Interventionist Causation in Physical Science
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
INTERVENTIONIST CAUSATION IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE by Karen R. Zwier B.S., Computer Engineering, University of Illinois, 2006 B.A., Philosophy, University of Illinois, 2006 M.A., Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2011 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2014 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Karen R. Zwier It was defended on November 20, 2014 and approved by Sandra Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh, HPS John Norton, University of Pittsburgh, HPS James Woodward, University of Pittsburgh, HPS Robert Batterman, University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy Mark Wilson, University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy Dissertation Director: Sandra Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh, HPS ii Copyright c by Karen R. Zwier 2014 iii INTERVENTIONIST CAUSATION IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE Karen R. Zwier, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2014 The current consensus view of causation in physics, as commonly held by scientists and philosophers, has several serious problems. It fails to provide an epistemology for the causal knowledge that it claims physics to possess; it is inapplicable in a prominent area of physics (classical thermodynamics); and it is difficult to reconcile with our everyday use of causal concepts and claims. In this dissertation, I use historical examples and philosophical arguments to show that the interventionist account of causation constitutes a promising alternative for a “physically respectable” account of causation. The interventionist account explicates important parts of the experimental practice of physics and important aspects of the ways in which phys- ical theory is used and applied. Moreover, the interventionist account succeeds where the consensus view of causation in physics fails. I argue that the interventionist account provides an epistemology of causal knowledge in physics that is rooted in experiment. On the interventionist view, there is a close link between experiment and the testing of causal claims. I give several examples of experiments from the early history of thermodynamics that scientists used in interventionist-type arguments. I also argue that interventionist claims made in the context of a physical theory can be epistemically justified by reference to the experimental interventions and observations that serve as evidence for the theory. I then show that the interventionist account of causation is well-suited to the patterns of reasoning that are intrinsic to thermodynamic theory. I argue that interventionist reasoning iv constitutes the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory, and that thermodynamic theory can provide clear answers to meaningful questions about whether or not a certain variable is a cause of another in a given context. Finally, I argue that the interventionist account offers the prospect of a unification of “physically respectable” causation and our everyday notion of causation. I conclude the dissertation by sketching an anti-foundationalist unification of causation, according to which causal reasoning occurs in the same manner in physics as it does in other branches of life and scientific research. v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ......................................... ix 1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................. 1 2.0 EXPERIMENT AS A TEST OF CAUSAL CLAIMS: A HISTORY .. 10 2.1 Background: Experience as evidence ...................... 12 2.2 Galileo Galilei .................................. 14 2.2.1 Galileo’s devised experiences to determine a cause ........... 17 2.2.2 Galileo’s notion of cause ......................... 24 2.3 Francis Bacon ................................... 35 2.3.1 Bacon’s method .............................. 38 2.3.2 Baconian methodology: Innovations and limitations .......... 41 2.4 John Stuart Mill ................................. 44 2.4.1 Mill’s two distinct concepts of causation ................. 45 2.4.2 Sorting out the two concepts ....................... 48 2.5 Conclusion .................................... 50 3.0 CAUSAL INFERENCE FROM EXPERIMENT: AN EPISTEMOLOGY 51 3.1 The interventionist account of causation .................... 53 3.1.1 Defining cause in terms of hypothetical experiment ........... 56 3.1.2 Ideal intervention ............................. 60 3.2 From hypothetical experiment to real experiment ............... 65 3.2.1 The “Fundamental Problem” of causal inference ............ 66 3.2.2 Non-ideal interventions .......................... 70 3.3 From real experiments to causal claims ..................... 72 vi 3.3.1 Example: The Berti experiment ..................... 73 3.3.2 When does an experiment afford causal inference? ........... 80 4.0 THE EARLY HISTORY OF THERMODYNAMICS: A CASE STUDY 82 4.1 Torricelli’s experiments ............................. 83 4.2 Roberval’s experiments ............................. 92 4.3 Pascal’s experiments ............................... 98 4.4 Boyle’s experiments and theorizing ....................... 104 4.4.1 Boyle’s J-tube experiment ........................ 105 4.4.2 First-order abstraction .......................... 108 4.4.3 Second-order abstraction ......................... 111 4.4.4 Boyle’s raised tube experiment ...................... 116 4.5 Physical theory: More than an equation .................... 119 4.6 Conclusion .................................... 123 5.0 INTERVENTIONIST CAUSATION IN PHYSICAL THEORY ..... 124 5.1 Clausius’ memoirs, 1850–1865 .......................... 126 5.1.1 1850 paper ................................. 126 5.1.2 1854 paper ................................. 133 5.1.3 1865 paper ................................. 139 5.2 Interventionist causal reasoning in thermodynamics .............. 142 5.2.1 The Clausius submanifold ......................... 142 5.2.2 Thermodynamic potentials and driving forces .............. 150 5.3 Conclusion .................................... 158 6.0 PROSPECTS FOR A UNIFICATION OF CAUSATION ......... 159 6.1 Prospects for interventionist causation in other subdomains of physics . 161 6.2 A unified concept of causation .......................... 163 6.2.1 Anti-foundationalist unification ...................... 166 6.2.2 Anti-reductionist unification ....................... 168 6.3 Conclusions and future research ......................... 171 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................... 173 vii LIST OF FIGURES 2.1 Galileo’s illustration of a device for measuring the “force of the void” ..... 23 2.2 Galileo’s illustration of two cylindrical beams of differing dimensions ..... 29 2.3 Galileo’s illustration of why an ebony chip floats on the surface of water ... 31 3.1 Illustration of multiple instances of an experiment ............... 68 3.2 Diagram of Berti’s experiment .......................... 75 3.3 Engraving of a more complex version of Berti’s experiment .......... 76 4.1 Diagram of Torricelli’s experiment ........................ 86 4.2 Diagram of Torricelli’s thought experiment about compressible wool ..... 91 4.3 Diagram of Roberval’s experiment with the carp bladder ............ 95 4.4 Illustration of one type of vacuum-in-a-vacuum experiment .......... 98 4.5 Boyle’s data table for the J-tube experiment .................. 107 4.6 Boyle’s data table for the raised tube experiment ................ 117 5.1 The 4-stage thermodynamic cycle in Clausius’ 1850 paper ........... 129 5.2 The 6-stage thermodynamic cycle in Clausius’ 1854 paper. ........... 135 5.3 Illustration of the Clausius submanifold ..................... 145 5.4 Two thermodynamic systems finding an equilibrium temperature ....... 151 5.5 Illustration of a pressure-driven process. ..................... 155 viii PREFACE This dissertation is a labor of several years and I have many people to acknowledge for their support. First of all, I thank the members of my committee. I consider myself fortunate to have benefited from their knowledge, experience, and goodwill. Each of them has helped me to clarify and build the ideas and arguments contained here, and more holistically speaking, each of them has influenced me as a scholar. Bob Batterman managed to steer me away from a na¨ıve reductionist argument that I was attempting to make at one point in the process. John Norton was always quick to respond and make time for conversation. Those conversations often provided the intellectual stimulus and motivation that I needed. Mark Wilson has shown me, with his unique style, that there are many different ways of doing valuable philosophical work. His ideas and his ways of expressing them are unlike those of any other philosopher I have encountered, and he has given me so much to ruminate on. I was lucky enough to have Jim Woodward come to the University of Pittsburgh half-way through my graduate career, after I had already come to admire his philosophical ideas. I thank him for his thorough feedback on my writing. My advisor, Sandy Mitchell, saw both the good ideas and the bad. She had a clear eye for what to discard (the pages of which are probably about twice as long as the finished version) and how to point me in fruitful directions. I thank her especially for her support of me at every stage. For a woman to give birth to three children while working toward her doctorate is neither a standard nor an efficient path through the endeavor. Yet Sandy was unceasingly supportive of my life choices and was a constant advocate for me professionally. She played the midwife to this dissertation,