Survey English

Executive summary

The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA), sets out a series of commitments to be implemented by all states to address Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation and misuse. As part of the UNPoA, governments agreed to establish National Commissions to co-ordinate the approach to small arms- related problems taken at the national level. In Sri Lanka, the National Commission Against the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms (NCAPISA) was established for this purpose and remains the only such body in South Asia. In order for the National Commission to respond effectively to the safety and security concerns associated with SALW, a comprehensive national survey is to be undertaken in order facilitate a greater understanding of the problems and to suggest policy options to address them.

In early 2006, NCAPISA decided to commission a pilot SALW survey in advance of the full national survey to test possible research methodologies. The venue for this pilot survey was identified as Hambantota District. Findings and recommendations of the pilot project are outlined in this confidential report. It also aims to provide lessons learned regarding the structure of the research process that will help to ensure that the full national survey, which will begin in November 2006, is as effective and useful as possible.

This survey aims to assess the distribution of illicit weapons, examine the impact of SALW on safety, security, development and governance and outline the capacity of the state to control them more effectively. Information included in this survey was gathered using four methods: a desk review; six focus group discussions which were held to gain a detailed qualitative insight into the perceptions of local people in relation to small arms, security and development; a media analysis; and key informant interviews, to gauge the views of stakeholders. These methods were supported by the inspection of evidence and infrastructure relevant to the survey.

Notable by its absence is the household questionnaire which, by preference, Saferworld would normally use to generate data when conducting research of this kind. The methodology would have included this component had it not been for tight time and resource constraints. The planned national survey should, however, include such a questionnaire. The following represents a summary of the key findings and recommendations from the pilot survey. It is intended as a positive and collaborative contribution to the work of the National Commission and relevant government agencies.

Distribution and impacts of firearms in Hambantota District

Situated along the Southern Coast of Sri Lanka, Hambantota District covers an area of 2,609 square kilometres and has a population of 525,370. Official statistics state that the District population is 97 percent Sinhalese, 2 percent Muslim and 1 percent Tamil.1

There is widespread illegal possession of home made guns (galkatas), muzzle- loading guns, and shot guns in the District. Additionally, there are small but growing numbers of ‘T-56s’ in criminal hands, apparently concentrated in the western end of

1 Statistics obtained from the District Secretariat in Hambantota dated 01 September 2005.

the District, which contribute significantly to a high level of armed violence.2 Illicit hand grenades are also increasingly in circulation in the district, apparently from state stocks.

The shift to galkatas which fire T-56 ammunition (7.62 x 39mm) possibly indicates that T-56 ammunition is more readily available. Refilled empty cartridges are also a source of ammunition for criminal misuse and therefore it is suggested that increased effectiveness in collecting and destroying used cartridge cases from all authorised gun users is important for the future.

The primary sources for galkatas production are local blacksmiths, of whom there are a large number in the district. While a clampdown on blacksmiths is an important measure for controlling the numbers of home made guns in circulation, it is important to recognise that the presence of domestic production of firearms on a large scale amounts to an almost limitless supply. It may be more important to work on the root causes of the demand for weapons in the District. These include: poverty and lack of access to opportunity, disputes partly resulting from administrative malpractice, mistrust of police and dysfunction of the law and justice system, non-integration and criminal behaviour among army deserters and the perception of corruption among police and other agencies.

The firearms homicide rate in Hambantota for 2005, at 4.95 per 100,000 of the population, is more than double the rate for the rest of the country (2.06) and is higher than in most countries where the rate has been measured. No evidence could be found of any significant level of firearms suicide in the District. The areas of the District worst affected by firearms misuse are: Suriyawewa, Beliatta, Walasmulla, Weeraketiya, Tissamaharama and Angunakolapelessa.

Organised crime with links to politicians is perceived to be a catalyst for armed violence in the District. Armed activities of organised criminals include contract killings, inter-gang vendettas, cannabis cultivation/trading, armed robbery and personal protection of VIPs. The use of T-56s and sophisticated weaponry appears to be the hallmark of organised criminal activity in the district.

Army deserters are highlighted as being a group involved in both the supply of high- powered weapons and the perpetration of serious crime in the district. The survey was unable to prove conclusively whether this assertion was true, however, it is still recommended that a concerted effort be made to reduce what criminality there is among army deserters through more effective preventative policing and reintegration initiatives. Reintegration programmes to help former military personnel return to civil society would empower former military personnel to choose to pursue legitimate livelihood opportunities. Improvements to the treatment and recognition of army personnel should also be considered, to encourage their retention.

The misuse of firearms in the District also occurs in relation to slash and burn (chena) cultivation, cattle farming, illicit logging and firewood gathering, disputes over land, irrigation and other entitlements, and illicit alcohol production (and consumption).

It appears that 18-35 year old males are the predominant victims and perpetrators of armed violence in the District, although this may in part be due to a lack of comprehensive data assessing the impact of SALW. For example, there is very little

2 The ‘T-56’, or Type 56, is a Chinese version of the Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle, however in Sri Lanka T-56 has also become a generic term for automatic, military style assault rifles.

information available on the extent to which weapons are used to threaten within a domestic environment – which is often a notable feature of SALW misuse in other parts of the world. The disparity between the involvement of men in small arms misuse, and that of women, suggests the need for a gendered response strategy. Women clearly offer a potential supporter base for any initiatives to change attitudes to firearms. The challenge of altering the pattern of firearms misuse among young males requires a focussed attempt to provide attractive non-violent alternatives to them at the structural level, as well as restricting their access to firearms.

The key social issue facing people in Hambantota, and a key root cause for armed violence pointed out by many interviewees and focus group participants, was the lack of education, training and opportunities to earn a living. The long-term priority areas for overcoming the social causes of armed violence in the District were thus said to be: education, especially university places, training, job creation, enterprise support, and community development. However, criminals are perceived to benefit from unfair protection from powerful sponsors. If this is the case, the creation of opportunities for legitimate work will do little to outweigh the attractions of a criminal lifestyle. Consequently, there must be a more effective system for warning and penalising potential offenders, in addition to effective development work to provide alternatives to a criminal lifestyle.

High-powered weapons appear to have entered circulation from the North and East of Sri Lanka. It is unclear what proportion originated from LTTE or GoSL stockpiles, but there is evidence that both are a source for some illicit weapons. Loopholes in the system of checking service personnel travelling to the South from operational areas need to be identified and closed. This would aid in the reduction of supplies of high- powered weapons to Districts such as Hambantota. Moreover, a substantial number of illicit armaments are known to have entered public circulation in Hambantota District, as a result of two JVP uprisings.

State capacity to control SALW

Policing

The survey identified pro-active work by specific police stations to foster community relations and reduce violence using preventative methods. Such efforts are urgently needed in areas where mistrust of police and levels of violence remain high. Increased wages and allowances for officers would also diminish the temptation to take bribes. Police also noted the need for awareness raising to encourage public co- operation with police, and a reward system to encourage informants to come forward.

Public suggestions for improvements to policing included: more police patrols to increase the perception of security in areas badly affected by crime; better mechanisms for mediating disputes and ensuring the fair distribution of resources and benefits; the establishment of a phone line for reporting serious crime; and active community involvement in the resolution of disputes and other initiatives to increase safety.

Some gang-related firearms homicides in the district follow in quick succession and relate to the same chain of events.3 It should be possible to anticipate such periods following a high-profile killing, and act to quell violence before it erupts, perhaps by conducting search and seizure operations in targeted areas before revenge can be played out between groups.

3 Interview with an official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006.

Police reported a need for enhanced training to respond to dangerous incidents of armed violence. This was confirmed by incidents which led to the death of both police officers and suspects in the course of arrest.

Police equipment, such as technology for communication and record-keeping, as well as protective clothing, were found to be lacking. The provision of any new equipment would require the training of personnel in its use.

Government Departments working with the police also pointed out the need for more vehicles and personnel to enhance the response capacity of police.

Departments facing violent threats such as the Forest Department and the Department of Wildlife require better training and back-up support to reduce the risk of death and injury to their personnel.

There were indications that the level of response by the police to everyday incidents can be satisfactory, but response to emergencies and serious crime is often weak. Furthermore, despite ongoing efforts by the Police Services to reform and improve its public perception, most, though not all, members of the public appear to believe the police to be untrustworthy and inefficient.

Investigation and prosecution

The public felt let down by the efficiency of the current system in punishing serious offences, and most were, predictably, keen to see more effective punishment for firearms offenders.

The survey identified problems with the capacity of actors in the law and justice sector to dispense justice efficiently and effectively in relation to serious offences, including firearms offences. These point to the need for:

− Improved detection work and greater integrity in the handling of evidence by police; − Investigations into and prevention of the loss of any firearms productions from state custody; − An increase in the capacity of the government analyst to report on firearms productions, including the training of more staff and, possibly, decentralisation of the Government Analyst to the provincial level; − An enhancement in the facilities and numbers of personnel available to conduct forensic investigation of death and injury, including in firearms related cases; − An increase in the capacity of the Attorney General’s department to prepare cases rapidly, and a reduction in the backlog of cases at courts; − An investment in the prison service to reduce overcrowding and to increase the emphasis on rehabilitation of offenders.

Licensing

There was a perceived need for greater control of weapons previously issued to politicians which may have been passed to their supporters. Tackling this issue would constitute a significant contribution to public confidence.

It is advisable that the fine for failure to renew a firearms licence is raised to provide a more credible disincentive against failure to renew a licence. Penalties for failure to renew should be imposed and publicised to encourage registration of firearms.

Because there are various parties involved in the processing of a single application, it was suggested that the process could be improved if the flow of information between parties was streamlined, and the overall level of co-ordination improved. Although informants were reluctant to talk openly about the issue, problems were also noted with people trying to use personal influence to get firearms licences.

At the local level it was remarked that the system for licensing weapons had become more stringent than at the national level, with fewer licences being issued under current management than in the past. While this is a positive achievement, it remains a concern that the rigidity of the system seems to rest on the discretion of key personnel rather than on a structure that guarantees stringency regardless of the personalities of the individuals in key positions.

Collection, amnesty and awareness

Previous amnesty initiatives had either not been noticed, or had had a limited uptake because of perceptions of insecurity, and a lack of trust in responsible agencies. There was some enthusiasm for weapons collection or amnesty initiatives. However, in worse-affected areas people warned that the conditions creating firearms misuse and insecurity, including confidence in police and other government agencies, would have to improve before weapons could be successfully collected or registered in large numbers. In any case, it was widely stated that people would be suspicious about handing weapons over to police, when the weapons of hardened criminals, which cause the bulk of problems, may not be similarly removed from circulation under any amnesty programme.

Future public campaigns could focus on eliminating dangerous SALW use not related to organised crime such as armed intimidation of Forest Department and Wildlife officials and in particular the use of trap guns, which are causing alarmingly frequent injuries in parts of the district. The link between the lack of access to opportunities and violence could suggest the need to focus development work in insecure areas. This could involve offering communities a direct reward for the hand-over of illicit weapons, or a more general, participatory approach to enhancing security through targeted community development initiatives.

If an amnesty programme or other initiative were conducted to reduce illicit weapons possession, focus group participants pointed out that a concerted awareness campaign involving locally trusted organisations would be needed to convince illicit owners of the safety of registering weapons. They also stressed the role that community organisations can play in enhancing community safety.

Media reporting

The lack of media reports on SALW issues in Hambantota was noted and ascribed in part to the lack of skilled journalists based there. Training for regional correspondents in reporting on small arms and crime would generate a greater quantity of more constructive coverage of small arms and lights weapons; and enhance their skills and lead to better remuneration. This would be an important component of any awareness campaign. For example, media coverage of sentencing for firearms- related cases could have an impact on public awareness of the law and penalties for illicit possession and misuse of SALW.

Stockpile management

The collection and pubic destruction of 17,000 weapons in Independence Square on 8 July 2005 was a positive demonstration by the Government of its desire to address the problems associated with SALW. This event also served as a means of raising awareness of the large number of weapon stockpiles situated in each district.

In keeping with the spirit of such activities, it is advisable that a maximum time period be established after which weapons in the vault at the District Secretariat must be destroyed. Although its location, robust door and dual-lock system makes the vault a relatively safe storage facility, a system guaranteeing regular destruction would further reduce the risk of misappropriation and the unnecessary accumulation of dangerous weapons.

It would be desirable to enhance the security of police weapons stocks by ensuring that armouries are fitted with more robust, dual-locking doors, and that weapons not in use are routinely stored out of view inside the armoury.

It was not possible for the survey team to assess the stockpile security procedures employed by the armed forces, as this was deemed a matter of national security.

The procedures for accounting for weapons appeared to be sound in all state agencies, which raises additional questions about how weapons have found their way into the illicit market.

Information and monitoring

The continued lack of an accurate electronic database of all government holdings and weapons unaccounted for is an obstacle to:

− The development of knowledge and policy responses among responsible officials, − Preventing the loss of institutional memory when personnel change, and − Reducing the burden of labour associated with manual record keeping.

The limitations of transparency surrounding all weapons held by public servants, and unaccounted-for weapons issued to politicians after the JVP insurgency, are particular blocks to the development of a clearer picture of key issues regarding management of state-issued weapons. It would be desirable for the issue to be analysed and dealt with in a more transparent way.

If implemented properly by the Ministry of Health or the Police, a system for compiling and analysing data on armed violence injuries would provide a valuable source of information for policy-makers on where the problem of armed violence is concentrated and whom it is affecting most severely. It would thus be an important basis for planning interventions. It would also lie at the core of a monitoring mechanism to demonstrate the efficiency of any initiatives to tackle the proliferation of illicit small arms, and their use in violent acts. Data-gathering systems of this kind are explicitly promoted by the WHO Department for Injury Prevention and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery’s joint Armed Violence Prevention Programme. Thus the Government of Sri Lanka might expect to find donor support

for building armed violence monitoring into its already functional health/police information systems.

Moreover, databases of firearms seized, wanted suspects and missing persons have potential utility in the tracing of illicit weapons, criminal investigation work or the identification of victims respectively.

1 Introduction

Scope and context

Under the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA), governments agreed to establish National Commissions to co-ordinate the approach to small arms-related problems taken at the national level. Accordingly, the National Commission against the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCAPISA) was established by the President of Sri Lanka in October 2004. With the change of president at the elections of November 2005, NCAPISA was re- established in February 2006 by a new presidential decree. Among other responsibilities, the Commission was set up to:

− Formulate and implement a Plan of Action to collect illicit SALW; − Suggest improvements to the legal and judicial framework for responding to firearms-related offences; − Formulate an amnesty for voluntary surrender of illicit weapons; − Obtain any necessary technical assistance, including from non-governmental organisations; − Identify sources of supply of illicit small arms and light weapons and suggest ways of effectively curbing such traffic.

The current survey represents tangible progress on fulfilment of these points within NCAPISA’s mandate. It has been compiled with reference to the methodology developed by Saferworld in research reports covering national problems related to small arms and light weapons in countries covered by the South East Europe Clearinghouse for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC).

The survey has been conducted in a limited time period and as the pilot phase of a comprehensive national survey on illicit small arms and light weapons issues in Sri Lanka. Therefore, it investigates small arms and community safety with a specific focus on Hambantota District, and presents information relating to:

− The distribution of small arms and light weapons in the district; − Their impacts upon society, with particular reference to public perceptions related to small arms, security and development; − The capacity of the GoSL and other actors to reduce problems identified and control illicit small arms in the district for the foreseeable future; − The possible measures which could improve the situation in Hambantota District on the basis of the survey findings.

Methodology

Information for this survey was gathered using four methods:

− Desk review: the survey draws on an extensive review of previous publications in this field. − Focus group discussions: six focus group discussions lasting between 90 and 180 minutes were undertaken to gain a detailed qualitative insight into the perceptions of local people in relation to small arms, security and development. The groups consisted of: rural men, rural women, business people, minorities, urban men and urban women.

− Media analysis: an analysis of media reports on SALW issues related to Hambantota District was undertaken. The analysis drew on all reports containing particular key words in six newspapers4 for a period of one year preceding the survey. − Key informant interviews: more than 40 interviews were conducted with key informants to gauge the views of stakeholders in illicit small arms control, to seek relevant information and statistics; as well as to inspect evidence and infrastructure relevant to illicit small arms control in the district.

Hambantota District in context

Situated along the Southern Coast of Sri Lanka, Hambantota District covers an area of 2,609 square kilometres.5 It has a population of 525,370,6 almost exactly 50 percent of which is female.7 The rate of unemployment in the district is approximately 11 percent.8 According to one source, Hambantota is the third poorest of Sri Lanka’s 25 districts, with 32 percent of its population categorised as poor.9 Official statistics state that the District population is 97 percent Sinhalese, 2 percent Muslim and 1 percent Tamil.10

The South of Sri Lanka is viewed by many as having been historically the primary supporter base of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party. When the party launched an initial rebellion in 1971, towns in Hambantota District witnessed their share of the nationwide violence which, it is estimated, claimed 8,000 to 10,000 lives.11 A further insurgency by the JVP began in 1987 and ended in November 1989, having caused the deaths of up to 60,000 people. Therefore, although relatively untroubled by the long-running conflict between the GoSL and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hambantota district has, historically, suffered politically motivated armed violence.

The district was also badly affected by the tsunami which devastated much of Sri Lanka’s coastline on 26 December 2004. According to GoSL figures, approximately 4,500 people in the district were killed by the tsunami,12 and a further 46,998 persons

4 Daily and Sunday Lankadeepa (Sinhala, privately owned); Dinamina and Silumina (Sinhala, owned by state- controlled Lake House); The Island and Sunday Island (English, privately owned). 5 International Water Management Institute, Bringing Hambantota Back to Normal: A Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Needs Assessment of Hambantota District in Southern Sri Lanka, (2005), http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/TSUNAMI/pdf/Formatted Final tsunami report 30-03-05.pdf, p.2. 6 Based on data from the 2001 Census. See GoSL Department of Census and Statistics, ‘Population Statistics’, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/population/index.htm, and accompanying tabulated data at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/population/tables.pdf, accessed 02 June 2006. 7 International Water Management Institute, ‘Bringing Hambantota Back to Normal: A Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Needs Assessment of Hambantota District in Southern Sri Lanka’, (2005), http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/TSUNAMI/pdf/Formatted Final tsunami report 30-03-05.pdf, p.2. 8 Poverty Bulletin, Department of Census and Statistics 9 International Water Management Institute, Bringing Hambantota Back to Normal: A Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Needs Assessment of Hambantota District in Southern Sri Lanka, (2005), http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/TSUNAMI/pdf/Formatted Final tsunami report 30-03-05.pdf, p.2. 10 Statistics obtained from the District Secretariat in Hambantota dated 01 September 2005. 11 Gunaratna R, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution, (Kandy, Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990 (3e, 2001), p.105. 12 Government of Sri Lanka Health Web Portal, 9.0 Tsunami: 2004 Disaster http://203.94.76.60/tsunami/links/figures.html, accessed 22 May 2006. Alternative figures are offered in International Water Management Institute, ‘Bringing Hambantota Back to Normal: A Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Needs Assessment of Hambantota District in Southern Sri Lanka’, (2005), p.6, stating that 3,067 people were confirmed dead, 361 injured and 963 missing (citing the District Disaster Management Committee, 2005).

displaced (the fifth largest number amongst affected districts).13 It has since made a strong recovery, with the swift reconstruction of many new homes and the restoration of tourist and other infrastructure.14

13 Government of Sri Lanka Health Web Portal, Ibid. 14 2,733 houses were damaged after the Tsunami, most of them in Tangalle and Hambantota DS Divisions. The number of houses pledged for partial repair or total reconstruction after the Tsunami was 4,514. As of 01 September 2005, 2,231 of the houses pledged were completed. Statistics obtained from the District Secretariat in Hambantota dated 01 September 2005.

2 Distribution

This section describes the licit and illicit small arms and light weapons holdings of all actors in Hambantota District, as far as information was available to the research team.

Licit civilian holdings

In Hambantota District as of May 2006, 774 firearms licences were held for crop protection, animal husbandry or to protect banks from armed robbery.15 Such licences are issued at the local level, with one licence issued per firearm held.16 The 774 firearms held under the licences are broken down by category in Table 01.17

Type Number Crop protection and animal husbandry 703 People’s Bank 35 Bank of Ceylon 31 National Savings Bank 5 Total 774 Table 01 – Number of licences issued by the District Secretariat

The information available did not indicate, for instance, where ownership of licensed weapons is concentrated in the District, the type of weapons held, or the age and gender of owners. According to the officer responsible for issuing licences at the District level, typical weapons held by licence holders in Hambantota include shot guns, repeater shot guns and muzzle loading rifles. Examples of manufacturers include Baikal, Stevenson and Savage.18

Farmers, who are recognised as having legitimate need to hold weapons for crop protection or animal husbandry, are reportedly on some occasions reluctant to license their guns formally, apparently out of a general disdain for bureaucratic process.19 There may therefore be a need for a targeted awareness initiative to bring such weapons and practices within legal control.

Unlicensed civilian holdings

Gun possession is not felt to be commonplace by members of the public living in the more relatively secure areas of the District, but is linked to the activities of specifically motivated users, and is widespread in certain locations.20 Illicit gun owners in Hambantota District include those who hold guns for licit purposes such as hunting and pest control but fall outside the licensing system, poachers, illicit loggers and firewood gatherers, individual criminals, gangs and syndicates involved in organised crime (such as robbery, contract killings and cannabis cultivation), those engaged in electoral or political intimidation and violence, and those holding unreturned weapons previously issued for official use.

To this list can be added those who produce illicit guns. Although no-one is authorised to produce firearms in Sri Lanka, in Hambantota District there are some problems related to home-made firearms or ‘galkatas’. The discussion held in

15 Interview with representative, Hambantota District Secretariat, 15 May 2006. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Interview with representative, Agriculture, Hambantota, 24 May 2006. 20 Focus group discussion with urban women.

Hambantota as part of the civil society consultation conducted by SASA-Net Sri Lanka in 2005 included the claim that illegal arms manufacturers are located in the interiors of the district.21 This finding was repeated by focus group discussion participants, who noted Hakmana, Beliatta and Walasmulla as known locations for such production.22 One interviewee stated that muzzle-loading guns could be repaired and produced ‘in more or less every village’ by local blacksmiths.23 In 2003- 2004, three illicit weapons producers were uncovered in Suriyawewa, Weeraketiya and Ambalantota, while explosive producers were found to be operating in Tangalle, Walasmulla and Kataragama (just north of Hambantota District).24

For galkatas barrels, blacksmiths are said to use either parts of other guns – in some cases by cutting off the shortened barrel – or else commonly available water pipes, and the steering wheel shafts of old Morris Minor vehicles.25 Galkatas are designed to fire whatever ammunition is most readily available. Thus there are examples in the District of homemade guns which fire 12-bore or 16-bore shotgun cartridges and, increasingly, T-56 assault rifle cartridges.26 Youths near Middeniya said that galkatas were increasingly outmoded by T-katas (galkatas that fire T-56 bullets). This would seem to confirm the easy availability of T-56 ammunition.27 It was also reported that some local weapons producers in the area have developed the capacity to imitate the Chinese type T-56 Assault Rifle (a variant of the AK-47).28

Some of the illicit firearms possession in the district appears to be the legacy of the two JVP uprisings. A detailed account of the JVP rebellions notes that some smuggling of weapons into Sri Lanka may have been conducted through a poultry farm operated by early JVP members within Hambantota District (‘at Kirinde, within sight of Little Basses light house’) from 1965-1969.29 Some interviewees commented that the skill of local blacksmiths in producing home-made weapons was developed in response to the demand for weapons created by the JVP insurgency.30 This is probable given that the rebels reportedly began arming in earnest in 1969, focusing on rifles with bayonets and ‘indigenously developed bombs and firearms’.31 By late 1970, the JVP had apparently procured 3,000 rudimentary bombs and was organising training in bomb production by activists nationwide.32 By early 1971 the JVP had over 100,000 members, all of whom were publicly ordered to arm themselves.33 In spite of this, in all probability the party had access to much fewer than 100,000 small arms. The 1971 insurrection was mounted with a small amount of unsophisticated firearms. These appear to have included galkatas, 12-bore or 16- bore shotguns,34 hand grenades,35 rudimentary bombs, rifles and revolvers.36 It is not clear how many JVP weapons were held in Hambantota District itself at this time, or have remained subsequently.

21 Findings for Southern Province from the SASA-Net Civil Society Consultation Process 2005. 22 Focus group discussion with urban women. 23 Interview with an inmate, Tangalle Prison, 16 May 2006. Blacksmith production of galkatas was also noted in the focus group discussions with urban men, urban women and rural men. 24 Interview with senior official, MoDPSLO, 30 May 2006. 25 Interview with youths near Middeniya, 24 May 2006. 26 Compatibility with T-56 ammunition widely stated, eg in the focus group discussion with rural men. 27 Interview with youths near Middeniya, 24 May 2006. 28 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 29 Gunaratna R, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution, (Kandy, Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990 (3e, 2001), p.6. 30 Interview with Representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 31 Gunaratna R, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution, (Kandy, Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990 (3e, 2001), p.7. 32 Ibid, pp.87-88. 33 Ibid, p.9. 34 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, 10 May 2006. 35 ‘Although we had money, there was no way to buy enough guns or revolvers. We could not get licences to buy guns or revolvers. Once in a while we had the opportunity to buy one or two illegal guns, and that was not enough to meet our need.[…] I decided to arm trade union activists with grenades.’ V Ivan, 71 Rebel (71 Keralla), (Colombo, Durga Publishers, 1979 repr 2000), p.118. 36 Gunaratna R, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution, (Kandy, Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1990 (3e, 2001)), pp.87-88.

The 1987-1989 JVP insurgency appears to have been more heavily armed. One interviewee stated that during this period local insurgents were armed with T-56s and revolvers (sources of which were believed to be army deserters).37 This opinion was however, contradicted by others. Significantly, a former licensing officer at the District Secretariat stated that over 1,000 weapons came into police custody, following a voluntary collection process undertaken during the JVP insurrection and after it ended in 1989.38 They included revolvers, pistols, single and double-barrelled shotguns, and galkatas. No T-56s were collected at that time.39 This indicates either that hardcore insurgents were too afraid or unwilling to surrender military-style weapons, or that such weapons were not in circulation in the District at that time. A senior police official believes that illicit weaponry from the insurgency must still be in illicit circulation in the District, because those who had weapons for illegal purposes were never effectively disarmed.40

It was not possible to access statistics on firearms issued to politicians and other officials. At the time of the second JVP insurgency, these are said to have numbered approximately 11,000 nationwide.41 This is the area where transparency about illicit weapons was found to be at its weakest. However, one example of weapons which had escaped state control after being issued to officials was pointed out to the survey team: from 1989-1991, 53 of the Provincial Council members were issued with .38 revolvers or 9 mm pistols and 24 of these remain unreturned.42 There was a perception among some members of the public that politicians had issued weapons to their close supporters.

Most key informants and focus group participants, with some exceptions, expressed the view that illicit civilian possession of military-style weapons, particularly T-56s, in the district was linked to former security forces personnel.43 Many interviewees subscribed to the view that state control of armed forces’ weaponry is good, but that, although little direct evidence could be proffered, military style weapons recovered on the battlefield from the LTTE might not be so well controlled.44 Two police officers interviewed recalled that the furthest edge of the barrel had been sawn off at the muzzle end of some T-56s that had been seized locally with their serial numbers erased.45 The officers took this to indicate that they had been held by the LTTE, because the LTTE is said to modify weapons in this way to reduce recoil. It is generally thought that it is these weapons which enter the illicit market through army deserters, and reach Hambantota either with the deserters themselves or through underground networks.46 One interviewee held the opinion that weapons were brought on leave by service personnel travelling by land, who were not thoroughly enough checked when travelling out of operational areas.47

37 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, 10 May 2006. 38 Interview with a Former Firearms Licensing Officer, Hambantota District. 39 Ibid. 40 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 19 May 2006. 41 Smith C, ‘In the Shadow of a Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in Sri Lanka’, (Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 11, October 2003), p.18. 42 Interview with senior official, MoDPSLO, 30 May 2006. 43 Interviews with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006, senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006 and senior official, Teaching Hospital Korapitiya, Galle. Focus group discussions with urban males, minorities, rural men and the business community. 44 Interviews with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 and Donor Consultant, 10 May 2006. Focus group discussion with urban men. 45 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 46 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, 10 May 2006. Focus group discussion with rural men. 47 Interview with official, Teaching Hospital Karapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006

Other interviewees questioned the statistics on control of weapons from state security forces, holding the opinion that local criminals use weapons sourced from both LTTE and state stocks in the North East.48 The words of a senior police officer are notable in this context:

[…] faced with the deteriorating security situation in the late nineties the Government increased the number of its military and Police personnel. Some of the recruits deserted with their weapons and passed these weapons on to unauthorized civilians, very often criminals for profit.49

Military-style weapons recovered from criminals in Beliatta have the serial number removed, making them difficult to trace.50 A weapon seized by Middeniya police in 2005 had however been traced to an army camp in Vavuniya.51

Some interviewees cited loss of control of weapons issued to platoons of police from 1985 as a source of illicit weaponry.52 Others pointed to rental of weapons by armed forces or police personnel as sources of high calibre weapons. This practice had, however, not been encountered in Hambantota District by representatives interviewed from the Police or Air Force.53

Despite some reports of the arrest of suspected LTTE cadres in Hambantota District during the period when the research for this report was carried out,54 no fatalities related to the insurgency have been reported in Hambantota District in 2005 or 2006.55

A representative of the Sri Lankan Navy stated that there had been no known incidents of trafficking off the coast of the District in at least the last five years. Patrols of the coastline around Hambantota are conducted from Galle, further to the West. However, another interviewee noted the lack of control and stated that, if illicit smuggling were attempted along the south coast, it would be unlikely to be detected.56

Civil society and official interviewees were concerned about the process of arming civilians as Home Guards in the North East, fearing that this would potentially lead to weapons issued being sold elsewhere in the country.57 One informant claimed knowledge of such a weapon being sold in Kataragama (just outside of Hambantota District.58 There is certainly a possibility of such weapons entering illicit circulation and therefore creating a dangerous legacy for future generations throughout Sri Lanka. It should also be noted that distribution of such weapons may dangerously blur the boundaries between civilians and combatants, and expose poorly trained civilians to violence which they are ill-equipped to repulse. It was also pointed out

48 Interviews with senior representative, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006, senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006 and official, Teaching Hospital Korapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006. 49 ‘Background of the Proliferation of Arms in Sri Lanka and Disarmament’ Police Consultation Meeting, September 2005 50 Interview with senior representative, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 51 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 52 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006. 53 Interviews with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006 and senior officer, Wirawila Air Base, 25 May 2006. 54 Interview with Prisons official 55 South Asia Terrorism Portal, ‘Fatalities District-wise 2005’, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/FatilitiesDisticwise_2005.htm, accessed 03 June 2006; South Asia Terrorism Portal, ‘Fatalities District-wise 2006’, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/FatilitiesDisticwise_2006.htm, accessed 03 June 2006. 56 Interview with senior officer, Wirawila Air Base, 25 May 2006. 57 Interviews with Freelance SALW researcher, 13 May 2006, Donor Consultant, 10 May 2006 and senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 and 19 May 2006. 58 Interview with Freelance SALW researcher, 13 May 2006.

that arming one ethnic group can generate a demand for weapons amongst others as they feel exposed due to the strength of their neighbours.59 Examples from other countries of the ‘strategic’ distribution of weapons to civilians backfiring on security and development for the long term are widespread, and include the former Yugoslavia, Albania and Afghanistan.

Police Station Total rifle rifle T-56 T-56 T-81 Muzzle Double Galkatas shot gun gun shot barrelled Trap gunTrap Shot gun loading gun Self loading

Lunugamwehera 11 24 2 0 0 0 0 0 37 Kataragama 9 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 Suriyawewa 3 1 7 2 0 0 0 0 13 Tissamaharama 6 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 12 Hambantota 7 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 11 Walasmulla 1 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 9 Middeniya 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 Tangalle 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 6 Angunakolapelessa 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 6 Katuwana 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 Weeraketiya 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 5 Ambalantota 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 Hungama 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 Beliatta 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Total 54 50 29 3 2 1 1 1 141 Table 02 – Illicit possession recorded by police stations in Tangalle Division, 2005 and Jan-May 2006

2.1 Type of weapons seized by Tangalle Division (2005 and Jan-May 2006)

Self loading Double T-81 1% rifle 1% barreled shot T-56 1% gun 1%

Trap gun 2%

Muzzle loading gun 38% Galkatas 21%

Shot gun 35%

The types of firearm most commonly found by police in illicit possession in the district are illustrated in statistics made available by the police department. The chart shows the predominance of muzzle-loading guns, shot guns and trap guns in the District. It

59 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006.

should be noted that the T-56 assault rifle, a variant of the AK-47, although seldom seized, was referred to by the majority of key informants as the weapon of choice for serious criminals. It is hard for police to carry out seizures of the weapons of organised crime groups, many of whom are reported to have received military training. Therefore it is likely that the proportion of T-56s among total illicit small arms holdings is greater than the proportion of T-56s among weapons seized.

This assessment is supported by the statement of a representative from Matara Hospital that the majority of firearms-related deaths he has examined involved high- velocity weapons, mainly T-56s.60 He reported that very few cases involved galkatas or hand guns, and remarked on a shift from galkatas to T-56 killings since he began handling cases at Matara in 2001.61 This suggests that T-56s are increasingly in circulation, although wounds caused by T-56s feature less in the deaths and injuries handled by Tissamaharama and Hambantota Hospitals, where the remainder of the District’s firearms related cases are treated or forensically examined.62

A senior police officer also observed a shift from shotgun to T-56 use among criminals. He estimated that there were 25-30 T-56s in Hambantota District, and believes the source for the weapons to be army deserters.63 The fact that T-56 injuries were only reported at Matara Hospital (usually occurring in Beliatta, Wiraketiya, Walasmulla or Tangalle),64 with a small number arriving at Hambantota (mostly from Suriyawewa), and none in Tissamaharama, suggests that the circulation of these weapons is largely confined to these more troublesome locations on the western side of Hambantota District. The focus group participants in Suriyawewa confirmed the presence of illicit T-56s in the area.65

Information Source Item Market price Availability (LKR) Inmate at Tangalle Prison Shot gun 200 From licensed firearms cartridge owners Assistant Superintendent of Galkatas 3,000 From blacksmiths Prisons, Tangalle Suspected firearms Galkatas From 1,500 From blacksmiths manufacturer Youths near Middeniya Galkatas 2,000 Widespread, from blacksmiths Focus group – rural men Pistol 50,000 Organised criminals or army deserters Focus group – urban men T-56 56,000 From army deserters Table 03 – Illicit SALW market prices and availability

In informal discussion with local youths near Middeniya, the survey team was informed that weapons such as muzzle-loading guns, galkatas and trap guns are commonplace in the District.66 While T-56s were not so likely to be seen, they could be acquired in the surrounding area at the right price, and one of the youths gave details which suggested direct personal experience of firing a T-56.67 In a focus group discussion, urban men also reported that it was possible to buy T-56s locally.68

60 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 61 Ibid. 62 Interviews with senior official, Tissamaharama Hospital, 25 May 2006 and official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 63 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006. 64 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 65 Focus group discussions with rural men and rural women. 66 Interview with youths near Middeniya, 24 May 2006. 67 Ibid. 68 Focus group discussion with urban males.

Some informants were uncertain about the type of weapons used in killings, pointing out that the development of ‘T-katas’ made it difficult to determine whether a T-56 had been used in a crime.69 However, forensic doctors appeared to be able to distinguish between the wounds caused by the respective kinds of gun.70

Nationwide, there were 1,435 productions consisting of firearms, ammunition or evidence bearing on the criminal use of firearms submitted to the Government Analyst in relation to criminal investigations and prosecutions from 01 January 2004 to 26 May 2006. Of these, 183 came from Magistrate’s Courts in Hambantota District. Thus Hambantota accounts for 12.8 percent of the nationwide total. This is significant if it is considered that the population of Hambantota District accounts for just 2.70 percent of the national population.71

2.2 Type of weapons submitted from Hambantota District to Government Analyst 01 January 2004-26 May 2006

Muzzle T-56 4 loading trap guns 4 Galkattas 87 Pistols/ Revolvers 8

Shot Guns 33

Muzzle loading guns 45

The survey team was also separately supplied with figures showing the type of weapons seized by police for Tangalle Division and nationwide for the last ten years. The figures show that for weapons whose type was specified, from 1995-2004, Tangalle Police Division had recovered 504 out of a total of 4,579, or 11 percent of the weapons recovered nationwide (again, significantly more than the District’s share of the national population).72 The figures further help to build up the picture of the types of weapon in illicit possession. It appears that the 2004 figures refer only to the beginning of that year.

69 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 70 Interview with senior official, Tissamaharama Hospital, 25 May 2006. 71 Calculated from Hambantota population 525,370 and national population 18,732,455. See: GoSL Department of Census and Statistics, ‘Population Statistics’, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/population/index.htm, and accompanying tabulated data at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/population/tables.pdf, accessed 02 June 2006. 72 If recovered items of unspecified type are included in the Tangalle Division and National figures, then Tangalle Division recovered 10 percent of the weapons recovered nationwide, or 1,009 out of a national total of 10,009.

2.3 SALW recovered by Tangalle Division 1995-2004 by type

1995

1996 Galkatas Shot gun 1997 Repeater 1998 T-56 84S 1999 SLR 2000 Pistol 2001 Revolver Hand grenade 2002 Other 2003

2004

0 50 100 150 200

The chart illustrates that no T-56s were recovered in the district in the decade from 1995 until 2003 and 2004, when they began to emerge in small numbers. The chart also shows an alarming increase in the seizures of hand grenades from 1999 culminating in the seizure of 21 in 2002. In 2005, police in the District seized a further nine hand grenades, and have seized two more in the first five months of 2006.73 The media analysis conducted for the survey also noted one report on an arrest for possession of a hand grenade of foreign manufacture in the District,74 and another noting the threatened use of grenades by armed robbers in the robbery of a house in Katuwana.75 This corroborates a perception among some interviewees at the national level that hand grenades were increasingly becoming available throughout rural Sri Lanka.76

Again, the source for grenades is believed to be operational areas in the North East. An official at Karapitiya Teaching Hospital in Galle has examined several cadavers killed in hand grenade explosions (not necessarily from Hambantota District) and identified the grenades as being manufactured in Singapore, of a type held by GoSL forces.77 Although the survey team did note the threatened use of grenades in one incident, key informants could offer few insights into the dynamics of their use in crime in Hambantota District. Local fishermen in Tangalle and Hambantota are reported sometimes to have conducted fishing with explosives taken from a local quarry, although the practice has reportedly been discontinued.78

73 Interview with senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 74 The media analysis cites Lankadeepa, 15 November 2005, p.1. 75 The media analysis cites Lankadeepa, 19 January 2006, p.6. 76 Interview with representative , Attorney General’s Department, NCAPISA member, 10 May 2006 and, Donor Consultant, 10 May 2006. 77 Interview with official, Teaching Hospital Karapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006 78 Focus group discussion with urban women and urban men.

2.4 Type of weapons recovered by Tangalle Division (1995-2004)

Galkatas 303

Other 505

Shot gun 87

Hand grenade 67 Repeater 1 Revolver 35 T-56 5 Pistol 6

Sources of illicit ammunition

A senior representative of police for Tangalle Division asserted that most galkatas he encounters are designed to fire T-56 ammunition.79 He asserted that the cartridges come from deserters, who bring them from the North and East under their clothes or in their boots.80 A number of sources pointed out that galkatas users in the District often use refilled cases from empty shot gun cartridges as ammunition.81 Homemade projectiles of different origin are also a source of ammunition. The bullets are constructed using a variety of materials from lead balls to pieces of metal obtained from water bucket handles; and the charges utilised are just as diverse, ranging from firecrackers to industrial explosives. A firearms offender in Tangalle prison stated that ammunition could be purchased from firearms licence holders.82

Military holdings

Hambantota District contains a Naval Base at Tangalle. The number and types of weapons held at this base, as well as the number of servicemen who are resident there, was not specified to the research team, as it is considered ‘restricted’ information by MoDPSLO representatives.

The Navy base at Tangalle holds small arms and light weapons only for its own protection, as the base is not used for sailing any vessels.

There is also an Air Base at Wirawila with stocks which are not described in the present report, for reasons of national security.

Police holdings

The police service covering Hambantota District is Tangalle Division, which contains 14 police stations. Ordinary police are armed for a variety of everyday policing tasks,

79 Interview with senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 80 Ibid. 81 Interview with a Former Firearms Licensing Officer, Hambantota District. 82 Interview with an inmate, Tangalle Prison, 16 May 2006.

but primarily with T-56s, some of which are of more recent manufacture than others. The police also hold pistols and launchers for firing teargas canisters. One station visited also held grenades. Self loading rifles (SLRs) are also held in some police station armouries, though in some cases they have not been in service since the 1980s. One police station also holds a sub machine gun.

The police were reluctant to offer details of how many officers worked out of particular police stations, or the size of individual armouries. However, it can be estimated using the conventional weapons per officer used in previous studies in Sri Lanka that, with 1,140 officers in the Division, the police department in the District holds roughly 1,370 units of SALW.83

As well as holding its own weapons, the police is also responsible for seizing illicitly held weapons and those used in criminal acts, and presenting them to magistrates’ courts at initial hearings. Thereafter the police may also transfer the weapon to the Government Analyst, together with an information request, so that relevant forensic information about the weapon can be supplied for use in a criminal trial. Figures supplied by Tangalle Police Division illustrate the numbers of such weapons from Hambantota District which are either on hold in police station production rooms, submitted to the courts, or lodged with the Government Analyst:

SALW Type Police Courts Government Station Analyst Production Rooms Galkatas 0 50 13 Shot guns 0 8 4 T-56s 0 1 1 T-81s 0 0 1 Muzzle loading 0 51 4 guns Trap guns 0 2 0 Self loading rifles 0 0 1 Total 0 112 24 Table 04 – Number of weapons seized/held in evidence

It is unclear as to the exact location of all weapons lodged with the courts, as a senior representative of police noted that, at least in Tangalle, the Police kept hold of weapons produced to the Magistrate’s Court, which had no means of securing firearms effectively.84

Department of Wildlife

The Department of Wildlife holds approximately 500 firearms nationwide, but no information was available about the level of its holdings in Hambantota District.85

Forest Department

The Forest Department holds 160 firearms nationwide to protect forests from illicit logging.86 All officers above the level of Beat Officer are issued a weapon. The holdings for the District are shown in the following table.87

83 C Smith, ‘In the Shadow of a Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in Sri Lanka’, (Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 11, October 2003), p.16. 84 Interview with senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006. 85 Interview with senior official, MoDPSLO, 30 May 2006. 86 Ibid. 87 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006.

Type Quantity Pistols (9 mm) 4 Shot guns 10 Repeater shot guns 4 Total 18 Table 05 – Forest Department holdings in Hambantota District

From the number of weapons held by a single Range Office visited by the survey team, the actual holdings of the Department in the District seem to be higher than officially stated.

District Secretariat

The vault at the District Secretariat previously held around 2,000 weapons at a time.88 Currently it holds approximately 200 weapons, and parts for a further 700 weapons.89 The firearms held were derived from a variety of sources. They included those weapons which had been acquired because the weapons were defunct, their owners had died, no longer wanted or needed them, or because they were evidence in court proceedings (although some weapons are sent by courts directly to Colombo for destruction). The holdings in the vault consist of galkatas, and rifles, in addition to single and double barrelled shotguns.90 Ninety percent of the weapons held in the vault are factory-made.91 Examination of records for recent years by the survey team showed roughly 80 percent of firearms submitted recently to the vault to be 12 bore shot guns.

Prison Service

It is possibly an indication of the need for a single comprehensive mechanism to record all weapons held by government agencies that figures for weapons held by the Prison Service in Hambantota differed at the local and national levels. At the prison in Tangalle the research team was told that the prison keeps 18 T-56 assault rifles on the premises, and also holds 9 mm pistols, revolvers, repeater shot guns and teargas guns.92 At the national level, we were told that the Prison Service in Hambantota holds 48 SALW, of which 6 are T-56s and the remainder are rifles, shotguns, repeater shotguns and teargas launchers.93

Private Security Companies

Of 280 legitimate Private Security Companies nationwide, only 82 have licences to hold weapons.94 Between them they hold a total of 752 firearms including pistols, revolvers, shot guns and repeater shot guns.95 No licensed Private Security Companies are based in Hambantota District, or have operations there, to the knowledge of the survey team.

88 Interview with a Former Firearms Licensing Officer, Hambantota District, 15 May 2006. 89 Interview with representative, District Secretariat, Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Interview with representative, Tangalle Prison, 16 May 2006. 93 Interview with senior official, MoDPSLO, 30 May 2006. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid.

3 Impacts of small arms and light weapons in Hambantota District

This section of the survey charts the impacts of small arms and light weapons in Hambantota District. It draws on statistics made available from police, hospitals, and criminal court sources, as well as on the perceptions both of local people gathered from the focus group discussions and from interviews held with key informants. Further insights are provided by the analysis of media reports from the last twelve months and from publications which contain relevant information.

Statistics for Tangalle Division, as supplied by the Police, give a very useful overview of the numbers of key crimes committed with firearms in Hambantota District over the past two years.

2005 2006 (to 19 May)

Police Station Total Homicides Homicides Grave injuries Robberies crimes Other Homicides Grave injuries Robberies crimes Other

Suriyawewa 2 2 19 0 0 1 2 0 26 Beliatta 2 0 8 0 4 0 8 0 22 Walasmulla 0 0 11 0 2 2 5 0 20 Ambalantota 1 3 11 1 0 0 1 0 17 Weeraketiya 3 2 11 0 0 0 0 0 16 Tissamaharama 2 0 6 2 3 0 1 0 14 Hungama 1 2 9 0 0 0 1 1 14 Angunakolapelessa 7 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 12 Hambantota 3 0 2 3 0 0 2 1 11 Lunugamwehera 1 1 2 1 1 0 3 1 10 Middeniya 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 8 Tangalle 1 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 7 Kataragama 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 Katuwana 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Total 26 14 91 7 12 3 27 4 184 Table 06 – Crimes committed with firearms in Tangalle Division 2005-2006

The police stations with the highest figures for firearms crimes correspond with the areas named by officials and members of the public as the trouble spots in the District in relation to small arms and light weapons misuse.96 Apart from Hungama and Ambalantota, the top eight police stations are assessed to be the places in the district most affected by the small arms problems described in more detail in the rest of this section.

There are four Magistrate’s Courts in Hambantota where cases are heard prima facie to decide whether the case should be prepared by the Attorney General’s Department and heard in the High Court. They are located in Tissamaharama, Hambantota, Tangalle and Walasmulla. The survey team was informed that roughly three quarters of the cases heard at the High Court come from the Magistrate’s Court

96 For example, the focus group discussion urban women referred to five of the top six locations in the table: Suriyawewa, Beliatta, Walasmulla, Weeraketiya and Tissamaharama. Minorities referred to Beliatta, Suriyawewa and Tissmaharama.

at Walasmulla.97 The statistics shown in the chart below were compiled from Government Analyst records for the period January 2004 to May 2006. They illustrate how many firearms productions of each type were submitted to the Government Analyst by each of Hambantota District’s Magistrate’s Courts. As the chart shows, Walasmulla Magistrate’s Court has not been the primary source of firearms produced to the Government Analyst since 2004, but it did produce 3 T-56 assault rifles in 2005.

2.5 Weapons included in productions to the Government Analyst, 01 January 2004-26 May 2006 Galkatas Hambantota Muzzle loading guns Wallasmulla Shot guns

Tissamaharama Pistols/ revolvers

Muzzle loading Tangalle trap guns T-56 0 1020304050607080

The media analysis conducted for the survey recovered 33 articles, referring to 30 separate incidents, that dealt with small arms and light weapons related subject matter in Hambantota District in the period 01 May 2005 to 31 April 2006. In terms of location, Tangalle was the most common place name cited (in nine incidents and one court case). The spread of locations cited in the media analysis contradicts the figures from the police and the statements of doctors from district hospitals, but this probably reflects the fact that media coverage of small arms related issues in the District is neither very extensive nor representative of the actual problem. The next most commonly mentioned location in media reports was Beliatta, with six separate firearms related incidents, four of these involving homicide. Angunakolapelessa and Tissamaharama were each the location of two reported incidents in the year. A total of 30 deaths resulting from firearms use were referred to in the articles, occurring in 18 separate instances of firearms homicide, one self-defence killing, one instance of police fatally shooting two robbers and one instance of accidental death. An overview of incidents from media reports is offered in the table included at Annex C.

Small arms related homicide

Using the statistics provided by the police, and the population figure given by the District Secretariat, the rate of firearms homicide for 2005 was 4.95 per 100,000 population.98 As the chart below illustrates, this rate is higher than that found in all except one of the countries for which data was available for the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) World report on violence and health (2002).99 It is also more

97 Interview with State Councillor, Hambantota High Court, 16 May 2006. 98 With a total of 48 recorded murders, the overall homicide rate in the District for 2005 was 9.14 per 100,000 population. Interview with senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 99 Krug E, Dahlberg L, Mercy J, Zwi A, Lozano R (eds), World report on violence and health, (Geneva, World Health Organization, 2002), pp.322-323. The data for Albania was for 1998, the year after a major leakage of weapons and widespread civil disturbances.

than double the average Sri Lankan firearms homicide rate for the years 2000-2004, which was 2.06 per 100,000.100

2.6 Firearms-related homicides per 100,000 population in Hambantota District (2005) and Sri Lanka (2000-2004) compared to countries worldwide (most recent year available, 1990-2000) 20 18 16 14 12 Albania 17.6 10 8

6 Hambantota 4.95 USA 4.4 4 Thailand 3.8 Estonia 2.1 Sri Lanka 2.06 Croatia 1.5 Croatia Latvia 1.4 Republic of Moldova 1.2

2 1 Macedonia FYRO Slovakia 0.8 Italy 0.8 Italy Greece 0.7 Belgium 0.6 Belgium 0.6 Bulgaria Portugal0.6 Canada 0.5 Netherlands 0.5 Czechrepublic 0.4 Finland0.4 Australia 0.3 Australia 0.3 France 0.3 Hungary Germany 0.2 Spain 0.2 UK 0.1 0 Japan 0

In the absence of a systematic collection of data from medical records on firearms related incidents, Judicial Medical Officers (JMOs) at the hospitals, who are charged with handling firearms injuries for the District consulted records of the levels of firearms deaths and injuries encountered in the course of their work. Their records also suggest a minimum average of 26 firearms homicides in the district in the last four years, matching the police figure for 2005.101

An official from Matara Hospital was able to provide monthly statistics on firearms- related deaths dating back to January 2001. These include cases from both Hambantota and Matara Districts, but the doctor asserted that a clear majority were from Hambantota District (usually occurring in Beliatta, Wiraketiya, Walasmulla or Tangalle).102

Month 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Jan 4 0 0 1 0 1 Feb 1 0 3 3 0 0 Mar 0 0 3 1 3 3 Apr 2 4 5 2 2 May 0 3 0 3 1 Jun 1 0 0 2 1 Jul 0 0 1 9 0 Aug 1 2 2 8 0 Sep 2 1 1 1 1 Oct 1 2 0 2 0 Nov 4 0 0 2 1 Dec 6 1 1 1 1

100 Based on figures supplied by senior official, MoDPSLO, 30 May 2006, there were an average of 396.8 firearms homicides nationwide in the years 2000-2004. The rate per 100,000 population is calculated based on the national population of 18,732,455 cited in GoSL Department of Census and Statistics, ‘Population Statistics’, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/population/index.htm, and accompanying tabulated data at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/population/tables.pdf, accessed 02 June 2006.. 101 Calculated based on Hambantota District producing a majority share of 96 firearms homicides at Matara hospital in 2001-2005 (at least 9.6 per year), 27 firearms related deaths at Hambantota Hospital since August 2002 (6.75 per year) and roughly 10 firearms deaths per year at Tissamaharama Hospital. There may have been additional cases at Galle and Colombo Hospitals, but figures were unavailable. 102 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006.

Total 22 13 16 35 10 4 Table 07 – Firearms-related deaths, Matara Hospital (Jan 2001 - March 2006)

An official who has examined deaths at Hambantota for the previous four years commented that the firearms homicides at the hospital generally come in from Suriyawewa.103

While an official at Matara Hospital reported T-56s to be the usual weapon in firearms homicides,104 at Hambantota and Tissamaharama Hospitals, which handle a smaller number of cases, this was not the case. The official at Hambantota commented that bullets from galkatas were the cause of death in approximately 15 percent of all homicides he encountered. Thus, out of 27 firearms homicides recorded at Hambantota since 02 August 2002, only 3 or 4 involved T-56s.105 At Tissamaharama, of the approximately ten firearms related deaths per year, most are caused by galkatas, shot gun and trap gun injuries.106 Accordingly, of the approximate 30-35 cases of firearms related injury per year, between 20 and 25 are caused by galkatas, between 5 and 8 by trap gun and 5 or 6 by shot gun.107 T-56 injuries were not recorded at Tissamaharama Hospital, although wounds resulting from T-56 ammunition fired from galkatas have been encountered.108

The official in Matara was able to report one killing perpetrated with a grenade in Hambantota in the past five years (in Beliatta).109 He had also seen injuries caused by trap guns, but not deaths.110

Small arms-related suicide

The indications are that suicides committed with firearms are rather rare in Hambantota District. The JMO at Matara Hospital reported having seen only two firearms suicide cases perpetrated with firearms – and one of them was in Matara District, to the West of Hambantota.111 The Assistant JMO at Hambantota observed that death in suicide cases is usually caused by poisoning or hanging rather than firearms.112 The media analysis did not reveal any reference to suicides or attempted suicides using firearms in the District for the whole year 01 May 2005 to 31 April 2006.

Accidental deaths

The survey team was made aware of several deaths and injuries caused by trap guns. These include the 5-8 injuries admitted to Tissamaharama Hospital annually noted above and the injury to a Forest Department officer described in Box 01 below.113 Some trap guns appear to be deliberately planted to deter human intrusion, and therefore deaths in such cases cannot be viewed as wholly accidental. The media analysis revealed one reported instance of accidental death related to firearms in the district in the period 01 May 2005 to 31 April 2006. In the incident, a woman was killed by a trap gun set up by her husband to prevent elephants from entering

103 Poison was the cause of death in approximately 80 percent of homicides. Interview with official , Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 104 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 105 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 106 Interview with senior official, Tissamaharama Hospital, 25 May 2006. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 113 Interview with senior official, Tissamaharama Hospital, 25 May 2006.

their property.114 In other countries where homemade guns are prevalent, the weapons carry an increased risk of causing injury to the user. One incident of this kind was recounted to the survey team at Walasmulla police station. In 2004 a galkatas owner had attempted to clean his gun after it had failed to fire, and then had been accidentally shot and killed by the weapon.115

Non-fatal injuries

The official at Matara Hospital reported seeing only 4-5 non-fatal firearms injuries per year. The majority of surviving patients would generally remain for treatment at Hambantota or Tissamaharama Hospitals rather than being transferred on to Matara, which lies 60 minutes to the West by road. This was corroborated by the statement by the official at Hambantota Hospital. He has encountered approximately 50 patients with non-fatal firearms injuries per year over the last four years.116 Tissamaharama Hospital has approximately 20 non-fatal firearms injury patients per year.117 These figures also suggest the greater lethality of T-56 injuries, which as stated above account for the majority of cases at Matara, where survival is rare, and very few cases in the other hospitals, where approximately two out of three firearms- related admissions survive their injuries.

Robbery

Businesses and the public were concerned about the threat of armed robbery, and able to cite numerous examples of its occurrence.118 The media analysis conducted for the survey noted two reported incidents of armed robbery in the past year, as well as an attempted incident and two operations to arrest alleged perpetrators. One report described the robbery of jewellery and cash from the house of a Forest Department officer in Katuwana, during which hand grenades were used to threaten the victims.119 Another described the arrest of a gang suspected of being responsible for three incidents of robbery (valued at 1.5 million LKR) from March to June 2006. Three pistols and a hand grenade were seized along with the gang.120 In a separate story, a gang of four men were arrested in Tissamaharama in connection with several robberies in the area, together with a T-katas, T-56 ammunition and military uniforms.121 Another media report describes a failed attempt to rob a cigarette sales company, in which an employee was shot and wounded.122

A representative at the Chamber of Commerce cited several further examples of night-time robberies of large sums of money by masked and well armed men.123 For example, the petrol station at Hambantota was robbed in 2005 of 25,000 LKR at night. Likewise, in recent months, at Ambalantota, a member of the Chamber of Commerce lost 20-30 million rupees in an armed robbery at his petrol station.124 Within days the same man was held up in his bowser (petroleum transport vehicle), which was stolen, emptied of its fuel and abandoned.125

114 The media analysis cites Lankadeepa, 04 March 2006, p.10. 115 Interview with senior representative, Walasmulla Police Station, 17 May 2006 116 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 117 Interview with senior official, Tissamaharama Hospital, 25 May 2006. 118 Interview with a representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006; focus group discussions with urban women and rural women. 119 The media analysis cites Lankadeepa, 19 January 2006, p.6. 120 The media analysis cites The Island, 22 September 2005, p.3. 121 The media analysis cites Lankadeepa, 04 January 2006, p.2. 122 The media analysis cites Lankadeepa, 20 December 2005, p.3. 123 Interview with a representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid.

As well as holding weapons for their own protection, banks also seek and receive police support in the form of regular patrols. In Middeniya, the People’s Bank and Bank of Ceylon are under constant armed guard. A branch of People’s Bank in the District was reportedly robbed by a gang, which resulted in the fatal shooting of the Manager and a Security Guard with revolvers at close range.126 A women’s rural co- operative bank between Hungama and Tangalle has also been subjected to armed robbery with revolvers.127 Furthermore, rural women near Suriyawewa cited two instances of women’s society banks being robbed.128 An official responsible for security at a bank in Hambantota asserted that there was a serious problem with firearms in the District, and pointed out that once weapons enter illicit circulation they are reused in successive crimes and are hard to recover.129

Patterns of small arms misuse

Interviewees pointed out that violence had been part of the culture in the District for some years.130 Focus groups also revealed the routine exposure to armed violence of local people at the time of the JVP insurgency. Participants across the District recalled the sound of gunfire, many killings on both sides, and the bodies of the dead on display on the roads.131 However, everyday life for most ordinary people in the District has not been affected by armed violence since that time.

Examining the causes for contemporary violence, it was asserted by many interviewees that young men who lack opportunities or education are in some cases tempted to commit robbery.132 Reportedly, organised criminals tend to enter their life of crime by committing two or three robberies and then getting involved with an organised crime gang.133 If an offender is able to commit initial crimes without conviction, his offences then escalate.134 Committing at least two offences appears to be a threshold for being approached to join a gang.135

According to the official at Matara Hospital, peaks in firearms-related deaths are caused by cycles of revenge following a high-profile gang killing. Thus the 17 firearms homicides occurring in July and August 2004 (see Table 07 above) included revenge killings following the murder of local gangster Army Jine, which took place in Matara Hospital.136

Box 1.1 – Examples of serious small arms related death and injury in Hambantota District

In Beliatta in 2001, suspects who were taken into custody agreed to co-operate with a police investigation. A police officer took them to a safe house. The house was attacked by gangsters and five people were shot dead, including a police officer.137

In Beliatta in 2003, an armed bank robbery carried out by three men led to a gunfight with two police officers who were on the scene. As the robbers fled, a man was shot and a T-56 was

126 Interview with senior official, Hambantota District Peoples Bank, Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 127 Ibid; focus group discussion with urban women. 128 Focus group discussion with rural women. 129 Interview with senior official, Hambantota District Peoples Bank, Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 130 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 131 Focus group discussions with urban women, rural women and rural men. 132 Interviews with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006 and representative, Walasmulla Police Station, 17 May 2006. 133 Interview with Rrepresentative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. This accords with the personal history of the notorious local gangster ‘Wambotta’ as recounted in the focus group discussion with rural men from his area of origin. 134 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 135 Ibid. 136 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 137 Interview with senior representative, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006.

recovered. The serial number had been erased. A second suspect escaped through an area of jungle but was blocked in and later arrested in possession of a pistol-like galkatas.138

In August 2003: Sunil Ratnaweera, a well known gangster from Suriyawewa, was being returned under police escort from Embilipitiya court. At Angunakolapelessa the transport was attacked, resulting in the deaths of a policeman and the prisoner, as well as the serious injury of a senior gaoler. The perpetrators were former inmates of Tangalle prison, and were allegedly members of a gang led by the notorious criminal Wambotta (a former vegetable and cannabis trader and army deserter), however suspicion later fell upon Army Jine. The attack was carried out using T-56s, and the 36 entry wounds on Ratnaweera’s body suggest that the criminals were well supplied with ammunition.139

Also in Beliatta, reserve inspector Sanjeewa was killed when he attempted to arrest an army deserter armed with a T-56. The culprit was Army Jine, who was himself killed in custody at Matara Hospital in 2004 by a group of gangsters armed with T-56s. This set off a wave of revenge killings.

In February 2004, a night patrol from Beliatta police station was searching for people. The patrol was ambushed and attacked, with one policeman shot dead, and another stabbed. A police T-56 was stolen, together with 30 rounds of ammunition. An empty T-56 cartridge was found on the scene.140 The same weapon was later used in five rapes in Hambantota and 3 highway robberies. When the weapon was seized a man was killed during the raid.141

In Beliatta in August 2004, four people were shot dead at the funeral house of a man who had himself been shot dead two days previously, in revenge for the killing of Army Jine. Two men and two women, brothers and sisters of the deceased, were the victims. The face of one of the male victims was destroyed in the attack because he was shot from close range repeatedly. There were 28 T-56 cartridges found on the scene.142

Another incident recalled by a police officer in the District involved an army deserter who stole 250,000 LKR and jewellery from a bus. Two police officers were on the bus but unable to prevent the crime from taking place. As the attempt was made to arrest him in Tissamaharama on the following day, the suspect was shot and killed. He was in possession of two hand grenades at the time.143

In December 2005, an officer from the Forest Department Range Office in Walasmulla was surveying the forest in an area known for problems with illicit loggers. He accidentally activated a trap gun set up as protection for an illicit logging site. The officer’s leg was seriously injured and he is now on paid medical leave.144

In early 2006, a group of police officers was conducting an investigation into ‘moonshine’ (illicit liquor). A trap gun went off and an officer was shot in the leg. He died in hospital through loss of blood. The trap gun was 70 cm in length, and appeared to have been made by a blacksmith with water pipe or galvanised pipe. Six holes were made in the officer’s trouser leg, caused by slugs made from the hard metal used in the handle of a type of bucket common in Sri Lanka.145 Trap guns are set up to hunt for food (especially wild boar). No culprit was found in relation to this death.

138 Ibid. 139 Interview with representative of Prisons, Tangalle Prison, 16 May 2006. 140 Interview with senior representative, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 141 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 142 Interview with a representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District. 143 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 144 Interviews with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006 and representatives, Walasmulla Range Office, Forest Department, 24 May 2006. 145 Bucket handles were also cited as the base material for slugs in: interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 146 Interview with senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 147 A state official administering access to poverty reduction benefits. 148 Case as revealed in the media analysis conducted for this survey, citing Lankadeepa, 11 March 2006, p.1. 149 Interviews with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006.

In March 2006, there was a kidnapping near Suriyawewa, and the victim was taken to a sparsely populated forested area. Two police officers were shot dead as they went to pay the ransom. The kidnap victim later said the kidnappers were armed with four T-56s.146

In March 2006, a newspaper reported that a gang riding on up to ten motorcycles began throwing projectiles and firing at the house of a Samurdhi administrator147 in Walasmulla. The perpetrators had been involved the preceding morning in a verbal dispute with the official about the distribution of poverty relief benefits. The attack was repelled by the brother of the official, using a licensed shot gun owned by the official’s father. Two of the assailants were shot dead and another two seriously injured.148

On 15 May 2006, at around 2.30 pm, the driver of a private bus en route from Beliatta to Tangalle halted the vehicle after hearing a loud bang. He saw three persons fleeing the vehicle and found the conductor with a wound to the head. The Consultant Judicial Medical Officer at Matara hospital identified that a T-56 bullet had been used in the killing.149

Organised crime

According to one source, only organised criminal groups would use T-56s to commit acts of violence.150 Therefore, the information about the number of T-56 killings passed on by the hospital representatives interviewed suggests a significant level of organised criminal activity as the key factor in serious armed violence in the District. One interviewee estimated there to be 28-30 organised criminal groups operating nationwide.151 In this context, the estimate by another key informant that there are 4- 6 organised gangs currently active in Hambantota District suggests that the District accounts for a high proportion of organised crime taking place in Sri Lanka.152 The Senior Superintendent of Police for Hambantota, however, stated that the gangs which had been causing problems were now better controlled following the recent death of a key gang leader, and with other key criminals in custody on remand.153 The problems appear to focus on specific areas – Suriyawewa, Beliatta, Mulgirigala and Angunakolapelessa – and to have a history spanning several years.154

The perceptions of the public on the issue of organised crime are disturbing. Participants in the discussion in Hambantota District as part of the civil society consultation process conducted by SASA-Net Sri Lanka in 2005 recommended that tougher laws be enacted to curb underworld criminal operations and their political patronage.155 Meanwhile focus groups and interviews consistently revealed a perception of political links to armed criminals and criminal groups,156 and made reference to interference in the investigation and prosecution of well-connected criminals.157 These perceptions at the local level corroborate the statement of a senior police officer concerning the national picture that: ‘Sometimes a high degree of political interference prevents the Police from performing their legitimate functions in an effective professional manner. Such interference hampers the efforts of the Police to deter and combat illegal activities, obstructing legal action aimed at prosecuting the wrongdoers.’158

150 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 151 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, NCAPISA member, 10 May 2006. 152 Interview with a representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District. 153 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 19 May 2006. 154 Interview with a representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006. Suriyawewa, Beliatta and Mulgirigala were named as key locations for organised gangs in the focus group discussion with rural men. 155 Findings for Southern Province from the SASA-Net Civil Society Consultation Process 2005. 156 Focus group discussions with urban men, urban women, minorities, the business community and rural men. 157 Focus group discussions with the business community and rural men. 158 ‘Background of the Proliferation of Arms in Sri Lanka and Disarmament’ Police Consultation Meeting, September 2005.

One interviewee, who did not wish to be identified, commented that, ‘if you take away the political reason, you will take away 95 percent of the reason’ for organised criminal activity in the District. Likewise the forensic doctor interviewed at Galle recalled conducting autopsies of numerous gangsters killed with T-56s or occasionally 9 mm pistols, and asserted that many of them were associates of politicians.159 The public believe that some politicians, motivated by fear for their own safety, arm supporters and in return for protection turn a blind eye to their illegal activity.160

The 4-6 organised crime groups said to be operating in Hambantota at present apparently derive income from trade in cannabis, contract killings and armed robbery.161 One interviewee pointed out that even though the District is the place of origin of many prominent criminals, they tend to conduct their illicit activities in towns to the West, such as Matara, Weligama and Galle.162

Desertion from security forces

There is a widespread perception amongst officials and the public that army deserters are the primary source of high-powered weapons where they are available in the district, and that such deserters are the typical perpetrators of armed violence incidents in the district.163 The senior representative at Beliatta Police Station stated that most firearms homicides in Hambantota involve an army deserter and, typically, an army weapon.164 This perception was not uniformly shared: the official at Hambantota Hospital stated that some but not all victims of firearms homicides he examined were army deserters;165 an experienced police detective agreed that there were problems with army deserters, but asserted that they accounted for only one or two percent of total crime.166

In attempting to examine the pattern which leads army deserters to become firearms misusers, the research team was told that deserters typically drop out of the army under encouragement from their families, because of the danger or remoteness of their post,167 or to escape the rigorous discipline.168 The involvement of army deserters in violent disputes partly stems, according to one key informant, from the fact that when a dispute breaks out, ex-army personnel are sought as the people in the community who can be decisive in support of one or the other side.169 Others ascribed the problem behaviours, in part, to loss of salary: personnel are often originally attracted to military service having come from modest backgrounds. Thereafter they become used to a certain level of expenditure and a reasonably affluent lifestyle.170 If they then desert, the fall in income and status is significant.

159 Interview with official, Teaching Hospital Karapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006. Participants in the rural male focus group discussion made almost the same assertion. 160 Focus group discussion with urban males. 161 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 162 Interview with senior representative, Walasmulla Police Station, 17 May 2006. 163 Interviews with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006, senior official, Hambantota District Peoples Bank, Hambantota, 23 May 2006, senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006 and senior officer, Wirawila Air Base, 25 May 2006. Focus group discussions with urban men, urban women, the business community and rural men. 164 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 165 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 166 Interview with senior representative, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 167 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 168 Focus group discussion with urban men. 169 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 170 Interviews with senior representative, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006 and senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006.

Measures have been taken to reduce desertion, such as reduction of the minimum service period required of personnel.171 Reintegration of deserters is not helped by the barriers deserters face in obtaining legitimate employment, as Government agencies refuse to employ deserters directly, and reportedly discourage their employment by others.172 Faced with loss of income, and skilled in combat, deserters are susceptible to temptation and make attractive recruits for criminal gangs in the District.173 Participants in the SASA-Net civil society consultation meeting for Hambantota also raised the issue of army deserters being in possession of illicit weapons as a key problem in the district, and recommended, ‘the rehabilitation of army deserters and their reintegration into society’.174

Small arms and the economy

Key economic activities in Hambantota District include fishing, trading, light engineering, vehicle maintenance, tourist and service industries (eating houses, guest houses, and service stations), salt production, rice production and other forms of agriculture. Businesses were obliged to close in the first JVP insurrection (1971), and were directly targeted in the second (1987-1989).175

No quantitative evidence was available to demonstrate the current effects of small arms and light weapons related violence on the economic well being of individuals, families and companies. However, a representative of the Chamber of Commerce for the District, which has approximately 200 members, believes armed violence to be one of the key problems for businesses in the area, and stated that the subject is regularly raised at the Chamber’s meetings.176 The focus group discussion with business people produced few findings, as it was held in Suriyawewa, one of the District’s most troubled areas, and participants were apparently too afraid of repercussions to answer questions about small arms directly.177 They did recall, however, that violence linked to gang rivalry had been so routine at one point that they had to close their shops, and that local people did not enter the town after seven o’clock in the evening during this period.178

Some local business owners keep firearms for protection purposes, but they are not of a type to offer effective protection from armed criminals.179 Although guns are believed to offer an effective deterrent to would-be robbers, they are also recognised as presenting an attractive theft item for criminals.180

171 Interview with senior officer, Wirawila Air Base, 25 May 2006. 172 Ibid. 173 Interviews with senior representative, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006 and representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 174 Findings for Southern Province from the SASA-Net Civil Society Consultation Process 2005. 175 Interview with a representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006. 176 Ibid. 177 Focus group discussion with the business community. 178 Ibid. 179 Interview with a representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006. 180 Ibid.

Illicit logging

Illicit logging was noted by officials and the public as the context for disputes which occasionally turn to violence.181 Sri Lanka’s forestry legislation is very strict.182 According to an official from the Forest Department, the threat to the personal safety and lives of officers from illicit loggers dates back to the foundation of the Department in 1887.183 The threat faced is seasonal, depending on the season for harvesting specific types of wood, and increased after the 1980s, when legislation was strengthened and the opportunities for illicit logging became increasingly limited.184 Once again, the perception of the Forest Department was that illicit loggers are typically army deserters whose names are well known to Department officers.185 It is believed by officials that the public is reluctant to report illicit logging because of fears over personal safety.186 Conversely, focus groups revealed public resentment at the perception that the Forest Department penalises poor people but allows large scale criminal logging to proceed unchecked.187

Forest Department officers confirmed the necessity of being issued with weapons for self-protection, and cited incidents of firearms related intimidation and injury in the District.188 One such incident is recounted in Box 1.1. The media analysis also noted the sentencing of a labourer who fatally shot a Forest Department officer on official duty. Typically the weapons which pose a threat are galkatas or shot guns, although T-56s have also been used.189 Officers from the Range Office at Walasmulla estimate that they encounter trap guns approximately eight times per year.190 In addition to the recent injury detailed above, another officer was shot by a trap gun ten years ago.191

It was further stated that felling of trees is conducted at village level, where it can be a last resort in the face of poverty.192 The stock is then sold on to dealers from the village level.193 If forest officers attempt to make an arrest, protests can develop. Sometimes these involve as many as 100 people.194 At Middeniya and Uswewa, crowds in such situations have stolen Forest Department weapons.195 Previous losses have included one repeater shot gun and one shot gun, although both were subsequently recovered.196 At Uswewa, a Forest Department Beat Office has also been burnt down.

Chena cultivation (or ‘slash and burn’ agriculture) also leads to disputes with Forest Department officers, but these have not yet turned to violence in Hambantota District.197 Reportedly, cannabis cultivators discourage all association with logging, in order to reduce their chances of detection.198

181 Official views referenced below, raised by the public in, for example, the focus group discussion with minorities. 182 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Interviews with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006 and representatives, Walasmulla Range Office, Forest Department, 24 May 2006. 186 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006. 187 Focus group discussion with minorities. 188 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006. 189 Interview with representatives, Walasmulla Range Office, Forest Department, 24 May 2006. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid. 196 Ibid. 197 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006. 198 Ibid.

Chena cultivation

In some areas of the District, such as around Angunakolapelessa,199 Suriyawewa, Lunugamwehera, Tissamaharama and Hambantota town,200 violence is related more to chena cultivation than to organised crime. It was stated by more than one interviewee that chena cultivators possess galkatas for crop protection201 and that injuries are occasionally inflicted as a result of land disputes, family disputes, adultery, illegal marriages and sexual assaults among communities practising chena cultivation.202 Other social problems in chena cultivation communities were also cited, such as cannabis use and alcoholism.203 It was asserted by a senior official working on development that the problem could be reduced through training in agricultural methods and projects to make the assets or land such people have more productive.204

Land and property disputes

Land disputes were reported by some interviewees and in focus groups as having led in the past to incidents of armed violence.205 The Deputy Commissioner of Agriculture in the District informed the survey team that in 2005 an officer who was assisting in deciding over legal aspects of a land dispute was run over by a vehicle and then shot.206 He highlighted the use of automatic weapons in land disputes, which were said to cause most problems in the Walasmulla and Beliatta areas.207 Participants in the rural women’s focus group in Suriyawewa referred to a recent land dispute which had led to shootings and the injury of at least four people.208 They also drew attention to disputes over the distribution of irrigation water, which have resulted in shootings and killings.209 Rural men attributed the rise of violent disputes near Suriyawewa to the malpractice of officers attached to the Mahaweli authority, who are responsible for the distribution of land and irrigation water in the area, as well as the loss of neutrality by police.210

Cattle farming

Cattle farming was highlighted as being linked to disputes and crime.211 Cattle- owners are often reportedly owners and users of illicit firearms,212 and disputes arise because cattle owners allow their cattle to graze at random. If the cattle stray onto the land of others, or cause damage, the ensuing dispute can lead to intimidation and violent assault.213 Cattle owners are reluctant to adopt modern methods of cattle farming, such as using grain stores for cattle feed, which might prevent cattle from grazing on the property of others.214 They are also reported to be difficult to deal with

199 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 200 Interview with representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006. 201 Interviews with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006 and a suspected firearms manufacturer, nr. Tissamaharama, 25 May 2006. Focus group discussion with urban women. 202 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 203 Interview with representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006. 204 Ibid. 205 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006. Focus group discussion with urban women. 206 Interview with representative, Agriculture, Hambantota, 24 May 2006. 207 Ibid. 208 Focus group discussion with rural women. 209 Ibid. 210 Focus group discussion with rural men. Loss of neutrality by police in Suriyawewa was also highlighted in the focus group discussion with the business community. 211 By several interviewees cited below and focus group discussions with urban men, urban women and minorities. 212 Interview with representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006. Focus group discussion with rural women. 213 Ibid. 214 Interview with representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006.

in part because they are able to curry favour with police and politicians.215 Police noted some examples of cattle thefts in Angunakolapelessa,216 while the business community noted the use of firearms in cattle-related disputes near Suriyawewa.217 Problem areas noted above in relation to chena cultivation were also noted as having problems related to cattle farming by another interviewee.218 At Hambantota Hospital, most victims of firearms death and injuries are reportedly farmers, and involved in disputes related to cattle farming or chena cultivation.219

Resettlement

The social problems underlying much of the crime in some locations of the District were said to relate to schemes to resettle families who were unaccustomed to agricultural subsistence onto agricultural land.220 The key example given of this was that of families settled along the road in Suriyawewa on the Welawa left bank under a Mahaweli Development Scheme.221 Focus group participants from the business community pointed to migrants to the area and consequent business rivalries, as a key source of problems.222

Cannabis cultivation and trading

Apparently linked to organised crime, the cultivation of cannabis is said not to be as widespread in Hambantota as in neighbouring Monaragala. Gangs running plantations, as well as being armed with T-56s, reportedly defend the area around plantations by setting up trap guns.223 Gangs in Hambantota are reported to have engaged in trading cannabis for weapons.224 There was little overt information demonstrating the level of the problem in the District, and the media analysis found no reports suggesting a link between drug trafficking/dealing and illicit SALW.

Poaching

Officers from the Department of Wildlife confirmed the need for weapons for crop protection (see the section below on ‘Positive uses of guns’). However, they pointed out that these weapons often end up being used for illicit poaching of wildlife.225 Typically the Department of Wildlife Office in Hambantota handles 15-20 cases of poaching per year.226 The weapons used by illicit poachers are typically muzzle- loading guns, trap guns and, occasionally, shot guns.227 The Department of Wildlife has the authority to confiscate guns from poachers and produce them direct to the Magistrate.228 Although records were destroyed in the Tsunami, it is estimated that around 100 illegal firearms have been seized by the Department of Wildlife in the Hambantota District in the last five years.229

215 Ibid. 216 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 217 Focus group discussion with the business community. 218 Interview with representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006. 219 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 220 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 17 May 2006. 221 Ibid.and representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006. 222 Focus group discussion with business community. 223 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 19 May 2006. Focus group participants from minorities, and rural men also stated that cannabis cultivators protecting their activities with unspecified weapons. 224 Interview with senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 225 Interview with representatives, Department of Wildlife, 15 May 2006. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid.

Officers from the Department of Wildlife feel threatened by the hazards posed by firearms. During raids, trap guns often place officers at risk, having to be deactivated with sticks. One officer interviewed by the survey team had narrowly escaped injury on two occasions: in one incident a trap gun which was inadvertently activated nearly shot him in the leg; in another instance a poacher had attempted to shoot him but the gun used failed to fire.230 It appears that as is the case with other Departments it is difficult to get a rapid response from Police when there is a problem related to poaching, because the Police has a heavy burden of work.

Age

Victims of firearms-related deaths examined at Matara Hospital have typically been aged 20-40, but there have, exceptionally, been victims aged over 50.231 Similarly at Hambantota Hospital, the predominantly male victims were typically aged 20-45, and at Tissamaharama, 25-30.232 The analysis of media reports for 01 May 2005 to 31 April 2006 was the only source suggesting older victims of SALW-related crimes: the average of the ages of victims specified in media reports was 47.4.

In the 42 small arms-related cases filed at Hambantota High Court in 2005, 64 of the 78 defendants (82%) were between 18 and 35 years of age. The same age range for offenders was specified by police at Middeniya.233 If there is to be a reduction in the levels of armed violence in the District, it would have to stem from a change of behaviours among offenders in this age range.

2.7 Age of defendants in SALW-related cases, Hambantota High Court, 2005

Unknown, Aged up to Aged 42 2 17, 3 and over, 3 Aged 18- Aged 36- 23, 17 41, 6 Aged 30- 35, 17

Aged 24- 29, 30

Gender

Firearms-related deaths at Matara and Hambantota Hospitals in recent years have overwhelmingly involved males.234 An official at Matara could recall only two involving females, having handled more than 100 cases.235 Likewise at Tissamaharama Hospital, a senior medical official had never seen a female firearms victim.236 Offenders in small arms and light weapons related incidents in the District are, according to one source, invariably male.237

230 Ibid. 231 Interview with officail, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 232 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 233 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 234 Interviews with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006 and official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 235 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 236 Interview with senior official, Tissamaharama Hospital, 25 May 2006. 237 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006.

A senior police officer in Tangalle stated that the number of rape cases reported in the District was higher than he has observed elsewhere.238 He also stated that there were very few incidents of domestic violence in the area.239

Focus group discussions did reveal some concern with domestic violence, mainly linked to alcoholism,240 but did not link its occurrence to the misuse of firearms. Women also drew attention to the lack of female police officers to whom women could report incidents with more confidence.241 Thus there may be a greater problem with sexual and domestic violence than is currently perceived. Women in Tangalle reported disputes over access to drinking water which had on one occasion culminated in two homicides involving firearms and knives.242 Rural women focus group participants stated that villagers did not go out after eight o’clock in the evening for fear of crime.243

Electoral violence

Many firearms-related incidents of electoral violence were reported in Hambantota during and after the 2001 General Election. In the 2004 election, the level of violence reported in Hambantota decreased even more than that reported in other districts. In the first of the following charts, for 2001, Hambantota appears as one of the districts worst affected by electoral violence, with the fifth highest number of reported firearm incidents of any district in the country.244 In the second chart, depicting the much less violently contested 2004 election, Hambantota is one of the eight districts least affected by firearms-related incidents.245

238 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006. 239 Ibid. 240 Focus group discussions with urban women and rural women. 241 Focus group discussion with rural women and minorities. 242 Focus group discussion with urban women. 243 Focus group discussion with rural women. 244 Based on the sum of the number of incidents before, during and after the election in: Centre for policy Alternatives, Final Report of Election-Related Violence by the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) - General Election 2001, (2001), http://www.cpalanka.org/research papers/CMEV General Election 2001.pdf. 245 Based on the sum of the number of incidents before, during and after the election in: Centre for Policy Alternatives, Final Report on Election Related Violence by the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV): General Election – April 2004, (Colombo, 2004), http://www.cpalanka.org/research papers/CMEV GE 2004 English.pdf.

2.8 Violent incidents by district reported by CMEV, General Election 2001

160 Kurnegala 512 166 Gampaha 437 108 Anuradhapura 394 170 Kandy 369 143 Puttlam 355 50 Kegalle 232 127 Hambantota 211 63 Digamadulla 208 43 Colombo 194 33 Matara 185 23 Polonnaruwa 158 25 Incidents Galle 150 involving 50 Ratnapura 128 firearms 19 Kalutara 122 Total 20 incidents N' Eliya 118 41 Matale 118 32 Batticaloa 108 37 Jaffna 85 16 Monaragala 70 33 Wanni 65 21 Badulla 55 10 Trincomalee 29

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

2.9 Violent incidents by district reported by CMEV, General Election April 2004 16 Digamadulla 190 8 Colombo 165 9 Galle 147 10 Gampaha 144 6 Matara 120 15 Kurnegala 117 14 Ratnapura 115 11 Anuradhapura 111 16 Puttlam 98 9 Kandy 98 7 Badulla 82 Incidents Matale 1 76 involving 3 N' Eliya 69 firearms 18 Batticaloa 63 Total 11 incidents Monaragala 56 2 Kalutara 54 8 Kegalle 53 2 Polonnaruwa 33 4 Hambantota 30 4 Jaffna 26 Trincomalee 22 Wanni 18

0 50 100 150 200

Only preliminary figures are available showing the number of violent incidents on during the campaign and on the day of the 17 November 2005 election. Prior to the election, out of 465 incidents nationwide, only 6 took place in Hambantota.246 One of these pre-election incidents involved firearms, compared to twenty-nine nationwide. On the election day itself, out of 46 incidents nationwide, only four took place in Hambantota District, and none involved firearms.247

246 CMEV, ‘Offences Report (Cumulative Figures) Date: 2005-11-16’, http://www.slelections.info/offences.php, accessed 31 May 2006. 247 CMEV, ‘Offences Report (Election day) Date: 2005-11-17’, http://www.slelections.info/election day offences.php?PHPSESSID=b90770b91cf631288b70855de25a5ec7, accessed 31 May 2006.

2.10 Pre-election and election day incidents in Hambantota District in 2001, 2004 and 2005 elections (CMEV) 160 151 140 Pre-election total incidents 120 100 Pre-election firearms 87 incidents 80 59 Election day total 60 39 incidents 40 27 Election day firearms 20 6 2 5 1 1 4 0 incidents 0 2001 2004 2005

The number of violent incidents reported at elections has to be scrutinised with caution because those making complaints are often politically motivated.248 Nationally, the number of prosecutions in court is very low in relation to complaints received, and no cases have been filed in relation to electoral violence at the High Court in Hambantota District from 2001 to the present.249 This may be partly due to a general reluctance to file cases against those with political patronage.

People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL) also reported on the 2004 General Election and stated that, despite 12 minor incidents involving impersonations, all polling stations monitored in the district offered conditions for free and fair elections.250 The PAFFREL co-ordinator for Hambantota remarked that when violence does occur, the two major party coalitions are equally to blame.251 He pointed to a definite reduction in electoral violence in the years 2000-2006. He further attributed the decrease to pressure on all state agencies from the President, whose home constituency is in Hambantota, to decrease the level of violence at election time.252

Although there has been progress in reducing the levels of electoral violence in the District, there are still tragic cases. For example, the media analysis noted a report about the fatal shooting of a 42-year-old man in Beliatta, who was an active supporter of the United People’s Freedom Alliance. According to the report, the killing was believed by Police to be related to the local government elections held a few days earlier.253 Participants in the SASA-Net civil society consultation conducted in Hambantota in 2005 were still concerned about violence during elections as a key issue in relation to small arms in the District,254 as were participants in the rural women’s focus group discussion.255 Members of the public consulted were very supportive of all efforts to end electoral violence.256

Alcohol

248 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 249 Ibid. 250 PAFFREL, Final Report on Parliamentary General Election 2004, (PAFFREL/MFFE, Colombo), pp.17-18. 251 Interview with the PAFFREL co-ordinator for Hambantota, 01 June 2006. 252 Ibid. 253 The media analysis cites The Island, 01 April 2006, p.2. 254 Findings for Southern Province from the SASA-Net Civil Society Consultation Process 2005. 255 Focus group discussion with rural women. 256 Focus group discussion with urban women.

Alcohol was fairly widely cited as a problem in relation to violence and criminality in the District.257 The media analysis revealed two alcohol-related incidents: one in which one man was killed and another injured during a drinking session in Hungama; another near Beliatta in which a police officer investigating a den for producing illicit alcohol was killed by a trap gun fixed to a tree near the den. Rural men remarked in their focus group that weakness in the rule of law encouraged people to pursue illicit activities such as illicit liquor production, and this in turn led them to possess weapons to protect the activity.258 Forensic doctors were unable to elaborate on intoxification of firearms homicide victims because they do not have the facilities to test intoxication levels during post mortem examinations.

Drug use

Some problems with drug addiction in the District were raised in focus groups, as a potential cause of petty theft among young people.259

Inter-communal tension

There appeared to be no problems or tensions between the ethnic or religious groups in the District,260 and thus armed violence appeared not to relate to tensions of this kind.

Tsunami displacement

Although there were some protests in which crowds asserted their entitlement to relief, no interviewees could recall either tension or armed violence associated with post-Tsunami displacement in the District.261

Positive uses of guns

The issuing of new firearms licences was banned in the years following the JVP insurgency. The former licensing officer at the District Secretariat recalled how, at this time, some people complained about the ban because they had a legitimate need for a gun. Their reasons included: protection of crops from wild boar, monkeys and elephants, especially given the threat they pose around Yala National Park and Uda-Walawa; self-protection; and sports shooting.262 The Deputy Commissioner of Agriculture for Hambantota and rural male focus group participants confirmed the need of farmers to hold guns for protection from wildlife.263

257 Interviews with representative, Hambantota mosque, 23 May 2006 and Dr D Dissanayake, District Medical Officer, Tissamaharama Hospital, 25 May 2006. Focus group discussions with minorities, rural women and rural men. 258 Focus group discussion with rural men. 259 Focus group discussion with minorities. 260 Interview with representative, Hambantota mosque, 23 May 2006. Focus group discussions with minorities and urban women. 261 Focus group discussion with urban women. 262 Interview with a Former Firearms Licensing Officer, Hambantota District, 15 May 2006. 263 Interview with representative, Agriculture, Hambantota, 24 May 2006. Focus group discussion with rural men.

4 Capacity

Law and justice system

Policing in violent communities

There was a widespread perception of corruption of police among the general public, who believe police officers to be open to bribery.264 The problem was linked by senior police officers in Tangalle Division to the fact that many of the division’s officers are of local origin.265 It was asserted that political will needed to be exerted to enforce existing regulations to ensure that officers are in service away from their place of origin.266 The Senior Superintendent of Police for Tangalle Division also drew attention to the salary of an ordinary constable (11,000 LKR per month), and argued that increased wages and allowances for officers would diminish the temptation to take bribes.267

In Middeniya, it was reported that two years ago there had been ‘almost daily’ killings, and that women had been scared to walk around even in daytime.268 A senior representative at Middeniya Police Station reported to the survey team an improvement in the local situation, based on a successful initiative in preventing violence, involving:

− Pressing Magistrates not to grant bail to firearms suspects in periods of unrest; − Conducting weekly meetings with known criminals to warn them against offending; − Regularly raiding cannabis plantations and ‘moonshine’ producers; − Monitoring the activities of known offenders; − Establishing a Peace Association and working through Temple Societies to build dialogue and trust with citizens; − Conducting awareness programmes in schools (officers explain how to contact police and respond to letters from school children); − Participating in and providing security to public events.269

It was not possible for the survey team to verify the impact of these initiatives independently, but they display a worthy emphasis on prevention and community relations as the basis for armed violence reduction, which may be worth replicating in other badly affected locations.

Focus groups with women drew attention to the need for: more police patrols to increase the perception of security in areas badly affected by crime; better mechanisms for mediating disputes and ensuring the fair distribution of resources and benefits.270 The latter is particularly important given that disputes related to land, irrigation and poverty relief benefits have all been noted as leading to violence in the District elsewhere in this report. Rural men also suggested the establishment of a phone line for reporting serious crime.

264 Focus group discussions with urban women, urban men, minorities, the business community and rural women. 265 Interviews with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006 and IP Suwaris, Head of Special Squad, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 266 Ibid. 267 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 268 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 269 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 270 Focus group discussions with urban women and rural women. Rural men also recommended an enhancement to police mobility.

In a relatively safe urban community, focus group participants pointed out that the community had its own mechanisms for resolving disputes, and enthusiastically emphasised the role communities themselves can play in establishing a lawful and safe environment.271 A senior police officer in Tangalle also raised the need for an awareness raising campaign to gain the help of the public in detection of criminals, and raised the example of successful work in schools to reduce alcoholism among parents elsewhere in the District.272 Another police officer recommended the use of a reward scheme to encourage the public to provide information in serious cases.273

Investigations, evidence and prosecutions

Some members of the public felt let down by the efficiency of the current system in punishing serious offences,274 and most were, predictably, keen to see more effective punishment for firearms offenders.275 However, there were some problems reported with the capacity of actors in the law and justice sector to dispense justice efficiently and effectively in relation to serious offences, including firearms offences.276

Although no specific cases were referred to, one key informant stated that the police do not gather enough evidence for effective prosecution of suspects.277 Elaborating on the problems in investigatory practice, another interviewee stated that police focus on eyewitnesses while placing little emphasis on physical evidence.278 At the same time, it appears that police have little alternative, since the capacity for analysis of physical evidence and crime scene investigation is so limited nationwide.279 A police officer routinely leading teams in firearms cases pointed to the need for better training in detective techniques.280

Three interviewees who were well placed to diagnose such problems alleged the occasional fabrication of evidence in firearms cases by police.281 One of these pointed out that both the public and police had previously added allegations about firearms to the charges against suspects to increase the gravity of the penalty imposed.282 Inconsistencies resulting from such practices can in fact weaken the case for the prosecution when revealed under cross-examination.283 An interviewee also identified the same problem in reverse: that police on occasion do not report the discovery of an illicit weapon, but instead remove it and take it into their personal possession.284 Likewise, the High Court in Hambantota has previously faced the problem that productions submitted to the Magistrate’s Court have gone missing before the case reaches the High Court.285 Any such losses relating to firearms should be scrutinised and prevented in future, because they represent not only the

271 Focus group discussion with urban women. 272 Interview with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 May 2006. 273 Interview with senior police representative, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 274 Focus group discussions with urban women and rural women. 275 Focus group discussions with urban men and rural men. 276 This perception was widely shared. For example, Sergeant Anura, Officer in Charge, Middeniya Police Station, stated in an interview on 17 May 2006 that:: the penalties for firearms offences are not high enough; the charges are often thrown out by uneducated witnesses getting tripped up by defence lawyers; and that cases take so long to come to trial that the victim forgets the incident and the perpetrator loses all sense of why he is being punished. 277 Interview with the senior official, Magistrate’s Court, Tangalle, 16 May 2006. 278 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 279 Ibid. 280 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. Corroborated by representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006. 281 Interviews with two law and justice sector officials in Hambantota District, May 2006, and an anonymous defendant. 282 Interview with a law and justice sector official in Hambantota District, May 2006. 283 Ibid. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid.

loss of a weapon into circulation, but also the loss of crucial evidence needed to prosecute illicit firearms users.

An important finding from the survey relates to weapons which are taken into custody by police when a crime is committed. The system for handling these weapons held in evidence, in order to extract relevant forensic information, is currently underperforming. A key problem is the under-capacity of the office of the Government Analyst to provide timely reports on weapons which are submitted along with information requests.286 The Government Analyst, owing to staff shortages, has a long backlog of cases, such that it can take two years to get a report on a firearm to use as evidence in court.287 The official responsible for firearms at the Government Analyst indicated that the technology is in place to match empty cartridges to the gun which fired them. However, another key informant complained that he had never come across a report from the Government Analyst matching cartridge and weapon, which would be an invaluable tool in conducting a prosecution.288 A further problem is that the police are obliged to deliver weapons held in evidence to the Government Analyst in Colombo and retrieve them from there. With limited vehicle resources to make this journey (a 16-hour round-trip from police stations in Hambantota)289 there is a large backlog of weapons on the premises of the Government Analyst awaiting pick-up.290

A common recommendation among all stakeholders in relation to this problem is that the Government Analyst function be devolved to Provincial Level.291 Interviewees further suggested that it should be prioritised for increased resources to allow it both to modernise its methods and undertake crime scene investigation.292 Finally, interviewees stressed the need for more Government Analyst staff to ensure that crucial evidence in serious cases, such as those related to firearms, is more comprehensively compiled and more quickly made available. This should lead to more successful prosecutions of firearms offenders, and reduce the burden placed on the correctional services system by firearms defendants held on remand and waiting to answer charges against them, as well as shorten their detention on unproven charges.

Forensic doctors handling cases from Hambantota District were characterised by a high degree of professionalism, but are working with sub-optimal equipment levels: one was forced to make photo records of injuries using his personal mobile phone;293 even in the biggest mortuary visited, the official interviewed reported that he is unable to access x-ray and toxicology equipment which would enhance the forensic examination of firearms homicide victims, and that doctors routinely pay their own internet costs.294 The WHO was stated to be neglecting forensic medicine capital development compared to other areas of assistance.295

286 Interviews with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006, senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006, official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006 and official, Teaching Hospital Korapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006. 287 Interviews with representative, Attorney General’s Department, 10 May 2006, representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 and official, Teaching Hospital Korapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006. 288 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 289 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006. 290 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, 10 May 2006. 291 Interviews with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006, representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 and official, Teaching Hospital Karapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006. 292 Interviews with representatives, Attorney General’s Department, 10 May 2006 and 16 May 2006. 293 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 294 Interview with official, Teaching Hospital Korapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006. 295 Ibid.

Delays at the Attorney General’s Department, which has 50 officers to prepare 10,000 cases per year, also delay the dispensation of justice in firearms cases. Similarly, the High Court in Hambantota, which hears all criminal cases involving firearms and any case related to automatic weapons, has a backlog of some 600 cases.296 The earliest of these cases dates from 1996, over 100 date from the period 1997-1999, and the remainder are cases from 2000 to the present.297 It can also take years for appeal cases to be heard.

Prisons

The Prison Department has three times more inmates than its optimal capacity (25,000 inmates are incarcerated in a system built for 8,000).298 The national system is dilapidated as a result of under-investment, and provision for rehabilitating offenders is poor.299 The national problems are reflected to some extent within Hambantota District. Tangalle prison currently holds a total of 448 inmates, among whom 359 are on remand. The prison has an optimal maximum capacity of 250 prisoners.300 When, in 2001, the prison was holding approximately 750 inmates, overcrowding and lack of water led to a riot. In response, overcrowding has been reduced to an extent, yet the problem remains.301

There was no data available at the local level on how many of the inmates were re- offenders. However, with no system for rehabilitating serious offenders such as firearms offenders, prisons appear to offer convicts and remandees education only in criminality.302 The prison would, in the opinion of a senior officer, benefit from the introduction of an additional 50 staff members. One key informant also remarked on the lack of donor interest in improving standards within the prison service, despite the existence of international standards in this field.303

Training and equipment within firearms holding agencies

Two police officers routinely dealing with firearms incidents pointed to the need for more officers who are trained to undertake raids and skilled in recognition and handling of weapons.304 The police believe they are regularly facing trained ex- combatants who possess military-style weapons, and therefore need the expertise and equipment to cope with situations that arise in such a context.305 Having initiated additional firearms training for ordinary officers in the Division, one interviewee noted that some officers had not fired a shot for four years.306 Another officer pointed out that training of officers could be enhanced in the areas of safe handling of weapons and explosives, and recognition of weapons.307 The survey team was made aware of more than one instance in Hambantota District of suspects being shot and killed as the attempt was made to capture them. Although the circumstances appear to have

296 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 297 Ibid. 298 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, NCAPISA member, 10 May 2006. 299 Ibid. 300 Interview with representative, Tangalle Prison, 16 May 2006. 301 Ibid. 302 For example, in an interview a former remandee reported coming into contact with organised criminals in prison who offered bail money if he agreed to supply them with home-made weapons. 303 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, 10 May 2006. 304 Interviews with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006 and senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 305 Ibid. The example was given in both interviews of the notorious local criminal ‘Army Jine’, a former paratrooper reputedly able to fire two T-56s simultaneously, one in either hand. A further example was offered (by the OIC Beliatta) of two police officers who were present during a robbery on a bus by an army deserter, but unable to halt it because of insufficient training. 306 Interview with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006. 307 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006.

warranted use of lethal force in at least one of the cases, better training might also enable such incidents to be resolved without loss of life in future.

In terms of equipment, to improve the response to instances of armed violence the need for bullet proof vests and an updated system which could prevent the interception of radio communications was pointed out to the survey team.308 In terms of resources for general police work, the small number of vehicles at some police stations was viewed as problematic not only by some police officers,309 but also by other Departments who sometimes require but do not always receive rapid support from the police.310 The public and business people also pointed to a poor level of response from police in emergency situations.311 Some police reported being overburdened with expectations from other Departments, such as the Departments of Wildlife, Forests and Customs and Excise, and pointed to the need for more personnel.312 Police Stations, currently equipped with phones and fax machines, could benefit from the installation of computers and internet access, if staff were sufficiently trained in their use.313 Police officers noted that, because of a lack of databases and current information, police stations can at times be unaware that a suspect is wanted elsewhere.314 Some police officers also reported that they would like more modern weaponry to counter the threat faced from well-armed criminals.315

A Department of Wildlife officer was shot and killed in 2004 in Yala by the bullet of a fellow officer, during a raid on a cannabis plantation.316 Although it is unfair to draw broad conclusions from isolated, tragic events, all personnel holding firearms should have appropriate training to ensure public safety and an ability to deal with threats they face with appropriate use of force. In the Department of Wildlife, officers in fact appear to have received a fairly high degree of training. Officers are currently trained to use T-56 assault rifles by either police, army or Special Task Force personnel.317 Officers in Yala, however, have already faced criminals wielding T-56s.318 Officers therefore admitted to feeling threatened and would welcome assistance to enhance the security of the Department premises, as well as their personal security.319

Forest Department officers have the legal right to use force to safeguard themselves, or if someone is interfering with their duties. An official at the District office highlighted the need for training and legal advice on when it is appropriate to use force.320 Although officers have, to date, only had to fire warning shots in Hambantota District,321 the interviewee at the District office was concerned about the legal implications of officers having to use force.322 Forest Department officers receive 7-

308 Interviews with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006 and IP Suwaris, Head of Special Squad, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. (a senior representative from Tangalle recommended only enhanced radio). 309 Three jeeps and one motorbike are available to the 66 officers at Walasmulla Police Station. Interview with Head of Criminal Investigations, Walasmulla Police Station, 17 May 2006. Three jeeps, two continually in disrepair, and two motorcycles are available to the 53 officers at Angunakolapelessa Police Station, where some officers reportedly have to use their own vehicles for police work. Interview with Sergeants Bandara and Jayasuriya, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006. 310 Interview with official , Department of Forest Conservation 24 May 2006. 311 Interview with a representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006. Again the lack of adequate vehicles and inadequate training in the handling of emergencies was mentioned as an aspect of the problem. 312 Interviews with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006, representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 and senior representative of police, Tangalle Division, 26 May 2006. 313 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 314 Interview with senior representative, Walasmulla Police Station, 17 May 2006. 315 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 316 Interview with representatives, Department of Wildlife, 15 May 2006. 317 Ibid. 318 Ibid. 319 Ibid. 320 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006. 321 Interview with representatives, Walasmulla Range Office, Forest Department, 24 May 2006. 322 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006.

10 days’ induction training on firearms at a police training camp.323 The official interviewed pointed out that this was insufficient for current needs.324 There had been an initiative to offer additional training to officers, but the training facility discontinued this because of other commitments.325 The Forest Department District Office reported no instances of loss of weapons,326 however, officers at the Range Office drew the survey team’s attention to incidents when officers’ weapons had been stolen by crowds of disgruntled villagers, and were later retrieved by police. This suggests a possible need for better training for officers in handling incidents which may turn to violence, as well as the need for more police support to control such incidents from leading to tragic conclusions.

Officers in the prison service in the District have been exposed to armed attack. Prison officers are trained in use of firearms by the police. The use of force by prison officers is governed by the prisons ordinance.

According to a bank security official, bank security staff are in most cases former police officers, so they are in general well-trained.327 The People’s Bank additionally send security officers on a day’s training each year.328 The same interviewee perceived a need for more security staff and more modern weapons to enhance bank security.329

Preventing violence among offenders, deserters and young males

The cost of failing to prosecute prominent organised criminals and rehabilitate previous offenders is underlined by the attack on a prison transport detailed above. The incident, in which one policeman and the prisoner were killed and one senior gaoler was injured, was led by persons previously released from state custody.330 An interviewee pointed out that the offenders brought in from the areas most troubled by armed violence perpetrated by organised gangs have been known to police for many years.331

The key social issue facing people in Hambantota, and a key root cause for armed violence pointed out by many interviewees and focus group participants, was lack of education, training and opportunities to earn a living.332 An official at Hambantota Hospital asserted that victims of firearms death and injury were ‘always the poorest and least educated’ of people.333

The representative interviewed from the Chamber of Commerce, which also conducts projects on vocational training and business development, elaborated on these problems as being related to lack of infrastructure and services, and lack of equal opportunities for people to attain the affluence which they see around them.334 Without more market development and opportunities for young people, he predicted a long continuation of the District’s organised criminal activity, and also did not

323 Ibid. 324 Ibid. 325 Ibid. 326 Ibid. 327 Interview with senior officail, Hambantota District Peoples Bank, Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 328 Ibid. 329 Ibid. 330 Interview with representative, Tangalle Prison, 16 May 2006. 331 Interview with representative, Attorney General’s Department, Hambantota District, 16 May 2006. 332 Interviews with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006, official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006, representative, Agriculture, Hambantota, 24 May 2006, representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006 and a suspected firearms manufacturer, nr Tissamaharama, 25 May 2006. Focus group discussions with urban women, minorities, rural men and the business community. 333 Interview with official, Base Hospital Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 334 Interview with a representative, Hambantota Chamber of Commerce, 23 May 2006.

discount the potential for political movements to mobilise violent supporters frustrated by inequality (as with the JVP insurrections).335 The long-term priority areas for overcoming the social causes of armed violence in the District were thus said to be: education, especially university places, training, job creation, enterprise support within an enabling business environment, and community development.336 Through such measures, violent young people could be offered a fresh start.337 The same kind of recommendations emerged in focus group discussions.338

Others warned, however, that while criminals have access to perks and the protection of powerful friends, the creation of opportunities for legitimate work will do little to change their choice of lifestyle.339 Thus it was asserted by a senior and experienced official working on development in the District that the first component of proper handling of deserters would be for them to be found and given a clear warning that criminal behaviour will be monitored and will not be tolerated.340 In tandem with this robust approach, economic integration based on job creation, vocational training and enterprise support was considered to have a lot of potential, because the need for money underlies army deserters’ problem behaviours in many cases.341 At the national level, the reintegration of ex-combatants including deserters is on the agenda of the Ministry of Human Rights and Disaster Management, and there are international partner agencies willing to assist in implementing any Government initiatives in this area, drawing on experiences in other countries.342

Amnesty and collection

Collection of licensed firearms in 1989 apparently reduced the number of firearms in the District substantially (by over 1,000 weapons according to the former licensing officer at the District Secretariat).343 In 2004 two weapons collection initiatives were conducted at the national level, but met with limited success. Urban male focus group participants had not heard about the 2004 collections.344 Other focus group participants suggested lack of trust in the agencies responsible and insecurity as key reasons why previous initiatives have not achieved more significant results.345 However, urban men and rural and urban women expressed strong enthusiasm for a future amnesty initiative to reduce illicit weapons possession.346 Both groups also stressed that it should be independently monitored, as they would not trust the police in such a matter.347

Although a senior police officer for Tangalle Division advocated an amnesty collection programme for illicit weapons,348 it was acknowledged by many people that the criminals’ weapons have been and would continue to be difficult to recover.349 Other focus groups pointed out that people would not be willing to give up weapons without addressing the sense of insecurity350 and other social issues that underlie

335 Ibid. 336 Ibid. 337 Ibid. 338 Focus group discussions with urban women and rural women. 339 Interview with representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006. Focus group discussion with urban women. 340 Interview with representative, Southern Province Rural Economic Advancement Project, 25 May 2006. 341 Ibid. 342 Interview with senior Official, International Labour Organization, 06 June 2006. 343 Interview with a Former Firearms Licensing Officer, Hambantota District, 15 May 2006. Participants recalled the reduction as substantial in the focus group discussion with rural men. 344 Focus group discussion with urban men. 345 Focus group discussion with minorities. 346 Focus group discussions with urban men and urban women. 347 Ibid. 348 Interviews with senior police officer, Tangalle Division, 16 and 19 May 2006. 349 Focus group discussion with urban women. 350 Focus group discussion with minorities.

weapons possession.351 Rural men in particular said that even a reward-based programme would be unsuccessful without the prior restoration of confidence in police and other government institutions, and stated that people would not hand over weapons if the collection was administered by police in any case.352

Future public campaigns could focus on eliminating dangerous SALW use not related to organised crime such as armed intimidation of Forest Department and Wildlife officials and in particular the use of trap guns, which is causing alarmingly frequent injuries in parts of the district. The link between lack of access to opportunities and violence could suggest the need to focus development work in insecure areas.353 This could involve offering communities a direct reward for hand-over of illicit weapons, or a more general, participatory approach to enhancing security through targeted community development initiatives.

Awareness and education

Urban and rural men and women drew the survey team’s attention to the demand of children for toy guns and their interest in playing at being soldiers, ascribed to the influence of foreign films.354 Rural men argued in favour of violence-free education throughout the curriculum at all ages.355

There are over 900 members in the National Cadet Corps in the District, including approximately 100 females.356 The National Cadet Corps offers young people aged 14-20 years drill, discipline, training and an introduction to civic responsibilities, laws and leadership.357 Cadets are trained to drill using obsolete .303 rifles from the military, and may have the opportunity to fire rifles if they visit a cadet training camp.358 While the emphasis on civic responsibility and the significant involvement of the cadet corps in relief and social work359 make the Cadet Corps an undoubted asset to society, the familiarisation of children with weapons and martial culture may not be the best way to promote peaceful, law-abiding citizenship in the long term.360

Participants in the urban women, rural men and women and minorities’ focus groups were keen for awareness raising programmes to be undertaken to reduce problems related to SALW.361 The urban women stated that women are the primary actors in social initiatives in the area, and rural women also drew attention to the existence of grassroots women’s organizations that would co-operate in any campaign against misuse of firearms.362 This suggests a potential role for women in assisting any future public awareness initiative, although the focus group participants also pointed out the problems they faced in trying to influence male behaviour.363

Civil society actors

351 Focus group discussion with rural men. 352 Ibid 353 This analysis also emerged from the focus group discussion with minorities. The minorities were perceptive about the need for a substitute for the perceived protection and benefits offered by gun ownership to be found if their numbers are to be reduced. 354 Focus group discussions with urban women, urban men, rural women and rural men. 355 Focus group discussion with rural men. 356 Interview with Representative, National Cadet Corps, Tangalle, 26 May 2006. 357 Ibid. 358 Ibid. 359 Ibid. 360 Cf Krug E, Dahlberg L, Mercy J, Zwi A, Lozano R (eds), World report on violence and health, (Geneva, World Health Organization, 2002), p.43, which states that both ‘Training in the safe use of guns,’ and, ‘Programmes modelled on basic military training,’ have been, ‘Shown to be ineffective in reducing youth violence or risk factors for youth violence.’ 361 Focus group discussions with urban women, rural women, rural men and minorities. 362 Focus group discussions with urban women and rural women. 363 Focus group discussion with urban women.

A senior representative of the election monitoring NGO People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), which is a civil society member of NCAPISA, noted that district level civil society organisations are at work to prevent violence at the local level. The recent ‘Ballot without the Bullet’ campaign was promoted within Hambantota by local PAFFREL activists as part of a nationwide effort to reduce electoral violence at the November 2005 election.364

PAFFREL also gathers information on the level of gun incidents at elections, offering an important source of information on armed violence and one of its more direct impacts on democracy and good governance.365 Detailed statistics, including a disaggregation of firearms incidents, are offered by the reports on elections produced by the Centre for Monitoring Electoral violence (CMEV). The level of detail provided and the standard format for the data in reports for the last five years make CMEV reports very useful for observing trends in electoral violence over recent years.

There were participants from Hambantota District who attended the first training on small arms which Saferworld and partners conducted in Sri Lanka. This covered an overall introduction to the small arms issue, planning of activities, advocacy and campaigning.366

If an amnesty programme or other initiatives were conducted to reduce illicit weapons possession, focus group participants pointed out that a concerted awareness campaign367 involving locally trusted organisations would be needed to convince illicit owners of the safety of registering weapons.368 They also stressed the role that community organisations can play in enhancing community safety.369

Role of the media

The media analysis conducted for this survey raised the issue that while reports on crimes themselves are commonplace, there was little coverage of firearms cases generally. It was noted that coverage of sentencing for firearms-related cases could have an impact on public awareness of the law and penalties for illicit possession and misuse of SALW. In terms of firearms homicides, seizures and productions to the Government Analyst, Hambantota has been shown above to be more challenged by SALW problems than many other parts of the country. However, less than three percent – out of the total number of 1,111 articles related to SALW nationwide identified from the six newspapers during the one-year period under reference – relates to Hambantota district. Clearly not only the number of the articles, but their placement in the newspapers (only three of the stories appeared in the front page) suggests the limited prominence of the firearms issue in public debate.

Lack of coverage of small arms-related issues in Hambantota district in the period analysed can be partly attributed to the prominence given to the coverage of the situation in the north and east of Sri Lanka and the peace process, the presidential election, and the slaying of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Lack of reports on SALW issues in Hambantota could also be due to lack of skilled regional journalists based there. It is possible that training for regional correspondents in reporting on small arms and crime might enhance their skills, lead to better

364 Interview with senior representative, Paffrel, 09 May 2006. 365 Ibid. 366 Ibid. 367 Focus group discussion with minorities. 368 Focus group discussion with urban women. 369 Focus group discussions with urban women and rural women.

remuneration, while in turn a greater quantity of more constructive coverage of small arms and lights weapons could be expected to emerge. This would be an important component of any awareness campaigns attempted with problem groups identified by the survey.

Licensing

After 1989 (the end of the second JVP insurrection), the issue of new licences was suspended and licensed weapons were collected. Licensing did not recommence until 1997.370 Since 1997, the Government Agent’s Office has been able to issue licences to banks and individuals for crop protection and animal husbandry. Self- defence and sports-shooting weapons are licensed at the national level.371

To obtain a licence for crop protection, the licensee must own over 5 acres of land.372 Agrarian Development Officers at Division level submit a report verifying the need of an individual licence applicant for a crop protection licence. The purpose of the reports is to indicate that the farmer has the requisite land and is of good character.373 To acquire a licence for animal husbandry, the Government Veterinary Surgeon under the Department of Animal Production and Health for the area should issue a letter of approval.374 Self-defence licensees must have annual income above a certain threshold.375 No licences are granted to individuals with criminal records.376 Licence application forms also include a check on previous weapons ownership and surrender by the individual (applicants must have surrendered any former weapons after 1989 to be allowed a weapon now).377 In cases where there has been a period where the previous licence for a weapon has lapsed, new application procedures are in place.378

Applications for licences are received at the District Secretariat. Police conduct a check on the applicant before the application is passed up to the MoDPSLO for approval.379 It was formerly the practice that firearms licensees could buy weapons from the vault at the District Secretariat.380 Commendably, the sale of weapons from the vault at the District Secretariat was discontinued after 1987.381 Those who have received approval for their licence application must either receive the weapon by transfer from a previous licensee or buy their new weapon from the small arms and ammunitions procurement unit.382 From the point of view of controlling access to weapons, it is encouraging that there are no authorised firearms dealers in Sri Lanka. It is also encouraging that the ammunition supplied by local dealers is held by the local police rather than by dealers themselves.383

Licensees are entitled to buy 20 rounds of ammunition in the first and 20 rounds in the second half of each year.384 At the local level it was stated that licensees are not

370 Interviews with representative, Hambantota District Secretariat, 15 May 2006 and senior official, MoDPSLO, 30 May 2006. 371 Ibid. 372 Ibid. 373 Interview with representative, Agriculture, Hambantota, 24 May 2006. 374 Interview with representative, Hambantota District Secretariat, 15 May 2006. 375 Ibid. 376 Ibid. 377 Ibid. 378 Ibid. 379 Ibid. 380 Interview with a Former Firearms Licensing Officer, Hambantota District, 15 May 2006. 381 Interview with representative, Hambantota District Secretariat, Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 382 Ibid, 15 May 2006. 383 Interview with a Former Firearms Licensing Officer, Hambantota District, 15 May 2006. 384 Interview with representative, Hambantota District Secretariat, 15 May 2006.

required to prove how the ammunition was used to purchase new ammunition.385 At the national level, however, it was stated that licensees are supposed to submit used cartridges when purchasing new ammunition. Whatever the reality, it is desirable, given the use of new and refilled cartridges by galkatas owners, that collection and destruction of empty cartridges be rigorously applied for purchase of new ammunition.

Each October, there is an announcement that licences are due for renewal in the newspapers.386 Licensees must then take an application form from the Government Agent, and submit it to the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) in Tangalle.387 It then comes back to the relevant police station covering the area where the applicant’s address is located.388 The Police Station sends an officer to check for the weapon. It is the duty of police to check the conditions under which weapons are stored. Observations go back to the SSP who has the responsibility to verify the age and criminal record of the applicant.389 The SSP puts a minute in the application and sends it back to the Government Agent.390 Then the Government Agent and responsible official at the MoDPSLO in turn approve the licence renewal.391 The charge for renewal is 100 LKR. The fine for late submission of renewal applications (applications reaching the SSP after December 31) is 100 LKR.392 It is advisable that the fine for failure to renew a firearms licence is raised to provide a more credible disincentive against failure to renew the licence. The process takes one month except in complicated cases. Few applications are rejected because applications not meeting the established criteria would not be accepted by the Government Agent at the initial stage.393

If someone becomes ineligible for a licence, he/she can seek to transfer their weapon to their next of kin, who will have to apply for a licence.394 If a firearm licence is not renewable and no transfer of ownership is made then the firearm is taken into a vault at the District Secretariat. In such cases, the licensing officer writes to the owner, sending a copy to the police.395 The owner is then supposed to bring the weapon him/herself.396 Often the owner appeals to get the renewal from the police, otherwise he/she hands the weapon in to the accountant at the District Secretariat.397

Because there are various parties involved in the processing of a single application, it was suggested that the process could be improved if the flow of information between parties was quicker and more regular, and the overall level of co-ordination could be improved. Although informants were reluctant to talk openly about the issue, problems were also noted with people trying to use personal influence to get firearms licences.

At the local level it was remarked that the system for licensing weapons had become more stringent at the national level, with fewer licences being issued under current management than previously.398 While this is a positive achievement, it remains a

385 Ibid. 386 Ibid. 387 Ibid. 388 Ibid. 389 Ibid. 390 Ibid. 391 Ibid. 392 Ibid. 393 Ibid. 394 Ibid. 395 Ibid. 396 Ibid. 397 Ibid. 398 Ibid.

concern that the stringency of the system seems to rest on the discretion of key personnel rather than on a structure that guarantees stringency regardless of the personalities of the individuals in key positions.399

Focus group participants also recommended greater control over the issuing of weapons to politicians and their supporters.400

Stockpile management and destruction

Destruction of weapons held in the vault at the District Secretariat occurs when, and if, a committee within the MoDPSLO decides.401 The weapons are then collected from the accountant at the District Secretariat for destruction by the responsible Senior Superintendent of Police from Field Force Head Quarters.402 This happens rarely and no time limit is set as to the maximum interval between destructions of weapons in the vault.403 While the holdings in the vault have diminished as a result of a commendable national initiative to destroy over 30,000 obsolete small arms and light weapons (July 2005), and automatic weapons and ammunition are not held there,404 it is advisable that a maximum time period be established after which weapons in the vault must be destroyed.

Although its location, robust door and dual-lock system makes the vault a relatively safe storage facility, a system guaranteeing regular destruction would further reduce the risk of misappropriation and the unnecessary accumulation of dangerous weapons. The manual record-keeping system contains records of all weapons held at the vault since 1961.

According to data supplied by Tangalle Police Division, in 2005, two shotguns were lost by or stolen from police: one from Kataragama and one from Tangalle. In 2006, one pistol was lost or stolen from Hungama. Police officers are not always armed when on duty, but are issued weapons only on the basis of operational need.405 They may carry arms to conduct road blocks, patrols and raids, and to guard VIPs and banks.406 A book is used by police in which officers sign weapons in and out.407 No police officer below the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police is permitted to take a weapon home.408 If a weapon is lost and malfeasance is confirmed then there is a possibility that the officer will lose his or her job.409 If the circumstance is not incriminating but the officer is responsible, he/she has to pay back the cost of the weapon.410 No officers could recall cases of loss of police firearms and therefore could not provide examples of disciplinary action taken in such cases.

Specific amounts of ammunition are allocated to be carried during beat patrols, special raids and multi-day operations.411 A special supply unit is used to rearm officers on multi-day operations.412 If an officer fires a shot, he/she has to write a report, indicating how many bullets were used, where, when and why.413 The officer

399 Ibid. 400 Focus group discussion with rural women. 401 Interview with representative, Hambantota District Secretariat, 15 May 2006. 402 Ibid. 403 Ibid. 404 Interview with representative, Hambantota District Secretariat, Hambantota, 23 May 2006. 405 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 406 Ibid. 407 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 408 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 409 Ibid. 410 Ibid. 411 Ibid. 412 Ibid. 413 Ibid.

must also account for the empty cartridges.414 If the use of ammunition is not satisfactorily explained, there is an inquiry.415 If anyone is killed, the officers involved are obliged to leave the empty cartridges on the scene for the Magistrate to conduct an investigation.416 The Police Department also makes its own enquiry, conducted by an Assistant Superintendent of Police.417

At Angunakolapelessa Police Station, an inventory is taken of the armoury every month.418 The security of police station armouries was better in some cases than others. Steps should be taken to enhance the security of police weapons by ensuring that armouries are fitted with more robust, dual locking doors, and that weapons not in use are routinely stored out of view inside the armoury.

It is recommended that more regular review be made of surplus small arms and light weapons in police holdings. One station reported that its armoury held a sub machine gun which had not been touched for three years because it was feared that it could begin firing at random if dropped. Officers were of the opinion that at the very least, there were .22 rifles in the Division’s stocks that were no longer of potential utility. Another station possessed self loading rifles which had not been used since the 1980s. Were there to be a serious attack, robbery, civil uprising or individual malfeasance at a police station, the loss of such weapons could have very serious consequences for public safety.

The Department of Wildlife conducts regular checks on its holdings and the use of ammunition by officers, and would take the loss of an officer’s weapon very seriously.419 After the tsunami struck, the Department of Wildlife in Hambantota was only able to recover four of its previous holdings of thirteen weapons. One of the lost weapons was later seized by Police, but the fate of the rest is unknown.420 As a precaution against loss of weapons in future, it is worth considering whether armouries could be placed only in locations well above sea level, and be better secured with more robust doors, dual locks and separate storage of weapons and ammunition.

The Forest Department has an internal verification board to conduct annual checks on its firearms stocks.421 If a weapon is issued to an officer it is his/her responsibility not to lose it, and he/she is not allowed to take it away, except for official use.422 When Forest Department officers are absent on vacation, the weapon is taken into custody by police.423 There is no armoury or safe in the typical Beat Office (the remote posting where individual officers live and work).424 Ammunition is issued according to the type of weapon: five rounds to officers issued with shot guns, and fifteen rounds to those armed with repeaters.425 Ammunition is replaced upon usage, and empty cartridges are collected back in.426 Monthly reports are made on use of ammunition, but reportedly ammunition is very rarely used by officers.427

414 Ibid. 415 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 416 Interview with representatives, Angunakolapelessa Police Station, 17 May 2006 417 Ibid. 418 Ibid. 419 Interview with representatives, Department of Wildlife, 15 May 2006. 420 Ibid. 421 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006. 422 Ibid. 423 Interview with representatives, Walasmulla Range Office, Forest Department, 24 May 2006. 424 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006. 425 Ibid. 426 Ibid.and representatives, Walasmulla Range Office, Forest Department, 24 May 2006. 427 Interview with official, Department of Forest Conservation, 24 May 2006.

Although the survey team did not have a chance to assess storage conditions and the security of the walls themselves, the armoury at Tangalle prison appeared to be as secure as any which the survey team had the opportunity to visit in the District. Every month the chief gaoler takes an inventory of the weapons held by the prison, in co-ordination with officers in Colombo. If there are any misfires or losses/thefts the prison must report it to the police, but it was stated that such incidents never occur.

The responsible official at a bank visited by the survey team reported that only state- owned banks are issued with weapons. Private banks cannot hold weapons but instead have to hire private security companies if they wish for armed protection. No banks in Hambantota hire Private Security Companies,428 and there are no licensed Private Security Companies based in Hambantota. The bank official interviewed stated that the bank was permitted to have its weapons visible anywhere within its premises during working hours.429 Ammunition is purchased through the Bank’s head office, and ten rounds are issued to armed officers at a time.430 State banks in the District reportedly hold weapons in safes with dual locks, the keys to which are held by separate individuals.431 Inventories of weapons at the People’s Bank are made every three months and sent to Colombo.432

There was no opportunity for the research team to inspect the armouries at the Navy or Air Force bases in the District. The armoury at the naval base was situated on high enough ground and was well enough secured for none of its holdings of small arms or ammunition to be lost during the Tsunami. It was stated that security of weaponry is of paramount importance at Wirawila air base.433 Thus not only are all weapons signed in and out, but sentries are subjected to regular random checks on duty to counteract the risk that weapons may be rented out to criminals.434 The base is also connected to an internet-based inventory system, through which it is possible to notify the departure of weapons being transported to other locations, their type, quantity, serial numbers and estimated time of arrival.435

Information and monitoring

In its report to the First Biennial Meeting of States on the UNPoA in July 2003, the Government of Sri Lanka reported that:

‘The Ministry of Interior has initiated a compilation of a list of weapons unaccounted for. The project titled “Support to the Establishment of a National Commission Against the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms in Sri Lanka” is to contribute to this task by providing assistance in establishing an arms registry and a database. Under this task, armed forces and the police are expected to provide the National Commission with a list of weapons missing from their stocks, on a regular basis.’436

428 Interview with senior official, Hambantota District Peoples Bank, Hambantota, 23 May 2006. According to the interviewee, the nearest is in Monaragala District. 429 Ibid. 430 Ibid. 431 Ibid. 432 Ibid. 433 Interview with senior officer, Wirawila Air Base, 25 May 2006. 434 Ibid. 435 Ibid. 436 GoSL, ‘Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects’, Report Submitted by the GoSL to The First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, 7-11 July 2003, New York, p.5

The same report stated that one of the main tasks of the soon-to-be established NCAPISA would be to, ‘Update the registry of the existing arms in private and Government possession’.437 Nevertheless, it appears that the figures relating to the holdings of different state entities, private individuals, security and other companies, as well as weapons lost, stolen or unreturned from such sources, either remain uncompiled, or are scattered in different paper files. It was further stated that, in order that the information should remain difficult for unauthorised personnel to access, the idea of creating an electronic database for easy reference, access to and analysis of such information by authorised personnel and policymakers, was not under consideration. The continued lack of a database of all government holdings and weapons unaccounted for is an obstacle to:

The culture of secrecy surrounding all weapons held by public servants, and unaccounted-for weapons issued to politicians after the JVP insurgency in particular, is a block to the development of a clearer picture of key issues in management of state-issued weapons. It would be desirable for the issue to be analysed and dealt with in a more transparent way: this would be an important step from the point of view of small arms control, but would be achievable only with leadership from the highest political level.

A World Health Organization (WHO) consultant in emergency medicine believes Sri Lanka’s system for monitoring causes of death to be fairly efficient:438 a manual record keeping system has been in place for 50 years;439 meanwhile the WHO recently invested in improvements to this system, funding the provision of computers to facilitate the gathering and transmission of health data in Tsunami-affected areas.440 According to the same consultant, the World Bank is also supporting a project to roll-out computer technology throughout the health information system nationwide. This demonstrates a potential capacity for the Ministry of Health to compile data on incidence of firearms injuries in specific locations nationwide.

The current system does indeed function with relative efficiency in providing statistics on causes of death, and the national system provides a useful clue to the scale of the armed violence problem in revealing that, ‘external causes of injury are the leading cause of death in all ages except infancy and above 50 years of age’.441 However, as in many countries, the classifications adopted under the present health information system, which are compatible with the International Classification of Diseases, do not enable a researcher or policy-maker to determine what proportion of such injuries are inflicted with firearms.442

Judicial Medical Officers, who handle clinical cases and post-mortem examinations in the case of admissions resulting from firearms injuries, keep their own records of cases related to firearms in an ad hoc manner, as such cases are not catalogued in detail in the core mortality data passed by Medical Records Officers to the

437 Ibid, p.2. 438 Interview with WHO Consultant in Emergency Medicine, 09 May 2006. 439 Ibid. 440 Ibid. 441 Family Health Bureau, ‘Annual Health Bulletin’, (2002). This is the most recent such bulletin to have been published. 442 Interviews with a Statistical Officer, Department of Census and Statistics, 11 May 2006 and representatives, Planning Unit, Provincial Director of Health’s Office, 23 May 2006.

Department for Census and Statistics. They would welcome the establishment of a database to record external causes of injury, but would require trained staff, computers and internet access to run it.443

In fact, the police may hold the more comprehensive data. By law a report must be filed with the police each time a firearms-related injury or death is reported to a hospital in Sri Lanka.444 The Police Department at the local level was very helpful in compiling statistics on the basis of its records, and supplying them to the research team. However, the Police Department does not have the technology to analyse in detail the nature of the problem on the basis of its records. Nor are the current arrangements for record keeping sufficient for it to mobilise its stations, officers and partner agencies in small arms control on the basis of the information it holds with the necessary speed. There were also inconsistencies between data supplied by individual stations and data compiled for the whole division. To regulate statistics and provide analysis and reports police stations need both computers and trained officers.445

If implemented properly by the Ministry of Health or the Police, a system for compiling and analysing data on armed violence injuries would provide a valuable source of information for policy-makers on where the problem of armed violence is concentrated and whom it is affecting most severely. It would thus be an important basis for planning interventions. It would also lie at the core of a monitoring mechanism to demonstrate the efficiency of any initiatives to tackle the proliferation of illicit small arms and their use in violent acts. Data-gathering systems of this kind are explicitly promoted by the WHO Department for Injury Prevention and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery’s joint Armed Violence Prevention Programme.446 Thus the Government of Sri Lanka might expect to find donor support for building armed violence monitoring into its already functional health/police information systems.

Databases of firearms seized, wanted suspects and missing persons were mentioned to the survey team as having potential utility in tracing illicit weapons, criminal investigation work or the identification of victims respectively.447

443 Interview with official, Matara Hospital, 26 May 2006. 444 Interview with WHO Consultant in Emergency Medicine, 09 May 2006. 445 Interview with senior representative, Middeniya Police Station, 17 May 2006. 446 UNDP/WHO, ‘The Global Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP) PHASE I: Support for the Development of a Framework to Address the Impacts of Armed Violence on Human Security and Development. Programme Document.’ 05 May 2005. 447 Interviews with senior official, Beliatta Police Station, 17 May 2006 and official, Teaching Hospital Karapitiya, Galle, 26 May 2006.

Bibliography

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60 Table of SALW related incidents reported in media 01 May 2005-30 April 2006

Incident within Location District Type of incident No of deaths No of injuries age Victim sex Victim Victim Occupation Nature of incident Perpetrator age sex Perpetrator Perpetrator occupation of Involvement army deserters typeSALW Source

1 Tangalle (1)Murder 1 54 F N/A Land N/A N/A N/A N/A - - (2)Injury 1 N/A M N/A dispute 2 Tangalle Injury - 1 70 F N/A Land N/A N/A N/A N/A - - dispute 3 Agunako- Murder 1 - 35 M N/A N/A N/A M N/A N/A N/A N/A lapelessa 4 Yala Murder 1 - - M Forest N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A officer 5 Agunako- Murder 1 - 48 M N/A Family N/A M N/A N/A - - lapelessa dispute 6 Beliatta Robbery - - N/A N/A Finance Organized N/A M Officer in a N/A Pistols N/A Companies robbery finance company Hand grenades 7 Beliatta Injury - 1 N/A M Businessman Argument N/A M Local N/A - - politician 8 Dickwella Injury - 1 N/A M N/A N/A N/A M N/A N/A - - 9 Tangalle Rape - - N/A F N/A - N/A M N/A - - - 10 Beliatta Arrested for 9 2 NA N/A Includes Organized N/A M N/A N/A T-56 N/A organized Injuries to 2 Crime robbery and policemen murder 11 Katuwana Murder 1 - N/A M N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 Beliatta Murder 1 - N/A M Threewheel N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

driver 13 Middeniya Arrested for - - - - - N/A N/A M N/A N/A N/A N/A possessing a bomb 14 Tangalle Murder 1 - 33 F N/A Family N/A M Lawyer - - - Dispute 15 Tissamaharama Attempted - 1 N/A M Employee at Attempted N/A M N/A N/A N/A N/A Robbery The cigarette Robbery shop 16 Hungama Murder 1 1 N/A M N/A N/A N/A M N/A N/A N/A N/A 17 Tangalle Murder 1 - N/A M N/A N/A N/A M N/A N/A N/A N/A 18 Tangalle Sentenced for 1 - N/A M N/A N/A N/A M N/A - - - murder (Stabbing) 19 Tissamaharama Arrested for 3 - N/A N/A M N/A Organised 20 M (1) student N/A Galkatas N/A robberies robbery 18 (2) student T56 bullets N/A (3) N/A N/A (3) N/A 20 Kirama Robbers shot 2 - N/A M N/A Organized ------dead by police robbery 21 Pallamalala Murder 1 - 57 M Government Dispute over a N/A M N/A N/A - - servant right to a land N/A F N/A (official matter) 22 Tangalle Murder 1 - 40 M N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - - 23 Seenimodara Murder (in 2004) 1 - N/A M Swiss N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - - national estate owner 24 Tangalle Murder 1 - N/A M N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - - 25 Ketanwela Accidental death 1 - 40 F Farmer - - - - - Shot gun - by firearm 26 Walasmulla Killed in self 1 2 N/A M N/A Fired in self - M N/A N/A Shot gun Licensed defence defence (licensed) 27 Tangalle Murder 1 - 55 M N/A Family dispute N/A M N/A N/A - - 28 Beliatta Murder (?) 1 - N/A M Policeman Official duty, died N/A N/A Illegal brewers N/A Shot gun N/A

during an operation to arrest illegal brewers 29 Beliatta Murder 1 - 42 M Security Political dispute N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A guard 30 Tangalle Robbery - - N/A N/A N/A Robbery N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A