American Conservative Political Orientation

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AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ORIENTATION:

MASCULINE INDEPENDENCE, RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISM,

AND ETHNIC SEPARATENESS

Caitlin Burton

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements

for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of Psychology

University of Toronto

American Conservative Political Orientation:

Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness

Caitlin Burton

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of Psychology

University of Toronto

2016

Abstract

Many studies of political orientation (PO) construe conservatism as a unidimensional construct, linked to variables reflecting heavier negativity bias. Paradoxically, conservatism is also linked to indicators of positive adjustment, social connectedness, and well-being. In 5 studies, I test how empirically derived factors of PO relate to variables relevant to negativity bias versus positive adjustment, and collective- versus individual-focus. Study 1 replicates a positive association between unidimensional conservatism and Satisfaction with Life (SWL), demonstrating that conservatives’ lower neuroticism can account for this association. Studies 2a,

2b, 3, and 4 develop a 33-item Attitude-Based PO (ABPO) Scale measuring what emerges as three factors of conservatism, starting with a pool of 214 items. I interpret the dimensions, based on item content and individual difference predictors, as Masculine Independence (MI), Religious

Traditionalism (RT), and Ethnic Separateness (ES). They constitute three correlated but distinct dimensions of PO, each of which accounts for incremental variance in unidimensional

conservatism and voting behaviour. MI, including attitudes toward taxation, environmental issues, health care, and government reach, is the only factor positively associated with SWL, and negatively with neuroticism and disgust sensitivity, clashing with findings linking unidimensional conservatism to negativity bias. RT issues include abortion, stem cell research, and euthanasia; RT is associated with religiosity and – when MI and ES are controlled for – femininity and higher agreeableness. ES issues include bi-racial families, refugees, and foreign aid. ES is associated with racism and accounts for the positive bivariate correlations of racism with MI and RT. I suggest that bidimensional models based on fiscal and social conservatism are not well-founded; MI is a mix of economically and socially relevant factors, RT is a social factor exclusively comprising issues relevant to Christian faith, and ES issues are also fiscally and socially relevant. Throughout, MI is linked with indicators of positive adjustment, while RT and

ES associate more expectedly with indices of negativity bias. RT exclusively is linked with indicators of benevolent collective-focus toward one’s ingroup members, while MI and ES are not. Thus, the ABPO scale stands to further clarify the associations of distinct dimensions of conservative PO with negativity bias and collective-focus.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my advisors, Jason Plaks and Jordan Peterson, for their many years of invaluable support and mentorship. The two of you have taught me so much about how to be a researcher, a teacher, and a functional person, and I am forever grateful to have worked with you. I count myself truly lucky to have been your student. Nick Rule, my non-supervisory thesis committee member and supervisor on additional projects, thank you so much for working with me. I learned a tremendous amount from you; you are an incredible role model and mentor for any aspiring academic to have. Poppy Lockwood, my undergraduate thesis advisor and outside project supervisor, I am so grateful for your teaching, support, and influence over the years. You have had a tremendous positive impact on me and my academic and professional paths. I am also grateful to my Peterson Lab-mate, Shona Tritt and her co-supervisor Mickey Inzlicht, for sharing an initial pool of 38 scale items, some of which were included in the current work, and which seeded the development of many more items. Ian McGregor, my thesis committee’s external appraiser, and Erika Carlson and Marc Fournier, my non-supervisory appraisers, thank you so much for the time you spent reading the thesis, for attending the final oral defense, and for your comments and questions. Your input undoubtedly sharpened my thinking about these ideas and improved future studies that will follow up on this work. On the home front, my astronomically wonderful husband David, I cannot thank you enough for your support, patience, and care over the last seven years, and for making day-to-day life hilarious and categorically enjoyable. I do not know what I would do without you. My incredible Ma, I am so lucky to have you. Your support and advice make me a happier and more functional individual, and I would not be who I am today without you. My grad school comrades, and lab-mates, thank you for making work so much fun, and for teaching me things about research, teaching, and life that I will always value. It has been a real treat to have made such wonderful friends and to have worked with such fantastic peers.

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Acknowledgements ...... iv

Table of Contents ...... v

List of Tables ...... viii

List of Figures ...... xi

List of Appendices ...... xii

Overview ...... 1 Do conservatives have stronger negativity bias? ...... 2 Are conservatives more individual-focused or collective-focused? ...... 11 What is the dimensionality of political ideology? ...... 20 The current research ...... 26 Study 1 ...... 28

Method ...... 29 Results ...... 29 Conservatism, SWL, the Big Five, income, and system justification...... 31 Discussion ...... 32 Study 2a ...... 32

Method ...... 34 Results ...... 35 Political orientation and Satisfaction with Life...... 35 Social versus fiscal political orientation...... 36 Political attitudes...... 40 Discussion ...... 55 Social versus fiscal political orientation...... 55 Factors of attitudes...... 56 Political orientation and SWL...... 57 Study 2b ...... 58

Method ...... 58

Results ...... 59 Political orientation and Satisfaction with Life...... 61 Social versus fiscal political orientation...... 62 Political attitudes...... 63 Discussion ...... 76 Study 3 ...... 78

Method ...... 78 Results and discussion ...... 79 Exploratory sample ...... 79 Confirmatory sample ...... 97 Voting behaviour ...... 99 Study 4 ...... 103

Method ...... 105 Results and discussion ...... 107 Predicting PO and SWL with the Attitude-Based PO subscales ...... 109 Block 1: Social Dominance Orientation and Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Scales ...... 112 Block 2: Social-Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS) ...... 115 Block 3: Patriotism, racism, religiosity, and disgust sensitivity ...... 119 Block 4: System justification, resistance to change, and opposition to equality ...... 123 Block 5: Masculinity-femininity and BFAS ...... 126 Confirmatory factor analyses ...... 130 General Discussion ...... 131

The subscales are politically relevant ...... 132 Consideration of incremental validity ...... 135 Canonical issues in the final measure ...... 136 The subscales individually ...... 139 Masculine Independence ...... 139 Religious Traditionalism ...... 146 Ethnic Separateness ...... 152 Summary: Dimensionality of political orientation ...... 154 Potential for extension to non-American populations ...... 156 Summary: Negativity bias ...... 157

Summary: Individual-focus versus collective-focus ...... 159 Mechanical Turk samples in the current work ...... 160 Conclusions ...... 162 References ...... 164

Appendices ...... 176

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List of Tables

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables in Study 1 (N = 700)...... 29 Table 2. Correlation matrix for Study 1 (N = 700)...... 30 Table 3. Bivariate correlations between general, fiscal, and social PO, SWL, demographics, Big Five traits, and overall disgust...... 38 Table 4. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring extraction and direct oblimin rotation...... 41 Table 5. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of three factors...... 46 Table 6. Bivariate correlations between the derived factors and general, fiscal, and social PO...... 50 Table 7. Bivariate correlations of the three factors with demographic characteristics, SWL, religiosity and disgust...... 50 Table 8. Bivariate correlations of the factors with the ten BFAS personality aspects...... 51 Table 9. Bivariate correlations between general, fiscal, and social PO, SWL, demographics, Big Five traits, and overall disgust...... 60 Table 10. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of two factors...... 65 Table 11. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of two factors, entering the sixty-nine remaining items...... 69 Table 12. Bivariate correlations between the derived factors and general, fiscal, and social PO...... 73 Table 13. Bivariate correlations between MI, RT, demographic variables, disgust sensitivity, religiosity, and Satisfaction with Life...... 73 Table 14. Bivariate correlations between MI, RT, and the ten BFAS personality aspects.. 74 Table 15. Bivariate correlations between general, fiscal, and social PO, religiosity, age, and gender...... 80

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Table 16. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of three factors, including all one hundred forty-three items...... 82 Table 17. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of three factors...... 88 Table 18. Bivariate correlations between MI, RT, ES, other PO scales, religiosity, SWL, and demographic variables...... 94 Table 19. Bivariate correlations between voting Democrat or Republican, demographic variables, and additional measures of political orientation...... 100 Table 20. Bivariate correlations between voting Libertarian and other variables...... 102 Table 21. Descriptive statistics and time taken for individual blocks of scales (N = 386)... 107 Table 22. Bivariate correlations between the Attitude-Based PO subscales, SWL, general, fiscal, and social PO, and demographic variables (N = 363)...... 110 Table 23. Regression analyses predicting general, fiscal, and social PO, and SWL with the Attitude-Based PO subscales...... 111 Table 24. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 1 (n = 53)...... 113 Table 25. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 1 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales...... 114 Table 26. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 2 (n = 57)...... 116 Table 27. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 2 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales...... 116 Table 28. Bivariate correlations between voting behavior and other variables in Block 2, in the sample of participants who voted either Democrat or Republican (n = 43)...... 117 Table 29. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 3 (n = 62)...... 120 Table 30. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 3 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales...... 121 Table 31. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 4 (n = 60)...... 124 Table 32. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 4 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales...... 124 Table 33. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 5 (n = 47)...... 127

Table 34. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 5 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales...... 128 Table 35. Summary of issues sampled in the original 214-item pool of items administered in Studies 2a or 2b...... 137 Table 36. Break-down of participants by political orientation...... 162

List of Figures

Figure 1. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis in Study 2a...... 40 Figure 2. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis in Study 2b...... 64 Figure 3. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis in Study 3...... 81 Figure 4. Two possible models of the relationships between negative emotionality and Masculine Independence...... 144

List of Appendices

Appendix A. The Original Pool of Two Hundred Fourteen Draft ABPO Scale Items...... 177 Appendix B. The One Hundred Forty-Three Items Included in Study 3...... 184 Appendix C. The Final 33-Item ABPO Scale...... 189

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American Conservative Political Orientation: Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness

Overview In political psychology, researchers frequently use brief and general measures of political orientation. However, political orientation is a broad and complex construct that reflects a host of ideological and psychological sources. Indeed, some conservatives’ attitudes and characteristics differ substantially from, or even directly contradict, those of other conservatives. Thus, it is not surprising that many efforts to describe the characteristics of conservative individuals, and outcomes associated with conservative ideology, yield a range of inconsistent or paradoxical findings. There are two main areas in which there are inconsistent findings. First, are conservatives more sensitive to – and avoidant of – negativity than liberals? Second, are conservatives more communal or more independent than liberals? The present studies address these questions by taking a novel approach to measurement. I develop an empirically derived attitude-based measure of political orientation, testing which distinct factors of attitudes are characteristic of conservative ideology. To foreshadow the results, I propose three separable factors, which I label Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness. I describe studies that provide evidence for the utility of this three dimensional structure over unidimensional approaches or bidimensional approaches based on “fiscal” versus “social” conservatism. This measurement tool sheds light on which political attitudes incline conservatives to be communally oriented versus independent, or avoidant of negativity versus emotionally stable and satisfied with life. I begin with a review of relevant areas of political psychology, which has largely operated under a unidimensional model of political ideology. Many studies have aimed to elucidate the individual difference variables and motivational predictors of variance along a single liberalism-to-conservatism continuum. I then discuss studies and ideas which have moved beyond a unidimensional conceptualization of conservatism.

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Do conservatives have stronger negativity bias? To date, many studies and theorists have suggested that there are fundamental differences between liberals and conservatives in how sensitive or attuned they are to negative stimuli. Recently, Hibbing, Smith, & Alford (2014) performed a review of the differences between liberals and conservatives, framing the overarching difference between them as the extent to which they evince negativity bias: although people on average allot greater psychological weight to negative than positive stimuli (e.g. Rozin & Royzman, 2001), conservatives appear to exhibit a more pronounced negativity bias on average. Consistent with this idea, Jost and colleagues presented a model of political conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) in a widely cited meta-analytic paper. They argue that individuals who are more motivated to reduce uncertainty and threat are drawn to two central tenets of conservative ideology, independent of specific political issues which constitute more time-sensitive, peripheral aspects of conservative ideology. These central tenets are acceptance of inequality and preference for stability over change. Jost and colleagues reported that conservatism was correlated with multiple variables related to avoidance of uncertainty and unpredictability, including death anxiety, system instability, dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, lower openness to experience, lower uncertainty tolerance, needs for order, structure, and closure, lower integrative complexity, and fear of threat and loss. Hence, Jost and colleagues suggest that the enduring central tenets of conservative ideology attract individuals who are less tolerant of uncertainty and threat; anxieties aroused by uncertainty and threat are minimized by tolerating inequality and supporting the status quo. A later study demonstrated that variables reflecting uncertainty orientation and threat concerns (e.g. death anxiety, perceptions of terrorism risk) predicted more conservative political orientation and not more liberal orientation (Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007). For example, lower openness to experience, higher needs for order and closure, intolerance of ambiguity, and avoidance of uncertainty were associated with more conservative PO. Mediation analyses confirmed that the association between uncertainty orientation/threat concerns and conservative PO was fully mediated by resistance to change and partially mediated by opposition to equality. These researchers therefore concluded that conservatism – not liberalism, and not extremity on both sides of the spectrum – was related to the tendency to be more attuned to uncertainty and potential threat.

It was therefore proposed that one way for conservatives to alleviate their elevated concerns about threat and uncertainty is to be higher in system justification (SJ) than liberals (Jost et al., 2007). According to this proposition, SJ confers confidence that the status quo is fair and justifiable; the authors note that virtually everyone engages in system justification to some extent, but some more strongly than others. SJ is thought to provide a palliative effect for a sense of uncertainty or dissonance about the current state of affairs or one’s place in it. Interestingly, SJ appeals to participants at all points on the socioeconomic spectrum. However, SJ appears to only have positive effects for the wealthy, because their privileged station in life is justified by their beliefs. For the poor, SJ confers ambivalent effects: they are at once comforted that societal injustices and inequalities are justifiable but also experience a lower sense of self-worth (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). More recently, Hennes, Nam, Stern, and Jost (2012) theorized that all people have existential, epistemic, and relational needs. Existential needs include the desire to reduce uncertainty and distress, epistemic needs involve a need for consistency, certainty, and meaning, and relational needs involve the motivation to manage social relationships and have a shared sense of reality with other people. Hennes and colleagues argue that conservative individuals feel these needs more strongly than liberal individuals. Accordingly, they ask whether any ideological system could address these particular needs comparably to any other and suggest the answer is no; political conservatism addresses these needs more effectively than political liberalism does, because conservatism is a system-justifying ideology. Thus, system justification is said to address conservatives’ epistemic, existential, and relational needs for certainty and predictability particularly well, because it justifies the status quo and reduces uncertainty and dissonance about whether the current state of affairs needs to change. Hennes and colleagues’ (2012) study confirmed that epistemic, existential, and relational needs predicted more support for the Tea Party, less support for the Occupy Wall Street movement, and conservative attitudes on five political issues (including global warming, immigration law, and the Ground Zero mosque). Most relevant to the authors’ hypothesis, the associations between epistemic motives and support/opposition for the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street movement, and more conservative policy attitudes were mediated by economic system justification (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Hennes and colleagues concluded that different ideologies are therefore not interchangeable, even controlling for how extremely or firmly one

4 believes in them. Rather, system-justifying ideologies – such as political conservatism – in particular help address some individuals’ stronger needs to reduce uncertainty and threat, have a shared sense of reality with others, and maintain a sense of meaning in the world. The occurrence of “conservative shifts” in individuals’ PO after fear- or threat-inducing events or primes has further bolstered the idea that conservative ideology addresses people’s uncertainty or anxiety in a way that liberal ideology does not. One study performed by Nail and McGregor (2009) found that participants reported more conservative attitudes (specifically toward George W. Bush and military spending) in the wake of the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks than a comparable sample who had participated in fall of the year 2000. Notably, this conservative shift in political attitudes in light of a threatening national tragedy occurred in participants who self- identified as both liberal and conservative. Thus, in contrast to competing predictions that liberals and conservatives would affirm their respective pre-existing worldviews in the face of threat, Nail and McGregor’s results were consistent with the motivated social cognition model of conservatism (Jost et al., 2003): both liberal- and conservative-identifying individuals became more conservative in the face of threat. Other work (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009, Study 3) corroborated these results; liberal participants primed with a mortality salience threat became as unsupportive of “gay-partner benefits” in the workplace as conservative participants were. Another study found that leaders perceived as stronger and more conservative won by larger margins during times of high societal threat, presumably because periods of high perceived threat were associated with increases in authoritarianism (McCann, 1997). Apparently then, measures of sensitivity to uncertainty and threat do predict higher conservatism, and events which increase the amount of threat or anxiety experienced significantly increase the conservatism of people who identify as either conservative or liberal. Physiological measures have corroborated a link between conservatism and sensitivity to uncertainty and threat as well. One study found that more conservative participants reacted more strongly, according to galvanic skin response and facial electromyography measures, to threatening (but not non-threatening) pictures, and unexpected blasts of noise (Oxley et al., 2008). In this study, conservatism was operationalized as attitudes related to protecting the United States and one’s social unit from threats. Thus, an arguably conservatism-related self- report index was related to higher physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli.

Another study used a different, indirect measure of avoidance of negative or threatening stimuli and found a positive association with conservative PO (this time measured with a 1-item 7-point scale and 13 belief statements). Shook and Fazio (2009) gave participants a learning task, in which they had to play a game to learn (i.e. memorize) which beans were good and which were bad, based on their appearance. The only way to learn whether a bean was good or bad was to approach the bean; if one chose to avoid it, then the nature of the bean remained unknown. Thus, participants could choose how many of the beans they wanted to approach in order to learn their nature. Results demonstrated that more conservative participants approached fewer beans in general than more liberal participants did. Accordingly, conservative participants also exhibited a larger learning asymmetry, such that they memorized the bad beans better than the good beans, to a greater extent than more liberal participants exhibited this learning asymmetry. Hence, conservative participants appeared to be more behaviourally cautious in the face of uncertainty with the possibility of negative outcomes. Studies of moral reasoning have further demonstrated that conservatives are more avoidance-oriented in their moral principles than liberals, who tend to be more morally approach-oriented. For example, conservatives are more concerned with maintaining social order and exercising personal restraint than liberals, who are higher than conservatives in social justice, which is an approach-motivated moral value (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008; Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2008). There is a sizeable literature suggesting that conservatives and liberals also differ in how they tend to perform cognitive tasks. Generally, studies have suggested that conservative thought is more rigid, simplistic, and inclined toward closure and conclusiveness rather than openness (e.g. Jost et al., 2003). For instance, studies have reported that conservatives mentally represent more pronounced cognitive boundaries between categories (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004); the Boundaries Questionnaire (Hartmann, 1991) is a measure which is highly correlated with trait openness and is said to measure the permeability of boundaries, or fluidity, of the mind. According to the findings of Van Hiel and Mervielde (2004), conservatives had more rigidly and definitively delineated opinions about matters such as truth, beauty, peoples, nations, and groups. Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) also hypothesized that the relationship between PO and cognitive rigidity was related to avoidance motivation. They primed participants with non- political avoidance- versus approach-motivating primes and found that avoidance primes made

6 conservatives more cognitively rigid (according to measures of needs for order, closure, and structure, and intolerance of ambiguity), while liberals’ cognitive rigidity was unaffected by approach or avoidance primes. The authors conclude that this is supportive of the idea of self- regulatory differences (i.e. approach vs. avoidance) between conservatives and liberals, which are reflected in their respective cognitive styles. Neural studies have also pointed to structural and functional differences in certain brain areas between conservatives and liberals. Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007) found that more conservative participants evinced less error-related negativity (ERN) on no-go trials during a go/no-go task, and were less accurate than liberals overall. The authors therefore suggest that conservatives may be less open to information that their behaviour needs to change. In other words, conservatives may be less sensitive to information suggesting that they are making an error, and this is reflected at the neural level. Structurally, conservatives have also been found to have more grey matter volume in the amygdala, and less volume in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), than liberals (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011). The authors propose that the lesser volume of ACC suggests that conservatives may be less attuned than liberals to conflict-related information, while the greater amygdala volume could reflect higher sensitivity to threat-related information. Other studies have assessed cognitive capacity and complexity in conservatives and liberals. One study straightforwardly reported that conservatism was negatively related to cognitive ability, according to scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test, Analogies, and Synonyms Vocabulary (Stankov, 2009). Cornelis and Van Hiel (2006) also reported that social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism predicted having a cognitive style oriented toward maintaining simple cognitive structures, such as higher needs for structure, predictability, and closure. Tetlock (1983) analyzed the content of speeches given by conservative, liberal, and moderate senators (15 of each), coding the speeches for integrative complexity (i.e. addressing multiple perspectives and points and integrating multiple points of view). In this study, conservative senators gave speeches with significantly less integrative complexity than liberal and moderate senators; they offered arguments which were simpler in structure, giving clearer arguments about some things being bad and some things being good. The authors point out that this could reflect presentation style as much as, or more than, cognitive style, but their findings would fit with the idea that conservatives are lower in cognitive complexity than liberals.

Other studies have taken an experimental route, inducing lower-effort thought or lowering cognitive capacity and examining effects on PO. A recent series of studies (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012) reported that consumption of alcohol, imposition of cognitive load or time pressure, and instructions to process a message cursorily were all associated with more endorsement of conservative terms and attitudes. The authors concluded that when deliberate thought was disengaged, endorsement of conservative ideology increased. Thus, these studies suggest that conservative ideology and attitudes are more appealing to those who think in more simple, structured, or rigid ways. Hodson (2014) emphasizes the importance of cognitive differences between liberals and conservatives in understanding why conservatives gravitate toward avoidance-oriented protective strategies. Hodson argues that development of non-authoritarian – and therefore more open and integrative – ideas or attitudes is likelier in those with more cognitive skill. Another area of research has focused on a somewhat distinct subset of negative stimuli: disgusting ones. Disgust sensitivity is generally associated with higher neuroticism and conscientiousness, lower openness, and being female (Druschel & Sherman, 1999). Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom (2008) later demonstrated that more conservative PO was related to overall disgust sensitivity (although there was a stronger relationship with purity-related issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage). Here, PO was measured with a 1-item scale of conservatism/liberalism and attitudes toward 10 specific political issues which were identified as important to U.S. residents in a pilot study. Another study found that interpersonal disgust was associated with having negative attitudes toward immigrants, and this association was mediated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO); Hodson & Costello, 2007. These authors argued that disgust is both hierarchy-enhancing, in line with the mediating role of SDO, and avoidance-orienting, in line with the role of RWA. Terrizzi, Shook, and Ventis (2010) presented a theoretical explanation for the conservatism-disgust association: conservative beliefs could be one expression of a behavioural immune system. In other words, beliefs which incline one toward stability over change and avoidance of potential negative outcomes could help one to avoid situations which could be contaminating or dangerous to oneself. In their study, they found that disgust sensitivity was positively related to fundamentalism, RWA, and political attitudes relevant to contamination (e.g. immigration and same-sex marriage).

Thus, multiple studies support the idea that conservative individuals are more sensitive than liberal individuals to stimuli which indicate a threat is, or may be, present. Conservative individuals appear more cautious, avoidant, and reactive than liberals in the face of stimuli which are shocking, aversive, disgusting, or potentially harmful. Jost and colleagues (2003) have advanced a model explaining conservatives’ tendency to justify inequality and favour stability over change as a cognitive motivational solution to their aversion to threat and uncertainty. Many of the aforementioned studies provide direct or indirect evidence for this theory, as does the construal by Hibbing and colleagues (2014) of conservative ideology reflecting a higher-than- normal negativity bias. Despite the picture painted by many political psychology studies of conservatives as easily threatened and avoidant, some studies suggest that conservative ideology is beneficial in ways. Some researchers have suggested that adopting system-justifying beliefs may buffer individuals from threat and uncertainty (e.g. Hennes et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2007), and Van Hiel & De Clercq (2009) found that authoritarianism buffered individuals from the effects of vulnerable personality constellations and negative life events. Corroborating the idea that conservative ideology may in fact have positive effects for people who adopt it is a developing literature suggesting that conservatives are higher in well- being than liberals. Some established non-political predictors of well-being and life satisfaction include neuroticism, conscientiousness, and extraversion, which can account for 32% to 56% of the variance in well-being, depending on the measures of both personality and well-being being used (Hayes & Joseph, 2008). Other predictors include self-esteem, optimism, and personal control, while demographic factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, and income beyond a certain minimum do not generally predict well-being (Myers & Diener, 1995). Conservatives are often found to be slightly but significantly higher than liberals on measures of well-being. Several studies reporting a positive conservatism-well-being association also examined potential mediators or explanatory factors for the difference. These proposed factors include conservatives being higher in socioeconomic status and having more plentiful group memberships (Jetten, Haslam, & Barlow, 2013); conservatives having more transcendent moral beliefs, general belief in fairness, more positive outlook, and higher personal agency (Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012); and conservatives being higher in system justification

(Napier & Jost, 2008). For a variety of proposed reasons, then, conservatives seem to be slightly better off well-being-wise than liberals. The positive association between political conservatism and well-being fits sensibly with the commonly reported absence of a positive conservatism-neuroticism relationship. Because neuroticism is the Big Five trait most closely associated with people’s inclination toward negative affectivity (e.g. DeYoung & Gray, 2009) and emotional volatility (e.g. DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), it is puzzling – given the magnitude of literature supporting the construal of conservatives as more reactive or sensitive to negativity – that there is not a robust positive association between neuroticism and conservatism. Tritt, Inzlicht, and Peterson (2014) and others (e.g. Feldman & Huddy, 2014; Inbar & Pizarro, 2014) have similarly noted the surprising lack of associations between neuroticism and conservatism, if conservatism is indeed associated with general sensitivity to negatively valenced stimuli. Some studies have, in fact, reported significant negative associations between neuroticism and conservatism (e.g. Burton, Plaks, & Peterson, 2015; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010). Higher neuroticism has been associated with stronger support for left- wing parties (Schoen & Schumann, 2007) and valuing individualizing moral foundations, which in turn predict liberalism (Lewis & Bates, 2011). Neuroticism has also been found to be negatively associated with general conservatism (Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, & Richter, 1993), and higher emotional stability with stronger identification with Republicans, higher 1- item conservatism, more approval of George W. Bush, and perceptions of economic fairness (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Addressing this paradox, Hibbing and colleagues (2014) point out that “being more attuned to the dangers of the world does not make for pessimistic, fearful individuals and being less attuned to dangers does not make for carefree, hedonistic individuals” (p. 307). They note that one could be more inclined to notice and respond to negative stimuli without being dispositionally haunted by a heavy behavioural inhibition bias, depressive symptoms, pessimism, or emotional instability. In agreement with this idea, Dodd, Balzer, Jacobs, Gruszczynski, Smith, & Hibbing (2012) found that right-leaning participants did react more strongly physiologically to aversive pictures than did left-leaning participants, and their gaze was more immediately drawn to aversive than appetitive pictures, but they spent more time looking at aversive pictures than liberals did. The authors note that this presents a nuanced exception to previous conclusions

10 about conservatives being fearful, vulnerable, or “easily victimized” (Block & Block, 2006, p. 395, cited in Dodd et al., 2012). Conservatives were more attuned and attentive to aversive stimuli, but spent more time facing them than liberals, whose attention and gaze were directed more toward appetitive than aversive stimuli. Conservatives, Dodd and colleagues say, may be more practiced in adaptive behaviour than liberals are, if liberals are unlikely to attend to threats and aversive stimuli in their environments. Hibbing and colleagues (2014) suggest that their argument for conservatism’s fundamental association with a stronger negativity bias could still be in line with findings that conservatives are no more – and are sometimes less – neurotic than liberals. The authors point to a model of negative affect defined by two axes (Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014): the first axis is defined by constraint, or sensitivity to clear threats in the environment; also referred to as “threat bias” (Hibbing et al., p. 224). The second axis of negative affect in this model is defined by predisposition to experience unpleasant affect more generally, including mistrust and anxiety. Conscientiousness and openness – two traits consistently found to be higher and lower respectively in conservatives – are themselves associated with the constraint axis of negative affect. Neuroticism, on the other hand, would load on the second, more general unpleasant-affect axis. It is this general inclination to experience a broad variety of negative emotions that Hibbing and colleagues argue would be unrelated to conservatism, while conservatives should be, and do appear, higher specifically in threat bias than liberals. Additionally, Onraet and colleagues factor-analyzed threat scales to test whether “threat” is itself a unidimensional construct (Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013) and suggested that it is not. They distinguished between internal threat (including death anxiety, test anxiety, and neurotic anxiety) and external threat (e.g. outgroup threat, threats to society). External threat was more strongly positively related to conservative PO than internal threat was. Furthermore, when controlling for external threat, internal threat was significantly negatively related to right-wing attitudes. Hence, the authors suggest that a threat à conservatism model is too general; a more accurate model might postulate external threat à conservatism, because conservatism does not appear to be related to higher internal threat sensitivity. Hence, it is unclear to what extent, and with which connotations, conservatism is associated with higher fearfulness, avoidance, and sensitivity to uncertainty and threat versus higher well-being and emotional stability. The current studies explore the possibility that

11 conceptualizing and measuring PO in a more nuanced way could allow for more precise understanding of which political attitudes are related to being emotionally stable or psychologically well and which may not be. After all, one might ask why risk- and uncertainty- averse conservative individuals would be opposed to safety nets like public social security and public health care, and staunchly in favour of individuals having ready access to personal firearms. The current work aims to allow factors of political attitudes to empirically distinguish themselves from one another, and explore how distinct factors of PO predict individual difference variables, including those potentially related to negativity bias, such as volatility, withdrawal, and Satisfaction with Life.

Are conservatives more individual-focused or collective-focused? While some researchers have explicitly studied established individual difference variables related to group versus individual dynamics, such as collectivism/individualism (e.g. Cukur, de Guzman, & Carlo, 2004), the majority of studies are of variables which are indirectly relevant to conservatives’ tendency to care more versus less about their own outcomes than others’. Even at the issue level in contemporary political discourse, there is a perceptible paradox in conservatives’ motivation for independence versus communal concern. On one hand, it seems that it is liberals who desire subordination of the self and one’s freedoms for the sake of the collective; liberals are more supportive of social welfare programs, higher taxation, wider government reach, and redistribution of wealth to the disenfranchised, and are more likely to support policies increasing social equality in the collective (e.g. heterosexual voters supporting the legalization of same-sex marriage). Indeed, a common stereotype of conservatives is that they are indifferent to the suffering of others, hard-headed, and pragmatic relative to liberals (Brooks, 2007). On the other hand, conservatives appear concerned with maintaining cultural continuity and purity, espouse traditional family values, and favour military funding and action to protect U.S. citizens. Accordingly, many studies’ conclusions about conservatives’ enduring characteristics suggest that conservatives are in some ways more competitive, independent, unconcerned about others’ welfare or equality (to which I will refer generally with “individual focus”), and dominant than liberals, but in other ways, they are more submissive, cooperative, and concerned about their communities and cultural traditions (to which I will refer generally with “collective focus”).

The first example of such individual difference associates of conservatism lies in social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Both are found to be positively associated with conservative PO, but they are distinct constructs with distinct correlates. Most relevant to the current work, SDO and RWA are both positively associated with conservatism, but they are themselves apparently related to measures of communality and coordination versus independence and dominance in opposite directions: SDO is said to be a social orientation which is favourable toward social hierarchy, involving beliefs that some social groups are inherently and justifiably better than others (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO is associated with low openness to experience and low agreeableness, higher dominance and tough-mindedness (Pratto et al., 1994; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), more prejudiced attitudes (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) and being more politically conservative. RWA is a constellation of authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism/traditionalism, making it, broadly, the submissive counterpart to SDO. RWA is associated with fearfulness and submissiveness, low openness, low conscientiousness, higher prejudice, and being more politically conservative (Akrami & Ekehammar, 2006; Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). While RWA is typically associated with lower agreeableness at the zero-order level, it does not yield an association with agreeableness if one controls for levels of SDO (Akrami & Ekehammar, 2006). Duckitt (2001) studied RWA and SDO and found the two were related but dissociable; together, and independently, they account for much of the variance in racist attitudes. Duckitt also found that RWA in particular involves perceptions of a dangerous world, associated with goals of protecting oneself and one’s social world from threats; RWA was higher among females and religious individuals. SDO by contrast involved a worldview that is competitive and jungle- like, involving goals of achieving superiority, dominance, and power; SDO was higher among males and people who were less religious. In line with the proposal that system justification beliefs can be palliative in the face of threat or uncertainty (Jost et al., 2007), it seems that authoritarian beliefs (more specifically, RWA) can buffer the effects of negative life events or a challenging personality constellation. Van Hiel and De Clercq (2009) found that RWA was negatively associated with depression symptoms and the likelihood of having a d-type personality (being inclined toward negative

13 affect and inhibition of self-expression). They also found an interaction, such that having a d- type personality had more deleterious effects on well-being among people with low levels of authoritarianism; its detrimental effect on mental health appeared to be curbed by higher levels of authoritarianism. Hence, being higher in authoritarianism had the positive effects of both reducing the likelihood of reporting negative life events and having a d-type personality, and of buffering their effects on one’s mental well-being when they were present. Van Hiel and De Clercq suggest that “authoritarian people seem to be especially aware of the stress-inducing potential of negative life events, while at the same time they seem to be better able to cope with the stress provoked by these events” (p. 45). Kessler and Cohrs (2008) have similarly suggested that individuals higher in authoritarianism may be more likely to coordinate and cooperate with others in times of distress, increasing their coping capabilities. Recently, Duckitt and Bizumic (2013) proposed a 3-factor model of Right-Wing Authoritarianism: Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism (ACT). This model has replaced the aforementioned model of RWA which included authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981). Duckitt and Bizumic posited that the three ACT factors correspond to different but related motivational goals or values related to one’s desire for collective security rather than autonomy. Their ACT scales each independently predict variance in general prejudice. The three subscales each comprise 12 items (6 pro-trait and 6 con-trait; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010): Authoritarianism items regard toughness on dissidence, law-breaking, perversion, and crime. Traditionalism items tap old-fashioned values, opposition to experimentation, promiscuousness, and deviation from bible- sanctioned behaviour. Conservatism includes attitudes toward defying, questioning, or confronting authority, versus submitting to and obeying authority. Interestingly, the three subscales of RWA according to Duckitt & Bizumic (2013) are thought to reflect “support…for the subordination of the individual freedom and autonomy to the collective and its authority and hence the motivational goal or value of collective security and cohesion over individual autonomy and self-expression” (p. 843). This would be consistent with findings that conservatives prioritize values of conformity and tradition more than liberals, suggesting that conservatives would indeed be more willing to behave in line with social norms and precedents to maintain harmony and consistency (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010).

In addition to SDO and RWA (or ACT), personality traits have been studied extensively in relation to political orientation. Conceptualizing personality as a three-layer construct, McAdams, Hanek, & Dadabo (2013) discuss differences between liberals and conservatives at the narrative identity level of personality, which is a large part of how one views oneself and one’s life story. In this study, conservatism was measured by standardizing and combining a 1- item measure of PO with measures of RWA and SDO. Participants narrated twelve important scenes from various points in their lives in response to prompts. The researchers found that conservatives’ narratives were significantly more likely to be about life milestones involving feats of self-regulation than self-exploration, in contrast to liberals. The authors concluded that self-regulation is more important to the self-concepts and life stories of conservatives than liberals, who are more oriented toward self-exploration. Block and Block (2006) performed a longitudinal study which gathered teacher-report data on 100 children at ages 3 and 4 years and self-report interview data at age 23 to test whether the descriptions of individuals now identifying as liberal or conservative were different when the individuals were children. These researchers employed a measure comprising a composite of the Kerlinger (1984) Liberalism and Conservatism Scales, McClosky’s (1958) Dimensions of Political Tolerance, and a measure of political activism in order to identify how liberal versus conservative the young adults were. Conservative young adults were more often described, when they were children, in terms such as easily victimized, easily offended, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, constraining of one’s own behaviour, and vulnerable. Liberal young adults had been described as self-reliant, energetic, dominating, expressive, resilient, and having close relationships with others. It is interesting that children who eventually identified as liberal were described as self-reliant and dominating, given that liberalism is negatively associated with SDO. Under the umbrella of Big Five models, conservatives are very often found to be higher in conscientiousness and lower in openness than liberals on self-report measures and behaviourally (e.g. Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010). Agreeableness often yields null or inconsistent associations with conservatism. Some studies have reported that conservatives are higher in one aspect of agreeableness, politeness, and lower in another aspect, compassion (Hirsh et al., 2010; Osborne, Wootton, & Sibley, 2013). This could explain why measures of overall agreeableness would yield null or unreliable associations with conservatism. Alternatively, one could frame the issue in terms of SDO and

RWA, as Osborne and colleagues (2013) did: they found that politeness was positively related to RWA and negatively related to SDO, while compassion was negatively related to SDO only. This further illustrates the potential for overall agreeableness measures to yield inconsistent associations with overall conservatism measures. The agreeableness aspects associated with conservatism itself, or RWA and SDO, also suggest that conservatives are in some ways more cooperative or social (e.g. higher politeness entails being respectful of authority, less pushy, and less likely to take advantage of others or look out for one’s own personal gain) and in other ways less cooperative or social; lower compassion entails less concern with others’ well-being, less care for others’ feelings, and less soft-hearted interest in others’ lives (DeYoung et al., 2007). Extraversion is typically considered, and found to be, unrelated to political orientation. However, it has been found to predict behavioural aspects of political orientation such as political participation (e.g. attending political meetings, displaying political signs or bumper stickers, voter turnout, and speaking on political matters; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). As was discussed earlier, neuroticism, one’s general inclination to experience negative affect (DeYoung & Gray, 2009), is typically found to be unrelated or, in some cases, negatively related to political conservatism. Thus, studies measuring the personality traits which can distinguish more liberal people from more conservative people yield some consistent findings. Most relevant to the question of communality versus independence, conservative PO tends to be associated with higher politeness and RWA, and lower compassion and higher SDO. The former two constructs point to conservative individuals being more willing to play a cooperative role in a system, where the latter two point to conservatives being more competitive, unconcerned with others’ welfare, and dominant. Again, measuring PO itself as a multidimensional construct would allow for the opportunity to better understand which aspects of conservative PO – rather than “conservatism” in general – are associated with cooperation and coordination versus competitive desire for dominance. Other studies, departing from the study of personality traits, also provide interesting findings on conservatives’ communality versus independence. Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci (2008, Study 1) examined the moral motives of conservatives and liberals, using the Moral Motives Scale (Janoff-Bulman, Manning, & Sheikh, 2006). The Self-Reliance motive is an “approach-based orientation that involves providing for

16 the self; the focus is on activation for one’s own advancement and entails industriousness and independence” (p. 1092), and the Social Justice motive is “the approach-based goal...to help others in the community advance” (p. 1092), usually reflecting a willingness to provide support economically and materially for others in society. Conservatism was measured with four items, including self-placement along continua of very conservative or Strong Republican to very liberal or Strong Democrat, and liking of liberals or conservatives (from dislike extremely to like extremely). Conservative individuals were lower in Social Justice motivation than liberals but comparable in Self-Reliance. However, median-split liberals had positively correlated Social Justice and Self-Reliance motivations, while median-split conservatives had negatively correlated Social Justice and Self-Reliance motivations. The authors concluded that liberals care for others in positive association with their care for themselves. On the other hand, it seems that the more conservatives are motivated to further their own interests, the less they are concerned with furthering the interests of others. Janoff-Bulman (2009) notes that the image of conservatives being concerned with their own outcomes more than those of others is not entirely consistent with conclusions drawn by other researchers (e.g. Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007), who have developed a picture of conservatives as more communally oriented than liberals, drawing on a model of five moral foundations in moral reasoning: harm/care and reciprocity/fairness/justice (which are categorized as individualizing moral foundations), and ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect/hierarchy, and purity/sanctity (binding moral foundations). Liberals and conservatives differ in which moral foundations they emphasize: Liberals emphasize the importance of the individualizing foundations and not the binding ones, while conservatives emphasize binding as well as individualizing; liberals are also more willing to behaviourally violate the binding moral foundations than conservatives are (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Thus, conservatives appear to place more value on obedience and duty (i.e. authority/respect/hierarchy) and committing to one’s ingroup (ingroup/loyalty) than liberals do. Accordingly, conservatives are also higher than liberals in Protestant Work Ethic (Feather, 1984) and personal agency, as indicated by measures of personal efficacy, personal responsibility, and conscientiousness (Schlenker, et al., 2012). Schlenker and colleagues suggest that conservatives’ higher value of the binding moral dimensions and accompanying concern for cooperation within the group could manifest in increased concern for people being accountable

17 for their behaviour within the group while also “pursuing their own individual interests to the best of their abilities” (p. 128). Hence, ideas about conservatives’ moral principles do not fit seamlessly with one another; in some ways, they seem more independent and concerned with their own welfare than that of others. From other angles, however, conservatives appear more richly connected to, and concerned about the welfare of, their communities than liberals are. Conclusions drawn on this topic seem to depend largely on how independence versus connectedness is operationalized. Janoff-Bulman (2009) herself ventures that this disparity could have to do with the nature of the “collective” moral principles in the Moral Foundations model (Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007). One could hypothesize that the binding moral foundations are incidentally tapping concern for maintenance of the social order, which conservatives should be higher in, according to prevailing ideas based on the motivated social cognition model of conservatism (Jost et al., 2003). Janoff-Bulman further points out that another study (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) demonstrated that liberals and conservatives were comparable in collectivism-individualism, but conservatives were more supportive of vertical social relationships, where liberals were more supportive of horizontal relationships. Keeping in mind that not all conservatives have the same set of beliefs, it is possible that some aspects of political ideology are associated with independent lack of concern for other people, while other aspects are associated with communality. Conservative and liberal individuals also differ in their values, some of which have to do with communality versus independence. Values constitute beliefs about which goals are desirable to pursue that transcend specifics of situations or individuals (Schwartz, 1992). They constitute motivational guides for one’s own behaviour, and provide standards by which one evaluates the goodness or badness of one’s own and others’ behaviour. The Schwartz model of values includes ten broad value types that have remarkable replicability across time and geographical location (e.g. Schwartz, 2012). The ten value types are organized in a circumplex model, such that some values are more conflicting versus compatible with others, resulting in probabilistic trade-offs. The model is organized along two dimensions: openness-to-experience (e.g. values of stimulation, hedonism, self-direction) versus conservation (e.g. tradition, conformity, security), and self-enhancement (e.g. self-achievement, power) versus self- transcendence (e.g. benevolence, universalism).

Conservatives are generally higher on values of security and conformity (i.e. conservation values), where liberals are higher on values of stimulation and self-direction (i.e. openness-to-experience values), which are probabilistic opposites in the circumplex model. Conservatives are therefore more inclined to positively evaluate action in line with maintenance of harmony, stability, and safety, or behaviour that is in line with social norms. Liberals, on the other hand, would be more approving of behaviour in line with seeking excitement, novelty, and challenge, and of independence in thought and action (Schwartz et al., 2010; Schwartz 2012). In this regard then, liberals appear more oriented toward promotion of one’s self-expression and self-exploration. Additionally, Cohrs and colleagues found that both SDO and RWA were associated with Schwartz values of self-enhancement more than self-transcendence (i.e. conservatives are more concerned with achievement and power while liberals express more universal concern for others; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005). Liberals’ patterns of values alone are quite interesting; they value self-directed exploration, but also have universal concern for those outside of their ingroup. Another study working with the Schwartz Values model found that values fully mediated the effects of personality traits on PO (Caprara, Vecchione, & Schwartz, 2009). Higher openness was associated with higher universalism values (i.e. more valuing of appreciation, tolerance, understanding, and protection of others’ welfare) and lower security values (i.e. less valuing of safety, harmony, and stable relationships in society), which in turn predicted more liberal PO. Higher conscientiousness was associated with higher security values, which in turn predicted more conservative PO. Finally, these researchers noted a role of agreeableness, such that higher agreeableness predicted stronger values for universalism, which in turn predicted liberalism. This study seems to point to an image of liberals as agreeable and benevolently concerned with others’ welfare, while conservatives are characterized primarily by concerns about threat. One study (Cukur et al., 2004) measured the values and collectivism-individualism of participants residing in the United States, the Philippines, and Turkey. The researchers drew on a model defined by two axes: collective-individualist, and horizontal-vertical. Collectivism is associated with viewing oneself as part of a collective/group; individualism involves seeing oneself as autonomous from others. Vertical orientation entails acceptance of hierarchy/inequality, and horizontal orientation entails a desire for equality (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Cukur and colleagues (2004) administered the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism-

Collectivism Scale (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) and the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992). They found that higher values of tradition, conformity, and security – i.e. conservation values, typically associated with conservatism – were associated with vertical collectivism. Individualism was also broadly positively associated with openness-to-experience values (e.g. stimulation, self-direction), which are generally higher in liberals than conservatives. Thus, on a scale explicitly measuring individualism-collectivism, those with conservative patterns of values (although PO was not directly measured in this study) were higher in collectivism than those prioritizing openness-to-experience values such as self-direction. Specifically, conservative patterns of values were associated with viewing oneself as part of a collective in which inequalities and hierarchies are accepted. Another construct strongly correlated with conservative PO is how much one adheres to a religious system of belief, or religiosity (e.g. Burton et al., 2015; Mehrabian, 1996; Schlenker, et al., 2012). Religiosity is in turn associated with a constellation of values (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004). According to Saroglou and colleagues (2004), religiosity is associated with valuing tradition, conformity, and security. Religiosity also predicts lower priority of self- enhancement values and higher priority of self-transcendence values, but only benevolence, not universalism. Thus, people higher in religiosity are more concerned for others closer to oneself (i.e. one’s ingroup) than more distant from oneself (i.e. out-group members and the environment; Schwartz, 2012). Finally, religiosity was associated with less value of stimulation and self- direction, values related to autonomy and openness to change. Thus, conservatism and the related construct of religiosity are both predictive of one valuing goals related to benevolently respecting the past and one’s ingroup, and remaining safe. Liberals’ values seem to prioritize both aspects of independent self-exploration and universal concern for others (including outgroup members). Conservatives’ values, on the other hand, are more characterized by concern for safety and the welfare of one’s ingroup. Conservatives and liberals have interesting patterns of inward and outward concern: Liberals seem more compassionate, benevolent, and universally concerned for others, while also more emphatic of the importance of personal freedom or independence to explore ideas and avenues in life. Conservatives seem relatively uninterested in furthering the interests of others, while also being more concerned about loyalty and protection of the group(s) to which they belong. SDO and RWA are two constructs intimately tied to conservative ideology (and both

20 positively associated with conservatism), but they are themselves oppositely associated with inclinations toward dominance and competitiveness versus submissiveness and desire for protection. The current studies will examine whether a novel measure can help understand which aspects of conservative attitude constellations reflect collective- versus individual-focused concerns.

What is the dimensionality of political ideology? As is reflected in the majority of studies and theories discussed to this point, conservatism is often taken to be sufficiently represented by a 1-factor construct, ranging from more liberal to more conservative. Accordingly, it is typically measured as a 1-factor construct, and there is ample evidence demonstrating the utility and validity of a unidimensional conceptualization of political orientation. For instance, even 1-item measures of unidimensional political orientation can account for the majority of variance in people’s voting behaviour (e.g. Amodio et al., 2007; Jost, 2006). However, there have been concerns that researchers may be misconstruing political orientation by not considering social and economic PO as dissociable constructs and measuring them both (e.g. Everett, 2013; Feldman & Huddy, 2014). It is possible that there are dissociable orientations one has toward social issues (e.g. same-sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty) versus fiscal issues (e.g. taxation, public health care, foreign aid). Relatedly, Robbins and Shields (2014) proposed a dual-factor model of political ideology, in which stronger negativity bias should predict higher social conservatism, while lower empathic concern should predict higher economic conservatism. The following studies are relevant to the dimensionality of political ideology and provide designs and results ranging from suggestive evidence to more direct tests of dimensionality. Ray (1971) developed a scale of social, economic, moral, and political conservatism comprising 28 items. One study found a dissociation between social and economic conservatism such that dogmatism was associated with social but not economic conservatism (Ray, 1973). Johnson and Tamney (2001) created five social traditionalism items and two economic conservatism items and found zero correlation between the two; they also found that dogmatism was positively related to social traditionalism and negatively to economic conservatism, and that education was negatively related to social conservatism and positively to economic

21 conservatism. Hence, their study would suggest a stark dissociation between social and economic conservatism. Crowson (2009) employed a translated version of the Flemish-language Middendorp Cultural and Economic Conservatism Scales (Middendorp, 1978; DeWitte 1990, cited in Cornelis &Van Hiel, 2006) and found that cultural conservatism was related to dogmatism, dogmatic aggression, fear of death, need for cognition, need to evaluate, and need for structure, but economic conservatism was unrelated to these variables at the bivariate level, or when cultural conservatism was controlled for. Crowson also found that one could account for 50% of the variance in cultural conservatism with the above predictors but only 7% of the variance in economic conservatism, which was significantly related only to stronger beliefs that knowledge is certain. Crowson concluded that those high in cultural conservatism may be “psychologically different” from those higher in economic conservatism (p. 459). Another study noted cultural differences in the correlates of social and economic conservatism (Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003): in a Belgian sample, cultural and economic conservatism were both associated with higher need for closure, while in a Polish sample, cultural conservatism was associated with higher need for closure, and economic with lower need for closure. Zumbrunnen and Gangl (2008) created two questionnaire items targeting cultural conservatism, three for market conservatism, and one for desire for a small government, which they factor analyzed and interpreted two factors, cultural and economic conservatism. These factors were not significantly correlated. Cornelis and Van Hiel (2006) used a scale with twelve items each for cultural and economic conservatism (DeWitte, 1990), also measuring simplicity of cognitive structures (e.g. desire for order, predictability, need for closure), RWA and SDO. In this study, RWA predicted cultural, but not economic, conservatism, and SDO predicted economic, but not cultural, conservatism. Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci (2008) measured attitudes on ten political issues and factor analyzed responses, concluding that the attitudes formed two factors which appeared to be economic and social issues. In sum, these studies, which employed items designed to tap either social or economic conservatism, seem to suggest overall that social and economic conservatism may both exist as constructs, and that they appear to be weakly correlated, if at all. Hence, these studies together would support the notion that the field should consider dimensions of social and economic conservatism in order to more fully understand political orientation.

Another clue pointing to a dissociation between social and economic political orientation is the existence of libertarianism, and people who self-identify as such. When asked about the way they self-identify and what their social versus economic PO was, 10-15% of Americans identified as libertarian, and up to 44% agreed that they felt they were fiscally conservative and socially liberal (the combination of positions generally taken to define libertarianism); Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, and Haidt, 2010. According to this study, libertarians are: lower than liberals and conservatives in agreeableness, conscientiousness, and extraversion; higher than conservatives, and similar to liberals, in openness; and, similar to conservatives, lower than liberals in neuroticism. Libertarians are characterized by espousing individual liberty as the most important moral principle, and endorse most other moral principles more weakly than liberals and conservatives do. They also report feeling less connected to their family members, community, partners, friends, nations, and humanity at large, and also have significantly lower Satisfaction with Life than conservatives and liberals. The authors suggest that libertarians are less emotional and more cerebral than conservatives and liberals. That libertarians appear to be an identifiable group with characteristics that distinguish them from both liberals and conservatives suggests that it is indeed, on the surface, possible to be socially liberal and fiscally conservative. Gerber and colleagues (2010) reported results suggesting that economic and social PO, measured using brief, targeted economic versus social scales, were separate enough to have fully distinct associations with trait agreeableness. The authors used social survey data which had measured “self-reported ideology” (p. 118) on a scale from to 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative), as well as “economic policy opinions,” with one item measuring attitudes toward each of government-funded health care and increasing taxation on high-income earners, and “social policy opinions,” with one item for each of abortion and civil unions. The authors found that all three measures of conservatism were associated with both higher conscientiousness and lower openness. However, higher agreeableness predicted more liberal economic attitudes and more conservative economic attitudes. The authors conclude that previous studies’ finding null associations between agreeableness and conservatism could be due to the oppositely valenced associations between agreeableness and social versus economic conservatism. Another study took a different approach from using targeted items or questionnaires, instead performing a principal components analysis on the opinions of German participants on

162 political issues (Riemann et al., 1993). The authors interpreted four factors: general conservatism and preference for authoritarian punitiveness; social welfare and women’s equality; liberalism and affirmation of technological progress; and affirmation of increases in taxes for protection of the environment and development of Eastern Europe. It is notable that these factors neither constitute a duo nor a cleanly identifiable cultural/social versus economic/fiscal dissociation. It seems possible, then, that the underlying structure of political attitudes is more complex than social versus economic issues. Similarly, Verhulst, Eaves, & Hatemi (2012) performed a principal components analysis on the Wilson-Patterson (1968) measure of political attitudes. They found evidence for three dimensions: social attitudes (including attitudes toward abortion and gay rights), economic attitudes (including attitudes toward foreign aid and federal housing), and defense/military attitudes (including attitudes toward the draft and military drill). They concluded that these results reflect dimensions of social, fiscal, and foreign policy sub-areas of American political ideology. Hence, they did find evidence for a social/fiscal distinction, but also for a meaningful dimension outside of fiscal and social issues. Another study by Henningham (1996) described the development of a 12-item social conservatism scale, which had a correlation of .41 with Henningham’s unpublished economic conservatism scale. Carney and colleagues ran one study which included 1-item measures for each of general PO, social PO, and fiscal PO (Carney et al., 2008); they found that general PO had a correlation of .74 with social, .63 with fiscal, and that social and fiscal were significantly correlated with each other, with a correlation of .32. Finally, Henningham derived the aforementioned 12-item social conservatism scale by factor analyzing 27 items. They interpreted six factors in these items: general conservatism; traditional morality; punitiveness; ethnocentrism; nationalism; and religion. These studies together suggest that, as one measures more political attitudes or issues, the factor structure underlying them becomes more complex. Additionally, the RWA-SDO approach to political ideology constitutes a bidimensional model of political ideology (e.g. Duckitt, 2001): under this model, some conservatives are motivated more out of fear and avoidance, wanting security from uncertainty and negativity (RWA), where others are motivated more by a competitive and social-hierarchical worldview (SDO). Indeed, RWA is found to be more closely associated with social than economic PO, and vice versa for SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).

A recent and overt test of the nature of the social-economic PO relationship involved the development of a Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS; Everett, 2013). The author argued that a given individual could be any combination of high or low in social and economic conservatism. After having 48 participants each write 10 issues that they thought were important to politics, the author created 14 issue-based items, 2 of which were dropped (taxation and immigration) on account of having the lowest inter-item correlations. Hence, 12 items remained, which were presented in a catch-phrase style (i.e. a straightforward statement of a political issue, such as abortion) and responded to on feeling thermometers. The 12 items were factor analyzed, and Everett interpreted two factors: the first included abortion, the family unit, religion, traditional marriage, traditional values, patriotism, and military and national security. It is noteworthy that patriotism and military and national security were initially in a third factor, which was not interpreted due to having fewer than three items. The second factor included fiscal responsibility, business, limited government, welfare, and gun ownership. These factors were interpreted as social PO in the first factor and economic in the second; the factors had a correlation of .55 with each other. Everett additionally measured conservatism on a 1-item scale, RWA, SDO, resistance to change, prejudice, dogmatism, system justification, and fair market ideology. Both of his subscales (Social and Economic) correlated with these scales in the same directions; there were no dissociations between the two correlating with any of these variables in either significance or direction (although there were differences in magnitude of the correlations in the .2 range). Although Everett’s scale is meant to assess two dimensions of political ideology (social and economic), it is unclear whether these two dimensions provide the best model of political ideology in the United States. For instance, some items, such as military and national security and limited government, also arguably involve both social and economic issues, making their inclusion in one factor or another hard to interpret with regard to whether the factor really represents social versus economic conservatism. The two derived factors also had a correlation of .55 with each other, and had the same general nature of relationship to every correlate tested. Overall, this scale needs to be employed in more studies and compared to other models of PO more extensively in order to assess whether it indeed reflects a meaningful distinction between social and economic PO, and if those are valid constructs.

Recently, Feldman and Johnston (2014) analyzed social survey data (American National Elections Studies from 2000, 2004, and 2006) to test the utility of unidimensional models of political ideology. From the political issues with data available on them, Feldman and Johnston selected issues related to social and economic realms, excluding those having to do with foreign affairs, immigration, or race; they note that their aim was not to model all the complexity of political ideology, but to test whether a non-unidimensional model would better account for people’s attitudes than a unidimensional one. Economic issues were government spending, government medical insurance, ensuring all have adequate living standards and employment, and federal spending on the poor. Social issues were abortion, same-sex couples adopting children, and the role of women in government and business. The authors also analyzed data on demographic variables and, for 2004 and 2006, “egalitarianism, authoritarianism, religiosity, need for cognition, and need for cognitive closure” (p. 343). The first main finding was that the data were modeled much more closely by a 2-factor (one social and one economic) than a 1-factor solution. Second, the social and economic factors had some different covariates: social conservatism was associated with measures of conservatism, need for cognition, and religiosity, but economic conservatism was associated with none of those variables. Further, economic conservatism was significantly negatively associated with need for closure (in year 2000 data), which was itself positively associated with social conservatism. To further test whether a unidimensional model would out-perform a bidimensional model, Feldman and Johnston (2014) separately modeled the attitudes of people with low political sophistication (i.e. low knowledge of political matters) from those with higher political sophistication. A unidimensional model was not a good fit for the attitudes of either of these subsamples, but the correlation between social and economic attitudes was significantly higher among those with higher political sophistication. Finally, the authors performed latent class analysis, identifying six groups of participants with similar patterns of attitudes. Only about 40% of participants fell into classes which could be labeled as traditionally conceptualized liberals and conservatives; the four other classes had different patterns of attitudes along the social and economic factors. Accordingly, Haidt, Graham, and Joseph (2009) used data in which over 20 000 U.S. residents had completed their Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) to test which groups

26 would be defined by scores on the MFQ in cluster analyses. The authors ultimately interpreted four clusters, which they referred to as secular liberals, libertarians, the religious left, and social conservatives. They pointed out that only the secular liberals and social conservatives fit the expected two-group outcome based on a unidimensional model of PO. Further, the remaining two clusters, libertarians and the religious left, do not constitute “moderate” groups which would define points between the poles of a unidimensional liberalism-conservatism construct. The authors suggest that, instead, their “four-square” clustering of participants by MFQ scores points to their different views along two axes defined by high or low individualizing or binding concerns (for instance, libertarians are relatively low in both individualizing and binding concerns, and the religious left are relatively high in both). Thus, their results also point to an at- least bidimensional construal of PO having more potential to model the realistic complexities of PO than a unidimensional one. In sum, multiple studies have found evidence of more than one dimension of political ideology – some by directly testing this possibility, and some indirectly. Some studies have been taken to support a fiscal-social bidimensional model of PO, while others indicate the possibility of more than two dimensions, or two dimensions defined by different theoretical axes. In Feldman and Johnston’s (2014) concluding remarks, they note that there is indeed more heterogeneity in people’s political ideology than has been previously modeled; individuals who identify as overall conservative can have quite different patterns of attitudes from one another, as can individuals who identify as overall liberal. They further note that “advances in understanding political ideology will depend on an empirically supported conceptualization of the construct” (p. 345).

The current research The fundamental idea behind the current studies builds upon the conclusions of Feldman and Johnston (2014): not all conservatives are alike, and an empirically derived, in-depth measure of political ideology could confer incremental understanding of conservatism and liberalism. While measures of unidimensional PO can account for ample variance in voting behaviour and related variables, there is substantial variety in the attitude constellations of people who identify as overall conservative (or liberal). In particular, questions related to whether conservatives have stronger negativity bias than liberals, and whether they are more independent

27 or collective than liberals, could benefit from a more nuanced measure. A finer-grained measure of key dimensions of political attitudes could begin to provide clearer, more precise answers to these questions, as well as allow for further modeling of libertarian ideology. The current studies involve the development of a novel, three-dimensional measure of political orientation. My approach is most similar to that of Riemann and colleagues (1993), who factor analyzed 162 political opinion items, interpreting a 4-factor solution. However, given that this paper was published 23 years ago and was developed using a German population, there remains a need for a measure reflecting contemporary patterns of attitudes in a United States population. Similarly, Everett (2013) factor analyzed multiple attitudinal items, albeit only 12 items, which seemed to suggest a 2-factor solution. Feldman and Johnston (2014) also factor analyzed multiple items, although they themselves explained that they were not aiming to sample the domain of political ideology comprehensively. With recognition that sampling this domain comprehensively would be a monumental task, I take an empirical approach to measuring the domain of PO more comprehensively than has been done previously. I begin with a critical examination of the association between SWL and unidimensional PO (Study 1), followed by four studies (Studies 2a, 2b, 3, and 4) beginning with a pool of 214 issue-based attitudinal items and ending with the derivation of a 33-item scale of three related but distinct factors of political ideology: Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness. Throughout, I compare the questionnaire’s three subscales to a 3-item measure of general (i.e. unidimensional) conservatism (referred to as General PO), and 1-item measures of fiscal and social conservatism. In exploring the individual difference predictors of each subscale, I test which factors of political orientation are more and less related to previously established predictors, including Satisfaction with Life, neuroticism/emotional stability, RWA, SDO, disgust sensitivity, religiosity, and masculinity/femininity; in many cases, some aspect(s) of conservative PO are associated significantly with a given variable, while the other(s) have null or oppositely valenced associations. Ultimately, these studies provide some clarification of the dimensionality of political ideology in the United States, the associations between political conservatism and negativity bias, and the association between PO and individual- versus collective-focus. Together, the three subscales seem to broadly sample the domain of political ideology and account for variance in relevant outcomes which other measures do not.

Study 1

Several studies have reported that Republicans, or individuals identifying as more conservative, are happier than Democrats or liberals (e.g. Jetten et al., 2013; Napier & Jost, 2008; Onraet et al., 2013; Schlenker et al., 2012; Taylor, Funk, & Craighill, 2006). Factors implicated in mediating this association include system justification (beliefs that the status quo and associated inequalities are acceptable; Napier & Jost, 2008), conservatives’ higher socioeconomic status and more extensive social networks (Jetten et al., 2013), and conservatives’ higher personal agency, more positive outlook, and more transcendent moral beliefs than liberals (Schlenker et al., 2012). Study 1 therefore tested whether a positive association between general PO and well-being would replicate, and whether that association would hold when controlling for other variables which are robustly associated with both happiness and PO. Specifically, Study 1 focuses on the differences between liberals and conservatives in personality traits. As was previously discussed, conservatives are found – in some studies – to be lower in neuroticism than liberals (Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Verhulst et al., 2012), and neuroticism is itself robustly negatively associated with Satisfaction with Life (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Vittersø & Nilsen, 2002). Thus, neuroticism presents a potential and previously unexplored mediator of the PO-SWL association. Hence, in Study 1, I used a comprehensive measure of the Big Five traits, the Big Five Aspect Scale (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007) and used the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985) as an index of well-being in order to examine how related – if at all – general PO would be to well-being when the Big Five traits were controlled for. Previous studies have also yielded contradictory findings regarding the role of system justification in explaining the association between measures of well-being and political identification (e.g. Jetten et al., 2013; Napier & Jost, 2008). Thus, I included Kay and Jost’s (2003) System Justification Scale to clarify the role of system justification (SJ) in explaining the conservative-liberal happiness gap, relative to personality traits (specifically neuroticism), demographic characteristics, and the logarithm of income (in line with recent recommendations for examining the association between well-being and income; see, for example, Kahneman & Deaton, 2010).

Method 1402 participants from the United States took part on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Participants indicated their household income in $5 000 increments ranging from $10 000 or under to $200 000 or over (M = $45 001-$50 000) and then completed the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Cronbach’s α = .91), the BFAS (Cronbach’s αs between = .88 and .94), a 3-item measure of conservatism, measured with a General PO scale (I find that my viewpoint on things tends to be very liberal; In general I consider myself to be a very conservative person; I consider my political views to be...; Cronbach’s α = .93), and the complete 8-item System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003; Cronbach’s α = .83); see Table 1 for descriptive statistics. Before running any analyses, I removed participants who did not complete either, or both of, the SWLS and the General PO scale, 2 participants with Indian IP addresses, and 17 who took 4 minutes or less to complete the study (5 minutes was in the 5th percentile of time taken; M = 10.5 minutes, SD = 5.3 minutes, range = 2 to 46 minutes), 700 remained (334 male; Mage = 33 years, SD = 12).

Results Conservatism had a small but significant positive correlation with SWL (r(698) = .08, p = .04); see Table 2 for all bivariate correlations. I then proceeded with analyses to test the nature of this General PO-SWL association, controlling for other variables.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables in Study 1 (N = 700)

Study 1 (N=700) Mean SD 1. Conservatism (General PO scale, 1 to 7) 3.35 1.77 2. Satisfaction with Life (1 to 7) 4.26 1.54 3. Extraversion (1 to 5) 3.29 .66 4. Agreeableness (1 to 5) 3.92 .58 5. Conscientiousness (1 to 5) 3.47 .62 6. Neuroticism (1 to 5) 2.67 .80 7. Openness (1 to 5) 3.89 .57 8. System Justification (1 to 9) 4.29 1.54

Table 2. Correlation matrix for Study 1 (N = 700)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1. Conservatism .08* .17** -.03 -.11** -.27** .01 -.08* .18** .16** .29**

2. SWL .29** .11** -.38** .02 .34** .09* 0 .31** .28**

3. Conscientiousness .27** -.40** .13 .32** .09* .18** .15* .17**

4. Agreeableness -.15** .33** .22** .32** .16** .01 -.02

5. Neuroticism -.14** -.42** .14** -.22** -.11** -.26**

6. Openness .38** .11* .01 -.08 -.21**

7. Extraversion .05 .06 .11** .10**

8. Gender .06 0 -.06

9. Age .10* .14**

10. Log Income .17**

11. System Justification Note. Gender was coded such that male = -1 and female = 1; * denotes p < .05, and ** denotes p < .01.

Conservatism, SWL, the Big Five, income, and system justification.

The following quoted section is as published in Burton, Plaks, and Peterson (2015, Study 2). Next, I “conducted a hierarchical regression predicting SWL with conservatism in block 1, basic demographic characteristics (i.e. age and gender) in block 2, variables previously implicated in explaining the conservatism-SWL association (i.e. system justification and the logarithm of income) in block 3, and the Big Five traits in block 4. In this analysis, three participants had standardized residuals more than three standard deviations away from the mean and were excluded from the regression analysis. In the model (R2 = .02, F(3, 563) = 3.16, p = .02) controlling for age (β = .00, p = .99) and gender (β = .10, p = .02), conservatism still predicted SWL (β = .09, p = .03). In the next model (R2 = .18, F(5, 561) = 23.23, p < .001), which included system justification and the logarithm of income, conservatism was no longer a significant predictor of SWL (β = -.02, p = .63). SWL was related to gender (β = .10, p = .01), the logarithm of income (β = .29, p < .001), and system justification (β = .25, p < .001), but not age (β = -.05, p = .24). In the final model (R2 = .34, F(10, 556) = 27.88, p < .001), which added the Big Five traits, conservatism was again not a significant predictor of SWL (β = -.04, p = .32), but SWL was associated with age (β = -.13, p = .001), gender (β = .14, p < .001), system justification (β = .15, p < .001), and the logarithm of income (β = .25, p < .001). Among the Big Five traits, significant predictors of SWL were neuroticism (β = -.31, p < .001), extraversion (β = .20, p < .001), and openness (β = -.12, p = .004); SWL was not associated with agreeableness (β = .02, p = .57) nor conscientiousness (β = .05, p = .25). In order to test which variables could individually account for the shared variance between conservatism and SWL, [I] ran partial correlations between conservatism and SWL, controlling for single variables. The control variables selected were those correlated with both conservatism and SWL in the same direction: neuroticism, conscientiousness, the logarithm of income, and system justification. The SWL-PO association was rendered non-significant when controlling for any of the following: neuroticism (r(697) = .04, p = .32), conscientiousness (r(697) = .03, p = .41), the logarithm of income (r(582) = .03, p = .45), or system justification (r(697) = .01, p = .88).”

Discussion The most interesting finding of Study 1, with data drawn from 700 U.S. residents, is the small but significant negative correlation between conservatism (measured with a 3-item measure of General PO) and neuroticism, which can account for the association between conservatism and happiness. Neuroticism is itself associated with general predisposition to experience negative affect (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003), lower relationship quality (Karney & Bradbury, 1995), and other measures of well-being (Costa & McCrae, 1980). Thus, it is sensible that a negative association between conservatism and neuroticism could account for the happiness gap between conservatives and liberals. Neuroticism as an explanatory factor for the positive conservatism-SWL correlation is in line with the positive-adjustment explanation espoused by Schlenker and colleagues (2012), who themselves linked conservatism to higher personal agency, more transcendent moral beliefs, and more positive outlook and found that indices of these positive adjustment factors could also account for the conservatism-happiness correlation. Overall, Study 1 suggests a positive link between SWL and conservatism, construed as a unidimensional construct and measured in a brief and general way. However, this effect was not robust enough to remain when controlling for a number other individual variables. Furthermore, the association between neuroticism (or emotional stability) and political orientation should be afforded more attention. The next study steps away from measuring PO as a unidimensional and general construct and measures attitudes toward a large sample of politically relevant issues. I accordingly test how various political attitudes are related to one another, and whether they may have different associations with relevant individual difference variables, including SWL.

Study 2a

Studies 2a and 2b were undertaken to explore whether measuring conservatism-liberalism as a unidimensional construct (as with the General PO scale used in Study 1) occludes the nature of some effects and relationships between PO and other variables. In other words, keeping in mind the overarching proposition that not all conservatives are the same, one could ask: which conservatives are happier than liberals? And, perhaps as importantly, which conservatives are happier than other conservatives?

In order to address this question, I designed a pool of 214 scale items to assess people’s attitudes toward a large sample of politically relevant issues. It is advisable in the first stages of scale development to generate a large number of items when sampling a multifaceted domain, and to obtain large samples of participants (Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003). Items were therefore aimed at tapping a multitude of issues mentioned in contemporary political discourse and lay conceptualizations of conservative ideology (for all items, see Appendix A), many of which have been included in previous studies of political issues (e.g. Everett, 2013; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Inbar et al., 2008; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Verhulst et al., 2012). I aimed to design at least three items tapping each issue, broadly construed, including a mix of forward-coded and reverse-coded items. To diversify the sample of U.S. residents and provide a more rigorous test of the political issues’ sampling of the domain of political orientation, I randomly divided the 214-item pool of items in two. This also allowed me to present a more reasonable number of items to participants in each sample, in order to reduce the impact of fatigue or irritation on participants’ responding. The first set of 107 items was employed in Study 2a and the second in Study 2b. This allowed us to test how the issues sort themselves out in both samples, according to which issues tend to be similarly evaluated, what the issues’ interrelationships suggest about underlying factors in political orientation, and how different subsets of issues predict variables like General PO and SWL. For instance, it is possible that some aspects of conservative PO are associated with higher SWL and some with lower. If this is the case, then measuring PO in a finer-grained way could help dissect the replicable, significant, small, and easily-accounted-for association between General PO and SWL. Studies 2a and 2b allowed us to address another main question regarding fiscal and social conservatism: If people are asked about their political attitudes on multiple issues and the associations among those attitudes are tested empirically, will the issues sort themselves out into fiscal versus social issues and attitudes, or would another model explain political attitudes’ interrelationships better than a fiscal versus social model? Studies 2a and 2b also introduced straightforward 1-item measures for each of participants’ self-reported fiscal/economic and social PO, from very liberal to very conservative. This allowed us to additionally test how participants’ specific attitudes, or factors of attitudes, would relate to explicitly requested reports of their economic versus social PO.

Method 863 United States community members were recruited to take part in an online survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform for compensation of $0.53. As in Study 1, variables considered during data preparation included IP address and times and dates on which participation was started and ended, allowing us to calculate the number of minutes taken from start to completion. Participants were trimmed before running any further analyses, in the manner described below: Ten participants were removed for having duplicate IP addresses and matching demographic information (in these cases, the second study completion was removed according to the dates and times of completion), 2 participants were removed for participating from Indian IP addresses, and 2 more were removed for entering the same answer to every item in the study. Next, 165 participants were removed for having incalculable time taken on the survey, indicating that they had canceled completion of the survey at some point during their participation.

After the above data preparation, 684 participants remained (297 male, 4 unreported; Mage = 32 years, SD = 12). In the next analysis, I calculated the 5th percentile for minutes taken. Thirteen minutes was in the 5th percentile (M = 32 minutes, SD = 57; range = 7 to 1154). In all subsequent analyses, 22 participants who took fewer than 13 minutes were excluded; all other participants were included unless specified otherwise.

After excluding these participants, 662 remained (283 male, 4 unreported; Mage = 32 years, SD = 12). Participants started by completing demographic information including ethnicity, religious affiliation, gender, age, and gross household income (in $5 000 increments ranging from $10 000 or under to $150 001 or over; Mincome = $45 001 - $50 000). Participants also completed a scale measuring religiosity (4 items on a 9-point Likert scale, M = 4.19, SD = 2.61; Cohen & Rankin, 2004), Disgust Sensitivity Scale-Revised (M = 3.06, SD = .66; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Olatunji et al., 2007), General PO (3 items on a 7-point Likert scale, M = 3.23, SD = 1.60), Satisfaction with Life (M = 4.15, SD = 1.53; Diener et al., 1985), and responded to the first pool of 107 items (on 7-point Likert scale) assessing their attitudes toward a variety of political issues. Next, participants completed the Big Five Aspect Scale (100 items, with a 5-point Likert scale; DeYoung et al., 2007). Finally, participants indicated their fiscal and social political orientation (Overall, with regard to fiscal/economic [social] policy, I would call myself:, on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 =

35 very liberal to 7 = very conservative. I also provided an 8th option for I don’t know; these responses were deleted so as to be excluded from analyses including these variables; Mfiscal =

3.76, SD = 1.74, Msocial = 2.86, SD = 1.73).

Results

Political orientation and Satisfaction with Life.

General political orientation and Satisfaction with Life.

General conservatism was positively correlated with Satisfaction with Life (SWL; r(651) = .11, p = .004). This correlation held in a regression controlling for age and gender in block 2 and the logarithm of gross household income in block 3; R2 = .07, F(4, 589) = 11.00, p < .001. In this model, SWL was significantly related to conservatism (β = .12, p = .003), gender (β = .11, p = .01), and income (β = .21, p < .001), but not age (β = -.06, p = .15). Bivariate correlations between the variables in Study 2a are displayed in Table 3. Next, I predicted SWL with conservatism in block 1, gender and income in block 2, and the Big Five personality traits in block 3. One participant had a standardized residual 3.57 standard deviations below the mean for this analysis and was excluded. In the final model (R2 = .25, F(8, 432) = 18.43, p < .001), SWL was marginally significantly related to general conservatism (β = .09, p = .06), gender (β = .14, p = .002), log income (β = .21, p < .001), neuroticism (β = -.30, p < .001), openness (β = -.09, p = .05), and extraversion (β = .21, p < .001). Agreeableness and conscientiousness were unrelated to SWL (both |β|s < .02, ps > .72). I repeated this analysis with the Big Five entering stepwise (the same participant had a standardized residual of -3.66 and was excluded from this analysis as well). In the final model (R2 = .25, F(5, 435) = 28.63, p < .001), SWL was related to conservatism (β = .11, p = .01), gender (β = .15, p = .001), log income (β = .21, p < .001), extraversion (β = .18, p < .001), and neuroticism (β = -.30, p < .001). Thus, in this study, the PO-SWL association remained when controlling for the Big Five traits, age, gender, and income.

General PO, religiosity, and SWL.

To investigate the nature of the relationship between conservatism, religiosity, and SWL, I ran a regression, including all participants, predicting SWL with General PO in block 1 and religiosity in block 2. Religiosity produced a significant change in the model (ΔR2 = .04, p <

.001); model R2 = .05, F(2, 650) = 17.59, p < .001. In this model, SWL was related to religiosity (β = .21, p < .001), but not general conservatism (β = .03, p = .47). Hence, general conservatism had a small but significant positive association with SWL in this large sample. This association held controlling for neuroticism, extraversion, age, gender, and income. However, this conservatism-SWL association was much attenuated and rendered non-significant by controlling for religiosity. I repeated the above analysis, entering fiscal conservatism in block 1 rather than general conservatism: in the first step, SWL was related to fiscal conservatism (β = .09, p = .02). Religiosity produced a significant change in the model (ΔR2 = .05, p < .001); model R2 = .05, F(2, 638) = 17.85, p < .001. In this model, SWL was again related to religiosity (β = .22, p < .001), but not fiscal conservatism (β = .05, p = .20). Finally, I repeated the above analysis, entering social conservatism in block 1: in the first step, SWL was related to social conservatism (β = .08, p = .04). Religiosity produced a significant change in the model (ΔR2 = .04, p < .001); model R2 = .05, F(2, 656) = 17.21, p < .001. In this model, SWL was related to religiosity (β = .23, p < .001), but not social conservatism (β = -.02, p = .68). Thus, accounting for religiosity rendered the associations between SWL and the three “types” of conservatism that I measured (general, social, and fiscal) non-significant and close to zero. Religiosity may therefore present a straightforward explanation for the apparent association between general conservatism and Satisfaction with Life, because conservatives are more religious than liberals on average and religiosity is itself related to SWL.

Social versus fiscal political orientation.

As a first step, I predicted fiscal PO with social PO (R2 = .32, F(1, 636) = 303.36, p < .001). There were 7 participants with standardized residuals more than 3 standard deviations above the mean and 2 participants with residuals more than 3 standard deviations below the mean. When these 9 participants were excluded from analyses, the model changed slightly (R2 = .39, F(1, 627) = 402.40, p < .001). These participants were excluded from subsequent analyses in this section.

Predicting fiscal and social political orientation.

The next analyses tested which variables, if any, the 1-item measures of social and fiscal PO would be associated with, over and above general PO, and whether they would have any distinct predictors.

Table 3. Bivariate correlations between general, fiscal, and social PO, SWL, demographics, Big Five traits, and overall disgust

Fiscal Social SWL Relig Gender Age Log N A C E O Disgust PO PO $ Overall Gen PO .76*** .80*** .11** .39*** -.09* .17*** .10* -.02 .01 .17*** -.06 -.25*** .13***

Fiscal PO .57*** .09* .19*** -.11** .14*** .17*** -.03 -.09* .09* -.06 -.19*** -.04

Social PO .08* .43*** -.06 .22*** .06 -.05 .05 .15*** 0 -.25*** .11**

SWL .22*** .10** -.01 .23*** -.40*** .06 .23*** .33*** .08* -.04

Religiosity .12** .24** .08* -.10** .26** .18** .12** -.03 .23***

Gender .03 -.01 .13** .31*** .05 .05 .04 .30***

Age .11** -.15** .13*** .17*** 0 0 .09*

Log $ -.05 -.11** .05 .05 -.04 .06

N -.10* -.36*** -.44*** -.25*** .13***

A .16*** .13** .28*** .18***

C .35*** .08* .18***

E .38*** -.04

O -.13***

Note. * Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01 *** denotes p ≤ .001. Gen PO = general conservatism; N = neuroticism; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; E = extraversion; O = openness.

In a linear regression, I predicted 1-item fiscal PO with its significant bivariate correlates entered simultaneously (general PO, conscientiousness, openness, gender, age, log income, and religiosity); see Table 3. Two participants had |standardized residuals| more than 3 and were excluded from this analysis, in addition to the 9 participants excluded above. The final model explained most of the variance in fiscal PO (R2 = .62, F(7, 487) = 114.89, p < .001), with fiscal conservatism significantly related to general conservatism (β = .81, p < .001), income (β = .14, p < .001), and religiosity (β = -.09, p = .01); all other |β|s <.04, ps > .18. Results were unchanged if these predictors entered stepwise. Hence, fiscal conservatism, according to a 1-item self-report measure, appears to be very strongly related to higher general conservatism, higher income, and less religiosity. I then ran a regression predicting social PO with its significant bivariate correlates (general PO, religiosity, conscientiousness, openness, overall disgust sensitivity, and age), excluding from the regression the 9 outlying participants from above. In this regression, 7 more participants had |standardized residuals| more than 3 and were excluded from this analysis. As with fiscal PO, the final model explained most of the variance in social PO (R2 = .80, F(6, 528) = 346.17, p < .001), with social conservatism significantly related to general conservatism (β = .81, p < .001), age (β = .05, p = .02), religiosity (β = .13, p < .001), and openness (β = -.06, p = .002); conscientiousness and disgust sensitivity were not significant predictors (|β|s <.02, ps > .44). Again, results were virtually unchanged by entering predictors stepwise. Thus, both 1-item social and 1-item fiscal conservatism were very highly correlated with general conservatism. Fiscal PO was further predicted by household income (positively) and religiosity (negatively). Social PO was further predicted by age and religiosity (positively), and openness (negatively). Thus, social and fiscal PO both had some minor and unique predictors over and above general PO. Most interestingly, religiosity was related to fiscal and social PO in opposite directions, such that religious people were more socially conservative and less fiscally conservative. To be clear, however, both fiscal and social conservatism were far more strongly related to general conservatism than they were to any additional predictors; they provided very small, albeit significant improvements to a model which includes general conservatism.

Political attitudes.

I first ran an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) guided by resources on best principles for EFA (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The item-to-participant ratio of approximately 6:1 is within recommended ranges (e.g. Comrey, 1973; Velicer & Fava, 1998; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). I used principal axis factoring extraction, as the goal was to elucidate latent factors underlying the data. Rotations were oblique, rather than orthogonal, in order to allow extracted factors to covary, because there was no reason to expect that they would be uncorrelated (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). I entered all 107 items in an analysis: the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .90, well over the recommended minimum value of .60 (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). There were 26 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (see Figure 1); factor 1 had the largest eigenvalue by far (22.19), followed by factor 2 (5.94), factor 3 (4.79), and factor 4 (4.47), which represented a small jump up from factor 5 (2.94). Hence, the scree plot indicated two potentially interpretable breaks in eigenvalue: one before factor 4 and one before factor 5. Thus, this model could be interpreted as having one factor, three factors, or four factors.

Figure 1. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis in Study 2a.

Four-factor solution.

I re-ran the analysis, specifying extraction of four factors. In this model, factor 4 had 19 items with factor loadings of .32 or greater, but the highest loading was .51, which is modest. Issues included illegal drugs, tough treatment of criminals, the death penalty, giving to charity, married couples having more children, Americans adopting American children, the satisfaction of having clean laundry, illegal immigrants, and tax dollars funding the military. Thus, there was also a good deal of variety in the content of the items and only modest loadings, indicating that interpreting a fourth factor is likely unwarranted. Next, I specified a 3-factor solution.

Three-factor solution.

This solution yielded three interpretable factors, each with loadings in the .70 range or higher, and with little cross-loading. As recommended by Worthington and Whittaker (2006), only factor loadings of .32 or over are reported (see Table 4), and cross-loading was defined as occurring when an item had loadings of .32 or higher on more than one factor, with a difference between loadings of less than .15.

Table 4. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring extraction and direct oblimin rotation

Factor 1 2 3 1. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently -.72 needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from Global warming. 2. The government must produce a national plan for all -.68 energy resources with sustainability in mind. 3. The government should protect its citizens from the -.62 greed of big, private businesses. 4. The government has much more important things to .62 fund than the health care system. 5. The environment is in grave danger from the impact of -.61 humans. 6. An economy based on competitive capitalism is the -.61 source of many problems in America. 7. There are too many personal firearms in the hands of -.61 American citizens. 8. The government should not be funding the search for .59 solutions to global warming.

Factor 1 2 3 9. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our -.59 country’s citizens are taken care of. 10. The government should fund alternative energy -.58 -.34 research and production. 11. The government should protect the public school -.58 system by providing additional funds to it. 12. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emissions will do .55 nothing to help the environment. 13. There is nothing wrong with “big businesses.” .55 14. I wish people would live in a more environmentally -.53 sustainable manner. 15. Americans should be willing to alter their lifestyles in -.53 order to become more environmentally sustainable. 16. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved with -.52 help from the government and tax dollars. 17. Every American citizen should share in the -.50 responsibility of making sure no one is homeless. 18. The government should not fund artistic pursuits. .47 19. Everyone should have the right to own a personal .47 firearm(s). 20. America must become less reliant on the use of fossil -.47 fuels like oils. 21. I dislike the idea of tax dollars going to support the arts. .46 22. Public school teachers do not make enough money. -.45 23. Hunting animals is good sport. .45 24. When people hunt animals for recreation, it makes me -.43 sick. 25. Lower taxes create more incentive for people to work, .41 save, invest, and engage in entrepreneurial endeavors. 26. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the public .39 school system. 27. Social Security provides a safety net for the nation’s -.38 poor and needy. 28. American employers should make sure there is cultural -.36 -.34 diversity in the workplace. 29. The military should be first priority when the .36 government spends money. 30. Every individual should own a personal firearm(s). .36 31. With enough will-power, people can overcome anything. 32. I wish more Americans were vegetarian. 33. The military receives too much funding from the government. 34. Oil is an abundant resource.

Factor 1 2 3 35. I dislike the idea of the American government paying the salaries of public servants. 36. Public schools are the best educational environment for a child. 37. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the military. 38. I have hunted animals for recreation. 39. Private schools compel improvement among students more than public schools do. 40. There are some things we cannot change no matter how hard we try. 41. If I were to travel, I would want a comprehensive itinerary for my time away. 42. I love the feeling when I’ve finished doing laundry and all my clothes are clean. 43. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two .77 people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 44. I wish that individuals of different races would not have .75 children together. 45. I worry that white people marrying individuals of .72 different races will result in having no more white people. 46. Cultural and ethnic diversity are not good for America .67 as a country. 47. Individuals of different races should not be able to get .64 married. 48. Immigrants take valuable job opportunities from .64 American citizens. 49. Cultural and ethnic diversity make America a better -.63 place. 50. I feel positive about people of different races having bi- -.62 racial children together. 51. Immigrants should not have the right to live as they did .61 in their original countries once they move to America. 52. Immigrants take jobs that could otherwise be given to .59 American citizens. 53. It is sensible for police to consider someone’s race .58 when assessing whether he/she is dangerous. 54. I feel positively about American people who adopt non- -.57 American children into their families. 55. Individuals who immigrate to America from other .56 countries should do their best to assimilate completely to American culture. 56. I wish there were more bi-racial couples in America. -.55

Factor 1 2 3 57. Immigrants cost taxpayers money. .53 58. If one is going to give money to charity, it should be an .52 American charity, not a foreign charity. 59. Racial profiling is good logical police work. .50 60. Women who dress in masculine clothing are probably .46 lesbians. 61. Women are better suited to staying at home with .43 children than men are. 62. Most homeless people could have jobs and homes if .41 they would just pull themselves together. 63. With regards to airport security, passenger profiling -.41 based on criteria such as race and ethnicity is simply wrong and offensive. 64. There should be amnesty for immigrants who enter -.40 illegally (undocumented immigrants). 65. I value others’ artistic pursuits. -.37 66. Executing someone who murders an innocent person is .34 justified. 67. Most people who are unemployed could be working if .33 they put in more effort. 68. The death penalty is not an appropriate sentence for -.32 anyone. 69. I think it is strange to want to adopt children. 70. If another country threatens the safety of our country, the government should take immediate military action to reduce that threat. 71. I wish there were fewer vegetarians in America. 72. Criminals should be punished harshly. 73. It is good to give money to charity. 74. Most people who are obese could lose weight if they just put in a little effort. 75. Many people who are obese cannot lose weight easily because of factors that are out of their control. 76. I feel contempt toward people with low will-power. 77. The government should be very tough on crime. 78. It takes a lot of talent to be an artist. 79. Charitable organizations often do not use donated money in the ways they say they will. 80. I feel positively about American people who adopt American children into their families. 81. If I were to underline something on paper, I would prefer to use a ruler than to freehand. 82. I feel positively about embryonic stem cell research. -.73 83. Embryonic stem cell research is just wrong. .73

Factor 1 2 3 84. Abortion is murder. .69 85. Women should have the right to choose whether they -.68 carry a pregnancy to term or have an abortion. 86. The government should support embryonic stem cell -.41 -.66 research. 87. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to cure diseases -.66 which current medicine has been unable to effectively treat. 88. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. .65 89. The government should not support same-sex marriage. .64 90. Same-sex marriage should be illegal. .56 91. The idea that America should separate God from .56 government is wrong. 92. The government should provide women with access to -.42 -.55 safe abortions. 93. A citizen should have the right to experiment with drugs -.48 without severe penalties from the government. 94. I feel negatively about people who have children out of .47 wedlock. 95. It is a shame when people who are un-married have .47 children. 96. Anyone can make a good parent, regardless of his/her -.46 sexual orientation, gender, or race. 97. The government has more important things to be -.43 concerned about than illegal drugs. 98. I dislike it when a married couple does not want to have .32 .35 children. 99. The government should fund scientific research more -.33 than the arts. 100. I really respect people who have lots of children. .33 101. Married couples should have more children. .33 102. It is the right of American adults to drink alcohol when -.33 they like. 103. The American military should be used to protect Democracy worldwide. 104. I think the value of having strong will-power is overrated. 105. Everyone has some aspects of him/herself that he/she cannot change, regardless of how much will-power s/he has. 106. I don’t like to be spontaneous. 107. If I go grocery shopping, I like to stick to a list I’ve planned out beforehand.

In light of the above results, I removed 30 items for not loading on any factor: 31-42, 69- 81, and 103-107 (inclusive). The analysis was re-run excluding these items. Based on that analysis I removed 5 more items: 28 (cross-loading), 86 (cross-loading), 92 (cross-loading), 98 (cross-loading), and 68 (not loading on any factor). In the next analysis, item 67 was removed for not loading on any factor. Based on the next analysis, 99 was removed for not loading on any factor. In the final analysis, no items cross-loaded according to the a priori criteria. Items’ loadings in this analysis are displayed in Table 5. At this point, as suggested by Clark and Watson (1995), the remaining items were submitted to another factor analysis along with the 20 items in the BFAS allotted to neuroticism measurement, specifying extraction of four factors. This was performed due to concern that many scale items, particularly those tapping worry, concern, or upset, may share variance with neuroticism in addition to, or instead of, the targeted construct. When this analysis was run, four factors were indicated: factor 1 was virtually identical to factor 1 displayed in Table 5, factor 2 included only the 20 neuroticism items, and factors 3 and 4 were virtually identical to factors 2 and 3 displayed in Table 5. Thus, this analysis suggests that the new items have good discriminant validity from a potential confounding trait, neuroticism.

Table 5. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of three factors

Factor 1 2 3 1. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently -.76 needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from Global warming. 2. The government must produce a national plan for all -.67 energy resources with sustainability in mind. 3. The government should protect its citizens from the -.65 greed of big, private businesses. 4. The environment is in grave danger from the impact of -.64 humans. 5. The government has much more important things to .63 fund than the health care system. 6. There are too many personal firearms in the hands of -.62 American citizens. 7. The government should fund alternative energy -.61 research and production.

Factor 1 2 3 8. An economy based on competitive capitalism is a -.61 source of many problems in America. 9. The government should not be funding the search for .59 solutions to global warming. 10. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our -.57 country’s citizens are taken care of. 11. The government should protect the public school -.55 system by providing additional funds to it. 12. I wish people would live in a more environmentally -.57 sustainable manner. 13. There is nothing wrong with “big businesses.” .56 14. Americans should be willing to alter their lifestyles in -.56 order to become more environmentally sustainable. 15. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emissions will do .53 nothing to help the environment. 16. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved -.51 with help from the government and tax dollars. 17. Every American citizen should share in the -.51 responsibility of making sure no one is homeless. 18. Everyone should have the right to own a personal .48 firearm(s). 19. America must become less reliant on the use of fossil -.47 fuels like oil. 20. The government should not fund artistic pursuits. .45 21. I dislike the idea of tax dollars going to support the .44 arts. 22. Hunting animals is good sport. .43 23. Public school teachers do not make enough money. -.41 24. When people hunt animals for recreation, it makes me -.41 sick. 25. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the public .39 school system. 26. Lower taxes create incentive for people to work, save, .39 invest, and engage in entrepreneurial endeavours. 27. Social Security provides a safety net for the nation’s -.38 poor and needy. 28. The military should be first priority when the .35 government spends money. 29. Every individual should own a personal firearm(s). .35 30. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two .76 people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 31. I wish that individuals of different races would not .75 have children together.

Factor 1 2 3 32. I worry that white people marrying people of different .72 races will result in having no more white people. 33. Cultural and ethnic diversity are not good for America .65 as a country. 34. Immigrants take valuable job opportunities from .66 American citizens. 35. I feel positive about two people of different races -.64 having bi-racial children together. 36. Individuals of different races should not be able to get .62 married. 37. Cultural and ethnic diversity make America a better -.62 place. 38. Immigrants should not have the right to live as they .63 did in their original countries once they move to America. 39. Immigrants take jobs that could otherwise be given to .62 American citizens. 40. It is sensible for police to consider someone’s race .58 when assessing whether he/she is dangerous. 41. I feel positively about American people who adopt -.58 non-American children into their families. 42. I wish there were more bi-racial couples in America. -.55 43. Individuals who immigrate to America from other .50 countries should do their best to assimilate completely to American culture. 44. Immigrants cost taxpayers money. .54 45. If one is going to give money to charity, it should be .52 an American charity, not a foreign charity. 46. Racial profiling is good logical police work. .48 47. Women who dress in masculine clothing are probably .43 lesbians. 48. Women are better suited to staying at home with .41 children than men are. 49. With regards to airport security, passenger profiling -.40 based on criteria such as race and ethnicity is simply wrong and offensive. 50. There should be amnesty for immigrants who enter -.41 illegally (undocumented immigrants). 51. I value others’ artistic pursuits -.35 52. Most homeless people could have jobs and homes if .33 they would pull themselves together. 53. Executing someone who murders an innocent .32 person(s) is justified. 54. Embryonic stem cell research is just wrong. -.74

Factor 1 2 3 55. I feel positively about embryonic stem cell research. .72 56. Abortion is murder. -.74 57. Women should have the right to choose whether they .71 carry a pregnancy to term or have an abortion. 58. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. -.71 59. The government should support stem cell research. -.36 .67 60. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to cure .63 diseases which current medicine has been unable to effectively treat. 61. The government should not support same-sex -.67 marriage. 62. Same-sex marriage should be illegal. -.61 63. The idea that America should separate God from -.57 government is wrong. 64. A citizen should have the right to experiment with .51 drugs without severe penalties from the government. 65. It is a shame when unmarried people have children. -.52 66. I feel negatively about people who have children out -.52 of wedlock. 67. Anyone can make a good parent, regardless of his/her .46 sexual orientation, gender, or race. 68. The government has more important things to be .44 concerned about than illegal drugs. 69. It is the right of American adults to drink alcohol .37 when they like. 70. Married American couples should have more children. -.37 71. I really respect people who have lots of children. -.35 Note. Factor loadings <.32 are not reported.

For subsequent analyses, I calculated values for each participant on the three factors by averaging the items which loaded on each factor .32 or higher. The correlations among these scores, the 3-item General PO scale, and 1-item measures of fiscal and social conservatism are in Table 6.

Table 6. Bivariate correlations between the derived factors and general, fiscal, and social PO

Factor 2 Factor 3 General PO Fiscal PO Social PO Factor 1 .55** .50** .73** .71** .56** Factor 2 .50** .59** .45** .57** Factor 3 .65** .37** .64** General PO .76** .80** Fiscal PO .57** Note. ** Denotes p < .001.

Factors’ individual difference predictors.

Next, I tested which individual difference variables would predict the averaged scores for each of the three factors (see Table 7).

Table 7. Bivariate correlations of the three factors with demographic characteristics, SWL, religiosity and disgust

Gender Age Log Disgust Disgust Disgust Disgust Religi- SWL Gross Overall Core Animal Contam osity Income Factor 1 -.12** .12** .09* -.04 -.09* -.04 .09* .22*** .18*** Factor 2 -.15*** .16*** .09* .08* .04 .03 .21*** .21*** -.01 Factor 3 0 .22*** .04 .28*** .18*** .22*** .39*** .64** .12** Note. * Denotes p ≤ .05, ** denotes p < .01, *** denotes p < .001.

All three factors were positively related to age and religiosity. Factors 1 and 2 were related to higher income. Factor 3 was, uniquely, related to disgust sensitivity (all of the disgust sensitivity subscales and overall), and it was very highly correlated with religiosity. Factor 2 was uniquely unrelated to SWL and core disgust. Factor 3 was uniquely unrelated to gender, whereas factors 1 and 2 had associations between male gender and more conservative attitudes. Higher contamination disgust was common to all three factors, but factor 1 was uniquely negatively related to core disgust. Then I tested the bivariate correlations of the three factors with the ten BFAS personality aspects. First, I used BFAS scores at the trait level, then I investigated how the ten aspects related to the political factors (see Table 8).

Table 8. Bivariate correlations of the factors with the ten BFAS personality aspects

N - N- A- A- C- C- E- E- O- O- Vol Withd Comp Polite Indust Order Enthus Assert Intell Open Fac1 -.10* -.17*** -.21** -.07 .15*** .02 -.03 -.03 -.13** -.35*** Fac2 .05 -.04 -.27*** -.10** .07 .19*** -.07 -.05 -.29*** -.41*** Fac3 -.03 -.13** .02 .18*** .15*** .23*** .03 -.06 -.26*** -.20*** Note. * Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p < .01, *** denotes p < .001. N-Vol = neuroticism-volatility; N-Withd = neuroticism-withdrawal; A-Comp = agreeableness-compassion; A-Polite = agreeableness-politeness; C-Indust = conscientiousness-industriousness; C-Order = conscientiousness-orderliness; E-Enthus = extraversion-enthusiasm; E-Assert = extraversion- assertiveness; O-Intell = openness-intellect; O-Open = openness-openness.

Next, I ran stepwise regressions predicting the three subscale scores with each one’s bivariate predictors. When both BFAS aspects of a given trait were related to a factor, the overall trait was entered into the model; when one aspect was related and one was not, only the predictive aspect was entered. Thus, factor 1’s predictors were trait openness, trait neuroticism, religiosity, compassion, core disgust, contamination disgust, industriousness, gender, age, log income, and SWL. Factor 1 was significantly negatively related to openness (β = -.27, p < .001), neuroticism (β = -.15, p = .01), compassion (β = -.19, p < .001), and core disgust (β = -.15, p < .001), and positively related to religiosity (β = .24, p < .001), and industriousness (β = .11, p = .04); model R2 = .24, F(6, 426) = 15.42, p < .001. However, there were five outliers with standardized residuals more than 3 standard deviations above the mean; these participants were excluded and the analysis was re-run. Excluding these participants changed results, with factor 1 negatively related to openness (β = -.32, p < .001), core disgust (β = -.21, p < .001), compassion (β = -.15, p = .001), and neuroticism (β = -.14, p = .003), and positively related to religiosity (β = .23, p < .001), contamination disgust (β = .12, p = .02), and SWL (β = .12, p = .01); model R2 = .29, F(7, 420) = 24.88, p < .001. Hence, in the final model with five outliers excluded, conservative attitudes on factor 1 were related to being less: open, neurotic, disgust sensitive (core), and compassionate, and more: religious, disgust sensitive (contamination), and satisfied with life; industriousness was no longer a significant predictor. Factor 1 was labeled Masculine Independence (MI). Next, I performed the same series of analyses predicting factor 2 subscale scores with its significant bivariate correlates. Thus, factor 2’s predictors were trait agreeableness, orderliness, trait openness, gender, age, log income, religiosity, and contamination disgust. Factor 2 was

52 negatively related to openness (β = -.34, p < .001), agreeableness (β = -.17, p < .001), and gender (β = -.12, p = .01; male = -1, female = 1), and was positively related to religiosity (β = .18, p < .001), age (β = .12, p = .01), orderliness (β = .14, p = .001), and contamination disgust (β = .10, p = .02); model R2 = .29, F(7, 460) = 27.07, p < .001. However, there were 6 outliers with standardized residuals 3 standard deviations or more above the mean, so these participants were excluded and the analysis was re-run. In this model, factor 2 was negatively associated with openness (β = -.39, p < .001), agreeableness (β = -.17, p < .001), and gender (β = -.13, p = .001), and positively related to religiosity (β = .23, p < .001), age (β = .14, p < .001), orderliness (β = .09, p = .02), and contamination disgust (β = .08, p = .05); model R2 = .35, F(7, 454) = 35.36, p < .001. Hence, in the final model with six outliers excluded, more conservative attitudes on factor 2 were related to being less open, less agreeable, more easily disgusted by contamination concerns, older, more likely to be male, more orderly, and more religious. Factor 2 was labeled Ethnic Separateness (ES). Finally, I ran parallel analyses predicting the factor 3 subscale. In this case, I included overall disgust, because all three sub-types were also significant bivariate predictors; predictors of factor 3 were therefore withdrawal, politeness, trait conscientiousness, trait openness, age, religiosity, SWL, and overall disgust sensitivity. Factor 3 was significantly positively related to religiosity (β = .55, p < .001), overall disgust sensitivity (β = .09, p = .01), conscientiousness (β = .09, p = .01) and age (β = .08, p = .01), and negatively related to openness (β = -.26, p < .001) and withdrawal (β = -.11, p = .004); model R2 = .51, F(6, 513) = 88.27, p < .001. There were 8 outliers with |standardized residuals| 3 standard deviations or more from the mean. These outliers were excluded and the analysis re-run with results essentially unchanged: factor 3 was positively related to religiosity (β = .60, p < .001), overall disgust sensitivity (β = .08, p = .02), age (β = .08, p = .01), and conscientiousness (β = .07, p = .03), and negatively related to openness (β = -.28, p < .001) and withdrawal (β = -.11, p = .001); model R2 = .56, F(6, 505) = 108.24, p < .001. Hence, more conservative attitudes on factor 3 were related to higher religiosity, higher disgust sensitivity, higher conscientiousness, and older age, as well as lower withdrawal, and lower openness. Factor 3 was labeled Religious Traditionalism (RT).

Predicting other measures of conservatism with the three factors.

In a regression, I predicted General PO with the three subscale scores. The model accounted for much of the variance in General PO: model R2 = .65, F(3, 484) = 304.49, p < .001.

General conservatism was positively related to each of Masculine Independence (β = .49, p < .001), Ethnic Separateness (β = .13, p < .001); and Religious Traditionalism (β = .34, p < .001). One participant had a standardized residual more than 3 standard deviations from the mean, but results were virtually unchanged when that participant was excluded. Next, I predicted 1-item social conservatism with all three subscale scores. The predictors comprised a significant model of social conservatism: model R2 = .53, F(3, 489) = 180.02, p < .001. As with general conservatism, social conservatism was significantly positively related to Masculine Independence (β = .19, p < .001), Ethnic Separateness (β = .22, p < .001), and Religious Traditionalism (β = .46, p < .001). Six participants’ standardized residuals were more than 3 standard deviations below the mean; when these participants were excluded, results were similar (R2 = .60, F(3, 483) = 239.86, p < .001), with social conservatism associated with all of Masculine Independence (β = .17, p < .001), Ethnic Separateness (β = .23, p < .001), and Religious Traditionalism (β = .52, p < .001). Finally, I predicted 1-item fiscal conservatism with all three subscale scores. In this model (R2 = .71, F(3, 473) = 159.53, p < .001), fiscal conservatism was positively associated with Masculine Independence (β = .67, p < .001) and, marginally, with Ethnic Separateness (β = .08, p = .06); Religious Traditionalism was not significantly associated with fiscal conservatism (β = -.01, p = .74). When one participant with a standardized residual more than 3 standard deviations above the mean was excluded, results were similar, with the association between Ethnic Separateness and fiscal conservatism reaching significance (β = .08, p = .05) and Masculine Independence the only other significant predictor (β = .67, p < .001); model R2 = .51, F(3, 472) = 163.75, p < .001. These results suggest that each subscale accounts for unique variance in general conservatism, and the three factors together account for a great deal of variance in it. Hence, although Ethnic Separateness was heavily loaded with race-related issues and Religious Traditionalism with religiously charged issues, it appears that they too capture variance in political orientation over and above Masculine Independence. In terms of social versus fiscal political orientation, it seems that social PO reflects attitudes relevant to all three subscales and is most strongly predicted by attitudes toward Religious Traditionalism. Fiscal PO, by contrast, was predicted by Masculine Independence and, with marginal significance, by Ethnic Separateness. Thus, there is indeed a difference between

54 the issues which are most relevant to fiscal versus social PO. However, there is not a clean dissociation between the two, whereby social PO would be predicted by completely different attitudes than would fiscal. Masculine Independence was related to both fiscal and social PO, whereas Religious Traditionalism was relevant to only social PO, and Ethnic Separateness is predominantly related to social PO but is also a minor predictor of fiscal PO over and above Masculine Independence.

Predicting SWL with the subscales.

First, I tested the bivariate correlations of the three subscales with SWL, finding that Masculine Independence (r(562) = .18, p < .001) and Religious Traditionalism (r(615) = .12, p = .003) were significantly positively related to SWL at the zero-order level, but Ethnic Separateness was not (r(587) = -.01, p = .84). Next, I predicted SWL with the three subscales, producing a significant model: R2 = .05, F(3, 490) = 9.12, p < .001. Interestingly, SWL was positively predicted by Masculine Independence (β = .21, p < .001) and Religious Traditionalism (β = .13, p = .02), and negatively by Ethnic Separateness (β = -.16, p = .004). Hence, being higher in Masculine Independence and Religious Traditionalism was associated with higher Satisfaction with Life, whereas higher Ethnic Separateness was associated with lower SWL when one’s other political attitudes are controlled for. Next, I tested the same model with the addition of general conservatism, allowing the predictors to enter stepwise. This model was significant (R2 = .05, F(3, 484) = 9.05, p < .001) and general conservatism did not enter into the model. All three subscales were significant predictors of SWL: Masculine Independence (β = .20, p < .001) and Religious Traditionalism (β = .13, p = .01) were positively associated with SWL, and Ethnic Separateness (β = -.16, p = .01) was negatively associated with SWL. Results were essentially unchanged when predictors were entered simultaneously rather than stepping in. The next analysis added religiosity to the model with the three subscales: model R2 = .09, F(4, 489) = 12.25, p < .001. Masculine Independence (β = .23, p < .001) and Ethnic Separateness (β = -.13, p = .02) remained significant predictors of SWL, with Religious Traditionalism no longer significant (β = -.06, p = .35) after the addition of religiosity (β = .26, p < .001). Next, I expanded the model predicting SWL to include age, gender, and the logarithm of household income, along with Masculine Independence, Ethnic Separateness, and religiosity. I

55 removed Religious Traditionalism, because it was not a significant predictor when religiosity was included in the model. One participant had a standardized residual 3 standard deviations below the mean and was excluded from this analysis. The final model was significant (R2 = .15, F(6, 465) = 14.03, p < .001). Significant positive predictors of SWL were Masculine Independence (β = .22, p < .001), religiosity (β = .22, p < .001), and the logarithm of household income (β = .22, p < .001), with one significant negative predictor, Ethnic Separateness (β = -.15, p = .003). Gender (β = .08, p =.07) and age (β = -.08, p = .07) reached marginal significance. I removed gender and age from the model and added the Big 5 personality traits. The same participant as above was excluded from this analysis as well (the standardized residual was 3.7 standard deviations below the mean). The model was significant (R2 = .28, F(9, 368) = 15.89, p < .001), with SWL positively related to Masculine Independence (β = .16, p = .003), religiosity (β = .14, p = .003), logarithm of household income (β = .20, p < .001), and extraversion (β = .19, p = .001), and negatively related to Ethnic Separateness (β = -.19, p = .001), neuroticism (β = - .24, p < .001), and openness (β = -.12, p = .02); agreeableness (β = .01, p = .79) and conscientiousness (β = .08, p = .13) were not significant predictors.

Discussion

Social versus fiscal political orientation.

The analyses of 1-item measures of self-reported social and fiscal/economic political orientation demonstrate that these two measures were very highly correlated with one another and with a 3-item measure of General PO. Fiscal conservatism was uniquely positively related to income, and religiosity predicted fiscal conservatism negatively and social conservatism positively. Both social and fiscal conservatism measured in this way shared over half of their variance with general conservatism, and 40% with each other. Thus, the utility of brief self- report measures of economic and social conservatism in service of better understanding political orientation (PO) overall may be limited. Nonetheless, predicting these 1-item measures of fiscal and social PO with the three subscales (i.e. Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness) does provide some clues to the nature of fiscal and social PO. Namely, all three subscales significantly predicted what people consider their social PO, but only Masculine Independence and Ethnic Separateness (to a lesser but significant extent) predicted what people consider their fiscal PO. It

56 could be said then, that you can have fiscal PO without social PO but not vice versa. In other words, there would not be orthogonality between one’s fiscal and social PO, as has been implied in lay discourse and previous studies (e.g. Everett, 2013). Subsequent studies will further investigate the associations between measures of fiscal and social PO, political attitudes, and individual difference variables.

Factors of attitudes.

This study further suggests that political attitudes can be sorted into at least three distinct but correlated factors, reflecting domains of attitudes which could be called: Masculine Independence, Ethnic Separateness, and Religious Traditionalism. Interestingly, Masculine Independence includes many issues which would be called “fiscal” issues; taxation, government reach, public health care, Social Security, public schooling, competitive capitalism, and distributing tax dollars to help disadvantaged folks. However, these seemingly fiscal attitudes factored out along with less cleanly fiscal issues, such as belief that the environment is in danger, willingness to live in line with creating a more sustainable American future, and beliefs about the abundance of fossil fuels. Further, they factored out with attitudes toward some decidedly non- fiscal-seeming issues: gun ownership and hunting for sport. Notably, Study 2a is not the first study to find that beliefs about fiscal issues factor out with beliefs about one’s right to bear arms. When Everett (2013) ran exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses on twelve issues, he also reported that the fiscal political orientation sub-factor included attitudes toward gun ownership, along with attitudes toward fiscal responsibility, business, limited government, and welfare benefits. In fact, when a 2-factor solution was specified, gun ownership was the second-highest loading item on the Economic Conservatism factor, behind limited government. No discussion of this is provided in Everett’s paper, but the clustering of attitudes toward gun ownership with attitudes toward multiple prototypical “fiscal” issues is interesting, particularly in light of this conceptual replication. The clustering of attitudes toward guns with attitudes toward fiscal issues, which typically revolve around – essentially – how much of one’s personal wealth one would like to see redistributed to anonymous others, is remarkable. That, along with the individual difference variables which predict Masculine Independence (namely lower neuroticism, lower compassion, and lower disgust sensitivity), provides support for the idea that the MI factor reflects a culturally

57 masculine outlook, making one less concerned about the welfare of anonymous others and more concerned with the right to enjoy culturally masculine pursuits (namely, bearing arms and hunting for sport). Ethnic Separateness and Religious Traditionalism are more intuitively coherent-seeming factors. Ethnic Separateness seems to be quite related to racist attitudes applied to the domain of political issues, with concerns about white people disappearing due to inter-racial marriage, being in favour of racial profiling, and being straightforwardly un-valuing of cultural and ethnic diversity. Some items, loading more weakly on this factor, were related to traditional gender norms and roles. Thus, the associations of Ethnic Separateness with right-wing authoritarianism and racism were explored in Study 4. Religious Traditionalism includes attitudes toward multiple “social” issues which are spoken to by Christian faiths, including stem cell research, abortion, euthanasia (issues related to the sanctity of life), as well as same-sex marriage and children out of wedlock (related to the sanctity of marriage), and finally attitudes toward alcohol and illicit substances (related to the sanctity of one’s earthly body). The correlation between Religious Traditionalism and religiosity is very high, which makes good sense; it is possible that a separate subscale measuring “religious political attitudes” is unnecessary when a good measure of religiosity could be employed. This possibility will also be further explored in subsequent studies. The main significance of finding dissociable factors reflecting race-related versus religious issues, each of which accounts for unique variance in general political orientation, is that “social” issues do not sort out as straightforwardly as some would expect them to. Additionally, given the inclusion of attitudes toward gun ownership and hunting with attitudes toward all the fiscal issues included in this study, one could certainly argue that a theoretical or psychometric divide between social and economic issues is missing the mark, at least somewhat. Attitudes seem to cluster along different lines, likely reflecting motivational underpinnings which do not map straightforwardly onto social versus economic issues.

Political orientation and SWL.

As in Study 1 and other studies in the literature (Burton et al., 2015; Jetten et al., 2013; Napier & Jost, 2008; Onraet et al., 2013; Schlenker et al., 2012), the association between general conservatism and Satisfaction with Life in Study 2a was small, reaching significance in a very

58 large sample, and easily accounted for by other factors, such as religiosity. By conceptualizing political orientation in a finer-grained way, considering different factors of political attitudes separately, the slipperiness of the association between unidimensional liberal-to-conservative PO and SWL makes more sense. According to Study 2a, political attitudes constitute at least three distinct but related factors: Masculine Independence, Ethnic Separateness, and Religious Traditionalism. Not only was Religious Traditionalism’s positive association with SWL straightforwardly nullified by controlling for religiosity, but the remaining two factors predicted SWL in opposite directions; Masculine Independence was positively associated with SWL, and Ethnic Separateness was negatively associated with SWL. That Masculine Independence accounts for quite a bit more variance in political attitudes than do the other two factors could explain why a small positive association between general conservatism and SWL is generally found. In sum, Study 2a suggests that measuring political orientation as more than one factor of political attitudes can allow for a more detailed understanding of the associations between conservative attitudes and SWL, fiscal conservatism, and social conservatism than can a brief and general measure of PO. A multidimensional model and measure could also potentially afford better understanding of the individual difference variables associated with distinct tenets of political conservatism. In Study 2b, I further tested the utility of a longer, attitude-based measure of PO, using the other pool of items tapping political attitudes.

Study 2b

In this study, I employed a separate sample of participants and the second pool of 107 items randomly selected from the original 214-item pool. This allowed for a conservative test of whether the factor structure derived in Study 2a would replicate.

Method 816 United States community members were recruited to take part in an online survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform for compensation of $0.53. As in Study 2a, I considered the amount of time participants took to complete the survey and IP addresses from which participants completed the survey. Again, participants were trimmed before running any further analyses, in the manner described below:

Eighteen participants were removed for having duplicate IP addresses and matching demographic information (in these cases, the second study completion was removed according to the dates and times of completion), 6 participants were removed for having participated from an IP address that was included in Study 2a, and 6 participants were removed for participating from Indian IP addresses. Next, 131 participants were removed for having incalculable time taken on the survey, indicating that they had canceled completion of the survey at some point during their participation.

After the above data preparation, 655 participants remained (299 male, 5 unreported; Mage = 32 years, SD = 12). Next, I calculated the 5th percentile for minutes taken, and 12 minutes was in the 5th percentile (M = 28 minutes, SD = 16; range = 7 to 221). In all subsequent analyses, 25 participants who took fewer than 12 minutes were excluded; all other participants were included unless specified otherwise.

After excluding these participants, 630 remained (283 male, 3 unreported; Mage = 32 years, SD = 12). Participants started by completing demographic information including ethnicity, religious affiliation, gender, age, and gross household income (in $5 000 increments ranging from $10 000 or under to $150 001 or over; Mincome = $45 001 - $50 000), which I used the logarithm of in subsequent analyses. Participants also completed Cohen and Rankin’s (2004) 4- item scale measuring religiosity (M = 4.32, SD = 2.70), the Disgust Sensitivity Scale-Revised (Haidt et al., 1994; Olatunji et al., 2007; M = 3.01, SD = .66), the 3-item General PO scale (M = 3.26, SD = 1.66), the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985; M = 4.25, SD = 1.52), and responded to the second set of 107 items (on 7-point Likert scale) assessing their attitudes toward a variety of political issues; see Appendix A. Next, participants completed the Big Five Aspect Scale (100 items, with a 5-point Likert scale). Finally, participants indicated their fiscal and social political orientation (Overall, with regard to fiscal/economic [social] policy, I would call myself:, on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative, with an 8th option for I don’t know; these responses were deleted so as to be excluded from analyses including these variables; Mfiscal = 3.75 SD = 1.80,

Msocial = 2.96, SD = 1.73).

Results Bivariate correlations are presented in Table 9.

Table 9. Bivariate correlations between general, fiscal, and social PO, SWL, demographics, Big Five traits, and overall disgust

Fiscal Social SWL Relig Gender Age Log N A C E O Disgust PO PO $ Overall Gen PO .79*** .87*** .08* .43*** -.11** .18*** .04 -.11** .06 .17*** .04 -.15*** .10**

Fiscal PO .62*** .07 28*** -.12** .18*** .09* -.12** -.01 .10* .06 -.08* -.02

Social PO .10* .43*** -.07 .18*** .03 -11** .03 .20*** .01 -.17*** .12**

SWL .12** .06 0 .27*** -.45*** .11** .28*** .34*** .03 -.03

Religiosity .16*** .23*** -.04 -.13** .24*** .19*** .17*** .10* .21***

Gender .06 -.09* .19*** .32*** .07 .04 .11** .27***

Age .08 -.16*** .15*** .09* -.03 -.04 -.02

Log $ -.10* -.03 .01 .09* -.06 -.01

N -.15** -.41*** -.42*** -.12** .16***

A .22*** .22*** .35*** .14***

C .34*** .22*** .11**

E .38*** -.07

O -.10**

Note.* Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01 *** denotes p ≤ .001. Relig = religiosity; Gen PO = general conservatism; Log $ = Logarithm of gross household income; N = neuroticism; A = agreeableness; C = conscientiousness; E = extraversion; O = openness.

Political orientation and Satisfaction with Life.

General political orientation and Satisfaction with Life.

General conservatism was positively correlated with Satisfaction with Life (SWL; r(617) = .08, p = .05). This correlation held in a model controlling for age and gender (R2 = .01, F(3, 609) = 2.64, p = .05); SWL was significantly related to conservatism (β = .10, p = .02), and marginally to female gender (β = .08, p = .06), but not age (β = -.03, p = .46). Next, I removed age and added the logarithm of income to the model predicting SWL. In this model (R2 = .08, F(3, 561) = 17.24, p < .001), SWL was related to log income (β = .28, p < .001) and female gender (β = .10, p = .02), but not general conservatism (β = .06, p = .16). Thus, in this sample, the association between general conservatism and SWL held when age and gender were controlled for, but not gender and income.

General PO, religiosity, and SWL.

To further investigate the nature of the relationship between general conservatism, religiosity, and SWL, I ran a regression predicting SWL with general conservatism in block 1 and religiosity in block 2. In this model (R2 = .02, F(2, 616) = 4.77, p = .01), SWL was related only to religiosity (β = .10, p = .02), not general conservatism (β = .04, p = .43). Hence, the small and barely-significant conservatism-SWL association is much attenuated and rendered non- significant by controlling for religiosity alone. I repeated the above analysis, predicting SWL with fiscal conservatism rather than general conservatism: in the first step, SWL was unrelated to fiscal conservatism (β = .07, p = .08). Religiosity produced a significant change in the model (ΔR2 = .02, p = .003); model R2 = .02, F(2, 601) = 6.21, p = .002. In this model, SWL was related only to religiosity (β = .13, p = .003), not fiscal conservatism (β = .04, p = .38). Finally, I repeated the above analysis, using social conservatism to predict SWL: in the first step, SWL was related to social conservatism (β = .10, p = .02). Religiosity produced a significant change in the model (ΔR2 = .01, p = .01); model R2 = .02, F(2, 604) = 5.96, p = .003. In this model, SWL was related only to religiosity (β = .11, p = .01), not social conservatism (β = .05, p = .30).

Thus, these results agree with those of Study 2a: accounting for religiosity renders the associations between SWL and the three “types” of conservatism that I measured non-significant and close to zero. Religiosity may therefore present a straightforward explanation for the apparent association between conservatism and Satisfaction with Life.

Social versus fiscal political orientation.

As a first step, I predicted fiscal PO with social PO (R2 = .39, F(1, 598) = 377.05, p < .001). There were 6 participants with |standardized residuals| more than 3 standard deviations from the mean. When these 6 participants were excluded from analyses, the model changed slightly: R2 = .43, F(1, 592) = 453.95, p < .001. These participants were excluded from subsequent analyses in this section.

Predicting fiscal political orientation.

In a linear regression, I predicted 1-item fiscal PO with its significant bivariate correlates entered simultaneously (general conservatism, neuroticism, conscientiousness, openness, religiosity, gender, and age). Three participants had |standardized residuals| more than 3 and were excluded from this analysis, in addition to the 6 excluded participants above. The model explained most of the variance in fiscal PO: (R2 = .67, F(7, 448) = 128.85, p < .001), with fiscal conservatism significantly related to general conservatism (β = .85, p < .001), neuroticism (β = - .07, p = .03), conscientiousness (β = -.06, p = .04), religiosity (β = -.10, p = .004), and age (β = .07, p = .02); all other |β|s <.05, ps > .10. However, when predictors were entered stepwise rather than simultaneously, results changed: in this model (R2 = .66, F(3, 452) = 294.66, p < .001), fiscal PO was related only to general conservatism (β = .83, p < .001), religiosity (β = -.08, p = .01), and age (β = .07, p = .01); neuroticism and conscientiousness did not enter as predictors. Thus, where income was a positive predictor of fiscal conservatism in Study 2a, it was not in Study 2b; however, general conservatism remained a strong positive predictor of fiscal conservatism, and religiosity remained a negative predictor of fiscal conservatism. Uniquely in Study 2b, older age predicted higher fiscal conservatism.

Predicting social political orientation.

I then ran a regression predicting social conservatism with its significant bivariate correlates (general conservatism, contamination disgust, neuroticism, conscientiousness,

63 openness, religiosity, gender, and age), excluding from the regression the 6 outlying participants from above. In this regression, 5 more participants had |standardized residuals| more than 3 and were excluded from this analysis. As with fiscal PO, the final model explained most of the variance in social PO: (R2 = .80, F(8, 445) = 221.58, p < .001), with social conservatism significantly related to general conservatism (β = .85, p < .001), religiosity (β = .05, p = .05), conscientiousness (β = .05, p = .03), and openness (β = -.05, p = .04); all other |β|s < .04, ps > .09. However, when entered stepwise, only three predictors were entered into the model (R2 = .80, F(3, 450) = 584.12, p < .001): general conservatism (β = .88, p < .001), contamination disgust (β = .05, p = .02), and conscientiousness (β = .04, p = .04). Thus, openness and religiosity may together suppress an effect of contamination disgust on social conservatism. Hence, as in Study 2a, 1-item measures of both social and fiscal PO were very highly correlated with each other and with general PO. In this study, fiscal conservatism was further predicted by older age and lower religiosity (where it was further predicted by higher income and lower religiosity in Study 2a), and social conservatism was further predicted by higher contamination disgust and higher conscientiousness (where it was further predicted by higher religiosity, age, conscientiousness, and lower openness in Study 2a).

Political attitudes.

As in Study 2a, I ran exploratory factor analyses with principal axis factoring extraction and direct oblimin rotation, based on suggested best principles (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). I entered all 107 items in an analysis; KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .91, well over the recommended minimum value of .60 (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). There were 24 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (see Figure 2); factor 1 had the largest eigenvalue by far (24.63), followed by factor 2 (6.96), factor 3 (5.31), factor 4 (4.66), and factor 5 (3.32). Based on the scree plot, this set of items could be interpreted as comprising 1, 2, or 4 factors.

Figure 2. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis in Study 2b.

Four-factor solution.

I re-ran the analysis, specifying extraction of four factors and saving factor scores. This model yielded somewhat interpretable factors. However, factor 4’s items had modest factor loadings, with a maximum value of .55. Factor scores on factor 3 correlated weakly with general conservatism (r = .17). Factor 3 correlated quite highly with conscientiousness (r = .61) and factor 4 correlated quite highly with agreeableness (r = -.42), suggesting that factor 3 was likely a rough index of conscientiousness and factor 4 of intergroup aggression or racism. Hence, the validity of the 4-factor solution was questionable, and I re-ran the analysis specifying extraction of two factors to see if it yielded more interpretable results.

Two-factor solution.

When I ran the analysis specifying a 2-factor solution, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .91, well over the recommended .60. As in Study 2a per Worthington & Whittaker

(2006), when cross-loadings occurred, items with loadings of .32 or higher on more than one factor with a difference less than .15 would be deleted. Factor loadings are displayed in Table 10.

Table 10. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of two factors

Factor 1 2 1. Government programs are an important way to -.75 provide for the poor and needy in society. 2. The government should help the poor and needy using -.75 tax dollars from the rich. 3. The government should provide equal health care -.75 benefits for all, regardless of one’s ability to pay. 4. The government should provide all citizens with free -.75 or low-cost health care. 5. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary -.74 to address inequity/injustice in society. 6. Health care in America should not be made public. .74 7. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s .73 health care. 8. Government programs encourage people to become .73 dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 9. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and -.72 provide welfare programs for those in need. 10. Global warming presents a threat to the future of -.67 humans. 11. A smaller government with limited power would .66 improve the standard of living for all. 12. More guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens would .65 mean less crime. 13. There should be more personal firearms in the .64 possession of American citizens. 14. Health care should be completely privatized. .63 15. I support “affirmative action” policies in workplaces -.63 and schools. 16. Global warming is real. -.62 17. It is ridiculous to keep a certain number of positions at .60 schools or workplaces aside for members of ethnic minorities. 18. The Social Security system must be made more .60 efficient through privatization and/or allowing individuals to manage their own savings. 19. I fear for future generations having to deal with the -.57 environmental problems humans are creating.

Factor 1 2 20. The number of public servants employed (and paid) by .57 the government should be kept to a minimum. 21. The Social Security system should not be privatized. -.55 22. Individuals do not need guns for their own protection. -.52 23. Income tax should be low. .49 24. The homeless are responsible for their own problems. .47 25. Government workers deserve the money they are paid -.47 by the government. 26. Competitive capitalism produces economic growth, .45 more jobs and highest standards of living. 27. Gas and electric companies should be under -.44 governmental control. 28. Homelessness can only be solved by the people who .44 are homeless themselves. 29. The government needs to be tougher on illegal .44 .39 immigrants. 30. Some criminals should be sentenced to death. .41 31. There is no crime which should be punished with the -.41 death sentence. 32. There are some crimes which should definitely be .40 punished with the death sentence. 33. It is very important for members of all ethnic groups to -.38 have equal access to education and employment. 34. Everyone should have the right to hunt animals for .38 recreation. 35. America will always have access to fossil fuels like .37 oil. 36. As far as the environment goes, the future looks grim. -.37 37. Women and men are equally able to work the same -.36 kinds of jobs. 38. Women and men are best suited to different types of .36 .31 work. 39. Being vegetarian is ridiculous. .36 40. Cultural and ethnic diversity is a valuable resource for -.35 America. 41. Undocumented, illegal immigrants should not have the .33 .31 same rights as those who obey the law and enter legally. 42. The arts are a valuable source of culture for America. -.33 43. Factory farming is a big problem in America. -.33 44. Every American should eat meat. .32 45. When determining whether someone is threatening, that person’s race/ethnicity should never be considered as a factor.

Factor 1 2 46. The conditions in which animals farmed for meat are kept are awful. 47. Obese people need to simply pull themselves together and lose weight. 48. I would hunt animals for recreation. 49. People who are obese disgust me. 50. Eating animals is wrong. 51. Many people are obese because their genes make them so. 52. Artistic pursuits have little value to America as a country. 53. I have very little respect for someone who does not have the will-power to overcome distractions or cravings. 54. With enough will power people can overcome any boundaries. 55. The American military should be employed to protect only America and its citizens, not foreign countries. 56. Marriage is meant to be a union of one man and one .76 woman only. 57. Homosexual people should not be allowed to have .69 children. 58. I fear that homosexual people adopting children will .66 result in there being more homosexual people in America over time. 59. Children raised by homosexual couples are more .66 likely to grow up gay. 60. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all .64 circumstances. 61. An aborted fetus is the victim of murder. .64 62. I find it hard to trust people who are not religious. .63 63. It should be legal for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and -.63 transgender individuals to marry. 64. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her -.63 own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 65. Men should wear masculine clothing. .63 66. A woman should never have an abortion. .60 67. Religious expression has no place in government. -.60 68. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal -.59 access to options for euthanasia. 69. The government must crack down on people who .58 produce or distribute illegal drugs. 70. Illegal drugs are the source of much evil in America. .58

Factor 1 2 71. The government is too concerned about reducing the -.55 amount of illegal drugs in this country. 72. Children should only be had by people who are legally .55 married. 73. It is better for a woman to have an abortion than to -.55 raise a child she does not want. 74. Drug crimes involving marijuana should be sentenced .55 as harshly as those involving other illegal drugs. 75. Women should wear feminine clothing. .53 76. It is morally and ethically wrong for a Government to .52 support embryonic stem cell research. 77. All reference to God in public and government spaces -.50 should be removed. 78. The legal drinking age should be raised (i.e. older). .48 79. Women should stay at home and parent children, and .33 .46 men should work to support their families. 80. If a heterosexual married couple chooses to have only .46 one parent go to work after a child is born, it should be the husband who goes to work and not the wife. 81. People who immigrate to America from other .44 countries should adopt an American way of life, rather than living as they did in the countries they came from. 82. The government should not fund embryonic stem cell .36 .44 research. 83. The federal government should secure the borders and .38 .42 enforce current immigration law. 84. The legal drinking age should be reduced (i.e. -.40 younger). 85. The government should never again prohibit citizens -.38 from having access to alcohol. 86. The military keeps our country safe. .37 87. It is perfectly acceptable for a heterosexual man to -.36 stay home and parent a child(ren), while his wife goes to work. 88. Immigrants dilute the purity of American culture. .36 89. It would be unacceptable for a woman to wear a pant- .36 suit on her wedding day. 90. People who immigrate to America should make .32 learning fluent English a very high priority. 91. Immigrants cost the American government money. 92. I find it bothersome when people living in America have strong foreign accents.

Factor 1 2 93. Adopted children are not the same as children who were born to a couple naturally. 94. I like to plan my time out very carefully. 95. Private schools give all parents the right to choose what schools they want to send their children to. 96. I like my time to be clearly scheduled. 97. People who are bi-racial (i.e. who have parents of different races) make me uncomfortable. 98. It is the role of the government to protect the people through enforcement of the law. 99. I don’t like to plan ahead for things. 100. I always plan ahead for things. 101. I never use the toilet without washing my hands afterward. 102. I always budget my money for upcoming expenses. 103. When I wrap a parcel or present, I like it to look immaculate. 104. The American military should not be sent abroad to defend other countries from threats. 105. Almost anybody could be an artist/actor/musician, it takes little special talent. 106. I strive to have good will-power in life. 107. I value will-power very highly in others.

In light of these results, I removed items 44 to 55 and 91 to 107 for not loading .32 or higher on either factor, and re-ran the analysis. In light of the next analysis, I removed 33, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 90 for not loading on any factor and re-ran the analysis. Subsequently, I removed 36 for not loading on any factor and re-ran the analysis. Based on re-running that analysis, I removed 29 for cross-loading. In the next analysis, no items cross-loaded, and every item loaded on one factor. Factor loadings are displayed in Table 11.

Table 11. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of two factors, entering the sixty-nine remaining items

Factor 1 2 1. Government programs are an important way to provide for the -.72 poor and needy in society. 2. The government should help the poor and needy using tax -.73 dollars from the rich.

Factor 1 2 3. The government should provide all citizens with free or low- -.72 cost health care. 4. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary to -.71 address inequity/injustice in society. 5. The government should provide equal health care benefits for -.71 all, regardless of one’s ability to pay. 6. Health care in America should not be made public. .71 7. Government programs encourage people to become dependent .70 and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 8. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s health .70 care. 9. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and provide welfare -.68 programs for those in need. 10. Global warming presents a threat to the future of humans. -.63 11. A smaller government with limited power would improve the .66 standard of living for all. 12. More guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens mean less .66 crime. 13. There should be more personal firearms in the possession of .65 American citizens. 14. I support “affirmative action” policies in workplaces and -.63 schools. 15. The Social Security system must be made more efficient .62 through privatization and/or allowing individuals to manage their own savings. 16. Global warming is real. -.59 17. Health care should be completely privatized. .61 18. It is ridiculous to keep a certain number of positions at schools .61 or workplaces aside for members of ethnic minorities. 19. The number of public servants employed (and paid) by the .54 government should be kept to a minimum. 20. Individuals do not need to own guns for their own protection. -.55 21. I fear for future generations having to deal with the -.48 environmental problems humans are creating. 22. The Social Security system should not be privatized. -.53 23. Income tax should be low. .47 24. Gas and electric companies should be under governmental -.50 control. 25. Government workers deserve the money they are paid by the -.45 government. 26. The homeless are responsible for their own problems. .40 27. Competitive capitalism produces economic growth, more jobs .41 and the highest standards of living.

Factor 1 2 28. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved by the .39 people who are homeless themselves. 29. Some criminals should be sentenced to death. .38 30. There is no crime which should be punished with the death -.38 sentence. 31. There are some crimes which should definitely be punished .38 with the death sentence. 32. Everyone should have the right to hunt animals for recreation. .35 33. Women and men are equally able to work the same kinds of -.33 jobs. 34. Marriage is meant to be a union of one man and one woman .81 only. 35. Homosexual people should not be allowed to parent children. .74 36. I fear that homosexual people adopting children will result in .71 there being more homosexual people in America over time. 37. Children raised by homosexual couples are more likely to grow .70 up gay. 38. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all circumstances. .69 39. I find it hard to trust people who are not religious. .69 40. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her own choice, -.67 therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 41. An aborted fetus is a victim of murder. .66 42. It should be legal for gay, lesbian, and bisexual and transgender -.65 individuals to marry. 43. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal access to -.63 options for euthanasia. 44. A woman should never have an abortion. .64 45. Religious expression has no place in government. -.62 46. Men should wear masculine clothing. .63 47. Children should be had only by people who are legally married. .60 48. Illegal drugs are the source of much evil in America. .60 49. The government must crack down on people who produce or .60 distribute illegal drugs. 50. Drug crimes involving marijuana should be sentenced as .59 harshly as those involving other illegal drugs. 51. It is better for a woman to have an abortion than to raise a child -.56 she does not want. 52. The government is too concerned about reducing the amount of -.57 illegal drugs in this country. 53. It is morally and ethically wrong for a Government to support .58 embryonic stem cell research. 54. Women should wear feminine clothing. .54 55. All reference to God in public and government spaces should -.53 be removed.

Factor 1 2 56. If a heterosexual married couple chooses to have only one .53 parent go to work after a child is born, it should be the husband who goes to work and not the wife. 57. Women should stay at home and parent children, and men .53 should work to support their families. 58. The government should not fund embryonic stem cell research. .51 59. The legal drinking age should be raised (i.e. older). .49 60. The government should never again prohibit citizens from -.44 having access to alcohol. 61. The legal drinking age should be reduced (i.e. younger). -.42 62. People who immigrate to America from other countries should .43 adopt an American way of life, rather than living as they did in the countries they came from. 63. It is perfectly acceptable for a heterosexual man to stay home -.42 and parent a child(ren), while his wife goes to work. 64. The Federal Government should secure the borders and enforce .41 current immigration law. 65. It would be unacceptable for a woman to wear a pant-suit on .36 her wedding day. 66. The military keeps our country safe. .34 67. Immigrants dilute the purity of American culture. .36 68. America will always have access to fossil fuels like oil. .34 69. Women and men are best suited to different types of work. .33

Next, the above items were entered in a factor analysis with the 20 BFAS items measuring neuroticism, specifying extraction of three factors. The first was virtually identical to factor 1 above, the second was all 20 neuroticism items, and the third was virtually identical to factor 2 above. As in Study 2a, then, this is good evidence for discriminant validity from a measure of overall negative affectivity. For subsequent analyses, I calculated values for each individual on the two factors by averaging the items which loaded .32 or higher on each factor. In light of the similarity between the above two factors and two of the factors interpreted in Study 2a, factor 1 will be referred to as Masculine Independence and factor 2 as Religious Traditionalism. The correlations among these scores, general conservatism, and 1-item measures of fiscal and social conservatism are displayed in Table 12.

Table 12. Bivariate correlations between the derived factors and general, fiscal, and social PO

RT Gen PO Fiscal PO Social PO MI .56** .74** .74** .63** RT .73** .49** .76** Gen PO .79** .87** Fiscal PO .62** Note. ** Denotes p < .001. MI = Masculine Independence; RT = Religious Traditionalism; Gen PO = General conservatism.

Next, I tested which individual difference variables correlated with the averaged scores for each of the three factors. First, I used BFAS scores at the trait level, then I tested how the ten aspects related to the two subscales.

Factors’ individual difference predictors.

Correlations of the two subscales (i.e. calculated average scores) with demographic characteristics, SWL, religiosity, and disgust sensitivity are displayed in Table 13.

Table 13. Bivariate correlations between MI, RT, demographic variables, disgust sensitivity, religiosity, and Satisfaction with Life

RT Gender Age Log Disgust Disgust Disgust Disgust Religi- SWL Income Overall Core Animal Contam osity MI .56** -.17** .09* .09* -.01 -.01 -.04 .06 .25** .09* RT -.08 .24** .04 .23** .15** .16** .33** .57** .07 Note. * Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p < .01. MI = Masculine Independence; RT = Religious Traditionalism.

Thus, both factors were associated with higher religiosity, although Religious Traditionalism more strongly. Both had a small positive association with SWL; the association of SWL with Masculine Independence just reached significance, but the association with Religious Traditionalism did not. Where the two differed most was in association with gender (Masculine Independence was significantly higher in males than in females), and in disgust sensitivity (Masculine Independence was unrelated to disgust sensitivity, where Religious Traditionalism is correlated with higher disgust sensitivity on all subscales). Finally, Masculine Independence alone was significantly, and positively, associated with the logarithm of gross household income. Then I tested the bivariate associations of the two factors to the ten BFAS personality aspects; see Table 14.

Table 14. Bivariate correlations between MI, RT, and the ten BFAS personality aspects

N - N- A- A- C- C- E- E- O- O- Vol Withd Comp Polite Indust Order Enthus Assert Intell Open MI -.07 -.12** -.14*** -.05 .12** .08 -.02 .06 -.09** -.18*** RT -.11** -.15*** -.05 .10* .16*** .17*** -.03 .02 -.22*** -.18*** Note. * Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p < .01, *** denotes p < .001. N-Vol = neuroticism-volatility; N-Withd = neuroticism-withdrawal; A-Comp = agreeableness-compassion; A-Polite = agreeableness-politeness; C-Indust = conscientiousness-industriousness; C-Order = conscientiousness-orderliness; E-Enthus = extraversion-enthusiasm; E-Assert = extraversion- assertiveness; O-Intell = openness-intellect; O-Open = openness-openness.

Next, I ran stepwise regressions predicting the two subscale scores with their respective bivariate predictors. When both BFAS aspects of a given trait were related to a factor, the overall trait was entered into the model; when one aspect was related and one was not, only the predictive aspect was entered. Thus, predictors of Masculine Independence were: gender, age, log income, religiosity, SWL, withdrawal, compassion, industriousness, and openness (trait). First, Masculine Independence was significantly related to religiosity (β = .32, p < .001), compassion (β = -.13, p = .01), openness (β = -.19, p < .001), gender (β = -.20, p < .001), and industriousness (β = .13, p = .01); model R2 = .19, F(5, 415) = 19.67, p < .001. There was one outlier with a standardized residual more than 3 standard deviations above the mean; this participant was excluded and the analysis was re-run. Excluding this participant left results unchanged, however. Results remained largely unchanged if predictors were entered simultaneously as well; the only notable difference was that industriousness’s association with Masculine Independence was marginally significant (β = .11, p = .07). Hence, in the final model, Masculine Independence was related to being less compassionate, less open, more industrious, more religious, and more likely to be male. Next, I performed the same series of analyses predicting Religious Traditionalism with its significant bivariate correlates (age, overall disgust, religiosity, neuroticism, politeness, conscientiousness, and trait openness). Significant predictors were: religiosity (β = .58, p < .001), openness (β = -.31, p < .001), overall disgust (β = .12, p = .001), and neuroticism (β = -.12, p = .001); model R2 = .47, F(4, 423) = 60.29, p < .001. However, there were 3 outliers with |standardized residuals| 3 standard deviations or more from the mean, so these participants were excluded and the analysis was re-run. In this model, significant predictors were: religiosity (β = .59, p < .001), openness (β = -.32, p < .001), overall disgust (β = .12, p < .001), and neuroticism

(β = -.12, p = .001); model R2 = .48, F(4, 420) = 59.73, p < .001. When predictors were entered simultaneously, the above four predictors remained significant, and age was also a significant predictor (β = .08, p = .03). Hence, in the final model, Religious Traditionalism was related to being more religious, less open, more disgust sensitive, less neurotic and, possibly, older.

Predicting other measures of conservatism with the subscales.

Including all participants who took 12 or more minutes to complete the study, I predicted general conservatism with MI and RT in a regression. Two participants had |standardized residuals| more than 3 standard deviations from the mean and were excluded. The model accounted for much of the variance in general conservatism (R2 = .71, F(2, 467) = 566.35, p < .001), which was positively predicted by both Masculine Independence (β = .50, p < .001) and Religious Traditionalism (β = .45, p < .001). Next, I included the two outliers from above and predicted 1-item social conservatism with both subscale scores; there were no outliers in this analysis. Both Masculine Independence (β = .32, p < .001) and Religious Traditionalism (β = .58, p < .001) significantly predicted social conservatism (R2 = .64, F(2, 454) = 407.62, p < .001). Finally, I predicted 1-item fiscal conservatism with the two subscale scores. Again, there were no outliers in this analysis. Both Masculine Independence (β = .70, p < .001) and Religious Traditionalism (β = .08, p = .04) significantly predicted fiscal PO (R2 = .56, F(2, 453) = 285.32, p < .001), although Masculine Independence accounted for far more variance in fiscal conservatism than Religious Traditionalism. Thus, as in Study 2a, both factors derived from a pool of 107 attitude-based items uniquely predicted variance – and accounted for much of the variance – in general conservatism. Also parallel to study 2a, both factors predicted unique variance in social PO, and Masculine Independence accounted for much of the variance in fiscal political orientation. Unlike Study 2a, Religious Traditionalism was a significant predictor of fiscal PO in Study 2b, albeit to a much smaller extent than Masculine Independence. Hence, social PO was similarly related to both Masculine Independence and Religious Traditionalism. Fiscal PO was predominantly associated with Masculine Independence and weakly albeit significantly to Religious Traditionalism; adding information about one’s stance on religiously charged political issues did not predict much unique information in his/her fiscal PO.

Predicting SWL with the subscales.

Both factors had small bivariate correlations with SWL (rs = .09 and .07, ps = .04 and .11 respectively). Next, I predicted SWL with the two subscales, producing a non-significant model (R2 = .01, F(2, 475) = 2.10, p = .12); SWL was related to neither Masculine Independence (β = .07, p = .22) nor Religious Traditionalism (β = .04, p = .50). Thus, when included together, the two factors seemed to split the variance that Masculine Independence shares with SWL. Next, I predicted SWL with Masculine Independence and general conservatism in a stepwise regression. This model was equivalent to the bivariate association between Masculine Independence and SWL, because general conservatism did not step into the model (R2 = .01, F(1, 532) = 4.48, p =.04). Next, I added religiosity to the model with Masculine Independence (R2 = .03, F(2, 539) = 7.33, p = .001); SWL was associated with religiosity (β = .14, p = .001) but not Masculine Independence (β = .05, p = .22). Thus, in this study, distinctly from Study 2a (in which Masculine Independence positively predicted SWL, and Ethnic Separateness negatively predicted SWL, controlling for many other factors), neither of MI and RT predicted SWL over and above religiosity in Study 2b. It is possible that either the items employed in Study 2a produce subscale indices which more meaningfully predict SWL, or that the association between those factors and SWL existed in that sample specifically. This required further investigation in Study 3.

Discussion Study 2b sampled political attitudes with a separate set of 107 items from the 107 employed in Study 2a. Several similarities between the results of Studies 2a and 2b are noteworthy: First, factor 1 in both studies appears to reflect Masculine Independence; individual difference predictors included maleness (either in gender or masculine personality traits – namely low neuroticism and low compassion), low concern for the problems of others at the issue level, and stereotypically masculine attitudes on issues such as gun ownership and hunting. It is indeed noteworthy that both of the samples showed that issues typically taken at face value to reflect “fiscal” attitudes such as taxation, health care, government reach, social security, and competitive capitalism factor out with attitudes related to environmental preservation and belief in global warming, gun ownership, hunting, and capital punishment. This presents serious cause

77 to reconsider the validity of considering “fiscal” issues as independent of “social” issues, which might at face value include things like gun ownership and environmental policy. Second, in both studies, although more so in Study 2a, the “social” factor included issues which were almost exclusively spoken to by organized religion. Thus, it is unclear the extent to which one can call these issues “social political issues” more than one should call them “religious political issues.” The third main finding in these studies is that not all conservatives were straightforwardly more disgust sensitive than liberals. In Study 2a, people higher in Masculine Independence were lower in core disgust sensitivity (but higher in contamination disgust) than those lower in Masculine Independence. Ethnic Separateness was also associated positively with contamination disgust alone, while Religious Traditionalism was associated with higher overall disgust sensitivity. Thus, the nuanced associations of the subscales with aspects of disgust sensitivity warranted further investigation, and testing for replication, in Studies 3 and 4. There were two main dissociations between Studies 2a and 2b. First, exploratory factor analyses in Study 2a yielded three coherent factors, with evidence for the utility of each factor in predicting other measures of conservatism and SWL (even controlling for multiple other factors). Analyses in Study 2b, on the other hand, pointed to a 2-factor solution. What was “missing” in Study 2b was a separate index or factor for race-related political issues (or the equivalent of Ethnic Separateness). It is possible that the randomly selected set of 107 items in Study 2b did not coherently assess Ethnic Separateness; alternatively, it could be an artifact of the particular set of items, and/or the sample, in Study 2a. Again, the design of Study 3 allowed for further testing of these possibilities. Second, results of Study 2a yielded subscale scores which robustly predicted SWL, even controlling for other strong predictors of SWL, including religiosity and the Big Five traits. Furthermore, in Study 2a, two of the factors predicted SWL in opposite directions (Masculine Independence positively and Ethnic Separateness negatively). Such findings are elucidating in light of the commonly reported small but significant bivariate correlations between SWL and general measures of PO, which are often easily accounted for by third variables. Some aspects of conservative ideology, as measured by the subscales in Study 2a, were associated with higher SWL, some with lower, and some not at all. By contrast, in Study 2b, MI and RT did not predict SWL when entered simultaneously in a regression. Although MI appeared to account for more

78 variance in SWL than General PO, MI was not a significant predictor when entered along with religiosity. Thus, Study 2b did not yield political subscales which robustly predicted SWL. Studies 3 and 4 allowed for further exploration of the relationship between the political subscales and SWL. Additionally, the items included in Study 2b seem to have better accounted for attitudes related to the death penalty, which factored out in Masculine Independence. In retrospect, it is apparent that the random selection of items included in Study 2a did not include a coherent subset of items on the death penalty, so the items in Study 2b may provide a better representation of how attitudes toward capital punishment cluster with other political attitudes.

Study 3

The aim of this study was to further scrutinize the factor structure in items pooled from Studies 2a and 2b. I combined the items from both studies which had loaded .32 or higher on any factor in the final factor analyses. Although factor loadings around .32 are modest, I did not want to over-fit the data in Studies 2a and 2b in early stages of scale development, so I erred on the side of overinclusion. Running Study 3 provided another data set with which to first, test the factor structure of the items, and second determine which items to include in the next iteration of the scale. The items loading .32 or higher on an interpreted factor in Study 2a or 2b comprised a pool of 140 items (see Appendix B), to which I added 3 items meant to tap obedience to and respect for authority (also in Appendix B). This was in light of the work of Duckitt and colleagues (2010); I had not yet created a subset of items measuring obedience to authority in the previous item pool and felt it was important to test whether obedience to authority would factor out with any of MI, RT, or ES. As recommended by Floyd and Widaman (1995), I used half of the Study 3 sample (randomly selected) to run a third exploratory factor analysis, and the other half to perform confirmatory factor analyses.

Method 1399 United States community members were recruited to take part in an online survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform for compensation of $0.90. As in Study 2, I considered the amount of time participants took to complete the survey and IP addresses from

79 which participants completed the survey. Again, participants were trimmed before running any further analyses, in the manner described below: Twenty participants were removed for having duplicate IP addresses, 7 participants were removed for having participated from an IP address that was included in Study 2a or 2b, 1 participant was removed for participating from an Indian IP address, and 1 participant was removed for entering her age as 4 years old. After the above data preparation, 1370 participants remained (646 male, 5 unreported; Mage = 37 years, SD = 12). Participants started by completing the 143 political attitude items (presented in random order), followed by the Satisfaction with Life Scale (M = 4.43, SD = 1.56), basic demographics including: gender, age, and a 1-item measure of religiosity, from 1 = Not at all religious to 7 = Very religious, 4 = Moderately religious (M = 2.79, SD = 2.09), the 1-item measures of fiscal (M = 3.80, SD = 1.89) and social PO (M = 3.01, SD = 1.80) employed in Study 2 (again, answers of I don’t know were removed and left blank), and the 3-item measure of General PO (M = 3.27, SD = 1.76) employed in Study 2. Finally, participants indicated how they voted in last federal election (Democrat, Republican, Other, or I didn’t vote in the last election). In order to split the data file into halves for separate factor analyses, I sorted participants according to their Qualtrics Response ID, which is a unique alphanumeric sequence randomly generated for each participant (see www.qualtrics.com/university/researchsuite/research- resources/other-resources/faqs/). I used the first 685 participants for exploratory factor analysis, and the second 685 participants for confirmatory factor analysis.

Results and discussion

Exploratory sample

In this sample of 685 participants, the average time taken was 18.6 minutes (SD = 12.82), and 8.67 marked the fifth percentile of minutes taken. Thus, 34 participants who took fewer than 8.67 minutes to complete the study were excluded from subsequent analyses.

Political orientation and Satisfaction with Life

General conservatism was marginally significantly correlated with SWL: r(639) = .08, p = .06. When entered in a regression predicting SWL along with religiosity (β = .16, p < .001), general conservatism was not a significant predictor (β = -.002, p = .96). Thus, again, general

80 conservatism had a small and marginally significant positive association with SWL, which was rendered non-significant by adding religiosity to the model.

Social versus fiscal political orientation

Again, the 1-item measures of fiscal and social PO were strongly correlated r(644) = .68. In this analysis, six participants had |standardized residuals| more than 3 and were excluded when the analysis was re-run: r(638) = .72, p < .001. Thus, as in previous samples, these 1-item measures of fiscal and social political orientation were very highly correlated; see Table 15.

Table 15. Bivariate correlations between general, fiscal, and social PO, religiosity, age, and gender

Social PO Gender Age Religiosity General PO Fiscal PO .72** -.17** .14** .33** .85** Social PO -.09* .17** .50** .87** Note. * Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p < .001.

First, I predicted fiscal conservatism with its significant bivariate correlates (general conservatism, religiosity, age, and gender), excluding the six participants from above and 10 additional participants with |standardized residuals| more than 3 standard deviations from the mean. Fiscal conservatism was predicted by general conservatism (β = .91, p < .001) and negatively by religiosity (β = -.08, p < .001) but not gender or age (|β|s <.02, ps > .29); model R2 = .78, F(4, 613) = 551.56, p < .001. Next, I predicted social conservatism with general conservatism, religiosity, age, and gender, excluding the six participants from above. Fifteen additional participants had |standardized residuals| more than 3 standard deviations from the mean and were excluded. Social conservatism was associated with general conservatism (β = .88, p < .001) and religiosity (β = .08, p < .001), but not age or gender (|β|s <.03, ps > .07); model R2 = .84, F(4, 608) = 785.12, p < .001. Thus, in this sample, both fiscal and social PO were strongly correlated with General PO, but they were distinguished by opposite associations with religiosity; when general conservatism was controlled for, fiscal conservatism was associated with lower religiosity and social conservatism with higher religiosity.

Factor analyses

I entered all 143 political attitude items into an exploratory factor analysis, using principal axis factoring extraction and direct oblimin rotation. Based on the scree plot (see Figure 3), either a 2- or 3-factor solution could be supported (first four Eigenvalues = 47.89, 9.06, 6.90, and 5.25). In order to err on the side of over-inclusion at this point in analyses, a 3-factor solution was interpreted. Subsequent analyses tested whether each of the three factors predict variance in variables such as general conservatism and Satisfaction with Life.

Figure 3. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis in Study 3.

Loadings in a 3-factor solution are displayed in Table 16. As recommended by Worthington and Whittaker (2006), only factor loadings of .32 or over are reported, and cross- loading was defined as occurring when items loaded .32 or higher on more than one factor with a difference between loadings of less than .15.

Table 16. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of three factors, including all one hundred forty-three items

Factor 1 2 3 1. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary -.84 to address inequity/injustice in society. 2. The government should help the poor and needy using -.81 tax dollars from the rich 3. The government should provide all citizens with free -.80 or low-cost health care. 4. Government programs are an important way to -.79 provide for the poor and needy in society. 5. The government should provide equal health care -.79 benefits for all, regardless of one’s ability to pay. 6. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently -.78 needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from Global warming. 7. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our -.74 country’s citizens are taken care of. 8. The government should fund alternative energy -.74 research and production. 9. A smaller government with limited power would .73 improve the standard of living for all. 10. The government should protect its citizens from the -.72 greed of big, private businesses. 11. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and -.72 provide welfare programs for those in need. 12. Health care should be completely privatized. .71 13. The government must produce a national plan for all -.71 energy resources with sustainability in mind. 14. The government should protect the public school -.71 system by providing additional funds to it. 15. The government has much more important things to .70 fund than the health care system. 16. Health care in America should not be made public. .70 17. I fear for future generations having to deal with the -.69 environmental problems humans are creating. 18. Government programs encourage people to become .69 dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 19. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s .69 health care. 20. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved -.68 with help from the government and tax dollars.

Factor 1 2 3 21. Global warming presents a threat to the future of -.68 humans. 22. Americans should be willing to alter their lifestyles in -.66 order to become more environmentally sustainable. 23. Every American citizen should share in the -.66 responsibility of making sure no one is homeless. 24. The environment is in grave danger from the impact of -.65 humans. 25. Global warming is real. -.63 26. The social security system must be made more .62 efficient through privatization and/or allowing individuals to manage their own savings. 27. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emissions will do .62 nothing to help the environment. 28. The government should not be funding the search for .61 solutions to global warming. 29. There are too many personal firearms in the hands of -.60 American citizens. 30. Gas and electric companies should be under -.59 governmental control. 31. More guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens mean .59 less crime. 32. I wish people would live in a more environmentally -.58 sustainable manner. 33. The government should not fund artistic pursuits. .58 34. An economy based on competitive capitalism is a -.57 source of many problems in America. 35. The Social Security system should not be privatized. -.56 36. America must become less reliant on the use of fossil -.56 fuels like oil. 37. Competitive capitalism produces economic growth, .56 more jobs, and the highest standards of living. 38. I support “affirmative action” policies in workplaces -.55 and schools. 39. I dislike the idea of tax dollars going to support the .55 arts. 40. The number of public servants employed (and paid) by .54 the government should be kept to a minimum. 41. There should be more firearms in the possession of .53 American citizens. 42. Lower taxes create incentive for people to work, save, .52 invest, and engage in entrepreneurial endeavors. 43. Individuals do not need guns for their own protection. -.51 44. There is nothing wrong with “big businesses.” .50

Factor 1 2 3 45. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the public .50 school system. 46. Social Security provides a safety net for the nation’s -.49 poor and needy. 47. The homeless are responsible for their own problems. .49 48. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved by .47 the people who are homeless themselves. 49. Everyone should have the right to own a personal .46 firearm(s). 50. There should be amnesty for immigrants who enter -.46 illegally (undocumented immigrants). 51. It is ridiculous to keep a certain number of positions at .45 .35 schools or workplaces aside for members of ethnic minorities. 52. Every individual should own a personal firearm(s). .45 53. Income tax should be low. .44 54. Government workers deserve the money they are paid -.42 by the government. 55. The military should be first priority when the .41 government spends money. 56. Public school teachers do not make enough money. -.41 57. The federal government should secure the borders and .41 .36 enforce current immigration law. 58. There is no crime which should be punished with the -.41 death sentence. 59. Most homeless people could have jobs and homes if .39 .32 they would pull themselves together. 60. With regards to airport security, passenger profiling -.39 -.38 based on criteria such as race and ethnicity is simply wrong and offensive. 61. Some criminals should be sentenced to death. .39 62. There are definitely some crimes which should be .38 punished with the death sentence. 63. Executing someone who murders an innocent .38 person(s) is justified. 64. When people hunt animals for recreation, it makes me -.35 sick. 65. America will always have access to fossil fuels like .35 oil. 66. Everyone should have the right to hunt animals for .33 recreation. 67. Hunting animals is good sport. 68. The military keeps our country safe.

Factor 1 2 3 69. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal -.75 access to options for euthanasia. 70. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her -.74 own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 71. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. .74 72. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all .73 circumstances. 73. Abortion is murder. .71 74. An aborted fetus is a victim of murder. .69 75. A woman should never have an abortion. .69 76. Women should have the right to choose whether they -.68 carry a pregnancy to term or have an abortion. 77. It is better for a woman to have an abortion than to -.66 raise a child she does not want. 78. I feel positively about stem cell research. -.66 79. Embryonic stem cell research is just wrong. .66 80. It is immorally and ethically wrong for a Government .33 .64 to support embryonic stem cell research. 81. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to cure -.62 diseases which current medicine has been unable to effectively treat. 82. Marriage is meant to be a union of one man and one .61 woman only. 83. The government should not support same-sex .60 marriage. 84. The government should not fund embryonic stem cell .42 .58 research. 85. The idea that America should separate God from .57 government is wrong. 86. Homosexual people should not be allowed to parent .57 .35 children. 87. The government should support embryonic stem cell -.44 -.57 research. 88. Religious expression has no place in government. -.56 89. All reference to God in public and government spaces -.56 should be removed. 90. Same-sex marriage should be illegal. .54 91. A citizen should have the right to experiment with -.53 drugs without severe penalties from the government. 92. Drug crimes involving marijuana should be sentenced .52 as harshly as those involving other illegal drugs. 93. I find it hard to trust people who are not religious. .51 94. It should be legal for gay, lesbian, and bisexual and -.50 transgender individuals to marry.

Factor 1 2 3 95. The government is too concerned about reducing the -.48 amount of illegal drugs in this country. 96. The government should never again prohibit citizens -.48 from having access to alcohol. 97. I fear that homosexual people adopting children will .47 .46 result in there being more homosexual people in America over time. 98. Children should be had only by people who are legally .47 married. 99. The government has more important things to be -.46 concerned about than illegal drugs. 100. The government must crack down on people who .44 produce or distribute illegal drugs. 101. I really respect people who have lots of children. .44 102. Illegal drugs are the source of much evil in America. .41 103. It is the right of American adults to drink alcohol -.40 when they like. 104. Married American couples should have more children. .38 105. It is a shame when unmarried people have children. .37 106. Anyone can make a good parent, regardless of his/her -.37 -.35 sexual orientation, gender, or race. 107. The legal drinking age should be raised (i.e. older). .36 108. The legal drinking age should be reduced (i.e. -.32 younger). 109. America would be a better place if people had more respect for authority. 110. People should question authority, rather than automatically obey. 111. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two .72 people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 112. I wish that individuals of different races would not .72 have children together. 113. Immigrants dilute the purity of American culture. .68 114. I worry that white people marrying people of different .66 races will result in having no more white people. 115. I feel positive about two people of different races -.66 having bi-racial children together. 116. Cultural and ethnic diversity are not good for America .63 as a country. 117. Cultural and ethnic diversity make America a better -.61 place. 118. It is sensible for police to consider someone’s race .56 when assessing whether he/she is dangerous.

Factor 1 2 3 119. If one is going to give money to a charity, it should be .55 an American charity, not a foreign charity. 120. Women and men are best suited to different types of .55 work. 121. Individuals of different races should not be able to get .55 married. 122. I wish there were more bi-racial couples in America. -.52 123. People who immigrate to America from other .52 countries should adopt an American way of life, rather than living as they did in the countries they came from. 124. I feel positively about American people who adopt -.52 non-American children into their families. 125. Women who dress in masculine clothing are probably .51 lesbians. 126. Racial profiling is good logical police work. .32 .49 127. Immigrants take valuable job opportunities from .48 American citizens. 128. Children raised by homosexual couples are more .42 .48 likely to grow up gay. 129. Women should stay at home and parent children, and .36 .47 men should work to support their families. 130. Women are better suited to staying at home with .46 children than men are. 131. Immigrants should not have the right to live as they .45 did in their original countries once they move to America. 132. It would be unacceptable for a woman to wear a pant- .45 suit on her wedding day. 133. If a heterosexual couple chooses to have only one .44 parent go to work after a child is born, it should be the husband who goes to work and not the wife. 134. Immigrants take jobs that could otherwise be given to .44 American citizens. 135. Individuals who immigrate to America from other .44 countries should do their best to assimilate completely to American culture. 136. Women should wear feminine clothing. .42 137. Women and men are equally able to work the same -.42 kinds of jobs. 138. Men should wear masculine clothing. .42 139. It is perfectly acceptable for a heterosexual man to -.41 stay home and parent a child(ren), while his wife goes to work.

Factor 1 2 3 140. Immigrants cost tax payers money. .33 .38 141. I value others’ artistic pursuits. -.34 142. I feel negatively about people who have children out .33 of wedlock. 143. People should really just obey authority.

In light of these results, I removed items 67, 68, 109, 110, and 143 for not loading .32 or higher on any factor and re-ran the analysis. Next, item 108 was removed for not loading on any factor. Subsequently, cross-loading items were items 51, 57, 60, 97, 105, 106, 128, 129, and 140, which were removed. In the next two steps, cross-loading items 87, 126, 138, and 139 were removed, followed by item 84. Factor loadings in the final model are displayed in Table 17.

Table 17. Pattern matrix using principal axis factoring, direct oblimin rotation, specifying extraction of three factors

Factor 1 2 3 1. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are -.83 necessary to address inequity/injustice in society. 2. The government should help the poor and needy -.83 using tax dollars from the rich 3. The government should provide all citizens with free -.80 or low-cost health care. 4. Government programs are an important way to -.80 provide for the poor and needy in society. 5. The government should provide equal health care -.79 benefits for all, regardless of one’s ability to pay. 6. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are -.78 urgently needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from Global warming. 7. A large government is necessary to ensure that all -.74 our country’s citizens are taken care of. 8. The government should fund alternative energy -.72 research and production 9. A smaller government with limited power would .73 improve the standard of living for all. 10. The government should protect its citizens from the -.73 greed of big, private businesses. 11. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and -.71 provide welfare programs for those in need. 12. Health care should be completely privatized. .73

Factor 1 2 3 13. The government must produce a national plan for all -.70 energy resources with sustainability in mind. 14. The government should protect the public school -.69 system by providing additional funds to it. 15. The government has much more important things to .71 fund than the health care system. 16. Health care in America should not be made public. .71 17. I fear for future generations having to deal with the -.69 environmental problems humans are creating. 18. Government programs encourage people to become .70 dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 19. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other .71 people’s health care. 20. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved -.70 with help from the government and tax dollars. 21. Global warming presents a threat to the future of -.67 humans. 22. Americans should be willing to alter their lifestyles -.65 in order to become more environmentally sustainable. 23. Every American citizen should share in the -.68 responsibility of making sure no one is homeless. 24. The environment is in grave danger from the impact -.64 of humans. 25. Global warming is real. -.62 26. The social security system must be made more .59 efficient through privatization and/or allowing individuals to manage their own savings. 27. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emissions will do .63 nothing to help the environment. 28. The government should not be funding the search for .61 solutions to global warming. 29. There are too many personal firearms in the hands of -.58 American citizens. 30. Gas and electric companies should be under -.60 governmental control. 31. More guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens mean .58 less crime. 32. I wish people would live in a more environmentally -.59 sustainable manner. 33. The government should not fund artistic pursuits. .59 34. An economy based on competitive capitalism is a -.58 source of many problems in America.

Factor 1 2 3 35. The Social Security system should not be privatized. -.55 36. America must become less reliant on the use of fossil -.56 fuels like oil. 37. Competitive capitalism produces economic growth, .56 more jobs, and the highest standards of living. 38. I support “affirmative action” policies in workplaces -.55 and schools. 39. I dislike the idea of tax dollars going to support the .55 arts. 40. The number of public servants employed (and paid) .56 by the government should be kept to a minimum. 41. There should be more personal firearms in the .51 possession of American citizens. 42. Lower taxes create incentive for people to work, .52 save, invest, and engage in entrepreneurial endeavors. 43. Individuals do not need guns for their own -.50 protection. 44. There is nothing wrong with “big businesses.” .50 45. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the public .49 school system. 46. Social Security provides a safety net for the nation’s -.46 poor and needy. 47. The homeless are responsible for their own .52 problems. 48. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved .48 by the people who are homeless themselves. 49. Everyone should have the right to own a personal .46 firearm(s). 50. There should be amnesty for immigrants who enter -.47 illegally (undocumented immigrants). 51. Every individual should own a personal firearm(s). .43 52. Income tax should be low. .44 53. Government workers deserve the money they are -.41 paid by the government. 54. The military should be first priority when the .42 government spends money. 55. Public school teachers do not make enough money. -.40 56. There is no crime which should be punished with the -.42 death sentence. 57. Most homeless people could have jobs and homes if .42 they would pull themselves together. 58. Some criminals should be sentenced to death. .40

Factor 1 2 3 59. There are some crimes which should definitely be .40 punished with the death sentence. 60. Executing someone who murders an innocent .40 person(s) is justified. 61. When people hunt animals for recreation, it makes -.33 me sick. 62. America will always have access to fossil fuels like .37 oil. 63. Everyone should have the right to hunt animals for .33 recreation. 64. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal -.76 access to options for euthanasia. 65. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her -.76 own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 66. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. .76 67. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all .74 circumstances. 68. Abortion is murder. .70 69. An aborted fetus is a victim of murder. .69 70. A woman should never have an abortion. .68 71. Women should have the right to choose whether they -.68 carry a pregnancy to term or have an abortion. 72. It is better for a woman to have an abortion than to -.68 raise a child she does not want. 73. I feel positively about stem cell research. -.60 74. Embryonic stem cell research is just wrong. .60 75. It is morally and ethically wrong for a Government .33 .57 to support embryonic stem cell research. 76. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to cure -.56 diseases which current medicine has been unable to effectively treat. 77. Marriage is meant to be a union of one man and one .62 woman only. 78. The government should not support same-sex .60 marriage. 79. The idea that America should separate God from .60 government is wrong. 80. Homosexual people should not be allowed to parent .57 .34 children. 81. Religious expression has no place in government. -.59 82. All reference to God in public and government -.58 spaces should be removed. 83. Same-sex marriage should be illegal. .55

Factor 1 2 3 84. A citizen should have the right to experiment with -.57 drugs without severe penalties from the government. 85. Drug crimes involving marijuana should be .51 sentenced as harshly as those involving other illegal drugs. 86. I find it hard to trust people who are not religious. .52 87. It should be legal for gay, lesbian, and bisexual and -.51 transgender individuals to marry. 88. The government is too concerned about reducing the -.50 amount of illegal drugs in this country. 89. The government should never again prohibit citizens -.48 from having access to alcohol. 90. Children should be had only by people who are .48 legally married. 91. The government has more important things to be -.49 concerned about than illegal drugs. 92. The government must crack down on people who .47 produce or distribute illegal drugs. 93. I really respect people who have lots of children. .46 94. Illegal drugs are the source of much evil in America. .43 95. It is the right of American adults to drink alcohol -.41 when they like. 96. Married American couples should have more .40 children. 97. The legal drinking age should be raised (i.e. older). .37 98. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two .77 people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 99. I wish that individuals of different races would not .76 have children together. 100. Immigrants dilute the purity of American culture. .69 101. I worry that white people marrying people of .70 different races will result in having no more white people. 102. I feel positive about two people of different races -.70 having bi-racial children together. 103. Cultural and ethnic diversity are not good for .64 America as a country. 104. Cultural and ethnic diversity make America a better -.63 place. 105. It is sensible for police to consider someone’s race .51 when assessing whether he/she is dangerous. 106. If one is going to give money to a charity, it should .53 be an American charity, not a foreign charity.

Factor 1 2 3 107. Women and men are best suited to different types of .51 work. 108. Individuals of different races should not be able to .58 get married. 109. I wish there were more bi-racial couples in America. -.53 110. People who immigrate to America from other .50 countries should adopt an American way of life, rather than living as they did in the countries they came from. 111. I feel positively about American people who adopt -.55 non-American children into their families. 112. Women who dress in masculine clothing are .50 probably lesbians. 113. Immigrants take valuable job opportunities from .48 American citizens. 114. Women are better suited to staying at home with .43 children than men are. 115. Immigrants should not have the right to live as they .47 did in their original countries once they move to America. 116. It would be unacceptable for a woman to wear a .44 pant-suit on her wedding day. 117. If a heterosexual couple chooses to have only one .42 parent go to work after a child is born, it should be the husband who goes to work and not the wife. 118. Immigrants take jobs that could otherwise be given .44 to American citizens. 119. Individuals who immigrate to America from other .42 countries should do their best to assimilate completely to American culture. 120. Women should wear feminine clothing. .40 121. Women and men are equally able to work the same -.40 kinds of jobs. 122. I value others’ artistic pursuits. -.33 123. I feel negatively about people who have children out .32 of wedlock.

Based on the above analysis, I computed participants’ scores on each of the three factors including all items with loadings of .70 or higher on a given factor. By these criteria, factor 1 included 18 items, factor 2 included 5 items, and factor 3 included 4 items. The factors’ items very closely paralleled the content of the three factors interpreted in Study 2a; here, factor 1 was

94 parallel to Masculine Independence (MI), factor 2 to Religious Traditionalism (RT), and factor 3 to Ethnic Separateness (ES). Bivariate correlations are displayed in Table 18.

Table 18. Bivariate correlations between MI, RT, ES, other PO scales, religiosity, SWL, and demographic variables

RT ES General Fiscal Social Gender Age Religiosity SWL PO PO PO MI .42** .28** .77** .73** .62** -.08* .16** .29** .10* RT .24** .54** .36** .58** -.04 .20** .60** .10* ES .34** .24** .32** -.18** .12* .12* -.12* Note. ** Denotes p < .001, * denotes p < .05. MI = Masculine Independence; RT = Religious Traditionalism; ES = Ethnic Separateness.

The 27 items included in the scale will henceforth be referred to as the Attitude-Based Political Orientation (ABPO) scale (Cronbach’s α = .95). Scale items were as follows: Masculine Independence (Cronbach’s α = .96): 1. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from global warming. 2. The government should fund alternative energy research and production. 3. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our country’s citizens are taken care of. 4. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary to address inequity/injustice in society. 5. The government should help the poor and needy using tax dollars from the rich. 6. The government should provide all citizens with free or low-cost health care. 7. Government programs are an important way to provide for the poor and needy in society. 8. The government should provide equal health care benefits for all, regardless of one’s ability to pay. 9. A smaller government with limited power would improve the standard of living for all. 10. The government should protect its citizens from the greed of big, private businesses. 11. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and provide welfare programs for those in need. 12. Health care should be completely privatized. 13. The government must produce a national plan for all energy resources with sustainability in mind. 14. The government has much more important things to fund than the health care system. 15. Health care in America should not be made public 16. Government programs encourage people to become dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 17. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s health care. 18. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved with help from the government and tax dollars.

Religious Traditionalism (Cronbach’s α = .92): 1. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal access to options for euthanasia. 2. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 3. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. 4. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all circumstances. 5. Abortion is murder. Ethnic Separateness (Cronbach’s α = .92): 1. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 2. I wish that individuals of different races would not have children together. 3. I worry that white people marrying people of different races will result in having no more white people. 4. I feel positive about people of different races having bi-racial children together. When the 3 factors were entered in a regression predicting General PO, there were 3 outliers with standardized residuals over 3 standard deviations from the mean; these participants were excluded. The model accounted for much of the variance in General PO (R2 = .67, F(3, 581) = 785.12, p < .001), with general conservatism positively associated with each of Masculine Independence (β = .65, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (β = .23, p < .001), and Ethnic Separateness (β = .11, p < .001). Subsequently, I added religiosity, age and gender in block 2, excluding the 3 outliers from above. In this model (R2 = .70, F(6, 573) = 221.34, p < .001), general conservatism was associated with Masculine Independence (β = .65, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (β = .12, p < .001), Ethnic Separateness (β = .11, p < .001), and religiosity (β = .17, p < .001), gender (β = .-.09, p < .001), but not age (β = -.03, p = .20): Thus, the three factors derived from analyses above were all significant predictors of General PO, even controlling for religiosity, age, and gender. Of particular interest is that Religious Traditionalism, which seems to exclusively tap religiously relevant political issues, remains a significant predictor even controlling for religiosity itself. Next, I predicted 1-item social PO with the 3 ABPO factors, including all participants who took enough time to complete the study; 5 additional participants were then excluded on account of their standardized residuals. The model was significant (R2 = .55, F(3, 583) = 221.34, p < .001), with social conservatism positively associated with all three of Masculine Independence (β = .43, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (β = .38, p < .001), and Ethnic Separateness (β = .14, p < .001).

The next analysis predicted fiscal PO with the three factors, initially including the 5 participants excluded above. Seven participants had standardized residuals more than 3 standard deviations from the mean and were excluded. The model was significant (R2 = .58, F(3, 580) = 268.90, p < .001), with fiscal conservatism positively associated with Masculine Independence (β = .73, p < .001) and Ethnic Separateness (β = .06, p = .04) but not Religious Traditionalism (β = .03, p = .42). Next, I entered MI, RT, and ES into a regression predicting SWL, including all participants who took enough time to complete the study; there were no outliers in this analysis. The model was significant (R2 = .04, F(3, 588) = 9.10, p < .001), and all three of Masculine Independence (β = .12, p = .01), Religious Traditionalism (β = .09, p = .05), and Ethnic Separateness (β = -.18, p < .001) were significant predictors. Again then, Ethnic Separateness was negatively associated with SWL, while conservative attitudes on Masculine Independence and Religious Traditionalism were positively associated. To test whether the three factors would predict SWL over and above General PO, I entered the three factors and General PO into a stepwise regression predicting SWL. The final model (R2 = .05, F(3, 582) = 9.64, p < .001) included Masculine Independence (β = .12, p = .01, Religious Traditionalism (β = .09, p = .05), and Ethnic Separateness (β = -.19, p < .001), but not General PO. Next, I removed General PO and added gender, age, and religiosity into the stepwise model predicting SWL (R2 = .06, F(3, 582) = 12.18, p < .001), which was positively associated with religiosity (β = .16, p < .001) and Masculine Independence (β = .10, p = .02), and negatively to Ethnic Separateness (β = -.18, p < .001). Thus, again, there is evidence suggesting that measuring PO as at least three factors of attitudes provides more explanatory power than measuring it unidimensionally. Where general conservatism has been consistently associated on a small but significant positive scale with SWL throughout these studies, this association is easily accounted for by SWL’s and General PO’s associations with another variable(s) – religiosity, for example. The developing ABPO scale, however, provides three subscales which factor independently and incrementally into models of General PO, social and fiscal PO, and SWL.

Confirmatory sample

Next, I turned to confirmatory analyses, using the second randomly selected subset of the larger sample gathered for Study 3. In this sample, 34 participants were deleted for taking less than 8.46 minutes to complete the study (i.e. the bottom 5th percentile for time taken), and participants with missing values on any of the 49 political attitude items loading .60 or higher in the final EFA above (see Table 17) were removed. This left 590 participants (270 male, 1 unreported, Mage = 37 years, SD = 13) for inclusion in confirmatory analyses. Generally, confirmatory factor analysis is not employed with large numbers of items, as models with many variables are unlikely to fit data (e.g. Kenny & McCoach, 2003; see http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm). One option for creating models with many items is to combine items into higher-order indices. This is called parceling, which can allow for testing models involving high numbers of items in a CFA (Meade & Kroustalis, 2005). However, parceling has been criticized as having the potential to inflate the fit indices of models which do not represent population characteristics (Bandalos & Finney, 2001, cited in Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). Bandalos and Finney (cited in Meade & Kroustalis, 2005) have recommended that parceling not be used when a measurement model is itself being tested with a CFA (rather than relationships among latent variables being tested). Thus, in order to test the appropriateness of the 3-factor solution implied by exploratory analyses, I first specified models taking the top three loading items from each of the three factors. I used the additional requirement that at least one item be oppositely coded from the others (i.e. if the top two loading items were reverse coded, I included the highest-loading forward-coded item as the third) to reduce the impact of possible acquiescence bias (Little et al., 2002). By modeling three items per factor, I satisfy a rule for sufficient model identification in CFA by having three or more indicators per latent variable and no correlated error terms (Flora, 2011) in the model. The items included in the model were, in factor 1: 1. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary to address inequity/injustice in society, 2. The government should help the poor and needy using tax dollars from the rich, and 3. A smaller government with limited power would improve the standard of living for all. The three items in factor 2 were: 4. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have access to legal options for euthanasia, 5. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized,

6. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. In factor 3, items were: 7. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable, 8. I wish that individuals of different races would not have children together, 9. Cultural and ethnic diversity make America a better place. The fit of these items to a 3-factor model was acceptable. χ2 = 108.25, df = 24; RMSEA = .077, 90% CI [.063, .09], CFI = .97, TLI = .96. Next, I tested a 2-factor model (i.e. roughly a fiscal factor and a social factor). The fit of these items to a 2-factor model (factor 1: items 1 through 3; factor 2: items 4 through 9) was very poor: χ2 = 671.66, df = 26; RMSEA = .21, 90% CI [.19, .22], CFI = .80, TLI = .73. I tested another 2-factor model, with four items related to factor 2: numbers 4, 6, 7, and 9 (i.e. two regarding religious issues and two regarding race-related issues, one forward-coded and one reverse-coded respectively). This improved model fit but it remained unacceptable overall: χ2 = 235.49, df = 13; RMSEA = .17, 90% CI [.15, .19], CFI = .87, TLI = .79. Finally, I created a 1- factor model, loading all nine items on one latent variable. This model was also an unacceptable fit: χ2 = 1294.29, df = 27; RMSEA = .28, 90% CI [.27, .30], CFI = .61, TLI = .48. To further explore the fit of the items to one, two, or three factors, I performed parallel analyses with parceled variables rather than collections of individual items.

Parceled variables

I parceled the 49 items loading .60 and up into three parcels each for each of three factors (i.e. 28 items in parcels for factor 1, 14 items in parcels for factor 2, and 7 items in parcels for factor 3). I parceled items by randomly assigning a number between one and three to each item and averaging the items grouped together by that assignment. This is a method of parceling recommended by Little and colleagues (2002), and is appropriate here because the dimensionality of each factor’s items is not fully understood or unambiguously identifiable; for instance, items regarding helping the homeless with tax dollars could tap multiple dimensions which are relevant to Masculine Independence (e.g. attitudes toward homeless people in general versus attitudes toward distributing resources via taxation). I first created a 3-factor model, with three parcels of items predicting each factor. Fit of this model was acceptable: χ2 = 127.09, df = 24; RMSEA = .085, 90% CI [.07, .10], CFI = .98, TLI = .97. When I created a 2-factor model with the three Masculine Independence parcels related to factor 1 and the remaining 6 parcels (i.e. Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic

Separateness) related to factor 2, the fit was unacceptable: χ2 = 985.42, df = 26; RMSEA = .25, 90% CI [.24, .26], CFI = .84, TLI = .78. Next, I created a “social factor” by pooling all 21 items loading .60 or higher on Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness and randomly grouping them into three parcels. Predicting factor 1 with the three Masculine Independence parcels formed in the above analysis and factor 2 with the “social” parcels, the model was a very good fit: χ2 = 17.25, df = 8, p = .03; RMSEA = .044, 90% CI [.01, .07], CFI = .998, TLI = .996. Thus, these confirmatory analyses suggest that a 3-factor model is an acceptable fit to the data set, and a 2-factor model may be an even better fit; particularly when items were parceled randomly rather than modeled as three individual observed variables per latent variable. Given that there are many subjective decisions involved in how to prepare large numbers of items for confirmatory factor analysis, these analyses are in no way definitive support for either model. Study 4 will allow for further confirmatory testing of a 3- versus 2-factor model of the latent variables tapped by the developing Attitude-Based PO scale. It remains possible that a 2-factor solution is a better model than three factors. In particular, Ethnic Separateness may not warrant inclusion as separate from Religious Traditionalism. A combination of Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness would indeed resemble what many would call a “social conservatism” factor. However, the issues that load on Masculine Independence are not straightforwardly fiscal. If a 2-factor model is supported by more testing, a main contribution of the current studies would be clarification that issues which factor out distinct from a “social factor” are themselves not straightforwardly economic; they rather seem to reflect a more complex blend of economically and socially relevant issues which seem defined more by an axis of Masculine Independence versus compassionate concern for others than by an axis of high versus low economic relevance.

Voting behaviour

Republican versus Democrat

Next, I explored the association of voting behaviour with scales included in Study 3. To this aim, I performed analyses on the entire sample of usable data (N = 1370 participants). 697 participants indicated that they voted Democrat, 275 voted Republican, 90 voted for an “other” candidate, and 239 did not vote. Of the participants who voted for an “other” candidate, the three

100 identifiable clusters were Libertarian (26 votes), independent (24 votes), and Green (11 votes). Attitude-Based PO subscale scores were calculated including the 27 items loading .70 or higher in the exploratory analyses in Study 3 (i.e. 18 Masculine Independence items, 5 Religious Traditionalism items, and 4 Ethnic Separateness items). For the purposes of logistic regressions, voting democrat was coded as 0 and voting Republican was coded as 1. In subsequent analyses, I excluded participants who took fewer than 8.63 minutes to complete the study, which marked the fifth percentile for minutes taken (M = 19.62 minutes, SD = 16.69). Bivariate correlations with voting behaviour are presented in Table 19.

Table 19. Bivariate correlations between voting Democrat or Republican, demographic variables, and additional measures of political orientation

Vote in last federal election (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican) MI .72*** RT .45*** ES .34*** Gender (male = -1, female = 1) -.08* Age .18*** Religiosity .36*** SWL .12** General PO .79*** Fiscal PO .70*** Social PO .70*** Note. * Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p < .01, *** denotes p < .001. MI = Masculine Independence; RT = Religious Traditionalism; ES = Ethnic Separateness. To further test the association of voting behaviour with the three Attitude-Based PO subscales, I performed a binary logistic regression predicting whether participants had voted Democrat or Republican with the three subscales. In this model (Nagelkerke R2 = .68), voting was significantly predicted by each of Masculine Independence (B = 1.73, SE = .16, Exp(B) = 5.67, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (B = .37, SE = .08, Exp(B) = 1.45, p < .001), and Ethnic Separateness (B = .31, SE = .09, Exp(B) = 1.37, p < .001). Next, I ran the same model with the addition of General PO. In this model (Nagelkerke R2 = .80), voting was significantly predicted by Masculine Independence (B = 1.02, SE = .17, Exp(B) = 2.78, p < .001) and general conservatism (B = 1.43, SE = .15, Exp(B) = 4.17, p < .001),

101 but not Religious Traditionalism (B = .003, SE = .10, Exp(B) = 1.003, p =. 98) or Ethnic Separateness (B = .19, SE = .11, Exp(B) = 1.21, p = .09). In the next analysis, I predicted voting Republican versus Democrat with Masculine Independence, General PO, and religiosity (Nagelkerke R2 = .80). Again, voting was associated with Masculine Independence (B = 1.07, SE = .17, Exp(B) = 2.92, p < .001) and general conservatism (B = 1.40, SE = .15, Exp(B) = 4.07, p < .001), but not religiosity (B = .02, SE = .07, Exp(B) = 1.02, p =. 74). Next, I predicted voting behaviour with Masculine Independence, General PO, and the 1- item measures of fiscal and social PO (Nagelkerke R2 = .80). Voting Republican rather than Democrat was predicted by Masculine Independence (B = .98, SE = .17, Exp(B) = 2.65, p < .001), general conservatism (B = 1.23, SE = .19, Exp(B) = 3.41, p < .001), and fiscal PO (B = .27, SE = .12, Exp(B) = 1.31, p =. 03), but not social PO (B = .04, SE = .13, Exp(B) = 1.04, p =. 76). Then I removed social PO, added age and gender, and re-ran the analysis (Nagelkerke R2 = .81). Voting Republican rather than Democrat was predicted by Masculine Independence (B = .91, SE = .17, Exp(B) = 2.47, p < .001), general conservatism (B = 1.33, SE = .16, Exp(B) = 3.76, p < .001), and fiscal conservatism (B = .31, SE = .13, Exp(B) = 1.37, p =. 01), but not age (B = .01, SE = .01, Exp(B) = 1.01, p =. 43) or gender (B = .08, SE = .15, Exp(B) = 1.08, p =. 60). Although all three subscales of the Attitude-Based PO scale predicted voting behaviour when they were entered together, general conservatism seemed to account for more variance in voting behaviour than Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness. Of the variables measured in Study 3, the most predictive model of who will vote Republican rather than Democrat included Masculine Independence, General PO, and fiscal PO. Hence, even controlling for a unidimensional measure of conservatism and a 1-item measure of fiscal PO, the Masculine Independence subscale of the Attitude-Based PO scale still accounted for a significant portion of variance in people’s voting either Republican or Democrat. Even when voters’ fiscal PO and general PO were controlled for, each unit increase in Masculine Independence was associated with them being 2.5 times likelier to vote Republican than Democrat. This is compelling evidence for construct, and incremental, validity of the Masculine Independence subscale.

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Republican versus Libertarian

Twenty-six participants indicated that they had voted Libertarian in the last federal election, providing a small sample of Libertarian voters. I created a variable coding Republican votes as 0 and Libertarian votes as 1, and another coding Democrat votes as 0 and Libertarian votes as 1, in order to test which variables may distinguish these voters. Bivariate correlations between these and other variables are displayed in Table 20.

Table 20. Bivariate correlations between voting Libertarian and other variables

Libertarian versus Republican Libertarian versus Democrat (0 = Republican, 1 = Libertarian) (0 = Democrat, 1 = Libertarian) Masculine Independence -.05 .40*** Religious Traditionalism -.17** .08* Ethnic Separateness -.14* .04 General PO -.26*** .35*** Fiscal PO -.002 .37*** Social PO -.32** .15*** Religiosity -.17** .04 Gender -.14** -.13** Age -.20*** -.06 Satisfaction with Life -.14* -.04 Note. * Denotes p < .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01, *** denotes p ≤ .001.

In a binary logistic regression, I predicted voting Libertarian versus Republican with Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness (Nagelkerke R2 = .10). Voting Libertarian rather than Republican was unrelated to Masculine Independence (B = .02, SE = .17, Exp(B) = 1.02, p = .89), but was negatively associated with Religious Traditionalism (B = -.36, SE = .14, Exp(B) = .70, p = .01) and Ethnic Separateness (B = -.42, SE = .20, Exp(B) = .66, p = .04). Thus, when participants’ Masculine Independence was accounted for, higher Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness predicted one being more likely to vote Republican than Libertarian. Finally, I predicted voting Libertarian versus Democrat with MI, RT, and ES (Nagelkerke R2 = .42). Voting Libertarian rather than Democrat was related to Masculine Independence (B = 1.90, SE = .28, Exp(B) = 6.68, p < .001), but neither of RT (B = -.32, SE = .22, Exp(B) = .73, p = .15) nor ES (B = -.03, SE = .23, Exp(B) = .97, p = .90). Thus, people who voted Libertarian were substantially higher in MI, but comparable in RT and ES, to people who voted Democrat.

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It should be noted that, with a very small sample of Libertarian voters, these results require further scrutiny and attempt at replication. With that in mind, the results of Study 3 suggest that Libertarian voters are similar to Republican voters in MI, and similar to Democrat voters in RT and ES. These results are further discussed in the General Discussion.

Study 4

The purpose of Study 4 was to add six new items to the developing Attitude-Based Political Orientation (ABPO) scale and to administer relevant scales alongside it to allow for testing of discriminant and convergent validity. Because there were many scales I wished to administer along with the ABPO scale, I created six blocks of scales: First, Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994) and Authoritarianism- Conservatism-Traditionalism scales (Duckitt et al., 2010), which together comprise a contemporary scale based on the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1981). As was previously discussed, SDO and RWA have been considered related but dissociable aspects of right-wing ideology (e.g. Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Duckitt, 2001). They are commonly included in studies of political orientation, and have been found to account for incremental variance in variables such as the content of people’s life narratives (McAdams et al., 2012), values (Cohrs et al., 2005) and generalized prejudice (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004). Both SDO and RWA are generally positively associated with indices of conservatism and, together, they can account for more than half of the variance in conservative beliefs and general political orientation (e.g. Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). According to Duckitt (2001), SDO reflects motivational goals related to competition and dominance, whereas RWA is underlain by motivation to defend one’s group and be protected from threat. Akrami and Ekehammar (2006) referred to people high in RWA as submissive authoritarian, and people high in SDO as dominant authoritarian. Thus, the SDO + RWA block was intended to compare the ABPO scale to two related but distinct constructs which are generally considered to represent two key motivational underpinnings of political conservatism. The second block included Everett’s (2013) Social Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS), as well as one item asking who participants last voted for. Everett’s scale comprises twelve items in a catch-phrase style (abortion, limited government, military and national security, religion, welfare benefits, gun ownership, traditional marriage, traditional values,

104 fiscal responsibility, business, the family unit, and patriotism), to which participants respond on scales of 0 to 100 to indicate how much negativity versus positivity they feel toward each phrase/word. The SECS is the most contemporary issue-based scale of political orientation developed in a North American population I am aware of, and it therefore presents an opportunity to compare the ABPO scale to an existing attitude-based measure. The third block included measures of non-political individual difference variables which previous studies have found to be related to political orientation, and which appear relevant to the three ABPO subscales. These variables are patriotism, racism, religiosity, and disgust sensitivity. Regarding patriotism, I included items tapping national identity, which tends to be uncorrelated with conservatism/liberalism, in contrast with most other measures of patriotism (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). I also included two items employed by Huddy and Khatib which tap symbolic patriotism; people’s feelings of pride around the American flag and American anthem. Symbolic patriotism is generally higher in conservatives than liberals and is therefore considered ideologically biased (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Thus, I used two brief indices of patriotism; one ideologically neutral, and one correlated with conservatism. To measure racism, I used a modified Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986): I replaced references to black people with non-white people, and I removed one item referring to desegregation of schools and one referring to whether the anger of blacks in America is understandable. Religiosity was measured with a 4-item religiosity scale (Cohen & Rankin, 2004), the 5-point scale of which I modified slightly to range from not at all to very much, rather than extremely. Given that Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness are closely related to religion and racism respectively, I wanted to compare them directly to measures of religion and general prejudice/racism. Finally, I again included the Disgust-Scale Revised (Haidt, et al., 1994; revised by Olatunji et al., 2007), because conservatives have been shown to be higher than liberals in disgust sensitivity (e.g. Inbar et al., 2008), and this could also potentially explain variance in outcome variables over and above that explained by the Attitude-Based PO scale. The fourth block of measures included scales relevant to Jost and colleagues’ (2003) model of political conservatism as motivated cognition, including the System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) and a 2-item scale explicitly tapping resistance to change (Jost et al., 2007). Together, those two scales should broadly tap into resistance to change, which is thought to be one of two main motivational underpinnings of conservative ideology. The second motivational

105 underpinning is opposition to equality (Jost et al., 2003), which I assessed with five items taken from Kluegel and Smith (1986); these items had been previously used for this purpose (Jost et al., 2007). Finally, I included a 1-item scale of political orientation previously used – or very similar to those used – in previous studies (e.g. Jost et al., 2007; Amodio et al., 2007), ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 9 (extremely conservative). Such 1-item measures of PO have been shown to account for a large amount of variance in voting behaviour (e.g. Amodio et al., 2007; Jost, 2006). It is therefore also important to compare the ABPO scale’s predictive utility over and above a 1-item measure of PO, as well as scales tapping constructs included in Jost and colleagues’ (2003) model of conservatism as motivated cognition. The fifth block included the BFAS (DeYoung et al., 2007) and the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI, a 40-item scale of masculinity and femininity, with 20 items tapping each; Bem, 1974). According to Holt and Ellis (1998), the BSRI appeared largely valid in the late 1990s, although gender roles did appear to be weakening somewhat. This block’s measures were included to allow for testing of how strongly the subscales would be related to personality traits and masculinity-femininity. The sixth block of participants completed a collection of novel items targeting participants’ perceptions of a same-sex couple based on various behaviours. Exploration of these items was outside the scope of the current set of studies, so Block 6’s individual measures are not discussed further; rather, participants in Block 6 were included in analyses of the larger pool of participants who completed the Attitude-Based PO scale, 1-item religiosity, SWL, demographic variables, General PO, and 1-item measures of fiscal and social PO.

Method 402 United States community members were recruited to take part in an online survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform for compensation of $2.12. Participants completed a consent page, and completed one of six questionnaire blocks (selected randomly) before or after (determined randomly) a block containing the Attitude-Based PO scale, along with gender, age, ethnicity, education, a 1-item measure of religiosity, SWL, the 3-item measure of General PO, and the 1-item measures of fiscal and social PO, before reading a debriefing page and – optionally – leaving their comments on the study.

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In this study, I added three new items aiming to tap each of Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness, with the intention of using less polarizing or overt language to capture more of the variance in people’s attitudes. In addition to those new items, one edit to an existing item loading on Ethnic Separateness was made for the same reason: Immigrants dilute the purity of American culture was changed to Immigrants dilute the characteristics of American culture. The six new items were: 1. Allowing refugees into America reduces the amount of resources available to American citizens. 2. I wish fewer American tax dollars were used for foreign aid. 3. It is easy for people from other countries to immigrate to America. 4. If a pregnant woman believes abortion is the best choice for her, she should not have to defend that choice to anyone. 5. The use of embryonic stem cells in medicine could cause problems in the long run. 6. Even if someone requests medical euthanasia, it may not be the best solution for them. As in prior studies, I considered the amount of time participants in each block took to complete the survey and IP addresses from which participants completed the survey. Again, participants were trimmed before running any further analyses, in this manner: 7 participants were removed for not completing the consent form by typing in the date. Three more were removed for having duplicate IP addresses (in which cases I deleted the second study completion), and 6 participants were removed for having participated from an IP address that was included in Study 2a, 2b, or 3. No participants took part from an Indian IP address in this study. Across all 6 blocks, 386 participants remained (186 male, 3 unreported; Mage = 32 years, SD = 10). I computed time taken for each of the six blocks so I could exclude the bottom 5th percentile of time taken for each block (see Table 21); this resulted in 17 additional participants being excluded from analyses.

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Table 21. Descriptive statistics and time taken for individual blocks of scales (N = 386)

Age Gender Time Block 1: SDO & ACT M = 33 years 31 male M = 16, SD = 9 SD = 11 32 female 5th %ile = 6.92 Block 2: SECS, voting M = 32 years 35 male M = 15, SD = 29 SD = 8 30 female 5th %ile = 5.0 1 unreported Block 3: Patriotism, MRS, M = 31 years 35 male M = 18, SD = 28 Religiosity, Disgust Sensitivity SD = 11 31 female 5th %ile = 6.29 Block 4: SJ, Resistance to change, M = 32 years 34 male M = 12, SD = 7 Opposition to equality, 1-item PO SD = 10 29 female 5th %ile = 6.40 1 unreported Block 5: Masculinity/Femininity, M = 32 years 21 male M = 20, SD =13 BFAS SD = 11 45 female 5th %ile = 9.82 Block 6 M = 31 years 30 male M = 14, SD = 6 SD = 9 30 female 5th %ile = 7.60 1 unreported

Results and discussion First, I calculated scores on the three Attitude-Based PO subscales: For Masculine Independence, I averaged the 18 items which loaded .70 or higher in Study 3 (M = 2.96, SD = 1.23). I had included three new items for each of Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness, so I ran exploratory factor analyses to assess whether the new items would factor out with the original items. First, I tested the structure of the five original and three new items for Religious Traditionalism, using principal axis factoring extraction and direct oblimin rotation. One factor was extracted (Eigenvalue = 5.35), and the three new items had |factor loadings| between .60 and .73. Thus, Religious Traditionalism was calculated to include all 8 items (M = 2.81, SD = 1.39). Next, I tested the structure of the four original and three new items for Ethnic Separateness: Two factors were derived (Eigenvalue 1 = 3.84, Eigenvalue 2 = 1.13). The original four items comprised the first factor (|loadings| between .65 and .96), and the three new items comprised the second factor (|loadings| between .61 and .79). When the analysis was re-run specifying a 1-factor solution, the three new items had the lowest three loadings on the factor, between .49 and .59, and the four original items had |loadings| between .74 and .87. It was therefore not clear that the three new items should be included in Ethnic Separateness. To explore this issue further, I calculated Ethnic Separateness as a 4-item measure

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(M = 1.71, SD = 1.04) and a 7-item measure (M = 2.62, SD = 1.02). The 4-item measure of Ethnic Separateness did have a concerning distribution; 80% of the sample scored between 1.0 and 2.0, whereas the 7-item measure had 82.5% scoring between 1.00 and 3.43. Thus, the original four items may have been worded too extremely to capture sufficient variance in people’s actual attitudes. The three new items seemed to capture more variance in attitudes but may not have measured the most pertinent construct. Hence, I considered Ethnic Separateness as a 4-item and a 7-item measure for comparison in further analyses. Items in the ABPO scale were as follows: Masculine Independence (Cronbach α = .96): 1. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from global warming. 2. The government should fund alternative energy research and production. 3. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our country’s citizens are taken care of. 4. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary to address inequity/injustice in society. 5. The government should help the poor and needy using tax dollars from the rich. 6. The government should provide all citizens with free or low-cost health care. 7. Government programs are an important way to provide for the poor and needy in society. 8. The government should provide equal health care benefits for all, regardless of one’s ability to pay. 9. A smaller government with limited power would improve the standard of living for all. 10. The government should protect its citizens from the greed of big, private businesses. 11. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and provide welfare programs for those in need. 12. Health care should be completely privatized. 13. The government must produce a national plan for all energy resources with sustainability in mind. 14. The government has much more important things to fund than the health care system. 15. Health care in America should not be made public. 16. Government programs encourage people to become dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 17. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s health care. 18. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved with help from the government and tax dollars. Religious Traditionalism (Cronbach α = .93): 1. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal access to options for euthanasia. 2. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 3. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. 4. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all circumstances. 5. Abortion is murder. New items (Cronbach α of all 8 items = .93):

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6. If a pregnant woman believes abortion is the best choice for her, she should not have to defend that choice to anyone. 7. The use of embryonic stem cells in medicine could cause problems in the long run. 8. Even if someone requests medical euthanasia, it may not be the best solution for them. Ethnic Separateness (Cronbach α = .88): 1. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 2. I wish that individuals of different races would not have children together. 3. I worry that white people marrying people of different races will result in having no more white people. 4. I feel positive about people of different races having bi-racial children together. New items (Cronbach α of all 7 items = .84): 5. Allowing refugees into America reduces the amount of resources available to American citizens. 6. I wish fewer American tax dollars were used for foreign aid. 7. It is easy for people from other countries to immigrate to America.

Predicting PO and SWL with the Attitude-Based PO subscales

All participants completed measures of SWL (M = 3.78, SD = 1.16), the 3-item measure of General PO employed in previous studies (M = 3.13, SD = 1.68), and the 1-item measures of each of fiscal PO (M = 3.68, SD = 1.81) and social PO (M = 2.75, SD = 1.80) employed in previous studies. Correlations among these variables, the Attitude-Based PO subscales (including Ethnic Separateness calculated with only the original 4 items and as a 7-item measure), age, gender, and religiosity are displayed in Table 22. In Study 4, I performed correlation and regression analyses using bootstrapping (with 1000 resamples) to diversify the analytic methods, since Studies 1 through 3 involved non-bootstrapped analyses in which outlying participants for each analysis would be excluded.

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Table 22. Bivariate correlations between the Attitude-Based PO subscales, SWL, general, fiscal, and social PO, and demographic variables (N = 363)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 1. MI .60*** .38*** .55*** -.02 .17** .50*** .17** .80*** .74*** .68*** [.51, 68] [.28, .48] [.47, .64] [-.13, .09] [.06, .28] [.41, .58] [.06, .28] [.76, .84] [.68, .79] [.61, .74] 2. RT .26*** .36*** .01 .21*** .68*** .04 .67*** .47*** .72*** [.15, .37] [.26, .46] [-.10, .11] [.10, .32] [.62, .75] [-.08, .14] [.60, .73] [.38, .55] [.65, .77] 3. ES (4-item) .88*** -.20*** .14** .18*** .04 .43*** .34*** .43*** [.84, .91] [-.29, - [.03, .26] [.09, .28] [-.06, .14] [.34, .52] [.24, .43] [.33, .53] .10] 4. ES (7-item) -.14** .21*** .28*** .04 .58*** .47*** .52*** [-.24, - [.10, .33] [.18, .37] [-.07, .13] [.51, .65] [.38, .54] [.43, .60] .04] 5. Gender .03 .08 .04 -.09 -.11* -.06 [-.08, .15] [-.03, .19] [-.07, .15] [-.20, .02] [-.22, - [-.17, .003] .05] 6. Age .18*** .06 .20*** .17** .28*** [.08, .29] [-.04, .16] [.09, .30] [.06, .26] [.17, .38] 7. Religiosity .11* .56*** .41*** .61*** [-.003, [.50, .66] [.30, .50] [.51, .68] .22] 8. SWL .10 .14** .09 [0, .20] [.03, .25] [-.01, .20] 9. General PO .79*** .83*** [.74, . 84] [.78, .87] 10. Fiscal PO .63*** [.56, .70] 11. Social PO Note. * Denotes p ≤ .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01, *** denotes p ≤ .001. Analyses were bootstrapped with 1000 resamples; 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, ES = Ethnic Separateness (7-item version includes three new items). Gender was coded as -1 = male, 1 = female.

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Next, I predicted General PO, social PO, fiscal PO, and SWL with Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness. In Model 1, Ethnic Separateness was calculated by averaging only the four original items. In Model 2, Ethnic Separateness was calculated by averaging the four original and the three new items. Results are presented in Table 23.

Table 23. Regression analyses predicting general, fiscal, and social PO, and SWL with the Attitude-Based PO subscales

Model 1 Model 2 MI RT ES MI RT ESE General β = .57 β = .29 β = .14 β = .52 β = .29 β = .19 Conservatism B = .77 B = .35 B = .23 B = .71 B = .35 B = .31 [.67, .87] [.26, .44] [.12, .36] [.59, .81] [.25, .44] [.19, .43] SE = .05 SE = .05 SE = .06 SE = .06 SE = .05 SE = .06 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 Model R2 .71, p < .001, F(3, 344) = 283.68 .72, p < .001, F(3, 344) = 295.31 Social β = .32 β = .48 β = .19 β = .29 β = .48 β = .19 Conservatism B = .46 B = .61 B = .32 B = .42 B = .61 B = .33 [.34, .61] [.49, .73] [.19, .44] [.27, .58] [.48, .72] [.19, 46] SE = .07 SE = .06 SE = .07 SE = .08 SE = .06 SE = .07 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p = .001 p = .001 p = .001 Model R2 .64, p < .001, F(3, 345) = 204.94 .64, p < .001, F(3, 344) = 200.28 Fiscal β = .68 β = .05 β = .07 β = .66 β = .05 β = .09 Conservatism B = .99 B = .06 B = .12 B = .96 B = .06 B = .15 [.85, 1.11] [-.05, .18] [-.02, .26] [.81, 1.10] [-.05, .18] [.01, .31] SE = .07 SE = .06 SE = .07 SE = .07 SE = .06 SE = .08 p < .001 p = .32 p = .10 p < .001 p = .31 p = .04 Model R2 .55, p < .001, F(3, 345) = 137.66 .55, p < .001, F(3, 344) = 138.00 SWL β = .25 β = -.10 β = -.03 β = .29 β = -.10 β = -.09 B = .24 B = -.09 B = -.03 B = .27 B = -.08 B = -.11 [.11, .37] [-.21, .02] [-.16, .08] [.13, .43] [-.21, .02] [-.27, .04] SE = .07 SE = .06 SE = .06 SE = .08 SE = .06 SE = .07 p < .001 p = .14 p = .60 p = .001 p = .17 p = .15 Model R2 .04, p = .003, F(3, 344) = 4.78 .04, p < .001, F(3, 343) = 5.41 Note. MI = Masculine Independence; RT = Religious Traditionalism; ES = Ethnic Separateness (4 items); ESE = Ethnic Separateness Extended (7 items).

These results show that all three subscales predict unique variance in General and Social PO. Fiscal PO, by contrast, was related only to Masculine Independence when Ethnic Separateness was calculated with the original four items. However, the 7-item version of Ethnic Separateness accounted for a significant portion of variance in fiscal PO. Moving forward, I

112 included all seven items in Ethnic Separateness, because the distribution is less extremely skewed, the Cronbach α remains acceptably high, and the 7-item version appears to account for comparable, or more, variance in variables of interest. SWL was related only to Masculine Independence in this study, and not negatively associated with Ethnic Separateness as in previous studies. To allow for further investigation of the SWL-Masculine Independence association, I added age, gender, and religiosity (1-item measure, How religious are you?, measured from 1 = Not at all religious, to 7 = Very religious, with midpoint 4 = Moderately religious; M(369) = 2.72, SD = 1.91) to the model with Masculine Independence, predicting SWL. The model was significant (R2 = .03, F(4, 346) = 2.96, p =.02), and Masculine Independence was the only significant predictor of SWL (β = .16, B = .15 [.03, .27], SE = .06, p = .02); all other βs ≤ .04, ps > .45. Thus, there was a significant positive association between Masculine Independence and SWL, which held controlling for age, gender, and religiosity. For the sake of comparison, I predicted SWL with General PO, along with gender, age, and religiosity. While general conservatism was a significant predictor of SWL on its own (β = .12, B = .08 [.03, .15], SE = .04, p = .04), it was no longer significant when the other three variables were added to the model (R2 = .02, F(4, 358) = 1.65, p =.16); none of the predictors were associated with SWL in this model (βs ≤ .09, ps > .18). Hence, Masculine Independence was related to SWL in a way that could not be accounted for by demographic variables or religiosity, whereas general conservatism had a small and significant positive association with SWL which is reduced and rendered non-significant by the inclusion of these variables. Now, I turn to results and discussion of each block of questionnaires. For each block of measures, I first predicted the pertinent scales with the three Attitude-Based PO subscales, then predicted General PO and SWL with the three subscales and the additional scales included in each block. My aim was to test whether the three Attitude-Based PO subscales predict significant variance in existing scales, and whether they allow for any incremental prediction of variance in General PO and SWL over and above those scales.

Block 1: Social Dominance Orientation and Authoritarianism-Conservatism- Traditionalism Scales

Bivariate correlations among the ABPO factors and the Block 1 variables are in Table 24.

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Table 24. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 1 (n = 53)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 1. MI .53*** .54*** .65*** .45*** .53*** .60*** .58*** [.25, .75] [.35, 72] [.42, .82] [.18, .67] [.28, .75] [.36, .77] [.34, .76] 2. RT .42** .23 .53*** .80*** .47*** .68*** [.19, .66] [-.05, [.28, .75] [.68, .89] [.22, .70] [.50, .82] .57] 3. ES .40** .31* .43*** .44*** .44*** [.16, .65] [.04, .58] [.18, .66] [.20, .64] [.22, .65] 4. SDO .26 .34** .43*** .38** [-.03, [.11, .57] [.18, .64] [.13, .59] .53] 5. ACT .77*** .81*** .94*** Conservatism [.55, .90] [.68, .90] [.90, .97] 6. ACT .67*** .90*** Traditionalism [.46, 83] [.82, .96] 7. ACT .89*** Authoritarianism [.83, .94] 8. ACT Overall Note. * Denotes p ≤ .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01, *** denotes p ≤ .001. Analyses were bootstrapped with 1000 resamples; 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, ES = Ethnic Separateness. Next, I predicted SDO and ACT with Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism (including the three new items), and Ethnic Separateness (including the three new items). Results of predicting the measures included in Block 1 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales are displayed in Table 25.

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Table 25. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 1 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales

MI RT ES SDO β = .70 β = -.18 β = .10 B = .57 B = -.12 B = .12 [.14, .84] [-.31, .13] [-.23, .49] SE = .18 SE = .11 SE = .18 p < .001 p = .28 p = .49 Model R2 .46, p < .001, F(3, 50) = 14.45 ACT- β = .43 β = .20 β = .14 Authoritarianism B = .40 B = .15 B = .20 [.10, .63] [-.02, .37] [-.17, .54] SE = .14 SE = .10 SE = .18 p = .01 p = .11 p = .25 Model R2 .43, p < .001, F(3, 51) = 12.29 ACT-Conservatism β = .23 β = .39 β = .04 B = .23 B = .32 B = .06 [-.11, .50] [.07, .59] [-.33, .45] SE = .16 SE = .16 SE = .20 p = .17 p = .02 p = .77 Model R2 .32, p < .001, F(3, 51) = 8.36 ACT-Traditionalism β = .12 β = .71 β = .08 B = .14 B = .69 B = .14 [-.21, .39] [.49, .88] [-.20, .49] SE = .15 SE = .10 SE = .17 p = .35 p < .001 p = .43 Model R2 .69, p < .001, F(3, 52) = 38.03 ACT-Overall β = .27 β = .50 β = .09 B = .26 B = .39 B = .13 [-.04, .49] [.22, .58] [-.20, .44] SE = .14 SE = .10 SE = .16 p = .08 p = .002 p = .42 Model R2 .55, p < .001, F(3, 51) = 20.00 Note. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness.

SDO and RWA have been said to reflect dominant and submissive authoritarianism respectively (Akrami & Ekehammar, 2006); SDO has more to do with a competitive motivation to dominate socially, and RWA to do with desire for protection from threat (Duckitt, 2001). Of the three ABPO subscales, only Masculine Independence predicted SDO, and the two correlated rather highly. Similarly, the Authoritarianism subscale of the ACT scale was predicted uniquely by Masculine Independence. Items in the ACT-Authoritarianism subscale have to do with being

115 tough on crime, using harsh penal methods, making stricter laws, and whether “loafers and criminals” deserve sympathy versus “strong medicine.” Religious Traditionalism was the only predictor of ACT subscales measuring Conservatism and Traditionalism. ACT-Conservatism items tap attitudes about whether people should question/challenge or obey authority and respect leaders. ACT-Traditionalism items have to do with attitudes toward sticking to the “straight and narrow,” “old-fashioned ways,” traditional morals and values, abortion, pornography, premarital sex, and heeding the Bible. It is noteworthy that Ethnic Separateness was correlated positively with SDO but it did not predict any of SDO or the subscales of ACT over and above the other two factors. Thus, SDO appeared to be more related to Masculine Independence than Ethnic Separateness.

Predicting General PO and SWL

In order to see whether any of the Attitude-Based PO subscales would account for variance in General PO over and above SDO and ACT, I predicted General PO in a regression with SDO and overall ACT in a first block, and the three Attitude-Based PO subscales in a second block. The model accounted for most of the variance in general conservatism (R2 = .78, F(5, 47) = 35.95, p < .001), with Masculine Independence (β = .46, B = .62 [.31, .91], SE = .15, p < .001) and ACT (β = .29, B = .43 [.08, .74], SE = .17, p = .01) being the only significant predictors; all other βs < .14, ps > .15. Results were unchanged when predictors were entered stepwise rather than simultaneously. Next, I predicted SWL, and the model was not significant: all |β|s < .24, ps > .26. Hence, in this block of participants and measures, the utility of the Attitude-Based PO scale lay in the prediction of most of the variance in general political orientation with Masculine Independence in concert with the ACT scale.

Block 2: Social-Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS)

Participants completed Everett’s (2013) SECS scale, which comprises a 7-item Social Conservatism subscale and a 5-item Economic Conservatism subscale, and indicated how they voted in the last federal election. Of the 66 total participants in this block, 14 participants voted Republican, 36 voted Democrat, and 16 did not vote. Bivariate correlations among the ABPO subscales and the Block 2 variables are in Table 26.

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Table 26. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 2 (n = 57)

2. 3. 4. 5. 1. MI .61*** .56*** .76*** .66*** [.35, .79] [.34, .76] [.60, 86] [.47, .79] 2. RT .31** .43*** .73*** [.03, .58] [.20, .62] [.60, .82] 3. ES .55** .44*** [.33, .73] [.20, .67] 4. SECS Economic .69** [.53, .80] 5. SECS Social Note. * Denotes p ≤ .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01, *** denotes p ≤ .001. Analyses were bootstrapped with 1000 resamples; 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness. Next, I predicted the Economic and Social Conservatism subscales in regressions with the three ABPO subscales; results are presented in Table 27.

Table 27. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 2 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales

MI RT ES SECS Economic β = .69 β = -.03 β = .16 B = 10.24 B = -.40 B = 2.64 [7.0, 13.17] [-2.48, 2.13] [.13, 6.01] SE = 1.55 SE = 1.12 SE = 1.50 p < .001 p = .72 p = .06 Model R2 .59, p < .001, F(3, 55) = 25.94 SECS Social β = .25 β = .55 β = .12 B = 4.69 B = 8.81 B = 2.82 [-.38, 9.78] [5.94, 12.65] [-2.66, 7.42] SE = 2.58 SE = 1.71 SE = 2.52 p = .07 p < .001 p = .22 Model R2 .61, p < .001, F(3, 56) = 29.51 Note. SECS items were completed on scales from 0 to 100. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness. Everett’s Economic Conservatism subscale (of which items are limited government, welfare benefits, gun ownership, fiscal responsibility, and business) was related mostly to Masculine Independence and – marginally significantly – to Ethnic Separateness. Everett’s Social Conservatism subscale (including abortion, military and national security, religion, traditional marriage, the family unit, and patriotism), on the other hand, was most robustly related to the index of Religious Traditionalism and – marginally significantly – Masculine

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Independence. These results support the possibility that the key factor differentiating “fiscal conservatism” from “social conservatism” is how high in Religious Traditionalism one is. Next, I analyzed voting behaviour (i.e. voting Democrat vs. Republican). The bivariate correlations between voting behaviour and the Block 2 variables are displayed in Table 28.

Table 28. Bivariate correlations between voting behaviour and other variables in Block 2, in the sample of participants who voted either Democrat or Republican (n = 43)

MI RT ES Everett Fiscal Everett Social Vote .81*** .55*** .51*** .71*** .69*** [.70, .89] [.30, .73] [.24, .73] [.55, .82] [.49, .84] Note. Voting Democrat was coded as 0 and voting Republican was coded as 1. *** Denotes p ≤ .001. Analyses were bootstrapped with 1000 resamples; 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness. Next, I predicted voting Republican versus Democrat in a hierarchical logistic regression, entering MI, RT, and ES. Voting Republican rather than Democrat was significantly associated only with MI (B = 2.56, SE = 1.01, Exp(B) = 13.15, p = .01); other Exp(B)s < 3.14, ps > .12. This model included 13 participants who voted Republican and 33 who voted Democrat, leaving little statistical power for prediction of voting. I subsequently predicted voting with Everett’s Economic and Social subscales alone; in this model, voting Republican was associated with Economic Conservatism (B = .18, SE = .09, Exp(B) = 1.19, p = .05) but not Social Conservatism (B = .04, SE = .04, Exp(B) = 1.04, p = .32). In this model, 12 participants who had voted Republican and 32 who had voted Democrat were included. Thus, in both models, there were very small samples of Republican voters, limiting the utility of these or further regression analyses predicting voting behaviour in Block 2.

Predicting General PO and SWL

When I predicted General PO with the three ABPO subscales and Everett’s two subscales, the model accounted for most of the variance in General PO (R2 = .75, F(5, 51) = 30.87, p < .001), with Masculine Independence (β = .48, B = .70 [.36, .1.02], SE = .17, p = .002) and Everett’s Social Conservatism scale (β = .44, B = .04 [.01, .06], SE = .01, p = .01) being the two significant predictors; all other βs < .02, ps > .87. Results were unchanged when predictors were entered stepwise rather than simultaneously.

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These results are interesting; two variables accounted for most of the variance in General PO, as Everett (2013) would predict. Indeed, Everett’s Social Conservatism subscale was one of the two predictors, and Masculine Independence includes attitudes toward multiple issues which one could call fiscally relevant. What these results hint at is the possibility that a 2-factor conceptualization of political orientation may be valid after all – particularly taken in consideration with the confirmatory factor analysis results from Study 3. However, Everett’s Economic Conservatism scale was associated with both Masculine Independence and Ethnic Separateness. Issues related to Ethnic Separateness do not appear intuitively fiscal, but ES nonetheless accounted for variance in the spectrum which Everett refers to as Economic Conservatism. Likewise, Everett’s Social Conservatism subscale was positively related to both Religious Traditionalism, which taps issues typically described as “social issues” (e.g. abortion, euthanasia), and Masculine Independence, which taps issues often described as “economic issues” (e.g. taxation, public vs. private health care, and government regulation of big business). These results suggest that ideas about political attitudes factoring cleanly into fiscal issues versus social issues are missing the mark somewhat. What the current studies are suggesting is that what some would call fiscal conservatism appears to be related to disinclination to care for others, particularly strangers, compared to having a more compassionate orientation toward others – rather than having attitudes coherently organized along a spectrum of economic relevance. Next, I predicted SWL with the three ABPO subscales and Everett’s two subscales. The only significant predictor in this model was Ethnic Separateness (β = -.29, B = -.33 [-.62, -.01], p = .02); all other βs < .10, ps > .01. I re-ran the model allowing predictors to enter stepwise. This resulted in only Everett’s Economic Conservatism subscale predicting SWL (β = .33, p = .01). Thus, the three factors were not associated with SWL over and above Everett’s Economic Conservatism subscale, which is highly correlated with the Masculine Independence subscale. These results are therefore roughly consistent with previous results which indicate that it is Masculine Independence – rather than Religious Traditionalism or Ethnic Separateness – which would share variance with SWL.

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Block 3: Patriotism, racism, religiosity, and disgust sensitivity

First, I examined the bivariate correlations (displayed in Table 29) between the ABPO subscales and the two measures of patriotism (national identity and symbolic patriotism), the modified Modern Racism Scale (MRS), the 4-item measure of religiosity, and the Disgust Sensitivity-Revised scale.

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Table 29. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 3 (n = 62)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1. MI .65*** .48*** .37** .39** .55*** .47*** -.08 .08 [.43, .82] [.30, .65] [.14, .57] [.16, .57] [.36, .74] [.21, .67] [-.31, .17] [-.14, .32] 2. RT .40*** .47*** .50*** .47*** .62*** .24 .30* [.23, .57] [.28, .62] [.34, .66] [.27, .66] [.43, .76] [.003, .44] [.10, .49] 3. ES .23 .27* .68*** .14 -.06 .06 [-.04, .45] [.05, .49] [.51, .80] [-.09, .35] [-.26, .19] [-.17, .29] 4. National .79*** .26* .51*** .06 .04 Identity [.70, .87] [-.003, .49] [.34, .66] [-.16, .26] [-.21, .27] 5. Symbolic .39** .53*** .07 .12 Patriotism [.16, .59] [.36, .65] [-.17, .30] [-.12, .33] 6. MRS .18 .06 .14 [-.05, .39] [-.21, .32] [-.10, .40] 7. Religiosity .23 .32* [.001, .45] [.07, .52] 8. Disgust .71*** Overall [.57, .80] 9. Disgust Contam Note. * Denotes p ≤ .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01, *** denotes p ≤ .001. Analyses were bootstrapped with 1000 resamples; 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness.

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Next, I predicted Block 3’s scales in regressions with the Attitude-Based PO subscales. Results are presented in Table 30.

Table 30. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 3 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales

MI RT ES National Identity β = .11 β = .39 β = .02 B = .09 B = .30 B = .02 [-.15, .34] [.09, .55] [-.33, .26] SE = .13 SE = .12 SE = .15 p = .49 p = .01 p = .90 Model R2 .23, p < .001, F(3, 58) = 5.74 Symbolic β = .08 β = .43 β = .06 Patriotism B = .08 B = .41 B = .09 [-.25, .47] [.10, .73] [-.33, 42] SE = .18 SE = .15 SE = .19 p = .62 p = .01 p = .63 Model R2 .26, p < .001, F(3, 58) = 6.84 Modern Racism β = .22 β = .12 β = .53 Scale B = .17 B = .09 B = .58 [-.03, .42] [-.13, .29] [.31, .82] SE = .11 SE = .10 SE = .13 p = .13 p = .37 p < .001 Model R2 .53, p < .001, F(3, 58) = 22.50 Religiosity β = .19 β = .57 β = -.18 B = .18 B = .51 B = -.23 [-.06, .43] [.29, .75] [-.58, .06] SE = .13 SE = .12 SE = .16 p = .16 p < .001 p = .17 Model R2 .41, p < .001, F(3, 58) = 13.72 Disgust Sensitivity β = -.38 β = .52 β = -.08 - Overall B = -.19 B = .24 B = -.05 [-.36, .05] [.05, .39] [-.21, .12] SE = .10 SE = .09 SE = .08 p = .08 p = .01 p = .51 Model R2 .16, p = .02, F(3, 58) = 3.69 Disgust Sensitivity β = -.20 β = .44 β = -.02 - Contamination B = -.12 B = .24 B = -.02 [-.31, .11] [.08, .44] [-.24, .22] SE = .11 SE = .09 SE = .12 p = .27 p = .01 p = .91 Model R2 .12, p = .07, F(3, 58) = 2.51 Disgust Sensitivity β = -.42 β = .45 β = -.13 - Core B = -.22 B = .22 B = -.09

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MI RT ES [-.39, .02] [.03, .38] [-.26, .06] SE = .11 SE = .09 SE = .08 p = .04 p = .01 p = .25 Model R2 .15, p = .02, F(3, 58) = 3.51 Disgust Sensitivity β = -.28 β = .43 β = -.02 - Animal B = -.19 B = .27 B = -.02 Reminder [-.46, .14] [.01, .49] [-.27, .26] SE = .15 SE = .12 SE = .13 p = .21 p = .03 p = .89 Model R2 .10, p = .10, F(3, 58) = 2.22 Note. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness.

These analyses showed that both measures of patriotism were associated only with Religious Traditionalism; not Masculine Independence or Ethnic Separateness, both of which could have been viably hypothesized to predict patriotism. It is possible that patriotism has more to do with a communal orientation than the more independent and individualistic orientation which seems to be associated with Masculine Independence. Likewise, patriotism may have more to do with positive feelings about one’s own culture more than hateful feelings toward other cultures, which seems to be tapped by Ethnic Separateness. Religiosity was unsurprisingly associated with only Religious Traditionalism, and MRS scores with only Ethnic Separateness. These results are supportive of the convergent validity of these subscales. Results regarding disgust sensitivity are particularly interesting. Conservatism – construed in a general, unidimensional way – is associated with higher disgust sensitivity (e.g. Inbar et al., 2008). However, the ABPO subscales provide a more nuanced picture of the association between disgust sensitivity and conservatism: Religious Traditionalism predicted higher disgust sensitivity (on all three subscales), whereas Ethnic Separateness was unrelated, and – most interestingly – Masculine Independence was associated with lower core disgust and, with marginal significance, lower overall disgust sensitivity. Thus, saying that conservatism is associated with higher disgust sensitivity is true enough, but is also excluding important nuance; not all conservative attitudes are motivated by desire to minimize potential for contamination.

Predicting General PO and SWL

First, I predicted General PO with the ABPO subscales, overall disgust sensitivity, religiosity, national identity, and Modern Racism Scale scores: R2 = .74, F(7, 54) = 21.51, p <

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.001. Significant predictors of general conservatism were Masculine Independence (β = .35, B = .47 [.16, .73], SE = .15, p = .01) and Religious Traditionalism (β = .33, B = .40 [.05, .72], SE = .17, p = .02); all other |β|s < .17, ps > .10. Because there were seven predictors, I re-ran the analysis as a stepwise regression. The model produced included Masculine Independence (β = .41, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (β = .39, p < .001), Ethnic Separateness (β = .21, p = .01), and overall disgust sensitivity (β = -.15, p < .001). Given the tendency of stepwise regressions to over-fit individual data sets (e.g. Lewis, 2007), the safest interpretation of the stepwise results is as confirmation that Masculine Independence and Religious Traditionalism predicted General PO over and above the other measures included in Block 3. Next, I ran the model predicting General PO with the same measures as above, except replacing national identity with symbolic patriotism: R2 = .75, F(7, 54) = 23.01, p < .001. Masculine Independence (β = .37, B = .49 [.18, .75], SE = .15, p = .003) and Religious Traditionalism (β = .30, B = .38 [.08, .67], SE = .16, p = .02) were significant predictors of general conservatism, along with symbolic patriotism (β = .16, B = .20 [-.001, .39], SE = .10, p = .05); all other |β|s < .16, ps > .12. Thus, patriotism having to do with pride in American symbols, which has been previously shown to be related to political orientation, unlike national identity (Huddy & Khatib, 2007), also accounted for variance in General PO over and above the other Block 3 measures. Finally, I predicted SWL with the same seven predictors used to predict General PO. There were no significant predictors in the model, regardless of whether national identity or symbolic patriotism was included, and whether the predictors were entered stepwise or simultaneously (|β|s < .41, ps > .11). Bivariate analyses confirmed that none of the predictors (including either measure of patriotism) were correlated with SWL; |r|s < .23, ps > .08.

Block 4: System justification, resistance to change, and opposition to equality

Participants in this block completed the 8-item System Justification Scale, two items tapping resistance to change, and five items tapping opposition to equality. Bivariate correlations among ABPO subscales and the Block 4 variables are in Table 31.

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Table 31. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 4 (n = 60)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. MI .49*** . 64*** .56*** .51*** .77*** [.28, .67] [.45, .77] [.39, .71] [.33, .66] [.57, .85] 2. RT .28* .45*** .27* .28* [.06, .50] [.26, .60] [-.01, .50] [.01, .51] 3. ES .41** .25* .58*** [.17, .61] [-.004, .49] [.39, .72] 4. System .66*** .67*** Justification [.40, .84] [.49, .81] 5. Change .72*** Resistance [.56, .84] 6. Opposition to Equality Note. * Denotes p ≤ .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01, *** denotes p ≤ .001. Analyses were bootstrapped with 1000 resamples; 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness.

Next, I predicted the three Block 4 measures in regressions with the three ABPO subscales; results are presented in Table 32.

Table 32. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 4 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales

MI RT ES System β = .39 β = .23 β = .09 Justification B = .48 B = .24 B = .11 [.12, .88] [.03, .45] [-.26, .53] SE = .19 SE = .11 SE = .20 p = .03 p = .03 p = .58 Model R2 .36, p < .001, F(3, 56) = 10.51 Resistance to β = .58 β = .02 β = -.12 Change B = .77 B = .02 B = -.16 [.33, .1.22] [-.29, .37] [-.53, .30] SE = .22 SE = .17 SE = .21 p = .003 p = .91 p = .46 Model R2 .27, p = .001, F(3, 56) = 6.84 Opposition to β = .75 β = -.13 β = .14 Equality B = .96 B = -.15 B = .18 [.67, 1.27] [-.32, .05] [-.08, .44] SE = .15 SE = .10 SE = .13 p < .001 p = .15 p = .17 Model R2 .62, p < .001, F(3, 56) = 30.85 Note. SECS items were completed on scales from 0 to 100. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, and ES = Ethnic Separateness.

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These analyses indicated that political conservatism, framed as comfort with inequality and discomfort with change to social structure, largely reflects what I would call Masculine Independence. System justification, however, was also associated with higher Religious Traditionalism, while resistance to change and opposition to equality were strongly and solely associated with Masculine Independence. The results of Block 4 again indicated that Ethnic Separateness did not provide prediction of variables over and above Masculine Independence and Religious Traditionalism. So far, Ethnic Separateness has been associated with Everett’s Economic Conservatism subscale and Modern Racism Scale scores. It is possible that, first, Ethnic Separateness is not well accounted for in previous conceptualizations of conservative ideology, or second, that it is superfluous when Religious Traditionalism and Masculine Independence are accounted for, or finally, that either the ABPO scale or the Block 4 sample is not capturing enough variance in Ethnic Separateness. Thus, Ethnic Separateness’s utility should be critically evaluated in subsequent analyses.

Predicting General PO and SWL

First, I predicted General PO with the ABPO subscales, system justification, opposition to equality, and resistance to change: R2 = .71, F(6, 53) = 21.48, p < .001. Significant predictors were Religious Traditionalism (β = .32, B = .40 [.12, .67], SE = .14, p = .01) and Ethnic Separateness (β = .29, B = .42 [.15, .71], SE = .14, p = .01); all other |β|s < .30, ps > .13. Next, I re-ran the analysis as a stepwise regression: R2 = .69, F(3, 56) = 40.78, p < .001. Significant predictors were Masculine Independence (β = .42, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (β = .33, p = .001), and Ethnic Separateness (β = .26, p = .004). It seems, then, that the highly correlated Masculine Independence and opposition to equality were splitting the shared variance between them and General PO, resulting in them being non-significant predictors when entered simultaneously. Next, I predicted SWL with the six predictors entered simultaneously: R2 = .25, F(6, 53) = 3.00, p = .01. The only significant predictor was Masculine Independence (β = .55, B = .54 [.17, .96], SE = .20, p = .01); all other |β|s < .37, ps > .12. However, when I re-ran the analysis with predictors entered stepwise, only resistance to change was included in the model (β = .40, p = .001).

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These results indicate that Masculine Independence is strongly related to opposition to equality. Items in the 5-item scale of opposition to equality include: If incomes were more equal, nothing would motivate people to work hard; Incomes cannot be made more equal because it’s human nature to always want more than others have; and Making incomes more equal means socialism, and that deprives people of individual freedoms. Thus, the high correlation between Masculine Independence and opposition to equality is in line with Masculine Independence’s other covariates, which also point to a competitive outlook, comfort with the fact that some will have more than others, and beliefs that those who have more should not be expected to share with strangers.

Block 5: Masculinity-femininity and BFAS

Participants in this block completed the Big Five Aspect Scale, 20 items measuring masculinity, and 20 items measuring femininity. Bivariate correlations among the ABPO subscales and the Block 5 variables are in Table 33.

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Table 33. Bivariate correlations between variables in Block 5 (n = 47)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 1. MI .72*** . 53*** -.50*** .04 .26 .35* -.14 .33* -.03 [.47, .88] [.25, .76] [-.69, -.28] [-.27, .33] [-.02, .53] [.15, .55] [-.50, .22] [.03, .58] [-.34, .27] 2. RT .29* -.27 .24 .18 -.02 -.28 -.02 .18 [.01, .64] [-.48, -.02] [-.01, .44] [-.07, .41] [-.23, .21] [-.60, .08] [-.29, .23] [-.09, .39] 3. ES -.15 -.23 .02 .25 .11 .31* -.06 [-.43, .16] [-.60, .33] [-.30, 43] [-.10, .50] [-.16, .37] [-.003, .51] [-.37, .27] 4. BFAS N -.17 -.46*** -.52*** -.22 -.52*** .05 [-.44, .14] [-.66, -.20] [-.74, -.24] [-.50, .08] [-.72, -.26] [-.20, .30] 5. BFAS A .12 -.17 .20 -.41** .69*** [-.30, .48] [-.43, .19] [-.11, .47] [-.60, -.14] [.52, .87] 6. BFAS C .29* .17 .40* -.08 [-.08, .63] [-.09, .43] [.09, .68] [-.36, .20] 7. BFAS E .26 .72*** -.04 [.02, .50] [.55, .85] [-.27, .20] 8. BFAS O .30* .14 [.06, .53] [-.12, 42] 9. Masculinity -.35* [-.55, -.09] 10. Femininity Note. * Denotes p ≤ .05, ** denotes p ≤ .01, *** denotes p ≤ .001. Analyses were bootstrapped with 1000 resamples; 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, ES = Ethnic Separateness, BFAS N = Neuroticism, BFAS A = Agreeableness, BFAS C = Conscientiousness, BFAS E = Extraversion, and BFAS O = Openness.

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Next, I predicted the three Block 5 measures in regressions with the ABPO subscales; results are presented in Table 34.

Table 34. Regression analyses predicting measures in Block 5 with the Attitude-Based PO subscales

MI RT ES BFAS N β = -.76 β = .21 β = .17 B = -.43 B = .11 B = .11 [-.73, -.22] [-.07, .36] [-.12, .35] SE = .13 SE = .11 SE = .11 p = .002 p = .27 p = .27 Model R2 .30, F(3, 45) = 6.61, p = .001 BFAS A β = -.13 β = .40 β = -.26 B = -.06 B = .18 B = -.14 [-.25, .21] [-.04, .32] [-.36, .17] SE = .12 SE = .09 SE = .14 p = .60 p = .05 p = .25 Model R2 .14, F(3, 49) = 2.70, p = .06 BFAS C β = .40 β = -.02 β = -.17 B = .19 B = -.01 B = -.10 [-.01, .46] [-.19, .14] [-.27, .25] SE = .12 SE = .08 SE = .13 p = .09 p = .93 p = .40 Model R2 .10, F(3, 48) = 1.91, p = .14 BFAS E β = .70 β = -.48 β = .03 B = .36 B = -.24 B = .01 [.15, .61] [-.45, -.07] [-.27, .20] SE = .11 SE = .09 SE = .12 p = .002 p = .02 p = .88 Model R2 .26, F(3, 49) = 5.74, p < .001 BFAS O β = -.07 β = -.20 β = .16 B = -.03 B = -.07 B = .07 [-.21, .17] [-.27, .07] [-.11, .27] SE = .09 SE = .08 SE = .09 p = .75 p = .34 p = .41 Model R2 .06, F(3, 48) = 1.02, p = .39 Masculinity β = .60 β = -.47 β = .11 B = .42 B = -.31 B = .09 [.15, .70] [-.49, -.13] [-.24, .30] SE = .14 SE = .10 SE = .14 p = .01 p = .01 p = .46 Model R2 .27, F(3, 50) = 6.02, p = .001 Femininity β = -.48 β = .45 β = .13 B = -.29 B = .26 B = .09 [-.53, -.02] [.01, .41] [-.09, .36] SE = .13 SE = .10 SE = .11 p = .02 p = .01 p = .32 Model R2 .13, F(3, 50) = 2.51, p = .07

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Note. MI = Masculine Independence, RT = Religious Traditionalism, ES = Ethnic Separateness, BFAS N = Neuroticism, BFAS A = Agreeableness, BFAS C = Conscientiousness, BFAS E = Extraversion, and BFAS O = Openness.

Regarding the Big Five traits, Masculine Independence was associated with higher emotional stability, extraversion, and – trending – conscientiousness. Religious Traditionalism was associated with higher agreeableness and lower extraversion, and Ethnic Separateness was associated with none of the traits over and above the other two factors. This pattern of associates differs substantially from the typically reported predictors of general conservatism – higher conscientiousness and lower openness (Carney et al., 2008; Hirsh et al., 2010). Extraversion and neuroticism correspond to positive and negative affectivity respectively (Costa & McCrae, 1980; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989), and they are more consistently and robustly related to affect than the other personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1980). The ABPO scale seems to be pointing toward a more emotionally laden model of conservative ideology; existing measures tend to point to decidedly null associations between conservatism and both extraversion and neuroticism. People high in emotional stability and extraversion, however, were higher in Masculine Independence than those who are more neurotic and introverted. Thus, conservatives high in Masculine Independence are likely to be less affected by negative stimuli, and more affected by positive stimuli (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989) than those low in MI. On the other hand, extraversion was negatively associated with Religious Traditionalism, suggesting that conservatives high in RT may be less affected by positive stimuli than those lower in RT. Future studies should test the association between the ABPO subscales and reactivity to aversive and appetitive stimuli, because these results do not straightforwardly agree with the predominant idea of conservatives as reactive, easily stirred up, and avoidance-oriented. Finally, MI was positively associated with masculinity and negatively with femininity; RT was positively associated with femininity and negatively with masculinity. RT was also associated with higher agreeableness. These results bolster the idea that some aspects of conservative ideology reflect culturally masculine motivations for independence and dominance, while others – which are related but distinct – reflect a more feminine, agreeable concern for others.

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Predicting General PO and SWL

First, I predicted General PO with the ABPO subscales and the Big Five traits entered simultaneously: R2 = .84, F(8, 38) = 25.27, p < .001. Significant predictors were Masculine Independence (β = .56, B = .69 [.39, 1.14], SE = .18, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (β = .25, B = .30 [-.01, .57], SE = .14, p = .03) and, with marginal significance, Ethnic Separateness (β = .24, B = .35 [-.12, .71], SE = .20, p = .06); all other |β|s < .10, ps > .18. I re-ran the regression allowing predictors to enter stepwise and the model was virtually identical, with only the three ABPO subscales stepping in and each significantly positively related to General PO. Next, I predicted General PO with the ABPO subscales and masculinity and femininity (R2 = .83, F(5, 48) = 44.31, p < .001), and General PO was positively associated with Masculine Independence (β = .54, B = .66 [.45, .96], SE = .12, p < .001), Religious Traditionalism (β = .29, B = .34 [.11, .55], SE = .11, p = .004) and Ethnic Separateness (β = .24, B = .33 [.07, .55], SE = .12, p = .005); all other |β|s < .06, ps > .40. Results were virtually unchanged when predictors were allowed to enter stepwise. Next, I predicted SWL with the three ABPO subscales, and the model was not significant: all |βs| < .23, ps > .20. However, bivariate analyses showed that MI (r(52) = .29, p = .03) and RT (r(52) = .32, p = .02) were both positively associated with SWL. I re-ran the analysis with only MI and RT predicting SWL, and neither was a significant predictor (|β|s < .22, ps > .19. Thus, in this sample, both MI and RT were correlated with higher SWL, but when they simultaneously predicted it, they appeared to split the shared variance between them.

Confirmatory factor analyses

Next, I performed CFAs to test the factor structure in this data set (N = 386). In this study, rather than deleting cases with incomplete data as in Study 3, I allowed AMOS to estimate means and intercepts in cases of missing data. As in Study 3, I parceled items into three parcels predicting each of three factors by selecting items randomly within each factor (18 for Masculine Independence, 8 for Religious Traditionalism, and 7 for Ethnic Separateness). I assigned items within each factor to one of three parcels by generating a number between 1 and 3, with the condition that each parcel have more than one item. I first created a 3-factor model, with three parcels of items predicting each factor. Fit of this model was acceptable: χ2 = 90.66, df = 24; RMSEA = .085, 90% CI [.07, .10], CFI = .98,

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TLI = .96. When I created a 2-factor model with the three Masculine Independence parcels related to factor 1 and the remaining six parcels related to factor 2, the fit was unacceptable: χ2 =673.82, df = 26; RMSEA = .25, 90% CI [.24, .27], CFI = .77, TLI = .61. Next, I created a “social factor” by combining all fifteen items from Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness and randomly grouping them into three parcels. Predicting factor 1 with the three Masculine Independence parcels formed in the above analysis, and factor 2 with the three “social” parcels, the model fit was similar to that of the 3-factor model above: χ2 = 36.18, df = 8, p < .001; RMSEA = .10, 90% CI [.07, .13], CFI = .99, TLI = .96. This is in contrast with the results of the CFAs performed in Study 3, which indicated that a 2-factor solution parallel to this one was an excellent fit. Finally, I modeled one latent factor associated with the three non-social parcels and the three social parcels. This model was a decidedly poor fit: χ2 = 319.91, df = 9, p < .001; RMSEA = .30, 90% CI [.27, .33], CFI = .85, TLI = .64. Thus, as in Study 3, analyses suggest that a 3- factor model of political ideology as measured by the Attitude-Based PO scale is an acceptable fit. In Study 4 specifically, a 3-factor solution was comparable to, or better than, one- or two- dimensional models.

General Discussion

A new measure of conservatism, the 33-item Attitude-Based Political Orientation scale, has three empirically derived subscales: Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness. I began with a pool of 214 items designed to tap the domain of political ideology as broadly as possible. I divided that pool in half randomly and administered each 107- item set to a separate sample of U.S.-residing participants. Exploratory factor analyses pointed to a 3-factor solution in Study 2a (Masculine Independence (MI), Religious Traditionalism (RT), and Ethnic Separateness (ES)) and a 2-factor solution in Study 2b (Masculine Independence and Religious Traditionalism). I pooled the relevant items from Studies 2a and 2b and performed further exploratory and confirmatory analyses on a subset of 143 draft items in Study 3; thus, exploratory analyses were performed with a total of 1943 U.S. participants. A 3-factor solution was reasonably well supported by analyses in Study 3, and a 27-item measure was derived (18 items tapping MI, 5 tapping RT, and 4 tapping ES).

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In Study 4, I added three items to each of RT and ES and specified a 33-item version of the Attitude-Based PO scale. There are multiple effects found across the current studies which demonstrate the utility of conceptualizing and measuring PO along the dimensions of MI, RT, and ES. First, I will examine evidence for the subscales being well situated in the domain of political ideology and their incremental validity. Then I will review what the dimensions of MI, RT, and ES seem to be measuring, how they are associated with relevant individual difference predictors, and implications for questions regarding the dimensionality of PO, how conservatism is associated with negativity bias, and how conservatism is associated with individual- versus collective-focus.

The subscales are politically relevant In establishing a novel measure of political orientation, it is imperative to determine whether the subscales are meaningfully related to multiple existing indices of PO. In all of the current studies, I included a 3-item measure of General (i.e. unidimensional) PO. If the derived factors do indeed tap PO, then they should all independently account for variance in General PO. This was the case in all four studies: Masculine Independence (MI), Religious Traditionalism (RT), and Ethnic Separateness (ES) were all positively and independently associated with General PO, and together they accounted for the majority of variance in General PO (e.g. 73% in Study 4). Thus, although RT was strongly correlated with measures of religiosity and ES with racism, these constructs and MI all incrementally predicted variance in self-reported general conservatism. Second, all but Study 1 included 1-item measures of people’s overall fiscal/economic PO and social PO. Although these measures were highly correlated with each other (typically sharing about 40% of their variance), the Attitude-Based PO subscales differentially predicted fiscal and social PO. All three subscales independently predicted variance in social PO, together accounting for 64% of the variance in Study 4. 1-item fiscal PO, on the other hand, was positively associated with mainly MI and slightly but significantly with ES, but not RT. These results were mostly replicated using Everett’s (2013) Social-Economic Conservatism Scale: Economic Conservatism was predicted by higher MI and higher ES (with marginal significance in the smaller sample employed in Study 4) but not RT. Everett’s Social Conservatism subscale was positively associated with MI

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(with marginal significance) and RT, but not ES. Together, the three Attitude-Based PO subscales accounted for 59% and 61% of the variance in Everett’s Economic and Social Conservatism subscales respectively. Thus, the ABPO subscales accounted for a substantial portion of the variance in two different measures of fiscal and social PO, as well as a unidimensional measure of General PO. Given that both unidimensional PO and bidimensional models defined by axes of social and economic conservatism have received a good deal of attention in the literature, it is important to see that the ABPO subscales are sensibly related to measures of these constructs. Further, in light of the literature linking political conservatism to Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) or, more contemporarily, Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism (ACT), these measures should associate sensibly with any novel measure of PO. Indeed, SDO, which reflects dominant-competitive aspects of conservative ideology (e.g. Duckitt, 2001) was associated uniquely with MI. This is evidence for convergent validity of the MI subscale, which itself seems to tap independence- and masculinity- related characteristics relevant to political ideology. MI was also uniquely associated with the authoritarianism subscale of the ACT scale. This subscale includes items regarding treating criminals and “loafers” with “strong medicine” rather than compassion, and being tough on crime in general. By contrast, the Conservatism and Traditionalism ACT subscales have to do with respecting and yielding to authority and valuing “old-fashioned” ways. These subscales were uniquely associated with Religious Traditionalism. Given that RT was associated with higher agreeableness and femininity when MI and ES are controlled for, RT’s association with attitudes valuing tradition and respect for authority is a sensible one. On the other side of the coin, MI’s associations with SDO, masculinity, and low neuroticism fit well with MI’s positive association with toughness and desire for harsh punishment of criminals and loafers in society. Another influential conceptualization of political ideology is of conservatism reflecting two central motivational tenets: acceptance of inequality and resistance to change (e.g. Jost et al., 2003). With regard to general resistance to change, I included the 8-item System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) and two items specifically targeting resistance to change (Jost et al., 2007): I would be reluctant to make any large-scale changes to the social order and I have a preference for maintaining stability in society, even if there seem to be problems with the current

134 system. Hence, although system justification (SJ) is conceptually similar to resistance to change, the items in the SJ scale appear to have to do with believing that American society is actually functional and fair (e.g. In general, I find society to be fair), while the two resistance to change items seem to tap reluctance to change society even if one acknowledges problems. In Study 4, all three ABPO subscales were positively correlated with SJ. When predicted with the three subscales simultaneously, SJ was associated with both MI and RT. MI was also associated with desire to maintain the status quo, even when the status quo is acknowledged as problematic. The five items measuring opposition to equality (Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Jost et al., 2007) included If incomes were more equal, nothing would motivate people to work hard and Making incomes more equal means socialism, and that deprives people of individual freedoms. Opposition to equality was associated only with MI over and above RT and ES (although all three had significant positive bivariate correlations with opposition to equality). MI and opposition to equality were very strongly correlated (with a coefficient of .77), suggesting that MI has much to do with low desire to ensure that all people have equal access to opportunities and resources. Future studies can investigate whether this has to do with meritocratic beliefs or more aggressive motivations toward others. Finally, analyses of voting behaviour supported the validity of each of the three subscales as indices of distinct dimensions of political orientation. Study 3 provided a sample of 697 Democrat voters and 275 Republican. All three ABPO subscales were positively correlated with voting Republican, and all three accounted for a significant portion of variance in a regression predicting the likelihood of voting of Republican versus Democrat. Thus, each subscale was distinctly associated with voting behaviour. When I predicted voting with the three ABPO subscales and the 3-item measure of General PO (parallel to 1-item General PO measures, which have themselves been touted as, and demonstrated to be, excellent predictors of voting behaviour; e.g. Jost, 2006), RT and ES were no longer significant predictors. However, MI remained a significant predictor of Republican voting over and above General PO. Specifically, even with General PO controlled for, a unit increase in MI was associated with participants being 2.8 times more likely to vote Republican than Democrat. The subscales were also useful in modeling Libertarian votes (albeit with a very small sample of Libertarian voters): people who voted Libertarian were similar to Republicans in MI but similar to Democrat voters in RT and ES. Libertarian voting behaviour is discussed further under Religious Traditionalism.

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In sum, the ABPO subscales appear firmly and sensibly situated in the domain of political ideology. The subscales were associated consistently with existing indices of left-right leaning, and other constructs theoretically relevant to political ideology. Additionally, when the subscales were used to simultaneously predict constructs, they showed distinct associations with some constructs more than others. This suggests that measuring the subscales separately rather than using an aggregated or general PO measure can allow for more precise understanding of associates of meaningful distinct factors of political attitudes.

Consideration of incremental validity In addition to evidence that the variance measured by the ABPO scale is well situated in the domain of political ideology, the current studies provide some evidence for the incremental validity of the ABPO scale – particularly the Masculine Independence subscale. One instance of such evidence is that the Masculine Independence subscale predicts Republican rather than Democrat voting over and above a unidimensional measure of PO, as well as the 1-item measures of fiscal and social conservatism, religiosity, age, and gender. Given that brief measures of general PO are excellent predictors of voting behaviour (e.g. Amodio et al., 2007; Jost, 2006), the incremental contribution of MI is noteworthy. RT and ES, on the other hand, both predicted voting behaviour in a model predicting voting behaviour with all three ABPO subscales, but they did not predict voting behaviour over and above General PO. It therefore seems that one could account for ample variance in voting behaviour by predicting it with either a combination of General PO and Masculine Independence, or with the three ABPO subscales themselves. In other words, the variance in voting behaviour predicted by RT and ES seems to overlap with the variance in voting that is associated with General PO. MI, on the other hand, constitutes an additional significant predictor over and above multiple variables, including General PO. The results of Study 4 provided more instances of MI having clear incremental validity over and above existing measures, with RT and ES seeming to tap similar variance to that accounted for by existing measures. When predicting General PO, for instance, MI made an incremental contribution over and above all blocks of alternative measures (for example, Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism, system justification, and so on), whereas RT and

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ES generally did not. Thus, the significant models predicting General PO tended to include a variety of previously existing measures and MI. Modeling Satisfaction with Life (SWL) provided further evidence for the incremental validity of the ABPO scale’s MI subscale. MI was consistently positively associated with SWL, as was General PO. However, MI’s positive association with SWL held controlling for demographic variables, General PO, social and fiscal conservatism, and religiosity. The association between General PO and SWL, on the other hand, was repeatedly rendered non- significant by controlling for religiosity alone. Thus, MI provides an index of political conservatism that has a robust association with Satisfaction with Life, and that association is not easily accounted for by third variables. MI therefore constitutes a useful tool for further investigating the association between that dimension of conservative ideology and well-being- related outcomes. Of the three ABPO subscales then, MI seems to have the most well established incremental validity. RT and ES seem to account for variance in political ideology which could alternatively be tapped with measures of General PO and religiosity, while MI can clearly account for incremental variance in relevant variables. Technically then, the MI subscale of the ABPO scale could be used in combination with existing measures of PO to good effect. Given the simultaneous development and scrutiny of all three ABPO subscales though, it is likely advisable to use the three subscales together where possible. In sum, it seems that by administering the ES and RT subscales, one would capture much of the variance tapped by existing measures, while MI would be accounting for the most unique variance in people’s PO.

Canonical issues in the final measure It should be noted that the final 33-item scale measures attitudes toward only a subset of the issues relevant to each factor. In other words, the items in the final scale tap the canonical issues in each of Masculine Independence, Religious Traditionalism, and Ethnic Separateness. Thus, given that the initial pool included 214 items, there are many political issues not included in the final scale. It therefore warrants discussing which items are not included in the current Attitude-Based PO scale because, as others have pointed out (e.g. Hibbing et al., 2014; Kinzler & Vaish, 2014), some issues or attitudes would constitute more ephemeral or peripheral aspects of political ideology, while others should load on core aspects of ideology.

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With that in mind, what the current studies have pointed to is an alternative model of the central tenets of political ideology (MI, RT, and ES) to Jost and colleagues’ (2003) model defined by opposition to change and comfort with inequality. Hence, I would predict that as time marches on, individuals high in the underlying construct of Masculine Independence – for example – would have negative attitudes toward issues relevant to individuals sharing their resources with unfamiliar others through the government. Likewise, individuals high in RT would develop more negative attitudes toward issues extending freedoms to behave in ways not sanctioned by the Bible, and people high in ES would feel more negatively toward issues related to blurring perceived ethnic boundaries in the United States. In Table 35, I summarize the issues which were sampled across Studies 2a and 2b, specifying which are canonically representative of each factor and therefore present in the final 33-item measure, and which are not currently measured by the scale. Future work would be well informed by noting which issues have been sampled and where they fit in the 3-dimensional model derived from the current work.

Table 35. Summary of issues sampled in the original 214-item pool of items administered in Studies 2a or 2b

Masculine Independence Religious Traditionalism Ethnic Separateness Issues which are 1. Global warming, 1. Legal access to 1. Interracial marriage represented in government funding of euthanasia 2. Interracial couples the final scale sustainability solutions 2. Abortion rights and/or having children 2. Taxing the rich/ acceptability 3. Refugees, foreign aid, government programs 3. Embryonic stem cells and ease of immigration to provide for the poor being used in medicine to America* and/or homeless *Note that these items were 3. Publicly funded versus added in Study 4, not Private health care derived from the initial 4. Corporate greed pool of 214 items 5. Large versus limited government reach Issues which 1. Big business 1. Couples having lots of 1. Cultural/ethnic diversity loaded .32 or 2. Public school system, children as good or bad for the higher in Study teachers, needing more 2. Same-sex marriage U.S. 2a or 2b but are funding or not 3. Same-sex couples 2. Immigrants being good not included in 3. Beliefs about raising children or bad; taking jobs, final scale availability of oil/fossil 4. Relating to people who costing money or not fuels are not religious 3. Immigrants being 4. Value of funding for the 5. Religious expression in obligated to assimilate arts government

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Masculine Independence Religious Traditionalism Ethnic Separateness 5. Military spending 6. Men wearing masculine quickly to U.S. culture, 6. Gun control/access to clothing, women learn English personal firearms wearing feminine 4. Racial profiling in police 7. Affirmative action clothing work, airport security policies 7. Children being had out 5. Adoption of non-U.S. 8. Social Security being of wedlock children by U.S. citizens privatized 8. Illegal drugs and 6. Donating to foreign 9. Public servants’ severity of punishment versus U.S. charities employment by the for drug-related crimes, 7. Stereotyping women government marijuana being taken as who dress in masculine 10. Government control of seriously as other drugs clothing as likely to be gas and electricity 9. Traditional gender roles; lesbians 11. Competitive capitalism raising children versus 8. Women being better as good or bad working by men and suited for staying home 12. Death penalty as good women and raising children than or bad 10. Access to alcohol, men 13. Hunting animals legal drinking age 9. Amnesty for illegal recreationally as good 11. Immigration, securing immigrants as good or or bad U.S. borders, the value bad 14. Men and women being of the military* 10. Value of artistic suited to the same types *Note that these items pursuits of jobs loaded with Religious 11. Homeless people as Traditionalism in Study 2b, deserving of their fate in which issues related to 12. Death penalty Ethnic Separateness were likely not sufficiently represented Issues which 1. Value of will-power, effects of will-power to change things in one’s life loaded on no 2. Orderliness-related attitudes toward cleanliness, neatness, and planning/scheduling/ factor budgeting versus spontaneity 3. Vegetarianism 4. Factory farming 5. Obesity; attitudes toward, beliefs about controllability 6. Beliefs about how much talent it takes to do art 7. Attitudes toward adoption in general and/or adoption of American children 8. Using the military in non-U.S. countries 9. Private schools giving parents more freedom to choose what is right for their children 10. Discomfort with bi-racial individuals

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The subscales individually

Masculine Independence

Masculine Independence is possibly the most illuminating subscale of the ABPO scale, in part due to its relevance to the question of whether fiscal and social issues comprise distinct factors of ideology. While the issues tapped in the final version of the MI subscale are all fiscally relevant, multiple issues which could be called “social” also loaded more strongly on MI than either RT or ES: the death penalty, gun control, affirmative action, men and women’s roles in the workforce, and hunting for recreation (which is itself not politically relevant prima facie). Rather than interpreting MI as reflecting “fiscal conservatism” then, one can further consider what might be the latent construct underlying attitudes on this factor. Taking all the relevant issues together, it seemed that Masculine Independence was related to how oriented one was toward the value of independently taking care of oneself versus ensuring others have equal opportunities and safety nets. There is a toughness or ruggedness associated with not wanting to pay for safety nets for others through governmental redistribution of resources, wanting to punish transgressors harshly, wanting to be at arm’s length from the government’s influence, and wanting the right to carry weapons and use them for recreation. Independence is commonly associated with masculinity (Brandth & Kvande, 1998); for instance, in a study of sex-role-related behaviour, Bem (1975) found that independence from social pressures (i.e. “saying what you believe, even when you know those around you disagree,” p. 636) was rated as significantly more masculine than feminine, suggesting that masculinity and independence are linked in the American construction of masculinity. As was mentioned in the discussion of Study 2a, Everett (2013) also found that attitudes toward gun ownership factored out on what he labeled fiscal conservatism, along with fiscal responsibility, business, limited government, and welfare benefits. The factoring of gun ownership with these economically relevant issues received little attention from Everett, but in light of the current results, it seems that this is worth more consideration. Furthermore, in Study 3, the MI subscale predicted a significant portion of variance in participants’ voting Republican versus Democrat over and above both General PO and a 1-item measure of fiscal PO. This further suggests that the latent variables unifying attitudes toward the issues factoring along MI

140 cannot be summarized by asking individuals to report on their self-reported “fiscal political orientation.” Altogether, while the canonical issues in MI could be summarized as reflecting “economic” issues, I believe this interpretation would obfuscate the truth of the matter. It seems that economic issues cannot be disentangled from non-economic issues; MI is strongly correlated with self-reported social PO as well as self-reported fiscal PO, and MI accounts for a substantial and significant portion of the variance in self-reported social PO over and above both Religious Traditionalism and Ethnic Separateness. By contrast, self-reported fiscal PO is associated with both MI and ES, but not RT. In other words, assuming that fiscal and social conservatism are constructs perceived to exist in lay collective consciousness, one could model “fiscal PO” fairly independently of people’s attitudes toward issues loading on Religious Traditionalism. On the other hand, one could not model “social PO” independent of the most fiscally relevant factor, MI. It also warrants noting that self-reported “fiscal PO” itself shares a significant but small proportion of variance with Ethnic Separateness; itself appearing socially relevant, prima facie. This suggests that, while measuring social or fiscal PO distinctly in psychology research is not necessarily devoid of value, it is somewhat missing the mark. What people seem to report as their “fiscal PO” constitutes their attitudes toward issues relevant to – primarily – a sense of Masculine Independence and – secondarily – a desire for ethnic groups to remain separate. When people report their “social PO,” they seem to be reporting a combination of all three factors, primarily weighting their opinions on issues spoken to by the Bible. In sum, people’s stances on “fiscal issues” such as taxation and government programs are likely unified by the extent to which people are high or low in Masculine Independence, rather than the economic relevance of those issues per se. It is therefore probable that issues factoring along a dimension that could be called economic relevance is likely a by-product of the fact that governments mainly enforce citizens’ caring for unfamiliar citizens via taxation. Hence, to the extent that one is low in compassionate concern for strangers and desire for equal opportunity for all, one is likely to be conservative on “economic” political issues. An important contribution of the current studies is consistent evidence that individuals who are conservative on “economic” issues are similarly conservative on non-economic issues which are themselves relevant to compassionate concern versus Masculine Independence.

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Support for the interpretation of MI as reflective of masculine and dominant motivations lies in the individual difference variables associated with it. Higher MI is associated with higher Social Dominance Orientation, Authoritarianism (ACT subscale), lower neuroticism (or higher emotional stability), higher extraversion, higher masculinity, lower femininity, opposition to equality, and lower disgust sensitivity. MI is additionally related to voting Republican, higher Satisfaction with Life, system justification, and resistance to change. This constellation of associates paints a picture of someone high in masculinity and assertiveness, with little inclination toward doubt or negative affectivity. Interestingly, people high in SDO are said to be characterized by higher dominance and tough-mindedness, as well as lower openness to experience and agreeableness, and more prejudiced attitudes (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Pratto et al., 1994; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). SDO and MI do appear similar and are indeed strongly correlated. The final MI scale, however, was not associated with modern racism over and above Ethnic Separateness, lower trait agreeableness (although draft versions of MI in Studies 2a and 2b were associated with lower compassion), or lower openness to experience (although draft versions of MI in Studies 2a and 2b were associated with lower trait openness). Rather, Ethnic Separateness alone was associated with racist attitudes when Modern Racism scores were predicted in a regression with the three subscales. Perhaps, then, modeling Ethnic Separateness and Masculine Independence as distinct constructs can allow for more precise understanding of constellations of conservative attitudes. MI seems to have more to do with emotional stability and satisfaction with competition-based outcomes leading to inevitable but justifiable hierarchies, where ES may capture more variance in hate-related or ethnicity-specific concerns in some conservatives’ attitudes. Future studies can further investigate the relative associations of MI and ES with constructs such as meritocratic beliefs, attitudes toward competitive pursuits, and rewarding people differently depending on their abilities versus their ethnicity. I turn now to discussion of novel findings associated with MI as opposed to unidimensional conservatism.

Disgust sensitivity

A valuable finding about MI is that, when RT and ES are controlled for, being higher in MI is negatively associated with disgust sensitivity. This flies in the face of previous conclusions linking unidimensional conservatism to higher disgust sensitivity (e.g. Inbar et al., 2008, Study

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1), and fits with studies finding that disgust sensitivity is less related to conservative attitudes on economic issues than it is to conservatism on sexually relevant political issues (Smith et al., 2011) or “‘sociomoral’ issues” (i.e. same-sex marriage and abortion; Inbar et al., Study 2, p. 721). Given MI’s association with emotional stability and masculinity, it is sensible that MI would be negatively related to disgust sensitivity, which is itself positively associated with neuroticism (Druschel & Sherman, 1999) and higher in females (e.g. Inbar et al., 2008). Fittingly, MI included items about hunting for recreation in Studies 2a and 2b; one would be hard pressed to hunt an animal while avoiding disgusting stimuli. It seems, then, that MI is an exception to the rule that conservatives are higher in disgust sensitivity than liberals. Religious Traditionalism, on the other hand, was positively associated with disgust sensitivity; thus, associations between unidimensional conservatism and disgust sensitivity are likely driven by its association with one factor of political ideology (RT). It seems that some conservative individuals would be higher in disgust sensitivity than liberals, and others should be comparable to, or less disgust sensitive than, liberals (e.g. those high in MI and relatively low in RT). These results suggest that existing theories linking disgust sensitivity to conservatism through the mechanism of a psychological immune system (Terrizzi et al., 2010) are perhaps not modeling all of political conservatism. Individuals high in MI and relatively low in RT likely do not arrive at their beliefs favouring stability over change and avoidance of negative outcomes via concerns about avoiding contaminants.

Neuroticism and Extraversion

Additionally, MI highlights personality correlates of political conservatism which have been generally considered irrelevant to unidimensional conservatism: Neuroticism and Extraversion. At the bivariate level and controlling for RT and ES, the final MI subscale was associated with lower neuroticism (higher emotional stability) and higher extraversion. Combined with previous studies that have reported lower neuroticism in conservatives than liberals (e.g. Burton et al., 2015; Iyer et al., 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Verhulst et al., 2012), evidence for an emotional-stability-conservatism association is mounting. The current studies show that conservative attitudes factoring along the MI dimension in particular are associated with higher emotional stability, where the other two factors, RT and ES, are not.

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Thus, a negative link between a key dimension of political ideology and neuroticism should be taken more seriously. The idea that conservatives adopt their attitudes toward political issues along dimensions of preference for stability versus change and acceptance of inequality to manage uncertainty and threat (e.g. Jost et al., 2003) needs to be revisited in light of the mounting evidence for a negative neuroticism-conservatism association. One possibility is that conservatives are motivated to adopt system-justifying attitudes out of concern regarding uncertainty and threat, and they subsequently reap palliative benefits of adopting those attitudes, which themselves confer a sense of emotional stability. This possibility, which has been previously discussed (e.g. Jost & Hunyady, 2003), is one which could be further and more specifically investigated in light of more serious acknowledgment of a link between conservatism and emotional stability. Another possibility is that conservatives (particularly those with conservative attitudes along the MI dimension) arrive at their attitudes relevant to this dimension out of emotional stability (see Figure 4). In other words, it is possible that people conservative on MI-relevant issues are conservative on those issues because they are unconcerned, unbothered, not stirred up by the societal issues which seem to evoke maternal concern from more liberal (i.e. less masculine-independent) individuals. Perhaps because individuals high in MI are high in masculinity and low in neuroticism, they are fairly unmoved by the needs or plights of anonymous others, as a more maternal, less emotionally stable individual (who would typically be low in MI) would be. Schlenker and colleagues (2012) took a similar perspective on conservatism, interpreting their findings that conservatives have higher personal agency, more positive outlook, and more transcendent moral beliefs as consistent with a “positive adjustment” (p. 127) explanation of conservatism’s positive association with measures of well-being. This explanation naturally paints a different picture than conservatives arriving at their beliefs and associated life outcomes out of low self-esteem and general fearfulness (Schlenker et al., 2012). Again, taking a negative neuroticism-conservatism association more seriously could fruitfully inform future efforts to further understand the characteristics of, and motivations of, conservatives and liberals.

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Figure 4. Two possible models of the relationships between negative emotionality and Masculine Independence.

The replication of a negative neuroticism-conservatism (here again, specifically neuroticism-MI) association is also relevant to an issue discussed by Hibbing and colleagues (2014): distinguishing negativity bias from neuroticism. After reviewing evidence which suggests a link between conservatism and enhanced negativity bias, Hibbing and colleagues point out that – despite concerns to the contrary – higher negativity bias would not necessarily load on neuroticism, meaning that the absence of a positive conservatism-neuroticism association would be perfectly sensible. The authors argue that one can be closely attuned to negative events without “living in fear of them” (p. 337) and being chronically behaviourally inhibited. Thus, neuroticism may load on an axis of negative affectivity (having more to do with general negative affect), while a second dimension related to constraint, or threat sensitivity specifically (involving predisposition to experience fear and response inhibition), could be positively associated with conservatism (Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014). While the current studies cannot speak directly to the interplay between threat sensitivity versus negative affectivity more generally (if there is a meaningful distinction between the two), they certainly point to the need for further scrutiny of this question, and they provide a more precise measure of a conservative dimension of attitudes which should specifically and robustly

145 predict emotional stability. In other words, future work could test whether people high in MI are themselves differentially high in constraint versus general negative affectivity (i.e. low in neuroticism but high in constraint or threat sensitivity), or whether the three ABPO subscales are differentially associated with indicators of constraint and general negative affectivity. For instance, it is possible that MI would be negatively associated with both axes of negative affect, while RT and ES are positively associated more with either or both of the axes. Thus, conservatives’ relative balance of MI, RT, and ES may be able to predict conservatives’ characteristics on negative affectivity/behavioural inhibition and constraint/threat sensitivity. Additionally, the association of MI with extraversion points to a novel direction for investigation. Not only is MI associated with less neuroticism/general negative affectivity, it also is associated with higher positive affectivity; thus, the dispositional profile associated with MI fits quite poorly with an image of all conservatives as high in either general negative affectivity or constraint/threat sensitivity. RT, by contrast, was negatively associated with extraversion when MI was controlled for, suggesting that people who are additionally high in RT may be the conservative individuals who could be characterized by higher threat sensitivity. These possibilities certainly warrant further investigation, given that previous studies examining the personality predictors of unidimensional conservatism have largely found null associations between conservatism and extraversion, linking it only to political participatory behaviours, such as attending political meetings, voter turnout, or displaying political signs or bumper stickers (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). In all, the higher extraversion-and-lower neuroticism profile of people high in MI presents ample reason to further investigate the interplay of the three ABPO subscales with measures of positive and negative affectivity, and threat sensitivity. With this more nuanced measure of PO, researchers could develop a more precise understanding of how dimensions of conservative ideology are associated with emotionally laden individual difference variables.

Satisfaction with Life

Finally, the MI subscale adds clarity to understanding the relationship of conservatism/liberalism to Satisfaction with Life (SWL). Previous studies, including Study 1 in the current work, have found small – but significant in large samples – positive associations between unidimensional conservatism and SWL. These associations are also often easily accounted for by third variables, including neuroticism, household income, and religiosity. MI,

146 on the other hand, was typically correlated significantly with SWL at the bivariate level and when RT and ES are controlled for. The association between MI and SWL also held controlling for unidimensional conservatism, gender, age, and religiosity (Studies 3 and 4) and the Big Five personality traits (Study 2a). The results of Study 4 using the entire sample collapsed across blocks also pointed to a robust association between MI and SWL. As was discussed by Burton, Plaks, and Peterson (2015), the association between SWL and political orientation in the United States is small and easily accounted for by other variables; the most novel contribution of that paper was that trait neuroticism could also account for the higher SWL of people higher in conservatism. The current studies back up that finding; Masculine Independence is itself quite robustly associated with emotional stability and, to a less robust but fairly consistent extent, with SWL. Thus, it is quite sensible that neuroticism could account for an association between unidimensional conservatism and SWL, given that unidimensional measures of PO would be indirectly tapping MI. However, in the results of Study 4, the MI-SWL association held even controlling for neuroticism and the other Big Five traits. Thus, it is possible that MI is itself directly related to higher SWL. Nonetheless, because there were only forty-seven participants in the Study 4 block which included the Big Five Aspect Scale, this possibility warrants further scrutiny; neuroticism, or other relevant variables, could account for the MI-SWL association upon further investigation. In sum, the associations between MI and SWL, disgust sensitivity, neuroticism, and extraversion are quite relevant to the question of whether conservatives are higher than liberals in negativity bias. Conservative attitudes toward taxation, public health care, environmental issues, and government reach were not predicted by any indicators of general negative affectivity (i.e. neuroticism) or, arguably, of constraint (i.e. introversion). There appears to be ample room to use the ABPO scale in further investigations of how indices of negativity bias relate to MI and other key dimensions of PO, rather than unidimensional PO alone.

Religious Traditionalism

Religious Traditionalism comprises a decidedly social-looking factor of political ideology, tapping attitudes toward abortion, medical euthanasia, and stem cell research. The list of items which loaded on RT, but were ultimately not included in the final scale, is also decidedly social-looking and religiously charged, including attitudes toward same-sex marriage,

147 same-sex couples parenting children, drug and alcohol use, and traditional gender roles. These issues are all spoken to by Christian doctrine, which remains by far the dominant family of faiths in the United States, with 71% of Americans identifying as Christian of some denomination, 23% unaffiliated, and 6% non-Christian (Pew Research Center, 2014). Thus, individuals who are more religious tend to be more conservative on Religious Traditionalism, and their issue-specific attitudes appear to be unified by the content of Christian doctrine. The finding that RT is consistently associated with measures of social PO and not fiscal PO suggests that RT is the closest thing to a “social conservatism” factor tapped by the ABPO scale. However, once again, the terminology and theoretical foundation associated with this form of “social conservatism” could be more precise; all of these “socially conservative” issues are spoken to in Christian doctrine, and they factor out as distinct from social issues having to do with ethnicity, as measured by Ethnic Separateness. I therefore suggest that Religious Traditionalism is a more precise and appropriate label for this factor of conservative ideology than “social conservatism.”

Agreeableness, femininity, and androgyny

The individual difference predictors of RT are interesting in light of previous studies, which typically construe conservatism, or the related construct of Social Dominance Orientation, as negatively associated with agreeableness (Pratto et al., 1994; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) or compassion (Hirsh et al., 2010). Another relevant construct, RWA, is found to be unrelated to agreeableness when SDO is controlled for (Akrami & Ekehammar, 2006). Thus, there is little reason to expect, based on existing literature, that a dimension of political conservatism would be positively associated with agreeableness. While the final RT scale was not significantly associated with the Big Five traits or masculinity-femininity at the bivariate level, when ES and MI were controlled for, being higher in RT was associated with higher agreeableness, lower extraversion, lower masculinity, and higher femininity. Thus, people who are more conservative on the RT dimension are higher in agreeableness than those who are low in RT; some conservatives are more agreeable than others, and the most agreeable conservatives are likelier to be high in RT. Caprara and colleagues (2009) found that higher agreeableness was associated with stronger Universalism values (having more concern for the general “other,” including outgroup members and the environment), which in turn predicted liberalism. The current studies

148 demonstrate the need for further investigation of the association of agreeableness, values, and political leaning. Given one’s MI and ES scores, then his Religious Traditionalism can be predicted positively by how agreeable he is. In other words, in one way, being more agreeable is associated with being more conservative (specifically, higher in Religious Traditionalism). Given findings that religiosity itself is associated with higher Benevolence but not Universalism values, it is possible that people who are more religious and higher in RT express their higher agreeableness (than people lower in RT) through Benevolence values, making them more concerned with positive outcomes for ingroup members but not outgroup members. Lakoff (2002) has described conservatism as characterized by a “strict father” orientation toward others, while liberals’ “nurturant parent” orientation inclines them to be more caring toward needy others. However, RT was associated with femininity in addition to agreeableness, when MI and ES are controlled for. Thus, given one’s level of conservatism on MI and ES, being higher in femininity would predict one being more conservative on the RT dimension. Given that both femininity and agreeableness predict RT when MI and ES are controlled for, it is worth considering whether RT constitutes a more maternal dimension of conservatism than MI or ES. Whereas MI is associated with indices of toughness, dominance, and independence – and therefore fits neatly with the image of a strict father – RT appears distinctly associated with indices of more tender and outwardly focused concern (i.e. femininity and agreeableness); more in line with the image of a nurturant parent. In light of the strong link between religiosity and RT, one might expect that RT should itself associate with Benevolence values, and future work should test this possibility. Thus, although many prevailing ideas present an image of conservatives as strict, paternal, and less caring than liberals, it may be that individuals higher in RT are in fact more caring than those low in RT; with the caveat that they are more caring toward perceived ingroup members but not outgroup members. Relatedly, a study using social survey data found that individuals who indicated their voting decision in an election had been more heavily influenced by a conservative Christian leader or organization (i.e. voters who would be located on the “Christian Right” of the religious- political spectrum) gave more to poverty-relief charities, even when religion was controlled for (Regnerus, Smith, & Sikkink, 1998). The authors point out the – to some – surprising “absence of ‘anti-poor’ sentiment” (p. 490) among these voters, given that conservative Christians are often expected to be hostile or indifferent toward the poor. On the contrary, the authors note that

149 conservative Christians actually seemed to have “‘pro-poor’ giving habits” (p. 491) relative to voters at other locations along the political spectrum. In line with those findings, Brooks (2007) discusses “compassionate conservatism,” noting that liberal individuals’ favorable attitudes toward government distribution of resources is not the same as charity; rather, it is the “obligatory redistribution of tax revenues” (p. 20). Brooks discusses additional findings linking registered Republicanism and self-reported conservatism to charitable donations, a link which was strongly related to conservatives’ tendency to be more religious than liberals. I would predict that RT would primarily drive the relationship between conservatism and charitable donations, and that people high in any of the ABPO subscales would be more likely to give to perceived ingroup charities than outgroup; donating to American veterans or impoverished American families, for instance, rather than incoming refugees or foreign charities. The associations of RT with patriotism and national identity, as well as ACT Traditionalism and Conservatism (but not Authoritarianism over and above MI and ES) further fit with the idea of RT associating with maternal or agreeable concern for the integrity of one’s ingroup culture. Or, to borrow Brooks’s (2007) terminology, RT seems to be the “compassionate conservative” dimension of conservative ideology. Hence, RT may be the dimension which most clearly speaks to the question of whether people higher or lower in conservatism are more individual-focused versus collective-focused, particularly in combination with MI: People high in MI and relatively low in RT would be highly individual-focused. People high in RT and relatively low in MI would be collective-focused, with a caveat: Their collective-focus is likely extended more to ingroup members than outgroup members. Future work could test this possibility by testing the associations between the ABPO subscales, personality traits, and the Schwartz Values. According to the current conclusions, people higher in RT should be higher in Benevolence but not Universalism values. I would also predict that people high in RT would be more likely to give to charities benefiting one’s perceived ingroup than foreign charities or marginalized members of social groups not accepted by Christian faith. It is worth noting that Bem (1975) has used the Bem Sex Roles Inventory (Bem, 1974) – employed in Study 4 of the current work – as a measure of psychological androgyny. Androgyny is characterized by high masculinity and high femininity (whereas “undifferentiated” individuals are low in both). Femininity is associated with “affective concern for the welfare of others” and

150 expressiveness (Bem, Martyna, & Watson, 1976, p. 1016), while masculinity is associated with cognitive concern for “getting the job done or problem solved” and instrumentality (Bem et al., 1976, p. 1016). Androgyny within individuals is associated with a variety of positive outcomes, including higher self-esteem (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1975) and more flexible adaptation to situational demands; displaying “masculine” independence from social pressures or “feminine” nurturance depending on the demands of the situation (Bem, 1975). On the other hand, individuals characterized by either femininity or masculinity (or “sex-typed” individuals) are inclined to avoid behaving in ways not consistent with their dominant masculine/feminine identity, and to feel uncomfortable when required to perform sex-role-inconsistent activities (Bem & Lenney, 1976). Generally, then, androgyny is thought to be associated with positive indicators of psychological health and functioning (Holt & Ellis, 1998). The current studies suggest that conservative ideology is comprised in part by a predominantly masculine dimension of attitudes, and a somewhat feminine dimension of attitudes – both of which are associated with identifying as more generally conservative. One might predict, then, that a conservative individual high in both MI and RT would be characterized by sex-role androgyny and possibly confer positive benefits as a result. Beyond the individual level, perhaps more importantly, it is worth considering whether conservatism may be a more balanced, androgynous ideology at the cultural level than liberalism is. Although some conservative individuals’ range of behaviours may be limited by respective masculine or feminine sex-role identities, if one considers couples, families, workplaces, church groups, and communities comprised of conservative people – some with more masculine attitudes and some with more feminine attitudes and their respective associated values and concerns – one could hypothesize that those groups may adapt better to situational demands than a group comprised of liberal individuals, characterized by lower masculinity (and perhaps lower femininity) and therefore lower androgyny. Although these ideas are currently speculative, the notion of conservatism conferring positive adjustment benefits in part through ideological androgyny (relative to liberal ideology) would fit with previous findings linking Libertarianism to lower life satisfaction and social connectedness (Iyer et al., 2010). Given that Libertarianism was characterized by Democrat- esque RT and ES, and Republican-esque MI, Libertarians – as individuals or collectively – would not confer the potential benefits of androgynous ideology conferred by being high in

151 femininity-related RT. Future studies can further investigate the role of sex-roles and androgyny more directly in potentially mediating associations between conservatism and/or libertarianism and positive or negative outcomes. It is to Libertarianism specifically that I now turn.

Libertarianism

One could also apply findings about RT, in combination with MI, to better understand Libertarianism. Study 3 provided a small sample of 26 participants who said they had voted Libertarian in the last federal election. Compared to Republican voters (of whom there were 275), Libertarians were significantly lower in RT and ES, but not significantly different in MI. Further, Libertarian voters were comparable to Democrat voters on RT and ES, but much higher on MI. Thus, one can more precisely describe how “conservative” Libertarian voters are; they are as conservative as Republican voters on issues relevant to MI, but comparable to Democrat voters on issues relevant to RT and ES. Given the small sample of Libertarian votes, particularly compared to the large sample of Democrat voters, these results should be further scrutinized in future studies. In particular, the comparable scores of Libertarian and Democrat voters should be further probed with a larger sample of Libertarians to assess whether there truly are non- significant differences in their ES and RT scores. Having said that, a pattern of Republican-esque conservative scores on MI and Democrat-esque scores on RT and ES certainly fits with past descriptions of Libertarians as valuing individual liberty as the most important moral principle (Iyer et al., 2010). I return here to the idea of economic conservatism being more accurately construed as MI, which is not exclusively economic. The ABPO subscales can clarify what constellations of attitudes are held by people voting Libertarian: Rather than being classified as high in “economic conservatism” and low in “social conservatism,” Libertarian voters appear to be conservative on issues relevant to leading a culturally masculine and independent lifestyle, and liberal on issues relevant to Christian faiths and inter-mixing of ethnicities. In sum, Religious Traditionalism is a dimension of political ideology that seems to be the feminine, exclusively religiously relevant complement to Masculine Independence. Together, MI and RT are two key pieces to the questions of how political attitudes factor together empirically, and whether attitudes factor neatly along economic and social issues. To this point, the answer is no. Political attitudes factor along dimensions associated with masculinity versus femininity, and

152 a third factor: racist concerns about ethnic “mixing” through marriage and reproduction (Ethnic Separateness).

Ethnic Separateness

Ethnic Separateness also appears primarily social in nature, encompassing issues regarding how different social groups should relate to one another. It should be noted, however, that attitudes toward different social groups, particularly those associated with immigration to the United States and using American tax dollars for foreign aid, constitute economic-looking concerns as well. Prejudiced individuals could perceive immigration and acceptance of refugees as ethnically unwelcome, or as fiscally irresponsible to American citizens. While the validity of RT and MI were quite robustly supported by the current studies’ results, the distinctiveness – and content – of ES was somewhat less well established. Exploratory analyses in Study 2b pointed to a 2-factor solution, involving MI and RT but not ES. This could have been due to the randomly selected sample of 107 political attitudes statements in Study 2b not including enough items coherently tapping race-related concerns, but it is worth noting nonetheless. Confirmatory factor analyses in Studies 3 and 4 were acceptably in line with a 3-factor solution being a suitable fit to the data sets, but did not overwhelmingly indicate good fit of a 3-factor solution. There is therefore reason to critically evaluate the necessity of the ES subscale as distinct from MI and RT. There are two main lines of supportive evidence for the utility of ES in the current studies. First, ES accounts for variance in General PO, 1-item social PO, and 1-item fiscal PO, over and above RT and MI. Thus, ES does model unique variance in people’s political orientation. Second, it is uniquely associated with Modern Racism Scale (MRS) scores; although RT and MI were both positively correlated with MRS scores, they were not associated with racism over and above the association of racism with ES. Thus, the ES subscale appears crucially involved in accounting for prejudiced aspects of conservative ideology. One likely reason that ES is the least well-established of the three ABPO subscales is that self-reports of prejudiced attitudes are heavily influenced by egalitarian social norms against expressing prejudiced attitudes (e.g. Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981; Weitz, 1972). Very few people nowadays sanction holding or expressing racist attitudes. For instance, in one study of the social acceptability of 105 different prejudices, (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002, Study 1),

153 the acceptability score of being prejudiced against racists was topped only by the acceptability scores of being prejudiced against rapists, child abusers, child molesters, wife beaters, and terrorists. The original ES subscale, derived in Study 3, was comprised of four items quite blatantly tapping prejudiced attitudes, meaning people’s responses were likely influenced by social norms against holding and expressing prejudiced attitudes. The original 4-item version of the ES subscale did indeed have truncated range compared to the MI and RT subscales; it was largely for this reason that I added three items to the ES subscale in Study 4, with the aim of making them less face-valid measures of prejudiced political attitudes. Even the extended 7-item version of the ES subscale has a somewhat restricted range of variance, although the range was extended by the inclusion of the three new items. While it is possible that there is limited range in people’s prejudiced political attitudes, it is likely worth continuing to test the utility of additional, less face-valid items in the ES subscale. Measuring self-reported prejudiced attitudes is a challenging endeavour, and the ES subscale could benefit from continued development aimed at reducing the impact of social desirability on people’s responses.

Conservatism and prejudice

All three ABPO subscales were correlated positively with Modern Racism Scale (MRS) scores. However, when the three subscales simultaneously predict racism, only Ethnic Separateness is significantly associated with it. Thus, “conservatism” itself does not necessarily predict prejudice; it is associated with hate to the extent that MI and RT are positively correlated with ES on average. Therefore, individuals could be high in MI and/or RT and low in ES and associated racism. Libertarian voters are a case in point: They were characterized by higher MI than Democrat voters but lower RT and ES than Republican voters. Thus, Libertarians seem to desire independent freedoms from the government enforcing more equal distribution of resources, without having prejudiced concerns about ethnic mixing. The distinction between ES and RT in the current studies is again relevant to the question of whether political ideology can be effectively modeled along dimensions of fiscal versus social conservatism. The RT and ES subscales both tap primarily social-looking issues, but they are usefully modeled as distinct factors of attitudes. Thus, “social conservatism” – even if it did exist as a counterpart to “economic conservatism,” which does not appear to be the case – itself does

154 not seem best conceptualized as a single dimension. I turn now to summative discussion of how the current findings relate to the three main questions posed in the Introduction.

Summary: Dimensionality of political orientation The current studies point to at least three correlated but distinct dimensions of conservative political orientation in the United States. These dimensions can be measured with the empirically derived 33-item measure of MI, RT, and ES. Having said that, I would encourage users of the ABPO scale to test the utility of including novel items. This would, first, overcome limitations or biases in the current attempt to – as comprehensively as possible – sample the domain of political ideology with attitudinal statements, possibly allowing for modeling of issues that were not originally included. Items explicitly tapping attitudes toward welfare, for instance, were unfortunately not represented in the initial pool of 214 items. Such items would likely factor out in Masculine Independence, but that remains to be tested. The second benefit of testing the utility of novel items is that it would keep an attitude-based measure of political ideology current because, over time, the specific issues arising in political discourse and platforms will change somewhat. Thus, the specific measure designed here could be used as a theoretical and psychometric backbone for further investigations of the dimensionality of PO over time. Hence, my priority is not for other researchers to use the exact set of 33 items derived here. Rather, the main contribution of the current studies is the derivation of a tripartite model of conservatism reflecting dimensions of MI, RT, and ES. It is worth noting that the three- dimensional structure of PO derived in the current studies does agree with previous work. Verhulst and colleagues (2012) interpreted a three-dimensional model when they performed a principal component analysis on the Wilson-Patterson (1968) scale of PO. The dimensions were interpreted as social, economic, and defense/military – or social, fiscal, and foreign. The ABPO dimensions too could be roughly called fiscal (MI), social (RT), and foreign (ES), although it bears noting again that MI appears to be in no way exclusively economic, and that RT appears to be an exclusively Christo-religious subset of social issues. The reason that I am quite critical of bidimensional models defined by economic and social conservatism, compared to unidimensional models, is twofold: first, the current studies demonstrate quite clearly that a bidimensional model defined by economic versus social issues was not derived when issues were allowed to sort themselves out empirically. In Study 2a, data

155 did not point to a viable 2-factor solution at all, and in Study 2b, I interpreted a 2-factor solution in which the factors were MI and RT – not fiscal versus social issues. As has been discussed previously, MI is by no means an exclusively fiscal factor of attitudes, and RT is an exclusively Christo-religious factor of social issues. Second, there is a large body of evidence demonstrating the utility of unidimensional conservatism, even when measured with a single item, in predicting important outcomes such as voting behaviour. By non-prescriptively asking individuals to report on their general political orientation, unidimensional measures are likely tapping relevant dimensions of PO in various proportions to provide a valid overall index of conservatism. Indeed, when a general factor can be broken down into sub-factors, a measure of the general factor is very likely to account for most of the variance in sub-factors (Cronbach, 1951; Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000). This idea is supported by the consistent finding that each of MI, RT, and ES predicted unique variance in General PO. “Fiscal conservatism,” on the other hand, was associated with both MI and ES, while “social conservatism” was associated with all three subscales. Thus, measuring fiscal and social conservatism as distinct dimensions of PO, as in Everett (2013) for instance, is splitting the dimensions of conservatism along lines which are not borne out empirically. According to the present work, fiscal conservatism does not exist independent of people’s attitudes on decidedly social-looking issues. Likewise, social conservatism does not exist independent of people’s attitudes on decidedly fiscal-looking issues. I therefore suggest that the ABPO scale not be considered replacements for general measures of liberalism-conservatism; unidimensional measures do seem to capture plenty of valid variance in people’s actual political leanings. Rather, the ABPO scale constitutes an additional tool which can help further the study of motivations and characteristics underlying distinct aspects of political ideology at a finer level of analysis. Future work can explore how individuals cluster into groups according to their respective scores on MI, RT, and ES, as have previous studies, which identify multiple clusters of people who do not fit neatly along a unidimensional spectrum of liberalism-conservatism (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Graham et al., 2009). In line with such work, the current studies point to distinct individual difference predictors of more than one dimension of political orientation. It seems that

156 the ABPO subscales can therefore help further study the heterogeneous clusters of beliefs that characterize individuals at various points on the left-right political spectrum.

Potential for extension to non-American populations

The current studies suggest that conservatism comprises dimensions having to do with desire for an independent and masculine lifestyle, traditional values on religiously charged issues, and concerns about ethnicities remaining separate. However, this three-dimensional model of PO was derived using exclusively U.S.-residing participants, so the potential for applying the current findings to non-American populations is uncertain. There are two main questions when considering cross-cultural application of the current model. First, would a three- dimensional model defined by MI, RT, and ES apply to other cultures? Second, which politically charged issues would load on each dimension in other cultures? Different cultures tend to have distinct constructions of what constitutes manhood or masculinity (Gilmore, 1990), and the American construction of masculinity may be uniquely influenced by specific aspects of American history such as U.S. frontier culture. Thus, if a dimension reflecting culturally constructed notions of masculinity were derived in other countries, the issues and attitudes that would cluster on that dimension would likely differ from the issues included in the current MI subscale. Specifically, the coupling of independence and self-reliance with the image of manhood may be stronger or weaker than in American samples. For instance, masculinity in some cultures could be associated more with being able to take care of others than to live with freedom from interference by the government. It is therefore possible that a dimension generally reflecting support for, or opposition of, government involvement in the lives of citizens (i.e. independence) could emerge in other cultures, with less of a rugged masculinity associated with that dimension. Religious Traditionalism is a dimension that could replicate in other countries, though the issues loading on that dimension should differ according to the specifics of the predominant religion(s) in a culture. Although most major religions share overarching emphases and espouse similar virtues, attitudes toward particular issues could be differentially shaped. For instance, attitudes toward the acceptability of drinking alcohol (and the importance of cultural freedoms to imbibe it) could differ substantially between Christian and Islamic faiths. Thus, one could predict

157 that the content of a culture’s predominant religion(s) could shape the specific content of a possible Religious Traditionalism dimension of conservatism in that culture. Finally, it is probable that some individuals of almost any culture will be concerned with the purity of one’s perceived ingroup – cultural or ethnic – and will therefore be more or less accepting of ethnic “mixing” through intermarriage and having multi-racial children. An Ethnic Separateness dimension may therefore replicate in multiple cultures, because issues of race are commonly associated with political policy through issues such as immigration and being more or less open to refugees. It is noteworthy here the Ethnic Separateness subscale could – and likely should – be modified in order to increase its utility in both American and other cultures. Six of the seven items either do not refer to a particular ethnicity or could be easily modified to refer to one’s own country rather than America. On the other hand, one item, I worry that white people marrying people of different races will result in having no more white people, is not tapping concerns about the integrity of one’s own ethnic/social group if one is not white. Thus, that item could be modified for future use to I worry that people of different ethnicities having children will result in the disappearance of my own ethnicity. Such a modification would likely bring the item more in line with overarching concerns about the mixing of one’s own race with others, and further testing should scrutinize that possibility. The final version of the ABPO scale with the above modified item is included in Appendix C. In sum, the applicability and generalizability of the ABPO scale and the dimensionality underlying it to other cultures is untested in the current studies. Future work would do well to continue to investigate the factor structure underlying political ideology in non-American cultures and look for similarities and distinctions across cultures. The current results, in other words, should be considered reflective of only U.S. culture, until further efforts are made to scrutinize its cross-cultural validity.

Summary: Negativity bias Results of previous studies often link unidimensional conservative PO to indicators of stronger negativity bias. Other results, however, link unidimensional conservative PO to indicators of positive adjustment and well-being. A resultant question has been, “Is conservative

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PO positively related to some aspects of predisposition to negativity and negatively to other aspects of it?” (e.g. Hibbing et al., 2014; Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014). The current studies clarify a question that future work can address: “Which aspects of conservative PO are associated with which aspects of negativity bias?”. While it may be the case that political conservatism is itself associated with some aspects of negativity bias or predisposition toward negative affectivity but not others, it may be the case that some factors of conservative ideology are associated with lower negativity bias, and others with higher negativity bias. In the context of discussing the association between negativity bias and conservatism, it has been previously noted that indices of negativity bias “reliably predict conservative social attitudes but do not reliably predict conservative economic attitudes” (Malka & Soto, 2014, p. 321). I agree that some aspects of political ideology are associated with indices of negativity bias and others are not (based on the current work, MI is not, and RT and ES are). However, rather than relying on dimensions of fiscal and social conservatism, I would suggest that measuring conservatism with the empirically derived ABPO scale could further clarify in what ways – and why – factors of political ideology would be positively, negatively, or non- significantly associated with negativity bias. A valuable contribution of the current studies is clear demonstration that a negative neuroticism-conservatism link needs to be seriously considered and incorporated into theories of conservatism. Specifically, a primary factor of conservative attitudes, MI, is quite robustly and negatively associated with neuroticism and positively associated with SWL. Using more precise psychometric tools, such as the ABPO scale, researchers can more carefully study how political ideology is associated with various indices of fear, withdrawal, behavioural inhibition, anxiety, attentiveness to negative stimuli, and wellness. Hibbing and colleagues (2014) note that a construal of conservatives as broadly heavier in negativity bias than liberals fits confusingly with issue-specific attitudes held by conservatives. Namely, they point out that it is surprising that people higher in negativity bias would be relatively unconcerned about “poverty, accidental shootings, and environmental degradation” (p. 305). The authors note that the understanding of a negativity-bias-conservatism link could be refined. The current work further suggests that one could predict the issues on which conservatives may evince stronger negativity bias than liberals. Specifically, issues

159 threatening a sense of Masculine Independence, issues extending freedoms to behave in ways not sanctioned by Christian faiths, and issues having to do with “mixing” of ethnicities. Thus, the right to bear arms, for example, technically introduces threat of accidental or deliberate shootings by one’s fellow Americans, but – as it relates to policy – it allows individuals the independence to protect themselves with weapons. People high in MI would therefore be drawn to platforms offering freedom to arm oneself more than platforms offering to protect individuals from shootings with governmental restrictions on firearms. Future work should test the association of MI with the Schwartz Values. Schwartz (2012) notes that conformity, order, tradition, security, and power are associated with anxiety and can be characterized as “self-protective values” (p. 14). Prioritizing these values can therefore help people cope with anxiety by regulating uncertainty. Unidimensional conservatism is typically linked to security and conformity (Caprara et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 2010), in line with a conservatism-negativity bias link. However, MI’s negative association with neuroticism suggests that MI may be unrelated to security and conformity values, particularly when RT and ES are accounted for. MI, by contrast, could be positively associated with self-enhancement goals, including achievement and power. These possibilities warrant investigation and could further clarify the motivations underlying these dimensions of conservative PO.

Summary: Individual-focus versus collective-focus The current studies show no evidence, direct or indirect, of universal collective concern being associated with conservative PO (i.e. concern including outgroup members and/or the environment). Masculine Independence is decidedly associated with concern for one’s own freedom from the government’s determination of how citizens should take care of each other. Religious Traditionalism, on the other hand, seems more relevant to a form of collective-focus. RT is strongly associated with religiosity and patriotism and, when MI and ES are controlled for, agreeableness and femininity. As with the question of conservatism’s association with negativity bias, a critical future direction for investigation is testing the associations of the ABPO subscales with the Schwartz Values Scale. Religiosity’s established link with benevolence but not universalism, combined with RT’s strong link to patriotism, suggests that higher RT is likely to be associated with stronger benevolence but not universalism values. This would

160 suggest that conservatives high in RT would indeed have communal or collective-focused concerns, but with a scope limited to those perceived as ingroup members. Thus, the ABPO subscales could elucidate the association of conservatism to collective- versus individual-focus: MI is likely associated with strong individual-focus, with little concern for group dynamics or intactness. The fact that high MI alone distinguished Libertarian voters from Democrat voters supports this possibility; Libertarians are generally characterized as being concerned almost solely with individual liberty. RT, on the other hand, appears to involve a more agreeable, feminine outward focus on the value and intactness of one’s ingroup. Hence, one dimension of conservative ideology is characterized by individual-focus, while another core dimension is characterized by collective-focus. Individuals who are high in both MI and RT would therefore be a particularly interesting group of people to focus on with regard to individual- versus collective-focus. Perhaps an individual high in MI and RT would show an inclination toward agreeable collective concern but with a more restricted scope. These individuals may have especially strong concern for the well- being of one’s own family unit/kin, rather than extending those concerns to a broader ingroup including others of the same religion or culturally “American” characteristics. Finally, the study of values in relation to the ABPO scale could help understand ES better. ES, when RT and MI are controlled for, is associated primarily with racist attitudes. It remains to be tested, however, whether those racist attitudes are motivated directly by hateful characteristics (i.e. low benevolence, low universalism) or by concerns about safety or tradition. ES was itself only positively correlated with symbolic patriotism, and that correlation did not hold over and above the shared variance between RT and symbolic patriotism. Thus, ES may not be associated with racism via high values of tradition and may be more related to low benevolence, but this remains to be tested.

Mechanical Turk samples in the current work A limitation of these studies is that they were all run through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. The main reasons for this were, first, to access participants residing in the United States and, second, to obtain multiple large samples. Another advantage was that, although Mechanical Turk workers are not representative of United States residents as a whole, they are often adult community members rather than exclusively university students. Nonetheless, there are

161 legitimate concerns about the validity of using Mechanical Turk samples to study psychological phenomena, which I attempted to mitigate in several ways. First, I removed participants who had completed more than one of Studies 2a, 2b, 3, or 4, so there were not repeat participants in the studies involved in scale development. Similarly, I checked for repeat IP addresses within each study, and removed the second participation from a given IP address. This is in light of concerns raised in the past that Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers make for non-naïve participants (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014); many have taken part in a great number of studies. While I cannot speak to how naïve the current studies’ participants were to psychology, or political psychology, studies in general, I aimed to use data only from participants who would be seeing the Attitude-Based PO scale items for the first time. I also noted concerns that some MTurk workers who identify themselves as residing in the United States are in fact participating from other countries – most commonly from the second biggest source of MTurk workers, India (Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). I therefore identified and excluded data from several participants who had participated from Indian IP addresses, because I was aiming to characterize political attitudes of United States residents. Because there is no guarantee that MTurk workers are providing good-quality data, I excluded participants who took an impossibly short amount of time to complete the studies (i.e. those whose time to completion was in the lowest 5th percentile). Although this may not be a conservative enough cut-point, it would have cut out the participants who completed studies the most carelessly. Finally, it has been pointed out that MTurk samples skew conservative and therefore do not sufficiently represent conservative people, particularly conservative males (Kahan, 2013). While I cannot definitively allay this concern, I did obtain reasonable samples of conservatives, and conservative males specifically, in these studies. Table 36 presents break-downs of participants by political orientation for each of the five studies. While it is the case that each sample skews conservative, there were usable data from 933 conservative participants in total (roughly a quarter of the samples on average), and 490 conservative males in total (roughly 13% of the samples on average).

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Table 36. Break-down of participants by political orientation

Study 1 Study 2a Study 2b Study 3 Study 4 (N = 700) (N = 662) (N = 630) (N = 1292) (N = 369) 1. Liberals 424 (61%) 427 (65%) 387 (61%) 782 (61%) 240 (65%) 2. Middle of the road 75 (11%) 73 (11%) 71 (11%) 175 (14%) 44 (12%) 3. Conservatives 201 (29%) 153 (23%) 161 (26%) 335 (25%) 83 (23%) 4. Conservative males 104 (15%) 74 (11%) 84 (13%) 178 (14%) 50 (14%) 5. Unreported 9 (1.4%) 11 (1.7%) 10 (.8%) 2 (.5%) Note. Liberals scored between 1 and 3.67 (out of 7) on the 3-item measure of General PO; Middle of the roads scored 4; Conservatives scored 4.33 to 7. Participants whose times to completion were in the bottom 5th percentile are not included.

Ultimately, MTurk allowed us to gather usable data from 3653 United States community members. There are valid concerns about the use of MTurk samples, and the biases and limitations inherent in MTurk samples would have impacted the current studies to some extent. However, given that these studies used correlational designs, had no deception or strict requirement of naïve participants, and required very large samples to properly test large pools of items in exploratory analyses, the benefits of using MTurk likely outweighed the costs; I felt it most important to obtain large sample sizes of U.S. adults in the early stages of scale development.

Conclusions Contemporary American conservative PO breaks down empirically into at least three dimensions, canonically tapped by attitudes toward issues including taxation, government reach, environmental issues, and public health care; euthanasia, abortion, and stem cell research; and bi- racial families, refugees, and foreign aid. These dimensions do not fit well with a bidimensional model defined by axes of social and economic conservatism-liberalism, and they have distinct correlates; some of which are generally associated with unidimensional conservatism, some of which are not. The most novel associations revealed by the current work include a negative disgust-sensitivity-MI association, a negative neuroticism-MI association, a robust positive MI- SWL association (fitting well with a positive adjustment account of political conservatism), positive associations between RT and femininity and agreeableness when MI and ES are controlled for (fitting well with a “compassionate conservatism” element of conservatism), and a specific positive association between racism and ES that can account for the positive correlations of MI and RT with racism.

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Future studies can test how broad value types reflecting negativity bias and individual- versus collective-focus are associated with the ABPO subscales to further elucidate the more complex relationships of these broad variables with more articulated dimensions of political ideology. Thus, as others have pointed out, not all conservatives are the same; constellations of attitudes appear to be well defined by combinations of MI, RT, and ES, and it seems that these empirically derived scales can be used to model the variety in attitudes among those identifying as conservatives.

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Appendices

A. The Original Pool of Two Hundred Fourteen Draft ABPO Scale Items B. The One Hundred Forty-Three Items Included in Study 3 C. The Final 33-Item ABPO Scale

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Appendix A The Original Pool of Two Hundred Fourteen Draft ABPO Scale Items Items included in Study 2a:

1. Cultural and ethnic diversity make America a better place. 2. Immigrants should not have the right to live as they did in their original countries once they move to America. 3. The government should not fund artistic pursuits. 4. The government should fund scientific research more than the arts. 5. An economy based on competitive capitalism is the source of many problems in America. 6. Hunting animals is good sport. 7. Most homeless people could have jobs and homes if they would just pull themselves together. 8. America must become less reliant on the use of fossil fuels like oil. 9. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. 10. Most people who are obese could lose weight if they just put in a little effort. 11. When people hunt animals for recreation, it makes me sick. 12. If I were to travel, I would want a comprehensive itinerary for my time away. 13. I have hunted animals for recreation. 14. The idea that America should separate God from government is wrong. 15. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emissions will do nothing to help the environment. 16. Everyone has some aspects of him/herself that s/he cannot change, regardless of how much will-power s/he has. 17. Embryonic stem cell research is just wrong. 18. I dislike the idea of the American government paying the salaries of public servants. 19. I feel positively about embryonic stem cell research. 20. I think it is strange to want to adopt children. 21. Americans should be willing to alter their lifestyles in order to become more environmentally sustainable. 22. I wish that individuals of different races would not have children together. 23. I feel contempt toward people with low will-power. 24. I love the feeling when I’ve finished doing laundry and all my clothes are clean. 25. Anyone can make a good parent, regardless of his/her sexual orientation, gender, or race. 26. The government has much more important things to fund than the health care system. 27. Everyone should have the right to own a personal firearm(s). 28. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from global warming. 29. Immigrants cost American taxpayers money. 30. The environment is in grave danger from the impact of humans. 31. The military receives too much funding from the government. 32. There should be amnesty for immigrants who enter illegally (undocumented immigrants). 33. I dislike the idea of tax dollars going to support the arts.

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34. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to cure diseases which current medicine has been unable to effectively treat. 35. The government should fund alternative energy research and production. 36. I worry that white people marrying individuals of different races will result in having no more white people. 37. I really respect people who have lots of children. 38. Executing someone who murders an innocent person(s) is justified. 39. I don’t like to be spontaneous. 40. The government should not be funding the search for solutions to global warming. 41. The government should support embryonic stem cell research. 42. The government should protect its citizens from the greed of big, private businesses. 43. If another country threatens the safety of our country, the government should take immediate military action to reduce that threat. 44. Married American couples should have more children. 45. I wish people would live in a more environmentally sustainable manner. 46. It is sensible for police to consider someone’s race when assessing whether he/she is dangerous. 47. Private schools compel improvement among students more than public schools do. 48. Every individual should own a personal firearm(s). 49. Cultural and ethnic diversity are not good for America as a country. 50. Same-sex marriage should be illegal. 51. I wish there were fewer vegetarians in America. 52. The government should be very tough on crime. 53. American employers should make sure that there is cultural diversity in the workplace. 54. Individuals who immigrate to America from other countries should do their best to assimilate completely to American culture. 55. If I were to underline something on paper, I would prefer to use a ruler than to freehand. 56. I think the value of having strong will-power is overrated. 57. The death penalty is not an appropriate sentence for anyone. 58. The American military should be used to protect Democracy worldwide. 59. There is no excuse for being downtrodden in life. 60. Lower taxes create more incentive for people to work, save, invest, and engage in entrepreneurial endeavors. 61. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our country's citizens are taken care of. 62. If one is going to give money to charity, it should be an American charity, not a foreign charity. 63. Immigrants take jobs that could otherwise be given to American citizens. 64. Oil is an abundant resource. 65. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved with help from the government and tax dollars. 66. There are too many personal firearms in the hands of American citizens. 67. Racial profiling is good logical police work. 68. Most people who are unemployed could be working if they put in more effort.

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69. Many people who are obese cannot lose weight easily because of factors that are out of their control. 70. It is the right of American adults to drink alcohol when they like. 71. I wish more Americans were vegetarian. 72. I feel positively about American people who adopt non-American children into their families. 73. Criminals should be punished harshly. 74. There is nothing wrong with “big businesses.” 75. It takes a lot of talent to be an artist. 76. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 77. Public schools are the best educational environment for a child. 78. Immigrants take valuable job opportunities from American citizens. 79. Women should have the right to choose whether they carry a pregnancy to term or have an abortion. 80. Individuals of different races should not be able to get married. 81. Abortion is murder. 82. I dislike it when a married couple does not want to have children. 83. The government should not support same-sex marriage. 84. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the military. 85. I wish there were more bi-racial couples in America. 86. If I go grocery shopping, I like to stick to a list I’ve planned out beforehand. 87. Women are better suited to staying at home with children than men are. 88. Every American citizen should share in the responsibility of making sure no one is homeless. 89. The government must produce a national plan for all energy resources with sustainability in mind. 90. Public school teachers do not make enough money. 91. Charitable organizations often do not use donated money in the ways they say they will. 92. I value others’ artistic pursuits. 93. The government should provide women with access to safe abortions. 94. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the public school system. 95. Social Security provides a safety net for the nation’s poor and needy. 96. It is good to give money to charity. 97. The government has more important things to be concerned about than illegal drugs. 98. The government should protect the public school system by providing additional funds to it. 99. It is a shame when people who are un-married have children. 100. A citizen should have the right to experiment with drugs without severe penalties from the government. 101. Will-power cannot change everything in life 102. I feel negatively about people who have children out of wedlock. 103. I feel positive about two people of different races having bi-racial children together. 104. The military should be first priority when the government spends money.

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105. Women who dress in masculine clothing are probably lesbians. 106. With regards to airport security, passenger profiling based on criteria such as race and ethnicity is simply wrong and offensive. 107. I feel positively about American people who adopt American children into their families.

Items included in Study 2b:

108. An aborted fetus is a victim of murder. 109. Government programs are an important way to provide for the poor and needy in society. 110. I support "affirmative action" policies in workplaces and schools. 111. Children raised by homosexual couples are more likely to grow up gay. 112. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 113. It is ridiculous to keep a certain number of positions at schools or workplaces aside for members of ethnic minorities. 114. I strive to have good will-power in life. 115. Health care should be completely privatized. 116. I find it bothersome when people living in America have strong foreign accents. 117. A woman should never have an abortion. 118. The conditions in which animals farmed for meat are kept are awful. 119. Marriage is meant to be a union of one man and one woman only. 120. Immigrants dilute the purity of American culture. 121. Immigrants cost the American government money. 122. All reference to God in public and government spaces should be removed. 123. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s health care. 124. The government should provide equal health care benefits for all, regardless of one's ability to pay. 125. The American military should not be sent abroad to defend other countries from threats. 126. The number of public servants employed (and paid) by the government should be kept to a minimum. 127. Individuals do not need to own guns for their own protection. 128. I never use the toilet without washing my hands afterward. 129. The Federal Government should secure the borders and enforce current immigration law. 130. Homosexual people should not be allowed to parent children. 131. It is the role of the government to protect the people through enforcement of the law. 132. There should be more personal firearms in the possession of American citizens. 133. People who immigrate to America from other countries should adopt an American way of life, rather than living as they did in the countries they came from. 134. The government is too concerned about reducing the amount of illegal drugs in this country. 135. Government programs encourage people to become dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 136. The government needs to be tougher on illegal immigrants. 137. Income tax should be low. 138. The government should help the poor and needy using tax dollars from the rich.

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139. Adopted children are not the same as children who were born to a couple naturally. 140. Almost anybody could be an artist/actor/musician, it takes little special talent. 141. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved by the people who are homeless themselves. 142. I fear that homosexual people adopting children will result in there being more homosexual people in America over time. 143. People who are obese disgust me. 144. Health care in America should not be made public. 145. I like my time to being clearly scheduled. 146. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and provide welfare programs for those in need. 147. I find it hard to trust people who are not religious. 148. There is no crime which should be punished with the death sentence. 149. It is very important for members of all ethnic groups to have equal access to education and employment. 150. Everyone should have the right to hunt animals for recreation. 151. Undocumented, illegal immigrants should not have the same rights as those who obey the law and enter legally. 152. I value will-power very highly in others. 153. The homeless are responsible for their own problems. 154. The government should not fund embryonic stem cell research. 155. People who immigrate to America should make learning fluent English a very high priority. 156. The American military should be employed to protect only America and its citizens, not foreign countries. 157. The arts are a valuable source of culture for America. 158. The legal drinking age should be raised (i.e. older). 159. The Social Security system should not be privatized. 160. People who are bi-racial (i.e. who have parents of different races) make me uncomfortable. 161. I have very little respect for someone who does not have the will-power to overcome distractions or cravings. 162. Religious expression has no place in government. 163. Global warming is real. 164. As far as the environment goes, the future looks grim. 165. Women and men are equally able to work the same kinds of jobs. 166. If a heterosexual married couple chooses to have only one parent to go to work after a child is born, it should be the husband who goes to work and not the wife. 167. The military keeps our country safe. 168. Men should wear masculine clothing. 169. I don’t like to plan ahead for things. 170. Some criminals should be sentenced to death. 171. I fear for future generations having to deal with the environmental problems humans are creating.

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172. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal access to options for euthanasia. 173. Global warming presents a threat to the future of humans. 174. The Social Security system must be made more efficient through privatization and/or allowing individuals to manage their own savings. 175. It would be unacceptable for a woman to wear a pant-suit on her wedding day. 176. Illegal drugs are the source of much evil in America. 177. Women and men are best suited to different types of work. 178. It is better for a woman to have an abortion than to raise a child she does not want. 179. When determining whether someone is threatening, that person’s race/ethnicity should never be considered as a factor. 180. The government should provide all citizens with free or low-cost health care. 181. Women should stay at home and parent children, and men should work to support their families. 182. Cultural and ethnic diversity is a valuable resource for America. 183. Government workers deserve the money they are paid by the government. 184. Being vegetarian is ridiculous. 185. More guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens would mean less crime. 186. It is perfectly acceptable for a heterosexual man to stay home and parent a child(ren), while his wife goes to work. 187. Obese people need to simply pull themselves together and lose weight. 188. America will always have access to fossil fuels like oil. 189. It should be legal for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender individuals to marry. 190. The government must crack down on people who produce or distribute illegal drugs. 191. Drug crimes involving marijuana should be sentenced as harshly as those involving other illegal drugs. 192. There are some crimes which should definitely be punished with the death sentence. 193. I like to plan my time out very carefully. 194. When I wrap a parcel or present, I like it to look immaculate. 195. Every American should eat meat. 196. Gas and electric companies should be under governmental control. 197. I always plan ahead for things. 198. Eating animals is wrong. 199. Many people are obese because their genes make them so. 200. Artistic pursuits have little value to America as a country. 201. I would hunt animals for recreation. 202. It is morally and ethically wrong for a Government to support embryonic stem cell research. 203. I always budget my money for upcoming expenses. 204. The legal drinking age should be reduced (i.e. younger). 205. The government should never again prohibit citizens from having access to alcohol. 206. Private schools give all parents the right to choose what schools they want to send their children to. 207. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary to address inequity/injustice in society.

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208. Women should wear feminine clothing. 209. Factory farming is a big problem in America. 210. A smaller government with limited power would improve the standard of living for all. 211. Children should be had only by people who are legally married. 212. With enough will power people can overcome any boundaries. 213. Competitive capitalism produces economic growth, more jobs and the highest standards of living. 214. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all circumstances.

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Appendix B The One Hundred Forty-Three Items Included in Study 3 These items were included in Studies 2a and 2b; they are items which loaded .32 or higher on one of the factors in the final factor analysis reported in each study. Study 2a, Factor 1: 1. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from Global warming. 2. The government must produce a national plan for all energy resources with sustainability in mind. 3. The government should protect its citizens from the greed of big, private businesses. 4. The environment is in grave danger from the impact of humans. 5. The government has much more important things to fund than the health care system. 6. There are too many personal firearms in the hands of American citizens. 7. The government should fund alternative energy research and production. 8. An economy based on competitive capitalism is a source of many problems in America. 9. The government should not be funding the search for solutions to global warming. 10. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our country’s citizens are taken care of. 11. The government should protect the public school system by providing additional funds to it. 12. I wish people would live in a more environmentally sustainable manner. 13. There is nothing wrong with “big businesses.” 14. Americans should be willing to alter their lifestyles in order to become more environmentally sustainable. 15. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emissions will do nothing to help the environment. 16. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved with help from the government and tax dollars. 17. Every American citizen should share in the responsibility of making sure no one is homeless. 18. Everyone should have the right to own a personal firearm(s). 19. America must become less reliant on the use of fossil fuels like oil. 20. The government should not fund artistic pursuits. 21. I dislike the idea of tax dollars going to support the arts. 22. Hunting animals is good sport. 23. Public school teachers do not make enough money. 24. When people hunt animals for recreation, it makes me sick. 25. I don’t like the idea of tax dollars funding the public school system. 26. Lower taxes create incentive for people to work, save, invest, and engage in entrepreneurial endeavours. 27. Social Security provides a safety net for the nation’s poor and needy. 28. The military should be first priority when the government spends money. 29. Every individual should own a personal firearm(s).

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Study 2a, Factor 2: 30. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 31. I wish that individuals of different races would not have children together. 32. I worry that white people marrying people of different races will result in having no more white people. 33. Cultural and ethnic diversity are not good for America as a country. 34. Immigrants take valuable job opportunities from American citizens. 35. I feel positive about two people of different races having bi-racial children together. 36. Individuals of different races should not be able to get married. 37. Cultural and ethnic diversity make America a better place. 38. Immigrants should not have the right to live as they did in their original countries once they move to America. 39. Immigrants take jobs that could otherwise be given to American citizens. 40. It is sensible for police to consider someone’s race when assessing whether he/she is dangerous. 41. I feel positively about American people who adopt non-American children into their families. 42. I wish there were more bi-racial couples in America. 43. Individuals who immigrate to America from other countries should do their best to assimilate completely to American culture. 44. Immigrants cost taxpayers money. 45. If one is going to give money to charity, it should be an American charity, not a foreign charity. 46. Racial profiling is good logical police work. 47. Women who dress in masculine clothing are probably lesbians. 48. Women are better suited to staying at home with children than men are. 49. With regards to airport security, passenger profiling based on criteria such as race and ethnicity is simply wrong and offensive. 50. There should be amnesty for immigrants who enter illegally (undocumented immigrants). 51. I value others’ artistic pursuits. 52. Most homeless people could have jobs and homes if they would pull themselves together. 53. Executing someone who murders an innocent person(s) is justified.

Study 2a, Factor 3: 54. Embryonic stem cell research is just wrong. 55. I feel positively about embryonic stem cell research. 56. Abortion is murder. 57. Women should have the right to choose whether they carry a pregnancy to term or have an abortion. 58. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. 59. The government should support stem cell research. 60. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to cure diseases which current medicine has been unable to effectively treat. 61. The government should not support same-sex marriage.

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62. Same-sex marriage should be illegal. 63. The idea that America should separate God from government is wrong. 64. A citizen should have the right to experiment with drugs without severe penalties from the government. 65. It is a shame when unmarried people have children. 66. I feel negatively about people who have children out of wedlock. 67. Anyone can make a good parent, regardless of his/her sexual orientation, gender, or race. 68. The government has more important things to be concerned about than illegal drugs. 69. It is the right of American adults to drink alcohol when they like. 70. Married American couples should have more children. 71. I really respect people who have lots of children.

Study 2b, Factor 1: 72. Government programs are an important way to provide for the poor and needy in society. 73. The government should help the poor and needy using tax dollars from the rich. 74. The government should provide all citizens with free or low-cost health care. 75. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary to address inequity/injustice in society. 76. The government should provide equal health care benefits for all, regardless of one’s ability to pay. 77. Health care in America should not be made public. 78. Government programs encourage people to become dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 79. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s health care. 80. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and provide welfare programs for those in need. 81. Global warming presents a threat to the future of humans. 82. A smaller government with limited power would improve the standard of living for all. 83. More guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens mean less crime. 84. There should be more personal firearms in the possession of American citizens. 85. I support “affirmative action” policies in workplaces and schools. 86. The Social Security system must be made more efficient through privatization and/or allowing individuals to manage their own savings. 87. Global warming is real. 88. Health care should be completely privatized. 89. It is ridiculous to keep a certain number of positions at schools or workplaces aside for members of ethnic minorities. 90. The number of public servants employed (and paid) by the government should be kept to a minimum. 91. Individuals do not need to own guns for their own protection. 92. I fear for future generations having to deal with the environmental problems humans are creating. 93. The Social Security system should not be privatized. 94. Income tax should be low. 95. Gas and electric companies should be under governmental control. 96. Government workers deserve the money they are paid by the government.

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97. The homeless are responsible for their own problems. 98. Competitive capitalism produces economic growth, more jobs and the highest standards of living. 99. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved by the people who are homeless themselves. 100. Some criminals should be sentenced to death. 101. There is no crime which should be punished with the death sentence. 102. There are some crimes which should definitely be punished with the death sentence. 103. Everyone should have the right to hunt animals for recreation. 104. Women and men are equally able to work the same kinds of jobs.

Study 2b, Factor 2: 105. Marriage is meant to be a union of one man and one woman only. 106. Homosexual people should not be allowed to parent children. 107. I fear that homosexual people adopting children will result in there being more homosexual people in America over time. 108. Children raised by homosexual couples are more likely to grow up gay. 109. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all circumstances. 110. I find it hard to trust people who are not religious. 111. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized. 112. An aborted fetus is a victim of murder. 113. It should be legal for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals to marry. 114. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal access to options for euthanasia. 115. A woman should never have an abortion. 116. Religious expression has no place in government. 117. Men should wear masculine clothing. 118. Children should be had only by people who are legally married. 119. Illegal drugs are the source of much evil in America. 120. The government must crack down on people who produce or distribute illegal drugs. 121. Drug crimes involving marijuana should be sentenced as harshly as those involving other illegal drugs. 122. It is better for a woman to have an abortion than to raise a child she does not want. 123. The government is too concerned about reducing the amount of illegal drugs in this country. 124. It is morally and ethically wrong for a Government to support embryonic stem cell research. 125. Women should wear feminine clothing. 126. All reference to God in public and government spaces should be removed. 127. If a heterosexual married couple chooses to have only one parent go to work after a child is born, it should be the husband who goes to work and not the wife. 128. Women should stay at home and parent children, and men should work to support their families. 129. The government should not fund embryonic stem cell research. 130. The legal drinking age should be raised (i.e. older). 131. The government should never again prohibit citizens from having access to alcohol.

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132. The legal drinking age should be reduced (i.e. younger). 133. People who immigrate to America from other countries should adopt an American way of life, rather than living as they did in the countries they came from. 134. It is perfectly acceptable for a heterosexual man to stay home and parent a child(ren), while his wife goes to work. 135. The Federal Government should secure the borders and enforce current immigration law. 136. It would be unacceptable for a woman to wear a pant-suit on her wedding day. 137. The military keeps our country safe. 138. Immigrants dilute the purity of American culture. 139. America will always have access to fossil fuels like oil. 140. Women and men are best suited to different types of work.

Items added to tap obedience to authority: 141. People should really just obey authority. 142. America would be a better place if people had more respect for authority. 143. People should question authority, rather than automatically obey.

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Appendix C The Final 33-Item ABPO Scale

Please indicate your opinions on the following statements. If you are unsure how to answer any item, or would prefer not to answer, leave it blank.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neither Somewhat Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree nor Agree Agree Disagree

1. Proposed laws to reduce carbon emission are urgently needed and should be enacted immediately to save the planet from global warming.* 2. The government should fund alternative energy research and production.* 3. A large government is necessary to ensure that all our country’s citizens are taken care of.* 4. Higher taxes (primarily for the wealthy) are necessary to address inequity/injustice in society.* 5. The government should help the poor and needy using tax dollars from the rich.* 6. The government should provide all citizens with free or low-cost health care.* 7. Government programs are an important way to provide for the poor and needy in society.* 8. The government should provide equal health care benefits for all, regardless of one’s ability to pay.* 9. A smaller government with limited power would improve the standard of living for all. 10. The government should protect its citizens from the greed of big, private businesses.* 11. Taxes enable the government to create jobs and provide welfare programs for those in need.* 12. Health care should be completely privatized. 13. The government must produce a national plan for all energy resources with sustainability in mind.* 14. The government has much more important things to fund than the health care system. 15. Health care in America should not be made public. 16. Government programs encourage people to become dependent and lazy, rather than encouraging work and independence. 17. I dislike the idea of tax dollars funding other people’s health care. 18. Homelessness is a problem that can only be solved with help from the government and tax dollars.* 19. If someone wishes to die, he/she should have legal access to options for euthanasia.* 20. A person has a right to die with dignity, by his/her own choice, therefore euthanasia should be legalized.* 21. Euthanizing someone who wishes to die is murder. 22. Euthanasia of a human is wrong under all circumstances. 23. Abortion is murder. 24. If a pregnant woman believes abortion is the best choice for her, she should not have to defend that choice to anyone.*

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25. The use of embryonic stem cells in medicine could cause problems in the long run. 26. Even if someone requests medical euthanasia, it may not be the best solution for them. 27. Interracial marriages (i.e. a marriage between two people who are of different races) make me uncomfortable. 28. I wish that individuals of different races would not have children together. 29. I worry that people of different ethnicities having children will result in the disappearance of my own ethnicity. 30. I feel positive about people of different races having bi-racial children together.* 31. Allowing refugees into America reduces the amount of resources available to American citizens. 32. I wish fewer American tax dollars were used for foreign aid. 33. It is easy for people from other countries to immigrate to America. Items 1 through 18 are the Masculine Independence subscale. Items 19 through 26 are the Religious Traditionalism subscale. Items 27 through 33 are the Ethnic Separateness subscale. Items should be presented in random order.

Reverse coded items are indicated with *.