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SECURITIZATION OF IDENTITY IN DURING THE AKP ERA Didem Aydindag1 Huseyin Isiksal2

Abstract: This article analyses some of securitization in particular. The latter the key political discussions in Turkey, sections evaluate the transformation of which are identity dichotomy, religious and secular identities through securitization and desecuritization cycle securitization and counter securitization of religion under the rule of the Justice by certain segments of the public. The and Development Party particularly in transformation is analyzed through the the post-2007 period. The article argues ruling periods of the AKP. The data that mostly from 2007 onwards, the consists of the AKP party manifestos, ruling party started the de-securitization official reports, election campaigns and process of religion as a referent object. speeches given by former Prime Minister The article further points out that from and current President Recep Tayyip 2014 onwards a shift in threat perception Erdoğan between the periods of 2002- can be analyzed utilizing anti- 2019. Westernization. The West interchangeable meant and homogenized Keyswords: Islamophobia, religious as the Christian world, is framed as discussions, prejudices, Christianity Islamophobic and therefore the new 1. INTRODUCTION threat to Islamic identity is not coming National identities have from the domestic secular identity but consistently been on the agenda of from the outside, the Western Christian international relations. Although identity/civilization. The national identity is an entrenched aspect conceptualization of the theoretical of the domestic policy orientations framework is built upon the Copenhagen regarding security, in some cases, the School’s societal securitization aspect. factors that define the overarching The first part focuses on the Copenhagen national identity are not always clearly School of security in general and identity

1 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4752-5037, University of Kyrenia 2 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2870-147X, Near East University 498

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defined and the dyad of identities may The study is particularly useful lead to a dichotomy and clashes, as in the in explaining the securitization cycle of case of Turkey. Deriving from this point, multiple identities in constructing threat this article analyses some of the key perceptions. The research is also political discussions in Turkey, which important in analyzing the structural are identity dichotomy, securitization transformation at the unit and subunit and desecuritization cycle of religion levels in Turkey. Thirdly, the article is under the rule of the Justice and important in elucidating the power Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma relationship between the secular identity Partisi – hereafter AKP), particularly in and the Islamic identity in Turkey. the post-2007 period. The conceptualization of the The article argues that mostly theoretical framework is built upon the from 2007 onwards, the ruling party Copenhagen School’s societal started the de-securitization process of securitization aspect. The first part religion as a referent object. The effects focuses on the Copenhagen School of of the top-down desecuritization of security in general and identity religion, which was also ironically a securitization in particular. The latter counter securitization move against the sections evaluate the transformation of dominant secular identity, enabled the religious and secular identities through secular audience who felt threatened by securitization and counter securitization the Islamic identity to act as securitizing by certain segments of the public. The actors in a counter-securitization move. transformation is analyzed through The article further points out different time periods based upon the that from 2014 onwards a shift in threat ruling periods of the AKP, namely 2002- perception can be analyzed utilizing anti- 2007, 2007-2011, 2011-2014 and finally Westernization. The West 2014-2019. The data consists of the AKP interchangeable meant and homogenized party manifestos, official reports, as the Christian world, is framed as election campaigns and speeches given Islamophobic and therefore the new by former Prime Minister and current threat to Islamic identity is not coming President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the domestic secular identity but between the periods of 2002-2019. from the outside, the Western Christian identity/civilization.

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1.1. Copenhagen school of fixed single national identity. Thus, even security when a securitizing actor’s securitization The Copenhagen School move is analyzed, the researchers usually conceptualized securitization as the presume that the actor’s identity is part discursive and political process through of the already existing fixed overarching which an inter-subjective understanding national identity. This ontological is constructed within a political assumption cannot explain how two community to treat something like an differing securitizing actors have an existential threat to a valued referent impact on the perception of national object, and to enable a call for urgent and identity. It causes national identities to exceptional measures to deal with the be treated as monolithic and unitary and threat (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde prevents that the observation that 1998, 30). In that respect, the ‘Referent identities are dependent on perceptions, object’ is the object that is claimed to be receptions, and actions of the agents. threatened and holds a general claim on Deriving from these points, this ‘having to survive.’ Additionally, there article argues that the post-2007 are ‘securitizing actors’ who make the desecuritization of Islamic identity claim through speech acts and audience. through institutionalization and Speech acts point to an existential threat discursive practices led to be a to this referent object and thereby threat perception to the dominant secular legitimize extraordinary measures identity. In return, it caused a counter (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, securitization from the secular audience 32). through securitizing at the As significant representatives subunit and individual level. of the Copenhagen School of security, Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan argue that 1.2. The peculiarity of the societal security is the defense of a Turkish case community against a perceived threat to In contemporary Turkey, the its essential character that is identity desecuritization of Islamic identity is not (Waever 2008, 581-593). Approached a result of the top-down military- from this perspective, threats to identity bureaucracy desecuritization. The symbolize external threats. This transformation is a result of the assumption is understandable if there is a desecuritization of Islam through

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transformation of the political and social In that respect, the Takrir-i structure, particularly from 2007 Sükun Law of 1925 is worth mentioning, onwards. In early Republican Turkey, since it was aimed specifically against threat perception was built upon the the Islamic establishments. Until the late pillars of the Ottoman era, such as Islam 1940s, the main threat perception of the and the Eastern way of life. Once the state elite was religion, which meant that republic was established, Westernization securitization measures implemented became an identity marker for the newly were aimed at protecting the secular founded state. On the construction of its identity of the state. In addition to the secular and Western identity, the ‘other’ Takrir-i Sükun Law in 1925, with the was shaped by differences inherent to introduction of another law, all orders, Turkey’s historical and social reality as lodges, and other religious brotherhoods the Ottoman past. In other words, the were officially banned, and sheikhdom other of the new identity was not directly and discipleship were prohibited. In the from the outside, but from within the 1928 Constitution, the clause that Ottoman history. This ‘past as other’ defined the Turkish state’s official (Diez 2005, 613-636) was the main logic religion as Islam was removed. Sharia behind legitimizing or securitizing the and the Islamic lifestyle were replaced religious and ethnic identities. As with the Western lifestyle and religious explained by Tanıl Bora (1996); tutors were considered illegitimate in the The ‘other’ image of the aftermath. Turkish national identity is intrinsic to Since the establishment of the Turkey's historical-social reality. The multi-party period from the 1950s other is the ‘old Turkey’. That is onwards, the securitization against Ottoman Empire; it is the old civilization Islamic identity has always been on the framed by the religious world view. In agenda of Turkish domestic politics this new ‘old identity’ the Ottoman is (Aydındağ and Işıksal 2018, 301). The perceived as oppressing the Turk. Islam threat perception of Islam was mostly is also thought of primarily in terms of constructed by military and bureaucratic the potential of this ancient civilization establishments. In this respect, and the balance of the Ottoman Empire significantly, the military intervened in (hence the ‘danger of the reaction’). domestic politics three times in twenty years on the grounds of a threat to secular

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identity through the 1960, 1971, and system. As a successful definition of the 1980 military coups. The military also situation, a columnist wrote that ‘the played an active role in removing headscarf battle is in fact a rebellion Islamist Welfare Party leader and vice- against Atatürk’s reforms and the prime minister Necmettin Erbakan from principles of the Republican state office in 1997, known as the February 28 Atatürk established’ (Çınar 2005, 79). incident. The military constructed the The closure of the Welfare religious identity and its establishments Party (Refah Partisi - hereafter RP) was as an existential threat to the secular a rupture in Turkish political Islamism. identity, which legitimately was the only In the 1995 elections, it had been the state identity. As a survival instinct largest supported party. However, under the dominant secular despite the widespread public support, establishments the modernist wing of the the coalition government was short lived. National Outlook under the leadership of In 1997, the Constitutional Court banned Recep Tayyip Erdoğan formed the AKP. the party on the grounds of the RP’s The Islamists realized that in order to violation of secular identity related diminish the suppression of the military Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution. and to sustain its own marginalized The Constitutional Court used identity, supporting the European values statements by the RP such as ‘the and the (EU) option had headscarf must be free in the become the only option (Yavuz 2003, universities’ and ‘the right to choose 250). your own legal system, including sharia’, Transformation can be as examples of anti-secular activities understood in part as an attempt to solve (Yavuz 2003, 247). the identity-based societal sectoral The ban was followed by the insecurities of Islamists in Turkey (Jung limitation of public spaces available to and Raudvere 2008, 168). The RP’s Islamic actors. The headscarf was experience showed that Islamists could banned in all state as well as private come to power through elections, universities. Within secularist discourse, although the Islamists were not able to the defense of headscarves was survive in power under military tutelage increasingly perceived as a direct threat (Cizre 2008, 20). This impacted on the to the state and the secular constitutional transformation of new conservative

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democratic identity that created the and with a majority of the votes. That impetus to follow the West’s demonstrates that political party instruments, such as a liberal economy, establishment or gaining electoral constitutional rights and liberties. legitimacy were not sufficient to sustain the Islamic identity, which was heavily 1.3. 2002- 2007: marginalized. Desecuritization of Islam through Prior to the 2002 elections, the Westernization AKP highlighted three objectives. AKP became the ruling party of Firstly, because of the increased demand Turkey in 2002, one year after the party’s for better representation of ethnic and establishment. With the break from religious groups and better human rights Necmettin Erbakan’s National Outlook standards, consolidated democracy was movement, the AKP identified itself as a promoted. Secondly, because of the ‘conservative democratic’ party rather heavy burden of the 2001 economic than an ‘Islamist’ party, which strongly crisis, which particularly impacted the emphasized good ties with the West, middle class, strong emphasis was given universal values of democracy, human to economic welfare. Thirdly, Turkey’s rights and plurality. Erdoğan recognized membership of the EU was promoted. that democratization, rather than seizing Here, the membership of the EU the power of the state, allowed pious served two objectives. Firstly, it people to live an Islamic life (Cizre 2008, differentiated the conservative democrat 31). identity from the former Islamist The new identity owes a lot to National Outlook identity. Unlike the the suppression under the 97 military National Outlook perception of the EU intervention and its aftermath. It showed as being a Christian Club, the AKP saw that not only the political representations it as an impetus for liberalization and of the Islamic identity but also the social democratization and therefore a space and economic aspects could shrink when for expansion of the Islamic identity. the dominant secular identity feels that Secondly, one of the identity markers of its own identity is under existential secularism, Westernization is elucidated threat. This does not change the fact that with the application for membership of the political party representation came to the EU. Islamic political identity was power as a result of the people’s choice traditionally built in opposition to the

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West and the Western values. Therefore, definition of secularism, also called through the values of the West, the AKP passive secularism, which keeps the state acquired legitimacy in their relationship at an equal distance to all faiths and with the secular establishment (Dağı religions. His promotion of passive 2005, 31). Through gaining legitimacy secularism is neutral towards citizens’ among the secular audience, the party religious identities. Traditionally, also allowed the desecuritization of Turkey has an assertive secularist stance Islam for the dominant national identity, whose ultimate aim is to ban or limit its namely secularism. visibility in the public space. Secularism Drawing upon the experience of is rooted in the Kemalist revolution and the RP, the AKP radically revised its is advocated by the military, judiciary, view of what political power can mean and the main opposition party, the and accordingly stopped conceiving Republican People's Party. Perhaps the society as a passive object of unilateral best expression of assertive secularism transformation. Thus, it was believed can be found in certain decisions of the that Islamic identity would not gain more Constitutional Court. For instance, in its space through state structures. Change is decision banning the RP, the Court stated achieved by liberating societal dynamics that ‘secularism is not the separation of and allowing them to be reflected in religion and state, but the separation of politics (Yıldız 2008, 44). One of the religion and worldly affairs...It means first AKP’s manifestos called separation of social life, education, Muhafazakar Demokrasi (Conservative family, economics, law, manners, dress Democracy) made it clear that the party codes; etc. from religion’. It is Turkey’s was not a continuation of the National philosophy of life that extends beyond Outlook and it did not have a Islamic just being a political regime (Hale and political agenda. Erdoğan has argued that Özbudun 2010, 22). his conservatism does not equate to Furthermore, while Islamism, rather it is the traditional acknowledging the importance of practices, values, and beliefs of Muslim religion as a personal belief, the AKP majority in Turkey. accommodated itself within the secular As the AKP positioned itself as constitutional framework. Erdoğan’s a center-right conservative party, middle of the road approach to Erdoğan supported the Anglo-American secularism and the state-religion

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relationship can be seen in the AKP’s Domestically, instead of indulging in the party program as secularism is explained politics of ‘othering’, the new Islamism, as: ‘it allows people of all religions and by using non-religious political beliefs to practice their religion in peace, language, develops a culture of political to express their religious convictions and compromise (Yıldız 2008, 46). John to live accordingly. Therefore, Esposito argues that the process of secularism is a principle of freedom and change represented by the AKP points to social peace’ (AKP 2002). the fact that mainstream Islamic It is also stated that the AKP movements in Muslim countries are ‘acknowledges and respects all the capable of adapting themselves to such birthrights of people, such as having issues as democratization, pluralism and different beliefs, ideas, races, languages, women’s rights (Esposito 2005). Thus, it the right of expression, the right of is asserted that 'freedoms constitute the association, and the right to live. It foundation of democracy' and that considers that diversity is not (a source respect for individual rights and of) differentiation, but our cultural freedoms is the basic condition for the richness that reinforces our solidarity’ establishment of social peace and well- (AKP Bylaws 2002). One can deduce being, as well as for the acceptance of a several key points from these bylaws and democratic political regime by the visions. Firstly, the party envisioned that people. It specifically mentions the Islamization could not be achieved freedom of thought and expression, the through the state. The state should not right to information, the right to seek impose its ideology on society. Change justice and to a fair trial. What was sui could be achieved by liberating societal generis in this case was the AKP’s dynamics and allowing them to be ability to command the respect of reflected in politics (Cizre 2008, 46). Muslim public opinion while Secondly, the specific mention simultaneously championing the cause of the respect for the concepts of nation, of EU membership and establishing an republic, borders and devotedness to enduring cooperative relationship with democracy and good ties with the West the West (Yıldız 2008, 47). reflects a re-evaluation that sees This worldview also functions civilizational dialogue between the as a move to curb any doubts of having Islamic and Western worlds as essential. an ulterior objective towards structural

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change. Thus, the adoption of a discourse National Outlook’s framing of the EU as based upon the secular pillars and a Western tool for colonizing Turkey. Western modernity naturalized itself The second reflects both a against the legitimacy crisis between departure from the Islamist party’s itself and the Kemalist/secularist understanding and the counter-argument establishment. In order to open up space to the ‘clash of civilizations’ perspective for the Islamists, it was necessary to that was popularized after 9/11 (Dinc transform within the long run the secular Belcher 2012, 10). The EU negotiation identity in line with the domesticated process triggered a change in identity suppressed identity (Çınar and Duran and interests through which formerly 2008, 19). securitized issues such as headscarf issue Here, desecuritization can be were desecuritized. The change in understood as a strategic practice that identity also transformed the secular occurs within the psycho-cultural discourse of nation-state. Formerly, the disposition of the securitizing actors and secular identity was protected via the audiences. In this respect, the security of the regime discourse of state construction of desecuritization as a and the military establishments. Through speech act is too narrow to fully grasp the consolidating the democracy, the social contexts of the act (Williams transformation of state and the secular 2003, 528). Erdoğan has framed AKP’s establishment occurred within the pro-EU stance around two main context of ‘justice’, ‘freedom’, and arguments. The first is that Turkey’s EU ‘institutional flexibility’(Yeşiltaş 2014, membership goal is part of Ataturk’s 60). project of reaching the level of One particular benefit of the EU contemporary civilizations. Secondly, was that the accession requirements Turkey’s membership to the EU would would diminish the military’s influence prove to be an antidote to the ‘clash of over politics, meaning that the AKP civilizations’ perspective. The former would have the ability to be more argument can be identified as the party’s independent in domestic policy choices. rhetorical strategy against the secularist Hence, the AKP promoted religious Kemalist elite. It was a departure from freedom, economic liberalization, and the Islamist arguments based on the democratization, which was a shift that difference with the West and the helped redefine Turkish political Islam

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within the confines of the increased from one month to two and (Dalay and Friedman 2013). finally and more importantly, a civilian Consequently, the party took Secretary General was appointed to the major steps towards democratization, NSC. The military’s weight in politics equality and human rights in line with was significantly reduced if not the EU candidacy. Between 2002 and eradicated by turning the NSC into an 2004, eight harmonization packages advisory body and the Secretary General including the rule of law, human rights, into an administrative unit. and the market economy were approved The EU harmonization by parliament so as to satisfy the packages provide a good example of a Copenhagen Criteria (Gül 2007). The non-discursive desecuritization move closure of political parties became more towards Islamic identity. The military, difficult. In February 2003, the media, and judiciary resources were parliament passed another material factors that were used to make it harmonization package that removed the possible for the dominant secular top military officers who dominated the identity to put pressure on the Islamic National Security Council (Milli identity. By limiting their power through Güvenlik Konseyi - hereafter NSC), harmonization packages, Erdoğan personnel at the Radio and Television indirectly managed to de-securitize Supervision Board and its censor board. religion at the domestic level. At this One of the most important time, it is important to mention that changes came with the August 2003 Erdoğan did not make any speeches harmonization package. The regarding secular identity as a threat or harmonization package introduced secular establishments as functional significant reforms with respect to actors of this threat. civilian-military relations. With the The main reason for this was package, the jurisdiction of military Erdoğan’s search for political courts over civilians was limited, the legitimacy. Erdoğan needed to prove that auditing of military expenditures and the the AKP as the Western-oriented, property was enabled by the court of modern, and mainstream party was auditors, executive powers of the NSC’s different from the National Outlook. General secretary were repealed, the Through Europeanization and time period of NSC meetings was internationalization of internal issues,

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Erdoğan transformed the parameters of to differentiate itself from the traditional both Turkish politics and Islamist secular discourse of ‘no solution is the politics. In this sense, he regarded solution’, Erdoğan opted for resolving international support as a fundamental and the eventual reunification of the factor in attaining political legitimacy. island. By differentiating himself from Erdoğan learned the hard way from the the traditional security perception on the February 28 process that electoral Cyprus issue, Erdoğan also marginalized victory does not necessarily give himself from his Islamic National legitimacy in the eyes of the state elite Outlook-oriented past. (Yavuz 2006, 282). This led Erdoğan to To sum up, the first term in the leave his rhetoric of searching for office saw a truly conservative Islamic rule and to begin to use secular democratic identity of the AKP under language. Thus, the AKP was successful Erdoğan’s leadership and a departure in framing religious and local issues in from the Islamism of the National terms of a broader European and Outlook of Erbakan, which embraced an universal language of human rights and anti-Western stance in general and an political liberalism. anti-European one in particular from the As evidenced by the EU 1970s to the 1990s. The AKP’s focus on progress reports and other legal good relations with the Western documents, the Cyprus problem stands countries, particularly with Greece, and as one of the main obstacles for Turkey’s its support for pragmatic moves such as EU membership. The EU authorities had the EU accession negotiations widely and continuously criticized eliminated the identity dichotomy Turkey for not working and making between Turkish secular and religious significant moves towards the settlement identities. of the Cyprus problem. Therefore, the Secondly, the first term also Cyprus issue was a significant ‘problem’ saw instrumentalization of the EU that Turkey was obliged to solve or at against the secular and Kemalist threat least make efforts in that direction. In perception of the AKP. Securing a path this connection, the AKP supported the leading to membership has been UN proposed Annan Plan, which regarded as essential, not only for represented an historic opportunity for democratizing and developing Turkey, the re-unification of the Island. In order but also for broadening the legitimacy of

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the AKP within the secular mentioned above, the military has establishment (Yavuz 2003, 101). The always been a securitizing actor of overlap of interests between the party secularism in the Turkish political arena, and the Westernization process saw a generally considering themselves as the significant reduction of power of the guardians of the Republic and Ataturk’s Kemalist establishment in Turkey. reforms, most importantly secularism. On the eve of the presidential election, 1.4. 2007-2011: Re- the then Chief of General Staff, Yaşar securitizing Islamic identity from Büyükanıt published an ‘online above memorandum’ that arguably was The second term of the AKP considered as an indirect military coup. brought several different dynamics that He stated that ‘the problem that emerged eventually crystallized the re- in the presidential election process is securitization of Islamic identity. The focused on arguments over secularism. first dynamic was the presidential The are elections. The President was Ahmet concerned about the recent Necdet Sezer, a former judge, a hardline situation…the Turkish Armed Forces are secularist and whose term in the office a party in those arguments, and absolute would end in 2007. As the president was defender of secularism...’ (BBC News elected with a majority vote of the 2007). Assembly, this meant that the ruling In line with the online party would have the power to appoint a memorandum, President Ahmet Necdet like-minded ‘conservative-democrat’ Sezer also became involved in the president. process, warning that the country’s The AKP’s presidential secular system faced its greatest threat candidate was Abdullah Gül, who was since the founding of the Republic in also one of the founding members of the 1923 (Rainsford 2007). Here, having the party. The effect of the possibility of bureaucracy and the military acting as having an AKP-based president, in securitizing actors implied that having a addition to being the ruling party, on pro-Islamist president created an societal securitization was twofold. The existential threat to secular identity. The first one could be defined as political- securitizing move that can be considered military sector interrelatedness. As successful as one of the very first

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audience response was the mass ban should be lifted even if the headscarf ‘Republic Protests’ led by several civil is used as a political symbol. He added society organizations in Tandoğan that there was no need to wait for the Square in the capital city . The adoption of a new constitution and the slogans included ‘Turkey is secular and problem could be solved by a simple secular it will remain’ (Türkiye laiktir, ‘one sentence’ constitutional laik kalacak) (Evrensel.net 2007). The amendment. The then Prime Minister’s military’s involvement meant that in statement was strongly criticized by the case of the possible Islamization of the main opposition Republican People’s government, the military would give a de Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). facto legitimacy to the audience-based On 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court securitization of secularity. annulled the amendments. The headscarf The counter-securitization of is a symbol that shapes how Islamists Islam through the protests resulted in the and seculars interpret the actions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling that the other. Within the Islamists social first round of the presidential elections context, the headscarf represents the was void due to insufficient participation oppressed, whereas for the secular (Hürriyet 2007). Later, on May 6, 2007 establishment, it represents the pre- Gül announced that he was withdrawing Republican old rule which is a threat his candidacy after a second failed vote from the past. because the parliamentary session did This dichotomy caused a not achieve the 367-member quorum backlash from the secular public and (Hürriyet 2007). secular elite establishments. They argued In February 2008, the that it represents a threat against parliament voted to Turkey’s secular identity, because it amend Turkey’s Constitution by might put pressure on women who eliminating the ban on headscarves being choose not to wear a headscarf. The worn on university campuses. The Islamists, on the other hand, argued that headscarf issue, dormant during the first it is a human right to wear religious term of the AKP government, suddenly symbols in public spaces. This became the number one issue of dichotomy resulted in a closure case for desecuritization in early 2008. Erdoğan, the AKP. The Chief Public Prosecutor of in a speech act in Madrid, stated that the the Supreme Court of Appeals, took the

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case to the Constitutional Court. The line with the EU standards regarding prosecutor asked Erdoğan among others democracy. It took measures on human to be banned from politics for five years rights and held the military accountable and for the AKP to be closed. However, to civilian courts for crimes against the the Constitutional Court did not ban the state or against the constitutional order. party and Erdoğan was not banned from Although the West supported the reform politics. In fact, AKP, under Erdoğan’s packages, the secular establishment, leadership, was extremely careful to mainly the secular opposition CHP, function within the limits of secular criticized the reforms. CHP argued that laws. the reforms would put Erdoğan in control The 2008 Ergenekon and 2010 of both the military and judiciary, which Sledgehammer cases changed the are the secular pillars of the country with dynamics in the civil-military and which Erdoğan had previously clashed Islamic-secular relationships. The (Hill 2010). Ergenekon trials involved high ranking Restructuring of civil-military military officials, judiciary, and relations and reformation of the judiciary journalists, all alleged to be members of for the sake of Europeanization also the Ergenekon organization. Ergenekon affected the Turkish foreign policy was a supposedly secular clandestine implementation. Unlike the Erbakan organization plotting against the AKP. case, during Erdoğan’s premiership, the Operation ‘Sledgehammer’ was the influence of the military and the name of an alleged traditional bureaucracy in foreign Turkish secularist military coup plan policy-making decreased (Talbot 2013). dating back to 2003, in response to This worked well with the re- the AKP’s victory. identification of Turkish identity in a The Ergenekon and more Islamic way by framing Islam as Sledgehammer trials and the subsequent belonging to the oppressed and the AKP legal reforms ended the Kemalist model representing the oppressed. For instance, of checks and balances between different in his 2011 General Elections victory pillars of authority within Turkey. In speech, Erdoğan said that ‘believe me, 2010, the Turkish Constitution Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul, revitalized the amendments backed by Beirut won as much as Izmir, Damascus Erdoğan in order to bring the country in won as much as Ankara, Ramallah,

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Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem East region, the Islamic masses, and the won as much as Diyarbakir…the hopes oppressed peoples in general. According of the victims and the oppressed have to this logic of discourse, what is good won’ (BBC News 2011). for the Islamic dominant identity of In effect, this discourse not only Turkey would benefit the entire region; stated the AKP as a national political meanwhile, he continued to sustain the party but also as a regional actor excluded and marginalized identity of representing the identity of oppressed Islam within the country. Muslim masses. The speech had a stronger Islamic, Eastern undertone than 1.5. 2011-2014: The clash and a Western undertone symbolizing the securitization of Islamic and through domestic policy discourse secular identities reflected in foreign policy. This construction of a unified Islamic The events that led to incidents community portrayed Erdoğan as the from the securitization of secular identity savior of the oppressed and religious peaked in Turkey during the 2013-14 guardian of the masses, while not only anti-government protests, mostly due to otherizing West but also Western Erdogan’s increasingly polarizing influenced identities within the state. The speeches and AKP policies. ongoing debate in Europe on the A counter securitizing move European identity of Turkey, and the came from the environmental-political blockage of key chapters during the sector through the of accession negotiations process due to 2013. The protests, which started as a deep-seated differences between Turkey peaceful environmental demonstration and the EU in relation to the Cyprus against the confiscation of a historical dispute, raised major question marks park for the building of a shopping mall, concerning the feasibility of Turkey’s were faced with denial of the right to membership (Öniş 2010, 54). This peaceful assembly and un-proportional further fueled the otherization of the police attacks. The police use of force West and Westernization of Turkey. In constructed a threat image to national this discourse, Erdoğan constructed a identity caused by seculars. From the host of objects to be referent objects that beginning, the Gezi protests were not required protection, such as the Middle solely a crisis in the environmental

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sector. The crises were the spontaneous physically and mentally de-stabilizing explosion of accumulated anxieties children (Özgenç 2013). resulting from what was perceived as the The protests were important in government’s increasing interference two ways; firstly, the public squares in with the secular way of life and the arena Turkey are symbols of the secular of personal choice (Özbudun 2014, 157). Kemalist republic. They were part of the Faced by the largest mass Republic’s secularist struggle to protest in a decade, Erdoğan declared eliminate the urban fabric during the that the protestors were looters (The Ottoman past. Taksim Square and Gezi Guardian 2013). His speech act Park, were symbols of secularism and institutionalized the national security progress. The AKP’s attempt at building and intensified the juxtaposition of a mosque in the square and Erdoğan’s national identity and societal identity. persistence in demolishing the Atatürk Censorship on media and blockading the Cultural Centre (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi internet websites with an overnight bill - hereafter AKM), the secular symbol of that allowed the government to block Westernization through ballet and other internet trafficking further fueled the performances, became concrete rage. Most infamous media censorship examples of the cultural transformation occurred when the mainstream media did of Erdoğan from conservative not broadcast any news regarding the democracy to Islamist identity. This demonstrations for three days. The lack caused tension within the secular of media coverage was symbolized segments of the society against the by CNN International covering the increasingly authoritarian policies, protests while CNN Turk broadcasted a which became more palpable after 2011 documentary about penguins at the same when the AKP achieved its third time (Öktem, 2013). The Radio and consecutive electoral victory. The Television Supreme Council (Radyo- secular identity felt threatened that their Televizyon Üst Kurulu - hereafter non-religious lifestyle was in danger. RTÜK) controversially issued a fine to Secondly, the protest in itself pro-opposition news channels such as was a dual securitization and counter Halk TV for their broadcasting of the securitization move from both the protests, accusing them of morally, secular and religious establishments. As highlighted above, from the very

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beginning, the Gezi protests were not Islamic identity, has been analyzed in solely a crisis in the environmental recent articles by scholars. Many have sector. Demonstrations were against the analyzed anti-Westernization with a Erdoğan government’s perceived particular emphasis on de- religious conservatism. The Gezi Europeanization (Buket Ökten protests created a rupture in AKP’s Sipahioğlu, 2017; Beken Saatçioğlu, legitimacy of responding to varying 2016; Seçkin Barış Gülmez,2013; Jacob societal demands. Instead of answering Wodka, 2013; Senem Aydın Düzgit, to those demands, Erdoğan’s 2016; Münevver Cebeci, 2016), while marginalizing rhetoric and coercion led others have focused on anti- to the secular-pious separation in a Westernization based on the cultural polarization reflected in the civilizational discrepancies between the political sphere (Mis and Aslan 2018, East and West (Menderes Çınar, 2018; 36). Katerina Dalacoura, 2017). There are also studies that have concentrated on 1.6. 2014-2019: Securitization anti-Westernism through a foreign of Islam Through Anti- policy perspective (Murat Yeşiltaş, Westernization 2013; Oguzhan Göksel, 2019), and anti- Particularly from 2013 Westernism in domestic politics (İhsan onwards, there was a shift in threat Yılmaz, Galib Bashirov, 2018; Henri J. perception towards the Islamic identity. Barkey, 2019; Huriye Toker, 2014). The change in security discourse this None of these articles have focused on time was not against the domestic secular the transformation of security discourse identity but the Christian West. The from a pro-Western and European West started to be perceived as a threat narrative to an anti-Western narrative. to Turkish-Islamic identity. From that The change in threat perception point on, the Turkish and Islamic stemmed from a series of elections identities stopped being distinct two beginning with the local elections of identities but were framed as a March 2014, followed by the first homogenized unit. presidential elections in August 2014, The AKP’s populist discourse, and then the June and November 2015 which focuses highly on anti- general elections. The July 15, 2016 Westernism particularly concerning coup attempt further increased the

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perception of the West as a threat to historical grandeur. The reference to the identity. Similarly, the constitutional Crusaders mimics and reminds that the referendum of 16 April 2017 and the age-old conflict between Islam and 2019 local elections created a heavily Christianity is still in progress and anti-Western perception. One of the Turkey is the most important actor acting major contexts of this anti-Western on behalf of Muslims around the world. discourse is accusing the West of The factor that is worth Islamophobia. emphasizing here is that the main driver During this period, two that brought the AKP to power in the first significant points needs to be underlined. term was the devotion to Western ideals Firstly, the main object of the of democracy and human rights. The securitization of Islam was the Muslims AKP sponsored the civilization alliance, in general, instead of the Turkish contrary to Huntington’s popular thesis population. Secondly, Turkey was in the era when the clash of civilizations, presented as the protector of the Muslims particularly between Islamic and oppressed around the world by implying Christian civilizations, gained more and sometimes referring to the Ottoman popularity in the aftermath of the 9/11 Empire’s grand past. attacks. As suggested by the ‘clash of For instance, in Bursa on July civilizations’ thesis, “the ‘West’ and the 18, 2014 Erdoğan said; ‘Muslim world’ are construed as “We are faced with a new monolithic and homogeneous and Crusader alliance; this is a wrong assume an unchanging character of direction. I am calling out to the West, duality between us and them” (Alper this is not an honest approach … Silence Kaliber, Senem Aydın Düzgit, 2018). would not suit us. Osman Gazi Contrary to the earlier terms in office, the established a state here, that state post-2013 era has followed a mutually brought justice in Palestine, for centuries exclusive understanding of Western it maintained justice in all of the Middle identities and Eastern identities. The East, North Africa, the Balkans” (Düzgit, West is framed as Islamophobic and all “De-Europeanisation). the oppositional groups against the AKP The reference to Osman Gazi, are accused of being Islamophobic and the leader and founder of the Ottoman Eurocentric. Empire works as a reminder of this

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In a speech given to AKP perpetrator a 'Christian terrorist.' Why supporters in Sakarya in 2017, Erdogan can't they say that?" (Daily Sabah, 2019). again securitized the subject by referring When these speeches given by to antagonism and opposition between Erdogan are examined, which securitize the Islamic East and the Christian West. Islam through an anti-Western discourse, He said, "My dear brothers, a battle has one sees several patterns. Firstly, none of started between the cross and the half- his speeches are directly targeted at the moon. There can be no other Western media, as in all of his speeches, explanation" (Deutsche Welle, 2017). the audience comprised the domestic Similarly, in a speech on April 16, 2018 public. Secondly, the speech acts were at the World Muslim Minorities’ Summit done for conservative electoral bases. in Istanbul, Erdoğan said “there are Thirdly, in most cases, the anti-Western efforts to degrade and defame Islam, rhetoric blamed the West for domestic which is the only religion that offers problems. According to Çinar, such anti- genuine solutions to the modern world’s Western discourse may be expected to problems. The West tries to put certain communicated better with the Arab labels on Islam through certain ‘project’ Islamic World (Menderes Çınar, 2018). terrorist groups. Racists and fascist According to the AKP, the main reason groups target businesses, homes and for the Arab uprisings was that they were places of worships belonging to against the Western-backed authoritarian Muslims, particularly in , the regimes, and they are symbolized by the Netherlands, and Belgium” rise of Islamist groups. Therefore, in (Hurriyet Daily News, 2019). order to build a bridge between these Most recently at an election groups and Turkey, Erdogan focused on rally in Izmir on 2019, in the wake of the a civilizational discourse built upon anti- terrorist attacks at two mosques in Western characteristics. However, more Christchurch, New Zealand, Erdoğan importantly, the securitization of Islam accused the international community of through anti-Western rhetoric works at having double standards in categorizing gaining public support. It gains support terrorism by stating "all of the world because it “enables such a government to leaders describe the terrorist attack in appeal to an imaginary ―nationalist New Zealand as an attack on Islam and nostalgia (for the Ottoman Empire in Muslims. They do not call the Turkey) while simultaneously accusing

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an external enemy of current socio- since the War of Independence. This is a economic and/or political troubles” fight for one nation, one flag, one (Göksel, “Foreign Policy Making,” 18). homeland and one state…Our nation Aside from the securitization of stood up courageously against the coup Islamic identity, anti-Westernism also and broke the hands around its throat and works to securitize the establishment of wrecked the operation (Yeni Akit, 2019). the Turkish Republic via effecting the To summarize, the anti- deeply rooted fear of partitioning of the Westernism should be understood as an Republic by the Western powers, extremely potent force for generating echoing the Sèvres treaty of 1920. The legitimacy and public support for the general belief in contemporary Turkey is AKP administration, which has been that the Ottoman Empire did not isolated (Göksel, “Foreign Policy gradually collapse by itself. Conversely, Making,” 13). Therefore, it is expected it was destroyed from within by Western that the majority of Erdoğan’s anti- powers and ethnic/religious minorities Western rhetoric takes place before the (Hakkı Taş, 2014). In contemporary elections and referendums. What can be Turkey, this fear and the securitization observed in those speeches is that the act find particularly acceptance from deep skepticism for the West and the nationalists, the traditional Kemalists West’s intentions toward Turkey was and most importantly, the traditional aimed at uniting Turkish religious Islamists. By articulating the domestic conservatives and nationalists, who are threats with international ones, the AKP the glue that bind the AKP’s electoral has naturalized its discourse in the coalition together (Max Hoffman, election periods or during domestic Michael Werz, 2018). problems. Particularly after the coup attempt on 15 July 2016, President 2. CONCLUSION Erdogan has appealed to this discourse. Turkey has always been a He has stated that: special country in terms of the In this critical time period in dichotomy of political identity. Since the which this region is shaped, if we stop, foundation of the modern Republic in the place we would find ourselves in 1923, there has been a clash between the would be Sèvres conditions…To be fair, top-down imposed secular identity and Turkey is putting up the biggest fight mass rooted religious identity. In

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contemporary times, especially in the the AKP and the influence of the military post 97 period, due to heavy oppression and the traditional bureaucracy in by the dominant secular identity the foreign policy-making has also been Islamic identity has transformed and decreased. Consequently, Turkish become more cooperant with the West. identity has been re-identified in a more In this connection, in its first two terms, Islamic way. This has resulted in the the AKP fully supported the EU process. counter-securitization move by the The EU provides coherence with the secular identity camp that was activated main identity marker of secularism that in the Gezi Park protests. The protests is Westernization. Therefore, the and security forces’ response led to the dominant secular identity does not separation in a cultural polarization perceive the AKP identity policies as a reflected in the political sphere. Finally, threat to itself, unlike the National in the aftermath of 2014, in part due to Outlook identity. One particular benefit multiple elections and referendums, the of the EU was that the accession securitization of Islam through an anti- requirements diminished the military’s Western rhetoric gained a pace. The west influence over politics and this enabled as a threat to Turkish identity is the AKP to be more autonomous in profitable in the elections as it is linked domestic politics. The EU membership to historical grievances stemming from bid expanded the AKP’s political space the Sevres treaty. Although these events and led to the implementation of deteriorated the image of the AKP democratic control via preserving abroad and seriously hindered Turkey’s secularism and democratic rule. EU membership bid, it also The AKP’s transformation from demonstrated that the AKP will continue conservative democracy to Islamist its policies on cultural transformation identity became most visible in the post- from conservative democracy to Islamist 2011 era. The legal reforms ended the identity. secular Kemalist model of checks and balances between different pillars of Disclosure statement: No authority within Turkey. Restructuring potential conflict of interest was reported of the civil-military relations and by the authors. reformation of the judiciary for the sake of Europeanization further utilized by References

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