2020 AMC Program

Aviation Maintenance Conference

May 11-14 Phoenix, Arizona

An ARINC Document Prepared by AMC Published by SAE ITC 16701 Melford Blvd., Suite 120 Bowie, Maryland, 20715 USA

AMC Reference 20-017/MSG-363 February 28, 2020

The AMC is an aviation industry activity organized by ARINC Industry Activities to assist aviation interests in cooperating to develop shared technical solutions and to establish technical standards. AMC seeks to reduce life-cycle costs for airborne electronics by promoting reliability and improving maintenance and support techniques through the exchange of engineering, maintenance, and associated technical information and the development of voluntary maintenance-related technical standards. A primary means of exchanging avionics maintenance information is the annual Aviation Maintenance Conference conducted under the auspices of the AMC. The AMC consists of representatives from the technical leadership of the air transport avionics maintenance community. The voting membership of AMC consists of those organization representatives of commercial air transport operators that agree to pay an annual fee appropriate to their size and category. These organizations are known as AMC Member Organizations (AMO). Each organization will have one vote. AMC accomplishes its objectives through a number of activities including the annual AMC conference, AMC Steering Committee meetings, a quarterly newsletter PLANE TALK®, task group activities, and liaison with the AEEC and with other aviation or electronic industry activities.

2020 AMC Program

Welcome to the 2020 AMC in Phoenix, Arizona! We are certain that your attendance at the AMC will prove enlightening and beneficial to your organization.

The AMC Program is organized into two major sections. The General Information section contains the information that you will need to get the most benefit from this unique aviation meeting. It includes the schedule of events and abstracts of the technical symposiums that are planned. The AMC Questions by Topic – the most important part of the program – presents the 314 questions submitted by airlines and suppliers that will be discussed at the AMC.

AMC Reminders

The 2020 AMC officially begins with the Opening Session at 8:30am on Monday, May 11, 2020. This will be a joint opening with the AEEC General Session.

Bring an up-to-date business card when you register. Your information will be used in the attendance list in the AMC Report.

The AMC Steering Committee has decided that business casual is the appropriate dress for all AMC events.

All participants are urged to attend the entire program. Every effort will be made to keep the discussion on schedule. However, it is not always possible to accurately predict the amount of time the various subjects will generate.

Joint Opening at the 2019 AMC | AEEC in Prague, Czech Republic

P-1

AEEC | AMC Tampa, Florida May 10-13, 2021

P-2 2020 Conference Registration

Attendance Fees

An AEEC | AMC Badge is required for all activities related to the AEEC | AMC to include the technical meeting, exhibit areas, hospitality suites, etc.

Conference Attendance Fees (cut-off date April 26, 2020) • Non-Member/Non-Sponsor: $1,000.00 • ARINC IA Corporate Sponsors: Complimentary • AEEC, AMC, and FSEMC Members: Complimentary

Refund Policy: • Price Paid: $1,000.00 • Refund: $900.00 • If Cancelled By: Monday, April 20, 2020

* Regardless of the refund amount listed, the amount refunded will never exceed the amount paid. The reduction of $100.00 covers the charges the credit card companies charge us for processing.

On-Site Registration

If you miss the April 26, 2020, deadline for registration, we will be happy to assist you on site.

On-site registration will be located just outside the Phoenix Ballroom.

Hours of on-site operation: • Sunday, May 10, 2020, from 4:00pm – 7:00pm • Monday, May 11, 2020, from 7:00am – 3:00pm • Tuesday, May 12, 2020, from 7:00am – 3:00pm and 5:00pm – 8:00pm • Wednesday, May 13, 2020, from 7:00am – 3:00pm • Thursday, May 14, 2020, from 8:00am – 10:30am

P-3 Transportation Fact Sheet

The Airport

The Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX) has three terminals connected by walkways and Sky Train service. Each terminal has a separate arrivals hall for baggage retrieval. Ground transportation and rental car shuttles all have stops outside the terminals.

You are going to the Sheraton Phoenix Downtown hotel 340 North 3rd Street Phoenix, Arizona 85004

P-4 AMC GENERAL INFORMATION

WELCOME TO THE 2020 AMC P-7

AEEC | AMC KEYNOTE SPEAKER P-8

AMC SCHEDULE OF EVENTS P-9

AMC OPENING SESSION P-10

AMC INDUSTRY SESSION P-10

AMC SYMPOSIUMS P-11

AMC ELECTIONS P-12

AMC STEERING GROUP P-13

AMC GUIDELINES P-14

AMC SOCIAL EVENTS P-17

AMC FOLLOW-UP ITEMS P-19

AMC QUESTIONS BY TOPIC See Next Page

P-5

2020 AMC Questions by Topic

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY 1

TEST SYSTEMS 17

ELECTRICAL POWER 24

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROL 38

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 63

GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & SPECIAL TOOLING 91

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 93

SOFTWARE 106

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS 107

INDICATING SYSTEMS 122

ENGINE SYSTEMS 128

IFE SYSTEMS 139

LIGHTING 142

FUEL SYSTEMS 150

LANDING GEAR 160

FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS 170

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING 172

PNEUMATIC 182

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS 190

OXYGEN 197

DOORS 199

WATER & WASTE 200

OTHERS 210

P-6 Welcome to Phoenix!

Anand Moorthy AMC Chairman American Airlines

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the 2020 Aviation Maintenance Conference (AMC) | Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee (AEEC) General Session in the vibrant city of Phoenix, where Lord Darrell Duppa, one of the original settlers, suggested the city be named as one born from the ruins of a former civilization. The capital of the southwestern state of Arizona in the United States, Phoenix is renowned for its year-round sun, warm temperatures, five-star resorts, world class golf courses, myriad of culinary choices, shopping centers, beautiful hiking, and business acumen that is sure to treat all visitors.

As the previous AMC vice chair serving under chairman Marijan Jozic, who stepped down after seven great years, my hope is to follow in his footsteps and continue to lead a strong Steering Committee that delivers successful and enjoyable conferences year after year. American Airlines is pleased to host this year’s AMC, and as an employee of the largest airline in the world, I’m excited to have you here with us.

Having attended numerous AMC conferences, I have learned much and have built many strong relationships over the years. Many of you who have attended past conferences can relate to the benefits of this professional gathering. This year will be no different. I expect to build on existing relationships and to make new connections so that we can share our thoughts, ideas, and arrive at common solutions.

Our goal is to always improve maintenance and to lower costs without compromising safety, compliance, and reliability. For 71 years, we have organized AMC conferences and maintained our purpose. We ask ourselves what repairs can be developed to increase our operational reliability and reduce cost. Throughout the years we have successfully saved millions of dollars for our airline members, setting standards not only for our members, but for the entire aviation community.

The inaugural Mechanical Maintenance Conference (MMC) was a huge success in Cleveland, Ohio during the Fall of 2017, which prompted our Steering Committee to expand to mechanical team members. The first AMC andMMC conference took place last year in Prague. As a result of our extended ATAs and growing participation, this year we have even more discussion items in Phoenix.

I look forward to this year’s AMC. I am eager to hear from our conference speakers as well as your insights as we explore solutions to the 314 discussion items. Our goal every year is to have more success stories than previous years. Let’s get ready to collaborate in Phoenix and make this 71st AMC | AEEC conference another successful year, as we always do. See you in Phoenix and let us have a great conference.

P-7 2020 AMC | AEEC Keynote Speaker

Mark Loyd Chief Engineer & Managing Director – Engineering Services American Airlines

Mark Loyd is the Chief Engineer and Managing Director of Engineering Services for American Airlines. In this role, Mark oversees operational and heavy maintenance support engineering, vendor and internal shop support engineering, new aircraft certification and factory deliveries, aircraft sales and lease returns, configuration management, tooling engineering, test equipment engineering, materials and process engineering, and PMA approvals.

Mark is a 24-year veteran of American Airlines. He held various engineering and leadership roles at AA including Maintenance Programs, AD programs, Fleet and Component Engineering. He was a DER in Structures and an ODA unit member in conventional and composite structure repairs. He oversaw the introduction of B777-300, A319/A321 Family and B787 family of aircraft into the AA Fleet. Prior to AA, he worked in heavy maintenance MRO’s with experience in Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed aircraft. He also worked at McDonnell-Douglas on the MD-11 program in design and liaison engineering. He is a graduate from Arizona State University’s college of Engineering and Technology.

P-8 2020 AMC Schedule of Events

This is a preliminary schedule of events. Please see the mobile app for the most recent agenda.

Sunday – May 10 1600 Early Registration 1700 Welcome Reception 1900 Registration Closes

Monday – May 11 0700 Registration Opens 0830 Opening Session 1030 Symposium – My Aircraft is Connected: Now What? 1200 Lunch 1330 AMC Discussion 1630 Recess 1700 Visit Suites Tuesday – May 12 0700 Registration Opens 0830 Industry Session (at the conclusion of the Industry Session, discussion items will commence) 1200 Lunch 1330 AMC Discussion 1630 Recess 1800 Showcase 2000 Visit Manufacturer Suites Wednesday – May 13 0700 Registration Opens 0830 AMC Discussion 1200 Lunch 1330 AMC Discussion 1520 Symposium – Shift Away from Hydraulics and Pneumatics to Electrical: How this Impacts Operators and MROs 1630 Recess 1700 Visit Manufacturer Suites Thursday – May 14 0800 Registration Opens 0830 AMC Discussion 12:00 Estimated Completion Time of Discussion Items

Event Locations Sunday Welcome Reception Phoenix Foyer Sunday – Thursday Registration Phoenix Foyer Monday – Thursday AMC Phoenix C Monday – Thursday Daytime Exhibit Phoenix D & E Tuesday Showcase Phoenix D & E

Coffee Breaks Coffee breaks will be provided daily at 1010 and 1500

P-9 2020 AMC Opening Session Monday, May 11 – 8:30am

Welcome and Introductions

AMC Chairman Anand Moorthy American Airlines AEEC Chairman Robert Swanson FedEx

Keynote Speakers

Mark Loyd Chief Engineer & Managing Director - Engineering Services American Airlines

Awards

Volare Awards Mike Rockwell ARINC Industry Activities

AMC Awards Sheila Liddle Southwest Airlines AMC Vice Chairperson

AEEC Awards Jessie Turner The Boeing Company AEEC Chairperson-Elect

2020 AMC Industry Session Tuesday, May 12 – 8:30am

Session Overview

AMC Chairman Anand Moorthy, American Airlines

Future Concepts for Maintenance Subcommittee

EDS Electronic Distribution of Software Ted Patmore, Delta Air Lines TPS Test Program Set Ted Patmore, Delta Air Lines AT-ASB Air Transport-Avionics Service Bulletin Ozgur Arayici, Turkish Airlines Technic

AMC Steering Committee Election Overview

AMC Exec. Secretary Sam Buckwalter

P-10 2020 AMC Symposiums

Monday, May 11, 2020 – 10:30am

My Aircraft is Connected: Now What?

My Aircraft is Connected, Now What? (or Keeping Up My Connectivity with the Jones’s) at the AMC in Phoenix. Airlines will discuss their success stories in using aircraft connectivity for improved operations and/or their strategy for keeping up with communication technology. Participant airlines will discuss their biggest operational wins with the level of aircraft connectivity and pitfalls along the way while dealing with the three to five-year useful life of internet technology and changes in the SATCOM business.

Wednesday, May 13, 2020 – 3:20pm

Shift Away from Hydraulics and Pneumatics to Electrical: How this Impacts Operators and MROs

This symposium will discuss the pros and cons of new age and legacy aircraft components, including reliability, predictive maintenance technology, tooling and test equipment, OEM support, and more. Speakers will address new repair challenges as well as reliability and repair cost benefits for old versus new systems.

The AMC Symposiums are intended to be interactive. Following the conclusion of the presentations, questions and discussions are strongly encouraged, as time permits.

P-11 2020 AMC Elections

AMC Steering Committee elections will be held for the following positions whose terms end in 2020:

Africa/Middle East Region El Al Israel Airlines Caribbean, Central & South American (CAR-AC-AS) Azul Member at large Lufthansa FedEx

If you are an AMC Member Organization (AMO) and you are interested in standing for election to the AMC Steering Committee, please contact Sam Buckwalter, AMC Executive Secretary: [email protected].

The AMC Steering Committee plans, organizes, and directs AMC activities including the annual AMC conference, publication of PLANE TALK®, establishing and monitoring standard setting activities, and acting on behalf of AMC in matters related to AMC activities or to industry interests in avionics maintenance. The AMC Steering Committee will authorize the AMC technical work program and rule on the adoption of proposed ARINC Standards and supplements to existing ARINC Standards.

The AMC Steering Committee shall be comprised of 11 voting representatives of the AMOs elected to the AMC Steering Committee and a non-voting secretariat provided by ARINC IA. AMOs represented on the AMC Steering Committee shall be elected by the AMOs.

To ensure global representation, the AMOs elected to the AMC Steering Committee should include at least one AMO from each of the following regions: North America; Caribbean, Central, and South America; Europe; Africa and Middle East; and Asia Pacific. AMOs will be attached to a specific geographical region according to the ICAO definitions.

For more information, contact Sam Buckwalter, AMC Executive Secretary.

P-12 2020 AMC Steering Committee

AMC STEERING COMMITTEE ROSTER

Anand Moorthy American Airlines AMC Chair Sheila Liddle Southwest Airlines AMC Vice Chair Quentin Souleau Air France/KLM

Johann Espinosa Air France/KLM

Ricardo de Azevedo e Souza Azul Linhas Aereas

Joe Falkenbach Delta Air Lines

Rick Dupree Delta Air Lines

Dan Ganor El Al Israel Airlines

Ted McFann FedEx

Kazuyoshi Kanno Japan Airlines

Karsten Montebaur Lufthansa Technik

Juergen Peschutter Lufthansa Technik

Jacque Mallard Southwest

Ozgur Arayici Turkish Airlines

Dean Conner United Airlines

Sharon Gradwohl United Airlines

Sam Buckwalter SAE ITC, ARINC Industry Activities

*Each airline organization on the AMC Steering Committee receives one vote.

P-13 2020 AMC Guidelines

Agenda – This program is the main document for the AMC. It is provided on the AMC websites several weeks in advance of the meeting. Please bring a copy with you to the meeting.

Seating – Airlines and other avionics users are seated in the center section of the meeting room. Manufacturers, suppliers, and others who are involved in responding to discussion items are seated in the wings of the meeting room.

The 2019 AMC & MMC was held in Prague, Czech Republic. The 70th annual

meeting was attended by 32 airlines, and six airframe manufacturers.

The total registered attendance was 629 attendees from 28 countries.

Delegates seated at the 2019 AMC & MMC in Prague, Czech Republic

AMC Conference Room Layout

P-14 2020 AMC Guidelines

Promptness and Courtesy

• Please be prompt for the start of each session. Pay careful attention to the start times published in the AMC Schedule of Events.

• Persons arriving late for the AMC Opening Session are asked to refrain from entering the ballroom during keynote remarks.

• Persons with cellular phones are requested to turn off the ringers for these devices during the meeting sessions. Use of these devices is not permitted in the meeting rooms.

Meeting Conduct – Anyone wishing to comment on a discussion item or raise a question during the discussion, please observe the following procedure:

1. Hold up the place marker to obtain the microphone. Wait to be recognized by the 120o moderator.

2. When recognized by the moderator, state your name and organization.

3. Speak clearly and distinctly into the microphone.

The Conference Microphone System is activated by pressing the button on the base of the microphone unit. The microphone will illuminate a red ring on the “stalk” when activated. The person speaking should be 8 to 20 inches away from the microphone stalk and within the shaded area in the diagram. When finished speaking, pressing the button on the base will deactivate the microphone, and the red ring light will extinguish. The microphones on the floor stands are similar, except the button is on the actual microphone.

If a microphone is left open (red light illuminated) without a person speaking into it, please press the button to turn off the microphone unit. This will prevent unwanted sounds in the audio system and allow other speakers to be heard clearly.

Manufacturers are requested to follow the agenda when a discussion item they are planning to answer is being introduced and to move to a microphone so as to be ready to respond. This will significantly help to keep the meeting flowing smoothly.

Language and Terminology – The AMC is conducted in the English language. Since English is not the native language for many AMC participants, please keep the use of slang, vernacular, or colloquial expressions to a minimum and speak slowly. If something is said that you do not understand, please wave your hand and the moderator will ask the speaker to repeat the comment. P-15 2020 AMC Guidelines

AMC discussions typically generate a large amount of technical jargon and acronyms. Please keep the use of acronyms to a minimum. Use only widely accepted acronyms. For example, "INS" is generally well known as the acronym for the Inertial Navigation System; however, "GBL" probably is not used to denote "Gyro Bearing Lubricant" in many organizations.

Since the AMC is all about communication and is an international meeting, the AMC Steering Committee encourages all attendees to participate. The person sitting next to you at the AMC may have that one bit of magic information that will solve your problem or offer a new perspective. Take time to meet that person, listen to what they have to say, and thank them for participating.

The moderators take additional care to ensure the use of these guidelines. Participants are encouraged to inform the moderator if you do not understand the discussion due to a language barrier.

For cases where the moderator feels that the question or response is not clear, the moderator will ask the respondent to repeat the response more slowly. In addition, manufacturers should be willing to restate a question to ensure a clear understanding for everyone.

Discussion Item Procedure

• The moderator will direct your attention to each new item number. If the question is complex, a brief summary may be made. • When it appears that a group of operators have similar problems, the moderator may ask for a show of hands to avoid redundant comments and to expedite discussion. • Airlines and suppliers are encouraged to provide concise verbal responses, preferably not to exceed one minute. • A copy of written responses should be given to the AMC Executive Secretary. • All written responses must be read by the submitter to be included in the report. • If solutions must be worked out after the conference, please send a copy of the appropriate documentation to the AMC Secretary at ARINC Industry Activities. This information will be published in PLANE TALK®.

NOTE: For delegates that are not native English speakers, it is imperative that discussions on the conference floor be spoken clearly, without colloquialisms, and loudly for all to hear.

Information for Manufacturers – New information related to improvements to existing equipment or new designs may be of interest to users. Manufacturers who wish to include such information in AMC discussions are asked to make prior arrangements with the chairman. Manufacturers are asked to concentrate on technical aspects of the information and refrain from giving a "sales pitch" during AMC presentations or discussion items. Sales related comments are appropriate during breaks, at the Exhibit/Reception, or in hospitality suites.

AMC Report – The AMC Report will be prepared following the meeting and will be available at:

https://www.aviation-ia.com/product-categories/amc-meeting-reports-and-presentations

P-16 2020 AMC Social Events

AEEC | AMC Welcome Reception

What a great way to start your evening – even better – what a great way to begin a week’s event. Meet up with old friends, make new friends, and enjoy the food and entertainment.

The AEEC | AMC Reception is planned for 5:00pm until 7:00pm Sunday evening, leaving you plenty of time to enjoy the nightlife of the city. The reception will be held in the Phoenix Ballroom Foyer.

This wonderful social event is sponsored by many companies. You are encouraged to join as a Reception Sponsor. In recognition of the reception sponsors, each company brand will be promoted on our website, at the reception, and special thanks given during the conference.

If you would like further information on joining the sponsors of the Welcome Reception, please contact Vanessa Mastros at [email protected].

Sponsorship

ARINC Industry Activities will be organizing and managing all of the AEEC General Session and AMC Conference activities (e.g., technical programs, welcome receptions, breakfasts, coffee breaks, lunches, hospitality suites, award programs, and more).

Coffee Breaks

Refreshments during the morning and afternoon breaks are provided by break sponsoring organizations. Morning and afternoon refreshments include regular coffee, decaffeinated coffee, tea, water, and a small snack.

Break sponsors receive recognition in our Mobile App and on our web site. Additionally, break sponsors may give a short presentation or provide a video just before the break release.

Coffee breaks will be provided at 10:10am and 3:00pm.

Lunch

As a convenience to the attendees and to avoid any unnecessary delays in returning to the conference, a buffet style lunch is possible through lunch sponsoring organizations.

Lunch sponsors receive recognition on our web site, during the event itself, and during the conference. Lunch sponsors may also provide a video to be played during the lunch break.

Lunch will be provided at 12:00pm Monday through Wednesday.

P-17 2020 AMC Social Events

Showcase

The Tuesday Evening Showcase will be held on Tuesday, May 12, 2020, at 6:00pm.

AMC Hospitality Suites

All attendees are invited to visit the Hospitality Suites!

The AMC Steering Committee encourages all airline participants to use Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday evenings as an opportunity to visit with the industry suppliers that are supporting the AMC. We ask airline attendees to refrain from accepting invitations for dinners, tours, or other activities that will take them outside the hotel where the supplier hospitality suites are located.

A list of hospitality suites is available on the AEEC and AMC event webpages (https://www.aviation-ia.com/content/hospitality-suites).

AMC blocks several suites at the hotel. Persons desiring a suite should contact:

Vanessa Mastros Business Manager Tel +1 240-334-2575 [email protected]

AMC Shipping

AMC has selected Agility Fairs and Events Logistics as the official freight carrier for the handling of ground and air shipments, as well as storage, delivery, pickup, and reshipment of materials.

For further information, please contact:

Paula Collaco 905-612-7158 [email protected]

P-18 AMC Review

AMC Follow-Up Items

The responses to most AMC discussion items result in a solution being accepted and the discussion item being closed. The following list identifies those discussion items still unresolved at the time of publication of this AMC Report. Airlines and suppliers are requested to contact the AMC Executive Secretary if an open item has been satisfactorily closed.

ITEM SECTION SUBMITTER SUPPLIER ACTION Boeing to develop an 1 17-016 Avionics Philosophy ETD Boeing extraction that prints in pdf. Lord/Airbus to provide the 2 19-036 Test Systems LHT Lord updated CMM Ultra to provide quote on 3 19-040 Test Systems AFR/KLM Ultra-Electronics TSDP. Reduce the NFF rate on the 4 18-056 Autoflight System ETD Thales ELAC. Moog to resolve EMCU high 5 19-045 Autoflight System JAL Moog/Boeing power failure. Boeing to support fleet replacement. Honeywell to provide root 6 19-047 Autoflight System KAL Honeywell cause and countermeasure. Airbus to root cause of fault 7 19-055 Flight Controls THY Airbus LGCIU. Airbus and Liebherr to find 8 19-057 Flight Controls DAL Liebherr cause of water ingress Collins to provide path for 9 19-059 Flight Controls LHT Collins Aerospace repair of Electro Hydraulic Servo Valve. Boeing to resolve issue with 10 19-062 Flight Controls LHT Boeing design responsibility regarding ballscrew assembly. 11 19-063 Flight Controls UAL Boeing Boeing to develop tooling Boeing to improve lead-time 12 19-064 Flight Controls UAL Boeing for replacement parts. Airbus to provide allowable 13 19-071 Flight Controls UAL Airbus Substitutes. Parker to provide CMM Rudder 14 17-025 Flight Controls LHT Parker Hannifin PCU. Parker to provide inspection 15 17-026 Flight Controls LHT Parker Hannifin criteria for elevator PCUs Boeing and Collins Aerospace 16 19-073 Electrical Power VIR Collins Aerospace to report on update to VFSG. Collins to resolve the problem 17 19-074 Electrical Power AFR KLM Collins Aerospace with input shaft shear Resolve the burnt circuit board 18 18-040 Electrical Power ETD UTAS on GAPCU. Collins to resolve issue with 19 19-083 Electrical Power LHT Collins Aerospace IDG Governor Failures during cold operation. 19-090 LHT Resolve low time HPV 20 Pneumatic Liebherr 19-095 UAL Microswitch failures Boeing and Jet2 to monitor 21 19-092 Pneumatic EXS Parker/Boeing Belled Air isolation to see if this was short-lived issues.

P-19 AMC Review

ITEM SECTION SUBMITTER SUPPLIER ACTION Resolve PRVC Diaphragm 22 19-094 Pneumatic LHT Collins Aerospace Ruptures Honeywell to release Service 17-041 AAL 23 Pneumatic Honeywell Bulletin to improve 19-130 Jet2 Temperature Control Valves. Collins Aerospace and Airbus 24 17-045 Pneumatic AFR KLM Airbus/Collins to resolve issue with HP Regulating Valve. Whippany Whippany to provide support 25 17-047 Pneumatics AFR KLM Actuation System to repair Rotary Actuator. Honeywell to provide root and 26 19-096 Communications ANA Honeywell solution to RFM failure and then associated SB. 19-098 Rockwell to provide root cause 27 Communications ANA Rockwell Collins 18-125 and corrective action. 19-101 Boeing to speed up SB to 17-117 27 Communications KLM/AFR Boeing install drip shield over HF 18-128 receiver. 19-102 Honeywell to provide more 29 19-104 Communications KAL Honeywell information with regards to ELT lithium batteries. Collins to update CMM HPA- 30 19-106 Communications ANA Collins Aerospace 901 HP Amplifier by June 2019. Collins to ensure the EFB Docking Station CMM is 31 19-108 Communications AFR KLM Collins Aerospace updated with correct CMM it should not have RITEC CMM. Boeing to pursue solution for 32 19-113 Communications VIR Boeing the existing TCS system or WWU going forward. Boeing to improve the AMM 33 19-115 Communications VIR Boeing procedures regarding troubleshooting core network. Supplier to provide a mean of 34 18-150 Software NAX All electronic distribution of software…no more floppies. Collins Aerospace Collins and Boeing to resolve 35 19-124 Air Conditioning ANA Boeing FCV Torque motor. Remove the requirement for Collins Aerospace 36 19-131 Environmental KLM AFR ESS testing at RTS. Should be Boeing part of production testing. Airlines would prefer a more 37 19-132 Environmental KLM AFR Collins Aerospace cost-effective solution to the air filter replacement. Collins to provide detail root 38 19-134 Environmental LHT Collins Aerospace cause analysis Collins to provide detail root 39 19-135 Environmental LHT Collins Aerospace cause analysis Spherea to work with Parker 40 19-138 Fuel System KAL Parker/ Spherea and KLM to resolve issue. Ontic and KAL to follow up and 41 19-140 Fuel System KAL Ontic see if switch replacement works reduce delays. P-20 AMC Review

ITEM SECTION SUBMITTER SUPPLIER ACTION Airbus to results of investigation of the Fuel Valve 42 17-142 Fuel System DAL Airbus/Zodiac Single Motor actuator reliability. Airbus to research 43 19-151 Navigation ETD Airbus consideration for retrofit of probes on the A320. 44 17-079 Navigation DAL UTAS/All Provide HMS for Pitot Tubes. Boeing to certify the -006 45 18-097 Navigation ETD Boeing Honeywell TCAS computer on B777. Continue investigation of Loss Collins 46 19-169 Navigation VIR of Mode S and report to Aerospace/Boeing analysis. GE and Boeing to work on SB 47 19-171 Navigation JAL GE Aviation for MCDU. ANA to work with Honeywell Honeywell 48 19-175 Navigation ANA and Woodward to resolve Woodward DAA-4A Drive Unit issue. Collins Aerospace to resolve 49 19-178 Navigation ANA Collins Aerospace the nuisance messages on Weather Radar to reduce NFF. Collins to investigate establishing limits for acceptable amounts of 50 19-181 Navigation VIR Collins Aerospace corrosion and/or developing repair procedures for corrosion removal. Collins and Boeing to complete 51 19-182 Navigation ANA Collins Aerospace root cause analysis. Collins and Boeing to release 52 19-183 Navigation ANA Collins Aerospace SB to address A3 module reliability. Safran to provide updated 53 19-188 Landing Gear AFR KLM Safran CMM Safran to resolve issue with 54 19-190 Landing Gear AFR KLM Safran water ingress. ITT and Bombardier to resolve 55 19-204 Engine Systems ANA ITT Aerospace issue door actuator Request that the 90-day ULB requirement be satisfied by stocking the recorder part number separate from the ULB 56 17-ULB Indicating Systems All Airlines Boeing and the recorder interchangeability be based on the Form, Fit and Function of the recorder. Thales to provide process to 57 18-169 Indicating System AFR/KLM Thales replace photocells. Diehl and KAL to work 58 19-224 Lighting KAL Diehl together on EPSU Boeing and Jamco speed up 59 19-225 Lighting JAL Boeing design change for lavatory ECU.

P-21 AMC Review

ITEM SECTION SUBMITTER SUPPLIER ACTION ANA to send lock brake to 60 19-228 Nacelles & Thrust ANA Honeywell Honeywell and monitor the situation. Waiting on CMM to be 61 19-230 Nacelles & Thrust AFR KLM Collins Aerospace updated. Boeing Collins and Boeing to work 62 19-231 Nacelles & Thrust UAL Collins Aerospace with UAL to increase repair. Collins to provide technical 63 19-232 Nacelles & Thrust UAL Collins Aerospace update to overhaul inlet cowl system. 19-238 Adams Right to provide Boeing 64 17-035 Equipment/Furnishing ANA solenoid rebuild and/or Adam Right 14-264 replacement. Airbus to work with Adams 65 18-227 Equipment/Furnishing Dal Adams Right Right to provide technical manual for the CDLS system. Boeing and Ipeco to follow up 66 19-239 Equipment/Furnishing ANA Boeing and Ipeco on possibility of SB. Lacobucci Lacobucci to issue a notice of 67 19-247 Equipment/Furnishing EVA Boeing change. Waiting on submittal. Collins to improve reliability of 68 17-147 Equipment/Furnishing DAL Collins Aerospace plunger in coffee maker. Thales and Korean to work 69 19-258 IFE Systems KAL Thales together on resolving QSEB. Panasonic to work with Korean 70 19-259 IFE Systems KAL Panasonic in discontinuation of minor part for IFE LRU. Boeing to improve Installation 71 19-262 Other KLM AFR Boeing drawing. Meggitt to investigate 72 19-275 Other TAP Meggitt corrosion on the hex wrench.

P-22 REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 1

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

1 Component Shop Data All All All All UAL

United Airlines is requesting all repair vendors to make shop findings reports available electronically, i.e., Excel or other electronic format.

United Engineering uses this data specifically for component health analysis, and with many vendors this piece part data/shop findings are only available via PDF. United is requesting a more accessible means of analyzing this data, specifically in spreadsheet format, for easier data analysis.

Operators and repair vendors, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

2 ICA for Service Bulletins DAL

Oftentimes OEMs release Service Bulletins (SB) without incorporating the SB in its respective CMM. When the SB is not incorporated, there can be new PNs (LRUs or subcomponents) listed in the SB that are not listed in the current CMM revision.

If the post modification is sent for repair, there will be no Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). OEMs are often are unwilling to cooperate or provide a very long lead time in incorporating the post modification PNs into the CMM. This creates operational issues for airliners when post-modification PNs come off the A/C and there is no manual for the post-modification PNs to maintain.

Can the SB serve as ICA for post modification units until new revision of the CMM has been released?

Operators and vendors, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

3 Predictive Maintenance Airbus A350 AFR/KLM AFR

This question is related to AMC 2019 item 2 – The NFF Dilemma on Predictive Maintenance.

Some A350 modifications are free of charge only if the component is found failed in shop with particular failure code. Unfortunately, due to maintenance predictive removals, the failure code never appears on the AiRTHM report and we are obliged to deal with OEM to prove the reason of removals.

How Airbus can work with the OEM to deal with this issue?

Airbus, OEM, other operators, comments please?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 2

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

4 Lack of Transparency on Airman-web All Airbus All All ETD Decommissioning

In July 2019, certain operators were provided with an Airbus Webinar session on Skywise Health Monitoring (SHM), which will replace Airman-web. The new SHM will only run on Skywise Core, meaning that if an operator declines to get on board Skywise Core, then there will be no chance to access the Airman-web successor.

Over the recent A32X/330/340/350 Airbus Symposium held in Frankfurt in October 2019, several operators complained about the lack of information on Airman-web’s decommissioning dates and its future replacement, along with the economic conditions that will apply onwards.

Due to the lack of transparency in the information that Airbus is providing to all operators in regards to the timelines, availability, and financial conditions in which SHM will be available, we would like Airbus to release an official Operators Information Transmission (OIT) in order to announce to all operators the timelines and conditions on which Airman-web will be replaced by SHM.

For more information, refer to Airbusworld FAIR 19.0282.

Operators comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

5 What is Happening to Technical All Honeywell All All ETD Publications? Thales Collins Aerospace

The below three cases summarize a chain of events and issues faced by Etihad over the past years, proving that it is becoming more and more difficult to operators to access the Technical Publications from the OEMs.

HONEYWELL:

Referring to AMC item 17-011 closed during Prague AMC 2019 without solution.

In several occasions, documents are not available for immediate download on Honeywell Technical Publication website. Instead, the operator has to fill in a form and justify the reason for downloading the document.

Several days after filling the form, the operator receives an e-mail confirming that the publication is available for download. This is highly inconvenient, as the Publication is required at the exact time that the operator looks for it. It is absolutely worthless to be granted access to download a Technical Publication several days later, when the issue is already solved, or the document is no longer required.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 3

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Figure 1: Example of Honeywell Technical Document Not Available for Download

A recent case happened to Etihad in July 2019 (Figure 1) when we tried to access the Honeywell ATC transponder model TRA-100B technical documentation, as the Component Maintenance Manual and Maintenance Manual were not available for immediate download.

After this event, we complained again to Honeywell reps and they advised us to send a complete list of Honeywell components installed in our fleet to the e-mail [email protected] so they could make sure the related publications to those components were released and available in the website. The list was sent in August 2019 and in September 2019, Etihad tried unsuccessfully to access the CMM of Wx Radar Transmitter Receiver PN 930-2000-001, so the strategy of sending the e-mail to Tech Pubs was completely unsuccessful.

Since 2017, Honeywell has promised a final fix at the AMC for next year and in AMC 2019, Honeywell stated that a final solution was expected Q4 2020.

• Can Honeywell enlighten us with the latest efforts on this subject?

COLLINS:

On the 13th of August, Etihad requested download access to Collins publication #523-0826086, which is the CMM for FOMAX computer PN 822-3613-100. On the initial reply, Collins stated that it would take weeks for them to grant this access, as the publication was classified as export controlled.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 4

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Figure 2: Example of Collins Technical Document Not Available for Download

On the 27th of August, Collins replied: “It has been confirmed that publication # 523-0826086 will remain as export controlled and as a consequence will not be available to view/download on the portal. We can provide the publication via hard copy (CD or Paper) at no charge, but will need to file for an export license. In order to start this process, we will require a no charge PO.”

On the other side, Etihad is perfectly able to download Collins publication #523-0825032, which is the CMM for FOMAX initial PN 822-3543-100. But now Collins will not allow the download of FOMAX new PN 822-3613-100.

• Can Collins explain why now the CMM of the latest Part Number of the FOMAX computer cannot be downloaded?

THALES:

Back on 18 June 2015, Thales published CIL number 77 titled: “Evolution of Technical Publication website on THALES Customer OnLine.” This CIL communicated among others the following changes: • Watermarks will be added to every technical documentation downloaded from the Thales website to ensure traceability of the distribution. • Download of CMM and SB will be available through a link sent to your email address valid for 1 day.

On the 28th Feb 2019, Thales released Customer Information Letter (CIL) number 93 with the title of “New Technical Publication Website Functionalities”. The last sentence of this CIL says: Thales will start deployment on March 20th, 2019 with a new website allowing both Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) download and CMM viewer access. At the end of the adaptation period the CMM download option will be disabled and all customers will be switched to a CMM viewer mode only. You will still have the option to download Service Bulletin’s (SB), Service Information Letters (SIL) and Customer Information Letters (CIL).

Instead of adding a huge red watermark on every CMM since 2015, Thales has completely restricted the download of their CMMs. This makes the consultation of a Thales CMM only possible thru a computer with internet access, making the consultation of this valuable technical documentation off line impossible. In the long term, this makes it more difficult for third party repair stations to repair Thales components, forcing customers to take the component to the OEM for repair.

• What are the reasons that made Thales take such an extreme decision, taking into account that currently no other major avionics supplier puts in practice such measures? • Which are the legalities involved in such practice? If an airline flies an aircraft with a Thales component, it shall be fully entitled to have OFF LINE access to the technical documentation that describes the functionality of this components and how to repair it.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 5

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Question to Airbus and Boeing: • How do you allow the OEMs that equip your aircraft to carry out and continue with these practices?

Operators comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

6 Technical Documentation All PN Honeywell A350 All AFR/KLM AFR CMM/CMP

Honeywell issues for some A350 P/Ns, two different types of CMPs, a light version and a full version. For example, for the OVCU P/N 2119332-00, there is a light version CMP 213406 and a full version CMP 213409.

As a result, we found that: • The referenced CMP in the Airbus documentation is the CMP in its lighter version. • The CMP used to release component to service is always the full CMP. • The CMP provided to operators is only the CMP in its lighter version and Honeywell systematically opposes providing the full version of the CMP.

This situation is very ambiguous from a technical and airworthiness point of view: • The CMP in its light version is not enough to ensure an effective technical follow-up, to check the relevance of repairs and costs, as well as the traceability of replaced components; • Our quality assurance department cannot confirm that the CMP used for equipment re-certification is the approved CMP in our document base and Airbus documentation, resulting in litigation and a decrease in our quality of service. • The OEMs ask us to be very rigorous in document tracking by requiring us to have the latest updates of the CMM or CMP used for the repair, but they don't give us the means to do so and put us at odds with the regulations.

More generally, operators intervene in the reiteration circuit to perform a final check before installing equipment on aircraft and, as such, they need documentation that is as complete as possible; if this condition is not met, the operator will not be able to fully play its role in airworthiness and flight safety.

Airbus, Honeywell, other operators, comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

7 Obsolescence All All All All UAL

OEMs often declare units BER due to obsolescence of parts. This is an ongoing issue and it appears OEMs do not always make an effort to find replacement parts. Why have the OEMs stopped supplying the actual part number of common items and just supply their in-house part number?

Boeing, Airbus, operator, and OEM comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 6

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

8 Obsolescence Definition Understanding Thales All Airbus DAL Avionics Platforms Airbus

In carryover from discussion around Item 12 from 2019 conference, DL has been informed by Thales that certain subcomponents are now classified as “strategic parts” and as such are N/A to standards set forth by Airbus SSC. In doing so, the price for these components are now equal to or greater than the cost associated with sending the entire LRU into Thales for repair.

Thales has created a new definition for the industry, one that does not exist in any Airbus (or Boeing) support agreement. The intent to price these “strategic parts” needed for top level assys at costs greater that the components alone is being interpreted as a thinly veiled effort to reclaim Thales component work that operators (and MROs) are doing and to further prevent these operators and repair stations from working target platforms of components.

Have any other operators experienced this with Thales and if so, has it been resolved?

Thales – please advise.

Airbus – please comment on Thales actions.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

9 B717 Obsolescence and On-Going Support Boeing B717 DAL

Delta, QantasLink, Hawaiian, and Volotea are the only renaming B717 operators. Similar to the MD90/95 platform, the B717 is experiencing similar obsolescence/supplier reluctance to continue to offer support. Boeing has previously noted support to ARINC Report 662 for obsolescence management. What is Boeing doing to address?

To what end has Boeing gone to notify their supply base of the need to continue support? Delta continually is going back to Boeing fleet program managers to press back on suppliers and “remind” them of their commitment to support. Delta is willing to work directly with suppliers to resolve obsolescence issues; what Delta is finding is that the first answer from suppliers is “no support/end of life/product obsolescence” and only after having Boeing insert themselves to get a more positive response.

This question can be applied to all aircraft type – Boeing as well as Airbus. Time and time again the airlines have to turn to the manufacturers to gently (or harshly) remind the suppliers of their support commitments. One would think after decades of hearing this request (or similar) that the message would be received loud and clear.

Boeing, other operators (and even Airbus) comment please?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

10 COTS Commercially Available Parts All All All UAL

In the past, OEMs provided part numbers for commercially available parts, but over the last few years, the OEMs have been removing manufacturers’ part numbers from their CMM-IPL and replacing them with their own part numbers. When asked for documentation to support purchasing from local sources, the OEMs decline to provide the manufacturer’s part number. This places an undue burden on the operators in obtaining parts for even the most generic parts.

Boeing, Airbus, operators and OEMs comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 7

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

11 Repair Capability All Liebherr Aerospace All All UAL

Liebherr only has one facility in the US. This facility has no in country service capability and only serves as a liaison between US-based customers and their European repair facility. All SRUs need to go back to Europe for repair. Repairs sent to Europe have long turn times (greater than 6 months).

Under the Airbus agreement, suppliers are required to have US-based repair facilities.

Airbus, operators, and Liebherr comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

12 Repair Stations All Airbus All All UAL

Under the Airbus agreement, suppliers are required to have US-based repair facilities. Some of these facilities are only able to do testing and/or replacing of PCB in units. They have no level II or III repair capability. Units that require more than testing are required to be sent back to Europe, leading to long lead times (90+ days). Examples of vendors include Liebherr, BAE, Safran, Barfield, and Thales.

Airbus, operators, and OEMs comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

13 Liquid Fire- All All All 26 AFR/KLM AFR Extinguishing Agent Extinguishers Bromotrifluoromethane Engine and (CBrF3) Cargo

Following regulation (EC) 2037/2000 and (EU) 744/2010, the halon has been prohibited from 2018 in EU on new installations. While still available and usable, the suppliers are progressively stopping the commercialization. In 2040, all halon exploitation will be stopped. Air France already faces difficulties to procure halon.

On a short-term basis, OEM, airframers, operators, do you have suggestions to keep on buying halon before 2040 despite the low production?

On a long-term basis, how do European airlines plan to operate their fleet when halon stops being procurable? Can airframers provide a list of certified suppliers?

OEM, airframers, comment please?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 8

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

14 No PMA Assist Letter to Sell AFR/KLM AFR Parts after OEMs Merge

With the merge of OEMs, piece parts are sometimes difficult to obtain. The new group may state that they do not have the PMA Assist Letter to sell the piece parts, and they are not owners of the Drawings and the Design of the part. Yet Illustrated Part List states that these parts are procurable, and the NHA can be bought or repaired in their shop.

Examples:

Collins former UTAS P/N 0871LD2 We do not hold PMA on P/Ns 00871-2106-3700 & 00871-2079-0003 and we are not able to obtain PMA on these parts. You will need to contact the OEM for procurement of these parts. I am very sorry for the inconvenience this has caused.

Safran P/N 7700198 In response to this matter, I can advise you that because of a recent FAA ruling regarding the flowdown of PMA (Parts Manufacturer Authority) from a line replaceable unit (LRU) to its components, I must advise you and all of our colleagues within WWS and Safran Aerosystems Services that the PN 7800116-series components no longer have PMA, and we cannot sell them to any customer as a spare part. Further, I must advise you that WWS does not have any engineering drawings that list alternate products for any of the PN 7800116-series components for the Pn 7700198 actuator assembly! Because of this, we cannot recommend or promote any alternate products to our customers!

The only two (2) options that our customers have if they should need to repair their PN 7700198 actuator assemblies is 1) the can send the concerned unit to WWS for repair, or 2) they can purchase a complete PN 7700198 actuator assembly as a replacement for their failed unit.

Air France expects continuity of service regarding Piece parts and any service described in the PSAA and SPSA when OEMs are merging under one brand.

Other operators, have you been facing similar issues?

Airbus, Boeing, comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 9

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

15 EFB Docking Station 822-2773-201 Collins A350 46 AFR/KLM AFR Documentation Aerospace

This question is related to AMC 2019 item 108.

The Docking Station provided by Collins is not repaired and recertified by Collins with CMM 462001 (as per Airbus IPD information) but by RITEC with its own CMM ref 100702, which is not available to operators.

AFR received a letter from Collins issued in April 2018 stating that the approved document is CMM 100702 REV D dated March 28, 2018; however, FAA Form part 145 issued by RITEC end 2019 mentions that the DS are now recertified with RITEC CMM 100702 dated January 11, 2019.

We note that no revision of the CMM is mentioned on the ARC while a REV D has been mentioned in Collins' approval letter.

Knowing that RITEC CMM is not available, we consider that operators should know which RITEC CMM revision is currently approved by Collins and should be informed of the purpose of these revisions through Collins CMM 462001.

AFR, as an operator, is requesting to have the RITEC CMM available.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 10

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Collins, Airbus, other operators comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

16 Lightning Strikes Significant Increase N/A Boeing B787 XX ETD in the Number of Events

Etihad operates a mix fleet of Airbus A32X/330/380 and Boeing B777/787.

Out of the abovementioned fleets, the B787 with currently 36 units in operation is the aircraft accounting the higher number of lightning strikes per Flight hour in comparison with the rest of Etihad operated fleets.

Just in the period from January until March 2019, Etihad B787 fleet suffered six lighting strikes, causing considerable damages and AOGs. This was all communicated to Boeing via Service Request # 4-4413722829.

Has Boeing received similar amount of lightning strikes events on B787 fleet from other operators?

According to Boeing records, is the B787 aircraft suffering more lightning strikes than other Boeing aircraft (B737/747/777…)?

Has Boeing an explanation for the high number of lightning strikes events suffered on Etihad B787 fleet?

Operators comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 11

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

17 Request for Collins N/A Collins B787 All KLM/AFR KLM Communication System Aerospace

Over the year, probably like many other operators, KLM Engineering has several technical questions and issues with OEM Collins. Most are initiated and handled by e-mail through the local rep. Often it takes a long time for Collins to reply, with ‘reminders’ as a result. This is undesirable and time consuming.

Boeing has its “Service Request” system, which has a clear, traceable item reference number and includes hard response dates and updates.

KLM would like to have a similar communication system with Collins.

Note: this was also a topic during the Madrid 2019 conference.

• Did Collins ever consider such a ‘SR’ system, or is planning other to do so in the (near) future?

Collins and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

18 Consistent Understanding of Divers All All LHT DLH Design Deficiency

In reference to Item 207 from 2019: It remains unclear when to consider a specific phenomenon of a component as “Design Deficiency” if it is fixed through the introduction of a new configuration and the simultaneous declaration of the old one as “obsolete.”

LHT would like to know if there is a consistent understanding for the term “Design Fault” between OEMs and aircraft manufacturers within the framework of the applicable Product Support Agreement. How relevant are TFUs/FTDs describing the field problem and the final fix for the classification as design faults?

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 12

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

19 Airbus Storage All, e.g., Airbus and all Airbus All LHT DLH Information 25002A010001 OEMs (e.g., (iSpec 2200) Liebherr for 25002A010001)

Storage limits were missing in the CMM, but on the certificate from the OEM there were storage limits mentioned. According to Lufthansa Technik knowledge all storage limitations should be listed in the CMM.

After back-and-forth discussions, Airbus agreed that according to ATA iSpec 2200, the storage life limitation information is now again possible to be shared in the CMM. However, Airbus states “This new rule is not applicable to previously published CMMs and no retrofit will be launched by AIRBUS.”

This is not understood and not accepted by Lufthansa Technik. All relevant storage data should be available in one source, which is the approved data for this component and its maintenance and handling incl. storage (CMM).

Years ago, when Airbus launched the MSD document, this was not accepted in the industry and the iSpec 2200 steering group decided in Ballot CR-2016-03 that all storage data should be in the CMM.

Other airlines, please share your opinion if you think that storage data should be available in one source or not (CMM)?

Airbus, please comment, why no retrofit of the CMM was done yet and if a retrofit can be expected in the future?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

20 Component Obsolescence Road Map All All All All UAL

United Airlines recently learned of a component going obsolete at the end of this year, due to piece part availability. Although the notice for obsolescence had been published over a decade ago, the current engineering team nor the direct OEM team working support with United, were unaware of the component’s obsolescence this year.

United is asking all OEMs and repair shops to strategically develop road maps for component obsolescence with a target date. Obsolescence is driven for a certain reason, e.g., piece part availability, repair support, etc., so United is asking for a clear timeline on when a component is expected to be obsolete based on the factors that initiated the obsolescence of the part.

Other airline operators, OEMs, and repair vendors please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

21 Obsolete Part Reliability Management Airbus All All UAL Boeing

In due course of operation, certain components become obsolete by different OEMs. From Airbus’s and Boeing’s standpoint, how do airlines maintain the reliability of these components? What is the process to be followed if reliability of certain components which are obsolete, is going down? Also, what is the process to be followed for rogue obsolete components?

Airbus, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 13

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

22 Airbus Parity Pin Depiction Various Airbus A319 Various UAL A320

UAL would like to request that Airbus accurately depict the parity wire configuration on AWM drawings that involve program pins with a parity wire.

The current drawings show the parity wire both open and connected, with a note to refer to the wire list for the specific connection. This is misleading and may cause the AMT to fix a parity error just by changing the parity wire to the other configuration, since both versions are shown on the drawing. There is only one correct parity configuration for the program pins shown on the drawing, and that is the parity that should be depicted.

Other aircraft OEMs show the correct parity configuration on the WDs and UAL believes that Airbus should be able to do the same.

UAL would like to know the views of other operators on this issue.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

23 Repair vs. Overhaul (Component All Honeywell All All UAL Reliability Improvement) Collins Aerospace Eaton Aerospace Lufthansa Technik

United Airlines has been working with many vendors in improving component reliability within pneumatics, hydraulics, flight controls, engine starting system, and electric power generation systems. A common theme when working with vendors such as Honeywell, Collins Aerospace, Eaton Aerospace, and Lufthansa Technik is that overhaul work scopes are generally not defined in the CMM as well as recommended time (in flight hours – TSO) or cycle thresholds.

In these conversations, the vendors (not limited to the vendors named above) cannot provide consistent repair versus overhaul decision making criteria. Defined overhaul work scopes as well as when these overhauls need to occur is a key aspect in improving component reliability; this is especially true for components without much Service Bulletin activity or are out of production.

United would like to hear why this approach is not well adopted by these repair vendors/OEMs.

Other airline operators, please comment. Honeywell, Collins Aerospace, Eaton Aerospace, Lufthansa Technik, Airbus and Boeing, please comment. Other OEMs and repair vendors are welcomed to comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 14

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

******17-016******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Extract SBs per Configuration Boeing Any ETD

When Boeing releases an SB, it contains several configurations to cover differences among all the MSNs covered by such SB. In many cases, the number of different configurations is too high, making the document too dense and difficult to evaluate for the affected airline and specific configuration.

To Etihad´s knowledge, Boeing has not yet developed any tool to extract a single pdf covering only a single configuration per SB. On the contrary, the competitor Airbus makes available to operators a tool called SB+, which allows to extract a pdf containing a single configuration out of a several configuration SB.

As example, mandatory Airbus SB A320-32-1346 is composed of 681 pages and 15 configurations. When configuration 002 is extracted in a single pdf using the SB+ tool it results on a 118-page document, significantly reducing the operator workload during SB evaluation.

Does Boeing have any plans to implement such SB configuration tool in the near future?

Other operators’ comments and experiences in case of being affected, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

24 POC Requested All LRU’s with S/W or firmware ALL/ATE B757 FDX Vendors B767 B777 MD10 A300

FedEx seeks to understand the potential cyber risks associated with the maintenance and R-T-S of various aircraft LRU’s having S/W or firmware. FedEx’s aircraft cyber security focal would like to inquire with automated test equipment and 145 component maintenance vendors to discuss any LRU maintenance/repair platforms running COTS software, having IP connectivity, or utilizing removeable digital media.

This includes platforms that service both traditional aircraft LRU’s (e.g. avionics, systems, engine, etc.) as well as eEnabled systems such as ONS, FOMAX, CoreNet etc.

FedEx is seeking points of contact for 145 component repair facilities and automated test equipment suppliers.

Other airline operators, OEMs, and repair vendors please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 15

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

25 Data Dictionary Publishing Data Dictionary Airbus A220Fam 31 or 46 DAL Canada

The need to access aircraft sensor data is critical for airlines to maintain their equipment under regulations such as 14 CFR §121 Subpart L Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, and Alterations. Components on aircraft generate significant amounts of data, but the ability for operators to access the data, decoded and in a readable format, is sometimes inhibited by component manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers from the operators. This is contrary to the operator’s belief that data transmitted from their aircraft is owned by the operator.

• Delta Air Lines realizes the benefit that the A220 (Health Management Unit) HMU provides operators. With nearly 48,000 lines of parameters listed in the FlightLink Data Dictionary, the aircraft is well positioned to provide operators sufficient access to our data being generated by the aircraft. Delta Air Lines has noticed that the contents of the Data Dictionary are not being updated at the same cadence as the contents of the reports being generated by the Aircraft, therefore leading to the Data Dictionary containing outdated and inaccurate information.

• Delta Air Lines requests that rigor, with full operator acceptance, should be in place whenever a parameter is added to a report, removed from a report, when a new report is added, and when a report is removed from transmission. As the operator of the aircraft and the owner of the produced data, we rely on the data to be produced in standard and repeatable formats for our maintenance of the aircraft.

• Delta Air Lines requests that the Data Dictionary be a controlled revised document, with the same level of rigor as described for the data in Reports above. The Data Dictionary should be updated whenever a parameter is added to a report, removed from a report, when a new report is added, and when a report is removed from transmission.

Airbus Canada, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

26 Data Dictionary Publishing Data Dictionary Airbus A320/330 31 or 46 DAL Fam

The need to aircraft sensor data access is critical for airlines to maintain their equipment under regulations such as 14 CFR §121 Subpart L Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, and Alterations. Components on aircraft generate significant amounts of data, but the ability for operators to access that data, decoded and in a readable format, is sometimes inhibited by component manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers from the operators. This is contrary to the operator’s belief that data transmitted from their aircraft is owned by the operator.

• Delta Air Lines realizes the benefits of the airline operator data which will be available when the ADC channel is available between the FDIMU and FOMAX hardware. Delta Air Lines requests that Airbus provide a Data Dictionary of the airline operator data which will be transmitted, and will be available to the airline in Skywise, for the A320CEO Family of aircraft, the A320NEO family of aircraft, the A330CEO Family of aircraft, and the A330NEO Family of aircraft. The Data Dictionary would inform the operator of all parameters being transferred on the ADC data channel and available to the operator for analysis. If a solution similar to FOMAX is being developed for the A220 and A350, Delta Air Lines requests a Data Dictionary for that product as well.

• Delta Air Lines operates the A220-100, A220-300, A319-114, A320-211, A320-212, A321-211, A321- 271NX, A330-223, A330-302, A330-323, A330-941, and A350-941 series of aircraft.

Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 16

MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

27 Data Dictionary Publishing Data Dictionary Boeing B717 31 or 46 DAL B737NG B757/67 B777

The need to access aircraft sensor data is critical for airlines to maintain their equipment under regulations such as 14 CFR §121 Subpart L Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, and Alterations. Components on aircraft generate significant amounts of data, but the ability for operators to access the data, decoded and in a readable format, is sometimes inhibited by component manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers from the operators. This is contrary to the operator’s belief that data transmitted from their aircraft is owned by the operator.

Delta Air Lines requests that The Boeing Company provide all Interface Connection Documents (ICD) and or specifications for components on Boeing aircraft for to enable the operator the ability to analyze data produced by those components and systems on the aircraft.

Furthermore, Delta Air Lines requests that The Boeing Company provide operators with a document describing the data available as inputs to the primary aircraft data acquisition device e.g. DFDAU, DMU, and or FDAM. This document request is consistent with documents made available to operators from other aircraft manufacturers.

Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 17

TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

28 ATEC Support Several Spherea All All TAP Thales

Since the introduction of the ATEC as an Automatic Test Equipment used among operators and OEMs for testing several avionics equipment, all the support, including updates, general support and contracts, has been provided by the test equipment manufacturer and negotiated directly by both parties (operators and Spherea).

We were informed that from last year, and for Thales units, the negotiation for Test Program Sets (TPS) had to be performed directly with them.

This new policy means the introduction of a new player in the procurement process, and to our surprise, represents a huge difference in the expected price, which affects the business case developed for this equipment. In what concerns current update support contracts, we fear that the renegotiation conditions with different companies will change the way we have evaluated the purchase of the equipment many years ago. Furthermore, as this is an equipment used by several vendors, it brings us some questions of how, and if, this service will work.

Being an operator, we are mainly concerned that these new conditions take out all our chances of checking the airworthiness (testing) of a unit.

Comments from all parties would be appreciated.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

29 Tooling and PN 321000M02, 321000M03 Lord (Fly by Wire) A320 Fam 27-92-13 LHT Testing Side Stick Transducer Unit A330 A340

This is a reminder to item 19-036 discussed at AMC 2019.

The 2019 AMC Follow-Up item no. 2 mentioned that Lord/Airbus would provide an updated CMM.

Note: The OEM Lord had deleted in its CMM 27-92-13, revision 9 from 15 May 2017 all information to test these components.

Question: We are currently waiting for the new CMM, which mentions all the necessary tool tolerances and measurement values. When will the new CMM be available?

Lord and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 18

TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)

******19-036******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Tooling 321000M02, 321000M03 Lord (Fly by Wire) A320 Fam 27-92-13 LHT Side Stick Transducer Units A330 A340

Content: • The OEM Lord deleted in the latest CMM revision 9 from 15 May 2017 the usage of alternate tools. • LHT in the past has bought original tools and original software according prior CMM revision. • The OEM ignored all tries from LHT to clarify tool tolerances, so that we can use our prior original tools again. • The OEM Lord constrains all MRO to buy new test tools “T11” and “T12”. • The OEM Lord did not name the measurement value tolerances.

Question: • -What is the reason to withdraw detailed test data and tool and limit specification (retreat access to Level 3 Documentation)?

LHT requests Lord to disclose that information in further CMM revisions!

Please any comments from other MROs.

******19-040******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

No TSDP and 003CM00-0x00 Ultra B787 CMM AFR/KLM AFR Tool Quote Wing Electronics 30-11-X0 Ice Protection Control Unit (WIPCU)

Despite multiple requests, since October 2017, Air France has not received from Ultra-Electronics TSDP and/or any quotation for tooling for those cited in CMM 30-11-30/40/50/60 for allowing to maintain WIPCU system P/N 003CM00-0100/-0200/-0300/-0400.

Air France requests Ultra Electronics provide Air France with TSDP and quotations of the tools cited in the CMM.

Ultra-Electronics, Boeing, and other operators please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 19

TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

30 TSDP Water Level Sensor 77000-016 Safran B787 38 AFR/KLM AFR – Absolute Pressure Zodiac

Air France already received the CMM 38-37-15.

In this CMM, as shown below, page 1005 the TSDP Technical Support Data Package is quoted and could be ordered.

According to the PSSA D6-81852 Rev C 12/09/2013 chapter 2.4 and 8.1.6, the TSDP should be provided.

Air France has been asking this TSDP since 22/10/19. When will this TSDP be available?

Other operator, OEM, Boeing please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

31 TSDP MD20016 Rev B PDU Collins B787 50 AFR/KLM AFR Aerospace

May 2019 new revision of CMM PDU 787 with TSDP 50-21-91 rev 01:

The last Collins communication was: “The original TSDP submission was rejected by Boeing, the revision is expected to be delivered to Boeing mid-January 2020.”

To date, we have still not received the update of this TSDP. When will the Rev B of TSDP be available?

Collins, Boeing comment please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 20

TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

32 No Timely Revision 182594-001 GE B787 42-40-01 KLM/AFR KLM of Remote Data Aviation Concentrator TSDP

Reference: AMC 2019 item 34.

QUOTES from AMC 2019: KLM: “Revise the current TSDP and specify everything that is needed to build 1P3434TE1 and put it in operation.”

LEACH/GE AVIATION: “In order to support both KLM and other B787 operators, GE will update TSDP SSP37206-4 to include the details of the Special Ground Support Equipment P/N 1P3434TE1, which was recently added to the CMM as an alternate test solution. This is in addition to the TSDP for the original RDC test set, 1P3358TE1, which is already detailed in the RDC CMM. It should be available within 90 days.”

UNQUOTE

After the AMC 2019, the weekly and later bi-weekly calls with GE continued as they had been continued before. KLM was kept in expectation of the revised TSDP for many months. Only in January 2020 did GE inform KLM that the revised TSDP was sent to Boeing for review,

This is to inform Boeing and other operators that GE has failed to revise their TSDP for the Remote Data Concentrator within the earlier mentioned timeframe of 90 days and to request GE Aviation to improve on possible future revisions of TSDPs that they are responsible for.

This is also to kindly request Boeing to support KLM by performing a timely and detailed review of GE RDC TDP SSP37206 on conformity with the specification set forth in ARINC 625.

Boeing, GE, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

33 TSDP SB MD20017 PDU Collins B777F 50 AFR/KLM AFR 43115-xx Aerospace

Since January 2019, Air France reported to Collins (CRC CAS-96097-Q8K8F8) that TSDP « SB MD20017 » has data missing or erroneous. On April 2019, Collins answered the TSDP will be released Q4 2019.

To date, we have still not received the update of this TSDP. When will the Rev B of TSDP be available?

Collins, Boeing comment please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 21

TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

34 Tester for 35000-00-01 Meggitt B737NG 31-25 ELY Electronic Clock Electronic Clock

I.A.W CMM 31-25-01 dated 09Sep2015 Rev: 007 TESTING paragraph 'J'

We need from Meggitt: Lighting Test Box, calibration table, the spec, and TSTP of Lighting Test Box (18-20350).

I.A.W CMM 31-25-01 ASSEMBLY paragraph 'E'

We need the Electronic Clock Programming Lead (18-20369) and Electronic Clock Download Software (94-0564-12-VA) and Electronic Clock Calibration Control (94-0262-12-VA05).

We contacted the vendor through our engineering and below is the answer we got:

Hello XXXX,

I apologize for being unclear with the previous information given.

Our tech support team have advised ‘The lighting test box, contains Meggitt proprietary information which cannot be distributed or sold to a customer.’

I hope this clears things up.

Kind Regards

Meggitt and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

35 Lightning Test Multi Boeing Multi Multi ANA Airbus Collins Aerospace

Recently, lightning test was added to Collins Aerospace CMM per revision.

ANA already discussed necessity of lightning test for return-to-service of component in case of operator's shop maintenance with Collins Aerospace. Response of Collins Aerospace was that lightning test is needed for return-to- service of component which is both aircraft platform of Boeing and Airbus.

In case of Airbus, lightning test is required per Airbus ABD0100. In case of Boeing, ANA is not sure which document mentions necessity of lightning test for return-to-service of component.

Test equipment of lightning test is very high cost and needs a long period approximately one year of lead time. It means that ANA is not able to introduce lightning test easily.

Based on above explanation, ANA has the following inquiry. 1. Why is lightning test needed for return-to-service in case of operator’s shop maintenance? Was the lightning test requirement added to document recently? ANA would like to know the reason because lightning test is not required to return-to-service of component till now. 2. ANA would like to know trend of the future of lightning test. Is lightning test added to CMM for every component?

Boeing, Airbus, Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 22

TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

36 Calibration N/A Honeywell N/A DAL

Honeywell requires calibration of some items to be returned to Honeywell through the use of Engineering Bulletins (EB). Turn times have become unreliable and causing major work stoppage problems. Units are taking over five months to be returned, are not being tracked on the Honeywell website or will show incorrect status. We receive no feedback when inquiries are submitted online. The onsite Honeywell reps are not receiving needed info after asked to help. We need Honeywell to fix the TAT problems or remove the requirements for the use of the EBs and allowed generic calibration procedures that can be accomplished at our own cal lab or a third-party lab.

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

37 Return to Service 7036340-xxx / Honeywell ERJ175 31-61 SKW Tests Flight Display

When looking through the CMM for the return to service portion for the ERJ 175 flight display, the CMM references using a software program to perform the return to service test. There are no listed test steps for the return to service test. When purchase of the software for the return to service test, Skywest Airlines was informed that software was not sold to anyone outside of Honeywell.

What do we need to do to gain access to the return to service test for Honeywell Flight Displays?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

38 Defective Software HG1050AD15 Honeywell B757 34 FDX HG1050AE15 Spherea A300 HG1050BD10 A310 HG1050BD11 MD11 HG1150BD02

MEM AVSH purchased hardware and software to upgrade the Series 6 ATE for IRU and ADIRU testing. The software for all the part numbers listed above table under the category of LRU part number/name was delivered inoperative. A brief description of the software failures is listed below. Please address the lack of quality control for test equipment software.

1. HG1150BD02 software was delivered with an IR BUS 4 negative failure. 2. HG1050AX software had check sum failures for all units that had mod 10 installed. 3. HG2050AC11, and HG2050BC04 software would not allow the rebiasing of any ADIRU. 4. HG1050BD10, and HG1050BD11 software was delivered with failures related to the automatic table turning the program would lose communication with either the commander 3500 tower and or tumble table or turn table.

Honeywell, Spherea, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 23

TEST SYSTEMS (LINE AND SHOP)

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

39 ACP 2100 RTS 866-0077-101 Collins B787 23-51 KLM/AFR KLM Protocols Aerospace

CMM 23-51-01 revision 3 dated April 29th, 2015 refers to the Technical Support and Data Package (TSDP) with part number 091-9857-003 Rev- and Test Specifications part number 5772-4001 Rev-.

The Return-to-Service test related receiving and transmitting commands and the protocols are missing in the test specification. We cannot implement our own Return-to-Service test solution. To date, Collins Aerospace Avionics has not updated the test specification to include the missing information. We need assistance in acquiring the missing data.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

40 Cabin Pressure Control 21230-10BA Nord-Micro (Collins B737 21 AAL System Outflow Valve Aerospace) Testing 21230-03AC 21230-02AC 4063-19972-XXXX Outflow Valve

American Airlines is seeking to test the above listed part numbers from their own fleet and has requested that Collins Aerospace and Nord-Micro provide a way to procure or manufacturer the necessary tooling and test equipment specified in CMM’s 21-33-30, 21-33-32, and 21-33-33. The CMM claims to provide the specifications for the mechanical test fixtures, but this information is completely missing from the CMM. The original request was submitted on December 11, 2019. Collins Aerospace has created reference case number CAS-103720 for this request but with no satisfactory response to date.

The following list is the equipment in question: • OFV Support Fixture Nord Micro P/N 21860-01 (CMM 21-33-33 pg. 1003) • Gear Fixture Nord Micro P/N 23964-01 (CMM 21-33-33 pg. 1003) • Field Tester 1 Nord Micro P/N 0645-18100-8 (CMM 21-33-32 pg. 1003) • Field Tester 2 Nord Micro P/N 0645-19991-xxyy (CMM 21-33-32 pg. 1003)

Will Nord-Micro or Collins Aerospace please provide an update on where they are at with resolving this request?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

41 CTS Support CTS ATE Teradyne Boeing 34 DAL

Teradyne has notified Delta of their intent to cease support in the repair and maintenance of the CTS ATE in the near future.

Delta would like to know if other CTS operators would be interested in a shared pool of assets and resources to maintain the future operation of the CTS.

Teradyne and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 24

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

42 ARINC 668 1023382 / Wiring Harness as Collins Aerospace Various 24 DAL Requirement in Example CMMs

A majority of legacy UTAS CMMs have the following statement in the Special Tools, Fixtures, and Equipment section of the CMM:

“Equivalent tools, fixtures, and equipment can be used if they agree with the requirements of ARINC Report 668.”

This statement leads the user to believe ARINC 668 is a requirement, and this is being misinterpreted by the user of the CMM. ARINC 668 is written to be used as guidance as quoted from the Forward section of ARINC 668-1, “ARINC Reports – Provide guidelines or general information found by the airlines to be good practices, often related to avionics maintenance and support.” Additionally, under Delta’s CAMP, we have established procedures using some but not all of ARINC 668-1 to determine tooling substitutions and equivalency.

Delta Air Lines request that Collins/UTAS to strike the word “requirement” from this statement or remove the statement completely from its CMMs. Delta recommends a more appropriate statement of “Equivalent tools, fixtures and equipment can be used. Refer to ARINC 668 for guidance as needed.”

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

******19-073******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

VFSG 2.5 7001330H03/H04/H05 Collins Aerospace B787 24 VIR

VAA continues to have removals of the VFSG and is currently completing the H04 retrofit on the fleet. VAA is very concerned that as more and more aircraft come out of warranty, the VFSG repair bills are not sustainable.

Why did UTAS not develop the VFSG to behave more like an IDG when it can operate for a limited time disconnected without driving a large repair bill in the shop? The technology is not new. Several years since EIS, Collins is still working on a mod to the input seal similar to that of an IDG. Operators continue to pick up the cost.

Additionally, VAA understood the longer the unit operated disconnected under MEL, the more damaged the VFSG would be. But VAA has removed a unit disconnected in descent and operated disconnected for 40 mins, yet the damage was similar to a VFSG that had remained on-wing for three days on MEL. VAA engaged with Collins to be told that no analysis has been done to compare time on-wing disconnected versus level of damage/repair required.

VAA would like other operators to share their experiences and Boeing/Collins comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 25

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

43 VFSG 7001330H03/H04/H05 Collins Aerospace B787 24 SR Disconnect Technics

As established in previous communication at the AMC (items 18-036 and 19-073), the VFSG overheats when operating with the disconnect mechanism activated within the permitted MEL period of three days. In most cases, this leads to damage of a major sub-assembly (Rotor Balance Assembly), resulting in material waste, significant cost of repair and restricts fault-finding investigations.

The origin of this specific type of overheating is a failure of the disconnect carbon journal bearing. This is caused by inadequate cooling from the oil circuit, when the disconnect mechanism is active, because the VFSG oil pump has no drive in this mode. SR Technics expects that this type of damage could be avoided if an IDG type disconnect mechanism is implemented, providing increased robustness and an allowance of reconnects.

It is understood that the H03/H04 disconnect mechanism met the specification requirements during design qualification between Collins and Boeing. However, it does not meet SR Technics expectations in terms of an economically sustainable product.

A new VFSG (H05/V2.5) is anticipated to be released with an IDG type ball bearing design. Please can a realistic date of when the H05/V2.5 VFSG will be released, it was originally expected for Q2 2019 (ref. UTAS 787 Technical Symposium 16-May-2018), and can affected customers be compensated until it is available and implemented?

Collins, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

44 Variable Frequency Starter 7001330H03 Collins Aerospace B787 24-11-92 LHT Generator – High Rate of Disconnected Units 7001330H04

The Variable Frequency Starter Generator (VFSG) shows a high removal rate due to disconnected operation. For the majority of all units, no technical issue was found, which could explain the need to disconnect it. The Variable Frequency Starter Generator fulfills all requirements of the requested specification published by Boeing.

Please explain the root cause for the high disconnect rate of the Variable Frequency Stater Generator. If it is an aircraft system issue, please provide further details how this issue can be solved.

What is recommended in order to prevent an “unjustified” disconnect of the Variable Frequency Starter Generator during operation?

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 26

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

45 Variable Frequency Starter 7001330H03 Collins Aerospace B787 24-11-92 LHT Generator High Repair Costs after Disconnected Operation 7001330H04

Several Variable Frequency Starter Generator shows signs of an overheat damage on the Balanced Rotor Assembly (P/N7001337) after a performed disconnect while operation. In some cases, the Balanced Rotor Assembly has to be removed and needs an overhaul (replacement of the Balanced Rotor Shaft).

Why does this kind of unusual damage occur in case of a successful disconnect? It seems that the disconnect mechanism does not fulfill the requirements to prevent the Variable Frequency Stater Generator against internal damage.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

46 Variable Speed Constant 1701768 Collins B777 24 AFR/KLM AFR Frequency Generator Aerospace

This question is related to AMC 2019 item 74 and AMC 2018 item 48.

Despite the explanation provided last year by both UTC and GE, AFR is still facing a high rate of shaft shearing on its B777-200ER fleet (not on B777-300ER fleet with the same VSCFG). Following 777-FTD-80-16001, this issue was supposed to be solved with GE90 Service Bulletin 80-0046 R0 but it is only a one-time inspection of the Starter Air Valve P/N 3290976-X and does not modify the SAV opening time. AFR also follows the GE90-90 WSPG recommendation for SAV soft-time overhaul: 5,000 cycles; furthermore, the last revision of this FTD is May 18. Since that date, no improvement have been presented by Boeing.

What other actions are Boeing, GE, Collins, and/or Honeywell going to implement in order to solve this very old issue?

Collins, Boeing and other operators, please comments

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 27

ELECTRICAL POWER

******19-074******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Variable Speed Constant 1701768 UTC B777 24 AFR/KLM AFR Frequency Generator

This question is related to AMC 2018 item 48.

Despite the explanation provided last year by both UTC and GE, AFR is still facing a high rate of shaft shearing on its B777-200ER fleet (not on B777-300ER fleet with the same VSCFG).

Following 777-FTD-80-16001, this issue was supposed to be solved with GE90 Service Bulletin 80-0046 R0 but it is only a one-time inspection of the Starter Air Valve P/N 3290976-X and does not modify the SAV opening time.

AFR also follows the GE90-90 WSPG recommendation for SAV soft-time overhaul: 5,000 cycles.

What other actions are Boeing, GE, UTC, and/or Honeywell going to implement in order to solve this very old issue?

Boeing, GE, UTC, Honeywell, and operators comment please.

******18-040******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Broken Promises on GAPCU Final Fix Release 1700667D Airbus A32X 24 ETD UTAS A330 A340

This is a tribute on the broken promises on the following AMC items: 63-2014 (AFR/KLM), 60-2015 (AFR/KLM), 61- 2015 (USA), 53-2016 (AFR/KLM), and 54-2016 (DLH). Since 2014, the AMC has been demanding to UTAS a solution on the worldwide problem suffered by GAPCU PN 1700667D, due to the burn of capacitors in the printed circuit board.

In the particular case of Etihad, we suffered a Customer Induced Damage on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN 1411 removed from A330 MSN 0724 in 2016 for a total of, lets say big bucks, on which the capacitors in printed circuit board A6 were found burnt (Figure 1). The shop report concluded that the cause of failure was outside the GAPCU, in this case, the GPU likely provided out of specs power.

An additional case took place in July 2017 on A340 MSN 933 on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN AADU001957. In this case, several diodes (D1, D2, D3, D6, D7, D8, and D9) were damaged on printed circuit board A5 and the origin of the burnt was due to external power out of specifications (Figure 2). In this case VSB 90EGS31AP-24-14 was embodied.

In AMC 2015 UTAS committed to release the Vendor Service Bulleting by end of 2015. Then in AMC 2016 UTAS stated that the VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 will be released in Q2 2016. According to our UTAS Field Representative (Ron Pang): “VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 was released in November 2016, but shortly after canceled as ineffective, i.e., did not demonstrate the ability to consistently prevent external overvoltage damage”. Finally, this issue was neither raised nor discussed in AMC 2017.

Questions: REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 28

ELECTRICAL POWER

1. What has UTAS to say to operators when it takes 2 to 3 years to develop a VSB that simply replaces the capacitors for new ones that have a greater tolerance and the solution is unsuccessful? 2. How can UTAS ensure that VSB 90EGS31/33AP-24-13 or subsequent will be the final fix for the continuous capacitor burn problem? 3. When will UTAS expects to release a final solution to this problem? 4. Does UTAS manufacture other GAPCU Part Numbers? If so, do they suffer this problem? 5. What can Airbus say to an OEM that has failed to deliver an on-time solution year after year?

Figure 1: On the Left, Affected Capacitor as Shown on VSB 90EGS31AP-24-13 / On the Right, GAPCU Capacitors Burnt on SN 1411

Figure 2: Diodes Burnt on GAPCU PN 1700667D SN AADU001957

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 29

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

47 In-Seat Power Supply 1191-46 / In-Seat Power Supply Astronics B737NG 2450 WJA

WJA has noticed numerous failures of the In-Seat Power Supply (ISPS). Our investigation shows problems with the DC control circuit. The resolution is to incorporate several Astronics SBs (SB 1191-46-25-001/002/003…).

Is Astronics confident their numerous service bulletins will resolve the issues?

The B737NG has had numerous problems with regard to power spikes generated during power transfer. Is Boeing doing anything to minimize power surges on the B737 platform?

Boeing, Astronics, and other operator comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

48 ISPS Grounding Stud 1191-46/In-Seat Power Supply Astronics B737NG 2450 WJA

WestJet has had numerous failures of the In-Seat Power Supply (ISPS). In many cases, the repair order stated broken grounding stud as a point of failure. We have questioned Astronics and their reply stated “the grounding stud is a swaged in stud and not welded. It is susceptible to side forces so care should be taken when installing and removing the retaining nut.” In their explanation, they recommended using specific tools and avoiding others. They also give torque settings for the stud (max torque is 25 in/lbs). They recommended the ground stud nut be installed before the unit is installed onto the mounting bracket.

This information does not line up with the AMM and in some cases, contradicts information in the AMM. Is Astronics going to update the AMM to give torque values and recommended tools? Also, will Astronics revisit the order of events in the AMM installation instructions?

Extracted from AMM 25-25-29 SYSTEM INSTALLATION In-Seat Power Supply (ISPS) Installation (1) Verify that the 115 VAC, 3 Phase circuit breaker located on the P36 panel, labeled LAPTOP POWER is open. (2) Install the termination plugs retained from the removal procedure on the J20 and J21 connectors. (3) Position the ISPS onto the seat bracket. (4) Secure the ISPS to the seat bracket using the four 1/4 turn fasteners. (5) Install hardware on the ISPS ground stud. (6) Connect all connectors to J1, J2, J6, J7, and J9 on the ISPS. (7) Remove the DO NOT CLOSE tag and close the LAPTOP POWER circuit breaker.

Astronics and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 30

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

49 RPDU Chassis 7000281x Boeing B787 24 KLM/AFR KLM 7004379x Collins Aerospace (UTAS)

RPDU position 41-42-74.

Fixes: 787-FTD-24-17009 RPDU 41/42 (apply felt on drip shields) 787-FTD-24-17002 RPDU 74 (apply tape "moist barriers" on back cover) • KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RDPU 41/42, which is to apply felt on the overlaying drip shields in order to guide possible fluid away from the RPDU. • KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RPDU 74, which is to apply tape over the perforated back cover (moist barrier) in order to prevent liquid from entering.

Before performing the required action, we suffered the subject problem and we were repairing RPDUs. 94% of all identified faults are related to the A1 PWB. The reason given: liquid ingress/corrosion.

Operational and maintenance experiences: • Fluid ingress on the internal electrical components leads to a large variety or multi-combination of maintenance messages. • Troubleshooting difficult due to variety of maintenance messages that may occur. • Troubleshooting difficulty results in large delays. • Replacement of the RPDU chassis in itself is not difficult, but the in case of RPDU position 74, the AMM includes the application and removal of tape for the installation/removal tasks. • Collins Aerospace returns the units (liquid ingress) under Customer Induced Damage (CID). • Water ingress warranty: Collins points to Boeing, Boeing rejects and points back.

Since a lot of costs were generated due to a design problem in the B787, we feel that we can issue and send the warranty claims to Boeing for all repairs prior to publication and implementation of the fix. Please make sure that the warranty department is aware of this and that they will not reject our warranty claims.

Collins, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 31

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

50 RPDU – Power 7001964H0x Boeing B787 24 KLM/AFR KLM Modules Cards and Micro Processor Cards 7000240H0x Collins Aerospace (UTAS) 7000276H0x 7000278H0x

RPDU position 41-42-74.

Fixes: 787-FTD-24-17009 RPDU 41/42 (apply felt on drip shields) 787-FTD-24-17002 RPDU 74 (apply tape "moist barriers" on back cover)

• KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RDPU 41/42, which is to apply felt on the overlaying drip shields in order to guide possible fluid away from the RPDU. • KLM/AFR has implemented interim action to RPDU 74, which is to apply tape over the perforated back cover (moist barrier) in order to prevent liquid from entering. • Fluid ingress on electrical components leads to a large variety or multi-combination of maintenance messages, which makes troubleshooting difficult and consequently causes delays. Fixes: o Apply felt on drip shields. o Apply tape "moist barrier" on the back cover. o Add application of "moist barrier" to removal/installation tasks. • We had a lot of removals of the RPDU LRMs from the aircraft and a lot of repairs in the shop. • Collins Aerospace rejects the claims for the units (liquid ingress) under Customer Induced Damage (CID). • Collins points to Boeing, Boeing rejects and points back.

Since a lot of costs were generated due to a design problem in the B787, we feel that KLM can issue and send the warranty claims to Boeing for all repairs prior to publication and implementation of the fix. Please make sure that the warranty department is aware of this and that they will not reject our warranty claims.

Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 32

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

51 Poor Reliability – ACW 20032-2/ACW Generator Thales ATR72 24 EVA UNI

UNI experienced Amendment K reliability improved ACW generator failure seven times within three months since August 2019. Shop report revealed that the Diode holder plate crack leads the poor reliability, inoperative generator resulting in flight dispatch problem or air turn back due to strict MEL limitations (runway width, limited payload).

According to UNI’s experience, the Diode holder plate crack occurs between TSN: 8,500FH ~ 11,000FH, Approx. second to third overhaul period. The average TSO of ACW generator in UNI ATR fleet is 2000 FH, which is the half of ATR MPD ACW generator overhaul requirement, 4000 FH.

Refer to CMM 24‐22‐61: overhaul includes inspection of diode holder plate which is carried out by visual inspection with a magnifier only. UNI suspects the insufficient overhaul inspection is the reason of low TSO (The lowest TSO in UNI ATR fleet is 27 FH). UNI had recommended Thales to revise CMM 24‐22‐61 by NDI instead of present measure.

UNI would like to keep this item open until the root cause is revealed and corrective action is provided.

ATR, Thales, and other operator comments, please.

ATR, please evaluate the restrictive reduced MEL.

Thales, please provide timeframe for availability of investigation report and permanent solution.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

52 Static Inverter 1-002-0102-2090 Avionic Instrument B757 24 UAL B767 B777

The OEM declared transistor part number 1-001-0413-0017 as obsolete and states we need to upgrade the -2090 Static Inverter to the new Static Inverter part number (1-002-0102-2170) the -2170 also includes the same 1-001-0413-0017 transistor so upgrading does not really solve the issue of replacing due to obsolete parts.

We were informed that a replacement IGBT is now in process but no timeframe on when it would be solved.

United would like the OEM to provide the actual part number of the transistor so that United can look for their own replacement solutions. If no, why not, as this looks to be a standard piece part?

Boeing, operator, and vendor comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

53 Emergency Power Supply D717-02-001 Page Aerospace Ltd. B737 24-35 AAL B777

Page Aerospace released Service Bulletin No. D71702-24-01, dated Nov. 09/12, with MOD AR1994, to replace Panel “A” Printed Circuit Board, P/N D717-02-020, with P/N D717-02-120.

The CMM has not been updated to reflect the modification. AAL needs the schematic and IPL for the new Printed Circuit Board P/N D717-02-120, to successfully troubleshoot and repair the Emergency Power Supply.

Does the OEM have plans to release the schematic and IPL to the Printed Circuit Board P/N D717-02-120?

Airline and OEM, please comment. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 33

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

54 SPDA Microprocessor 1713878A Collins E170 24 JALEC JAL Module Aerospace 1707789F E190 1720897B

Japan Airlines has experienced 27 removals of SPDA Microprocessor Module due to CAS MSG "SPDA FAIL" and CMC MM “SPDA X LRM YY FAULT” (X=1 or 2, YY=8 or 12) in the last 2 years. Almost of those shop findings were No Fault Found except only one case.

The percentage of CMC Maintenance Message occurrence is below: • SPDA1 LRM8 FAULT: 22% • SPDA1 LRM12 FAULT: 0% • SPDA2 LRM8 FAULT: 33% • SPDA2 LRM12 FAULT: 45%

JAL is considering this is nuisance failure that easily occur in SPDA2.

The occurrence phase of the message is random, but when the failure occurs in taxiing phase, it causes Ground Turn Back event. So, this is one of most concerned issue for JAL.

Question 1. Are other Operators seeing similar issues? 2. Are Embraer and Collins Aerospace currently working on a solution to this issue?

Comments from other operators, Embraer, Collins Aerospace and other airframers are highly appreciated.

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Title Associate Airline

55 SPCU 1151952- Honeywell B737-800 24-33 KLM/AFR KLM 6/8/9/10/11/13/14/16/18/19

Standby Control Power Unit (SPCU) P/N: 1151952-6/8/9/10/11/13/14/16/18/19

The standby power control unit (SPCU) gives manual and automatic power source selection control of the battery and standby buses. The SPCU supplies DC system failure data to the P5-13 electrical meters, battery and galley power module. The SPCU also controls some power distribution relays in the electrical system.

SPCUs in KLM’s B737 NG fleet have caused many delays and cancellations lately.

Questions: 1. Are operators experiencing illumination of P5-13 ELECT LIGHT on their fleet, which results in unnecessary removals of SPCU? 2. What is the amount of SPCU removals of the operators in last 12 months? 3. What is the NFF percentage for the SPCU after shop visit? 4. What are operators doing to avoid ELEC faults caused by SPCUs? 5. Do operators have any reference that removals of the SPCU’s are caused due to electrical stressing of the K1 and K8 relays?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 34

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

56 IDG Oil Filter Clog 755017B / Integrated Collins A330 TRENT 24 TKT THY Faults Drive Generator Aerospace Motor 752168B / Integrated A330 CF6 Drive Generator Motor 752168C / Integrated A330 PW Drive Generator Motor

THY A330 fleet has three types of engines (PW, TRENT, CF6) and until 2019, Mobile Jet Oil II has been used.

As of 2019, oil changes from Mobile Jet Oil 2 to Eastman Turbo Oil 2197 are made in our fleet. After changing to Eastman Turbo Oil use on A330 aircrafts, “IDG OIL STSTEM FAULT” failures from “IDG OIL FILTER CLOG” have increased significantly. After filter replacement and oil filling, the fault was fixed for a short time, but after a while it was re-observed on all these three engine types of aircraft. We sent it to Collins Aerospace to analyze the oil samples from the defective IDGs (Analysis results have not been received yet).

In the current situation, there is a serious decrease in the fault trend, but we have not been able to reach the root cause of the problem.

If any, can other operators share their experiences on this issue?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

57 P5-13 ELEC Light 1151952-14 through SPCU – B737NG 24 TKT THY Illumination 19 / SPCU Honeywell 1-002-0102-2090 and SI – Avionic B737MAX 2170 / Static Inverter Instruments 8-930-03 / Battery Crane Charger Aerospace BA35-01 and 024147-000 / Battery

ELEC light illumination is a chronic issue that has been continuing on B737NG/MAX airplanes over a decade.

ELEC light illuminates when Standby Power Control Unit (SPCU), Static Inverter, Battery/Battery chargers, P5-13 module, and/or interface wiring fail. The root cause of these faults is still unknown and it is still one of the top issues affecting B737 fleet.

Like other B737NG/MAX operators, Turkish Airlines experiences numerous ELEC LIGHT fault related delays and gate returns. Most of the Turkish fleet use Standby Power Control Unit (SPCU) Post Mod P/N 1151952-19 but there are also -16 and -18 SPCUs. In addition, SPCU Tray Modification (SPCU Tray brace and strengthener) was applied related aircraft. Also, most of the fleet use Static Inverter Post Mod P/N 1-002-0102-2090 but newer aircraft have P/N 1-002-0102-2170.

The last 12 months UR and MTBUR values are as follows:

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 35

ELECTRICAL POWER

Unscheduled Component P/N MTBUR Removals NOTES: • Turkish Airlines only Standby Power Control Unit 1151952-19 16 19778 use post mod SPCU P/Ns, but the reliability data shows that SPCU Static Inverter 1-002-0102-2090 8 43838 failures are still on top. • Newly design SI P/N 1- 002-0102-2170 components have no Battery 024147-000 13 70773 UR data and provide a tremendous reliability. Battery Charger 8-930-03 10 97297

1. Can the component OEMs inform operators regularly to provide activity updates on this matter? 2. Can other operators share their UR and MTBUR data and experiences on this matter? 3. Can the SPCU supplier – Honeywell provide reliability data for the recently introduced SPCU P/N 51090412-001?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

58 DOM “Date of Manufacture” ISFD Dedicated ACME B-NG, 24 THY Indication Problem on the Label Battery/Charger Aerospace MAX of ISFD DBC and Storage (DBC) 312BS101-1 Boeing Spec. No. UTAS B747-8 S282T005-1

CMM 24-31-05, page 705, Section 4.B states that “The battery pack assembly can be stored up to 3 years (with annual top charges) in a fully charged condition from the date of manufacture located on the ID label.”

However, the “DOM” date of manufacture is not stated in 4.A when the battery pack assembly is installed to the whole unit! Only installation date is recorded on the label.

Per CMM page 705 Section 4.A.2: (2) The DBC can be stored up to 3 years (with annual top charges) in a full-charge condition. After three years storage as indicated by the “Battery Pack Maintenance” label located on the exterior of the DBC, install DBC on aircraft to begin the 3 year service life or replace the battery pack assembly and return to storage.

So, after storing Battery Pack Assembly in two years period with proper charging, when we install such Battery Pack Assembly into the unit, CMM Section 4.A states to replace the label and record the installation then. So, DOM seems not to be important. A new life of three years of storage period seems to start again.

However, per Section 4.B, we have to take care to the DOM. Therefore, a new label has to be used for indicating the DOM of Battery Pack Assembly of the on the outside of the DBC, the whole unit for following the storage life.

Would ACME Aerospace state the above case in the CMM and evaluate using additional label on the DBC to inform the DOM of Battery Pack Assembly?

Other MRO and airlines comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 36

ELECTRICAL POWER

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 37

ELECTRICAL POWER

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

59 Erroneous Under Voltage 976J862 Collins Aerospace MD11 24 FDX Fault During Initial Power UP

In troubleshooting an MD11 that had nine repeat write-ups of the EPGS fault for a fault caused by the APU GCU Generator Control Relay tripping. To reset this fault requires the performance of the RTS of the EGPS and a set- auto-reset function from the CFDS. During the trouble shooting the FDX AVI Bench discovered a potential design flaw in the Underspeed lockout circuitry in the GCU. The current design works as intended if ground power is maintained to the aircraft between flight legs. When powering up a dead aircraft, turning the ground service switch or battery switch, the Undervoltage circuit trips the GCR “Generator Control Relay approximately 4 seconds after power is applied. The bench found that if you can ground an Underspeed Inhibit Circuit for 1 second on power up, you can prevent the GCU control relay from tripping. FDX has a power point presentation that provides the details of this issue and a potential solution and is available upon request.

Any LRU sent to a shop with a similar write up would have been tested per the CMM and returned “No fault Found”. This is the first time this fault has ever been discussed. Any other tripping of the GCR would be an actual internal fault that would intentionally trip the GCR.

FedEx would like Collins to review and consider developing a S/B to fix this issue? Have other MD11 operators experienced this problem?

******19-083******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

IDG Governor Failure 761574B Collins B737NG/MAX 24-11-85 LHT

LHT frequently receives integrated drive generators with damages caused by stuck governor assemblies during winter periods. This failure is well known and identified as a design deficiency of the governor assembly caused by cold starting temperatures.

Collins (former Hamilton Sundstrand) was informed about this problem but has not provided corrective actions yet.

• Collins and Boeing, please comment if corrective actions will be provided. • Other MROs and operators, please comment if you experienced similar cases.

Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator and MRO comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 38

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

60 Need Piece Part Availability 115370-0106 Litef A319 27 DAL Airbus A320

Litef is refusing to sell Delta piece parts for this component. However, part of their response is “if you ship the NHA to us, we can repair it”. If parts are available to Litef, they should be available to Delta. It should be irrelevant who performs the repairs.

Per the Airbus SSC, Delta can perform repairs at their own facility if we chose. If some items are truly “obsolete”, then we ask Litef to provide us with part specifications so that we may determine suitable substitutes on our own.

Litef and Airbus comments please.

******18-056******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

ELAC High No Fault Found (NFF) Rate 3945128215 Airbus A32X 27 ETD 3945129100 Thales

Etihad’s A32X fleet has suffered a high No Fault Found (NFF) rate over the past years on a fleet of 37 aircrafts for both Non-Downloadable ELAC PN 3945128215 (std L97+) and Downloadable ELAC PN 3945129100 (std L97+). Below Table 1 shows that the Non Downloadable ELAC PN 3945128215 (std L97+) removed on Etihad fleet over 2017 suffered a 52% NFF rate.

2017 Removals Analysis Confirmed Fault Not Fault Found ELAC Non-Downloadable 10 removals / 48% 11 removals / 52% ELAC Downloadable 7 removals / 70% 3 removals / 30%

Table 1: Distribution of ELAC Confirmed and NFF Rates over 2017

In the majority of the cases, the ELAC or related Flight Control fault occurs during push back and causes a return to stand with a consequent delay. In such situations, the lack of time and limited capability to perform troubleshooting ends up in an ELAC replacement, but apparently the fault does not reproduce in shop during ELAC testing.

During 2017, Etihad’s fleet has suffered a total of 13 hours and 12 minutes of delays due to ELAC faults that were cleared after either ELAC replacement or by applying MEL. Refer to Table 2 for the detailed list of delays.

Table 2: List of Delays Suffered in Etihad A32X Fleet during 2017 due to ELAC Faults REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 39

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

In order to tackle such a high rate of NFF and delays, Etihad has actively embodied Thales VSBs 394512B-27-021/2/7 on ELAC computers; nonetheless, these actions does not seem to have improved the unit’s reliability.

For additional information, refer to Airbusworld FAIR 16.0051 (ELAC reliability). Furthermore, up to Etihad´s knowledge, two major A32X operators flying more than 100 aircraft have suffered a NFF rate higher than 50% during 2017.

Thales: • Provide details about the worldwide NFF rate of ELAC PN 394512821x and 3945129100 for 2017. If the NFF is 50% or higher, is that an acceptable figure? • Aside from the Thales VSBs 394512B-27-021/2/7, what can operators do to improve the ELAC reliability? • If the root cause of this high NFF rate resides in the design of the ELAC computer, what are Thales’s plans to improve the unit?

Airbus: • Is Airbus aware of such a high NFF rate on the ELAC? If so, what are Airbus’s recommendations? • What is Airbus doing to avoid such a high NFF rate on a component installed on their manufactured aircraft?

Operator comments please.

******19-045******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

EMCU CA72711-006 MOOG B787 27 ANA

We often experience the failure of EMCU due to the issue “High Power Failure,” especially spoiler’s position.

The total number of the discrepancy was eight cases within a year due to this failure mode and 50% of these eight cases led to flight delay/cancellation. As there are four positions regarding spoiler’s EMCU per an airplane and we have around 65 airplanes, we are always facing the possibility of delay/cancellation due to this failure mode for about 300 units. That is why this issue is the biggest concern in the B787 flight control system for us.

Although we understand that the plan of EMCU GEN 3 is suspended and the investigation has been progressing between Boeing and MOOG, we cannot clearly identify how this thing has been going. As the issue is related with Boeing SRP (Service Related Problem), we would like Boeing and MOOG to have more initiative for the investigation to proceed.

Operators, please comment and share your experiences.

Boeing and MOOG, please provide us with the timeline when the investigation is completed. In addition, we would like Boeing and MOOG to take this SRP issue into CRB (Component Review Board) or CRC (Component Reliability Collaboration) to facilitate this issue to be resolved effectively by Supplier Management and Boeing and Supplier Executive leadership. Please consider it. We would like to get Boeing/MOOG’s feedback.

Operators, Boeing, and MOOG comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 40

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

******19-047******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Mode Control Panel 4082260-939 Honeywell B737 22 KAL

Recently, KAL frequently experienced the failure of LCDs which were installed on the front panel of mode control panel. Even if KAL replaced it with new LCD or Honeywell repaired the MCP, their reliability of LCD is lower than expected.

Because the replaced LCD and/or repaired MCP is showing a defect of light leakage from LCD, with having low accumulated operating hours.

In the past, LCD’s reliability was satisfactory but recently, LCD defect occurs with very high frequency.

KAL kindly requests Honeywell the following: 1. KAL kindly requests Honeywell verify the root cause of this issue and provide us any measure to reduce LCD defect rate. 2. Honeywell should improve the LCD quality of the front panel.

Other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 41

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

******19-057******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Flap Position Pickoff Unit 9028A0005-01 Liebherr A330 27-55 DAL HAL Moisture Ingress

Hawaiian Airlines replaced three position pickoff units in 2018 and another in January of this year in FIN positions 29CV and 30CV due to flaps locked ECAM warnings. Moisture has been noted inside of the removed units. The three units removed in 2018 were original installs on lower time recent delivery aircraft, but the most recent failure occurred on an aircraft that was delivered in 2010 and had accumulated over 38,000 hours.

The mitigation procedure of checking the position differences via the MCDU is covered by AMM 27-51-00-820-801 but allows for adjustment if found to be out of limits. Is Airbus suggesting that the APPU be replaced if found out of AMM limits or is further visual inspection for water contamination required prior to replacement?

We understand Airbus is investigating the root cause of failure but would like to know if Leibherr is also performing an investigation? What are the expected completion dates of the investigations?

Airbus, Leibherr, and other operator comments, please.

******19-059******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Repair of Electro 51200-x Goodrich CRJ 27 LHT DLH Hydraulic Servo Valve Aerospace Canada Ltd.

Follow up to MMC 2017 item “Flight Controls item 24.”

Failure of the Electrohydraulic Servo Valve (EHSV) is still one of the main failure reasons for the CRJ Multi- Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU). Manufacturer of the EHSV is Zodiac Aerospace (Safran). Zodiac is also an EASA/FAA Repair Station (FR.145.290).

Until 2013, LHT sent all EHSVs directly to Zodiac and got the valves back in repaired condition with EASA Form 1 (Dual Release). Later repair orders were rejected and LHT was advised by Zodiac to send the valves directly to Goodrich Aerospace (UTAS).

Following repair orders for the EHSV directly sent to Goodrich were rejected with the statement Goodrich has no capability for the EHSV and LHT should send the CRJ Multi-Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU) for repair.

LHT has capability for the MFS PCU and still needs a repair station or maintenance documentation for the EHSV. (CMM 27-64-00 from Zodiac just includes testing; parts list, etc., is missing)

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 42

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Multi-Function Spoiler Power Control Unit (MFS PCU) Part number 51200-7,-9,-11,-13,-15

Zodiac and Goodrich (UTAS) please comment.

Bombardier, please comment on the fact that no repair capability is offered for the EHSV, but only for the NHA (MFS PCU).

Other operators, please share your experience with this issue.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 43

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

******19-062******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Design 734-06485-x Boeing B747-8 27-51-22 LHT DLH Responsibility Boeing PN Shimadzu S256U500-4100 Umbra

The ballscrew assembly is manufactured by Umbra Group, with the design responsibility by Shimadzu Corp. Repair facility for these units is Umbra Group.

In the past, we had several units removed from DLH B747-8 and sent to Umbra for repair during the warranty period. Umbra claims that the units had seen forces beyond the designed limit. No abnormalities during the flights had been reported.

While Shimadzu acknowledges that there is a dispute between Boeing and Shimadzu, the issue has not been resolved yet and the operator is left with the entire cost for the repair (ongoing since 04/2018). This has already resulted in multiple AOG orders.

• Who is responsible for the design of the unit? • How can we streamline the process of warranty case handling (and who covers the cost for the time being) so that the repair process is not slowed down for everyone involved (Umbra cannot continue work without the cost approval, operator does not give approval for units under warranty, etc.)?

Boeing, suppliers, and other operator comments, please.

******19-063******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

B737 Slat Wedge Replacement 114A5010 Boeing B737 57-00 UAL 114A5020 114A5030 114A5040

CMM 57-43-01, CMM 57-43-02, CMM 57-43-03, and CMM 57-43-04 do not provide necessary information regarding the trailing edge wedge assembly replacement, distance between slat trailing edge to auxiliary arm roller, and rigging tolerance.

Boeing stated that replacement of trailing edge wedge to drawing requirements is difficult to achieve without tooling similar to assembly jigs. However, no Boeing tooling or process for B737NG slat wedge replacement has been developed as of now.

Is this something Boeing is looking to develop and incorporate to the CMMs?

Boeing and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 44

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

******19-064******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Replacement Part Lead Time 113A2100-x Boeing B737 57-00 UAL 113A3100-x

Multiple replacement parts for B737NG IB Main Flap and OB Main Flap are posted with extremely long lead time. This includes but not limited to lower panel P/N 654A0004-1138 with EST 12/2/19, wedge assy P/N 113A3511-3 with EST 10/18 and pushed to 2/19, fitting P/N 113A3135U1 EST 9/19.

Can Boeing comment on this issue? Can this lead time be improved upon?

Boeing and other operator comments, please.

******19-071******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Epoxy Carbon Prepreg – Plain A320 Elevators and Airbus All 51-30 UAL Weave 193 gsm 120 ⁰C More General Interchangeability Applications

Airbus CML contains two (2) Appli Codes for Epoxy Carbon Prepreg - Plain Weave - 193 gsm - 120C cure as follows: • 13LDC1 - Plain Weave - 193 gsm – 120 oC • 13LDC9 - Plain Weave - 193 gsm – 120 oC Legacy

A review of the CML Introduction indicates that the difference between the two (2) Appli Codes is the location used on the aircraft as designated by the 1 and 9.

Could Airbus evaluate allowing materials listed under Appli Code 13LDC1 as allowable substitutes for materials listed under Appli Code 13LDC9 on components such as A320 Elevators?

Airbus and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 45

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

61 RTLU Failures and no Final Solution DV8456701-5 Airbus A33X 27 ETD

This is another tribute to closed AMC items 14-212 and 18-055 and closed Airbus FAIR items 14.0060 and 17.0179.

In AMC 18-055, Etihad described the delays and removals of the Rudder Travel Limit Unit (RTLU) PN DV8456701-5 suffered during 2015, 2016, and 2017 in A32X fleet. During that AMC, Airbus replied that a final solution to this problem would be the release of new Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) standards FAC B625 (SB A320-22-1644) and CAA09 (SB A320-22-1629).

Figure 1: List of Delays Suffered by Etihad A32X Fleet during 2018 and 2019

Etihad performed the embodiment of FAC B625 in Q3 2019 (18 aircraft) and FAC CAA09 in Q2 2019 (11 aircraft). Unfortunately, the Etihad A32X fleet embodied with the mentioned upgrades still suffered RTLU failures and “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1(2) FAULT” messages.

This was communicated via TechRequest 80275011 and Airbus confirmed the release of new TFU 27.23.00.008 issued in Dec 2019 to communicate operators the “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1 (2) FAULT” message suffered on aircraft embodied with FAC B625 and CAA09.

We would appreciate Airbus to provide some background on the subject, an update on the reasons why the latest FAC updates did not actually fix the issue, and what are supposed to be the next FAC upgrades.

Operator comments please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 46

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

******17-025*****

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Rudder PCU 390500-1009 Parker Hannifin Q400 27 LHT 390500-1011

CMM 27-21-04 is missing maintenance instructions for the attached servo valve, PN 74160-01 (390599-1003). Please provide maintenance details, such as an individual CMM including acceptance test procedure, spare parts list, and maintenance, to allow maintenance on the servo valve.

Other MROs and Parker Hannifin please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

62 Elevator PCU 390600-1009 Parker DHC-8-402Q 27 LHT Various

Follow up to MMC 2017 item 26

LHT still experiences many cases where the anti-rotation lugs of the tailstock of the Elevator PCU show some wear marks. Tailstocks need to be replaced on approximately 70% of the Elevator PCU´s seen at LHT in 2019. In most cases just one lug was damaged.

CMM 27-31-02 gives design dimension of the lugs but wear limits are not available.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 47

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Question to the OEM (Parker): • When can we expect to have a final solution for this problem? • Is there an interim approval to use a minimum limit of 0,527 inches (or less) as an in-service wear limit, is there any kind of allowable damage to the tailstock? • Is Parker working on a repair solution (laser weld, cold metal spray, etc.)?

Additional Question

Some of the tailstock anti rotation lug are severely worn (see picture below). Tailstock shown on the left side was removed from an Elevator PCU after 2919 FH / 4031 FC. The Anti Rotation Lug on one side was worn nearly down to base material of the Rod End.

Parker/Bombardier, please comment • What is the root cause for such damages after short time period (installation)? • Reason for removal was leaking. What happens to the unit if not removed due to leakage?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 48

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

******17-026******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Elevator PCU 390600-1009 Parker DHC-8-402Q 27 LHT

LHT experienced several cases where the anti-rotation lugs of the tailstock show some wear marks. Total Time of most of the Elevator PCUs was below 20,000 FH

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 49

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Since there is no specific inspection criteria in the CMM, LHT contacted Parker about the omissions.

Parker came up with following instructions: 1. Perform visual inspection of anti-rotation lugs for scuffing, damage and measure 0.542 +/- 0.005 2. Replace tail stock P/N 390643-101 if the above anti rotation lugs dimension is below 0.537 inches.

Following these instructions (basically, Parker provided manufacturing dimension), LHT stated that most of the tailstocks were beyond these limits and had to be replaced. Actual wear exceeds the minimum limit of 0.537 inches by 0.01 inches Parker stated they consider evaluating the possibility of an in-service wear limit, but this will be a “longer term project.”

Question to other MROs: Have you experienced similar findings on the Elevator PCUs?

Question to the OEM (Parker): When can we expect to have a final solution for this problem? Is there an interim approval to use a minimum limit of 0.527 inches as an in-service wear limit?

Parker and other MRO comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 50

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

63 Flight Augmentation B397BAM0624 Thales AVS A320 Fam 22 SR Technics Computer (FAC) France SAS

Within the last 24 months, 50 removals were noticed, whereof 24 removals were NFF in shop. Average age of SR Technics’ pool units is 10 years.

Thales you please provide an explanation for such a high rate of NFF units? Is it related to intermittent faults of the FAC itself or possibly caused by external inputs?

Thales and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

64 Autoland System Check NIL Boeing B777 22 EVA Boeing B787 Airbus A330 Airbus A321

Quote from FAA AC 120‐28D Section 9.2 Item 15: “Typically at least one satisfactory low visibility system operational use, or a satisfactory systems ground check, should be accomplished within 30 days, for an aircraft to remain in Category III status”. FAA requests operator to do Autoland Practice or Autoland System Ground Check every 30 days to remain CAT III status.

To comply with this FAA requirement, currently EVA does Autoland Practice every 28 days. EVA would like to change the method by executing Autoland System Ground Check, but CAT III AMM test procedure does not exist in any specific AMM task code which can do full Autoland system ground test to fully comply with the requirement in FAA AC 120‐28D mentioned above.

EVA has asked Boeing and Airbus if this Autoland CAT III AMM test task can be created, but the answer was negative.

Questions/Requested Actions: 1. Please comment if any operator has to comply with FAA AC 120‐28D continuously remaining CAT III capability and share your compliance method. 2. Boeing, Airbus comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 51

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

65 Flight Control Unit C12850AC03 / Thales A320 22 AFR/KLM AFR Reliability Flight Control Unit Fam

This problem is described in item FAIR 19.0321 and linked to the ISI 22.81.00009.

The FCU fitted on A320 family is subject to fault messages similar to the Long-Range counterpart, but contrary to the Long-Range P/N, Thales does not plan to publish a modification to solve this issue. More details below:

Recent Reliability analysis conducted by AAY on ATA 22 has shown that “Spurious Auto Flight Flt FCU 1 Fault” messages are a large contributor to the decline of performance for the system in question. Of the total 609 defects reviewed in the last year, 135 recorded discrepancies were driven by the aforementioned faults. ISI 22.81.00009 discusses this issue and has identified the root cause of this fault to be associated to the push and pull action on ALT selector knob. Per the ISI, when the selector is engaged, a click might be detected by only one channel of the FCU thus resulting in this fault message. An interim mitigation plan has been developed to curtail unwarranted FCU replacements as well as consequential delays. The ISI however does not provide a permanent solution to this issue at this moment; it states that an FCU modification in Alt Selector monitoring function is needed to address these faults however there is no foreseeable schedule for this mod.

Air France shares Allegiant Air’s concerns and also notes that the global reliability of this P/N is gradually decreasing:

Average MTBUR (Flight Hours) 2017 2018 2019 9291 7152 6260

Operators, can you relate to this problem?

Thales, Airbus, comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

66 Spoiler Servocontrol 414800 Nabtesco E170 27 AFR/KLM AFR Parker E190

Ruptures of bolts 1-205 from the CMM 27-65-02 occurred at least twice since 2017 causing loose of hydraulic circuit. As this event is related to flight security issue, recommendations are wanted.

Investigations between Parker/Nabtesco/Embraer were supposed to be released last June.

What is the result of the investigations to prevent the issue?

When will corrective measures be released by OEM and Embraer?

In the meantime, what are the recommendation from OEM and Embraer?

Parker, Nabtesco, Embraer, and operators please, comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 52

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

67 Low Reliability of P-ACE 7028273-802 Honeywell E170 27 JALEC JAL 7028273-822 E190

JAL experienced many P-ACE (Primary Actuator Control Electronics) removal due to “FLT CONT NO DISPATCH” MSG appeared.

Major Shop Findings are CAN BUS Failure (35%) and NFF (25%). In both situations, resoldering U84, U85 and Y1 of A1 and A4 and U82, U83 and Y1 of A2 and A3 have been performed as precaution maintenance for CAN BUS Failure. However, the same problem has been recurred on P-ACE which this work was performed.

Since this problem has a high risk of Ground Turn Back event, further reliability improvement is a pressing issue.

1. Other operators’ comments would be appreciated. 2. Honeywell, is the root cause found or any further inspection performed about this problem? 3. Embraer and Honeywell, please advise if there is a plan for improvement.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraf ATA From t

68 Final Technical Solution 321000M03 / SSTU – Side Lord A320 27-92-13 LHT to Improve the SSTU as Stick X-Ducer Unit (Fly-By-Wire Series a Replacement for the Systems) SIL FB4F2-27-002 A330 Series A340 Series

In Jan 2014, the SIL FB4F2-27-002 had been initially released. The technical background was and currently is: (…Technical investigations have been conducted on A330 and A340 Flight Control Systems on repeated F/CTL SENSOR FAULT Warnings. Even though the component shop testing of FCPCs and SSTUs is very often No Fault Found (NFF), no re – occurrences of the fault messages have been observed after replacement of the potentiometers and associated wiring within the SSTUs…..)

The SIL is based on a technical investigation that Airbus had launched in the past. The current status will be regularly updated and published in TFU 27.92.41.002 SSTU.

From the first issue of the SIL to its today's revision, the OEM has promised FOC support for its application as a mitigation until a permanent fix of the root cause is available. In the last Rev. 09 (dated 10th of Jan. 2020), OEM Lord announces end of March 2020 as an expiry date of FOC – Support. In the latest issue of TFU 27.92.41.002 SSTU, released on December 19, 2020, Airbus announced the official stop of the FOC support policy at the end of the first quarter of 2020, although SSTUs are still in-flight operation with suspect potentiometers installed. This leads to the assumption that AIRBUS has already developed a final technical solution to improve the SSTU, maybe as a replacement for the SIL FB4F2-27-002.

Question: What final technical solution for improving the reliability and NFF Issue will Airbus offer their customers as a replacement for the SIL FB4F2-27-002?

Lord, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 53

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraf ATA From t

69 Extend Effectivity to 321000M03 / SSTU – Side Lord A320 27-92-13 LHT A320 Fleet for SIL Stick X-Ducer Unit (Fly-By-Wire Series FB4F2-27-002 Systems) A330 Series A340 Series

In Jan 2014, the SIL FB4F2-27-002 had been initially released. The technical background was and currently is: (…Technical investigations have been conducted on A330 and A340 Flight Control Systems on repeated F/CTL SENSOR FAULT Warnings. Even though the component shop testing of FCPCs and SSTUs is very often No Fault Found (NFF), no re – occurrences of the fault messages have been observed after replacement of the potentiometers and associated wiring within the SSTUs…..)

The SIL is based on a technical investigation that Airbus had launched in the past. The current status will be regularly updated and published in TFU 27.92.41.002 SSTU.

The A320 – Flight – Control – System seems is very similar to A340 – Flight – Control – System. The same SSTU PN 321000M0x is effective for installation in A320 and A330/A340 Aircraft. So, the conclusion can be, that also A320 Fleet is affected.

Question: Why did Airbus not include the A320 – Fleet into Aircraft – Effectivity for SIL FB4F2-27-002, until all SSTUs that are equipped with potentiometers and thus could be affected by the "abnormal tear and wear" findings named in the AIRBUS TFU are modified?

Airbus, Lord, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

70 Spoiler Faults Not 407475-04-01 / Spoiler BAE B717 27-61 HAL Always Reported Electronic Control Unit (SECU) Systems Boeing

1. Spoiler faults displayed to crew but mechanics report finding no codes from the central fault display system. 2. Boeing unable to supply criteria that trigger faults; therefore, hard to impossible to develop predictive tests.

BAE, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 54

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

71 Burnt EMI Filter Slat/Flap Electronic Collins CRJ 27-51 LHT DLH Boards Control Unit 766389x Aerospace 1716470A (CRJ) ERJ 1700064F (ERJ)

This item was already placed in 2019 with reference 19-053. A technical solution was promised by Collins Aerospace until Q3 2019. But nothing happened so far.

LHT observes a frequent and extremely critical burning of the capacitors located on the SFECU EMI filter boards A10/A11. In each year of 2017 and 2018 we had five units with such damage. The EMI filter board consists of 27ea capacitors and 3ea inductors. It provides filter function for the three-phase input power of the SFECU. There are two filter boards installed per unit. Due to the extensive burnings, other SFECU subassemblies will often be damaged seriously as well, e.g., motherboard A1, which is located very close the EMI filter board (see pictures below). This leads to a total loss of the SFECU.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 55

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Unfortunately, LHT is not able to determine any correlation neither to a specific batch of unit serial numbers, batch of capacitors nor any aging problems of the used capacitors.

An investigation has been addressed to Collins Aerospace in October 2018 already. Two burnt units have been provided to Collins Aerospace for the investigation. Despite repeated requests, no results provided so far (Jan 2019). A technical solution is urgently demanded.

Please any comments from other operators.

Collins Aerospace, what is the current status of your investigation? What will happen next?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

72 ARINC 625 Compliant C99142 (ref. C99143) MOOG B787 27-61-11 LHT CMM/TSDP

Mid of 2015, LHT started to check the documents of B787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the review, it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components with third party test systems. The documents do not meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG).

A re-check of the CMM in 2019 showed that test procedures are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Affected Tests are Servovalve subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in the beginning of December 2019. We only got an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until were given.

Inquiry: • Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please give reasons if this is not possible. • Provide a schedule for update process if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC 625 regulation is not possible. • Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process. • LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is involved into the process.

MOOG and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

73 ARINC 625 Compliant C99143 (ref. C99142) MOOG B787 27-61-11 LHT CMM/TSDP

Mid of 2015, LHT started to check the documents of B787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the review, it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG).

A re-check of the CMM in 2019 showed that test procedures are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Affected Tests are Servovalve subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in the beginning of December 2019. We only got an information that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until were given.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 56

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Inquiry: • Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please give reasons if this is not possible. • Provide a schedule for update process if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC 625 regulation is not possible. • Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process. • LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is involved into the process.

MOOG and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

74 ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP C99160 (ref. C99163, MOOG B787 27-11-10 LHT C11962, C99257)

Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61

Mid of 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test.

In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got one of four TSDPs as revised DRAFT Version (P/N C99163) from the discussed. LHT checked this draft Version (it was significant improved). LHT asked for a similar revised version of TSDP for the C99160. LHT has not yet received any answer to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.

Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed that most test procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are e.g. electric, hydraulic and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We only got an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.

One fact in particular is strange about the missing data: In an old (superseded) CMM (revision 2) of this P/N, the missing tests were completely described. These descriptions have been removed and replaced by automatic tests in newer revisions.

Inquiry: • Please provide a reason for removing the data from the CMM from revision 2 to revision 3. • Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please give reasons, if this is not possible. • Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC 625 regulation is not possible. • Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process. • LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is involved into the process.

MOOG and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 57

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

75 ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP C99162 (ref. C99163, MOOG B787 27-31-03 LHT C99160, C99257)

Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61

Mid 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test.

In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got one of four TSDP’s as revised DRAFT Version (P/N C99163) from the discussed. LHT checked this draft Version (it was significant improved). LHT asked for a similar revised version of TSDP for the C99162. LHT has not yet received any answer to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.

Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed, that most test procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are e.g. electric, hydraulic and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We only got an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.

One fact in particular is strange about the missing data: In an old (superseded) CMM (revision 2) of another P/N (C99160 Aileron), which is quite similar to the here discussed Rudder-PCU, the missing tests were completely described. These descriptions have been removed and replaced by automatic tests in newer revisions. We cannot proof the fact, that earlier CMM of this P/N also had this data included, but anyway, the missing data have to be included into the CMM and TSDP.

Inquiry: • Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please give reasons, if this is not possible. • Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC 625 regulation is not possible. • Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process. • LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is involved into the process.

MOOG and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 58

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

76 ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP C99163 (ref. C99160, MOOG B787 27-21-02 LHT C99162, C99257)

Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61

Mid 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test.

In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got a revised DRAFT Version of the TSDP of P/N C99163. LHT checked this draft Version (it was significant improved) and send some additional questions to Moog for clarification and ordered the released version of the TSDP. LHT has not yet received any answer to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.

Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed, that most test procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for the RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are, e.g., electric, hydraulic and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We only got an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.

One fact in particular is strange about the missing data: In an old (superseded) CMM (revision 2) of another P/N (C99160 Aileron), which is quite similar to the here discussed Rudder-PCU, the missing tests were completely described. These descriptions have been removed and replaced by automatic tests in newer revisions. We cannot proof the fact, that earlier CMM of this P/N also had this data included, but anyway, the missing data have to be included into the CMM and TSDP.

Inquiry: • Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please give reasons, if this is not possible. • Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC 625 regulation is not possible. • Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process. • LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is involved into the process

MOOG and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 59

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

77 ARINC 625 Compliant TSDP C99257 (ref. C9963, MOOG B787 27-12-03 LHT C99160, C99162)

Follow up to MMC 2019 ITEM 61

Mid 2015, LHT started to check the documents of 787 Flight-Controls to build up test capabilities. During the review it became apparent that the data contained in the documents is not sufficient to test these components with third party test systems. The documents don’t meet the requirements of the ARINC 625, as well as the World Airline and Supplier Guide (WASAG). The Test Specification (TS), which is part of the TSDP and the CMM was not containing the necessary data to realize the data bus communication during the return to service test. The TS only contained the hydraulic test without REU. No information on the testing with data bus.

In 2019, this topic was discussed on the MMC. After the MMC, in May 2019, LHT got one of four TSDP’s as revised DRAFT Version (P/N C99163) from the discussed. LHT checked this draft version (it was significant improved). LHT asked for a similar revised version of TSDP for the C99257. LHT has not yet received any answer to this request, although LHT asked several times. Topic unfortunately still not solved.

Additionally, to the missing data for the bus communication, a check of the CMM in 2019 showed, that some test procedures without data bus communication are not described in the CMM. Mostly there is a reference to an automatic test software. The procedures and the test limits for these RTS tests are not described. The TSDP does not contain any information on these tests. This is not compliant to ARINC 625. Tests that are affected are, e.g., electric, test with REU and subassembly tests. LHT asked for the missing data in early December 2019. We only got an information, that Moog will check that inquiry. No data or delivery date until now.

One fact in particular is strange: three of four Test specifications contained information on the test with REU, apart from the fact that they were incomplete. The TS of this unit only contain data on the hydraulic test without REU. There is no data about the test with REU in the TS. So sometimes data about the data bus is missing, sometimes on the classic hydraulic tests. But no documentation is complete.

Inquiry: • Delivery of an ARINC 625 conform documentation within 90 days, like specified in ARINC 625. Please give reasons, if this is not possible. • Provide a schedule for update process, if providing ARINC compliant documentation according to ARINC 625 regulation is not possible. • Point out the problems/reasons for such a long update process. • LHT is continuing willing to support the process of updating documentation, if possible and LHT is involved into the process

MOOG and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 60

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

78 Additional TSDP HG2291AD01 Honeywell B787 27 AFR/KLM AFR Document

CMM 27-20-04 refers to ATP 2046-02 which has been provided by Honeywell.

The ATP is incomplete and refers to other applicable documents listed step 2.1 below.

Following several previous discussions with Boeing to clarify such topics, it was confirmed that TSDP should be complete, and all documents listed in TSDP should be provided.

Could Honeywell revise its position and provide the five listed documents?

Operators, Boeing please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

79 Technical Solution for PN Artus A320 27-23-51 LHT DLH Solder Issues on Cards DV8456701-5 Pacific Scientific Meggitt

With reference to 2019 AMC item 60

For the Travel Limitation Unit (TLU) PNR DV8456701-5, both control-boards have to be exchanged during each repair since it is not possible to determine faulty boards from good ones due to soldering issues on the boards.

@Meggitt: The current process increases the cost/FH and is not a permanent long-term solution. Please provide information on the development of a permanent solution taking the following points into consideration: • Re-design of the boards, aiming for the improvement of the soldering points, eradicating these undetectable solder cracks (different solder technique, analysis of the weak spots and improving those, etc.) • Make a repair of the old boards possible and economical feasible and/or • Improve the test-parameters and conditions, so that solder cracks can be identified (cold soak test, climate chamber, etc.) and repaired.

Meggitt and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363- Page 61

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

80 MRO Capability, PN 3210200-1M00, 321200M02 Speed Lord A320 27-92-14 LHT Repair Possibility Brake Control Transducer Unit (Fly by Family Wire) A330 A340

This is a reminder to item 19-193 discussed at AMC 2019. This item was referenced to item 19-036.

The 2019 AMC Follow-Up item no. 2 mentioned that Lord/Airbus would provide an updated CMM.

Note: The OEM Lord had deleted in its CMM 27-92-14, revision 6 from 15 November 2014 all IPL-data and all instructions to repair these units.

Question: We are currently waiting for the new CMM, which mentions all piece parts in DPL and MRO instructions to repair the unit. When will the new CMM be available?

Lord, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

81 CMM Not Available to Operators U431 Series Power Thales 319 27 UAL Supply Block A320

Thales CMM 27-94-08 for the U431 Power Supply Block refers to CMM 27-94-08A for test procedures for the power supply alone (not installed in unit). UA has requested this CMM from Thales and have been denied access. Per Airbus agreement, all documentation required to maintain equipment owned by the operator is be made available.

Airbus, Thales comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

82 FMGEC EFOB-EFOD C13200HA03 Honeywell A330 22-83 DAL HAL C13226HA06

HAL has been having issues with the FMGEC P/Ns C13200HA03 and C13226HA06 and the Estimated Fuel On Board (EFOB)/Estimate Fuel Over Destination (EFOD). This issue has been documented in several Airbus TechRequests 80695526, 80649781, 80628075, 80622585, 80633081, 80628076 and 80746033.

Data gathering and submission to Airbus and Honeywell continues when faults occur. However, no solution has been found to prevent this issue.

Airbus, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 62

AUTOFLIGHT SYSTEMS/FLIGHT CONTROLS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

83 FMGEC Winds C13200HA03 Honeywell A330 22-83 DAL HAL C13226HA06

HAL has been having issues with the FMGEC P/Ns C13200HA03 and C13226HA06 and the FM winds not being able to upload. This issue has been documented in Airbus TechRequest 80493817.

Data gathering and submission to Airbus and Honeywell continues when faults occur. However, no solution has been found to prevent this issue.

Airbus, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 63

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

84 Smart Probe 2015G2H2H-8 Collins E170 34-10-80 AFR/KLM AFR Corrosion Aerospace 2015G2H2H-8A E190 2015G2H2H-9

This question is related to AMC 2017 item 80 and AMC 2016 item 088.

The SIL-2018-09/VSIL59885-34-0012 from UTAS indicates the criteria for the smart probe aircraft removal when the Altitude Split failure is combined with corrosion and a pressure measurement error.

The Altitude Split failure and removals after inspection are due to the corrosion (60% of the 180 removals per year) which is now monitored but that still have an impact on the smart probe reliability, the removal rate and OEM warranty period.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 64

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Are there any improvements planned to eliminate corrosion on the surface of this smart probe?

Collins, Embraer, other operators comments please.

******19-151******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

A32X Pitot Probe Retrofit Policy Airbus A32X 34 ETD UTAS

In October 2018, Airbus released SB A320-34-1678 (Navigation – Sensors, Power Supply and Switching – Replace UTAS Pitot Probe 0851HL by Pitot Probe 0851MC). The reason was that new icing requirements (CS25 Appendix P and Appendix O) have been defined by EASA with an increased maximum ice crystal concentration and UTAS has developed new Pitot Probes that comply with these requirements.

In parallel, Airbus also released in October 2018 SB A330-34-3367 (Navigation – Sensors Power Supply and Switching – Install UTAS Pitot Probes PN 0851MC Compatible with new Icing regulation) and RIL LR34M18001408 R00 (Install UTAS Pitot Probes 0851MC compatible with new icing regulation). This RIL makes the provision of the new UTAS Pitot Probes 0851MC FOC for A330 fleet until 31-OCT-2020, but no RIL was released for A32X.

These unequal conditions were discussed with Airbus under TechRequest 80553264, but the answer provided by Airbus was unsatisfactory.

Questions: 1. UTAS pitot probes PN 0851HL are prone to blockage due to icing conditions regardless of the aircraft type they are installed in. Nonetheless, Airbus makes the retrofit FOC for A330 and not for A32X, being indirectly responsible of the unsafe operation of thousands of aircraft worldwide. Under which technical reasons has Airbus taken this decision? 2. How many cases of unreliable airspeed has Airbus received from operators on A32X and A330 fleets due to ice crystal blockage? 3. Aside from UTAS Pitot Probes, which other new icing requirement-compliant Pitot Probes are Airbus going to certify on A32X and A330 fleets?

Operator comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 65

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

******17-079****** Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Heaters, Pitot, TAT Varies by Aircraft Boeing All 34-00 DAL Airbus Rosemount

Failure of pitot/static/TAT heaters usually results in flight cancellations, delays and air turnback/diversions due to flight restrictions for weather. If there is a way to determine the health of pitot heaters by on wing monitoring electrical current, voltage drop, resistance, etc., to the probe, operators may be able to avoid the Operational Difficultly Index (ODI)s and move probe heaters from a hard time maintenance program to a managed on condition program.

What is being developed or added to aircraft to be able to detect degradation of the various heaters prior to an actual failure?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

85 Support for WL102AMS3 GE Aviation B737 3416 DAL Product Altimeter/Airspeed Indicator Ontic

Ontic, in acquiring this product line from GE, has had difficulty supporting for parts, notably vibrator 601EMA8 (which at the time had a 500-day lead time from Aviall‐Boeing). Of note, this is not the first time a product line has been acquired/assumed by Ontic and had similar issues. It appears there is a disconnect between the acquiring company eager to shed a product line and the ability of Ontic to support.

Does the Boeing PSA not require Ontic/Boeing to fully support without excessive lead times/issues?

Other operator and Boeing comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

86 Altimeter 64141-582-1 Thales A340 34-21-22 TAP

The Altimeter P/N: 64141-582-1 has its scale adjusted according to a table present in the CMM that ranges from -1000 ft to 50000 ft. This table specifies several test points where the unit should be verified. We sent a unit to Thales with the specific complaint of out of values at 37000 ft (the CMM has the 35000 ft and 40000ft test points). This unit was tested under a chronic unit process to be tested at this specific test value and Thales confirmed the fault.

Even accepting that this failure was very specific and that this test point is not on the CMM, we consider that after our specific complaint, the unit should have been tested at that flight level without the need for a chargeable Chronic Unit Process as a standby altimeter should be inside tolerances in all its useful range and not just at the test points that were considered when the CMM was written.

1. Have other operators also experienced this problem with standby altimeters from Thales? 2. Is Thales considering any other test procedures to avoid cases like this?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 66

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

87 Lack of TSDP HG2030BExx Honeywell A321 34 DAL Airbus A330

Honeywell is refusing to provide a full TSDP to Delta for testing of the HG2030BExx ADIRU per the requirements in the Airbus SSC. Likewise, the TSDP listing which is currently “view only” on the Honeywell publication website stops at HG2030BE02, and Delta operates the newer version HG2030BE03 and HG2030BE04. Honeywell advises that they provide the TSDP to Airbus, not Delta. Airbus advises they will not provide TSDP directly to Delta. Honeywell is testing all of these MPNs at their FAR145 repair station, so there must be a valid TSDP available somewhere.

Delta requests two actions: 1. Honeywell, please update the TSDP to add testing for HG2030BE03 and HG2030BE04. 2. Honeywell and Airbus, please work together to resolve your differences and provide the updated TSDP to Delta.

Honeywell, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

88 Lack of Fault Dump Data and HG2050BC04 Honeywell B737NG 34 DAL Health Data Boeing

Delta has discovered that the HG2050BC04 ADIRU lacks the ability to view segments of the fault dump that show laser health data such as LIM and RIM values as well as stored flight legs. This data exists in the HG2050ACxx ADIRU and it is an important part of Delta’s maintenance program for maintaining our B737 ADIRU.

It appears this functionality was not designed into the testing software of HG2050BC04. Honeywell has advised that this functionality was not required by Boeing, so they did not add it.

Delta is asking for Boeing to require this data be made available in the test specification and for Honeywell to add back this important functionality. Without it, we are unable to determine weak laser gyros or units with excessive drift. This will lead to overall lower reliability and reduced dispatch rate for our B737NG fleet.

Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

89 ERT Kit Modification 9599-607-19996 / Thales Airbus 34 AFR/KLM AFR ERT-550

Air France ordered kit modification for VSB ERT-550-34-10 and VSB ERT-550-34-00-07 since December 2017. These kits have not been received and Thales is not communicating a due date. Air France cannot apply the VSB and is forced to subcontract the modification.

Operators, are you facing similar issues for VSB kits from Thales?

Thales, Airbus, comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 67

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

90 ATEC Series 6/7 is not ALA 52B Radio Honeywell Boeing NG 34 THY Specified in the CMMs Altimeter 066-50007-0101 066-50007-0111 066-50007-0531 066-50007-0631

ALA-52B CMM 34-42-35 still mentions old test systems such as JCAir (old brand name), as displayed below. Although we know that ATEC Series 6 is used as the test bench, this is still not stated in the related CMM.

Thanks to Honeywell and Spherea Test & Services for working together and publishing the ATEC Series 6 TPS SBs. However, there is no official document such as a SIL, TNL, or SB that can be used as a reference during EASA/FAA audits stating that ATEC Series 6/7 and its related TPSs can be used.

There are a lot of CMMs that need to be revised to state that ATEC Series 6/7 should be used instead of STS2000, STS1000, and such other RF testers. Therefore, can Honeywell publish such a TNL, SIL, or SB so that even if a CMM does not refer to ATEC Series 6/7, it can be used as test bench with its TPS as far as the Honeywell TPS SB exists?

Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 68

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

91 Long TAT and Lack of 066-01212-0102 Honeywell A32X 34 ETD Organization on Repair of Honeywell ATC Transponder TRA-100B Leonardo A330

Etihad installed the Honeywell ATC Transponder TRA-100B PN 066-01212-0102 on the A32X and A330 fleets as part of the ADS-B OUT DO-260B mandated campaign. After installation we suffered the following two removals:

1. ATC PN 066-01212-0102 SN S18319376 (RO 1000588398) was removed from A320 MSN 2167 on 22 Dec 2019, four weeks after installation. Shop report resulted in the unit being Not Fault Found. 2. ATC PN 066-01212-0102 SN S19029924 (RO 1000586747) was removed from A321 MSN 5836 on 3 Dec 2019, six weeks after installation. The unit was tested in Honeywell Olathe facilities (Kansas, USA) around 24 December 2019, the result of the incoming test was unit declared faulty. Unfortunately, Olathe facilities can only perform repair level I (go/no go test) on PN 066-01212-0102, so the unit had to be sent to Leonardo (original manufacturer of the unit) in Italy in order to undergo repair and testing.

On 12 January 2020, Etihad demanded an update on the repair status of SN S19029924 and was told that expected shipping date was 24 January 2020. Furthermore, we were told that Honeywell TAT for this unit was 30 days.

On 22 January 2020, Honeywell stated that SN S19029924 unit was still under repair but Leonardo could not release an EASA certificate form 1 or FAA certificate form 8130 on the unit, meaning that the unit had to be sent back to Olathe (Kansas, USA) in order to perform the final test and release the required certificates.

On 30 January 2020, Honeywell provided an update stating that the unit was at Olathe (Kansas, USA) site and expected ESD was 24 February 2020, which would mean 2 months since the unit was originally tested and found faulty.

1. Does Honeywell have any plans to enable Olathe facility to perform level II repairs on ATC PN 066-01212-0102? 2. Does Leonardo have any plans to enable their facilities to be able to release EASA and FAA certificates in order to release to service the ATC PN 066-01212-0102? 3. How can Honeywell state that standard TAT for PN 066-01212-0102 is 30 days when all major OEMs offer 10 days TAT? 4. How many units of ATC Transponder TRA-100B PN 066-01212-0102 has Honeywell manufactured to date?

Operators comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 69

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

92 ADS-B Out 822-1338-XXX / Collins All 34 LHT DLH Upgrade ATC Transponder Aerospace

ATA 34-50-99, Collins Aerospace TPR-901 ATC Transponder, SB TPR-901-34-504/-505, DO-260B ADS-B out Upgrade

Background: SBs TPR-901-34-504 and -505 describe the upgrade of TPR-901 ATC Transponder to DO-260B functionality by doing a software upgrade and some hardware changes. These SBs have been revised several times up to Revision 04 (for SB -504) and Revision 05 (for SB -505). With the latest revision of these SBs, the replacement of the A3 Receiver SRU to the newest version became mandatory.

Before release of the latest revision, LHT modified several units according the previous Revisions of these SBs, keeping the old A3 Receiver Board. These units passed all RTS Tests and work normal on board the aircraft.

Question: What is the experience of other MRO/operators with modifying the Transponders according the ‘old’ revisions of the SBs (without A3 Receiver Replacement)?

Any functional anomalies or failure occurrence during RTS Test or operation in aircraft, which can be traced back to the DO-260B Transponder modification without A3 Receiver Replacement?

Collins and other operator comments, please.

******19-169******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Loss of Mode S/Poor 822-2120-102 Collins Aerospace B787-9 34-42 VIR Performance Reported by ATC Boeing

VAA has received several reports by different ATC agencies of loss of mode S/poor Mode S performance on its B789 fleet.

So far VAA has replaced six ISSPUs [All NFF] and one Bottom Mode S/TCAS antenna for this issue.

The ongoing investigation with Boeing/Collins Aerospace is taking considerable time and effort to support.

1. Have any other operators had similar events? 2. What findings/defects have other operators confirmed? 3. Please can Boeing/Collins Aerospace provide the latest update on their investigation and the next planned steps?

Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 70

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

93 Effectivity Update TPA-100 TCAS Honeywell Airbus 34-45 LHT DLH TPA-100 Computer PN: Obsolescence SBs 940-0351-005/-006

Honeywell has introduced new dash-numbers to TPA-100 TCAS Computer PN: 940-0351-xxx.

More than two years ago, dash -005 and in the last year dash -006. Unfortunately, several most relevant obsolescence SBs, e.g., 940-0300/0400-34-13, 940-03XX-04XX-34-13 and 940-03XX-04XX-34-14 are not updated for years (see pictures below) and do not cover these latest PNs 940-0351-005/-006.

Honeywell already embodies and quotes these SBs for repair of the new dash-numbers although SBs do not official cover them.

For almost two years, we try to push and clarify. We had several discussions about it (email, phone, discrepancy reports, etc.) and received just the information that this will be updated by next revision, but there is still no progress nor new or temporary revisions.

We know there is no technical issue behind missing applicability, since units are from hardware point-of-view the same like dash -001 and change was just software driven. It is just a formal issue, but customers complaining that the SBs are not applicable. Without any kind of proof, they/we have to scrap units, because they are formally not repairable without performing the SB.

Questions to Honeywell: 1. Please provide final release date for SB updates to reflect latest PN effectivity 2. As interim solution please provide official statement that the SBs are also applicable to dash -005 and -006 units

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 71

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

94 TCAS Failures Boeing B787 34-42 THY

THY is badly suffering from TCAS failures on its whole B787 fleet which caused flight delays and AOG situations in outstations.

Currently there are six ea. B787 aircraft in THY’s fleet which were delivered in 2019.

After the TCAS failures, inspection of the TCAS Top Antenna area was made and a serious amount of water drops found, for the moment it is not confirmed that whether these water drops are resulted from leakage or condensation of the Moisture in the aircraft. However, after the drying of the related are faults were cleared and aircraft were released to service, wrap application was made to prevent TCAS Top Antenna in accordance with 787 MT-34-002. After a couple of weeks, TCAS failures was received again and at that time TCAS Top Antenna Harness (P/N 668Z301800-18) was needed to be replaced to clear the failure. Most probably harness had been affected from the moisture in that area.

In the previous years, Boeing made some improvements on harness design for those failures however THY has already the latest available Harness PN: 668Z301800-18.

Boeing and THY closely working on this issue to find a solution and understand the root cause of the water/moisture in that area.

THY would like to hear other operators’ experiences on this issue.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 72

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

******18-097******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Certification of TCAS PN 940-0351-005 940-0351-005 Boeing B777 Fleet 34 ETD on Boeing Fleet

Etihad A32X/330/340 and B777 fleets were equipped with Honeywell TCAS P/N 940-0351-001.

In May 2017, EASA released AD 2017-0091 due to false TCAS traffic alerts making mandatory the upgrade of Honeywell TCAS from P/N 940-0351-001 to P/N 940-0351-005 only on Airbus fleets. Apparently, the problem suffered by TCAS P/N 940-0351-001 was only affecting the Airbus fleet and not the Boeing fleet due to the different way the GPS signal is feed into the TCAS on both platforms.

As Etihad operates both Airbus and Boeing fleets, it meant that Airbus fleet needed to be upgraded to P/N 940- 0351-005 while Boeing fleet remained at P/N 940-0351-001. From the logistics point of view this creates a costly spare segregation (P/N 940-0351-005 for Airbus and P/N 940-0351-001 for Boeing) that was not there before the mandate.

For this reason, Etihad contacted Boeing thru message ETI-ETI-17-0284-02B in order to hope for Boeing to certify P/N 940-0351-005 on B777 fleet and again reach the lost commonality on the TCAS computer, but Boeing replied that there is no intention to do so.

Why Boeing does not certify P/N 940-0351-005 on B777 fleet?

Other operator’s comments and experience in case of being affected, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 73

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

95 Poor Reliability on ACSS ATC PN 9008000-10000 Boeing B777 34 ETD 9008000-10000 and Lack of Customer Support ACSS L3Harris Thales

In September 2019, Etihad started the installation of ACSS ATC transponder P/N 9008000-10000 on the B777 fleet in order to comply with the ADS-B OUT DO-260B mandate.

To our surprise, we started to see the failure and removal of ACSS ATC transponder just a few days after the units were installed, see below Table 1. Furthermore, the removed units confirmed fault in shop and most of them showed a common fault on the A3 Transceiver Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) that either required repair or replacement.

Table 1: ACSS ATC Transponder Removals on Etihad B777 Fleet up to 1 January 2020

Due to the high number of removals, Etihad fell into a shortage-of-spares situation and was unable to continue the retrofit on some aircraft as the units reserved for the retrofit were used as operational spares.

Etihad highlighted the issue to Thales (who sold us the units), but they referred us to contact ACSS in order to obtain technical support. No specific support and proactive attention were provided from ACSS other than trying to expedite the repair of the units, so they could be returned to Etihad and be used to continue the retrofit.

Finally, in November 2019, Etihad got in contact with the right people at ACSS and demanded two EAs of the ATC transponder were to be loaned FOC in order to cope with the retrofit and support the operational removals. The units arrived in December 2019 and we were able to complete the retrofit and cover the operation.

1. Why did the brand new ACSS ATC transponder P/N 9008000-10000 fail after installation? 2. Why could the technical issue not have been foreseen and fixed at the manufacturing level? 3. Why did ACSS did not provide proactive support and supply FOC loan units from the moment we started suffering the failures?

Operator comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 74

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Title Associate Airline

96 ISSPU Test 822-2120-102 Collins Aerospace B787 34-42 KLM/AFR KLM Decal

This item was submitted for the 2019 AMC as item 19-172.

Collins Aerospace places a Test Date Marking Plate (Test Label) on ISS-2100 repaired units (ISSPU). Refer to lower decal in picture attached. The maintenance regulations do not require to install the Test Label.

2019 RESPONSE – ANDERSON/COLLINS AEROSPACE: After investigating the origin of this requirement and discussing with Boeing, Collins agrees that this label should be removed. Collins is processing the design change to remove it from the Engineering drawings, which will in turn remove it from the CMM.

Collins should have removed the Test Date plate instructions from CMM 34-42-10. However, the current CMM rev 42 (25 May 2018) is still the unchanged version. Refer to the Note in par 3.A.(3) on page 1003, the Note in Procedure/Description step number 1.28 on page 1036, and Fig-Item 1 – 35 and - 35A on page 10213/10214.

Request Collins for an update on this action item.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 75

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

97 ADS-B Out Multiple Multiple Multiple 34 AAL

Now that ADS-B Out is fully implemented across the industry, could we hear about the experience of operators using SA Aware or SA On GPS under FAA exception letter 12555? Are you seeing poor performance? Or are your installations meeting the necessary performance?

Please state which GPS you are currently operating when providing a response.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

98 DO-260B ADS-B Out UAL

Now that DO-260B ADS-B Out is installed on all of United’s fleet, and DO-260B ATC transponders trigger a FAIL for a missing GPS input, GPS interference issues are now causing service interruptions to United.

• Have other operators seen an increase in service interruptions due to GPS interference? • If so, how have other operators been handling this problem?

Other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

99 B787 TAWS TDB Release Schedule ISSPU Collins Aerospace B787 34-42 UAL

UAL would again like to request that the Collins Aerospace TAWS database for the B787 ISSPU be issued at the same 56-day interval as the Honeywell EGPWS TDB updates.

In response to the previous request at the 2019 AMC, Collins estimated that a nuisance alert due to a mismatch between the B787 FMS nav database and the TAWS database would be minimal. However, the TAWS functionality provides an additional level of safety beyond what can be provided by the FMS. If a new obstacle appears (a cell tower, for example), it could take as long as 12-14 months for that data to be implemented into TAWS. The consequence can be more severe than a nuisance alert, since there could be a new potential obstacle for which no warning will be given.

UAL would like to know the views of other operators on this issue.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 76

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

100 Receiver Transmitter Module 822-2127-002, -003 Collins B787 34 ANA (RTM-2100) Aerospace

ANA has experienced failure of test step 6.8 Fiber Optic Transmit when performing automatic testing by using RFT-1000 test station.

This test step failure solved by replacing O/E converter Tektronix P6703B with ANA spare, but ANA does not understand root cause of O/E converter failure.

ANA already informed Collins Aerospace of this issue and requested Collins Aerospace to perform engineering evaluation by using ANA non-working O/E converter and ANA RTM-2100 to find root cause of O/E converter failure. The root cause of failure at test step 6.8 Fiber Optic Transmit is wrong conversion gain value of O/E converter.

Conversion gain value of ANA non-working O/E converter is 1.11 V/mW @ 1550nm. Conversion gain value of working O/E converter is 1.12 V/mW @ 1550nm or greater. On the other hand, specification of conversion gain value of O/E converter Tektronix P6703B is 1 V/mW ± 8% at DC, 1310nm.

ANA could understand that failure of test step 6.8 Fiber Optic Transmit happens due to wrong conversion gain value but there is contradiction between specification of conversion gain value of O/E converter Tektronix P6703B and Collins Aerospace response of conversion gain value.

ANA thinks that Collins Aerospace response of conversion gain value is out of tolerance of O/E converter’s specification.

Currently, ANA is requesting Collins Aerospace to explain contradiction of conversion gain value of O/E converter but Collins Aerospace has not respond to ANA yet.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

101 DAA-4A Drive Unit 2041444-04XX Honeywell A320 34 ANA Woodward MPC (WMPC) B767 B777

This is an additional input related with AMC item 19-175. (Follow-up item)

Honeywell submitted a letter to Woodward MPC to provide required parts, tools and material for ANA to perform repair and overhaul of drive motor, but Woodward MPC has not responded to Honeywell and ANA yet. Meanwhile, Honeywell released SIL D201911000111 to deactivate drive motor CMM 31-09-82 revision 1. There is no way of repair and overhaul of drive motor by the operator due to SIL release.

ANA is not able to accept this situation as the following reason. 1. ANA believes that operator is able to reduce maintenance cost and TAT of drive motor. 2. ANA knows that New Hampshire Ball Bearings, who is the manufacturer of the drive motor bearing, are manufacturing drive motor bearing of DAA-4A Drive Unit P/N 2041444-0422 and are delivering to Woodward MPC, but New Hampshire Ball Bearings informed ANA that ANA has to purchase the drive motor bearing by Woodward MPC.

Woodward MPC, please advise why Woodward MPC is not able to provide required tool, material and parts for operator. Is there any good way to perform repair and overhaul of drive motor by the operator?

Honeywell, Woodward MPC (WMPC) and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 77

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

******19-175******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

DAA-4A Drive Unit 2041444-04XX Honeywell A320 34 ANA Woodward MPC (WMPC) B767 B777

This is an additional input related with AMC item 18-091 (Follow-up item).

Honeywell’s response to this drive unit motor's repair and overhaul issue is as follows at AMC 2018 in Dallas: “Honeywell plans to create drawing, as well as update the two CMMs 31-09-81 (3001-81) and 31-09-82 (3001-82) by the end of Q3 2018.”

ANA communicated with Honeywell periodically to confirm progress of drive motor CMM revision and Honeywell informed ANA that Honeywell is not able to revise these CMM for the following reason: “Woodward-MPC is not willing to support other entities in the repair and overhaul of these units, consequently Honeywell will not be able to update the CMM with orderable parts as ANA has requested.”

On the other hand, ANA communicated with Woodward MPC about this issue and Woodward MPC's response is as follows: “Woodward does not have PMA, or any license, so we cannot sell parts. In addition, we are restricted from selling parts directly to airlines.”

ANA thinks that there are different opinions between Honeywell and Woodward MPC and Honeywell should take the lead to solve this issue.

ANA believes that operator is able to perform drive motor’s repair and overhaul in accordance with DAA-4A CMM and drive motor CMM.

Honeywell, please take the lead in resolving this issue and provide a solution to ANA.

Other operators, please comment if you are performing drive motor repair and overhaul by yourselves.

Honeywell, Woodward MPC (WMPC), and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 78

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

******19-178******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

WXR Transceiver (WRT-2100) 822-1710-002 Collins Aerospace B777 34 ANA Boeing

This is an additional input related with AMC item 18-088 (Follow-up item).

Boeing proposed wiring change for B777 single installation of Collins Aerospace WXR concerning TERRAIN/WXR relays at AMC 2018 in Dallas. ANA performed jumper wire implementation at TERRAIN/WXR relays and monitored whether weather nuisance message will be reduced or not but it was unsuccessful. Jumper wire implementation at TERRAIN/WXR relays could not reduce weather nuisance message.

On the other hand, ANA found that Boeing has created FTD 777-FTD-34-18005 concerning weather nuisance message. FTD 777-FTD-34-18005 mentions the following contents: “Supplier Rockwell Collins has identified the root cause and is performing regression testing on the proposed solution to address this nuisance fault.”

ANA asked Collins Aerospace whether this FTD is for the single weather installation or not and ANA understood that this FTD is for the dual weather installation from Collins Aerospace’s response.

Currently Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and ANA are searching the next additional leads.

Boeing, is there the other possible cause of this weather nuisance message at aircraft side? Please provide the corrective action for this issue.

Boeing, Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 79

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

102 WRT-2100 Receiver- 822-1710-002, -312, -411 Collins Aerospace B737NG 34 ANA Transmitter B777 A320Neo

ANA has experienced failure of Audio Gain Test at WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-002 with Mod 10 and 822-1710-312, -411. These WRT-2100 are using different test software part number but they have the same phenomenon as the following snapshot.

Ground level is shifted up from ground to +5 VAC. Hence sine wave is shifted to positive side.

WRT-2100 Test bench which ANA has cannot measure LO signal correctly and then voice of windshear alert becomes faint voice. It means that ANA shop technician cannot hear windshear alert correctly.

ANA already informed this issue to Collins Aerospace and understands that ANA shop and Collins Aerospace service center use different software part number as follows.

ANA shop uses the following test software part number. • P/N 831-4265-815 (PROG number 832-2601-815) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-002. • P/N 831-4265-105 (PROG number 832-2601-105) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-312, -411.

Collins Aerospace service center uses the following test software part number. • P/N 831-4265-817 (PROG number 832-2601-817) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-002. • P/N 831-4265-106 (PROG number 832-2601-106) for WRT-2100 P/N 822-1710-312, -411.

ANA purchased same two test software which Collins Aerospace service center uses and confirmed whether audio gain test failure issue of ANA shop is fixed but it was unsuccessful. The same phenomenon happened again.

Currently, ANA is requesting Collins Aerospace to provide the next corrective action for ANA to solve audio gain test failure issue.

Other operators, please comment if you have experienced the same issue of ANA at your shop.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 80

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

******19-181******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

WXR Radar Antenna Flat Plat 622-5137-601 Collins Aerospace B787-9 34-42 VIR Corrosion

VAA has recently had to replace a Weather Radar Antenna flat plate due to excessive corrosion after three years’ service.

This is a high cost item.

1. Have any other operators had similar experiences? 2. Is there any corrosion protection process that Collins recommends? 3. Why does warranty not cover this?

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 81

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

103 Poor Reliability of Wx Radar RDR- 930-2000-001 Airbus A32X 34 ETD 4000 Transmitter-Receiver (TR) 930-2000-020 Honeywell A330

Etihad A32X/330 fleets are equipped with Honeywell RDR-4000 and the RTU P/N 930-2000-001 is one of the Wx radar components.

During 2016 and 2017, Etihad suffered poor reliability of the RTU P/N 930-2000-001 and at that time, it was advised to embody VSB 930-2000-34-4 (MOD 30), which installs a new diode in the Synthesizer CCA, evolving its PN to 722-4411-020. Etihad units sent to Honeywell for MOD 30 embodiment ended up being equipped with a new Synthesizer CCA PN 722-4411-030 (VSB 930-2000-34-5) at a higher cost.

Since January 2018, Etihad A32X fleet suffered 21 removals of the “modified” RTU PN 930-2000-001 in a fleet of around 30 aircraft. Out of the 21 removals, only 4 units were declared NFF, the Synthesizer CCA and TRC module being the main source of failure and replacement in order to repair the units.

In September 2019, Etihad contacted Honeywell, providing all the removal data and shop report due to the unacceptable reliability of RTU P/N 930-2000-001 and highlighted some cases in which the units suffered TRC module replacement and a few months later Synthesizer CCA replacement, and on and on.

Honeywell came back, stating that RTU PN 930-2000-001 became obsolete and new RTU PN 930-2000-020 has been certified in order to improve the RTU reliability and face obsolescence. Nonetheless, Honeywell did not recommend to Etihad the upgrade of the RTU PN 930-2000-001 into PN 930-2000-020, as according to Honeywell the new PN 930-2000-020 also suffered significant reliability issues. This was ratified by Airbus on the 13th Dec. 2019, when TFU 34.41.00101 (Honeywell - WXR - RTU P/N 930-2000-020 reliability) was released.

In summary, during 2016 and 2017, Etihad pumped thousands and thousands of dollars in the embodiment of a modification that was supposed to improve the reliability of the RTU PN 930-2000-001, but during 2018 and 2019, the unit kept failing and thousands and thousands of dollars were required to repair the units and keep them in operation.

When is Honeywell supposed to improve the reliability of the RTU PN 930-2000-001 or PN 930-2000-020?

Operator comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 82

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

******19-182******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Radar Drive Assembly 822-2131-003 Collins Aerospace B787 34 ANA (DRV-2120)

This is an additional input related with AMC item 18-108 (Follow-up item).

As result of discussion with Collins Aerospace concerning DRV-2120 failure after AMC 2018 in Dallas, ANA understood that encoder disk failure has intensive tendency. There are two issue of defacement and scratch concerning encoder disk failure.

Defacement: Scratch:

Collins Aerospace performed the best practice at all Collins Aerospace service center to avoid scratch of encoder disk when assembly. Collins Aerospace completed implementation of the best practice at all Collins Aerospace service center March 2018.

ANA feels that the number of cases of scratch of encoder disk is reduced, but ANA still has experienced defacement of encoder disk after performing the best practice at all Collins Aerospace service centers.

ANA already informed Collins Aerospace of this issue that defacement of encoder disk still exists, and ANA thinks defacement of encoder disk happens due to intense temperature change because the encoder disk repeatedly suffers tough conditions.

Currently, Collins Aerospace is performing the failure trend analysis of encoder failure.

Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries: 1. Please provide a timeline of encoder disk failure to have corrective action. 2. Did Collins Aerospace already complete the failure trend analysis of encoder failure? 3. What is root cause of encoder disk failure?

Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 83

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

104 GPS (SBAS) for 2025 N/A Collins Aerospace All 34 AZU Thales Honeywell

In 2025, USA will require airplanes to have GPS with SBAS features when flying in USA airspace.

We would like to know the manufacturers’ schedules to satisfy this requirement.

Aiframer, supplier, and operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

105 Capacitor No Longer 2041167-370X / DME Honeywell A320 34 UAL Available Interrogator A319

Part number 09710384-0003 is no longer available from Honeywell and there is no generic part number. This capacitor is a high failure item. UA would like for Honeywell to supply a substitute part number.

Airbus, Operators and Honeywell comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

106 Repair Fee Policy 822-1465-001 VOR/ILS/MKR Collins Aerospace ATR72 34 EVA RCVR UNI

VOR/ILS/MKR RCVR, P/N 822-1465-001, had been sent to Collins for repair.

However, Collins informed us that they would only do an exchange for VOR/ILS/MKR RCVR, P/N 822-1465-001, instead of repair, and charge an exchange fee. If EVA insists on having the original serial number back due to NFF, Collins would still charge with same price as the exchange fee.

The repair policy is not reasonable to the operator; therefore, EVA would like Collins to adjust NFF charge, and advise your repair charge policy.

Operator, ATR, and Collins comment please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 84

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

107 LRRA RCVR/TXMR 822-0334-003 Collins Aerospace B737NG 34 ANA

ANA experienced diversion due to a loss of FD command bars and NO AUTOLAND message appeared on B737NG airplane. MMSG 22-11052 and 22-11054 were also confirmed during troubleshooting. Boeing has issued 737NG-FTD-34-15002 and informed that this condition could be caused by an intermittent LRRA coax cable/antenna attachment. They also recommended that operators inspect LRRA coax cable connection as an interim action in the FTD.

ANA investigated our maintenance record to see the number of occurrences of MMSG 22-11052 and 22-11054 (MMSG 22-11051 and 22-11053) recorded since 2017 and found that MMSGs have been recorded randomly throughout ANA’s B737NG fleet, but we have not seen the MMSGs chronically on one airplane. If there is an issue in LRRA coax cable connection, ANA thinks that we should see these MMSGs more often repeatedly in one airplane.

ANA thinks that the problem on this issue is that NO AUTOLAND Message will be latched once this condition is detected and it will not be reset until power to the LRRA is cycled via its circuit breaker or by cycling aircraft power. Depending on weather condition, we have to divert if under CAT lllb operation.

ANA would like to request Boeing and Collins Aerospace to consider a solution so a latched NO AUTOLAND message can be reset automatically or manually by pilot if it happened by an intermittent failure.

ANA would appreciate other operator’s comments and best practices if experienced a similar issue.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

108 757/767 MCP Reliability PN 622-4717-003/004 Collins B757 UAL Improvement Aerospace B767

Premature failure of knobs and backlights are one of the main reasons which degrades reliability of MCPs. What has Collins done to improve reliability of these units?

As this problem is faced by all airlines, are Boeing/Collins collaborating to create a better solution to this problem?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 85

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

109 Seal Panel 827-2861-001 622-8001-350 Collins B737 34-22-66 LTH Obsolete Aerospace

Background:

Seal Gasket Panel 827-2861-001 of EFIS Control Panel 622-8001-xxx (ATA 34-22-66) became obsolete in mid- 2019. OEM Collins Aerospace does not provide an alternate solution and refers to Boeing.

Boeing’s answer:

After Boeing supply chain conference call with Collins, Collins has confirmed that Service Information Letter SIL 19-1, publication number 523-0829195 to be released Mid-October 2020 will address and confirm the obsolescence of the top assembly part number EFIS panel (622-8001-352). Collins also confirmed that, after engineering analysis, there is no compatible replacement for the sub assembly Seal Panel P/N 827-2861-001, since the top assembly part number is obsolete.

Collins has advised that operators can purchase the top-level assembly aftermarket unit to acquire any spare parts that are needed. Collins was able to confirm through their INTERTRADE aftermarket support system that "there are available aftermarket units, both removed as is and tagged serviceable" for the top-level assembly part.

Question:

LHT is not satisfied with the solution Boeing gives. Seal Gasket Panel 827-2861-001 in nominal. A serviceable LRU costs thousands of dollars. LHT asks Collins to provide a replacement part for 827-2861-001.

Boeing, Collins, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

110 ADF Receiver (DFA-75B) 066-50014-1101 Honeywell B787 34 ANA

ANA experienced delay due to system anomaly (No R ADF POINTER identification and No ID tone) on B787-9 airplane. ADF receiver removed and sent to repair and found to have bad IC U8015 (Antenna Power Switch on Receiver Module).

Bad U8015 is known issue (as 2015 AMC), and baking process change had been implemented as corrective action in accordance with Honeywell letter; S/N cut-in DF75B-09231. However, the bad U8015 has been implemented new baking process change. According to ANA’s experience, repair report from 2016 indicates nine (9) U8015, which had been implemented NEW baking process, failed again.

ANA would like Honeywell to investigate the U8015 failures which have implemented new baking process.

Other operator and Honeywell comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 86

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

111 DME Transceiver (DME-2100) 822-2325-001 Collins Aerospace B777 34 ANA

The first B777 with DME-2100 was delivered to ANA in July 2019.

ANA has experienced several “DME Flag” events on B777 with DME-2100 at London Heathrow Airport (LHR) since last August. Our pilots reported that DME Flag appeared on Both PFDs during LHR approach and DME Flag disappeared after block in. Our mechanic also confirmed that there was no related Maintenance Message in CMC (PLF, Existing Fault, Present Fault) and GND TEST was passed with NO Fault.

Since ANA has never experienced this issue except LHR, then ANA believes that peculiarity of LHR affects the DME Flag event. • Peculiarity of LHR : Terminal DME reads 0.0 at runway threshold (Airplanes fly over D0.0 point just before landing)

Fig. 1 – DME Flag Appeared During LHR Approach

D 0.0

Fig. 2 – Terminal Chart of LHR Airport

ANA operates both B777s with DME-900 and B777s with DME-2100 in HND-LHR route, but DME Flag has never appeared on DME-900 during approach at LHR. To study the different behaviors of DME-2100 and DME-900, ANA did the simulation of “over the DME station” by using IFR-6000 on the ground. We confirmed that DME Flag appeared on the DME-2100 during over the station, but DME Flag did not appear on the DME-900.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 87

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Over the Station of B777 with DME-2100

DME indication shows “0.0” and DME Flag.

Over the Station of B777 with DME-900

DME indication shows “---” and No DME Flag. Fig. 3 – Behaviors of DME-2100 and DME-900 During over the Station

Boeing recognized this issue and confirmed that this flag is nuisance. However, ANA was informed that Boeing would not fix this issue.

ANA concerns about possible flight diversions due to this nuisance DME Flag, especially in foggy situation because CAT II/III approach procedures require the DME readout. ANA would like Boeing to correct the appropriate software to prevent nuisance DME Flag.

Other operator, Collins and Boeing comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

112 Degradation of 174101-xx-02 GE Aviation B737NG 34-60 KLM/AFR KLM MCDU Keyboard 174101-xx-03

Referring to AMC 14-070 item 118; 17-077 item 105; 18-081 item 103; 19-013 item 171:

During several years, remarks have been made about the degradation of the MCDU Keyboards. Several Service Bulletins (SBs) are created to fix this issue promising increase durability and reliability with increasing costs. So far, no SB’s has significantly increase the MTBUR of the MCDU keypad. High flow of MCDU’s is traced back to keyboards failing. During the last AMC, GE Aviation committed on releasing a Service Bulletin about counteracting the degradation of the MCDU Keyboards. Today, we are in the end of the 1st quarter of 2020 and we are still waiting for the publication.

Could GE Aviation let us know when the proposed Service Bulletin will be ready?

Could Boeing accelerate evaluating this Service Bulletin for GE Aviation?

Comments from other operators (or OEM, OAM) are highly appreciated.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 88

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

******19-171******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Degradation of 174101-02-01 GE Aviation B787-800 34 JAL MCDU Keypad 174101-03-01 174101-02-02 174101-02-03

This item is the continuation from the last AMC 17-103 and 104.

For the wear resistance improvement of existing rubber type keypads, JAL has been exchanging to the hard type keypads since last year, and the numbers have been reached to 12 of the units. The conditions of keypads are going well as expected at this time.

However, still the hard type keypads have only been assigned for 174101-02-01.

JAL understands GE Aviation is in the process of expanding target units and will be released the SB for PN: 1741010-03-01, 174101-02-02 and 174101-02-03. JAL is awaiting the SB to be released and would like to hear about its target date.

Comments from GE Aviation would be appreciated.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

113 MCDU 4077880-902 Honeywell B767 34 ANA

Request: ANA would like to know the target schedule when Honeywell become able to perform the BM-5A color correlation.

If Honeywell cannot show the schedule, please provide the alternative equipment except PR-1980A as soon as possible.

Background: ANA has been waiting for the color correlation completion of MCDU test equipment (BM-5A) since last September.

Honeywell said Honeywell cannot perform the color correlation due to the defective of their standard equipment (display unit) and there is no target date when it will get back to normal.

Even if it is difficult to procure new/used standard display unit, ANA believe Honeywell should show the solution to the customer since Honeywell is the only company to perform the color correlation. Please note that if this situation is expected to remain unchanged, airline become unable to support B767 Fleet.

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 89

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

114 757/767 Peg 2 FMC Flight Management Honeywell B757 34-61 UAL Implementation Computer B767

UAL would like to know if other operators are installing the Peg 2 FMC on their 757 or 767 fleets. If so, have they developed any solutions for loading the NDB every 28 days, other than installing new Ethernet wiring from the E&E compartment to the cockpit?

UAL would like to know if Honeywell would consider certifying a version of the Peg 2 FMC with an Ethernet connector on the front of the box to allow a plug-and-play installation without taking the airplane out of service for an extended period to install new wiring for software loading.

UAL would appreciate other operators’ views on this.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

115 GE FMS U14 OPS Mandate Multiple Boeing B737NG 31 AAL GE B737MAX 34 SWA Honeywell Collins Aerospace BAE

Our understanding is that Boeing is advocating to have U14 OPS mandated across NG and MAX airframes. This will present several issues that include incompatibility with BAE HUD 2020 and Collins HGS-2350. The HUD incompatibility exists because U12 and above require DEU BP15 software. Another issue is an understanding that U14 is also not compatible with the GE 2907A4 FMC LRU (MPN 171497-05-01).

For AAL, this would potentially push into a full HUD swap and Dual FMC swap impacting 76 aircraft representing 25% of our 737 fleet. In turn, this would most likely put AAL in the position of not being able to comply with an anticipated 12-month compliance date. This is not just a simple software load. The BAE HUD incompatibility is documented in the Boeing SBs for U12 and U13.

SWA operates close to 200 aircraft with the HGS-2350 system, more than half of those also have the older A4 flight management computers. We have maintained these airplanes at CDS Block Point 6 software to avoid the display blanking issue. We have previous guidance from Boeing that the display blanking is considered an incompatibility issue, and we agree. However, now Boeing is saying that the combination of new BP software with older HGS is approved and works correctly “except for the blanking” which is now advertised as “not that bad”. We cannot have Boeing recommending (and the regulator mandating) a configuration that the manufacturer has already deemed incompatible.

We welcome comments of support and/or experience from other airlines. We also would like to hear from Boeing and the four vendors involved indicating that they are already or willing to coordinate for a better outcome.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 90

NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

116 Delay in the Release of AIMS-2 BP V17B N/A Boeing B777 34 ETD Honeywell

Within the frame of the Performance Based Communication and Surveillance (PBCS) over oceanic areas, operators were required to meet the Required Communication Performance (RCP) of 240 seconds and Required Surveillance Performance (RSP) of 180 seconds. This requirement became effective from the 29th March 2018 over North Atlantic and Asia Pacific Flight Information Regions (FIR).

According to Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777-FTD-34-17001, the B777 fleet equipped with Airplane Information Management System 2 (AIMS-2) shall be upgraded to Blockpoint (BP) V17B software version in order to comply with the required RCP240 and RSP180.

In March 2018, Boeing communicated to Etihad (Service Request #3-4153161993) the availability of BP V17B software by Q1 2019. Later on, in May 2019 (Service Request #4-4480393063), it was communicated that the release of BP V17B software will be delayed till Q1 2020.

Can Boeing and Honeywell explain the reasons on the continuous delay of B777 AIMS-2 BP V17B, which is required to comply with the PBCS RCP240 and RSP180 effective since March 2018?

Operators comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 91

GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & SPECIAL TOOLING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

117 Piece Part & E2144x000-1 / Safran A350 32 AFR/KLM AFR Tooling Quotation TPIS A350 Electronic and Defense

Air France has requested a quotation for three parts of the Static TPIS also considered as Tools for Rotating TPIS. The initial demand was made in July 2019. Safran has stated that they are facing internal difficulties to answer this request.

Kit Antenna P/N 262204957 (CMM 32-49-24) / Kit Antenna P/N 261729033-0201 (CMM 32-49-22) / Kit Antenna P/N 261729020-0201 (CMM 32-49-25)

Piece parts quotation should not take so long to be issued as many operators now fly the aircraft and the CMM clearly lists these parts as procurable.

Safran, could you commit to a date to fulfill our request?

Safran and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

118 Tooling Quote 2100-1227-02 / L3Harris A350 23 AFR/KLM AFR FA2100 CVR

Air France has requested from L3 a quote for tools and software of the Cockpit Voice Recorder of the A350. The first request has been made in September 2018 and discussed at the AMC in 2019, then during the UK MRO in October 2019. We still have not received an answer on this request.

L3, could you please answer this request with a firm commitment?

Airbus, comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

119 Tooling Quotation 8730Bx-1 / Collins B787 23 AFR/KLM AFR and TSDP SCIU Aerospace / Rosemount

Air France has requested from Collins (Rosemount) a quote for tools and software of the Security Camera Interface Unit (SCIU). The first request has been made in June 2018 and discussed at the AMC in 2019. Collins had planned to answer by August 2019, then delayed to December 2019. We still have not received an answer.

Collins please, could you answer this long due request with a firm commitment?

Collins and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 92

GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & SPECIAL TOOLING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

120 A350 Test CIDS Airbus Cabin A350 23 AFR/KLM AFR Equipment Electronics

Air France has been asking for a quotation of the Test Equipment and TSDP of the A350 CIDS from Airbus Cabin Electronics. The initial request has been made in Q2 2017. Despite several meetings and emails, Airbus Cabin Electronics has not answered with a clear proposal.

Airbus Cabin Electronics, Airbus, comments please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 93

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Title Associate Airline

121 HF Collins Aerospace B787 23 KLM/AFR KLM Boeing

Reference is made to questions: 19-101, 17-117, 18-128, and 19-102.

AMC, Prague 2019, Boeing’s attitude was very promising with statement that we can redirect warranty claims from Collins to Boeing.

Some background:

We are sure that the whole B787 community knows KLM’s issue regarding moisture ingression is not an isolated case. We detected the problem five years ago and reported it to Boeing and Collins. We also submitted the AMC question. Based on the KLM AMC question, other airlines checked their situation and found that they also had a problem. In the first place, everybody was submitting warranty claims to Collins because the HF Transceiver was damaged by moisture ingression. Collins announced that they would reject every warranty claim because it was not a problem of the HF Transceiver. The HF is built by Collins, according to the Boeing Specification, and we should go to Boeing with our claims.

Boeing promised to fix it (already 4 years ago) but the SB was not issued because Boeing was doing a thorough investigation to find the root course. The SB was postponed every year for period of a year and there is still no resolution to the problem. In the meantime, we are patiently repairing the HF’s and sending claims to Boeing. Our claims were rejected every time. Therefore, we resubmitted the question for AMC 2019 and many airlines supported us in that discussion. We were quite happy to learn that Boeing at AMC 2019 agreed with us and would accept the claims.

Nevertheless, Boeing is still rejecting our claims.

Before we hear any answer or explanation from Boeing’s side, we would like to emphasize that:

a. We have purchased the B787 in full faith that the airplanes will work properly. b. You certified the subject HF transceiver for use on the B787 under B787 TC. The installation should at least be compliant with Federal requirements:

FAR §25.1301 Function and installation.

(1) Be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function; (3) Be installed according to limitations specified for that equipment; and (4) Function properly when installed.

§25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.

(a) The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchapter, must be designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition.

Installation of HF Transceiver is definitely not fully compliant with the above FAR. The unit is not performing the intended function because the operating conditions are not fulfilled. Due to water intrusion, the unit is damaged during the flight and stops operating. It is foreseeable that the situation can occur, and Boeing did nothing to prevent it. Also 5 years ago when situation was discovered, Boeing did not respond adequately to fix the problem. Instead of fixing the problem, Boeing endlessly investigated the root course and postponed the SB.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 94

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

c. We understand Collins position. Legally, they might have a case which is: “We built the LRU according to Boeing Specifications.” Boeing had enough time to change the specification and transfer the responsibility to Collins and airlines. Nothing was done in that respect. d. Be aware, the situation that airlines are caught in is very unpleasant. Boeing and Collins are pointing at each other and in the meantime, airlines are spending cash repairing HF Transceivers knowing that the water intrusion will occur again and that the costs will come again. e. I am not trying to speculate, but at certain moment there might occur serious damage (fire) in the aircraft due to a short in the power supply of the HF Transceiver due to damage by water. That will be the moment that the whole world will ask, “Boeing! What is going on with HF Transceivers?” At that moment, we will be able to show the whole paper trail in attempts to urge Boeing to fix the problem and accept the warranties. f. There is one more thing that we would like to emphasize. The costs of repairs of HF Transceiver will stop the moment that the problem in the B787 is solved. Until then, we will keep issuing the warranty claims.

The present situation, which has continuously been going on for five years now, is not acceptable and we will keep escalating it until we reach satisfactory resolution. For us, it is not acceptable that airlines are supposed to assimilate the costs knowing that Boeing specified the LRU and installed it in Boeing manufactured aircraft which is purchased in good faith by the KLM (and many other operators). Boeing introduced the damage and Boeing should accept the costs of non-quality.

In view of the above, we strongly request that Boeing accepts our warranty claims and solve the HF Transceiver problem once and for all.

Boeing and Collins, please comment! Other operators, please comment!

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 95

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

******19-101******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

HFS-900D HF Transceiver 822-0990-120 Collins Aerospace B787 23 ANA Boeing

This issue is related to AMC item 17-117.

ANA has experienced that internal boards of some HFS-900Ds have corrosion and short circuit due to moisture ingress from CMDU wire bundle.

ANA is applying sealant at AFT cargo door cheek dripshield in accordance with Boeing SB B787-81205-SB250159-00 to avoid this moisture ingress issue, but ANA understands that application of sealant is interim action and Boeing has plans concerning additional protection of moisture ingress into left HFS-900D by introducing a new drip shield between the CMDU and the HFS-900D.

This information is provided by FTD 787-FTD-23-18005.

Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries.

Boeing, please provide milestones of SB release concerning introduction of a new drip shield.

Boeing and other operator comments, please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 96

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

******17-117******

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Title Associate Airline

HFS-900D 822-0990-120 Rockwell Collins B787 23 KLM/AFR KLM Boeing

Reference is made to Question 136 from the 2016 AMC and to Boeing’s 787-FTD-38-13006:

KLM still sees many units (HFS-900D) delivered to the shop with moisture damage. Boeing announced during last year’s AMC: “The issue is now being reviewed by Boeing Equipment Installation Engineering to assess how effective the drip shield over the electronics rack is in protecting the HF Transceiver from moisture intrusion. At this time, Boeing is actively discussing the development of an improved protection or modifying the drip shield.”

Changes (i.e., production incorporation) for drip shield/water line shroud installation in Forward EE Bay is scheduled for Feb 2017. Why does this take such a long time (compared to the Aft EE bay solutions)?

*****18-128*****

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

HF Transceiver Moisture 822-0990-120 HFS-900D Rockwell Collins B787 23 VIR Ingress

Reference is made to Q136 from 2016 AMC and Q117 from 2017 AMC.

VAA has suffered many removals of HF Transceivers from the B787 fleet due to moisture ingress issues (25 removals in total, 21 confirmed due to moisture damage). VAA is embodying SB 787-24-0159 but strongly believes this is not a final fix for this issue.

The application of tape above the CMDU panel partially addresses one leakage path only. VAA has seen the same failure mode after the SB has been embodied, albeit the removal rate has slowed.

VAA has discussed this at length with Boeing, but is frustrated with the lack of progress to properly address the problem. Boeing has suggested that operators should look at engineering their own solution, which is not acceptable. Warranty is being denied on the removed units, so it is costing a lot of money.

VAA would like to encourage other operators who see this issue, to report to Boeing via a Service Request.

Other operator and Boeing comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 97

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

******19-102******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

HF Transceiver Moisture Ingress Boeing B787 23 VIR

VAA refers to Items 127 and 128 from last year. According to 787-FTD-23-18005, the latest information from Boeing is: “Change Committed: November 2018 (target) Production Incorporation: TBD Service Bulletin Available: TBD”

Can Boeing please provide an update on when the SB is expected to be released and will kits be available for Operators to at least target the problem aircraft straight away? Will the SB be FOC?

Is Boeing willing to accept warranty claims for the repairs to the HF transceivers due to moisture ingress to date since the SB release admits the problem with the original installation design?

Boeing and other operator comments please.

******19-096******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

SDU 7516118-27010 Honeywell B777 23 ANA

This is an additional input related with AMC item 17-115 (Follow-up item).

Honeywell released SB 7516118-23-0028 May 18, 2018, to introduce new DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Module), but this SB does not have effectivity of P/N 7516118-27010, which is installed in ANA B777 fleet.

ANA requested Honeywell to add effectivity of P/N 7516118-27010 to SB 7516118-23-0028, but Honeywell response is as follows: “We do not have approval from Boeing to utilize the new DRFM for future repairs on the 7516118-27010 (SD-700 for non-Airbus applications). There will not be a Service Bulletin announcing any change to the SD-700 for using the DRFM.”

Honeywell’s response disappointed ANA because ANA expected that introduction of DRFM would improve SDU reliability.

Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following inquiries: 1. Please provide the root cause of ARFM failure which is introduced in SB 7516118-23-0021. 2. Please provide other Honeywell proposals to address ARFM failure.

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 98

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

*****18-125*****

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

VHF Frequency Change 822-2211-101 Rockwell Collins B787 23 ANA TCP-2100

ANA has been encountering VHF frequency change between “ACTIVE” and “STBY” without XFR switch push on the TCP. Thirty-one (31) events have been reported for 3 years (Y2015 to Y2017). In most of the cases, flight crew notes the frequency change when they are called on emergency frequency by ATC. This could be a safety issue due to lost communication during a critical phase. However, no mitigation action has been given.

Boeing, suppliers, and other operators, please comment.

******19-098******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

VHF Frequency Change 822-2211-101 Collins Aerospace B787 23 ANA TCP-2100

This item was discussed at last year’s AMC (Item 18-125).

ANA has experienced over 50 incidents of Uncommanded Frequency Change on the TCP and a few other operators have had similar experiences. Details of the problem can be found in the referenced FTD.

The issue has been identified as a Safety Service Related Problem and Boeing/Collins Aerospace is developing a new TCP software to rectify this problem.

Boeing and Collins Aerospace, please provide an update on the development of the software and schedule.

References: FTD: FTD-23-18006 MOM: MOM-MOM-18-0504-01B

Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 99

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

122 EVR (Enhanced VHF Radio) EVR716-11-0350A De Havilland Q400 23 ANA Thales

Flight crew which is receiver side heard voice of transmitter side when using above frequency pairs. It means that voice of receiver side is blocked by transmitter side. Thales SIL THAV/SIL-1240 mentions that there is a possibility that squelch circuit would open if two frequencies selected VHF 1 and VHF 2 are separated by less than 2 MHz but shift of ANA experience is more than 2 MHz.

ANA already informed this radio interference issue to Thales and Thales investigated this radio interference issue. As result of Thales’s investigation, this radio interference happens due to the following reason.

If harmonic selected frequency (receiver side) of intermediate frequency (21.4 MHz) and harmonic incoming frequency (transmitter side) of intermediate frequency (21.4 MHz) are matched, squelch circuit could be opened around -25 dBm. EVR is designed that undesired response is less than -33 dBm in accordance with MOPS recommendation. Hence, ANA has understood that this radio interference issue happens within EVR specification and needs EVR design change to address this radio interference issue.

Currently, ANA has been working with De Havilland and Thales to address this radio interference issue. This radio interference issue is safety issue for flight operation. Hence, ANA thinks that De Havilland and Thales have to provide a solution for the operator.

Other operators, please comment if you has experienced a same issue like ANA. Share of frequency pair information would be highly appreciated.

De Havilland, Thales and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

123 ELT – RESCU 406AFN2 51090414-1 Honeywell B787 23-24-12 ELY

We are looking training for ELT PN: 51090414-1from Honeywell.

Can Honeywell assist in this issue?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 100

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

******19-104******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Repair Discontinuity of ELT Fixed: RESCU 406AP, Honeywell All 23 KAL 406AF, 406AFN Portable: RESCU 406SE

Honeywell recently changed the repair policy with Battery replacement for Fixed and Portable ELT. • Applicable model: all existing ELT models of Fixed RESCU 406AP, 406AF, 406AFN/Portable RESCU 406SE • Honeywell will discontinue the battery replacement service no later than June 30, 2019. • Moreover, Honeywell will also discontinue the repair of ELTs no later than the end of year 2021.

The ELT Battery is replaced as per their TRP cycle, so KAL should replace total 374 units (Fixed 160 and Portable 214). This is so big burden for KAL, because it amounts to 2 million USDs.

We understand that new type ELT installation on the aircraft to be delivered in production line is reasonable. However, we cannot understand why operators put up with the change of all existing ELT to 406AFN2 and 406SG, because this issue is a product design problem, and this is the one-way change of Honeywell repair policy.

KAL strongly requests Honeywell to continue to maintain the battery replacement and repair of existing ELTs.

Vendor comments, please.

******19-108******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

EFB Docking 822-2773-201 Rockwell Collins A350 46 AFR/KLM AFR Station

AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOCKING STATION DS-2200

This Docking Station (DS) is an equipment provided by Rockwell Collins under P/N Rockwell, but this OEM is neither the manufacturer nor the repair station of the DS. The real manufacturer and repairer is RITEC and the FAA form part 145 issued by RITEC informs that the DS is a PMA repaired according to CMM RITEC 100737A (as per FAA form and certificate of conformance in annex); however, this CMM is not procurable and not approved in the Airbus documentation, it is the CMM 462001 from Rockwell Collins which is approved in the Airbus documentation.

Air France requests to Airbus and Rockwell Collins to solve this issue and make official the correct CMM (reference and availability on Airbus World).

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 101

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Airbus, Rockwell Collins, and FAA comment please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 102

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

******19-113******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

B787 Terminal Cellular System 2250100-01 Boeing B787 46 VIR

VAA refers to item 173 from last year. VAA understands that Boeing are working on developing a replacement for the Terminal Cellular Unit, known as the WWU.

As 3G technology is retired around the world, will operators will be forced into upgrading to the WWU to take advantage of 4G, but operators with TCS have already paid for a system which comes as an option on B787? As VAA does not have TWLU, VAA is very concerned about future developments of the TCS system.

Other operator and Boeing comments please.

******19-115******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

B787 Core Network Troubleshooting Boeing B787 46 VIR Collins

VAA has a lot of problems troubleshooting core network defects on B787 aircraft. This is often because more than one Maintenance Message is generated in AHM and the FIM points in different directions. Some Maintenance Messages appear to be nuisance. VAA usually has to engage Boeing for help which can be a time-consuming process if the defect is on MEL. Boeing often request log files to analyze, which takes time to get if the defect means the aircraft is not connecting to the ground network.

VAA believes some Core Network training would be useful to increase knowledge and understanding to help troubleshoot the system more effectively. VAA would like to know if other operators has similar issues with the core network on B787 and would training be useful?

Is this something that Boeing/Collins would be prepared to commit?

Boeing and other operator comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 103

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

124 Cabin Configuration CIDS Airbus Cabin Airbus 23 AFR/KLM AFR Management Electronics Airbus

On Airbus aircraft family, Airbus Cabin Electronics is the provider of the whole CIDS system, including the Flight Attendant Panel and the Attendant Indication Panel. These LRUs are visible in the cabin; their color is a choice operators can make when buying an aircraft. With many different color variations of an LRU technically interchangeable, it makes the cabin visual management and stock management extremely complicated. Unfortunately, the A350 has received the same treatment.

Example: according to ISI 23.73.00021, FAP P/N Z133H0xxx:

The Sub panel front can be of four different colors and the Cover coil for hardkey can also be of four different colors.

As a result, the number of existing configurations is overwhelming, and Part Numbers are not interchangeable despite being so close in color.

Example of two different colors of Sub panel front on two FAPs:

Air France understands the need for Airbus to offer customization of the cabin. However, other options exist like having covers or shrouds separate from the LRU itself. This has been done on other aircraft platforms and considerably alleviates the burden for operators, as well as the total cost of ownership of these LRUs. In a changing world looking for reasonable consumption, durable utilization, Air France expects more long-term thinking during the design of this product.

Is this a demand from Airbus in the design phase or a choice from ACE to have an inseparable cover from the LRU and so many little variations of colors?

Operators, Airbus Cabin Electronics, Airbus, comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 104

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

125 SSD Fail on Fit of FSM-200 822-2244-102 Collins Aerospace B787 46 ANA 822-2244-151

ANA adopted SB FSM-220046-1 and SB FSM-2200-46-501 to replace HDD to SSD because ANA had experienced many HDD failures on FMS-2200. Until November 2019, ANA had experienced four “FAIL ON FIT” because software could not be installed when FSM was replaced due to brand-new SSD failure. In November 2019, ANA raised this SSD failure issue to the meeting agenda with Collins Aerospace and requested them to investigate the SSD failure and to take corrective actions. After the meeting, Collins evaluated SSDs from some suppliers and then revised the SBs to use a new part number of SSD.

However, ANA still experiences “FAIL ON FIT” twice with new SSD after revision of the SB.

Table: List of “Fail On Fit” FSM-2200 due to SSD failure (Aug 2018 – Jan 2020) # Date of Removal P/N S/N Shop Finding Comments 1 27 Aug 2018 822-2244-151 18FYFN SSD Failure 2 20 May 2019 822-2244-151 18FYFN SSD Failure 3 22 Jul 2019 822-2244-102 42866M SSD Failure 4 21 Aug 2019 822-2244-102 42866M SSD Failure 5 2 Jan 2020 822-2244-102 4283NY NFF After revision of SB 6 16 Jan 2020 822-2244-102 4784FL NFF After revision of SB

ANA would like Collins Aerospace to find out the root cause and to take corrective actions.

Other operators and Collins Aerospace, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

126 MMU2 In-Flight Reset MMU2 PN 1616055-10 Honeywell B767 2315 UAL

United Airlines uses the Honeywell MMU2 (PN 1616-055-10) as a dialer interface for the Cobham Aviator 300D SBB Satcom. This system and dialer combination is installed on eight 767-300ER aircraft. There have been sixteen occurrences where the dialer has lost the phonebook directory or factory resets. Most of these events are noted by the pilots while in flight.

The MMU2 unit has a manual factory and phonebook reset function where the user can press either the star (*) or pound (#) key during the startup sequence. United has tested these units and can confirm that MMU settings are reset when the * key is pressed during power on and the Message Set is reset when the # key is pressed during power on. Honeywell is unaware of any other causes that would lead to a phonebook or factory reset.

United engaged Honeywell in attempt to find a solution. 1. Can Honeywell provide a schedule to provide a proper solution? 2. Are there any other operators considering using the Cobham Aviator 300D SBB Satcom? If so, what are the dialers that are under consideration?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 105

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

127 Need Parts Breakdown 285W0114-3 BAE Systems B757 23 DAL Boeing B767

Delta would like a detailed parts breakdown and piece part support in order to repair MPN 362A6411P2 and 362A6411P4 (LCD) as well as MPN 362A6411P1 and 362A6411P3 (Light Block).

Per the Boeing PSAA, we should have the data to repair an item down to the “basic part level”. Since all of these items can be disassembled and repaired further that the CMM allows, we ask for the additional data and support be provided down to the “basic part level”, which would include the sub-components of these items.

BAE and Boeing comments please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 106

SOFTWARE

*****18-150*****

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

EDS Many Many All NAX

Electronic Distribution of Software (EDS)

This item is for all suppliers of loadable software LRUs.

We are still receiving software on floppy disks from suppliers. For example, Rockwell Collins said at the AMC a few years ago they would implement EDS in 2016, yet a few months back, we received ACARS software on a floppy disk.

We have switched to Boeing EDS (BEDS) for B737NG and wonder when the various suppliers will follow suit.

Other supplier, airframer, and operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

128 Wireless EFB Activation 261690-101 Boeing B777-300ER 46 TKT THY Problem B787-9

THY and Boeing have been working together to activate NFS-2 system for remote, wireless EFB software installation on 12 B777 and B787 aircraft. Unfortunately, the system has not been able to be activated for quite a long time. Therefore, EFB software upload on B777 and B787 aircraft equipped with NFS-2 are being performed manually which cause Line Maintenance man-hour losses. All the relevant software has been sent to Boeing for testing in lab. THY requests on-site support from Boeing if the issue will not be resolved soon.

Are there any other operators having problems about this issue? If yes, can other operators share their experiences on this issue?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 107

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

******19-124******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

B777 FCV 810204-4 Collins Aerospace B777 21 ANA

ANA experienced removal of 45 FCVs by FCV STATUS MSG in the last one year.

According to the data from Quick Access Recorder, it was found that the current exceeding FCV torque motor operating current value is sometimes supplied from ASCPC to the torque motor. Collins Aerospace advised that torque motor become inoperative intermittently by supplying a current greater than operating current to the torque motor. We believe that this systematic inconsistency contributes to FCV STATUS MSG.

We hope that the root cause (FCV, ASCPC, SYSTEM DESIGN or other) is identified and the reliability of FCV is improved.

We would like Boeing to coordinate with component OEM so that an appropriate solution is provided (FCV OEM: Collins, ASCPC OEM: Honeywell).

Other operator, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and Honeywell comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

129 Torque Motor is Not in 810204-4 Collins Aerospace B777 21 JAL Commanded Position

JAL has been experiencing multiple FCV (Flow Control and shutoff Valve) removal due to the EICAS status message “PACK FCV UPR/LWR L/R” with the correlated maintenance message “xx Torque Motor is not in commanded position”.

Some of these cases, FCVs are found no fault. Also, the condition of torque motor and proximity switch were good. On the other hand, no same trouble is recurred at the airplane after the replacement of FCV as well. For these FCVs, JAL replaced the torque motor for precaution.

JAL assumes CTC detects the discrepancy between command and the actual flow of the torque motor. We suspect the monitoring criteria is too severe against the original performance of the FCV.

1. Comments from the other operators who are experiencing similar issue would be appreciated. 2. Boeing and Collins, comments about criteria of the maintenance message would be appreciated. 3.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

130 Temperature Control 398908-5 Honeywell B737 21 ANA Valve (TCV)

ANA has experienced 12 unscheduled short time removals (<1000 flight hour) including 5 dispatch interruptions due to PACK Light ON from January 2017 to December 2019. • 10 out of 12 unscheduled removals were related to failure after push back. • 9 out of 12 unscheduled removals (75%) did not fail shop testing. • 6 out of 9 units which did not fail shop testing (67%) were replaced the limit switch due to switch resistance fluctuation failure; blinking lamp during CMM test.

If PACK Light turns on after push back, pilot decides to return the airplane to the gate in many cases. It means this fault has a high probability of causing dispatch interruptions.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 108

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

In most cases, MEL is applied to continue the flight. Line maintenance representative in ANA who deals with MEL decides to replace the TCV.

ANA understands that Boeing and Honeywell do not recommend the removal of the TCV without an associated M/C Recall Light (Ref: FTD 737NG-FTD-21-17002 and two FIM tasks (21-53 Task820, 21-53 Task 821)). However, it is difficult not to replace the TCV when PACK Light is ON from the operator’s viewpoint. • [Operation] Pilots return the airplane to the gate when they find the PACK Light is ON. • [Maintenance] ANA cannot judge whether the event is nuisance or actual TCV failure without any technical background. • [Maintenance] Most of TCV stocks in ANA warehouse have a history of short time removals and limit switch failure.

We would like to provide detail information regarding this event for our pilot to prevent the dispatch interruptions. Line maintenance representative also needs more information for our correct judgment of aircraft operations and would like to know if this event is nuisance or not. Therefore, ANA requests Boeing and Honeywell to investigate the root cause of this issue and would like to know other operators’ experiences.

However, Honeywell and Boeing announced -7 P/N roll to address simultaneous limit switch faults after -6 P/N roll has been incorporated to resolve AC motor faults. ANA requests Boeing and Honeywell to solve the limit switch fault as soon as possible.

Requests 1. Please let us know the root cause of PACK Light is ON condition matched with FIM task 21-53 Task820 and 21-53 Task 821. 2. Please put in work to solve the limit switch fault.

Boeing, Honeywell and other operators comment, please.

******19-131******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Vibration Test Several UTAS B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Boeing

KLM/AFR requests to reopen AMC item 18-154.

Reference is made to KLM/AFR question 17-002 at the MMC Conference in Cleveland.

KLM asked UTAS and Boeing to relax the CMM test (CMM 21-54-12 and 21-55-01). KLM suggested removing the vibration test from the CMM whenever the electronic board is replaced. After a long discussion, UTAS agreed to accomplish the investigation and report results at AMC conference in April 2018.

The issue is very important for KLM and KLM strongly supports the change in the CMM. 2Q 2018 has arrived here in Dallas and KLM would like to hear UTAS’s answer.

UTAS and Boeing comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 109

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

******19-132******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

NGS Pack Air Filter 7012013H04 UTAS B787 47 KLM/AFR KLM Replacement

Nitrogen Generating System – air filter/ozone converter.

Filter costs are high, and they are discarded every 6000 hrs. Considering the 6000-hour replacement interval, the maintenance cost of this consumable is very high compared to other filters. On B777 or other fleets, there is a cleaning task which brings the cost down to acceptable levels.

This item has been discussed with Boeing and Collins Aerospace; however, a suitable solution has not been found so far.

KLM would like to see: a) A CMM cleaning/regeneration method for the filter/Ozone converter. b) The possibility to replace its filter element. c) Another cost-effective solution

Collins Aerospace, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

******19-134******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Condenser Fan – 4101944G Triumph Thermal A380 21 LHT DLH Missing Information Systems (Maryland) About Repair Details UTC Aerospace Systems (Goodrich Corporation Monroe)

The A380 condenser fan PNR 4101944G is repaired by UTC Aerospace Systems but was designed/integrated by Triumph Thermal Systems. This component is contracted for Lufthansa Technik and we are sending it to Triumph Thermal Systems Maryland; the repair work and certificate will be done by UTC Aerospace Systems (Goodrich in Monroe).

For most of the units, the motor drive needs to be changed/repaired due to an internal failure. UTC has set up an exchange pool of motor drives, which means that the defective motor drive will be removed and a used repaired one will be used for the repair of the condenser fan.

Lufthansa Technik has already requested to receive detailed findings of the changed core motor drives several times for years but has never received them. This is needed to understand the failure modes of the condenser fan and the motor drive and to be able to create more detailed reliability analysis.

Please provide findings overview of previous events and findings for motor drives for future events.

Triumph Thermal Systems (Maryland): Which failure modes appear on the motor drives? What are the measures to improve reliability?

Triumph, UTAS, and other operator comments, please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 110

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

******19-135******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Supplemental Cooling N052100001 Triumph A380 21 LHT DLH System Controller – Bad Thermal Reliability/Design Flaws Systems (Maryland) N052100002

The A380 SCSC is repaired by Triumph Thermal System in Maryland but needs to be sub-contracted to a vendor in New England for welding of covers/connectors etc. as the inner parts of the housing are hermetically isolated.

1. LHT suffers high price repairs due to unreliable Boost Inductors which is the most common failure reason. In avg., nearly 3 EA of the Boost Inductors need to be replaced due to “Overheat” (plus labor/Administration, Sub- contracting and mandatory new material). Airbus has already dropped a “Request for Work” to improve the reliability of the SCSC/Boost Inductors, but LHT didn’t receive the result of the investigation.

TTS-M: What are the next steps for increasing the reliability and decrease the removal rate of the Boost Inductors.

Airbus: Would you be so kind to share the results of your “Request for Work”?

All: Do you have same experiences?

2. Sometimes during the De-Lidding-Process of both covers, the housing suffers cracks at the inside corners near the welding. This leads into complete replacement of the housing which could not be a failure of an operator. The replacement of the housing is highly expensive. In LHT’s view, these further damages are risk of the repair-facility and the costs must also be borne by them.

All: Comments please.

3. The newest Quotes shows burnt contacts (deemed as Customer Induced Damage by TTS-M; for LHT it is normal wear/tear) which leads either into replacement of the whole housing to meet the TAT or replacement of the connector for a lower price but with an additional TAT of 8 weeks. An investigation on the connectors of the affected aircraft were performed without any findings.

All: Does anyone have the same experience with these new findings?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 111

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

TTS-M: What are the next steps for increasing the reliability and decrease the removal rate of the Boost Inductors.

Airbus: Would you be so kind to share the results of your “Request for Work”?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

131 Reliability of 2022432-4 / Ram Air Honeywell B767 ALL 21 ANA Potentiometer Actuator

ANA has experienced unscheduled removals of Ram Air Actuator due to potentiometer failure. The failure induced “PACK OFF” or “PACK TEMP” MSG. The Potentiometer is used to monitor an angle of the Ram Air Actuator Open/Close operation. Usage time of almost all of the potentiometers were less than 4,000 flight hours. ANA would like to clarify the root cause of the potentiometer defect; product quality issue or design issue.

ANA believes that the reliability of the potentiometer needs to be increased. In addition, ANA has introduced PMA potentiometer. As a result, unscheduled removals of less than 4,000 flight hours have been decreased.

ANA would like to know other operators’ experiences about unscheduled removal of Ram Air Actuator due to potentiometer failure.

Does Honeywell know the occurrence of the potentiometer failure on the other operator? Please let us know the detail about the failed potentiometer if Honeywell reviewed it.

Potentiometer parts number: 2047136-4

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 112

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

Other operator and Honeywell comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

132 Humidifier 816086-3 / Humidifier Collins Aerospace B777 21 ANA 1003111-4 / Cell Stack

ANA experienced 26 unscheduled removals of Humidifier due to the status message “HUMID FLT DECK” in recent 3 years. All units (26 unscheduled removals) were repaired by replacing Cell Stack which part number is 1003111-4. So, ANA assumes that the reliability of Humidifier depends on Cell Stack.

ANA has peculiar Maintenance Requirement (MR) that replaces Cell Stack before 6,000 hours for predictive maintenance. To confirm whether MR (6,000 hours) is appropriate or not, ANA would like to get information regarding worldwide removal data and failure tendency.

Therefore, please let ANA know the following 4 questions. 1. Is the target Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of cell stack longer than 6,000 hours? 2. Please provide the worldwide MTBF of Cell Stack. 3. Is Cell Stack failure related to operating time? (ANA found that Cell Stack failure is random failure by Weibull analysis.) 4. Please provide unscheduled removal data including Total Time (TT) and Time Since Conditional Overhaul (TSCO).

ANA would appreciate other operators, Boeing, and Collins Aerospace comments regarding unscheduled removal data for Cell Stack.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 113

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

133 Large Galley Control Unit (GCU) Fan 7011005H01 Collins Aerospace B787 21 ANA 7011005H02 (UTC Aerospace)

ANA experienced a lot of malfunction of B787-8 Large Galley Control Unit (GCU) Fan. When Large GCU Fan is inoperative, we have a lot of bad influence of aircraft operation for passengers.

1. Results of failure analysis that removed from ANA aircrafts (Data: 2016 – 2019) a. There is 75 percent of removal from FORWARD (1F and 1A) position. b. There is 97 percent of removal from B787-8. (3 percent of removal from B787-9) c. Major defective parts on Large GCU Fan are Bearing (Water Ingress or Grease Seepage) and Motor Drive (Water Ingress). 2. Worldwide information from Boeing and Collins Aerospace a. Removal data from the fleet show GCU removal are predominantly from the Fwd galley (Door 1 and 2). b. Worldwide MTBUR of Large GCU Fan exceeds guarantee MTBUR. 3. ANA Hypothesis B787-8 ICS Liquid Loop is from AFT Galley Heat Exchanger (HX) to FORWARD Galley HX in order. So, liquid temperature is raised gradually, and warmer liquid is supplied on FORWARD Large Galley HX. For this reason, Large Galley Fan will be rotated fast speed because Galley Fan and HX are maintained galley temperature using warmer liquid. Bearings are worn by max speed rotating and Motor Drive is defective by water (Condensation due to heat generation). There is a difference of ICS liquid loop between B787-8 (Serial) and B787-9 (Parallel). Parallel liquid loop can minimize the difference of liquid temperature between FORWARD galley and AFT galley. So, there are few malfunctions of Large GCU Fan for B787-9. 4. Desired Action a. Please provide comments regarding “ANA Hypothesis” b. Please provide the root causes why a lot of malfunction occurs at the FORWARD position on B787-8. c. Please provide technical solution and milestone.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

134 Equipment Cooling Fan 4100941C Collins Aerospace B777 21 JAL 4100941D B767

JAL has been experiencing numerous unscheduled failures of the Equipment Cooling Fan for a long time. Majority failure is bearing problem and there has been observed a few (but tough) issues on impeller broken: • Regarding bearing issue, it may be concerned degradation by usage time. These population can be operated over several ten thousand flight hours. But there are numerous population that is having low lifetime (failing in several thousand flight hours). • Regarding impeller broken issue, it has been introduced the aluminum impeller for 4100943 series but there is not for 410941 series.

Is it only the solution to replace degraded parts more often? How we can made longer life Fan?

JAL would like to hear about comments from the operator who are having headache on low lifetime of the bearing or broken impeller.

JAL also would like to ask Collins’s opinion about the solutions on these two issues.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 114

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

135 Overvoltage N/A Collins B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Damaging Fans – Aerospace Warranty

On a regular basis, KLM receives invoices/quotes from Collins concerning electric fans, which even are still within warranty. In most of those cases “Overvoltage” is the main reason for declining warranty. Collins claims the units are subjected to “CID” Customer Induced Damage, which they say is the overvoltage. KLM's opinion is that 'overvoltage' as root cause should be something of the past after performing 787-SB-24-0063.

It is meanwhile confirmed that all KLM's customers have accomplished 787-SB-24-0063 on their fleet. This Boeing SB should prevent overvoltage. Also, all of them are using external power supplies on home- and outstations which adhere to all requirements of the B787 Maintenance Facility and Equipment Planning Document (D011Z009-100) and so have constant power loading capability. Both the SB and correct external power units should exclude power ‘rippling’ and unstable voltages. Unfortunately, Collins disagrees.

Boeing was asked by KLM about their opinion, and agrees that it is not possible for the electrical system to cause damage to the LPS fans after accomplishment of 787-SB-24-0063, and agrees with KLM that "overvoltage" should not be mentioned as a root cause on ATA 21 Fan-warranty rejections. Boeing also commented that they initiated SRP -21-0271 to investigate the 787 Low Pressure System, including this Fans “overvoltage” issue.

• KLM likes to know the status of the SRP investigation and… • KLM requests Boeing and Collins to work together and discuss this matter with some urgency, so that in the end, we as operator know where we are standing, not in the last place in relation to our customers.

Boeing, Collins, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

136 PFCSOV Torque Motor 820902-6 / PFCSOV Collins Aerospace Q400 21 ANA Problem (Hamilton Sundstrand)

Background: ANA has experienced several flight interruptions (ATB, RTO, etc.) due to PFCSOV Torque Motor failure. Open circuit of Torque Motor coil has been confirmed at each of the events. At the most recent event in December 2019, the Torque Motor TT: 4,336 flight hours since brand new.

According to Collins information, Torque Motor coil failures are caused by high temperature operating environment; expansion of epoxy which encapsulates coil causes coil wire fracture. Collins has been working on changing potting epoxy with heat resistant type but ANA has been informed that it will take a long time to release the new design since 2018.

Because of the above situation, ANA started a refurbishment program to replace Torque Motor coil with new one every 4,000 flight hours. It is very tough to keep repaired Torque Motors in stock.

Request: Please accelerate and fix the schedule of releasing the new design as soon as possible.

De Havilland, Collins and other operators comment, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 115

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

137 PECS Heat Exchanger 7113609 Collins B787 21 JALEC JAL Series Aerospace

PECS Heat Exchanger still has the issue of “Fluid Leakage” due to the corrosion. Fluid Leakage can result in the irregular flight (i.e., Air Turned Back to the Airport or Diversion to the alternate airport).

JAL has experienced 15 cases of Fluid Leakage. 10 cases occurred soon after the heavy maintenance, and 5 cases occurred just after the installation.

It is assumed that the corrosion progresses during heavy maintenance. And the leakage from the corroded point at the first power up of the aircraft, in other word, at the first PECS fluid pressure application.

It was announced by Collins that the improved thickness/coverage of the coating and the new cleaning procedure were supposed to be developed in 2019, but it has not been completed yet. JAL expects Collins to accelerate the action.

Comments from the operators who are experiencing similar symptoms would be appreciated.

Comments from Collins about the updated milestone would be appreciated.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

138 ACM – Water 7110121 – Air Collins B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Ingestion Cycle Machine Aerospace

Despite all available Collins and Boeing water management hard- and software changes incorporated, the LH ACM’s are continuing to fail in-service. Water is still accumulating in the LH pack.

Boeing will issue PCU software Y201 in the 1st Q of 2020, which will alter some valve controls and HX outlet temp. The Y201 should improve the MTBUR with a stunning 67% and is advertised to be the final action for this problem.

KLM is not so confident the software alone will be the final fix for this long dragging water problem and feels it needs a more, hardware-like modification like a water extractor or similar. That should be somehow technically feasible. Drilling small holes at certain places is not a solution. KLM feels that if pack designer Collins (together with Boeing) would be able to solve the water problem, they have solved the whole ACM problem.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 116

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

• KLM would like to know if Collins ever made a serious study in such ‘hardware’ water–extracting solution, possibly supported with Boeing software. • KLM requests Collins to continue to work together with Boeing on this, despite the high hopes for Y201.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

139 Low Temperatures in N/A N/A B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM the Bulk

KLM has stopped carrying live animals in the bulk because of too low temperatures. Measurements have shown that at floor level, temperatures near or below freezing is possible.

Meanwhile, Boeing has developed three improvements to improve the situation: Isolation of air supply duct, Improved air nozzle and an enhanced bulk door curtain. With the new nozzle, the warmest location is now RH AFT. Also, Boeing rightfully recommends to place the animal/pet kennel on a 6” platform in that area.

All this indeed improved the overall temperature, but especially in winter on longer flights, recent data logging showed it is still too cold for live animals according IATA regulations. Also blocking of the air inlet nozzle and temp sensor is often seen. The issue is still open.

• KLM is wondering how other operators deal with this situation and if they are still carrying live animals in the bulk.

Operator experience, ideas and comments are welcome.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 117

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

140 CAC Arnon 5 7010101 / 7110101 Collins B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Experience Cabin Air Aerospace Compressor

KLM is currently modifying their CAC population per SB 7010101-21-3 and 7110101-21-2 to introduce the Arnon 5 stator lamination which should prevent overheating of the stator and significantly increase the reliability of the CAC.

According to Collins, the new stator should operate 11 to 16 °C cooler. However, recent shop tests reveal no direct visible, clear temperature decrease during testing per CMM. With the promised significant temperature reduction, one would expect to also see this during shop testing.

KLM now hopes the expected reliability improvement will be evident on a longer term.

• What is the shop experience at Collins’ and other shops in this respect? • Is it normal that the ± 11-16 °C temperature decrease with the Arnon 5 Rotors is not visible during shop testing?

Collins and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

141 Dirty/Clogging Boeing B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Orifices

During a maintenance action, Air France found a half-clogged orifice (picture) in the Lav and Galley vent system on an aircraft which was delivered in 2017. There is no cleaning task in MPD and KLM suspects neglecting these multi hole orifices could have a negative effect on the ventilation system and perhaps even lavatory smoke detection on the long term.

Boeing states that contamination is depending on operators environment and recommends a regular inspection during f.i. C-checks, if desired.

KLM was unable to find a clear Boeing drawing which shows the multi-hole orifices and their location/part number. On earlier Boeing types (777, 744) these drawings were available).

• KLM likes to know if other operators are cleaning the orifices on a regular basis and/or have experience in clogging orifices on specific locations. • KLM requests Boeing to provide a clear, for operators accessible drawing which shows locations and PN’s of all installed ventilation system orifices. This to aid a future preventive cleaning task introduction.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 118

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

Boeing and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

142 Ozone Converter 7010106 – Ozone Collins B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Cleaning Converter Aerospace

KLM shop is struggling with the O3 converter cleaning procedure. It seems that the CMM-prescribed ‘mild alkaline’ (pH 3.5 to 7.5) method is not sufficient to clean the internal converter. During the Collins Madrid conference in 2019, it was agreed that Collins would review/change the CMM 21-73-06 on this part and allow for high alkaline cleaning. To date, no CMM change was made.

Meanwhile, KLM did some testing with ‘high alkaline’ (pH12) with positive results and would like this incorporated in the CMM.

• KLM likes to know how other operators/shops are currently performing O3 converter cleaning and are yes/no satisfied with it. • KLM requests Collins to incorporate ‘high(er) alkaline’ cleaning into the CMM 21-73-06.

Collins and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

143 B787 QHX Pressure 7113609-x Collins B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Cleaning Aerospace

KLM has started the ‘new’ Pressurized Cleaning method on the B787 Pack HX Assemblies. To date, three aircraft have been cleaned with positive results. We are planning to use this cleaning ‘on condition’ to allow the QHX on wing for the full three years. KLM is not separating the PECS and FCAC HXs during cleaning.

• KLM would like other operators experience with the Pressurized Cleaning. Have they developed any special tooling? Do they separate the PECS and FCAC HXs? How often are the HX cleaned?

Comments are welcome.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 119

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

144 MC Test 7110170Hxx / Collins B787 21-55-28 KLM/AFR KLM Requirement PECS Pump Aerospace (2017 MMC Assembly Item 51) 7111038Hxx / 21-53-92 ICS Pump Package 7110615Hxx / 21-54-18 FCAC Pump Package

During the 2017 MMC, KLM requested Collins to remove the MC test requirement from the G5 PECS/ICS/FCAC Pump Packages CMMs. Collins was to provide an update at the 2018 AMC. Although there have been ongoing discussions between AFR/KLM, Boeing, and Collins, an official response has yet to be provided.

Statistics learn that LPMCs are highly reliable LRUs which are rarely removed on wing. This shop requirement, however, will increase the removals by 2400% compared to the on-wing removals (Based on the 2018 removal rate). Not having to remove the MCs will save on spare units and logistical costs. And will improve TAT.

The ongoing Collins response is that this requirement cannot be removed from the CMM due to: • HIRF lightning testing is currently mandatory for every LPMC removal per Boeing (per FAA) • The G5 pump level testing does not exercise all the control and protective functions of the LPMC, and so the current testing requirement mitigates the risk of unrecognized failures NOTE: KLM learned that the HIRF lightning testing will no longer be mandatory after modification of the motor controllers LVPSs.

@ Collins: • Does Collins see a high NFF rate on the LPMCs that were sent in for test only? o If so, what is the Collins policy to diminish the NFF rate? o If not, are the failures found isolated cases? Or do they have great commonality? o If the failures have a great commonality, what has been done to solve this problem? o Were the failures found major or minor issues, i.e., would these failures have greatly jeopardized the NHA’s functionality? o Could these failures have been detected by interpreting the aircraft data (i.e., with a predictive maintenance program)? • Does Collins still deem the MC test requirement necessary? o If not, please remove the requirement from the CMMs. o If so, could these failures be detected by a “stripped-down” LPMC test stand? And which specific tests need to be performed? o Will performance of those specific tests be accepted as test substantiation to the MC test requirement? Incorporate these tests in the G5 PECS/ICS/FCAC Pump Packages CMM’s.

Collins is requested to: • Provide the NFF rate, of the past three years, on LPMCs sent in for test only. • Provide, in percentages and in absolute numbers, which, otherwise unrecognized, failures emerged. • Provide the (specific LPMC) test sections during which the, otherwise unrecognized, failures have emerged.

@ Boeing: • What is the Boeing position on NFF? • Can Boeing confirm that the HIRF lightning testing will no longer be mandatory after modification of the motor controllers LVPS’s? REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 120

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

• Does Boeing support the KLM position that any performance test, on an LRU, should be able to detect failures on its NLAs?

Other operators and or suppliers please comment.

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Title Associate Airline

145 Test Limits 81253A010001 Liebherr B747-8 21-51-90 LHT DLH Aerospace Toulouse SAS

CMM-limits of the Air-Pressure Loss Test are not reachable, the measured values are above the permissible maximum. Even on the production test bench of the OEM repair facility could not be achieved.

Q1: Will the limits change in the next CMM revisions?

Q2: Are other actions taken to make the CMM limits reachable?

Liebherr and other operator comments, please.

******17-041******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Temperature Control Valve 39808-2 Honeywell B737 21 AAL 398908-3 398908-4 398908-5

The B737 Temp Control Valve has for some time not performed satisfactorily for the needs of the aircraft. Honeywell issued service bulletins to convert the -3 valve to the -4 valve, without success in increasing the reliability. Subsequently, additional service bulletins were released to convert the -3 valve to the -5 valve, or the -4 valve to the -5 valve.

A vital part in the upgrade of these valves is the (actuator) switch, part number 2047168-8. While it seems to operate better than the old switch, part number 67620694-1, its performance is still lacking. The new switch exhibits signs of blinking or flickering on the test panel and Honeywell has revised the CMM (21-51-94) to state that this is not a confirmation of reason for removal or rejection.

AAL has experienced some switches that must be cycled several times before making contact. These are switches that have not been in service for an extended time. Some failures have occurred within 500 hours. We would like to see an improvement or a redesign to this switch.

Questions: 1. Boeing/other operators – Have you seen the above switch failures as well? 2. Will Honeywell look at a re-design of this switch?

Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 121

AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS

******17-047******

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Title Associate Airline

Rotary R4232M-2/R4232M6-2 Whippany A380 21 AFR/KLM AFR Actuator Actuation Systems 1380162-7/-8 Hamilton Sundstrand

No quotation and provisioning available from the Rotary Actuator spare parts (CMM 21-52-42 Rev.06 UTC Aerospace Systems).

Currently, we do not have the possibility to repair this actuator alone. The current solution to repair the NHA (Trim Air Valve PN 1380221-X/1380224-X) is only by a standard exchange of an actuator assy or sending the NHA to Hamilton for repair.

Same case for the Rotary Actuator PN 1380155-5 (CMM 21-52-37 Rev.04 UTC Aerospace Systems) with NHA Temperature Control Valve PN 1380214-X.

AFR/KLM requests to have the possibility to purchase the parts needed to repair the rotary actuators according to the related CMM.

Whippany and other operator and supplier comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 122

RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS

****17-ULB****

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

CVR 2100-1X2X-xx L3 Boeing 31300 DAL

DFDR 2100-4X4X-xx L3 Boeing

ICAO ANNEX 6 describes that non-deployable flight recorder containers shall have securely attached an automatically activated underwater locating device operating at a frequency of 37.5 kHz. At the earliest practicable date, but not later than 1 January 2018, this device shall operate for a minimum of 90 days.

This requirement is being satisfied by the airframe manufactures by certifying the SSFDR and the SSCVR with a stand-alone part number for recorders with the 90-day ULB installed.

Delta considers the recorder and the ULB two separate LRUs and this should be configured at the Aircraft IPC level.

Having the recorders identified based on the ULB installed causes a number of problems for the Airline including the following:

• ULB is considered hazardous material when shipping and requires special handling of the recorder. This could delay shipment of the recorder for special reads of the flight recorder data. • Additional inventory of the recorder is required for a recorder with the same Form, Fit, and Function. • If an SB is accomplished on the recorder to install a 90-day ULB, the Recorder cannot be installed on an aircraft only requiring a 30-day ULB without undoing the SB. • The ULB stays with the aircraft and is transferred to the new recorder being installed. The recorder and the ULB are stocked separately and the ULB is only changed at battery expiration or failure.

Delta request that the 90-day ULB requirement be satisfied by stocking the recorder part number separate from the ULB and the recorder interchangeability be based on the Form, Fit and Function of the recorder. The 30 day and 90-day ULB configuration should be controlled at the aircraft tail number through the AIPC.

Questions: 1. Are other operators seeing similar issues? 2. Airframe manufacturer recommendation. 3. Vendor comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 123

RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

146 2100-4945-22 Latch Faults Require SB25 2100-4945-22 L3 A320 31 DAL Boeing A330 A319 B737NG

SB025 dated Mar 22, 2016 had listed LRUs 2100-4945-22 as eligible to receive this mod but was subsequently removed from the current SB rev 4 dated April 13, 2018. As of now, SB 25 cannot be accomplished on LRU 2100-4945-22. L3 states they cannot do SB25 on the 2100-4945-22 because Boeing never set up SB25 to be accomplished on these FDRs.

This recorder is the exact same FDR as 2100-4045-22 and 2100-4045-00, with the only difference being the 2100-4945-22 has a 90-day beacon versus a 30-day beacon on the other part numbers. These SBs are currently complied with on the 2100-4045-22 and 2100-4045-00 FDRs, resulting in a greatly decreased amount of these recorders pulled for nuisance latch faults. Delta is experiencing a lot of latched faults on the 2100-4945-22 FDRs. This latched fault cannot be cleared on the aircraft and requires the FDR to be removed and sent to the repair shop. Many of these latched faults are nuisance faults and can be fixed by SB25, which is a software mod accomplished at L3.

Delta is requesting Boeing to approve SB25 on 2100-4945-22 so we can begin having this SB accomplished on our Fleet. We are starting to see more reliability issues due to this nuisance latched fault problem. If Boeing will not approve SB 25, perhaps L3 would like to initiate a remedy for the latch fault problems on the 2100-4945-22.

Comments from other operators, L3, and Boeing please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 124

RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS

*****18-169*****

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

LCDU C19298AF05 Thales 31 AFR/KLM AFR EDU C19755BA01 PDU68 C19596AC04

On these products, the LCD module assembly (LAM) contains photocells.

In case of photocell failure, the LAM is declared unrepairable (must be replaced by a new one.) even if the LCD matrix is in good condition.

Do you have a solution to replace just the photocells or is there a marketing implementation strategy?

LCDU CMM 31-63-30 Figure 1 Item 95 EDU CMM 31-60-02 Figure 2 Item 250 PDU68 CMM 31-64-05 Figure 1 Item 110

Thales and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

147 Missing Piece 822-2152-201 / - Collins B787 31 AFR/KLM AFR Part 101 Aerospace Safran

CMM 31-61-07 IPL Figure 4 page 10063 shows the Side A of the Touch Glass card PN 565-000861-6. Side B of the Touch Glass card is missing. This includes the Glass Part number which is also missing.

Thank you for providing the missing PN for the Glass and other components present on the Side B, if any.

Collins Aerospace, Safran, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 125

RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

148 EFIS Control Panel 4082730-911 Honeywell B737 31-61 DAL

HW MPN# 4082730-911 has replaced MPN# 4082730-901 on Delta’s newer 737-900.

MPN# 4082730-911 is not nearly as reliable as the older model (-901). The “MINS” switch is failing at a high rate and almost all units we receive in the shop have this switch failing. In the past 12 months, we have received 12 failed switches. The switch is Fig.4 Item 15. PN 3900-7635-05, (CSD: 62002676-5 V58960).

The switch on the older model (-901) does not have anywhere near the fail rate the new unit has. We feel this is a manufacturing defect to have so many “new” switches fail so early.

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

149 Recording 967-0212-058 / Boeing B737-900ER 31 TKT THY Auxiliary Tank DFDAU Fuel Quantity in FDR CFM56

In 10 THY B737-900ER aircraft (from TC-JYA to TC-JYJ) auxiliary fuel tank installed with STC number: ST01725NY-D by PATS Aircraft, LLC, before the delivery, THY needed a modification for obtain fuel quantity information of Aux Tanks and record in FDR. When we asked for details of the modification, Boeing listed required steps as follows: 1. Since this involves an STC, the STC holder needs to add wiring from the AUX fuel tank to the FQPU. Boeing does not make changes to third party STCs. 2. Wiring from FQPU to DEU are installed. 3. Boeing can provide a DEU OPC change to enable OPC_AUX_FUEL_TANK_G, if you request it. However, Boeing would responsible for the operation of the OPC and nothing else. 4. Wiring from the DEU to DFDAU are installed 5. The DFDAU is already configured to acquire the AUX tank parameter from the DEU 6. The FDR is already configured to record the AUX tank parameter from the DFDAU

STC holder confirmed that related wiring already exists and the ALOFT AFS does interface with the Fuel Quantity Processor Unit. Therefore, the only thing that Boeing can provide us a proposal for is the DEU OPC change.

Please find THY’s request from Boeing in the below schematic:

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 126

RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS

In proposal phase, Boeing replied that they could not deliver a Service Bulletin, but they could provide “not certified” software to enable OPC_AUX_FUEL_TANK_G. In this case, THY will be responsible for the certification, which may cause problems for THY in the future. THY requests Boeing's approved SB for the relevant modification process.

Are there any other operators having problems about this issue? If so, how did they apply the related modification?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

150 Curtiss Wright CMM-IPC 31-34-00 rev 07 D52000-62200 Curtiss B737 31 UAL Missing PN’s that they are using. Wright

UAL has OQARS PN D5200-62200 with CPU PEC PN SA108175-3 installed.

Curtiss Wright has informed UA that the -3 CPU is applicable to D5200-62000 and NOT D5200-62200. The OEM states the -3 board will work in D5200-62200 after a minor modification of removing the LK3 link. The OEM also states however, that there is no documentation that supports this.

UA believes the NHA were modified from part number D5200-62000 and re-identified as D5200-62200 when the CPU board had the LK3 link removed. These units can’t be legally put into service in this configuration and UAL is seeking a remedy from Curtiss Wright.

Boeing, Airbus, Operators and OEMs comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 127

RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Title Associate Airline

151 Repair Flat C19736AA01 / Integrated Thales ATR 31 EVA UNI Rate Avionics Display

INTEGRATED AVIONICS DISPLY (IAD), PN C19736AA01, was sent to Thales for repair. The order was charged a flat rate. The corrective action was replacement of a fuse on Power Supply Board. Another case for the same PN: the corrective action was standard exchange of Graphic Generation Board and replacement of front panel, but there was an additional fee for the replacement of the Front panel due to the replacement of the SRU being excluded from the repair flat rate. Thales provides a one-time exception to charge flat rate after negotiating for the second case.

Generally, component repair is under supplier unilateral general agreement. EVA would like to know how OEMs restrict their suppliers to avoid unreasonable repair charge/policy to operators?

OEM comment please. Thales comment please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

152 DEU I Obsolescence 4081600-930 Honeywell B737 31 DAL Boeing

Honeywell SIL, Publication Number D201501000056, details the obsolescence issues with the DEU I, MPN 4081600-930. The only option given is to purchase a brand new DEU II, MPN 4081600-940 at a substantial cost.

Delta requests a list of the obsolete components and detailed technical specifications so that we can determine suitable substitutes. For example, we were recently told that a type of SRAM IC used in the DEU I is obsolete, but Delta believes we could identify a replacement if we knew all the technical specifications for the IC.

We also request Boeing support in this request to Honeywell.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

153 DFDAU Ground Tool 967-0212-050 Honeywell B757 31-31 FDX 967-0214-001 MD10/11

Since Honeywell’s announcement, many years ago, of the end of life of their DFDAU product line their DFDAU and VADAR SME’s have been re-assigned to other positions within the company with new responsibilities.

FedEx would like to know if there are any SME’s left with the assigned role at Honeywell to answer questions regarding VADAR programming or the relationship between the DFDAU’s and the VADAR software?

Honeywell comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 128

ENGINE SYSTEMS

******19-204******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Intake Bypass Door LA11A2104 ITT Aerospace DHC-8-400 71 ANA Actuator Poor Reliability

Due to the design of the actuator, the average flight time is remarkably short. The recent MTBUR is around 3000 hr.

The actuator is located at the outside of the airplane. However, it is not sealed and not protected from water ingress. Main failure reason of the actuator is poor contact of the micro switch.

ANA has repeatedly requested Bombardier and ITT Aerospace to change the design to improve the seal characteristics and the switch’s water-resistant characteristics over the years. At last, they mentioned that they have a plan to release an improved actuator. But the detailed schedule has not been disclosed.

Other operator comments please.

Bombardier and ITT Aerospace, please provide the target date of the new actuator release.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

154 Missing Brief Information for 824972-11-024 Collins A320 73 THY the SBs Listed in the CMM Aerospace Series 824972-XX-XXX (UTAS, Hamilton Sunstrand)

CMM 73-28-02 lists all the SBs, but there is no summary information telling what the related SB stands for.

Could Collins Aerospace add brief information for each SB so that it can be understood what is done with each SB? Of course, we can reach each SB from the web portal, but this could make it easier to remember and decide.

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 129

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

155 Missing Brief Information for 2042M14PXX FADEC A320 73 THY the SBs Listed in the CMM International Series (BAE Systems CAGE Code: 89954)

CMM 73-21-68 lists all the SBs, but there is no summary information that tells what the related SBs stand for.

Could FADEC International (BAE SAFRAN) add brief information for each SB so that it can be understood what is done with each SB?

This case is same for all FADEC ECU CMMs. Therefore, for FADEC ECUs for 5C, 7B, GE90, and CF6-80E engines, we request all SBs be summarized or briefly explained so that it is easier to follow.

FADEC International and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 130

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

156 Engine Parts Serial CF6 and CFM56 Parts Boeing B767 7XXX DAL Number/Checksum and Components GE Safran

Confusion around the addition of the checksum to the serial number of engine parts continues to present compliance hazards at Delta Air Lines. We raised the issue with Boeing at the 2017 MMC and opened a service request with them.

In November 2019, we were informed that CFM would include a clarifying note in the engine IPC explaining the checksum suffix. Previously, we were informed that Fleet Highlight articles were published regarding checksum in June 2019 for the CFM56 and Leap models.

Delta considers these corrective actions inadequate as they do not clarify the use of the checksum to field and warehouse workers who work with the parts. We believe that as long as the checksum remains in the same box as the serial number, there will continue to be paperwork and computer errors when workers enter the serial number for these parts.

Boeing and other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

157 Engine Electronic T5050ECUF6252 TRW Aeronautical A330Neo 73-21-11 TAP Control Systems Goodrich Control Systems Collins Aerospace

Recently TAP sent an EEC P/N: T5050ECUF6252 to the manufacturer for test/repair under warranty of new. It was the first removal for this S/N since the aircraft was delivered new to TAP. The warranty was rejected as the manufactured considered that the unit had a CID on a pipe union and informed TAP that the pipe union was not replaced/repairable, so all the pressure transducer module had to be replaced. This module has a huge cost, especially considering the value of a pipe union that was the rejection cause.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 131

ENGINE SYSTEMS

1. Have other operators also experienced this problem? 2. Does the manufactured intend to develop a repair to this problem? Pipe unions can be damaged during installation or handling of the unit and these damages should not force the operator to replace all the electronic module for a small external damage.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

158 Fuel Flow 8TJ124ERF1 Ametek B777 73 AFR/KLM AFR Transmitter 8TJ124ERJ1 8TJ124ERG1 8TJ167ERF1 8TJ167ERG1

Many of pieces parts supposed to be procurable according to the CMM 73-31-12 and 73-31-14 are not provided either by Kellstrom or Ametek. Ametek does not offer any alternate piece parts to solve this issue.

Ametek, via its provider Kellstrom, answered that these pieces parts are out of production and there is no replacement. Despite unprocurable parts for airlines, Ametek continues to repair this LRU in their shop with this piece part.

As an example, Piece part like: screw cap 6560W12P004, item 1-200 (CMM 73-31-12)

Can you please make these pieces parts procurable as they are supposed to be, according to the CMMs?

Ametek, Boeing comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

159 Selling Piece Parts in Kits to Ignition Exciters – P/Ns Unison A319 74-11 DAL Mark Up Price 10-617980-1, 10-631045-X A320 A321 A330 B737 B767 B777

A warning label, a piece part of the Ignition Exciter 9049861-1.

Previously, this label was available for purchase at a nominal cost. Currently, this warning label is now only available for purchase in kit form which is disproportionate.

DAL requests that Unison make piece parts available outside of kits packaging.

Other airlines – please comment.

Airbus Boeing – please comment on current policy and plans.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 132

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

160 Customer Departure Several Engine BAE Systems Several 73-21 LHT DLH Record Control Units

During repair of Engine Control units or SRUs from Engine Control units at BAE Systems, if the repair deviates from the CMM, BAE is issuing a CDR for customer engineering approval, even for known printing errors in CMM. This process unreasonably delays the processing, because units are kept on hold until approval. I know no other OEM repair shop, which ask for approval for known CMM errors, if the procedure conforms to design or engineering specifications.

Is there any possibility to avoid the CDR approval in case of minor deviations covered by engineering specifications?

BAE Systems and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

161 Chafing on 30558-000/2A4524 Harco Lab. A320 77-21-43 LHT DLH V2500 EGT EGT Harness Family Harness

General explanation:

Over the last couple of years, the V2500 EGT system was part of three service bulletins. The two last SBs exchanged the whole component (costs of around 10.000 to 18.000 USD per mod). The intention of this service bulletins was to increase the reliability and reduce on wing problems. Please find the following SB overview attached:

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 133

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Current standpoint:

Nevertheless, LHT observed that the reliability did not improve. Major chafing problem of this harness never get solved. Please find the following illustrations for further explanation:

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 134

ENGINE SYSTEMS

These chafing issues are coming up after short operation times (around 12 months). The component OEM declines any warranty requests due to mishandling cases. IAE itself declared that a chafing between harness and reverser causes this issue. Therefore, that problem was forwarded to Airbus.

Older Harness versions are out of production; therefore, customers need to purchase the new cost-intensive one- piece-Harness. Even when only one of the older parts (W6 or EGT Harness) is defective the whole new Harness needed to purchase. Such cases create longer down times due to more complex modifications instead of simple changes.

Q1: Due to the fact that this damage is known on Harco and IAE, why have there not been any product improvements been taken to eliminate the chafing problems (better braid material, different clamping, etc.)?

Q2: Why is there not any reverser SB for chafing elimination?

Q3: Who (i.e., AIB/Harco/IAE) should be deemed to be accountable for the chafing and granted the operators/their nominated MRO service providers the warranty against such chafing condition?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 135

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Q4: If operators would like to de-mod the engine/aircraft to use the old harness, how AIB/Harco/IAE provides technical/material support to them?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

162 Chafing on PW1100 1020902-1 Collins A320NEO 74-21-14 LHT DLH Ignition Cable Ignition Cable Aerospace PW

Several PW1100 ignition cables sent to Collins for maintenance have been found affected by chafing of outer metallic shell. Findings occur independently of operating hours even below 1.000FH. Dependent on severity of chafing cables are either repairable or declared BER. Chafing is declared on different positions of cable. Cables are attached to engine with several metallic clamps.

Q1: Please provide experience of finding on returned ignition cables. Q2: Metallic to metallic contact is most probable cause for chafing marks. What will be the technical solution for this issue and when will it be available (i.e., cushioned clamps)? Q3: Whom to contact in case of warranty clarifications (Collins refers to PW)?

Collins, PW, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 136

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

163 Pitting on PW1100 1020901-2 Collins A320NEO 47-11-14 LHT DLH Ignition Exciter Ignition Exciter Aerospace PW

Several PW1100 ignition exciters sent to Collins for maintenance have been found affected by pitting on channel outputs. Pitting on channel output leads to BER declaration of ignition exciter. Either only channel B is affected or both channels are. Lowest number of FH of an exciter has been below 1.000FH. Ignition cable was properly attached to exciter and connection between exciter and cable was not loosened since installation during engine assembly at PW.

Pitting is also visible on associated ignition cable.

Q1: Please provide experience of finding on returned ignition exciters and most probable cause. Q2: What is the action plan in order to rectify this fault (modification, check procedure, installation advise…)? Q3: Whom to contact in case of warranty clarifications (Collins refers to PW)?

Collins, PW, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 137

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

164 Differential 2492M60P01 / Kulite A320NEO 73-34-05 LHT DLH Pressure Sensor P02 / P03 Fault Due to Pressure Spikes CFMI B737MAX LEAP-1A/-1B

LEAP fuel differential pressure (DP) sensors PN 2492M60P01 and 2492M60P02 can fail due to overpressure spikes above the DP sensor capability if engine is operated beyond normal conditions. SB LEAP-1A 73-0003 and LEAP-1B 73-0005 introduced a new DP sensor with PN 2492M60P03 which was designed to withstand occasional pressure spikes.

Currently removals of post-mod sensors show same failure as pre-mod sensors. According OEM Kulite, SB was revised to allow for the reuse of pre-mod PN 2492M60P02 which is a snubbed sensor better able to mitigate pressure spikes.

Q1: Which are “…beyond normal conditions…” of engine operation? Number of failed sensors indicate the engine is very often operating beyond normal condition regardless of operator.

Q2: What is the percentage of returned DP sensor showing this kind of damage by PN (P01/P02/P03)?

Q3: Which PN is the favored PN showing best withstand in regards to pressure spikes?

Q4: What will be the solution for this issue and when will it be available?

Kulite, CFMI, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 138

ENGINE SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

165 Fuel Lacquering on G4000VSVA01 Collins A320 74-32-42 LHT DLH Servovalve Inlet Aerospace Filter IAE V2500

In reference to AMC 2019 item 208: During shop visit, fuel lacquering on servovalve inlet filter is detected. No cleaning or repair procedure is given within CMM and therefore costly replacement of servovalve is necessary. Youngest affected unit had TSN=6500 and due to lacquering defined as CID by UTAS, no new part warranty is granted. There were several discussions on different Repair Orders (POs) without positive outcome for LHT. UTAS views this as external contamination that is not covered under warranty.

Answer in 2019: The first question is regarding the status of the IAE fuel task force on fuel deposits and lacquering. IAE has currently advised that the investigation is still ongoing. This is all the information Collins has, as this is an engine level investigation being carried out by IAE, not Collins Aerospace.

The second question is regarding servo valve replacement rather than cleaning and flushing. The servo valve contained within the G4000 SVA is a purchased subassembly item. There are no defined maintenance procedures for this item. Collins Aerospace has been working IAE and Rolls Royce to develop an approved cleaning work scope and expects this will be approved within the next few months.

What is the current investigation status of IAE fuel task force regarding fuel deposits/lacquering? What are the experiences with the revised cleaning procedure?

Collins, IAE, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

166 Need Piece Part Availability 304640-5 Diehl A319 49 DAL Airbus A320

Diehl is refusing to sell Delta some piece parts for this component. However, part of their response is “if you ship the NHA or the CCA to us, we can repair it”. If parts are available to Diehl, they should be available to Delta.

It should be irrelevant who performs the repairs. Per the Airbus SSC, Delta can perform repairs at their own facility if we chose. If some items are truly “obsolete”, then we ask Diehl to provide us with part specifications so that we may determine suitable substitutes on our own.

Diehl and Airbus comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 139

IFE SYSTEMS

******19-258******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Thales i5000 QSEB Power Board Fails 178861-101 / QSEB Thales A330 44 KAL 178861-102 / QSEB B777

Last March 2018, smoke and burning smells occurred under seat 57E (economy class) after take-off on the KE647 (ICN-SIN) flight. The aircraft was HL7584 (A330-300) and equipped with Thales i5000 IFE system.

L19 thermal fuse inductors designed to protect the QSEB internally with overcurrent and overheating were the main causes of smoke and burning odors. According to the Thales investigation report, as of November 2018, there have been seven confirmed L19 thermal fuse failures related to the QSEB since Thales changed the QSEB design to replace the L19 inductor with the new L19 thermal fuse inductor. Even if this was not the first time, Thales has no solution to prevent the QSEB burn because the LRU design has met its safety requirements in Thales’s perspective.

How can you say it is "safe" when smoke and burning smell occurs during flight?

There are 5,382 QSEBs in 48 aircrafts equipped with the Thales i5000 IFE system at Korean Air. If there were no solutions to prevent the QSEB burn, it could recur and cause other flight diversions/delays/ATBs that were used to determine a definitive adverse economic impact to the operators.

Thales and other operator comments, please.

******19-259******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Discontinuation of Minor Part for IFE LRU RD-FW7805-53 Panasonic B777 44 KAL 10.6” Smart Monitor A380

Last year, KAL received a notice about the discontinuation of minor part (R8U4FW7805W). Since KAL could not repair the IFE monitor, we sent it abroad for repair. During the repair process, KAL operated aircraft with seat blocked condition. Even though we repeatedly told Panasonic about our difficulties, the situation has not improved.

Recently, the warranty (four years) for the monitor has been over. The last aircraft equipped with this monitor is still less than five years. KAL has introduced equipment and authorization from Panasonic for the repair of monitors but could not fix it because of minor part discontinuation.

This condition causes economic loss to KAL and the bigger problem is that seat blocks still occur. Due to monitor repair abroad and discontinuation of the minor part, TAT has increased. KAL requested several alternatives (purchase an additional monitor, reproduce minor part for repair, decrease TAT period, etc.) to prevent seat blocks, but all were rejected from Panasonic. Because of these circumstances, we do not have any option to solve this problem.

1. Panasonic informed KAL that discontinued minor parts will increase. Therefore, KAL strongly requests to Panasonic take measures to prevent seat blocks.

Panasonic and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 140

IFE SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

167 IFE Harnesses/Cables – AOG Requirements Several Panasonic Several 44 THY Thales

THY Technic receives yearly catalogues with less part numbers of not only harness but also cables. For instance, in 2020 catalogues, 83 ea. of 3554 ea. is having cable or harness description for Thales and 242 ea. out of 12371 ea. for Panasonic. In order to create any orders, emails should be exchanged that is ending roughly two days to get any quote which is exactly causing time wasting at the beginning. More harnesses and cables should be placed in catalogues or any separated catalogues can be created for them only.

Any AOG requests for harness and cables are taking consideration nevertheless AOG shipment cannot be performed on time and even the exact delivery date can be specified even declared AOG. To meet any AOG requirement on time, the delivery dates should be defined and can be exactly acquiesced in.

The IFE companies should keep enough safety stock of customized part numbers in order to meet the requirements of Turkish Technic which also can lead the customer satisfaction on better level.

Panasonic, Thales, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

168 Not Providing IFE Harness Capability Several Panasonic Several 44 THY Thales

THY Technic encounters a lot of problems in case an IFE Harness without any spares gets defected. Currently, there is no trend in harness P/Ns in terms of defect frequency. Most of the defects occur from a different part number. Some the defects are due to that harness’s structural strength. In case a harness gets defected, once the PO is opened the lead time is generally mentioned as 90 to 120 days, which is unacceptable. The reason of this long duration is every single harness has to be produced from the beginning. Because the length of the harness may be set due to the operators’ cabin configuration.

The defects which occur because of these harnesses may cause 3 to 12 seats to be inoperative for a long time during the operations.

The request is to be able to produce these harnesses by getting the capability in order to be able to address such issues as fast as possible.

For example:

Panasonic P/N: RD-FM6434-30988 Thales P/N: 185605-0915LN

Thy Technic also receives yearly catalogues with less part numbers of not only harness but also cables. For instance, in 2020 catalogues, 83 ea. of 3554 ea. is having cable or harness description for Thales and 242 ea. out of 12371 ea. for Panasonic. In order to create any orders, emails should be exchanged that is ending roughly two days to get any quote which is exactly causing time wasting at the beginning. More harnesses and cables should be placed in catalogues or any separated catalogues can be created for them only.

Any AOG requests for harness and cables are taking consideration nevertheless AOG shipment cannot be performed on time and even the exact delivery date can be specified even declared AOG. To meet any AOG requirement on time, the delivery dates should be defined and can be exactly acquiesced in.

The IFE companies should keep enough safety stock of customized part numbers in order to meet the requirements of Turkish Technic which also can lead the customer satisfaction on better level.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 141

IFE SYSTEMS

Being obsolete of some IFE parts cause us to have trouble especially on leased aircrafts’ re-delivery phase. Is there a procedure for parts obsolescence? How can we take precautions against this issue?

We demand expedition for our orders regarding cord PN: R6Z206XA because we are still ordering the related cradle PN: RD-KA5612-13 at high quantities.

Panasonic, Thales, and other operator comments, please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 142

LIGHTING ******19-224******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

EPSU 3214-62 Diehl Aerospace GmbH A330 33 KAL 3214-62-10 3214-62-20

KAL has experienced several maintenance delays due to EPSU failure on A330 aircrafts. Currently, P/N 3214-62 and 3214-62-20 have been installed on A330 classic aircrafts and P/N 3214-62-10 has been installed on A330 enhanced aircrafts.

If an EPSU is failed in outside stations, a lot of passengers have to be removed as per MEL. If FPEEPMS is failed due to EPSU, the aircraft cannot be dispatched unless the defective EPSU is replaced.

The main reason to lead this failure is EPSU battery. The best way to prevent this problem is the allocation of EPSU Battery in all the station or loading as FAK. But since the battery is categorized as Dangerous Goods, it is almost impossible to load on the aircraft. Also, since the shelf life time is too short, it is not efficient to allocate it.

KAL would like to get other airlines’ experience about EPSU failure and how to operate A330 aircrafts in case of EPSU failure.

Diehl Aerospace and operator comments, please.

******19-225******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Reliability of Lavatory ECU AEPC000200A0003 Jamco B787 33 JAL

ECU – Elec Control Unit part number AEPC000200A0003 is a circuit card for the purpose to generate constant current into the lavatory interior lighting.

Since 2016, JAL has been observing its increasing number of removals. In 2017, we experienced four times of departure delay due to inoperative lighting at the departure preparation.

In response to the above situation, JAL has been talking to Jamco, and was advised the almost failure of the ECUs were caused by blown temperature fuse located close to the FET. According to Jamco analysis, since the thermos-tolerance is suspected not to be optimized, Jamco and Boeing have been taking their effort for investigation and planning design change.

However, the progress of planning improvement has been taking long time. And it seems like the target date is also not set yet.

Especially for the summer season, its failure rate tends to increase in association with outside temperature. JAL hopes to accelerate the improvement activities in time for this summer.

Could Boeing or Jamco advise operators the target date of the improvement for the ECU?

Comments from other operators would be highly appreciated too.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 143

LIGHTING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

169 Decrease in Quality Q4559X/Parabolic General B777 33-40 AUA of PAR64 Lamps Anodized Reflector Electric (GE) Lamp B767 ERJ190 A320F DH8 (The Entire Austrian Fleet)

Austrian Airlines uses parabolic anodized reflector lamp, P/N: Q4559X, on the entire fleet for various outside light assemblies, for example, the landing light on Austrian’s A32F fleet. Since GE closed its manufacturing plant in the USA and moved the production to China, an obvious change in design and a massive increase in lamp replacements was observed.

The change affects both the inside and the outside design:

The lamp had stiffener bars inside, which supported the actual lamp body. The curvature of the cover glass and the main dimensions differ from the “old” lamp design so that the lamps can hardly be installed in some light assemblies. The old badge had a little bulge, which contained the base of the standoff for the stiffener bars. The outside of this bulge has also the function of a support of a holding clamp of some light assemblies. For details, please refer to the pictures at the end of this item.

Here are some numbers that show the increase in replacements within the LH group:

Lufthansa (A32F Fleet only): • 2017: 951 replacements • 2019: 1416 replacements

Swiss • 2017: 636 replacements • 2019: 1047 replacements

Austrian • 2017: 275 replacements • 2019: 403 replacements

Questions: 1. Are other operators seeing similar issues? 2. Why did the significant change in design not lead to a new part number? 3. Are there plans inside GE to go back to the “old” design in order to improve the quality again?

Additionally, some pictures to visualize the change in the lamp’s design:

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 144

LIGHTING Actual lamp body with stiffener bars (made in USA, before 2017):

Actual lamp body without stiffener bars (made in PRC, from 2017):

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 145

LIGHTING Back with bulge (made in USA, before 2017):

Back without bulge (made in PRC, from 2017):

GE and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 146

LIGHTING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

170 Part Poor Reliability 040004-1 / Socket Retainer Collins Aerospace B777 33 EVA

EVA found the consumption rate of socket retainer, PN 040004-1, in 2019 was very high, especially removed from wing scan L’T (total 50ea replacement in 2019).

Boeing and Collins have provided the following suggestions in mid of 2019: 1. Use lamp PN HLX64621 produced by IPC instructing Vendor. 2. Press the lamp firmly into the holder by pushing against the metallic surface of the lamp and make sure that the lamp is flush with the holder surface.

EVA confirms that EVA’s lamp replacement procedure and spare lamp PN HLX64621 both had never been against Boeing and Collins suggestion, but socket retainer, PN 040004-1 still had high consumption rate in 2019.

Questions/Requested Actions: 1. Please comment if any operator has similar reliability problem. 2. Please Collins, comment if there is any explanation for this high consumption rate issue. 3. Please Collins, comment if any improvement change will be applied on socket retainer or any suggested physical maintenance action to reduce its consumption rate.

Other operator and Collins Aerospace comments, please.

Item Summary LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From Title

171 Wire Damage 4319586 / Landing Light Assembly Zodiac ATR 33 EVA UNI

UNI ATR fleet encountered a lot of landing L’T inoperative events, around six cases in 2019, which were caused by wiring damage or terminal lug arcing in L’T housing as shown in Figures below.

Chafing

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 147

LIGHTING

Chafing & Burnt

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 148

LIGHTING

Burnt

Based on UNI’s research, this issue is caused by the following L’T housing design: 1. Wiring inside L’T housing is free without any fixing clamp and screw on lamp holder is too closed to make the wiring chafing in L’T housing easily. 2. Lamp is too hot to make terminal lug on lamp holder burnt.

UNI tried to ask Zodiac to improve this bad design, but the result was not enough.

Questions/Requested Actions: 1. Have any ATR operators encountered similar problems? Operator comment, please. 2. Unsecured wires inside the landing light assembly housing is the root cause of wire damage, this is a design defect. ATR, Zodiac comment please. 3. Please provide the solution.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 149

LIGHTING Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

172 Repair Service 301-3017 / Emer L’T Battery Cobham ATR 33 EVA UNI

UNI ATR fleet installed with EMER L’T battery PN 301-3017 since 2012. UNI has encountered the following issues with Cobham: 1. The average handling duration of every case between UNI and Cobham is 4~6 months in which UNI spent the most time waiting for Cobham’s reply after lots reminder letters. 2. Unacceptable CID (Customer Induced Damage) reason without any convincing explanation to reject battery purchasing warranty. 3. Late Bench test result

Questions/Requested Actions: 1. Please comment if any operators have similar service problems from Cobham. 2. ATR and Cobham comment, please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 150

FUEL SYSTEMS

******19-138******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Fuel Quantity Data Concentrator 367-334-002 Parker Hannifin A380 28 KAL

KAL suffers the failure of LRU’s identification, showing PN, SN, and related software information during FQDC auto testing.

Even though KAL purchased three types of board for FQDC repair, KAL is unable to use them for the LRU repair due to this identification issue.

At final stage of the test program set operation, operator cannot identify the PN, SN and software’s information of LRU of own TPS.

KAL believes a specific tool is required and loaded into the system to achieve successful identification. Despite several requests, the vendor has not provided it yet.

KAL would like to request Airbus and Parker review this issue to provide the tool.

Airbus, Parker Hannifin, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

173 FQDC – Unavoidable Scratch for 30278-0102 Goodrich B787 28 JAL Sealant Removal 30278-0202

Since 2018, JAL has been experiencing 13 cases of CID (Customer Induced Damage) due to the scratch on the FQDC (Fuel Quantity Data Concentrator) housing/plate caused by sealant removal at the airplane maintenance.

AMM mentions to remove the FQDC carefully with non-metallic scraper. But the sealant is firmly applied to avoid moisture ingression and even when we use the appropriate tool, the damage is not avoidable. It is not feasible to remove sealant without any scratch or take longer time for work.

Photo 1: FQDC Installation

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 151

FUEL SYSTEMS

Photo 2: FQDC Sealant

Once the damage is observed on FQDC, the housing cover assembly will have to be replaced. Costs are very high, and warranty is denied.

How it could be solved? Are there any better maintenance practice to remove sealant without scratch? If possible, it could be better to change the sealant material.

Comments about a solution from Goodrich and Boeing will be appreciated. Also, comments from operators who are experiencing similar problems would be appreciated.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

174 Fuel Quantity Indicator 1407KID02-03 Ontic A320 28 AFR/KLM AFR

In the Air France shop, we noticed poor reliability of circuit integrated IC4 and/or CPU/PSU board assy. Observed MTBUR is 9522 FH for IGO fleet, and 4776 FH for CEBU Fleet (GMTBUR: 12000 – MTBUR AIR FRANCE 215000).

Previously, when Air France’s shop observes no presence of ARINC signal, replacement of IC4 circuit or reworked solders were necessary to troubleshoot the FQI. Now we have to replace the CPU/PSU board due to tracks internal cut. Is there a frailness on this Microprocessor/Power Supply PCB?

On March 25, 2019, Air France sent 5 PCBs for troubleshooting. Air France has not received any answer about these PCBs.

On September 25, 2019 Ontic emailed:

“This hasn’t been forgotten. Investigations so far suggest that the problem may lie with the PCB. We do not believe that the processor or its associated solder joints are root cause. We would like to focus on the PCB and potential tracking open/shorts, but due to engineering resources being re-directed onto ongoing B777 FQIS issues, we will not be able to pick this up in the near future. Whilst we acknowledge that we see a high proportion of IC4 related failures, feedback from airlines suggests good reliability with the LRU. This makes it REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 152

FUEL SYSTEMS

more difficult for me to justify resources to continue the investigation, given that we have a priority situation with the B777 FQIS.

If you are able to help in your shop with any findings relating to the PCB, it would be appreciated.”

Air France requests feedback on the 5 PCBs.

Can Ontic provide a way of reliability improvement?

Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.

******19-140******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

IRP (Integrated Refueling Panel) 6026-01/-02/-03 Ontic B777 28 KAL

KAL has been experiencing numerous maintenance delays by IRP refueling valve control switch failure (S12 to S14 on IRP).

It is an obvious fact that it is impossible to dispatch the aircraft with no fuel. To mitigate the operational disruption, KAL is doing an IRP switch refreshment campaign, replacing refuel valve switches (S12 to S14) on the IRP and applying a new potting method for the entire B777 fleet with OEM "Ontic", despite its being a costly solution.

Furthermore, the IRP that have incorporated SB 6026-28-714/-717 called new potting method also makes failure. KAL has doubts about the effectiveness of SB 6026-28-714/-717.

KAL found out other operators also suffering from the same switch issue through Fleet Idea eXchange (on MBF) that KAL has opened (ISE-28-18-22546). But there is no action and no official answer from Boeing and Ontic. • Recent switch failure removals: 22 removals (Recent three years)

KAL would like to Boeing and Ontic to find the root cause and its solution for frequent switch failure.

Boeing, Ontic, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 153

FUEL SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

175 IRP Corrosion 6026-0X Ontic B777 28 AFR/KLM AFR

Following the issue 2019-140 last year about corrosion:

AF shop is facing 3 cases of connector receptacle 55-way PL9 on IRP with corrosion. In 2 cases, cleaning of corrosion was not sufficient, and we had to replace this connector, with extreme difficulty to procure it.

Does Ontic foresee an improvement axis concerning the connector’s corrosion?

Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 154

FUEL SYSTEMS

******19-142******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Refuel Control Panel – 30288-0101 UTC B787 28 LHT DLH Corrosion on Front Panel Aerospace (Design Deficiency)

The Front Panel of the Refuel Control Panel suffers corrosion around the switches and mounting holes.

According to UTAS, “Mechanical damage to the Front Panel (e.g., nicks, chips) that cuts through the paint layer and exposes the metal underneath starts the galvanic corrosion process where the copper plating and the aluminum body meet. To prevent this, UTAS proposed to change the finish of the RCP Front Panel from copper plating to anodize (except where copper plating is necessary for soldering).”

From LHT’s point of view, this cannot be basically operators guilt as the corrosion often starts next to the switches installed originally by the OEM. Although the replacement of a corroded Front Panel is covered by the OEM- warranty for the first 5 years, the corrosion had never led to a technical fault of the unit but needed a replacement of the complete front panel plus additional costs for harness/switch when the corrosion passes attaching parts. LHT expects a replacement of a corroded front panel FOC as this must be deemed as a Design Deficiency.

UTC Aerospace: LHT considers the front panel corrosion to be a design deficiency issue. Please provide information regarding the design of the panel and the resulting corrosion issue.

All: Do you see the corrosion issue as well?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 155

FUEL SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

176 Cavitation Erosion – Fuel Pump P/N Eaton A330 28 AFR/KLM AFR Final Fix 568-1-28300-103 A340

As all A330/A340 operators, AFR is impacted by the inspection of fuel pump P/N 568-1-28300-103, due to cavitation erosion. A new P/N, mentioned as terminating action of inspection mandated by EASA AD 2019-0291, is scheduled to be issued by end of Q3 2020.

Why does the development of a new P/N of fuel pump take so much time?

As a reminder, initial inspection was introduced end of year 2017 through AOT A28L006-17 and EASA AD 2017-0224.

Indeed, fuel pump P/N 568-1-28300-004 is not affected by this problem and the reliability is very good. No AD linked to this P/N.

Please Eaton can confirm the issue date of the new P/N?

Eaton and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

177 787 Fuel Inlet Adapter Replacement 25P0001 / Fuel Boeing B787 28-21 AAL Adapter Assy 2K97-136 / Inlet Eaton Adapter

AAL experienced fuel inlet adapter damage on both fuel inlet adapters on the left wing of one of our B787s when a fuel truck drove away from the aircraft while connected to the aircraft. The AMM does not include instructions to replace the inlet adapter on wing. Instead the operator is driven to replace the next higher assembly – the fuel adapter assembly. Replacement of the fuel adapter assembly requires fuel tank purging, entry and extensive down time – driving three days out of service. Other Boeing aircraft allow for the replacement of the fuel inlet adapter without replacement of the higher assembly or defueling the aircraft. Those aircraft have out of service events on the order of three hours rather than three days.

Boeing has stated that the CDCCL bonding tests require the use of 1 amp of current to verify the bonding resistance under current and that this would be unsafe to do on wing.

AAL is asking if other operators have had similar events.

AAL is also asking Boeing or Eaton to provide an alternate test for the bonding tests that uses a current that would be safe for on wing testing.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 156

FUEL SYSTEMS

Boeing, Eaton, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

178 GEnx Fuel Nozzles 6100005E0* Advanced B747-8 73-10-09 LHT DLH Wear and Tear Fuel Nozzle Atomization Technologies (AAT) GE 73-10-11

Long history on GEnx fuel nozzle deterioration.

Fuel nozzles with low installation times, as low as less than one year in operation, needed damper repair and aft shroud replacement at shop visit at AAT. Same work scope was performed at former shop visit of fuel nozzle at AAT or SB 6100005-73-001 was accomplished.

Repetitive damper repair and aft shroud replacement indicates further ongoing technical problems with the nozzles.

Q1: What are the major findings on GEnx fuel nozzles returned to AAT? Q2: Please provide data in regards to MTBR of different PNs (E02/E03 vs. E05/E06/E07). Q3: When can we expect an update regarding a technical solution for this issue and how will this solution look like?

AAT, GE, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 157

FUEL SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

179 OVH of Fuel Fuel Components, Woodward 73 LHT DLH Components if Mainly FMUs and Contamination at Inlet HMUs Filter is Present

In reference to AMC 2019 item 144

Several fuel control units such as HMUs and FMUs were sent to Woodward and contamination at inlet screen was detected. Due to the present contamination, overhaul is the only possible work scope to be performed on such units according to Woodward, regardless of flight hours of unit. General rule by Woodward: if the contamination is deemed to be small enough or found to be inconsistent in size to suggest the possible presence of contamination even smaller than what they have found in the inlet screen, the FMU is deemed to be contaminated. This leads to increasing costs for the airlines that are difficult to explain on a technical basis.

Answer by Woodward in 2019: Contamination is a very broad term. When Woodward suspects contamination, the type and source of contamination is reviewed. If it is determined that the type and size of contamination would have been caught in the inlet screen, then there would be no further action required. If it is determined that the contaminant could have passed through the inlet screen and affected other aspects of the FMU and HMU, the only possible scenario is to disassemble and clean the FMU/HMU of any potential contaminants. During this process, the unit naturally becomes overhauled based on the disassembly and inspection requirement. The pure presence of contaminants in the inlet screen does not automatically require an overhaul. In many cases, Woodward would find large debris and no further action is required.

Q1: Why is test/repair as necessary for units showing contamination in undamaged inlet filter after cleaning not possible? Filter design should ensure that only contamination not affecting operation and function of unit could pass the filter. Harmful contamination would be prevented from entering by filter design. Passed test according CMM would ensure airworthiness of unit.

Q2 of last year is still not answered. Was an analysis conducted on different units in order to determine amount of contamination inside of unit if inlet screen was found contaminated? If yes, what was the outcome? If not, why not?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

180 Airworthiness Limitation Task ASM 2180163-101 Boeing B737NG 47 SR 47-AWL-09 Wrongly Updated Technics by Boeing Filter 2040025-107 Oxygen Sensor 3522W000-001/002

Boeing updated SCAWL (task 47-AWL-09, Snapshot 1) and consequently, Airliner Task Cards (e.g., Ukraine Airlines, Snapshot 2) related to Oxygen Sensor life limitations based on the documents that do not support this action with applicability ALL (see below Snapshot 1, marked in orange).

SB 737-47-1015, FTD-47-19003 as well as Parker’s/Honeywell’s VSBs do not support this life limitation because it is applicable ONLY in the case that ASM and Filter post mode art numbers are installed or the aircraft delivery date is after 04 June 2019, Snapshot 3.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 158

FUEL SYSTEMS

Snapshot 1

Snapshot 2

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 159

FUEL SYSTEMS

Snapshot 3

SR Technics experienced at the same time that OEM-Honeywell repaired one Oxygen Sensor unit without asking about the unit’s history and whether it was repairable or life limited, and thus had to be scrapped. OEM-Honeywell was not aware of this limit at all.

Many airlines asked SR Technics, as their MRO, to provide them new sensors since the installed one’s life expired per AWL.

Boeing has been contacted by SR Technics Engineering and admitted mistake that AWL and task cards may be misleading and will be revised.

SCAWL task 47-AWL-09 still is not revised as Boeing announced!

Operators may continue to ask for certified NEW sensors (with no reason) and thus produce additional costs to themselves, their MROs, as well as suffer the operational disruptions.

Boeing and other operator and supplier comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 160

LANDING GEAR

******19-188******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Lockstay Actuator 10-452701-000 Safran A320NEO 32 AFR/KLM AFR

AFR/KLM observed some lack of information in A320NEO CMM component in the repair chapters. Several repair procedures available in the CMMs of A320NEO are no longer available in the CMMs of A320NEO components.

For example: A320NEO Cylinder in CMM 32-11-21 is repairable with refurbishing available for holes; oversize bushes are allowed, and those repairs are no longer available in CMM 32-31-05 for A320NEO.

AFR/KLM requests a revision of A320NEO CMMs to introduce those repairs again, such as example above.

Airbus, other operator comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

181 Pitch Trimmer 10-359303-001 Safran A350 32 AFR/KLM AFR Actuator Lock Stay 10-359501-000 Actuator Retraction 10-359703-000 Actuator

Many pieces parts PN in the IPL of these components (CMM 32-31-94; 32-31-93; 32-31-91) are supposed to be procurable. However, since the beginning of 2019, it is not possible to get Request For Quotation from the OEM Safran, either a price or lead time.

• Safran, can you please fix this issue to allow these piece parts to be procurable?

Safran, Airbus comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 161

LANDING GEAR

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

182 Retraction Actuator Piston 201590001, Safran Landing A320 32-31 DAL Retainer Nut Retraction Systems Actuator

Delta Air Lines (DAL) maintenance has been receiving retraction actuators (P/N 201590001) from the OEM, Safran Landing Systems, with several piston retainer nuts (P/N 20159091) not torqued to the specified range in the CMM when performing the breakaway torque to disassemble the unit.

The piston retainer nut is supposed to be torqued to a certain range so that the holes properly align for the retainer lock bolt. When DAL maintenance torques these units during the assembly process according to the specified rang, there are no holes aligning for the retainer bolt.

DAL Engineering contacted Safran Landing Systems in July 2019 to discuss the issue of the bolt holes not aligning given the specified torque. DAL maintenance has made record of units coming in with breakaway torque less than the CMM requirements that were last overhauled by the OEM as well as whether the torque ranges will allow for alignment of the bolt holes (October 2019). Safran has noted that they have not seen any torqueing issues at their overhaul facilities and would check with their MRO customers.

Safran and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

183 MLG Door 114122015 Triumph A320 Series 32 LHT Various Actuator Bearing Actuation

Summary: • During the inspection of the MLG Door Keen Beam Hinge and Actuator Fittings (AD Note 2012-118, SB A320-53-1195 and A320-53-1196), the MLG Door Actuator P/N 114122014 (pre SBC 114122-32-106) will be removed due to bearing free play and the P/N 114122015 (post SBC 114122-32-106) is removed due to cracked bearing sealer. • With the modification of P/N 114122014 into P/N 114122015 (SBC 114122-32-106) the issue with the extremely high free play was reduced, but a new removal reason was created. The outer race of the bearing, P/N P336621, starts to rotate in the lug of the Cylinder and End Fitting. The sealer around the bearing starts to crack. This is the major removal reason of the actuator P/N 114122015.

NHA SBC Status Bearing Problem cracked bearing any P/N pre SBC 114122-32-105 P336621 sealer 114122014 post SBC 114122-32-105 pre SBC 114122-32-106 114122695SC bearing free play cracked bearing 114122015 post SBC 114122-32-106 P336621 sealer

Requested action • Do other operators or MROs see the same finding of a rotating bearing (cracked sealer) after implementation of SBC 114122-32-106? • Is the modification from P/N 114122014 into P/N 114122015 (installation of the bearing P336621 which was already pre-SBC 114122-32-105 version) the final solution? • Does Triumph work on a new bearing design to reduce the new existing problem of the rotating bearing?

Triumph and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 162

LANDING GEAR

******19-190******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Electrical Box D23119000 Safran Landing A320 Fam 32 AFR/KLM AFR System

In 2017, AFR fleet has experienced three late departures incriminating Landing Gear Electric Box, later confirmed in shop. Like every year, AFR-KLM is observing peak in removals during rainy periods. Placed on the landing gear, the electrical box is subject to many water splashes. Its design should take this parameter into account. Water stays trapped into the box. As a result, 85% of the failures are due to oxidation. GMTBUR (7940 FH) is hardly met during rainy periods (8000 FH).

In 2018, this item was submitted and closed with the promise of Safran to take actions in the year. As of today, Safran has not made or shared progress on the water ingress.

This item was submitted in 2011 by TAP Portugal, mentioning that the SB 580-32-3159 does not correct the defect.

Other operators, airframers, OEMs comment please.

******19-055******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Control Lever (6GA) 215TS07Y00 Zodiac ECE A320 Fam 32 THY TKT Reliability

Turkish Airlines’ fleet has been experiencing serious issues related with the PN: 215TS07Y00 LG CONTROL LEVER both on A320 FAM and A330 aircrafts. There were total of 32 PN 215TS07Y00 replacements made with 11 replacements were made only in last 12 months. Most of those units were found with faulty PN 367UN01 switch assy, which is almost expensive as the new whole unit. Therefore, almost all switch-related units are being scrapped at the THY shop. A total of 45 PN 367UN01 replacements have been done in the last five years.

THY fleet has experienced eight different "CTL LEVER" status message occurrences rooted from 6GA issues since 2014. Additionally, a total of 25 different L/G Ctrl Lever caused LGCIU status messages appeared since 2013.

The root cause for switch failure could not be clearly identified by any document or procedure. Contrary to TFU 32.31.00.029, THY shop procedures do not include any partial/stopped lever operation or inconsistent up and down inputs, and we believe that related switches are needed to be investigated deeper.

THY would kindly asks other operators if they also experience such issues.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 163

LANDING GEAR

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

184 A330 Wheels Assy 3-1546 Safran A330 32 TAP 3-1596 Airbus

TAP Uses in its Fleet both TPIS systems available for the A330 Fleet, Classic and NEO.

Both systems manufactured by Safran and Crane, are incompatible in terms of aircraft connection and reading system.

The TPIS system is mentioned on the Wheel assembly CMM, including details applicable to the assembly on the wheel, like the applicable torque as an example, but there are no references on the CMM and aircraft AMM/IPC about the configuration identification impact.

Both types of wheel assemblies can be stored and managed without any identification different (dash number, amendment, etc.) which creates a technical and logistics constraints resulting in operational problems.

It is requested Safran and Airbus to analyze an identification or operational procedure to avoid delays resulting in an incorrectly identified/non-fully interchangeable wheels.

The wheels have a relatively high rotational cycle between shop/warehouse/aircraft, so it is a very exposed and impactful item, in the airline maintenance operations.

NOTE: Crane TPIS (P/N 83-294-01)/Safran TPIS (4305990071)

Safran, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

185 Landing Gear Repairs Various Safran All 32 TAP

Considering the significant number of repairs submitted via “repair concession” by all the MROs around the world, it would be interesting to understand the volume of repair concessions issued and approved per part number, to provide to the operators an indicator of potential repairability of candidate components.

Based on this information, the costly and time-consuming concession requests may be more efficiently analyzed before application by the applicant.

This transparently provided data, may demonstrate that some of the repair requests are recurrent and should be analyzed as a permanent repair, published on the CMMs repair sections, providing an efficient and economically more effective procedure to the operators and MROs.

Example of a commonly submitted unit (components) Retraction actuator P/N 201590001.

Safran and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 164

LANDING GEAR

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

186 Crack on the P/N: C20674700 Safran A350-900 32 AFR/KLM AFR Bolt Hole Main Wheel Landing Assembly System

Over a period of six months (June 2019 – January 2020), we detected in the workshop four wheels with cracks located on the tie bolt holes. These wheels did not fly as much (less than 1000 cycles). These defects can cause a deflation of the wheel with all the consequences.

Are you going to develop a repair or new design to avoid such defects? Indeed, these defects arrived too early in the life of this equipment.

OEM, OAM, other operators in the same situation, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

187 Identification V3245001900000 Airbus A350-900 32 AFR/KLM AFR Part/Number Airbus (Wheel and Tire) V3245501800000 A350-1000 WL203SBAAAAD WL203SBAAAAF And so on.

Airbus has introduced new P/N evolving according to the P/N of the rim (Goodrich or Safran), to the retread level of the tire and to the sensor installed on the wheel. These new P/Ns allow us to know the configuration of the wheel.

Basically, a wheel could arrive in the shop with a specific P/N and leave with another (for example, if the retread level has changed). On the CMM Airbus wheel and tire assembly, there is no information to identify and mark the P/N Airbus on the wheel. Could you give us a proposition in collaboration with OEM in order to identify/mark the P/N Airbus (V32... or WL...) on the wheel?

Operator and OEM please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 165

LANDING GEAR

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

188 LGCL A350 166TS11Y00 / Zodiac A350 32 AFR/KLM AFR Spare Parts Landing Gear Control Lever

Zodiac has not fulfilled the numerous requests of Air France to provide a quotation for piece parts of the LGCL P/N 166TS11Y00. The initial request was made in March 2019. Zodiac states that the AF request is still being studied by Zodiac. Piece parts quotation should not take so long to be issued as many operators now fly the aircraft and the CMM clearly lists these parts as procurable.

Zodiac, could you commit to a date to fulfill our request?

Zodiac and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

189 Freefall Extension 210TS07Y01 / Airbus Airbus 32 AFR/KLM AFR of Landing Gear on Landing Gear Airbus Aircraft Control Lever Zodiac

This has been a recurring subject since 2013. Recently, see AMC question AMC 2018-197 renewed in 2019.

In 2019, three new incidents of a Freefall extension of the Landing gear occurred once again. In 2018, Airbus stated that they had found the defect which would be corrected by SB 32-1450 and SB 32-1451 on A320 fleet FOC. Despite incorporation of the SB, Air France has not seen any improvements. Airbus also stated that investigation with Zodiac was ongoing, associated with regular TFU updates. Air France has not been able to get any information on these investigations.

On top of the former information provided by Air France, new defects have been identified: • Burnt flex circuit probably because of the short in S1 switch. o Never observed before by AF. o Has been discovered in shop after a freefall extension landing during normal operations. o Zodiac says not to be aware of this failure.

• Broken spring causing an FOD. o The spring breaking used to be retained by a nylon thread inside the spring in case of break. o With SB 215TS07Y-32-005, Zodiac removed the thread because it was breaking and causing an FOD. o Now the spring does it, more severely. Two cases since Oct 2019. AF questions the usefulness of this SB. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 166

LANDING GEAR

On Airbus A350, the design of the Switch is identical. Air France expects future events related to it.

Airbus stated that this type of event is not critical for operations. However, with recurring events occurring in Air France, concerns are ever growing.

Operators, Airbus, Zodiac, comment please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

190 Additional Test 42-907-4 Crane / Hydro B777 32 AFR/KLM AFR Procedure Aire

CMM 32-43-41 Rev 08 adds a new procedure page 1017, 1018. Pull up and pull-down resistor test Task 32-43-41-99A-832-A01.

We have performed this procedure on two SERV units certified by Crane and none of them could reach the requirements specified for Range 40 to 60 K Ohms (Step 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 24 to 26, 31, 32). Measured values are about 400 K Ohms.

Please confirm Range value for Step 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 24 to 26, 31, 32.

Crane/Hydro Aire, comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

191 Brake Accumulator 088256-04644 Parker A320 32 ANA

ANA has experienced a lot of brake pressure accumulator removal and eight flight delays in 2019. “BRAKE ACCUM LO PR” is added by EWC software modification and old A320 model is not displayed. So, eight flight delays occurred with the new A320 model. • MTBUR is between 4000 and 8000. • Most units were removed due to “ECAM Warning “BRAKE ACCUM LO PR”” and “PRSS Drop Rate Hi.” • Most units were early removal and around 30% units was removed below 1000(FH).

Airbus released SB A320-32-1470 to increase pre charge pressure in April 2019. But it is not effective because the removal reason of ECAM warning and pressure low do not decrease in ANA’s fleet.

Therefore, ANA accomplishes this check every month as a mitigate action from October 2019 instead of every four months, which is required by MPD. As a result of this inspection, pressure low condition was confirmed on 19 aircraft in November 2019, four aircraft in December 2019, and six aircraft in January 2020.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 167

LANDING GEAR

According to the repair report, some of units were found bladder damage (Blister, Crack, and Wear); however, most of units are no fault found.

ANA requests Airbus/Parker to investigate the root cause of this issue and would like to know other operators’ experiences. In addition, we would like to know how often N2 pressure charge to brake accumulator.

MTBUR and Removal Q'ty 10000 15 8000 10 6000 4000 5 2000 0 0 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Removal Qty MTBUR

Reason for removal

3%

5%

33% 59%

ECAM Warn "BRAKE ACCUM LO PR" PRESS Drop HI PRESS Low Unknown

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 168

LANDING GEAR

Fligh Hours of Removed Unit

4000- 15% 0-1000 28%

3000-4000 16%

1000-2000 2000-3000 18% 23%

Flight Cycle of Removed Unit

4000- 15% 3000-4000 0-1000 8% 31%

2000-3000 18%

1000-2000 28%

Airbus, Parker, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 169

LANDING GEAR

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

192 Incorrect Function of C24730001-x / Safran Landing A320 Series 32-37-08 LHT Uplock Uplock Assy Systems

LHT got two units from Lufthansa Airline, which did not lock after gear retraction. The units were tested on the test bench and failed the test due to unable to lock or due to extremely high locking force. The disassembly of the units show swelled Hytrel Stops. Swelled Hytrel Stops were identified at nearly each unit, which was repaired at LHT.

This problem is well known at Safran since March 2007 (item of ISE Nr.02, A320 Family Landing Gear Uplocks) without any action or change.

Do other airlines or MROs have equal findings?

When does Safran will solve the Hytrel Stop swelling problem?

Do Airbus or Safran plan to implement an MPD task for uplocks which have this kind of Hytrel Stop?

Safran, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 170

LANDING GEAR

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

193 NLG Bypass Valve Airbus A319 UAL A320

During analysis of Bypass valves in the Airbus fleet, we found that NLG Bypass (PN: 114087006, 114087007, 114087009) valves are failing more frequently than MLG Bypass valves with the same part number.

We would like to know Airbus’s comments on the reliability of these valves and why NLG valves fail more frequently due leaks. Is this an Airbus known issue? If yes, what are the measures that need to be taken to eliminate this trend?

Airbus and other operator comments, please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 170

FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

194 TAT Improvement FR3123 / Smoke Detector L’Hottellier ATR 26 EVA UNI

According to smoke detector manufacturer’s document (CMM 26-15-04 and 26-15-05) test procedure, the test bench (P/N:117-2) should be used and sent the bench to manufacturer (L’Hottellier) for calibration. But the Turn Around Time (TAT) is too long (about five months).

UNI had placed a calibration order on January 18, 2019, to L’Hottellier for periodic calibration. But the unit was considered an unprocessed entity and status shows the quote was withheld for two months. The calibration was accomplished on the unit and it was shipped back on May 20, 2019.

Please advise the why it takes so long for a test bench calibration?

L’Hottellier comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

195 Tool Equivalent 33600005-3 / Fire Extinguisher Meggitt A330 26 EVA

CMM 26-20-03 published by Meggitt. The previous revision of CMM (R.09) allows equivalent items use on Special Tools, Fixtures, Equipment and Materials. The latest CMM version (R.10) only mentions equivalent items are available on Standard Tools and Test Equipment.

All CMMs revised by Meggitt have the same problem.

This seems to have been missed in some of the statements in the current CMM. EVA e-mailed Meggitt to allow EVA to use tools available in the previous CMM. However, Meggitt replied that we can only use the tools mentioned in the manual.

In order to meet CMM requirements, EVA no longer can use tools that were previously available. Therefore, EVA hopes Meggitt considers revising the CMM and re-note equivalent tools are available on Special Tools, Fixtures, Equipment and Materials.

EVA would like to know if there are any technical concerns for cancelling the equivalent tools for Special Tools, Fixtures, Equipment and Materials.

Do any other operators have similar experiences in this situation?

Meggitt comment please.

REFERENCE 17-110/MSG-338 - Page 171

FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

196 Fire Extinguisher 473474 Collins Aerospace B777 26 AFR AFR/KLM Containers (Kidde) 473854 473876 473475

This item refers to AMC 19-243, which was closed last year but one item not closed.

CMM: 26-21-44 / 26-21-53 / 26-21-54/26-21-45. SUBTASK NITROGEN CHARGE.

Torque the fill-and-safety fitting (80) part number 446354-4 to 85 to 110 lbf-in (9.6 to 12.4 Nm). Then we perform the leak test on the fill fitting. Often, the test results result in rejection and need to be scrapped. An NTO was rescinded in 2019 that covered this problem with an extended range of torque.

Air France does not understand why the NTO was revoked and why the given range in NTO was not included in the CMM. Air France asks Collins to include the NTO range in CMM or emit a temporary Revision that permits to cover this case known by Kidde.

Collins, please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 172

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

******19-238******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Door Striker AR4726-5 Adams Rite B777 25 ANA Boeing

In the item No. 35 of latest 2017 MMC, ANA had commented and requested to encourage improvement of the striker assembly to avoid frequent replacement. We hear that Boeing and Adams Rite have made an effort to incorporate modified switch into the striker assembly.

Could Boeing and Adams Rite introduce their modification plan and schedule in the MMC?

Boeing, Adams Rite, and other operator comments, please.

******17-035******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Door Strike AR4704-2/-6 Adams Rite B747 25 DAL AR4726-1/-5 B777

The Boeing widebody Door Strikes have a 9-year discard requirement, due to the CMRs. Delta has requested the discard requirement be changed to an overhaul requirement.

Delta requests that Boeing and Adams Rite work together to certify that an overhauled unit passes the requirements.

Additionally, the 9-year requirement does not take into account the actual usage of the components, which is what would lead to the failure of the internal solenoid.

Boeing, Adams Rite, and other operator comments, please.

******14-264******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Cockpit Door Strike Assembly AR4726-1/-5 Adams Rite B747 25-00 DAL AR4704-2/-6 B767 B777

Adams Rite has provided Boeing with a requirement that the cockpit door strike assemblies must be discarded within 9 years. This requirement is tied to the solenoid. Research has shown that the solenoid can be rebuilt, removing the necessity of maintenance discarding the unit.

Other operator, vendor comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 173

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

*****18-227*****

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Cockpit Door Lock Controller Tester AR4709-25-03 Adams Rite A320 25-20-26 DAL Aerospace A330

In order to troubleshoot intermittent errors, we need to troubleshoot the Cockpit Door Locking System (CDLS) Control Unit Programmer P/N AR4737-1.

We need the schematics for the following parts included in the Adams Rite Aerospace (ARA) CDLS Control Unit Programmer package:

*Bench Test Unit (BTU) ` 73155-1 *DCU Signal Cable 73146-1 *RS232 Computer Communications Cable 73147-1

There was no technical manual provided with this tester. We do not accept that technical information regarding the testing of LRUs should be withheld from operators and MROs.

Other operator comments welcome.

******19-239******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Flight Crew Seat 3A380-0007-01-X Ipeco B787 25 ANA 3A380-0008-01-X Boeing

ANA has often experienced that Flight Crew Seat on B787 was replaced because the seat did not move electrically. After the seat removed from aircraft, the mechanic replaced the subject component such as ECU (P/N:EC0602A00P71100A), Vertical actuator (P/N:2A380-0825), Horizontal actuator (P/N:2A380-0827) and sent them to Ipeco for the repair. However, most of all shop finding reports showed no fault found functionally.

On the other hand, the installed seat on the aircraft is functioning properly after being replaced with new one. This shows that the removed components or seat electrical system seem to have something wrong functionally.

In recent three years, 59 seats were replaced, 17 ECUs were replaced, 63 V-actuators were replaced, and 63 H-actuators were replaced.

Based on contents mentioned above, ANA would like to raise the following request: to maintain more reliability as a seat electrical system, an investigation more detailed than existing one for finding the root cause is needed.

Ipeco, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 174

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

197 Seat SRU Reliability-- 3A380-0007-01-7 / IPECO B787 25 EVA Cockpit Seat

Boeing 787 Pilot seat lumbar up‐down adjust knob is easily broken.

EVA has replaced 3ea hand wheel, lumbar (up/down), PN: 2A380‐0645 with TSN 708 FH, 788 FH and 817 FH, respectively.

EVA requests OEM IPECO to provide a solution to improve the reliability of hand wheel, lumbar.

OEM and other operator comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

198 CMM Update Request 3A258-0041-01-2 IPECO B777-300ER 25 EVA Cockpit Seat 3A258-0041-01-2 /

Pilot seat, PN: 3A258-0041-01-1 and P/N: 3A258-0041-01-2 is installed on Boeing 777. EVA is encountering FWD/AFT manual function inoperative due to horizontal/vertical cable assembly damage (chafed, bent or broken).

EVA has replaced 12ea horizontal cable assembly, PN: 2A258-0449, and 9ea Vertical cable assembly, PN: 2A097-0629, in Q3, Q4 2019.

Refer to CMM 25-11-38: there is no clear instruction or illustration to install or adjust the cable assemblies. Please update the manual to provide a clear instruction for cable assembly installation.

Supplier, OEM comments please.

******19-247******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Poor Reliability Espresso Maker HFE2005-01 Iacobucci B777 25 EVA

EVA has experienced many removals of Espresso Maker PN: HFE2005-01 due to continuous leaking of water to the drain tube. The problem, per Iacobucci, is due to failure of the manifold. They advised EVA to replace the manifold every time failure is found.

The cost of replacing the manifolds (there are about seven manifolds or solenoids in each espresso maker) is high. However, the main reason for failure of the manifolds was never corrected until now: the spring inside the manifold tends to stick to the solenoid’s plunger in open position, which could be due to inadequate dimension clearance.

In addition, maintenance found a compound inside the water supply system.

EVA requests Iacobucci investigate the reason why this compound was found inside the water supply system, provide corrective action to the manifold with less cost to the operator, and clarify the main failure reason for the manifold.

After disassembly, EVA found water inlet main fold contaminated, which caused the solenoid water leak.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 175

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Iacobucci, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

199 Reliability Improve- 4651-2811-00 BE Aerospace B787 25 EVA Beverage Maker

Beverage maker PN 4651-2811-00 has a high removal rate due to defective control assembly, PN: 3520-0925-01.

EVA has replaced 24ea control assemblies within seven months (from August 2018 to February 2019). The beverage maker TBI is between 200 Hours to 761Hours (Removal reason: TEA POT LIGHT NOT ILLUMINATE) control assembly has low reliability. Reliability improvement of control assembly, PN: 3520-0925-01, is needed.

BE Aerospace, comments please.

******17-147******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Coffee Maker 4510-22UF00 BE A330 25-36 DAL HAL Reliability Aerospace Airbus

Coffee makers have been #1 on the HAL component performance index for years. In the last 12 months, they have had 109 confirmed failures with an experienced MTBUR 7517. Most of the failures are for the liquid level sensors and/or ventilation valves.

What is being done to improve reliability of this highly used, but often deferred, necessary flight equipment?

BE Aerospace, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 176

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

200 Trash Compactor Stops 3230005WV300 Safran B787-9 25-32 ELY Working During the Flight

EL-AL currently operates 36 units P/N: 3230005WV300 installed on 12 B787-9 airplanes. In the last 24 months, the trash compactors have a high failure rate in service.

A total of 497 events are reported by Crew and Line Maintenance.

Totally Not Faults are confirmed Line Maintenance Faults are Not Failures by Trash Compactors Confirmed by Confirmed LINE Faults Total Count Shop by Shop Maitanence and Shop TOTAL 497 12 17 480

All NFF events happen when the aircraft is in the air. We found that the Trash Compactor stops operating when the power source is switched from APU to another source. This phenomenon exists in all B787-9 airplanes.

Can Boeing and the vendor can find a solution to this problem?

Do any other operators have the same problems?

Do any other operators have any procedures to reduce this problem?

Safran, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

201 Trash Compactor 3230005WV300 Safran B787-9 25-32 ELY Interchangeability 3230005WV600 B787-8

EL-AL currently operates 36 units P/N: 3230005WV300 on 12 B787-9 airplanes and nine units P/N: 3230005WV600 on three B787-8 airplanes.

The P/N: 3230005WV300 is approved for installation (by Boeing) only on B787-9 airplanes.

The P/N: 3230005WV600 is approved for installation (by Boeing) only on B787-8 airplanes.

According to the manufacturer (Safran) and Boeing, P/N: 3230005WV300 and P/N: 3230005WV600 are interchangeable and can be installed on B787-9 and B787-8 aircraft. But this is not approved by Boeing and requires payment from airlines.

Can Boeing implement the Certification of both LRUs into two different airplane -8/-9 models as interchangeable and intermixable in the IPC to assist all airlines?

Boeing, Safran, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 177

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

202 Air Chiller Reliability 7000-2 / Safran B777-300ER 25 EVA

Wheel assembly, PN 36050-1 and PN 36050-2, is a sub-assembly of Air Chiller, PN 7000-2. EVA has replaced more than 70 wheels in past 2 years; they are high consumption units. EVA reported to Zodiac in 2017, after Safran took control of Zodiac Aerospace in 2018, but the solution has not been provided yet.

Wheel assembly improvement is in process. EVA would like Safran to provide a timeframe for service bulletin publication.

Safran, comment please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

203 CMM Update 7000-2 Safran B777 25 EVA Request-- Air Chiller

Compressor assembly is sub-assembly of Air Chiller, PN: 7000-2.

Due to obsolescence, compressor PN: 33366-1 is replaced by PN 33711-201. Zodiac recommends the operator return Air Chiller for compressor replacement in case of compressor PN: 33366-1 failure. Our shop has repair capability for the Air Chiller in order to save maintenance cost and shorten the TAT. EVA would like Zodiac to provide service procedures for the compressor assembly, PN 33711-201, and update the CMM accordingly.

Zodiac comment, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 178

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

204 Soap Dispenser CBS154-002 Carsten Daus A321Neo 25 TAP Airbus

TAP detected on the newest A321 Neos, due to a reported fault, some soap dispensers were removed as having the IPC indicated P/N, the DCIN154-002. After removal, it was detected that the units have a different Part Number and different manufacturer. The manufacturer indicated is Carsten Daus and the P/N is CBS154-002.

Airbus was contacted to provide information about the manufacturer and the Part Number, since there was no indication on the Aircraft AMM and IPC, and we were informed by Airbus that this Part Number is completely unknown on their system.

We would like to understand how this manufacturer appears installed in new aircraft without any indication.

Carsten Daus, Airbus, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 179

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

205 787 Interior CMM Support Multiple Interior Compartments Boeing B787 25 AAL

For the Boeing 787 interior components installed, Boeing has not released any CMMs to support. This includes overhead stowage bins, ceiling panels, overhead crew rest/entry modules, closets, doghouses. It is noted that for SFE design components that were designed by design partners that CMMs were released. These CMMs released includes galleys, lavatories, main entry door linings, sidewall panels and flight deck bulkhead. This is an issue as Boeing directs operators to the AMM for repairs, but these instructions are not specific and too general.

When will Boeing release these CMMs for interior components installed?

Boeing, OEMs, other operators, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

206 B737NG/MAX Escape 5A3307-7 Collins B737NG 25-60-37 LHT SAS Slides / Typical Slide Aerospace Girt Damages 5A3307-9 B737MAX TVS AFL ESR

The slide girt P/N 5A3312-50 is part of the B737NG/MAX escape slide and is the connection between the aircraft and the escape slide in case of an emergency.

Lufthansa Technik AG receives many B737NG/MAX escape slides that have typical damages on the edges of the slide girt, that are caused by the interference of the slide girt edges with the J-hooks of the slide packboard and the aircraft door. This leads to fraying and abrasion of the slide girt material and requires the replacement of the part. The OEM confirmed to be aware of this problem but does not plan to improve/modify the design of the slide girt or introduce any protection item against it.

Questions: 1. Are other operators or MRO companies experiencing the same issues on the B737NG/MAX escape slides? 2. Since the slides are installed for 3ea years, and the newer P/N for even 5ea years on aircraft, this damage over time can lead to a significant decrease of the structural strength of the slide girt, that might not be noticed by the crew or line maintenance. Does the OEM consider this, when deciding to not improve/modify the design? 3. Is Boeing aware of this issue with the B737NG escape slide girts?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 180

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

207 Suspect Quality and Heater (for Crew Diehl (AOA) A330 25-75-01 LHT Piece Part Provisioning Rest Compartments) A340

In 2016/2017, we had some smoke and smell events on A330/A340 crew rest compartments, caused by burnt heating sub-assy. The thermos-sensors and switches of the heater have no effect and the controller is not able to detect overheating and smell of these burnings too. Until now, we have the unsatisfied situation that the OEM is not able to deliver new and enough heating sub assembly in good quality and we currently have to visually inspect these heaters every 1000 flight hours to avoid further events. The OEM is also not able to repair these units and due to parts obsolescence, the same problem maybe will occur in other units of the same crew rest heating system, e.g., the controllers. Sometimes we have to reserve several business seats for the flight crew, because we could not operate the crew rest compartment, because no serviceable heater has been available. Currently some heating sub assy have been delivered, but the quality is suspect again.

Question:

What is the planning of the OEM to make sure that this crew rest heating system can be operated and maintained in future again without any smoke and smell events and without any unserviceable controllers?

Photo: REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 181

EQUIPMENT/FURNISHING

Please any other comments from other MRO or aircraft operators.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 182

PNEUMATIC

******19-090******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Overpressure 6740F010000/6740G010000 Liebherr A319 36-11-12 LHT Isolation Valve Hi Pressure 6773E/6774 Series A320 36-11- Regulating Valve 05/06/27/28/4 5/46/48/49/51 HP Bleed Valve 6713D/6714D Series A321 6773B030000/6774B030000 A330

The indication microswitch 16HM4 has an early failure, mainly abnormal level of electrical resistance. Liebherr issued SIL LS6740-36-01 on Jan 2018 (only 6740F/G) for additional testing to detect the early failure of the microswitch and introduce a switch with new manufacturing process (overpressure isolation valve SN 6740-15001 or higher, microswitch date code SN 1744 or higher). This microswitch is also installed on many High Flow valves as listed above with the same problem. The new microswitch also fails from stock or within a few hundred flight hours of service.

Other operators, have you seen the same failure with the new switch?

OEM, why SIL does not address all LRUs above? Will OEM look at a re-design of this switch?

OEM and other operator comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

208 Pressure Regulating Valve 6774B040000 Liebherr A330 36 SR PRV Reliability Issue Technics 6764B060000

SR Technics sees a reliability problem on these PN levels: • B04 has MTBUR 6,796 FH, while the lowest customer’s MTBUR within the SRT pool is 3,700 FH. The total number of units in SR Technics’ pool is 89 each. • B06 has even worse reliability although it is measured on the level of only one unit in SR Technics’ pool. Unit failed after only 2,480 FH.

This bad reliability trend was confirmed on Liebherr RTW 2018:

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 183

PNEUMATIC

Bulletin 6764-36-06 that modifies B04 inti B06 has been put on hold (cancelled) as it has been noticed early removals of PRV *B04 retrofitted into PRV *B06. Liebherr has discovered that the design is prone to create more ‘Engine Bleed Not Closed’ situation on the aircraft.

Per Liebherr’s words, it is not a design defect, but inadequacy to A330 Single engine taxi operation.

Therefore, to avoid massive in-service removals of PRV with very low time on wing, the OEM has decided to put the retrofit of B04 into B06 on hold until further notice.

So far, there is no technical supporting material to detail the MRO’s/operator’s understanding of the situation and announce further steps and/or reliability issue solutions.

Liebherr and other operator comments, please.

******19-095******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Low-Time HPV Microswitch Failures 6713D080000 Liebherr A319 36 UAL 6773E010000 Honeywell

Honeywell Microswitch P/N 16HM4 is installed on all part number standards of Liebherr High Pressure Valve assembly in the A319/320 family ATA 36 system. According to the MIL specifications for this microswitch, it is good until 260 °C. However, during operation, the temperature of the air from the high stage duct can be as hot as 550 °C.

United needs to know the status of alternative design(s) for this switch to ensure proper operation for the temperature range and/or mitigating actions that can be applied at a shop-level to reduce the failures of these switches due to over-temperature conditions.

Note that this has been a long-term issue with Liebherr and we would like to hear from Liebherr at the MMC.

Other operators: Comments?

Liebherr, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 184

PNEUMATIC

******19-092******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Bleed Air Isolation Valve Corrosion 2760000-101 Parker B737 36 EXS Boeing

Jet2.com is suffering numerous failures of Parker Bleed Air Isolation Valve on our recently delivered aircraft. This is not an issue we see on our established fleet, despite the valve being the same.

Parker has performed an investigation and cited nickel based contaminate as the root cause. They have also cited that this contaminate does not come from their valve.

Jet2.com is seeking other operators’ experience with this valve, and for Boeing to assist in determining the source of this contamination.

Other operators, Boeing, and Parker comments please.

******19-094******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

PRVC Diaphragm Ruptures 792755-15/-16 UTC Aerospace Systems B747 36 LHT B767

The Pressure Regulating Valve Controller (PRVC) PN 792755 has been a known driver of issues in ATA 36 (removals, delays, etc.) for many years. Several approaches were taken to improve the reliability of the unit and the situation. The diaphragm inside the component and its surrounding parts was identified as a key factor for the performance/failure reason. Several SBCs were developed to improve calibration stability of the PRVC and to prevent a fail (break/rupture) of the diaphragm: • 36-190 (B747) Jun 9/11 / 36-2181 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-3, Spring Seat PN 818789-1, Code L19 • 36-191 (B747) Sep 20/12 / 36-2182 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-5, Spring Seat PN 818789-2, Code L20 • 36-194 (B747) Feb 28/17 / 36-2185 (B767) – Diaphragm PN 792801-5, Spring Seat PN 818789-3, Code L21

The last modification code L21 introducing an improved Spring Seat was developed specially to prevent the failure of a torn/broken diaphragm (as a part of Boeing ATA 36 Tiger Team activities). The analysis of the shop findings during the last few years shows that torn/broken diaphragms are still a main failure mode with the L21 configuration and improvement measures (e.g., enhanced more resistant diaphragm design) are still urgently needed. Please refer to att. diagrams of reference operator.

Do other operators observe the same behavior?

What will be done to improve these LRUs?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 185

PNEUMATIC

Figure 1: Cases of Ripped Diaphragms per Modification Code and Year

Figure 2: Cases of Ripped Diaphragms (All Modification Codes) per Year as Percentage of Event Total and in Sum

Figure 3: Example of Ripped Diaphragm Partially Disassembled REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 186

PNEUMATIC

Figure 4 and 5: Intact and Ripped Diaphragm

Operator, supplier, and airframer comments, please.

******19-130******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

TCV-5 Unreliability 398908-5 Honeywell B737-800 21-61 EXS

Jet2.com is seeing an unacceptable level of reliability with the -5 TCV. Numerous warranty returns are from our factory new aircraft under warranty, where most are NFF; however, we often have a number of leaking capacitors as an incidental finding. Other issues include position switch issues. Honeywell has implied that there will be another part number roll. This TCV started life as a -2 and we are now at a -5. Will these part number rolls be the final part number rolls that correct the issues with the TCV?

Does Honeywell have an update on when these reliability improvements will be available to the operators?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 187

PNEUMATIC

******17-045******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

HP Regulating 6763C080000 Liebherr A330 36 AFR/KLM AFR Valve Anti-Ice Pneumatic FYLB-52145-1 UTAS 30-21-15 Shutoff Valve FYLB-52145-2 FYLB-52145-3

Problems of vibration on engine CF6-80E1, which causes heavy damages on HP REGULATING VALVE and ANTI ICE PNEUMATIC SHUTOFF VALVE. The vibrations seem to continue despite the modification by addition of links (VSB GE CF6-80E1 72-0472 and AIB A330-71-3029).

1. MTBUR of the HP regulating valve (20 000 for MAY 2016 and 6925 for MAY 2017) decreases since end of 2015 after realization of modification. The main removal reasons (not open/HPV fault/not closed) are due to many important damages (actuator repair/heavy damage) declared per OEM, 12 heavy damages for 2015- 2016 for AF-KLM fleet. 2. Regarding FYLB-52145, the heavy vibration level of CF80 engine has a real impact on the reliability of the valve. A VSB FYLB-52145-30-177 (upgrade from PN FYLB-52145-2 into -3) was implemented with no positive results on the reliability (on A330 fleet). The same valve installed on A340 fleet has a MTBUR 3x higher than the one installed on A330 fleet.

Will AIB, GE or LBH, and UTAS provide a new solution to improve the reliability of both components?

Please airlines, comment.

Examples of damages due to the vibration of engine, caused by the wear of the link on HP regulating valve:

Piston

Actuator housing REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 188

PNEUMATIC

Link damaged

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

209 IP Sensor 1151474-2 Honeywell B777 36 AFR/KLM AFR

AFR has faced for years very poor reliability on B777 IP Sensor P/N 1151474-2 with a high rate of NFF (80%). Fleet Time Digest 777-FTD-36-18001 has been open since August 2018: Boeing investigation determined that thermal degradation of the Sensor was the root cause (impacting protective coating, solder and epoxy).

Boeing’s conclusion is that they are unable to accurately quantify the expected reliability improvement for design changes to the sensor itself or sensor installation; therefore, an industrial support plan will be implemented.

Can Boeing explain what is the meaning of an “Industrial support plan? And when this plan will be released?

Honeywell, Boeing and other operators, please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 189

PNEUMATIC

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

210 FAV Duct Pylon 70649A010001 Liebherr A320 36 AFR/KLM AFR Broken Neo 70649A010002 Airbus

Airbus released late 2018 two RILs (SA54M18006038 and SA54M18000940) with SB A320-54-1043 in order to reinforce the design of the 3 FAV Brackets directly on the Aircraft for certain batch of Aircraft S/N. Unfortunately, this modification is not efficient as AFR noticed again failure on the Fan Air Valve brackets on modified Aircraft (11 removals). However, we never noticed any failure on aircraft modified on production.

TFU 36.11.00104 has been released on Nov. 19, and we are waiting for the corrective action.

Airbus, Liebherr, and other operators, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

211 V2500 Pneumatic IAE6F10029IAE6P16353 Pratt and Whitney Airbus 36 UAL AirFlow Test Cart

The specification for these testers indicates that the manufacturer will supply operating and maintenance manuals including calibration and maintenance instructions. United contacted the manufacturer several months ago to obtain copies of these manuals. We have yet to receive them and would like to again request copies of these manuals.

Airbus, Operators and OEM comments please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 190

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS

******19-228******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Lock Brake Sticking 3283086-3 Honeywell B767 78 ANA

ANA has replaced 128 Lock Brakes between 2006 and 2018 as suspected cause of the damage of Short Flex Shaft. Our line mechanics mostly suspect that the Lock Brake “sticking” causes the damage. However, only seven of 128 Lock Brakes were confirmed to be the cause of the Short Flex Shaft damage at ANA's shop inspection.

ANA would like to know the mechanism of short flex shaft damage to reduce the removal of Lock Brake without any fail.

We have the following questions and requests regarding this situation to Honeywell and Boeing: 1. We believe that the major cause of the short flex shaft damage such as shearing is sudden stuck of lock brake. Honeywell and Boeing comments please. 2. Is there a possibility that the stuck Lock Brake return to normal condition suddenly for some reason? 3. If the sticking is enough to break the shaft, what kind of sticking marks appear? Which part of the Lock Brake does the mark appear at? 4. What is the reason why Lock Brake suddenly sticks?

Other operator comments please.

******19-230******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Fan Cowl Actuator 725Z3191-31 Goodrich B787 71 AFR/KLM AFR Aerostructures

The hydraulic female “quick disconnect coupling” to connect actuator to the test bench is not referenced in documentation such as CMM.

Goodrich has already informed AFR-KLM that Parker is the vendor of the item that connect Actuator on aircraft. Parker has noted they are not the PMA holder and the part can only to be sold to Boeing.

AFR-KLM requests the correct reference of female coupling to be ordered. Who is the authorized vendor?

Boeing, Goodrich comments please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 191

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS

******19-231******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Fan Cowl 721Z2300-303NC Boeing B787-200 71-10 UAL UTAS GENX-1B

UAL has experienced two damaged fan cowls which exceed the repair scope of SRM B787-A-54-21-01-01B-664A-A. The SRM covers wet lay-up repairs which is applicable to only 25% of the fan cowl surface (SRM example shown as Fig. 1). One fan cowl was covered by UTAS one off repair, and the other was traded in for exchange after Boeing/UTAS could not provide one off repair.

UAL would like to request Boeing/UTAS to provide pre-preg repairs to expand the SRM to cover no size limit permanent repair as with other Boeing SRMs (777 SRM 54-20-01 Repair 1 as an example shown as Fig. 2). It is frustrating while all other Boeing fleets operated by UAL has SRMs that list no size limit 350 °F pre-preg repairs; but for the 787, 75% of the fan cowl is in the un-reparable zone.

UAL is open to new repair materials such as M20 or other pre-pregs.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 192

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS

Boeing, please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 193

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS

******19-232******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

B767 GE Inlet Cowl Component 224-2101-573 Collins B767 71-11-16 UAL Overhaul Instructions Aerospace Goodrich Aerostructures

UAL has been working on the subject Inlet Cowl and has noticed that the CMM does not contain sufficient data in order to perform a complete overhaul of the Inlet cowl. For example, the check section contains information on what TAI items to check on previous configurations of the nose cowl where a spray tube is used for the TAI, where on the newest configuration a TAI spray tube does not exist and is a D-Duct style TAI system. Repairs for the newest configurations are also not common and therefore the manual does not actually cover a full overhaul and requires a newer revision.

Other operators: How are you performing repair/overhaul for the GE Inlet Cowl?

UAL requests a manual revision to include repair and overhaul instructions for the latest/newest configuration.

Can Collins Aerospace comment on this issue and provide a timeline for this manual revision to be released?

Collins Aerospace and other operator comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

212 PW4168 TR Support 70M000-51X Pratt & Whitney A330 78 DAL Airbus

Pratt & Whitney (P&W) is the IP holder for this Thrust Reverser system. Middle River Aerostructures Systems (MRAS) is the actual OEM. Delta has to submit repair design requests to P&W. The repairs then follow a convoluted path: • P&W to MRAS • MRAS to P&W • P&W to Airbus • Airbus to P&W • P&W to Delta

This system results in repairs taking 2+ months to receive. Similar repair requests for the CF6-80C2 TR system (very similar design) go directly to MRAS and take approximately a week.

Delta needs the delays to be simplified.

Pratt & Whitney and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 194

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

213 Thrust Reverser D23090000-8 Collins A320 78 AFR/KLM AFR Actuator Aerospace

It is mentioned in the check chapter of the CMM 78-31-41 that “small amounts of corrosion in non-critical areas that do not require the parts to be scrapped can be removed.”

As a corrective action proposal: • As this comment is not suitable to evaluate/remove the pitting corrosion, this comment has to be detailed in the check section/repair section of the CMM or in Standard Practice Manual, can you please take this action?

As a preventive action proposal: • Can a primary layer can be made up and added into the repair section of the CMM to prevent from corrosion on the body actuator?

Collins, Airbus other MRO comment, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 195

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

214 Incomplete CMM 612C3001 Safran A320NEO 78 LHT DLH Feedback Locking Nacelles Actuator

The respective CMM 78-30-49 to the component in question does only provide procedures to verify if the unit is serviceable or not, plus the replacement of minor external parts (nameplates, screws, etc., ref. to figure below). It does not list any procedures for the replacement of any internal parts (valves, seals, etc.) or external electrical parts (e.g., LVDT). Therefore, it does match the definition of an Abbreviated CMM only but not a CMM.

Proper maintenance incl. repair and replacement of piece parts is not possible with this level of information. LHT considers the current situation highly unsatisfactory for a high selling product like A320neo family.

LHT requests that maintenance documentation will made public that allows a proper maintenance of the component.

Other MROs please comment on this issue regarding similar experience.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 196

NACELLES & THRUST REVERSERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

215 Incomplete CMM 612C3501 Isolation Safran A320NEO 78 LHT DLH Control Unit Nacelles

The respective CMM 78-30-41 to the component in question only provide procedures to verify if the unit is serviceable or not, plus the replacement of minor external parts (nameplates, screws, etc.; ref. to figure below). It does not list any procedures for the replacement of any internal parts (valves, seals, etc.) or external electrical parts (e.g., solenoid). Therefore, it matches the definition of an Abbreviated CMM.

Proper maintenance incl. repair and replacement of piece parts is not possible with this level of information. LHT considers the current situation highly unsatisfactory for a high selling product like A320neo family.

LHT requests that maintenance documentation will made public that allows a proper maintenance of the component.

Other MROs please comment on this issue regarding similar experience.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 197

OXYGEN

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

216 Crew O2 Mask MF20, MF40, and Safran/Zodiac B737NG and MAX 35 AAL MC10 Series B757 B767 B777 B787 A320F A330

As previously discussed, AA uses the Zodiac MF20, MF40, and MC10 series masks cross fleet and between legacy AA and US Air fleets. In the past few years, increasing reports of supply hose failure at the mask attachment have been reported. This failure rate is still increasing and now also includes the MC10 and new MF40 series masks. Zodiac has informed AAL and Airbus of an improvement to the supply line but there is no improvement proposed for the Boeing fleets.

AAL has the following questions: 1. Have other operators seen failures on the MF40 and MC10 series masks O2 supply lines as well? 2. Can Zodiac and Boeing work together so that the same improvement on the Airbus fleet supply lines are brought to the Boeing fleets as well?

Zodiac, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

217 Full Face Quick MF40-45-002 Safran B787 35 JAL Donning Mask Regulator

Full Face Quick Donning Mask Regulator has the issue of “Loosen Mask Lock Screw”. This issue can result in the Separation of Mask and Regulator during flight.

Since 2019, JAL has experienced 6 times of Mask Lock Screw issues in zero or short flight hours. 1. Incorrect screw installation as same as Fig.7002, CMM 35-13-77 (been floated the inner part of the screw and washer) despite these were brand new (3 cases) 2. The red colored lock vanish has not been applied (2 cases) 3. Mask and Regulator had been separated completely during flight due to loosen screw (1 case)

This may be considered both a repair and production issue and should be solved as soon as possible. But no corrective action has been taken at this time.

Please be aware that the issue of oxygen system could cause to obstruct safe flight and induce irregular flight (i.e., Air Turned Back to the Airport or Diversion to the alternate airport).

JAL still expects Safran to accelerate the root cause analysis and process improvement on this issue.

Comments from the other operators and Safran would be appreciated.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 198

OXYGEN

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

218 Lavatory O2 Cylinder 807894 Series Safran/Zodiac B737NG 35 AAL B767

These Lavatory O2 cylinders are sealed, with no gauge attached. To verify during internal shop visits, AA has been weighing the cylinder to ensure no leakage has occurred. Safran has provided minimum weight information to AAL and has committed to add this information to the CMM so that that it can be readily checked.

AAL has the following concerns: 1. Other than the above weighing, the only means to check that the cylinder is full is to observe that the striker pin is protruding. After actuation of the cylinder, a cotter pin can be re-inserted until a cylinder is nearly empty. If this is done, an empty cylinder will appear full. This aspect of the design is concerning. 2. We have concerns that the cylinders may leak during their 15-year life limit. We internally tested a cylinder and the weight was below what we typically see but still above the minimum set by Zodiac. When we tested it, we measured a weight loss of 74g, when it should be closer to 86g for the full O2 volume.

Safran and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

219 Torque of Valve Cylinder 804044-15 Safran B777 35 AFR/KLM AFR

December 2018: “The locknut between oxygen cylinder and valve torque indicated in CMM (240 in.lbs) damage the valve thread. As consequence: the valve can't be installed. AFI can't hear another 'have you respected the torque value?’

We thought repaired valve was the problem, so we bought new valve and test the torque value indicated in CMM (240 in.lbs) -> Same results: damage on the valve thread.

There was a meeting with Zodiac Aerospace on 27th September 2018 and no answer was brought to us about this topic. No other costumers complains about the torque of valve cylinder.”

December 2019: This case is not resolved. Safran tells us there is only one solution that is PMA (Part Manufacturing Approval).

Air France politic does not allow PMA on oxygen equipment for safety reasons.

Will Safran give us other solutions?

Safran and other operator comments, please. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 199

DOORS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

220 Battery Maintenance BPAS10-5 Radiant Power Corp. B777 52-11 AAL

For aircraft battery maintenance, AAL is currently using the practice of stocking batteries in a freezer to preserve the battery charge while in storage.

Radiant’s battery maintenance requires charging the battery twice a month or provide continuously trickle charge to the battery while in storage. AAL is in the process of implementing a program to continuously trickle charge this battery while in storage.

Please comment on your airline’s maintenance program with this battery or aircraft batteries in general?

Airline, vendor, OEM, please comment. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 200

WATER & WASTE

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

221 Non-Procurable 77001-040 / Safran B787 38 AFR/KLM AFR Parts 7700-600 Water (Zodiac Pump W&W) Boeing

In CMM 38-17-14: • Ball item 1-90 PN: D7-1-14 is listed and should be procurable. o Identification tag item 1A-20 PN: B4-482-1 is listed and should be procurable.

Safran, could you please provide a quotation and lead time for these parts?

Safran, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

222 Software: Toilet 38000-150-20X Safran A380 38 AFR/KLM AFR VSB (Zodiac Monogram)

VSB 38000-150-38-006 REV03 dated DEC2019

One of the VSB’s objectives is to update the toilet MPI by a new revision of software. To do so, AF needs MPI Download Software Tool (MST), PNR 38100-475SW3, and the software which needs to upload in the unit referenced as 38201-364SW2.00.hex.

Safran does not want to furnish this software, which is essential to perform this VSB, because capability is available in their shop.

All necessary parts or software included in the VSB should be procurable to apply it.

The software should be provided by Safran: could you provide them?

Safran, please comment?

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 201

WATER & WASTE

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

223 Toilet Assy. [1] AOA A330 38-31 DAL Apparatebau Gauting

[1]

COMPONENT SUB-COMPONENT A – TOILET ASSY. (P/N) A1 – WATER VALVE ASSY (P/N) A2 – FLUSH CONTROL MODULE (P/N) TA9115-00 TA9125-00 WV9135-01 FCM9130-01 TA9116-00 TA9126-00

B – TOILET ASSY. (P/N) B1 – WATER VALVE ASSY (P/N) B2 – FLUSH CONTROL MODULE (P/N) J540AI1-700 J540AI2-700 WV9135-00 FCM9130-01 J540AI1-701 J540AI2-701

Delta has toilets that come off wing at very short intervals, some that fail on installation. A lot of the removals are for the toilets not flushing. Some toilets may cycle but there is no water flow into the bowl. Sometimes toilets are removed for continual flushing.

Attachment 1 shows all closed alerts since July 2019 on the A330 toilets. These alerts provide the reasons for their removal, as well as, the respective corrective actions. This information is only for the low time alert toilets we received in the shop.

During the repair process, Delta is experiencing problems with them passing test due to error coded during the bit check. Most of the time they appear to function properly, i.e., good water flow, flushes good but throws a code: 20 on the 4th or 5th cycle on the test stand. Per the CMM (38-31-61) this could indicate either a water valve or FCM depending the test. We have these issues on both the TA9115-00/TA9125-00 and the J580AIXX toilets.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUES: 1. High level of calcification on the spray ring assembly P/N 9110-02-0000-00 (Ref Attachment 2) 2. Corrosion on the water valve solenoid housing due to water and other fluids splashing through the vent holes on the upper back section of the toilet bowl (Ref. Attachment 3) 3. Unrealistic lead times for the procurements of spare parts.

Are other carriers/repair stations seeing low time removals on repaired units? Excessive failures with the water valves (WV9135-01 or -00)? Excessive failures with the Flush Control Modules (FCM9130-01)? Other issues in service or with repair processes?

ATTACHMENT 1 – 2019 ALERTS

ALERT COMPLETED 7/23/19 ALERT 59296 FTN 2G0104 P/N TA9115-00 S/N 01450366 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: 2L LAVATORY LOUD AIR NOISE IN CRUISE. SHOP FOUND WASTE GATE STUCK IN THE OPEN POSITION (FAULTY CONTROL MODULE). CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER OEM CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD (12/5/2014). REPAIRED THE FLUSH CONTROL MODULE AND ASSOCIATED PACKINGS AND HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 94DAYS, 21 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 129.29 HOURS. REMOVED ON 6/22/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 7/15/19. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 202

WATER & WASTE

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

NO DATA AVAILABLE. PART PREVIOUSLY REPAIRED AT PERFORM AIR.

ALERT COMPLETED 9/26/19 ALERT 60162 FTN 4Q1700 P/N TA9115-00 S/N 11455546

COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: TOILET KEEPS FLUSHING. UNIT WILL BE ROUTED TO OUTSIDE VENDOR FOR REPAIR AS IT HAS BEEN REPIRED THREE TIMES THIS YEAR. THIS TOILET WAS LAST REPAIRED IN DEPT 390 ON 9/14/19. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019, OEM REV 00212/052/2014 PUB 36975. REPLACED ASSOCIATED PACKINGS AND HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 181 DAYS, 16 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 136.36 HOURS. REMOVED ON 8/30/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 9/14/19. THIS UNIT HAS BEEN REPAIRED TWO TIMES PREVIOUSLY IN 2019 BY PERFORM AIR, THE SECOND TIME WAS FOR WARRANTY FROM A FEBRUARY REPAIR.

ALERT COMPLETED 10/7/19 ALERT 60108 FTN 4T9360 P/N TA9115-00 S/N 11455817 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV A INOP LEAKING FROM WATER SUPPLY LINE. SHOP FOUND TOILET DIRTY / LEAKING. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED, REPAIRED, AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014. REPLACED BAD PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 122.0 DAYS, 5 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 48.00 HOURS. REMOVED ON 9/17/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 9/30/19. PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

TOILET REMOVED FOR WATER LEAK. SHOP FOUND WATER LEAK AND WATER. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM OEM CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD (12/5/2014). REPLACED FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, TOILET BOWL, AND ACCOCIATED PACKINGS AND HARDWARE. REMOVED ON 5/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 7/15/19. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 100 DAYS, 17 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 123.23 HOURS.

ALERT COMPLETED 10/7/19

ALERT 60313 FTN 65B0VY P/N TA9115-00 S/N 11454470 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: TOILET IS INOP, WILL NOT FLUSH. SHOP FOUND BAD RINSE VALVE AND DIRRTY. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED, REPAIRED, AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED RINSE VALVE, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 12.0 DAYS, 0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 0 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/10/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/29/19.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

TOILET REMOVED FOR TOILET WILL NOT FLUSH. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED, INSPECTED, AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 PUB 36975. NO MATERIALS REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 203

WATER & WASTE

REPLACED, UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 82.0 DAYS, 2.0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 21.24 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/19/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/5/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 11/7/19 ALERT 60438 FTN 2F9935 P/N J540AI2-701 S/N 30314 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: DIRTY AND BROKE ELBOW. SHOP FOUND BROKEN ELBOW. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-58 DAL REV 005 DTD 10/07/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 05/10/2005 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 31331. REPLACED ELBOW, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 12.0 DAYS, 0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 0 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/10/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/28/19.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

TOILET REMOVED FOR AIRLEAK AT FLAPPER VALVE IN TOILET. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS DAMAGED ELBOW LEAKS. RCVD AS REPAIRED FROM VC:10007207 , DTD:15/AUG/2019 , TN:PAI258255 , WO/PO:4800086277 , GVI. NOT N WRNTY,SENT-OUTSIDE,REPAIRED. TECHNICIAN D.NADZAM, I, 889412 08/15/2019 ALERT COMPLETED 11/13/19

ALERT COMPLETED 11/13/19 ALERT 60438 FTN 2F9989 P/N TA9125-00 S/N 01461430 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: COMPONENT TROUBLE LAV E 205 BOTTLE STUCK INSIDE TOILET. SHOP FOUND DIRTY, JAMMED. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB.36975. REMOVED JAM, REPLACED PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 98.0 DAYS, 4.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 27.00 HOURS. REMOVED ON 11/1/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/9/19.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: SHUT OFF WATER SUPPLY IN MAIN DECK LAV F" INDICATION ON FAP INOPERATIVE. SHOP FOUND DIRTY, BROKE W/V HOUSING, BAD FCM. CORRECTIVE ACTION CLEANED INSPECTED, REPAIRED, AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED WATER SHUTOFF VALVE FITTING, FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 803.0 DAYS, 1238.0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 9816.49 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/30/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/28/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 11/25/19 ALERT 60110 FTN 4E4820 P/N TA9115-00 S/N 54816 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV INOP, REPORTED BY PILOT. SHOP FOUND BAD FCM, BAD WATER VALVE, BAD BOWL AND DIRTY. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED FCM, WATER SHUT OFF VALVE, TOILET BOWL, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 103.0 DAYS, 17 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 105.18 HOURS. REMOVED ON 9/18/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/20/19. REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 204

WATER & WASTE

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: RINSE WATER WILL NOT SHUT OFF. SHOP FOUND CONTINUOUS WATER FLOW. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD (12/5/2014). REPLACED CONNECTING TUBE, TOILET RING, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 79.0 DAYS, 19.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 122.41 HOURS. REMOVED ON 4/16/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 8/28/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 12/10/19 ALERT 60426 LEVEL 3 FTN 4Q1696 P/N TA9115-00 S/N 54729 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV A CONTINUALLY FLUSHES. SHOP FOUND: TOILET DIRTY, FLUSH CONTROL MODULE AND WATER VALVE INOPERATIVE. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61. DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14. REPLACED FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, WATER VALVE, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 36.00 DAYS, 6.0 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 33.24 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/19/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/27/19.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: TOILET WILL NOT FLUSH. SHOP FOUND FLUSHES CONTINUALLY. CORRECTIVE ACTION: REPAIRED AND INSPECTED PER CMM. 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019 OEM REV 002DTD 12/05/2014 REMOVED PAGES CONTAINING OOPP PARTS PER MDCR 2020882. REPLACED TOILET BOWL, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 133.00 DAYS, 10.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 85.09 HOURS. REMOVED ON 9/15/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/01/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 12/10/19 ALERT 60426 FTN 3V2812 P/N TA9125-00 S/N 01462889 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: WATER SEWAGE. LEAKING INTO AFT GALLEY FROM AFT LEFT LUA. SHOP FOUND LEAKING AT ELBOW/ ORBITAL VALVE; INCORRECT HARDWARE INSTALLED; VALVE CLOGGED/DAMAGED. CORRECTIVE ACTION: REPAIRED BY PERFORM AIR INTERNATIONAL INC DTD 27/NOV/2019; TNPAI 263004; WO/PO 4800088165; GVI-RTS. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 93.00 DAYS, 7.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 37.29 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/27/19.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: CLASS II FAULT {{PREVIOUS LOG 1134595 CLOSED IN ERROR, FAULT STILL PRESENT}}. SHOP FOUND CLASS II FAULT CLOSED IN ERROR. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 004DTD 06/12/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 EO 3810-01129 PUB. 36975. REPLACED PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 1126.00 DAYS, 24.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 147.50 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 8/12/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 12/20/19 ALERT 60718 FTN 2F9958 REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 205

WATER & WASTE

P/N TA9125-00 S/N 60337 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV HAS A CONTINUOUS VACUUM PUMP REPRESSURIZATION. SHOP FOUND LAV HAS A CONTINUOUS VACUUM PUMP REPRESSURIZATION. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. SEALS, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 133.00 DAYS, 3 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 28.10 HOURS. REMOVED ON 11/23/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 12/17/19.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: RM COMPONENT TROUBLE FAP MSG LAV D. SHOP FOUND BAD FCM AND BAD OR WORN BOWL. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED TOILET BOWL, FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, WATERHOSE, TOILET RING, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 534.00 DAYS, 842.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 6646.23 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/15/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/30/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 1/7/20 ALERT 60718 FTN 2F9958 P/N TA9125-00 S/N 60337 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: 4L DOOR LAV HAS A CONTINUOUS VACUUM PUMP REPRESSURIZATION CYCLE EVERY 30 SEC. LOUD SOUND. SHOP FOUND DIRTY / TIME LIMITED PARTS. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED SEALS, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 133.00 DAYS, 3.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 28.10 HOURS. REMOVED ON 11/23/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 12/17/19.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: FAP MSG LAV D. SHOP FOUND BAD FCM AND WORN BOWL. CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 007DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14 PUB. 36975. REPLACED BOWL, FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, TOILET RING, HOSE, MOUNTING BRACKET, TUBE, FILTER, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 534.00 DAYS, 842.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 6646.23 HOURS. REMOVED ON 7/15/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 10/30/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 1/27/20 ALERT 60573 FTN 4A4569 P/N TA9115-00 S/N 11454250 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: CFS TECH REP - CLASS 2 MSG REPETITIVE ITEM 38-31-41 LAV53(3L). SHOP FOUND TOILET DIRTY, BOWL WORN, WATER VALVE INOPERATIVE. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM38-31-61 DAL REV 007 DTD10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14. REPLACED TOILET BOWL, WATER VALVE, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 151.00 DAYS, 92.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 543.07 HOURS. REMOVED ON 1/14/20, RETURNED TO SERVICE 1/17/20. PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: CLASS 2 FAULT - LAV 54 (LAV D). SHOP FOUND FAULTY RINSE VALVE (LEAKING RINSE RING). CORRECTIVE ACTION: CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 OEM REV. 2 DTD REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 206

WATER & WASTE

(12/5/2014). REPLACED WATER SHUTOFF VALVE FITTING, PACKINGS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 90 DAYS, 40.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 320.05 HOURS REMOVED ON 6/8/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 7/17/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 1/28/20 ALERT 60951 FTN 3V2812 P/N TA9125-00 S/N 01462889 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: PER STEP 9 OF AMDS 3810-1001, REMOVE LAV C TOILET ASSY P/N: TA9125-00, S/N:01462889 AND INSTALL NEW TOILET ASSY. SHOP FOUND TOILET DIRTY. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61. DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 ERA 580187-14. REPLACED WATER SHUTOFF VALVE, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 61.00 DAYS, 2.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 15.38 HOURS. REMOVED ON 12/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 1/21/20.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: WATER SEWAGE. LEAKING INTO AFT GALLEY FROM AFT LEFT LUA, LOC WATER SEWAGE. LEAKING INTO AFT GALLEY FROM AFT LEFT LUA, LOCKED LAV. FNDS: LEAKING AT ELBOW/ ORBITAL VALVE; INCORRECT HARDWARE INSTALLED; VALVE CLOGGED/DAMAGED. CORRECTIVE ACTION: TOILET REPAIRED BY 10007207 PERFORM AIR INTERNATIONAL INC DTD 27/NOV/2019; TNPAI 263004; WO/PO 4800088165; GVI-RTS. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 93.00 DAYS, 7.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 37.29 HOURS. REMOVED ON 12/20/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 11/27/19.

ALERT COMPLETED 1/29/20 ALERT 60459 FTN 2F9980 P/N TA9125-00 S/N 60928 COMPLIED WITH THE INTENT OF DELTA’S SMS/SRA POLICY. RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV NOT FLUSHING. SHOP FOUND DIRTY, BAD WATER VALVE, AND BAD FCM. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38- 31-61 DAL REV 007 DTD 10/08/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 PUB. 42855. REPLACED FLUSH CONTROL MODULE, WATER VALVE, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 76.00 DAYS, 6.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 30.46 HOURS. REMOVED ON 10/23/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 1/29/20.

PREVIOUS FINDINGS:

RECEIVED UNIT IN THE SHOP FOR: LAV 3R DOES NOT FLUSH. SHOP FOUND BOWL COATING WORN/ DIRTY. CLEANED, INSPECTED, REPAIRED AND TESTED PER CMM 38-31-61 DAL REV 006 DTD 09/06/2019 OEM REV 002 DTD 12/05/2014 REMOVED PAGES CONTAINING OOPP PARTS PER MDCR 2020882. REPLACED TOILET BOWL, PACKINGS, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE; UNIT TESTED GOOD. TIME SINCE REPAIR: 14.00 DAYS, 24.00 CYCLES, FLYING TIME 137.56 HOURS. REMOVED ON 8/10/19, RETURNED TO SERVICE 9/25/19.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 207

WATER & WASTE

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 208

WATER & WASTE

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

224 Water Pump and 2 77001-040 / Safran B787 38 AFR/KLM AFR and 4 Port Motor 7700-600 (Zodiac Operated Valve W&W) Training 77000-685 / 77000-695

This item refers to AMC 19-255, which was closed last year but Safran’s commitment has not been fulfilled since then.

AFR has requested training on the following components: • 77000-600/77001-040 – Potable Water Pump • 77000-695 – 2 port Motor Operated Drain Valve • 7700-685 – 4 port Motor Operated Drain Valve

OEM does not have the ability to provide the trainings (repair is done by subcontractors, repair is done by other Business units, or Zodiac does not have PMA certificate to sub-assy and piece parts).

We request Zodiac (Safran Aerosystems) to propose a solution and provide training as contracted with airframer.

Safran, please comment?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

225 Vacuum Generator 77000-003 Safran B787 38 AFR/KLM AFR 77000-003-201 Zodiac

Air France has been waiting for the quotation of the bench/tools and software fort the B787 vacuum generator P/N 77000-003 and P/N: 77000-003-201, CMM 38-37-20 for more than one year and half.

In fact, a quotation was provided last June, before placing an order. Air France has requested if the software mentioned in the CMM for the card test was also included. The OEM has answered a CMM was in progress and it could not confirm. A new CMM update was issued last October but no new quotation has been received yet.

Air France requests the quotation of the complete bench/tools/software described in the CMM for recertified this vacuum generator.

Safran/Zodiac Water & Waste, Boeing please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 209

WATER & WASTE

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

226 Piece Parts PN 14330-375 Vacuum Safran A320 38-31-81 LHT Provisioning Generator Assembly Family Zodiac A340 EJET

In 2019, we had a lot of problems to perform the MRO of the mentioned vacuum generators, because piece parts like the second stage housing (DPL, figure 1, item 160A, PN 67410353-1) could not be delivered by the OEM for some months. In the meantime, the OEM was not able to repair these units as well due to same reasons. This already has affected flight operation.

Question: What is the planning of the OEM to make sure that all necessary piece parts can be delivered in an acceptably time?

Please any comments from other MROs.

Photo of a second stage housing (CMM 38-31-81, DPL, figure 1, item 160A, PN 67410353-1):

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 210

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

227 Time to Answer one AOG Any Airbus A320 Any AZU Request A330

Some time ago, AZU made an AOG request to Airbus (#80732538) around 03AM through TechRequest, that was delayed approximately 2h30min beyond the scheduled time for one AOG request (4h) to be answered.

When the form was filled out, it was selected “AOG”, because we needed a fast answer.

After this time, a call was made to France asking an answer, because the scheduled time for one AOG answer was over. When the final answer was sent, we asked Airbus why they were delayed, and they answered that we should have modified the automatic hour that appeared in the form (23h59min) as they follow this time as the reference.

If an operator is requesting one AOG answer and this information was written in the form, this time “23h59” should be modified automatically for 04h beyond the time that the request is being done, not the end of the day.

Other operators, comments please.

Airbus, please give your comments.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

228 OEM Code Numbers in CMM Any Any All Any KLM/AFR KLM

Some OEMs are using own created part numbers for commercially available materials in their CMMs. This makes it difficult to understand what material the OEM means. Requesting a “translation” list takes time and effort.

1. Are other operators having the same issues? Please comment. 2. What is Boeing and Airbus policy on OEMs using own created part numbers for commercially available materials in OEM CMMs?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

229 PC Applications on W10 Teledyne All Fleets SWA GE Boeing Panasonic

Airline IT departments are cutting support for XP and Windows 7, and engineering departments are being company mandated to 64-bit operating systems software applications. Southwest Airlines has software applications that are not Windows 10 compatible such as: Remote Data Station application by GE, Boeing’s UMD, CSCT (Configuration Item Signer Crater Tool) QAR Utility (Quick Access Recorder), and CF Card Maker by Panasonic.

A potential solution I see is what Teledyne is offering with Teledyne AGS95, which is not 64 bit, that the airlines can access the software through the Teledyne Cloud.

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 211

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

230 Aircraft Fuselage Damaged N/A All All N/A Safran at Airport Stopover

Context:

During ground operations at an airport stopover, aircraft fuselages (composite and aluminum) may be potentially damaged by the tools and/or machines providing their ground services (passengers, Luggage loading, Catering, Refueling, etc.); these shocks could potentially serious damage the aircraft fuselage structure and in some cases it is not visible by the crew (the pictures below show different shocks and their impact on aircraft fuselage).

• Is the airframer and/or airlines aware of this issue? • Are other operators seeing similar issues? • How do the airlines proceed in case of damages to the aircraft structure during airport stopover? What are the procedures? Do you use a special instrument to detect the damages or you only perform a simple visual inspection?

Safran is working on a solution to detect shocks and is looking to discuss with potential users.

For further information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 212

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

231 B787 Goldcare Repair Goldcare Components Boeing B787 N/A UAL Order Visibility

Background:

United Airlines is currently subscribed to the Goldcare program; as components are removed from the aircraft and returned to the Goldcare pool for repair/re-certification, the operator doesn’t have traceability on the issue(s) found and corrected by the repair facility, so that the operator can bridge the gap between the removal reason(s) and manufacturer correction(s) and ensure that the diagnostics approach utilized by the operator was the most effective.

United Airlines needs full component traceability, i.e., from “birth” to “death”, so we can accurately track the maintenance lifecycle operating cost (MLOC) of a subcomponent and a key input for tracking this metric is via the shop findings report. However, for an operator to attain a copy of the shop findings report for Goldcare components is very arduous; UAL either sends numerous emails to established contacts at Boeing or we submit service requests to attain a copy of the repair findings.

Please note, we often reach out to the supplier of the component to provide us a copy of the shop findings report, but we are often redirected to Boeing as we are told that the component is part of the Goldcare program and the airline operator is not the owner of the part.

Question 1: UAL is requesting Boeing to create a central portal via My Boeing Fleet where operators who are subscribed to the Goldcare program can view the component history of all Goldcare components, especially as these components are a part of a shared pool so we all have the right to know the history of the components we install on our aircraft.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 213

OTHERS

******19-262******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

Finding System Parts in the Boeing B787 53 KLM/AFR KLM B787 Fuselage

KLM recently completed the first three C-checks of KLM 787-9s. An issue that created multiple maintenance disturbances was the lack of access to fasteners for replacement due to lightning strike damage.

Example 1: ref A shows a picture of a lightning strike on a fastener on PH-BHD (ZB236). After removal of the interior lining from the forward cargo compartment, a duct was found to cover the fastener location, see ref B. This duct is part of the ECS. There was no more time left in the C-check to remove, re-install and test this duct. KLM engineering analyzed why the presence of this duct was missed during the work preparation phase. We found that: 1. The fastener is common to a stringer that is NOT shown in the 787-9 SRM structure identification, 2. The duct/ECS system is not referenced or shown in the frame drawing.

Ref. A

Conclusion: the inability to see in Boeing SRM and fuselage frame drawing that the ECS system is located directly behind the frame makes the engineer miss important access information.

Example 2: PH-BHD (ZB236) had a lightning strike at a fastener at STA569, between STR38L and 39L. During access, KLM found that the fastener is behind the ref C Refrigeration Unit. This unit cannot be removed easily. Since the C-check ground time was limited, the fastener could not be replaced. KLM also found that this fastener is common to an intercostal that is not shown in the 787 SRM, nor in the frame drawings.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 214

OTHERS

Conclusion: again, KLM engineering missed important access information here, resulting in a maintenance disturbance and postponement of the task.

General: To prevent future work stoppage and postponement of repairs, KLM engineering needs more insight into the presence of system parts adjacent to 787 structure, as noted in the two examples above. The structure LWG drawing typically does NOT show the surrounding system parts, NOR are they referenced. The system drawings ARE generally accessible for KLM in the Bill of Materials Data Search, but you do need a system drawing number to start.

Please note that it is often not practical to have a look inside a 787 during A-checks: KLM mechanics have a high workload and have little time to assist engineering with removing and re-installing lining, parts, systems. The cockpit is a busy area with mechanics doing checks, there not much space for system/cabinet removal. Also, 787s are not frequently hangered due to the high A-check interval.

This item was sent to Boeing as a SR. Until now, Boeing indicates that a composite drawing that combines the structural, electrical, and systems installation for a specific section of the airplane does not exist and has not been produced by Engineering. However, in each of the systems installation drawings, there will be a reference to a structure, electrical harnesses, or system as a reference for orientation purposes.

In other words: you will have to review the separate system installation drawings, which remains a labor intense way.

DESIRED ACTION: KLM Engineering needs a B787 (LWG) drawing that shows all of the airplane systems that are located between fuselage frames, or immediately behind fuselage frames. The drawing should show (1) if there is a system present adjacent to the structure, and (2) show a reference drawing number of that particular system.

KLM needs such a drawing to engineer lightning strikes for the B787-9 and B787-10 fuselages. Separate drawings for each B787 section will also do.

Boeing and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 215

OTHERS

******19-275******

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Fire Extinguisher – Press. Switch 33600005-3 Meggitt A320 Fam 26 TAP 34600028-1

The Halon 1301 fire extinguishers have installed a welded pressure switch. This pressure switch is designed to permit the functional test with a hex-wrench, during aircraft maintenance or in the shop, during overhaul and repair.

We noted that this hex adapter in the pressure switch is showing more frequently a strong corrosion.

Due to manufacturing material used, with the addition of a weak design, the hex wrench adapter fractures very frequently. This component is not repairable, and the cost associated with the replacement makes the unit normally beyond economical and technical repair.

The conclusion is that the design of the hex adapter and materials used in this fire extinguisher should be reanalyzed by the manufacturer to avoid the scrap as a consequence of a test.

The newly manufactured fire extinguishers have also frequently shown corrosion on the container, not acceptable per DOT regulations.

We would like to know the industry experience on this matter and the manufacturer feedback about this issue.

Considering this issue is a serious problem already reported to the manufacturer, we would like to know, in the case of a worldwide reported issue, what has been done to improve the reported problem.

Meggitt and other operator comments please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

232 Part Not Procurable 120874 / Differential Pressure Switch Unison A330 75 EVA

CMM 75-44-13 is component maintenance manual of Differential Pressure Switch (DPS), P/N 120874. Switch assembly, PN 230159, is SRU of DPS; CMM has replacement procedure of switch assembly, PN 230159. However, switch assembly, PN 230159, is not procurable resulting in the operator having to replace the NHA DSP, PN 120874.

Why can the switch assembly, PN 230159, not be procured? Why did Unison provide a replacement procedure to an unprocurable part in the CMM?

Unison comment, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 216

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

233 Remote Data Concentrator 182594-001 GE Aviation Systems B787 42 SR (RDC) Technics

Over the last 24 months, 33 removals were noticed, whereof 17 removals were NFF in shop. Several of the Boeing FIM’s were amended as they wrongly indicated the RDC as the faulty component, but NFF rate remains high. Could you please provide explanation for such a high rate of NFF units?

Boeing, GE, and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

234 Printers Reliability C31007AA01 Thales A330-900 45 TAP C31007AA02

TAP is experiencing low reliability on printers PN C31007AA01 and C31007AA02 which are installed on the recently phased-in A330neo fleet. Since the beginning of 2019, there have been 21 unscheduled removals, of which 4 are repetitive units, of a total of 22 units currently on TAP fleet. Thales has been made aware of this issue and informed that the root cause was already identified and that a production improvement has been introduced on the faulty components. In TAP’s experience, even after this improvement, the overall reliability remains low and the number of unscheduled removals remains unacceptable. Thales has been supporting TAP on this issue but up until now there has not been a definite solution provided.

TAP is expecting a solution soon and would like to know when Thales will be releasing a new standard for this component. TAP would like to know if other operators are experiencing a similar issue and the approach taken to mitigate it.

Other operator and Thales comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 217

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

235 APU Shipping 70720041-00 Honeywell A350 49 AFR/KLM AFR Installation Airbus

AFR faced 2 cases were APU mounts to cradle arms were found loose after transportation, one to the shop and the other one from the shop, despite the installation of correct nuts and lock-washers.

Airbus answers provided through TR 80712994 are already applied and do not meet with the AFR expectation (Refer to the below pictures): Before shipment After shipment

Is Honeywell going to take any further actions?

Does Lufthansa Technik notice some similar cases?

Honeywell, Airbus, Lufthansa Technik, and other operators, please comment.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

236 Tools and Pieces Parts 0877B1 Collins B787 30 AFR/KLM AFR Quote Aerospace 0877B2 UTAS Rosemount

Air France has requested since June 2018 tools and pieces part quote. Despite several reminders, Air France has no answer to date.

Piece parts and tools quotation should not take so long to be issued as many operators now fly the aircraft and the CMM clearly lists these parts as procurable.

Collins, UTAS, Rosemount, could you commit to a date to fulfill our request?

Collins, UTAS, Rosemount, Boeing please comment.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 218

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

237 Wiper Motor Converter 2313M-347-X Collins Aerospace B737 30 ANA 2313M-348-X

ANA would like to repair B737 WMC (CMM30-40-14) in ANA’s shop because increase removal rate temporarily depends on the season. Therefore, ANA has been requesting Collins to provide the drawing and quotation of the tools/equipment listed in the CMM since 2018/11, but there is no response from Collins.

Please verify and provide test equipment drawing of the following 6 equipment (REFER Table 1001) immediately: 1. Control Switch 2. Mounting Fixture 3. Restraint 4. Wet-glass Test Panel (Windscreen - Opt) 5. B737 Wiper Test Box 6. Test Glass Panel

If Collins cannot provide the drawing, please provide the quotation of the following tools/equipment as soon as possible.

Collins and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 219

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

238 Shrinking 7001749H02 / Collins B787 21 KLM/AFR KLM Windshield Wipers Wiper Blade Aerospace Zodiac

During three C-checks in a row, KLM found ‘shrunken’ wiper blades that in two cases caused nasty scratches on cockpit windshields. The missing rubber varied from 15 to 20 mm. According vendor Collins/Zodiac, the shrinking is caused due to extended wear of the wiper blade.

Ref: UTAS SIL733 that states: “in a limited number of cases the blades may shrink.”

KLM finds it hard to believe that a wiper blade is allowed to ‘shrink’ 2 centimeters in just a few years, and suspects it being a manufacturing quality problem.

• Do other operators see this same ‘shrinking wiper’ phenomenon? • Can Collins/Zodiac explain how and why the wipers blades are shrinking that much during normal service?

Collins, Zodiac, and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 220

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

239 Windshield Wiper 2313M347-4 Rosemount B737NG 30-40 KLM/AFR KLM Motor Converter (Collins) Assembly with Brushless Motor 2313M348-4

Related to last year’s AMC 19-013 item 276:

KLM E&M is repairing a lot of Wiper Motor Convertors and found the main cost driver to be the BDCM Driver (p/n: 02316-0191-0001), which is installed on the Brushless Motor Amplifier CCA (p/n: 02316-0181-0002). Over 80% of repairs are done by replacing the BDCM Driver.

Last year, Rosemount design engineering proposed an update to this Wiper Motor Convertor, model 2313M-347-4/348-4 that would eliminate the power module such that it is replaced with discrete components. KLM E&M considers this a useful update since the power CCA is an expensive component.

Could Rosemount let us know when the proposed Service Bulletin will be ready?

Could Boeing accelerate evaluating this Service Bulletin for Rosemount?

Comments from other operators (or OEM, OAM) are highly appreciated.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

240 No Test Capability on 28969-x GKN B787 30-11-01 DLH ACA Heater Mats Aerospace

With reference to AMC 2019 item 270 the following statement is still true: “Although they can technically test the units, they cannot issue any release to service certificates.”

Lufthansa Technik still has not received one heater mat back tested from GKN.

When will the test capability including certification capability be set up?

GKN Aerospace and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 221

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

241 NGS Heat Exchanger 7012011 – Collins B787 47 KLM/AFR KLM Repair Request NGS Heat Aerospace Exchanger

When performing the leakage test on the NGS HX per CMM 47-11-04, the KLM shop sometimes finds the core leaking. No repair is available in CMM.

In 2019, KLM requested Collins to look into a proposed repair action that consisted of: • Cutting a section in HX manifold to get access • Locally displacing a limited amount of fins • Applying epoxy mixture at the leaking area • Welding the cutted manifold section in place and do a penetrant inspection and coating. • Proof/ leak and pressure drop tests per CMM.

Above procedure is a standard repair described in similar B777 and B787 Heat Exchangers CMMs.

Mid-2019, KLM requested Collins to review the above repair to be considered as a structurally acceptable permanent repair and put it in the CMM. And if that is not possible, Collins is to provide an alternative repair.

To date, the repair has not been approved, but recent communications reveal that a similar repair has now been developed and is in the administrative approval process.

• KLM requests Collins to expedite this repair to be included in the CMM and/or to approve it as a structurally acceptable permanent repair.

Collins and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

242 Integrated Wide Display Unit 101301M00040500 Thales 31 TAP (IWDU) – Processor and Graphic Board (PGB) – Replacement of MPC 8610 Diehl Aerospace

According to SB 101301M0004-31-003, units produced before March 2015 have experienced PGB failure rate in service rate than the ones produced after this date. This PGB failures were mainly driven by the combination of two factors: • Weak thermal stack design; • Application of high vibration levels during Environmental Stress Screening Test (ESS) in production.

SB has various conditions in which its application is not F.O.C. As this is a design problem, TAP thinks that it should be always F.O.C.

Thales, Diehl Aerospace, Airbus and other operator comments, please.

REFERENCE 20-017/MSG-363 - Page 222

OTHERS

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the Associate Airline

243 CRJ700-900 EDP 66190-02, -03, -04, Parker CRJ 29 LHT CLH Poor Reliability -05, -06, -07 IBX 4GU ADR EST UGD

Summary: • The EDPs of CRJ aircraft sticks out with poor reliability: MTBUR 4500 to 7000 FH (depending on the operator) • Several Service Bulletins were implemented without successfully improving the situation (see below summary). • There is no positive MTBUR trend with post modification part numbers (66190-04,-05,-06 and -07). • Main issues remain shaft seal leakage and parting line leakage between Front Housing and Port Cap.

Requested action: • Other operators to confirm that there is no determinable improvement with any of the post modification P/N. • OEM Parker & Bombardier to address this issue and provide measures to improve EDP reliability. • OEM Parker & Bombardier please provide your reliability analysis.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

244 A320 Hydraulic Pump / PTU Installation Airbus A319 29 UAL A320

Priming of pumps and PTUs during installation is defined as one of the solutions to avoid Hydraulic problems as stated by Airbus.

Is this process followed by any airline? If yes, did you find any percentage of reduction in hydraulic issues?

Are there any new practices in the hydraulic line to eliminate problems related to hydraulics in the Airbus fleet?

Airbus and other operator comments, please.

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

245 Grommet Seal Blistering 849589 Eaton Aerospace B737NG 29-10 DAL Hydraulic Pump

Delta Air Lines Hydraulic shop has been experiencing sealing ring (P/N 329282) blistering issues and low time failures of Hydraulic Pump (P/N 849589). Units repaired or coming in new from Eaton are experiencing the failures and DAL repaired units are not experiencing this same failure mode. August 2019, DAL informed OEM of the issue and they notified DAL they are conducting high temperature testing and Fluid Compatibility testing being done in coordination with CFMI and Boeing (November 2019).

Eaton and other operator comments, please.