee hopes that these hearings will ity, will be the speaker. Following his be carefully studied by all who are engaged in military technical develop- remarks, a bell will be rung 129 times, ment, for they contain many lessons learned for which we have already once for each life lost on Thresher. paid a high price.” Later that day, the Electric Boat With those words in mind, we remain committed to providing aware- Management Association will sponsor ness and information on the lessons we have learned from the tragic loss of a commemorative program open to all Thresher. company employees. We also want to increase awareness for each Electric Boat team member as to The event will be held at the Port ‘N “why we do what we do” at the company. This becomes more important as the Starboard at Ocean Beach Park in New memory of the loss of Thresher recedes in history and as our work force increas- London. Registration will be from 5:30 ingly comprises men and women who have no personal recollection of the event. to 6 p.m.; the dinner and program will Finally, we wish to honor each of the men who lost his life with the sinking run from 6:30 to 9 p.m. of Thresher and to recognize the friends and family members who carry on The program speaker will be the legacy of these amazing heroes. ALFRED H. FORD JR., whose 40-year We as Electric Boat team members are responsible for our Special Empha- career as a Navy civilian manager and sis Program (SUBSAFE, Diver Safety and Fly-By-Wire) compliance. We all leader included an assignment as the must adhere to the fundamentals of work discipline, material control, docu- senior civilian responsible for safety mentation and compliance with procedures on every task we do. and quality assurance for the Navy’s submarine fleet and deep submergence “Lest We Forget” systems. He is now director emeritus, Submarine Safety & Quality Assur- Noonan is director of Submarine Safety, Deep Submergence Systems, ance, serving as an advisor and mentor Fly-By-Wire Ship Control Systems, and Quality Assurance. for Naval Sea Systems Command. H

4 | ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 Thresher / Permit-Class THE SHIP’S PATCH he ship’s patch for USS Thresher T was adopted in 1960 and received in he Thresher / Permit-class submarines resulted October of that year. It was accompanied T from a study commissioned in 1956 by Chief of with this description: “The fish depicted Naval Operations Adm. Arleigh Burke. in the subject insignia is a Thresher Ships of this new class kept the proven S5W reactor plant from the immediately preceding EB shark, which is characterized by a tail that is approximately one-half of its total Skipjack Class, but were a radical change in many length. The Thresher shark reportedly other ways. The Thresher Class had the large bow- NEWS attacks its prey by flailing the long tail. mounted sonar and angled, amidships tubes The horizontal lines signify the deep div- pioneered by the Barracuda Class. The use of a new ing capability of Thresher. The circles alloy steel, HY-80, increased the boats’ test depth. represent its sonar capability. The motto, Another innovation was the redesigned engineer- CONTENTS ‘Vis Tacita,’ describes the overall char- ing spaces, with the turbines supported on “rafts” acteristics of the ship, ‘Silent Strength.’” that were suspended from the hull on sound-damp- ing isolation mounts. 6 / 7 USS Thresher – The Loss, The Inquiry And The Lessons Learned Thresher-class hulls were more effectively stream- lined and had smaller sails, so while they used the 8 / 9 The Names And Faces same reactor plant as the Skipjack Class, their larger Of The Men Lost size did not reduce their speed. The first submarine commissioned in this class 10/11 Brothers Perished In Thresher was the ill-fated USS Thresher (SSN-593), and so Submarine Disasters the class was known by that ship’s name. After 11 USS Scorpion Is Lost Five Years Thresher was lost, the class was named for its sec- After Thresher ond ship, USS Permit (SSN-594), in conformance with Navy custom. 12 Finding USS Thresher

13 The Loss Of Thresher, 50 Years Later USS THRESHER FACTS 14 SUBSAFE Must Be A Way of Life USS Thresher was named for a type of 15 Thresher’s Legacy Is In Our Hands shark that is harmless to man and easily Kittery Flagpole recognizable by its tail, which is longer than to Honor Lives the combined length of body and head. Thresher was laid down May 28, 1958, ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS is published Lost on Thresher by the Public Affairs Dept. at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and 75 Eastern Point Road s a tribute to the sailors and civilians launched July 9, 1960. The ship sponsor was Groton, CT 06340 A who died when USS Thresher (SSN- Mrs. Frederick B. Warder. The submarine 593) sank April 10, 1963, the Thresher was commissioned Aug. 3, 1961, with Memorial Project Group will install a Cmdr. Dean W. Axene in command. DAN BARRETT, Editor flagpole standing 129 feet – one foot for each life lost. Displacement: 3,700 tons surfaced Contributors: The flagpole will be located in Kittery, 4,300 tons submerged HARRY AINSCOUGH Maine, hometown to Portsmouth Naval Length: 278 feet 6 inches Shipyard where Thresher was built. SHEILA BLYDENBURGH Electric Boat employees contributed Beam: 31 feet 8 inches BETH RAFFERTY to the flagpole project through the sale Speed: More than 20 knots of commemorative coffee cups, an effort coordinated by the Quality orga- Complement: 100 officers and enlisted Phone (860) 433-8202 nization. These donations are expected personnel Fax (860) 433-8054 to reach $5,000. Armament: Four torpedo tubes Email [email protected]

ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 | 5 USS THRESHER – THE LOSS, THE INQUIRY AND THE LESSONS LEARNED

BY HARRY AINSCOUGH considerable disagreement over the exact Advocate General Court of Inquiry was communication. convened to establish what happened on n the morning of April 10, 1963, USS However, the Skylark’s log of those last the ship when it was lost, and if possible Thresher (SSN-593) began a series of four minutes contains the following: why it happened. Osea trial exercises, accompanied by P 9:13 a.m.: Thresher reported its status After extensive investigation of the the submarine escort ship Skylark. over the underwater telephone. Though design, construction and short operational The exercises were conducted at the the transmission is garbled, some words life, the court established a number of key end of a major ship overhaul performed at are recognizable: “[We are] experiencing facts. Based on these facts, the court rec- Portsmouth Naval Shipyard during a Post minor difficulty, have positive up-angle, ommended a number of corrective actions Shakedown Availability (PSA), much like attempting to blow.” to improve the design, construction and those completed at Electric Boat. maintenance of all newer, deeper diving P 9:15 a.m.: Skylark picks up a second After a series of shallow dives to ships, and to eliminate or mitigate risks “garbled” transmission from Thresher, validate the ship’s readiness for deep- associated with identified weaknesses. transcribed in the Skylark ‘s log as “900 dive testing, Thresher began a slow Overall, the court concluded that design N.” The meaning of this message is and methodical descent to the ship’s and construction activities were not keep- unclear; it may have indicated the sub- maximum test depth. At periodic depth ing pace with the complexity of newer marine’s depth and course, or it may have intervals, Thresher reported its status to ship design and materials, and newer referred to a Navy “event number” (1000 Skylark through an underwater sound indicating loss of submarine), with the operational capabilities. telephone. “N” signifying a negative response to a In short, submarine design, construc- At 9:13 a.m. Skylark received a “garbled previous query from Skylark, “Are you in tion and operational capabilities had come message” from Thresher, though some control?” “too far, too fast.” words were recognizable: P 9:17 a.m.: Skylark receives a third “[We are] experiencing minor difficulty, Weaknesses identified by the transmission from Thresher, with the par- have positive up-angle, attempting to blow.” Court of Inquiry deliberations tially recognizable phrase “exceeding test included: Thresher’s message was garbled depth … ” because of the communication method Ship’s Seawater Connected This was the last communication Sky- System Design and Construction used and the state of the communication lark received from Thresher. Almost technology at the time. immediately after that, Skylark personnel P Seawater connected systems were During dives, Skylark communicated detected a high-energy low-frequency designed and constructed using silver with Thresher by means of an underwater noise with characteristics of an implosion. brazing (silbraze) joint designs that were sound telephone. Voice communication During a subsequent interview, a Sky- developed in the 1940s and 1950s. Welded over this underwater telephone was dif- lark crewman was asked why he thought joints were not used in seawater con- ficult at best. the noise heard was “... a compartment nected systems. The underwater telephone functions collapsing, or something similar to that P Silbraze joint failure in sea connected similarly to a conventional telephone nature.” systems was a common occurrence on except that the energy is carried by sound The crewman responded: “Both of us… ships in the fleet. Failures included signifi- waves in the water rather than by electri- heard a sound that registered with me as cant flooding causalities, but the condition cal signals through a wire. being familiar because of the fact that I was commonly accepted in the submarine As depth increases and the sound trav- had heard a lot of ships breaking up dur- community as a part of submarine design. els farther through the water, a variety of ing World War II after having been torpe- P There was no effective nondestructive physical factors cause the quality of the doed at depths.” testing (NDT) capabilities developed for sound transmission to degrade. This chilling observation made it plain silbrazed joints in sea water connected There was confusion on Skylark regard- – Thresher was most likely lost. ing the exact context of Thresher’s mes- systems. Visual inspection and successful sages during the four minutes between “Too Far, To Fast” system testing were the only criteria used. the initial garbled message and the sub- Immediately after the loss of the P On Thresher, a new technology marine’s final dive. To this day, there is Thresher was confirmed, a Judge called ultrasonic testing was tried as an

66 | |ELECTRIC ELECTRIC BOAT BOAT NEWS NEWS | FEBRUARY| MARCH 2013 2012 Despite the Navy’s rigorous investigation, no conclusive cause for the loss of Thresher was WHAT MAY established. There is, however, a widely accepted scenario. HAVE P One or more silver-braze piping joints failed, resulting in engine-room flooding. HAPPENED P The crew was unable to access vital equipment to stop the flooding. P Saltwater spray on electrical components caused short circuits, reactor-plant shutdown and loss of propulsion power.

P The main ballast-tank blow system failed to operate properly at test depth. Restrictions in the air system coupled with excessive moisture in the system led to ice formation in the pip- ing. This in turn caused an inadequate blow rate. Consequently, the submarine was unable to overcome the increasing weight of water rushing into the engine room.

experimental NDT process for silbraze the capability to quickly and remotely These systems are fully tested each time a joints. When the NDT was applied, there secure all sea-connected systems during a submarine goes to sea. was a 14 percent rejection rate of sibraze flooding casualty. P Implementation of an emergency joints, including joints in critical systems. flood-control system that enables quick Access to vital equipment during Because this newer NDT technology was hydraulic closure of all sea-connected sys- an emergency not well understood, it was not mandated. tems from remote locations. Thresher went on sea trials without fur- P Equipment that required immedi- P Redesign of ship systems to ensure ther corrective actions. ate access during an emergency was quick access to vital equipment in an obstructed, in some case by bolted Ship Ballasting During an emergency. Additionally, implementation Emergency decking. of a formal test procedure that mandates P There was no emergency blow system Lest We Forget — access to vital equipment within specified on Thresher-class ships (named Permit times, in some cases, within seconds. Class after the loss of Thresher). The Lessons Learned Sen. John O. Pastore, R.I., chairman of The loss of Thresher was a watershed P The ship had a high pressure air sys- the Senate subcommittee that reviewed event in the submarine community and tem but it had never been tested under the Navy’s Thresher investigation, pro- generated an immediate response. In simulated full blow conditions at test vided this assessment: June 1963 – less than two months after depths. “The committee hopes that these hear- the sinking – the Submarine Safety (SUB- ings will be carefully studied by all who P Testing after the loss of Thresher found SAFE) Program was created. the high-pressure air system would ice up are engaged in military technical develop- during full ballast-tank blows, effectively The program established and imple- ment, for they contain many lessons for disabling the system needed to bring the mented clear requirements for the design, which we have already paid a high price. ship to the surface. construction and maintenance of all Navy If the lesson is learned that excellence in submarines. design, fabrication, operation and training P The system was not required to be cannot be compromised in modern high dehumidified to eliminate moisture that Many of the Court of Inquiry’s recom- performance military systems, the men of might form into ice. mendations were incorporated into the SUBSAFE program. Thresher will not have died in vain.” P The high-pressure air system was Among these were: designed to shut off air banks in the case Ainscough is deputy SUBSAFE program of the loss of electrical power (key if the P Redesign of sea-connected systems to director in Dept. 320 reactor was disabled). use welded joints rather than silbrazing. Additionally, ultrasonic testing was man- Thresher’s design did not dated for all silbraze joints used in other incorporate an emergency flood- in critical systems. control system P Implementation of emergency blow P The submarine’s design did not include systems designed to function at all depths.

ELECTRICELECTRIC BOAT BOAT NEWS NEWS | FEBRUARY| MARCH 2013 2012 | 7| 7 HONORING THE MEN LOST ON USS THRESHER – AND THE NEXT GENERATION OF SUBMARINERS – BY RESPECTING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST FRED PHILIP PHILIP HARCOURT TILMON “TILLY” RONALD CLARE RONALD EUGENE ABRAMS ALLEN ARSENAULT BABCOCK BAIN AGE 42 AGE 39 AGE 36 AGE 25 AGE 23

STEVEN GEORGE ROBERT E. CHARRON EDWARD “CHRIS” LARRY WILLIAM THOMAS EDWARD MERRILL FRANCIS KENNETH RAY KENNETH JAMES FRANCIS MICHAEL CAYEY AGE UNKNOWN CHRISTIANSEN CLAUSSEN CLEMENTS COLLIER CORCORAN CRITCHLEY CUMMINGS AGE 23 AGE 20 AGE 21 AGE 25 AGE 31 AGE 46 AGE 44 AGE 26

TROY EARL DYER RICHARD KAYE ELWOOD HENRY RAYMOND PETER LARRY WAYNE GREGORY JOSEPH JOSEPH “DOC” NAPOLEON “NAPPY” JOHN EDMOND AGE 30 FISHER FORNI FOTI FREEMAN FUSCO GALLANT JR. GARCIA GARNER AGE UNKNOWN AGE 34 AGE 23 AGE 23 AGE 26 AGE 35 AGE 35 AGE 21

LAIRD GLENN HEISER MARVIN THEODORE JAMES JOHN LEONARD JOSEPH JAMES PORTER JOHN “JACK” JOHN PENFIELD MAURICE FRANK AGE 24 HELSIUS HENRY JR. HOGENTOGLER HARTSHORNE HODGE HUDSON INGLIS JAQUAY AGE 23 AGE 24 HEWITT HOAGUE AGE 23 AGE 28 AGE 21 AGE 26 AGE 31 AGE 23

GEORGE “PAPPY” BILLY MAX KLIER ROBERT LEE KRAG GEORGE RONALD DONALD WILLIAM NORMAN GILBERT WAYNE WILFRED JOHN SHELDON TEMPLEMAN KIESECKER AGE 28 AGE 35 KRONER KUESTER LANOUETTE LAVOIE LYMAN NORWOOD MABRY AGE 38 AGE 21 AGE 41 AGE 33 AGE 28 AGE 32 JR. AGE 26

DONALD “BABY WALTER “JACK” JOHN DANIEL CHESLEY CHARLES FRANKLIN JAMES GUY CARRINGTON ROSCOE CLEVELAND JAMES GLEN JAMES FRANK DUCK” NAULT NOONIS NORRIS OETTING PALMER PARSONS JR. PENNINGTON PETERS PHILLIPPI AGE 36 AGE 33 AGE 29 AGE 22 AGE 42 AGE 25 AGE 38 AGE 38 AGE 22

JOHN DAVIS SHAFER JOSEPH THOMAS BURNETT MICHAEL ALAN DENNISON JOHN SMARZ JR. WILLIAM HARRY JAMES LEONARD RONALD HAL DONALD T. AGE 33 SHIMKO SHOTWELL SINNETT AGE 33 SMITH JR. SNIDER SOLOMON STADMULLER AGE 26 AGE 20 AGE 29 AGE 28 AGE 23 AGE 26 AGE 26 H

8 | ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 DANIEL W. BEAL JR. JOHN EDWARD ROBERT DONALD JOHN HILARY EDGAR SOLON GERALD CHARLES GEORGE BRACEY RICHARD PAUL RICHARD “SKI” PATRICK WAYNE AGE 31 BELL BIEDERMAN BILLINGS BOBBITT BOSTER AGE 43 BRANN CARKOSKI CARMODY AGE 27 AGE 32 AGE 35 AGE 23 AGE 21 AGE 24 AGE 24 AGE 24

PAUL CHEVALIER SAMUEL JOSEPH CLYDE ELCOTT DONALD CLIFFORD ROY OVERTON DENNY RICHARD ROY PETER JOSEPH GEORGE J. DINEEN MICHAEL JOHN DON ROY DUNDAS CURRIER DABRUZZI DAVISON III DAY JR. DES JARDINS DIBELLA AGE 42 DINOLA AGE 22 AGE 40 AGE 26 AGE 19 AGE 20 AGE 24 AGE 32 AGE 19 AGE 33

PAT MEHAFFY ROBERT “MITZI” ROBERT HOWARD JOHN GILBERT WILLIAM EDWARD PAUL ALFRED AARON “GUNNER” RICHARD CHARLES JOHN WESLEY NORMAN THEODORE GARNER GAYNOR GOSNELL GRAFTON GRAHAM GUERETTE GUNTER HALL “CAPTAIN” HARVEY HAYES AGE 31 AGE 23 AGE 20 AGE 25 AGE 32 AGE 24 AGE 29 AGE 23 AGE 35 AGE 24

BRAWNER “BG” EDWARD “DRIFTY” RICHARD “RL” ROBERT “COB” THOMAS “TB” RICHARD WILLIAMS EDMUND JOSEPH THOMAS CHARLES ROBERT DENNIS RONALD DEAN JOHNSON JOHNSON JOHNSON JOHNSON JOHNSON JONES KALUZA KANTZ KEARNEY KEILER AGE 32 AGE 33 AGE 19 AGE 37 AGE 25 AGE 21 AGE 22 AGE 27 AGE 21 AGE 22

FRANK JOHN RICHARD “DICKIE” JULIUS FRANIS DOUGLAS RAY DONALD JAMES KARL “MAC” SIDNEY LYNN HENRY CHARLES RONALD ARTHUR JAMES ALTON MALINSKI MANN MARULLO JR. MCCLELLAND MCCORD MCDONOUGH MIDDLETON MOREAU MUISE MUSSELWHITE AGE 32 AGE 23 AGE 29 AGE 22 AGE 32 AGE 24 AGE 26 AGE 55 AGE 31 AGE 29

DANIEL ANDREW RICHARD PODWELL ROBERT DAN JOHN SAGE REGAN JAMES PATRICK PERVIS ROBISON GLENN ALVA ANTHONY “SKI” JAMES MICHAEL BENJAMIN NATHAN PHILPUT AGE 23 PRESCOTT AGE 24 RITCHIE AGE 21 ROUNTREE RUSHETSKI SCHIEWE SHAFER AGE 23 AGE 28 AGE 22 AGE 24 AGE 23 AGE 23 AGE 36

ROBERT “ROCKY” ROGER EDWIN JOSEPH “SKI” DAVID ALLAN WASEL LAWRENCE EUGENE CHARLES “CHUCK” JOHN JOSEPH WILEY DONALD EDWARD RONALD EUGENE JAY HENRY ZWEIFEL STEINEL VAN PELT WALSKI AGE 21 WHITTEN WIGGINS AGE 23 WISE WOLFE AGE 22 AGE 24 AGE 28 AGE 23 AGE 33 AGE 29 AGE 31 AGE 20

ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 | 9 BROTHERS PERISHED IN THRESHER SUBMARINE DISASTER

(Reprinted with permission by seacoastonline.com) state of shock that day, John Davis Shafer joined his older the report stated; Ben- brother as a crewmember of Thresher in cores of families were devastated jamin’s wife Joyce wept September of that same year. when the nuclear submarine USS as she disclosed the fatal “They asked to be on the same sub- Thresher went down on April 10, cruise was to be his last marine,” Clara recalled. “They loved 1963, but the blow to the Shafer clan BENJAMIN NATHAN before transferring to each other; they were brothers. They just S SHAFER of Connecticut was doubly brutal. another command. wanted to be together.” A total of 129 U.S. Navy sailors And the Shafers’ John was born in August 1929 in Fort and civilian workers were lost aboard mother, according to Pierce, Fla. During his school years in Thresher in the worst submarine disaster the newspaper, could be Groton, Conn., he received awards in both of all time. They were fathers, husbands, heard wailing repeatedly, spelling and history competition. Much sons and brothers. In the case of Benjamin “Both my sons! Both my of his free time was spent fishing, hunting and John Shafer, they were brothers from JOHN DAVIS SHAFER sons!” and bowling. the same bloodline. “Neither one of After graduating from Robert E. Fitch Both were electrician’s mates, and both them lived long after High School in 1947, John enlisted in were career sailors. Benjamin, the oldest of that,” Clara Main, their only surviving the Navy and entered basic training at the two, had achieved the rank of master sibling, said of her parents this week. the U.S. Naval Training Center in Great chief petty officer, the highest standard “You can truly die of a broken heart — Lakes, Ill. He served aboard the air- achieved by enlisted men; John was a senior I believe that.” craft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt chief, the next highest enlisted rank. Brothers and heroes (CVA 42) and the heavy USS They were also both fathers. When Benjamin Nathan Shafer was born in Salem (CA 139) before volunteering for Thresher (SSN 593) was lost during sea September 1926. He enlisted in the Navy submarines. trials more than 200 miles off the New in August 1944, after graduating from He followed his brother to Electri- coast, Benjamin left behind three Robert E. Fitch High School in Groton, cian’s School and proceeded to serve sons and a daughter, while John was sur- Conn. He then completed basic training aboard the subs USS Harder (SS 568), vived by four sons. in Sampson, N.Y., and served aboard the Kingfish (SS 234) and Trutta (SS 421), Michael Shafer, Benjamin’s youngest boy, USS Doyle (DD 494), during earning his Silver Dolphins aboard would grow up to devote 29½ years of his World War II. Benjamin was awarded the Entemedor (SS 340). life to the Army, enlisting as a private and Asiatic-Pacific Theater Service Medal, A third brother — the oldest, Joe — retiring as a major in 2005. As a military the World War II Victory Medal and other was also a Navy veteran of World War II, man, he understands the push to get the decorations earned prior to his discharge while their father had served in France world’s most advanced submarine of its in May 1946. with the Navy in the First World War. day into action. It was, after all, the height He worked for a time as a welder at the Michael, the retired Army major, of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. As Electric Boat Division of General Dynam- takes solace in knowing the Thresher hindsight suggests, however, Thresher may ics in Connecticut, then according to tragedy directly resulted in the creation not have been ready for the deep-dive tests it Michael, opened an electrical repair shop. of SUBSAFE, the Navy’s enhanced sub- was conducting when it sank. After his partner took off with the money marine safety program. No vessel has “They gambled and lost,” Michael said. from their business, Michael said, Ben- been lost after passing through SUB- Both he and his sister Penny Shafer jamin re-entered the Navy in February SAFE in the nearly half-century since Craig take pride in the sacrifice their 1949. He attended the Navy’s Electrician’s Thresher’s loss. father and uncle made for their country, Mate School, and ultimately volunteered Asked about his thoughts regarding the but acknowledge the heavy toll it took on for submarine duty. family’s legacy with the submarine, he the family. He earned his coveted Silver Dolphins cites “The Ballad of the Thresher,” a song According to a 1963 newspaper account when he qualified as a submariner aboard by the popular folk band the Kingston that ran in the New London (Connecticut) USS Cobbler (SS 344), and attended the Trio. Famous for such 1950s and ‘60s hits Day in the wake of the Thresher tragedy, Nuclear Power Training Unit at West as “Tom Dooley” and “Where Have All the Shafer brothers’ parents were so dis- Milton, N.Y. He also served aboard the the Flowers Gone,” the band paid tribute traught they had to be placed under heavy nuclear submarine USS Skipjack (SSN to the Thresher’s crew in verse shortly sedation by a physician. Family members 585) before his assignment to Thresher in after the disaster. In the ballad’s chorus, gathered in the parents’ home were in a February 1961. the trio sings:

10 | ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 “Every man jack on board was a hero that a photo of herself at the age 2 or 3 wrapped around her father’s arm was USS SCORPION IS Every man jack on board there was brave inspired by her mother teasing that Benja- min was “MY daddy!” LOST FIVE YEARS “I was Daddy’s girl,” she said. Every man jack on board was a hero Michael said his father’s legacy as an honest, responsible family man provided AFTER THRESHER Each man risked a watery grave” him with a “measuring stick” that he id you know? The sounds you hear applied as a standard while growing up. during the PS-45 Special Empha- “If you listen to that song, you’ll know,” “By all accounts he was a great guy,” D sis Program training video of “air Michael explained. “It says it all to me.” Michael said, “but I never got a chance to escaping” and “bulkheads collapsing” know him.” were not recorded when USS Thresher ‘I was Daddy’s girl’ About a dozen members of the Shafer was lost. These sounds were recorded as clan, including 79-year-old Clara, plan to USS Scorpion (SSN-589) was crushed attend 50th anniversary Thresher ceremo- In 1969, the 116-man Bachelor Enlisted as it sank below 10,000 feet of water. nies in Kittery this April. Quarters at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Scorpion was the second U.S. nuclear Evaluation Center on Andros Island in the Impact on the American psyche submarine to be lost. Bahamas was named Shafer Brothers Hall After its commissioning in August in honor of Benjamin and John. P 99 men died on board Scorpion. 1961, Thresher was considered the fastest, “I was very proud that the Navy named quietest, deepest-diving and most lethal P On June 5, 1968, after a deployment this building after my father and uncle,” submarine the world had ever known. Its of several months in the Mediterranean, Penny said. “Even though it’s only a bar- loss was a stunning blow to the nation and racks, it’s not very often that they name Scorpion and its crew were declared the world. lost approximately 400 nautical miles buildings after servicemen.” It says something of the Thresher disas- southwest of the Azores. On June 30, However, the decade was otherwise ter’s impact on the American psyche at the the submarine’s name was struck from unrelenting on the family. Penny notes time that in addition to the Kingston Trio’s the . both sets of grandparents died in the tribute, legendary folk singer 1960s, and just days before Christmas also dedicated a song to the doomed sub- P Scorpion was a Skipjack-class 1969 her oldest brother Steve — a high marine. “The Thresher” appears on Ochs’ submarine built by Electric Boat and school senior — died in an auto accident. first album, “All the News That’s Fit to commissioned July 29, 1960. Special- Their mother was “out of it” for a while Sing,” released in 1964. With haunting lyri- izing in the development of submarine after that, Penny said. She would listen cism, Ochs captures the early enthusiasm warfare tactics, Scorpion was assigned to the Glen Campbell tune “My Baby’s surrounding the submarine’s construction various roles from being the “hunter” Gone” and cry as the country artist sang, “in Portsmouth town on the eastern shore/ to the “hunted.” Scorpion was equipped “Dry all the raindrops/hold back the sun/ Where many a fine ship was born.” with state-of-the-art “spy gear,” and had the world has ended/my baby’s gone.” “She was shaped like a tear/She was earned a reputation for its clandestine “That one almost did her in,” Penny said built like a shark/She was made to run fast surveillance of Soviet Naval operations. of her brother’s death. “Eventually, she and free,” he sings. But eventually a sense came back to us.” of impending doom creeps into his lyrics P On February 1, 1967, prior to its Joyce Shafer went to work at the Navy and the vessel becomes “a death ship all ill-fated voyage, Scorpion entered Nor- exchange on the New London Submarine along.” He describes the sub’s final voy- folk Naval Shipyard for an extended Base in Groton, Conn., and eventually age, culminating in a stark final verse that overhaul. Instead of receiving the SUB- retired as private secretary for the head of conveys her fate: SAFE program upgrades introduced research and development there, Penny said. after the loss of Thresher, the ship She described her mother as independent, “And she’ll never run silent strong and stubborn, but said she rarely received only emergency repairs so it could return to sea as soon as possible. talked about the loss of her husband. Joyce And she’ll never run deep never remarried and died of cancer at age P The results of the U.S. Navy’s inves- 55. Penny was only 5 when her father died, For the ocean had no pity tigations into the loss of Scorpion were while Michael was 6. They remember very inconclusive. little of their dad. And the waves, they never weep Penny recalled that he loved the amo- P No SUBSAFE-certified submarine rous animated skunk Pepe Le Pew, and They never weep.” has ever been lost.

ELECTRICELECTRIC BOATBOAT NEWSNEWS || FEBRUARY MARCH 2013 2012 | 11| 11 FINDING USS THRESHER

BY SHEILA BLYDENBURGH transmission “We have initiated SUB- oments after receiving the final MISS. Indicate your position.” communication from USS P USS Recovery joins the search and Thresher April 10, 1963, the Navy discovers an oil slick about 7,000 yards M began an exhaustive search for from Thresher’s original position. the lost vessel. This search concluded BRASS PIPE RECOVERED FROM THE USS THRESHER DEBRIS FIELD. more than four months later on Aug. 29, P 1738 – Skylark rendezvous with 1963 when the bathyscaphe Trieste came USS Recovery and takes samples of the that Thresher had been discovered and upon the Thresher’s final resting place. oil slick (1/2 mile wide by a mile and a photographs had been taken of the ship, Since the initial discovery in 1963, quarter long). Also recovered were bits only to find out later that the machinery the site has been visited by the Navy a of cork, yellow plastic, and two rubber in the pictures was actually of the camera number of times. One of the most notable gloves. rigging equipment on Atlantis II. In the visits occurred in 1985 when undersea P 2000 – The Department of Defense meantime, the research vessel Conrad explorer Dr. surveyed the issues a news release stating “The next of had managed to scoop up packets of wreckage. Footage from Ballard’s visit kin of the crew of the nuclear submarine O-rings thought to be from Thresher. has recently been de-classified and can be USS Thresher (SSN-593) are being noti- Other images taken by Atlantis II and viewed through a link on Electric Boat’s fied that the ship is overdue and presumed Conrad showed various debris, including Thresher home page. missing.” crumpled sheet metal, a book and a 10-ft Finding the final resting place of bulkhead. P 2130 – Chief of Naval Operations Thresher 8,400 feet below the surface was On June 24, the bathyscaphe Trieste Adm. George Anderson states in a press no easy task. The following highlights the made its first dive in search of Thresher. conference “To those of us who have been series of events that led to the Thresher’s Trieste was a deep-diving research ves- brought up in the tradition of the sea, one eventual discovery. sel that had recently returned from a trip of the saddest occasions is when we lose to the bottom of the Challenger Deep in April 10, 1963 a ship. Such was the case today when it the Marianas Trench, the deepest point P 0917 HOURS – A garbled message appears that the nuclear-powered subma- in any of the world’s oceans. was received from the USS Thresher stat- rine Thresher was lost with 129 officers, On its first two dives, the Trieste was ing the ship was “exceeding test depth.” men and civilians.” unable to locate the submarine. On its P The submarine escort ship Skylark Over the next 13 days, dozens of vessels third dive June 27, Trieste discovered a hears a “muted, dull thud” over the radio joined in the search, recovering charred yellow plastic shoe cover used by crew- that “sounded as though there was a com- plastic, red and yellow gloves, and parts men with stenciled lettering “SSN-5.” partment collapsing.” of a life vest. Following a repair period, Trieste On April 23, the Navy announced that began its eighth dive Aug. 29, 141 days P 0931 – Skylark requests a radio check after Thresher went missing. As Trieste from Thresher every 60 seconds. six ocean-bottom protuberances had been located and gave the code-name proceeded near the ocean floor, it found P 1006 – Skylark requests Thresher to Point Delta to the one most likely to be a torn cable, twisted pipes and scattered communicate its position by any means Thresher. The research vessel Atlantis II battery plates. Finally Trieste came upon possible. tried to take pictures of Point Delta using large numbers of jagged metal plates roughly 20 square feet in size that were P 1058 – Skylark began dropping pat- a camera lowered on a line, with little terns of three hand grenades at intervals success. Woods Hole Oceanographer Dr. twisted, warped and spread over hun- of 10 to 15 minutes. This was a pre- J.B. Henry said that getting the camera in dreds of yards. Using a newly installed mechanical arranged signal telling Thresher to sur- the right spot was “like lowering a ping- arm on Trieste, the crew grabbed a piece face if possible. pong ball into a beer can from the top of a three-story building while blindfolded of brass pipe from the ocean floor and P 1100 – Skylark radios Thresher to and during a northeaster.” brought it back to the surface. This pipe “Indicate your position or prepare to As the search pressed on, many ideas had the number “593” printed on it as well surface. Acknowledge within 10 minutes were considered. One involved sinking as part and job order numbers. Thresher or I will initiate SUBMISS (submarine a submarine at the last known location had been found. missing).” of Thresher and tracking its descent. On Blydenburgh is a senior engineer in P 1129 – Skylark sends the following May 31, the media inaccurately reported Dept. 322

12 | ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 THE LOSS OF THRESHER, 50 YEARS LATER

BY BOB SCHEEL • VICE PRESIDENT – QUALITY completed in accordance with drawings and procedures. No matter how small, these individual certifications form the true basis of ship ifty years ago – on April 10, 1963 – the U.S. Navy nuclear certification. They must be correct. We can tolerate nothing less. submarine USS Thresher (SSN-593) was lost at sea along Integrity with the lives of the 129 men on board. It’s easy to sign your name when you know you have done F From that event, I want to impart to you one very impor- something correctly. But when something goes awry, it takes real tant message – the hard lessons learned from that tragedy are as integrity to own up to the responsibility. At Electric Boat, the relevant today as they were 50 years ago. integrity of our employees is second to none. Because of the Thresher tragedy, our predecessors in the This integrity is typified by our welders. They know that the nuclear submarine community embarked on a mission to provide use of correct filler materials is so important that no error can be “maximum reasonable assurance” that a similar event did not tolerated. Mistakes are few – usually fewer than 20 occurrences recur. They mandated that, among other things, improvements be per year – and they are almost always self-identified by the welder made in critical submarine systems, test and quality programs, or welding department. I hate to see any “wrong weld-wire occur- and accessibility to vital equipment. rence” or any mistake for that matter, but our employees know The program further demands of us that everything be done to they have to do all work correctly. They know if an error occurs, make sure a flooding casualty never occurs and if the unthink- they must identify the mistake to supervision and together deter- able happens, that we provide the ability to isolate the failure and mine how to correct it. The self-identification of problems makes return the ship and its crew safely to the surface. This is the foun- Electric Boat what it is – and it’s something we can all be proud of. dation of the SUBSAFE Program. Every construction and repair shipyard has worked to implement improvements in submarine Thoroughness safety since the loss of Thresher; no SUBSAFE certified subma- Occasionally, there are misses in our work or in the documenta- rine has been lost since. tion of our work. But when considered in the context of millions Since I joined Electric Boat in 1979, there have been other of opportunities, the number of errors is relatively small. It is incidents that serve to reinforce the lessons from Thresher and evident that an overwhelming number of employees take owner- the necessity and wisdom of the SUBSAFE Program. In 1982, an ship of their work and are thorough (double and triple checking) incident on the USS Grayback cost five young navy divers their to ensure things are correct before they certify work as complete. lives. Our nation has since lived through the loss of Space Shuttle We must always remember that our work can affect the safety of Challenger in 1986, the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia in our country’s submarines and crews. 2003, a fire on the USS Bonefish while under way in 1988 that Alertness left three crewmen dead, and the BP oil spill in 2010. These incidents and my background in Quality Assurance have No matter how hard we try, mistakes or failures will occur in made me very aware that technology failures remain real possi- our quality system. Our workforce seems to have a natural sense bilities unless we are always diligent. of awareness of our environment, and frequently bring suspicions It is my job – and the job of each one of you – to make sure the to the attention of their supervision or Quality Assurance. Over submarines we design, build and maintain are as safe as they pos- the course of my career, I couldn’t tell you how many quality sibly can be. If there is one thing I have learned in my years with issues have been identified and rectified due the alertness of a tradesperson, engineer or planner. Our job is to catch these issues the company, it is this – to fulfill this obligation, we must have early when they are small and correct them before they become this commitment from everyone. big problems. At Electric Boat, I believe we have this level of commitment. It is To sum up, the SUBSAFE program is the cornerstone of our evident through four personal traits shared by virtually everyone in efforts to assure the safety of the Navy’s submarines, as are other the company – honesty, integrity, thoroughness and alertness. safety programs that have emulated the SUBSAFE approach, such Honesty as Diver Safety and certain aspects of Ship’s Control (Fly by Wire). Before a ship is certified, it must be verified as complete. This The SUBSAFE program is effective because of the honesty, is no easy task for something as complex as a submarine. Every integrity, thoroughness and alertness of each employee. Elec- work order, weld joint, engineering report, test form and inspec- tric Boat’s culture, with its commitment to safety and quality, is tion record is first certified by a member of our workforce – an incredibly important. Mistakes will happen. But when they do, we engineer, designer, tradesperson or inspector. are responsible for ensuring that they are managed and contained. We have records to document that work has been accomplished We must do everything in our power to make sure an occur- and certified. But the real cornerstone of our SUBSAFE program rence like the loss of USS Thresher never occurs again. I am con- is the honesty of our employees who certify that all work has been fident you and your colleagues are working to fulfill this mission.

ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 | 13 SUBSAFE MUST BE A WAY OF LIFE

BY CMDR. DANIEL ETTLICH, USN THE KEYS TO SUCCESS LIE IN from the 2003 disaster. Rather, the disas- ter was a harsh reminder of what NASA n April 10, PROPER RECOGNITION OF THE had forgotten.” 1963, while Ober provides a bold statement about THREATS AND APPLICATION OF conducting NASA’s safety culture at the time of the O post-overhaul EFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE AND Columbia disaster, “These bad things hap- deep dive tests off pened mostly because attitudes toward the coast of the PREVENTATIVE ACTIONS. safety got soft … as complacent careless- , the ness and time-saving shortcuts crept into nuclear submarine the culture … ” USS Thresher lie in proper recognition of the threats In further discussing the degradation in (SSN-593) was lost with all persons and application of effective corrective the safety culture at NASA, Ober notes: aboard. This event caused drastic changes and preventative actions. Ignorance is the “The fundamental safety rule had been in the conduct of U.S. Navy submarine state of not “knowing” the requirements. to base no belief purely on hope. Safety design, construction and maintenance. In Arrogance is the façade of “knowing was a quality that had to be explicitly ver- the years that followed the Silent Service better” than the requirements. Compla- ified. To assume that all was well unless worked tirelessly to build one of the most cency is the state of not “caring” about there were visible hazards was imprudent robust quality assurance organizations in the requirements. One or more of these and irresponsible. Convenient, unverified the world. The U.S. Navy’s Submarine threats always present themselves for assumptions of goodness had led to the Safety (SUBSAFE) and Quality Assur- personnel errors (i.e., failure to follow the loss of Columbia and its crew.” ance Program is known globally for its process). Continued vigilance at all levels, As we learn from other disasters, we thoroughness, rigor and record. Most especially senior leadership, is required to better understand why the SUBSAFE importantly, the program serves as a last- combat these threats. program places such a huge investment ing reminder of those we lost in 1963 and A significant contributor to the Deep- in compliance verification. The most as a vow to do everything possible to pre- water Horizon disaster of April 2010 was important reason is that consequences of vent a similar catastrophe. a degraded safety culture. In his article failure are unacceptable. Additionally, the For those of us who work in the busi- titled, ‘Errors in Judgment: Engineer- pressures of cost and schedule are great, ness of submarine design, construction ing’s Great Teacher,’ Bill Clayton states, thus requiring us to ensure standards are and maintenance, the preceding paragraph “The environment throughout the chain upheld, even under the harshest of pres- acts as a background for the philosophy of command was one in which those with sures. Lastly, an honest mistake can kill behind the SUBSAFE program. I am in the best information didn’t act; those with someone just as dead as malpractice. the majority of the workforce who were little information didn’t ask; and execu- I challenge all of those who work in the not even alive when USS Thresher was tives at the corporate level didn’t care SUBSAFE enterprise to lost. In an effort to ensure that the philos- about safety as much as they cared about (1) heighten their sensitivity to the three ophy and requirements of the SUBSAFE the bottom line.” threats facing our safety culture, program sit in the forefront of every work- 2013 also marks the 10-year anniversary (2) take time to reflect on why we do what er’s mind, special emphasis is placed on of the loss of the space shuttle Columbia. we do, annual training and awareness. The goal We can learn a lot from other disasters (3) consider what the consequences of is that the work discipline and principles in an effort to continue to improve and failure would really mean, and associated with the program become a strengthen the SUBSAFE program. (4) think about your personal standards habit and thus a way of life. One can- Unfortunately, organizations can also for- – is it 100 percent compliance 100 per- not successfully “turn on and off” these get lessons learned. The following quote cent of the time? It is a continual battle principles depending on whether they are is from an article by NBC News Space to maintain the rigorous standards of the doing SUBSAFE work or not; it must be Analyst James Ober on the 10-year anni- SUBSAFE program, but the alternative is part of their culture. versary and NASA’s apparent amnesia: not an option – “Lest We Forget.” Ignorance, arrogance, and complacency “Beyond the tragic loss of life, the prove the three biggest threats facing the greatest tragedy of the space shuttle Ettlich is director, Submarine Safety and SUBSAFE Program. These threats con- Columbia was that NASA should have Quality Assurance Division, NAVSEA tinually attack and erode the long estab- known better. As an organization and as 07Q. lished safety culture. The keys to success a team, the agency learned nothing new

14 | ELECTRIC BOAT NEWS | MARCH 2013 THRESHER’S LEGACY IS IN OUR HANDS

BY STEVE SCHULZE THE SUBSAFE PROGRAM’S MISSION IS SIMPLE AND

pril 10, 2013 marks a somber CONCISE: TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM REASONABLE ASSUR- moment for the U.S. Navy. On that day 50 years earlier, USS Thresher ANCE OF WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY AND OPERABILITY A (SSN-593) was lost 200 miles off the AND INTEGRITY OF CRITICAL SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO coast of Massachusetts taking with her 112 sailors and 17 civilians. CONTROL AND RECOVER FROM A FLOODING CASUALTY. This tragedy shook the Submarine Force to its very core. On April 11, one day after the accident, the Navy convened a Court of Inquiry and a Design Appraisal Board to and handled according to strict protocols to ensure the correct investigate the tragedy and issue findings that would be used to material is installed. help prevent another similar loss. P DOCUMENTATION: Design products such as system dia- Further, the Navy imposed depth limitations for all nuclear- grams, SUBSAFE mapping drawings, ship systems manuals, powered submarines, restricted any test dives to areas where SUBSAFE certification boundary books, and others meet the submarines would not exceed crush depth, revised submergence technical requirements of the ship’s specification and are main- procedures, restricted speed at certain depths, required all subma- tained for the submarine’s life. Likewise, the work performed on rines to maintain positive buoyancy and instituted new training. SUBSAFE systems must have corresponding records document- While the Navy’s investigations would result in 166 findings ing the type of work performed, who performed the work, mate- of facts, 55 opinions, and 19 recommendations, one thing was rial information, testing results, assembly records and waivers. perfectly clear, a submarine as new as Thresher, recently out of These documents are signed by the people doing the work – mak- a maintenance period, should never have been lost. The series of ing them directly and personally accountable for their work. cascading events that led to the tragedy stemmed from a combi- P COMPLIANCE Verification: inspections, surveillance, techni- nation of an inadequate design and low quality standards for the cal reviews, and audits of the work performed, including a care- operational environment. On July 8, 1963, the chief, , established the ful review of the objective quality evidence serves to ensure the Submarine Safety (SUBSAFE) Program. The program codified SUBSAFE work was performed by the proper personnel, using submarine design requirements, safety certification requirements the correct material, in accordance with the proper design docu- and processes, and certification continuity requirements and pro- mentation, and validated by test. cesses while providing a framework for certifying certain critical Our challenge today is to remain vigilant 50 years after our systems for unrestricted submerged operations. “pinnacle event.” We cannot allow another Thresher. Much of our The SUBSAFE Program’s mission is simple and concise: to workforce was born after 1963, and the Thresher loss can easily provide maximum reasonable assurance of watertight integrity become “ancient history.” and operability and integrity of critical systems necessary to con- We are blessed with a workforce that is passionate about the prod- trol and recover from a flooding casualty. uct, dedicated and patriotic. We share a culture whose foundation is The accomplishment of this mission is borne by the civilian based on compliance with technical and programmatic requirements workforce, both private sector and government, as well as the and supported by personal responsibility and accountability. We can- Navy’s Submarine Force and its fleet maintenance activities. We not be content with resting on our past success; we must continually specify design requirements, we develop and approve the design seek to improve ourselves and the program. products, we fabricate the components, assemble the systems and We conduct internal audits to self-identify deficiencies and construct the ship, we test the systems to demonstrate compliance areas for improvement and welcome external audits of our poli- with technical requirements, and we specify the maintenance cies, processes and procedures because we want to be better requirements and perform the complex depot level maintenance and recognize these actions are required to reach the next level required to safely operate the ship for its 30-plus year design life. of excellence. These behaviors are characteristic of a mature Our SUBSAFE Program provides a thorough and systematic program and workforce. Please take time to reflect on the loss, approach to quality assurance through four overarching means: discuss the lessons learned with your peers and co-workers, P WORK DISCIPLINE: Only highly trained select craftsmen understand the SUBSAFE Program requirements as they pertain work on systems within the SUBSAFE boundary. to your responsibilities and strive to avoid complacency. P MATERIAL CONTROL: All material within the SUBSAFE Schulze is executive director, Undersea Warfare Directorate boundary is made to exacting standards, and is inspected, stored (SEA 07), Naval Sea Systems Command

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