Manoeuvre Warfare in the South African Campaign in German South West Africa During the First World War
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MANOEUVRE WARFARE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR by Antonio Garcia submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree MASTER OF ARTS in the subject HISTORY at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA Supervisor: Mr N.D. Southey Co-supervisor: Prof T. Dedering February 2015 ii Student number: 39261301 I Antonio Garcia declare that MANOEUVRE WARFARE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. Date: 04/02/2015 iii ABSTRACT This dissertation studies the First World War South African campaign in German South West Africa from 1914 until 1915. The campaign was characterised by the high mobility of the Union’s mounted soldiers which enabled swift advances and rapid envelopments. The German forces applied a defensive strategy relying on the lack of water and remoteness of the terrain to deter and prolong the Union’s invasion. The German force also relied on internal lines of communication to concentrate its forces on the Union’s advancing columns. The Union Defence Forces’s numbered approximately 50 000 compared to the German force of about 7 000. The campaign culminated on 9 July 1915 with the surrender of almost the entire German fighting force intact. This study analyses whether the victory can be attributed to the Union Defence Forces’s numerical superiority or the operational strategy and tactics which were applied during the campaign. It is argued that this operational strategy is congruent with the modern theory of manoeuvre warfare and that the campaign is therefore a textbook example of manoeuvre warfare theory. KEY WORDS First World War; German South West Africa; Union of South Africa; Union Defence Forces; manoeuvre warfare theory; mobility in warfare; logistics. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge the guidance of my supervisors, Nicholas Southey and Professor Tilman Dedering. Both are accomplished historians who have expanded their scope of interest to the military sphere. A special word of appreciation is noted to Evert Kleynhans who assisted greatly with ardent enthusiasm by editing and painstakingly analysing and commenting on each chapter. I also thank David Katz for his comment and discussion on South Africa’s participation in the First World War. The University of South Africa is thanked for the financial assistance it provided in the form of a bursary. My thanks also go to Nicholas Southey for facilitating the bursary application and for cutting through as much red tape as possible. Furthermore I appreciate the methodical editing of Bridget Theron-Bushell. Lastly I thank my beautiful wife for tolerating me and for supporting me throughout this study. v CONTENTS PAGE Maps vi Tables and Graphs vii Figures viii CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1 CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 11 CHAPTER 3: Manoeuvre Warfare Theory 30 CHAPTER 4: The German South West African Campaign and the Afrikaner Rebellion 44 CHAPTER 5: The Northern Offensive until 31 March 1915 65 CHAPTER 6: The Southern Army: Central, Eastern and Southern Forces 80 CHAPTER 7: The Continuation of Operations in the South of German South West Africa 89 CHAPTER 8: The Final Envelopment 96 CHAPTER 9: Analysis of the German South West African Campaign 116 CHAPTER 10: Conclusion 129 Sources 132 vi Maps PAGE Map 1: Comparison of the sizes of the theatre of operations in German South West Africa and Europe 46 Map 2: Terrain and infrastructure of German South West Africa 47 Map 3: Battle of Sandfontein 50 Map 4: Illustration of the engagement at Upington 62 Map 5: Strategic situation on 4 January 1915 66 Map 6: Advance of the Northern Army in German South West Africa 67 Map 7: The engagements at Riet, Pforte and Jakkalsfontein 70 Map 8: Union Defence Forces axes of advance 77 Map 9: Strategic situation on 20 March 1915 79 Map 10: German South West Africa 81 Map 11: Mackenzie’s advance 84 Map 12: Divergent advance of the Union Defence Forces in the south of German South West Africa 86 Map 13: The advance on Gibeon 91 Map 14: Result of the South African actions up to 3 May 1915 93 Map 15: Strategic situation in the north of German South West Africa on 6 May 1915 94 Map 16: The final envelopment in German South West Africa 99 Map 17: Action at Otavifontein 105 Map 18: The final advance 107 Map 19: The final envelopment 110 vii Tables and Graphs PAGE Table 1: Rebels captured and surrendered 63 Table 2: Best forced marches 106 Table 3: Casualties for the German South West African campaign and the Afrikaner Rebellion 111 Graph 1: Strength of the Eastern, Southern, Central and Northern forces (including forces in field and en route to the theatre of operations) 78 Graph 2: Central Force increase in troops (including the forces in the field and 1815 soldiers en route in March 1915) 82 Graph 3: Strength of the Southern Army (Central, Southern and Eastern forces) by March 1915 (inclusive of the forces in the field and 5 895 soldiers en route) 87 Graph 4: Comparison between mounted and non-mounted soldiers in the Central and Southern and Eastern forces (inclusive of the forces in the field and en route) 87 Graph 5: Increase in Union Defence Forces logistical support 97 viii Figures PAGE Figure 1: Hierarchy of the levels of war 13 Figure 2: Formula for total military power 18 Figure 3: The levels of war and their centres of gravity 32 Figure 4: Direct and indirect attack 42 Figure 5: Horse and soldier exhausted in the desert 75 Figure 6: Formula for total military power 113 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION The study of manoeuvre warfare theory received a great deal of international attention in the latter part of the 20th century and has thus influenced the study of military theory as a discipline from the 1980s until the present. This dissertation applies the framework of manoeuvre warfare theory to the South African campaign in German South West Africa during the First World War.1 The dissertation deals with the dual aspects of military theory and historical study. The literature review (Chapter 2) systematically addresses manoeuvre warfare theory and the historiography of the campaign in two separate sections. The relevant literature on manoeuvre theory highlights the themes which are central to the manoeuvre theory framework applied in this study, including the means to defeat an enemy with the least resistance and material loss. The second part of the literature review addresses the historiography of the German South West African campaign and focuses on aspects of the campaign which bear similarities and congruency to what we today refer to as manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare theory is a modern construct and the commanders of the campaign were not necessarily consciously executing manoeuvre warfare in the modern sense. The force groupings and their commanders applied their existing knowledge of warfare in an attempt to win the campaign in the most efficient manner. The campaign makes for an ideal case study of manoeuvre warfare theory with the advantage of hindsight. Manoeuvre warfare theory is discussed in Chapter 3. The fundamental elements of manoeuvre warfare theory are elaborated upon and combined into a framework. In Chapters 4 to 8 the campaign is discussed in depth, detailing the course of events and analysing them with reference to the manoeuvre warfare theory framework. The dissertation hypothesises that the German South West African campaign provided the backdrop for a deliberate and effective display of manoeuvre warfare (or warfare concepts congruent to those of manoeuvre warfare theory) which resulted in victory with minimal loss of life and materiel. 1 Note that German South West Africa was a German colony from 1884 until 1915. German South West Africa refers to the area that is modern day Namibia. 2 Background The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 as a dominion within the British Empire and Louis Botha became its first prime minister. The Union was inextricably linked to the global British wartime effort. The German South West African campaign involved the invasion of German South West Africa by South African forces as an extension of Britain’s military strategy in the First World War. The history of the formation of the Union of South Africa and the subsequent involvement in the German South West African campaign revolves around the two central and towering figures of Botha and Jan Christiaan Smuts. They were the leaders of the campaign and their military backgrounds, experience and abilities are important in the understanding of their position and approach towards the campaign. The broad political developments within South Africa at the time provide some insight into the rise to power of Botha and Smuts. This section outlines the general political developments in the Union of South Africa from the early 20th century until the formation of the Union Defence Forces in 1912. Furthermore, it provides an overview of the Afrikaner Rebellion and the German South West African campaign. Thereafter, manoeuvre warfare is discussed briefly with reference to its modern-day study, application and relevance within the military sphere. Prior to the formation of the Union of South Africa, Botha was a proponent of a united South Africa which he believed would only be possible through cooperation with the British Empire.2 During the South African War (1899–1902) Botha was initially a Boer3 commandant and subsequently became the commandant general of the Transvaal commandos in 1900 after the death of Petrus Jacobus Joubert, the previous commandant general.