Framing the Arrival of Migrants by Populist and Liberal

Framing the arrival of migrants by populist and liberal political parties in the Netherlands and Flanders: The aftermath of the sexual assault on women in Cologne 2015

Name: Julian Mensies Student ID: 11082321 Supervisors: Dr. J. Doomernik & Dr. A. van Heelsum Date: 22 June 2018 Program: Master thesis Political Science – International Relations Research project: Global Migration: The Politics of International Migration and Asylum

Abstract

This research paper shows how political parties organizations, in particular populist and liberal political parties, use framing to set the political agenda and gain policy entrepreneurship. The case of how populist and liberal political parties framed the arrival of migrants in the Netherlands and Flanders was chosen, after males with a foreign origin sexually assaulted women in Cologne on New Year’s Evening 2015. This research focussed on the victim-intruder frame and whether the large Moroccan community was named and blamed in the aftermath of Cologne. A content analysis was conducted to analyse the statements of populist and liberal politicians on Twitter and in Dutch and Flemish newspaper articles. To get a deeper understanding of how populist and liberal political parties frame, which frame they use and who the target of the framing is, a combination of discursive policy analysis and critical framing analysis has been executed. In line with the expectations, this study found that the intruder frame was mostly used by the populist political parties and the victim frame was often used by the liberal political parties. As expected, the populist political parties could be identified as the policy entrepreneurs because the field of immigration is one of the main political fields in which they operate. This study found that the populist had by far made more statements about Cologne than the liberal political parties. No substantial evidence was found to know whether populist and liberal political parties named and blamed the large Moroccan communities living in the Netherlands and Flanders more frequently.

Preface

In front of you lies the master’s thesis ‘Framing the arrival of migrants by populist and liberal political parties in the Netherlands and Flanders: The aftermath of the sexual assault on women in Cologne 2015.’ In February 2018, at the start of the research project ‘Global Migration: The Politics of International Migration and Asylum’ it was a challenge to find a research project that was compatible with my interests. During the research project I realised that I was very interested in the concept of framing, which I became aware of during my employment as junior employee public affairs at an enterprises association in the Netherlands. Although the issues addressed during employment were very different than for the field of migration, I became very interested in this subject. In particular, I found it very interesting that there are so many ways to send a message to an audience and that you will always have to keep your goals in mind during the writing process. This is something I will always take with me in the future. In June 2018 I submitted my master’s thesis. I would like to thank my supervisor Jeroen Doomernik from the University of Amsterdam for guiding me during the process of writing this thesis. He gave me new suggestions and insight for how to set up my research proposal and how to finish my master’s thesis. In addition, I would thank my friends and family for motivating me to continue with writing my thesis and for their support. Finally, I would like to thank one of my dear co-students and friends for giving me peer-feedback on my thesis.

I hope you enjoy reading the final product of my study.

Julian Mensies

Utrecht, June 22, 2018.

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 6 1.1 Background ...... 6 1.2 Introduction to study ...... 6 1.3 Research questions ...... 9 1.4 Scientific and societal relevance ...... 9 1.5 Thesis outline ...... 10 2. Theoretical framework: Public policy making, agenda setting and framing ...... 12 2.1 Public policy making and agenda setting...... 12 2.2 Conceptualization of framing...... 14 2.3 Frames ...... 14 2.4 Framing of populists and liberals ...... 16 2.5 Effects of frames on minority groups ...... 19 2.6 Framing in newspapers ...... 20 2.7 Hypotheses ...... 21 3. Methodological approach...... 22 3.1 Sample...... 22 3.2 Period of study ...... 24 3.3 Procedure ...... 24 3.4 Operationalization...... 25 3.5 Methodological weakness ...... 26 4. Case description: ...... 28 4.1 Cologne 2015: The assault on women ...... 28 4.2 A brief summary of characteristics: Belgium and the Netherlands ...... 29 5. Results ...... 31 5.1 Pre-Cologne ...... 31 5.2 Post-Cologne ...... 32 5.2.1 Frames used by liberal and populist political parties ...... 33 5.2.2 Nationality and mentioned migrant ...... 35 5.2.3 Framing on specific topics ...... 36 5.2.4 Twitter statistics ...... 37 5.3 In-depth findings ...... 38 5.3.1 PVV ...... 38 5.3.2 Vlaams Belang ...... 39

5.3.3 Open VLD ...... 40 6 Conclusion & Discussion ...... 41 6.1 Research questions ...... 41 6.2 Reflection on methods ...... 42 6.3 Generalising outcomes ...... 43 6.4 Theoretical implications and future research ...... 43 References ...... 46 Appendices...... 55 A: Codebook: Guidelines for coding Tweets and articles in newspapers ...... 55 B: Guidelines for analysing large articles on the websites of the political parties ...... 57 C: List of newspapers articles ...... 58 D: List of twitter statements ...... 60

1. Introduction 1.1 Background On the night of 31 December 2015 many women were assaulted in Cologne, a city in West Germany. In the weeks after the event 1054 criminal charges were reported (Welt 2016b). These criminal charges included being sexually assaulted, robbed, intimidated or separated from their friends at Cologne’s central train station (The Washington Post 2016). The victims alleged that many of the perpetrators had a North African or Arab origin and were between the ages of 15 to 35, although not much was at the beginning of January 2016 known about the perpetrators (Spiegel Online 2016b; Washington Post 2016). Later, in February 2016 the police stated that some men with different nationalities were arrested, including 23 Moroccans, 25 Algerians and some other nationalities (Welt 2016b). In the police report the officers stated that the situation was chaotic as they were hindered by a large group of men to help people who were calling for help (Spiegel Online 2016a). Also, many orders from police officers were ignored, fights broke out and arresting the offenders was not possible due to the lack of resources (ibid). A couple of days after the assault of women in Cologne, the much attention was given to it by international newspapers, news channels and news websites. When politicians read or hear about a certain issue like this, they will consider the costs and benefits of giving their attention to this event. When they do so, then politicians or political parties want to spread their ideas and positions on a certain issue, included in a statement, to the supporters of the political party and the media. It is only possible for a limited time to address a certain issue when these ‘windows’, also named as policy windows, are open (Kingdon 2003: 166). This research will focus on how populist and liberal politicians in two neighbouring countries, the Netherlands and Belgium, used this event to frame, set the agenda and gain policy entrepreneurship on the topic of the arriving immigrants.

1.2 Introduction to study Political party organizations have the aim to implement policy on the grounds of their own ideas or ideology (Bale 2013: 150). This is only possible when certain policy windows open (Kingdon 2003: 166). When these policy windows are open, politicians try to be the policy entrepreneur and set the agenda by framing certain occurred events, such as the event in Cologne on New Year’s Evening 2015 (idem: 20 & 166). Framing has an important role in agenda setting, as the media and politicians shape and interpret information (Berbers et al. 2015: 799). Entman (1993: 52) introduced a widely cited definition of framing: ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in

6 such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.’ The concept of framing can be useful to understand how citizens create a perception about political, economic and social issues (Chong & Druckman 2007; Slothuus & de Vreese 2010). In this study the emphasis will be on the framing of the arrival of migrants in Flanders and the Netherlands by Flemish and Dutch liberal and populist political parties. Although the Netherlands welcomed more post-colonial migrants than Belgium, both countries have experienced similar circumstances in the field of migration (Super 2015: 419-420). From the 1960s they have both experienced similar cycles of labour migration and asylum migration (ibid). At the beginning of the 21st century the number of asylum applications dropped and years later the numbers in both countries rose again (ibid). In the years to follow, both countries experienced bad economic circumstances, an increase of labour migration, including the free movements of workers within the EU (ibid). On a political level both countries have experienced an electoral success of the populist political parties at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. In the past, the debate about immigration in the Netherlands was mostly focussed on ‘non-western allochthons’, including immigrants from guest labour countries such as Morocco (Van der Haar 2013: 215). The populist parties are known for their anti- immigration position, while the liberal political parties are in favour of the incoming migrants and are concerned about their security and safety. Building on the theory of Van Gorp (2005) about victim and intruder frames, which are related to the episodic frame, it is interesting to see which frame was more frequently used by politicians and whether this differs for populist right- wing parties and liberal political parties. The difference between positions of the populist and liberals has not been researched before in the academic field of migration. This comparison of positions and used frames could provide insights in the debates on migration and in the broader political landscape in the Netherlands and Belgium. The other reason why the Netherlands and Belgium were chosen for the analysis is the existence of a large Moroccan community in both countries (Statistics Netherlands 2018; OECD 2017). This study will analyse how frequently the Moroccan community was mentioned and blamed for event in Cologne, as persons with this nationality were mentioned in the newspapers as perpetrators. Besides the fact that a large Moroccan community lives in the Netherlands and Flanders and men with this nationality have been mentioned in the newspapers, there are other reasons why these two countries were chosen. One of the reasons why the Netherlands and Belgium were chosen is that the position of the public towards immigrants is similar. On the questions

7 published by the European Social Survey (2016) the civilians of Belgium and the Netherlands had similar scores: (1) Country’s cultural life is enriched by immigrants. (BE 61/100; NL 65/100), (2) Immigrants are good for country’s economy (BE 40,9/100; NL 46,9/100), (3) Immigrants make a country a worse or better place to live (BE 38,1/100; NL 46/100). Although Belgium scores a bit lower on these questions, the numbers are almost equal. These similarities are a good starting point to conduct this research. This research will include a quantitative and a qualitative research design, also known as mixed methods. In the first part a content analysis was conducted to analyse the statements, made by populist and liberal political parties, in news articles and on Twitter between the 1st of January 2016 and the 31st of January 2016. The Dutch newspapers, De Telegraaf (sensational), het Algemeen Dagblad (sensational), de Volkskrant (qualitative) and de NRC Handelsblad (qualitative) will be included in this research as these newspapers have the highest circulation and distinction can be made between sensational and qualitative newspapers (Schaap & Pleijter, 2012). The sample of Flemish newspapers will include: Het Laatste Nieuws (sensational), Het Nieuwsblad (sensational), De Morgen (qualitative) and De Standaard (qualitative) (Van Gorp 2005). To avoid that one part of the sample had to be translated from French to Dutch and linguistic and grammatical errors occurred, this study chose only to include Dutch-Flemish newspapers. This is also one of the practical reasons why the Netherlands and Belgium were chosen for the analysis. Since Twitter as a media source is very new it is interesting to include the statements on Twitter in the analysis. Previous observations of other researchers showed that on Twitter frames were often politized in two versions: A far-right perspective, in which refugees were portrayed as rapists and terrorists, and a humanitarian perspective, in which refugees were in need or protection and safety (Siapera et al 2018: 17). These observations show that the debate is ongoing in the digital world. In the second part a mix of critical framing analysis and discursive policy analysis will help to get a deeper understanding of the position of the political parties and what the effects are of the used frames. This will be done by analysing articles on the website of the political party after the event on the 31st of December. A deductive approach will be used to collect the frames. By using this approach, the frames are predetermined. The huge advantage of using a deductive approach is that it is possible to replicate this research and that it increases the transparency (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000: 94).

1.3 Research questions The main question that will be answered in this study is the following: How has the framing of the arrival of migrants by the populist and liberal politicians in Flanders and the Netherlands been evolving before and after the assault on women in Cologne on New Year’s Evening 2015? This research question can be divided into several other research questions:

1. Which frames were used for the arrival of migrants by members of parliament of the liberal and the populist right parties in Flanders and the Netherlands before and after the attack on women in Cologne? 2. Do populist political parties use different frames than liberal political parties? 3. To what extent is the victim-intruder frame used by the politicians and did it focus on the large Moroccan minority living in the Netherlands and Flanders?

1.4 Scientific and societal relevance There are many ways how this research can be scientific and societal relevant. First, migration flows, asylum and integration are considered as a common concern for governments of the EU members states (Triandafyllidou 2014). The media and politicians can play a major role in increasing the public support for asylum policies. Framing plays an important role in the message of the media and politicians. Frames show how stereotypes and characterizations are created and how citizens of a country understand political, economic and social issues (Van Gorp 2005: 489; Chong & Druckman 2007; Slothuus & De Vreese 2010). Therefor it is meaningful to understand the concept of framing and how it contributes to the immigration debates in the Netherlands and Belgium. This research will focus on the populist and liberal political parties. These parties are often each opposite when it comes to issues on migration. It is interesting to see which of these parties set the agenda, how they set the agenda and who can be considered as policy entrepreneur. For other political parties this would provide insights in how political parties frame. Second, one of the main questions that will be asked is which individuals or groups were named as the offenders and whether migrants were framed as victims or intruders in the aftermath (Van Gorp 2005). As Moroccans are part of the described ‘North African men’, thirty of them were arrested after the event in Cologne and a large Moroccan community lives in the Netherlands and Flanders, it is interesting to see whether Moroccans were named more frequently by politicians and how they were framed after this event. More than five years ago the debate about immigration in the Netherlands was mostly focussed on ‘non-western

9 allochthons’, mostly immigrants from guest labour countries such as Morocco (Van der Haar 2013: 215). Because the media shapes the public opinion, it is worth analysing the appearance of the Moroccans in statements made by populists and liberals and whether this media attention became more negative (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000: 92; Lecheler & de Vreese 2012: 185). A new insight on an increasing anti sentiment towards the Moroccan community would help understand how minority groups deal with integration and acceptance of a larger majority. Further, this research provides information of how immigration is perceived by different actors, in this case the politicians. At the same time, it compares to two political landscapes, Flanders and the Netherlands, to discuss how actors use the information to frame certain migration issues. By understanding the position of political parties, it is possible to know framing could play a role in shaping policies (Kangas et al. 2013). Inside an economic region, such as the European Union, the position or actions of a national government play a role in shaping the debate on an intra-national level (European Union 2018). Lastly, because the number of asylum applicants in Belgium, and Flanders, is lower than in the Netherlands and it would interesting to see the differences between the two countries (Eurostat 2017).

1.5 Thesis outline The outline of this study is as follows. Chapter two will start with describing the theory on public policy making and agenda setting. The next paragraph aims to get a better understanding of the concept of framing and framing analysis. In the next part the different kind of frames are elaborated. Part three will focus on how and what frames populist and liberal political parties use. Following the effect of frames on minority groups. This chapter ends with a section on framing in different kind of newspapers. Chapter three, the methodology, will sets out how this research was executed. First the research design will be discussed, followed by the sample and between what date the data was collected. Further, the procedures of conducting this research will be explained with the operationalization of the concepts. Lastly, the methodological weaknesses are discussed. Chapter four will describe detailed information about the case. First the assault on women in Cologne in 2015 will be discussed. This will be followed by a brief summary of the characteristic of Flanders and the Netherlands. The fifth chapter will show the results of this study. The framing of populist and liberal political parties before Cologne will first be discussed. The second section provides the results of the content analysis. This will show the frequencies of the used frames and other important findings. In the next section the results of the analysis of articles on the website of the political

10 parties will be elaborated. By making use of a combination of discursive policy analysis and critical framing analysis these articles will deepen the understanding of the positions and used frames of liberal and populist political parties. The last chapter will elaborate the overall conclusions. The first part will include the findings and whether the research question could be answered. Next, a reflection on the methods provides useful information about the quality of this research. Third, this chapter will go into whether the outcomes of this research are generalisable. This is followed by section on theoretical implications and the relevance for future research.

2. Theoretical framework: Public policy making, agenda setting and framing This chapter will provide insights in theory of public policy making, agenda setting and framing to answer the research question and its sub questions of this research. The section starts off with a section on public policy making and agenda setting. The next section will explain the concept of framing. The third part will elaborate further on the different kind of existing frames. In the fourth section will the framing of populists and liberals be discussed. The fifth section will provide insights in the effects of framing and how it can affect minority groups. Section six will discuss the role of newspapers in framing. The last section of this chapter will summarize the drawn-up hypotheses.

2.1 Public policy making and agenda setting Political party organizations have the aim to implement policy on the grounds of their own ideas or ideology (Bale 2013: 150). In the process of public policy making these politicians or political organizations determine why some items are accepted and others are ignored. Kingdon (2003) began in 1984 with describing the processes of public policy making. The author divided these processes in four phases: ‘(1) The setting of the agenda, (2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative choice among those specified alternatives, as in a legislative vote, or a presidential decision, and (4) the implementation of the decision’ (idem: 2-3). This study focusses on the first two phases of public policy making as this study achieve to know why some politicians use different items than others and how they do this. To understand these two phases, it is necessary to look to the word ‘agenda’. This can be described as ‘the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside the government closely associated with those officials, are paying attention at any given time’ (ibid). It is possible that this list of subjects and ideas addressed by policy analysists, researchers, consultants, interest groups, but also from the mass media (idem: 16). These actors might want to set the agenda because of three kinds of processes: problem recognition, generation of policy proposals and political events (ibid). The recognition and occurrence of one or multiple events could present a problem that is pressing on a certain system. This crisis or event might create the emergence of more problems (ibid). The event in Cologne can be assigned to this type of process. Some items do not just come to the attention of politicians. Indicators do often simply show or explain how big or small an issue is. Governmental actors, such as research institutes, and government institutions such as the police, but also non-governmental actors, for instance

12 the mass media or humanitarian organizations, monitor these indicators (idem: 90). Indicators could be the number of reported assaults, filed police reports or the number of immigrants which arrived in the last months. These indicators are measured to be aware of the changes of the problem and to determine the magnitude of the issue (idem: 91). A change of the monitored indicator will sometimes be exaggerated in politics, as those who supports the political party believe the change is symbolic to a larger process (idem: 91-92). At a certain point an opportunity presents itself to politicians, so they can try to spread their ideas with the goal to implement policy. The time windows to address the issue are only open for a limited time and might close after less attention is given to it (idem: 166). These windows are called policy windows. Those political parties who are willing to invest their resource to gain attention are called policy entrepreneurs, these are also described as: ‘people who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solutions to politics’ (idem: 20). If these political parties are not able to take advantage of the opportunity they will need to wait until the next opportunity presents itself. The outcomes of the actions taken depend on a mix of elements, such as the current political mood and the acceptance of the public, and how these elements are coupled (idem: 166). It is not easy to be a policy entrepreneur. Kingdon (2014: 180-181) found that a successful entrepreneur needs to have some claim that people support this person. Most likely this person needs to be an expert, has the ability to speak for supporters of the political party or have an authoritative decision-making position, for instance a seat in the parliament. A persistent policy entrepreneur can then set the agenda. Some items, which are addressed by political parties, may rise on the agenda, while others do not. Especially when these policy windows are unpredictable and unexpected. There is always a strong competition for items, issues or problems to gain attention. Some items are more pressing than others. A published news or research report and the installation of a new administration are ways to rise or drop items on the agenda (Kingdon 2003: 18). It is also possible that some items do not even end up on the agenda due to high financial costs, the opposition has more powerful interests or the lack of acceptance of the public (ibid). Another way to disappear from the agenda is that a solution has been found for the problem or even a failure to address and solve the problem is one of the reasons that a topic is deleted from the agenda (idem: 104). Problem recognition is seen as an important part of agenda setting. We have seen that items rise and drop on the competitive subject list. At the same time the policy window is small

13 to address certain issues. Only the entrepreneurs who are willingly to invest their resources in a particular issue might gain attention certain actors such as the mass media or the government administration. The next section will provide insights in framing, one of the many ways to set the agenda.

2.2 Conceptualization of framing In the seventies frame analysis was introduced by the Canadian sociologist Goffman (1974). These days frame analysis has been introduced in many fields such as sociology, cognitive psychology, linguistics, discourse analysis, communication and media studies and policy studies (Wu et al. 2012: 844-845). Goffman (1974: 21) describes frames as ‘schemata of interpretation’. Subsequently he argues that frames enable people to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” the information around them, although this concept has been altered other scholars Almost two decades later, Entman (1993: 52) introduced a widely cited definition of frames: ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.’ It is for example possible to identify a frame when visual images, metaphors, dramatic characters, stereotypes, etcetera are used (Van Gorp 2005: 486). The concept of framing can be useful to understand how citizens create a perception about political, economic and social issues (Chong & Druckman 2007; Slothuus & De Vreese 2010).

2.3 Frames To use the concept of framing it is important to notice that different kind of frames exist. Frames can be divided into generic news frames and issue-specific news frames (De Vreese et al. 2001). The generic frame could exceed thematic, cultural or time limitation and the issue specific news frames emphasize on the occurrence of one event. All kind of frames such as the thematic frame, episodic frame, the conflict frame, the action frame reassurance frame, victim frame and intruder frame exist and are shown in figure 1 (De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2003: 363; Liu & Pennington-Gray 2015: 37).

Frame Purpose Thematic frame Gives information about the larger historical context.

Conflict frame Focusses on a conflict of opinions between certain individuals, groups, institutions or organizations. Action frame Calls for a needed action for a certain reported issue Reassurance frame Expresses the idea that public should not be worried. Victim frame Migrants are described as innocent and victims who have been fleeing from their country for reasons such as war, political instability or poor economic circumstances, et cetera. Intruder frame Migrants are described as profiteers or criminals who enter a certain country, and this is being a threat to someone’s cultural ideas and economic situation. Table 1: Frames First, the thematic frame is part of the generic frame and focusses more on the larger historical social context. The episodic frame is part of the issue specific frame and emphasizes the problems of one event or for one person or group (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000: 95; Iyengar 1991). The conflict, action frame and the reassurance frame can be categorized under both frames, generic news frames and issue-specific news frames. The conflict frame focusses on a conflict of opinions between individuals, groups, institutions or organizations. This frame has the purpose to create media attention and an audience for the opinion (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000: 95; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). The action frame calls for a needed action for a certain reported issue. (Liu & Pennington-Gray 2015: 37). Lastly, the reassurance frame expresses the idea that the public should not be worried about the issue (ibid). In this research special attention is given to the episodic frame. This frame includes the personal experience of a person, or a victim (Liu & Pennington-Gray 2015: 37). For example, research conducted in Belgium analysed the representation of asylum seekers in the news and categorised two frames, ‘asylum seekers are innocent’ and ‘asylum seekers are profiteers and criminals’ (Boomgaarden & De Vreese 2003). Van Gorp (2005) built on his previous research by creating two issue specific frames: The intruder frame and the victim frame. Asylum seekers,

15 refugees or other immigrants can be described as innocent victims as they could have been fleeing from their country for reasons such as war, political instability or poor economic circumstances. Another reason is that migrants have a well-founded fear of persecution, such as the fear to be prosecuted because of having a certain religion, nationality, a certain group membership or race (idem: 389). Van Gorp states that ‘victimizing is a dramaturgic technique from the media to portray that the poor, elder, women and children should receive help’(ibid). Especially when this is caused by someone else, so they cannot be held responsible for their circumstances (ibid). The intruder frame is often used when an unknown person attempts to enter the country or region, and this is being seen as a threat to someone’s cultural ideas and economic situation (ibid). Sometimes are asylum seekers seen as ‘suspects or associates of human traffickers’ (ibid). By raising media attention for these intruders, a new sentiment can arise. A specific expected policy outcome of this is that the asylum seekers will be discouraged to seek asylum or when they do arrive, that they will be forced to return to their country of origin (ibid). The way in which the framing of asylum seekers takes place in the field of migration is different when the global and European level is compared to the described national level above. In the global politics the frames are mostly concerned to the humanitarian aspect of asylum and the threats to national security (ibid). On a European level is asylum and illegal immigration connected to the protection of the national identity and the threat to the economic position of the EU members (ibid).

2.4 Framing of populists and liberals To understand the framing of populist and liberal political parties we must deepen into the term ‘political party organization’. Political party organizations can be described as ‘organizations that, for the most, recruit candidates to contest elections in the hope that they can then participate in government, or at least push it in the direction of their own ideas – ideas that, often, reflect the socio-economic interest and/or moral values of those who support them’ (Bale 2013:150). The distinction between different political party organizations evolved from the 19th and 21st century. The liberal parties can be included in the ‘mainstream parties’ type of organization, while the populist political parties are added to the ‘anti-system’ or ‘anti-political establishment’ type (idem: 151). Statements about migration, made by populist political parties can be very different than those of liberal political parties. In the last two decades populist political parties have gained more attention among the public and it is said that the media is partially responsible for it

(Hameleers et al 2017: 2). Mudde (2004: 543) defined populism as: ‘An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people’. Often is referred to the ordinary people versus the evil politicians or the groups who are responsible for the problems of ordinary people (Hameleers et al 2017: 3). Meret and Siim (2013: 78) describe that right-wing populist parties in Western Europe have a strong anti-immigrant profile. More specifically, these parties have an emphasis on national values, institutions and historical traditions. The members of these populist parties argue that non-Europeans and Muslims are a threat to the social cohesion and the national identity (ibid). Some populist parties, such as the Belgian party Flemish Block and the Dutch parties List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the Party for Freedom (PVV) achieved electoral successful in the past by addressing anti-immigration positions (Akkerman 2005 :340). Electoral voters of the LPF stated that their highest priority was fighting crime and tightening control on the admission of asylum seekers (idem: 340). In the last decade it is common that political parties make statements about women rights and the position of women in society. In the field of migration, most of the statements about these rights focussed on women who were married to or living with a man with a foreign background. Populist parties have been shifting attention to the gender area, such as family violence, forced marriages and genital mutilation, to strengthen their position in the immigration debate (Meret & Siim 2013: 84). Also issues on wearing a veil/headscarf and honour killings were addressed (idem: 90). The DFP in Denmark had been calling men as people who ‘not yet understood that the Middle Ages ended a long time ago and that the premise for freedom and progress is women’s equality’ (idem: 91). This comparison with historic times is something that populist, such as the Front National, Vlaams Belang and the PVV, often do. In an analysis of speeches historic frames were used to help people understand that in the past the nation and the people were fantastic, opponents are creating bad living circumstances in the society and that the nation should take on these problems by voting on them (Mols & Jetten 2014: 80-83). The current main populist party in the Netherland is the PVV. This party is described as a right-wing radical populist party, which is anti-immigration and critical of the current establishment (Van Gent et al 2014). In their one-page election program they state that the following anti-immigration issues: 1) Zero asylum seekers and no immigration from Islamic countries. 2) Revoke all already issued residence permits for asylum. Close all the asylum centres. 3) No Islamic headscarves are allowed while having a public job. 4) Prohibition on Islamic expressions which conflict with the public order. 5) Preventive arrest for radical

Muslims. 6) Criminals with a double nationality should be denaturalized and send out. 7) People who joined the terrorist organization Islamic State are not allowed to return to the Netherlands. 8) All mosques and Islamic schools should close, and the Quran should be banned (PVV 2017). The main far-right populist party in Belgium is the Vlaams Belang. This party warns for the incoming estrangers and for the consequences of immigration for housing, mobility and education (Vlaams Belang 2018). According to VB the Flemish people should feel safe at their homes and therefor the party argues for a strict immigration policy. The rules on family reunion should be changed and made more restrictive. Illegals, criminal estrangers and denied asylum seekers should be send back to their country of origin. According to the party everyone who does not adapt to the Flemish society and its norms, should return to their country of origin. The electoral programs of the PVV and the VB include many statements with a call for action. Therefor the next hypothesis will be: H1: The populist will use more frequently the call for action frame than the reassurance and the conflict frame.

Quite the opposite of the populist political parties are the liberal political parties. In the Netherlands the Democrats 66 (D66) is seen as a liberal political party which is seen as cosmopolitan, in favour of human rights positions and further Europeanization (Berkhout et al 2015: 104). Liberal political parties are known for promoting the rights of the individual, including the legal, property, religious and political rights of a person (Bale 2013: 163). This party could be described as the opposite of the populist far right anti-immigration party PVV. The D66 wants a ‘charitable and open position on asylum’ (Statham & Koopmans 2009: 457). The electoral program shows that D66 is in favour of safety for refugees and the party strives to help refugees to work (D66 2018). Further Europeanization, by completing the European Asylum system, is necessary to achieve equal chances for refugees and an equal and fair distribution of refugees among the EU-member states (ibid). The equivalent in Flanders is the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD). This party is in favour of ‘a humane and clear reception in accordance with the international rules’ (Open VLD 2018). Liberals have been using the multicultural frames far more often than any other group in the political landscape (Helbling 2014: 24). These frames are positive towards exchange and peaceful coexistence of religious and cultural groups within a society (ibid). Liberals are also considered to be in favour of cultural openness (ibid). Research conducted between 1998 and 2001 showed that the Dutch left-leaning parties GroenLinks (GL), Socialistische Partij (SP), D66 and PvdA, have claimed more than half of the statements on migration topics, in a favourable position to migrants (Berkhout et al 2015:109).

Due to the fact liberals are very in favour of peaceful coexistence of groups and a charitable asylum system, it is expected that after the event in Cologne the liberals portrayed migrants as victims in their journey to find a peaceful country to live. Therefor the next hypothesis is: H2: The victim frame is more frequently used by liberals than the populists after the event in Cologne. Due to the hostile characters of right-wing populists towards immigrants I expect the following hypothesis: H3: The intruder frame is more frequently used by populist than the liberals after the event in Cologne. It can also be expected that the populist political parties can be identified as the immigration is one of the main themes of the populist parties electoral program. Therefor the following hypothesis is formulated: H4: The populist political parties will more likely be identified as policy entrepreneurs than the liberal political parties.

2.5 Effects of frames on minority groups As framing can be useful in understanding how citizens create a perception about political, economic and social issues, it is also useful to learn about its effects. It is believed that that framing affects individual persons by altering the perceived importance of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997). Other scholars suggested that a trade-off exist between different considerations or beliefs when individuals express their opinion (De Vreese et al. 2011: 182) Issues are then, for example, framed as they are in favour of the issue or opponent of the issue. One or two frames are seen as important, while others are ignored and are considered as less important (ibid). Frames can offer information via a direct route or an indirect route (Slothuus 2008; De Vreese et al. 2011: 182-183). Via the direct route frames can offer a new perception to an individual. When the information or opinion is presented to the individual, the person might consider this information as new and relevant. This information could be something that individual was not beware of before. After the new frame is presented, the existing frames do not always disappear. The frames can then change via the indirect route from mutually exclusive to complementary or the new frame (De Vreese et al. 2011: 182). In other words, the already existing frames could support the existence of the new frame. What also should be considered is that frames do not have the same impact. Some frames include more information or considerations than others. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2003) observed that frames are indicative of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ they can implicitly emphasize positive or negative aspects of an issue. The valence of news frames is important to consider because it can influence attitudes (Schuck & de Vreese 2006) and responses (Shah et al. 2004).

According to a study of Fumagalli (2007: 570) we cannot belief frames are static or fixed. Frames can compete with each other, can vary and can change. A frame can be used to mobilise or demobilize a whole community and therefor it is possible a minority group is the target of the framing (idem: 584-585). The more negative the news articles are about a minority, the more problematic image they get (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2009). These news representations show how we see certain minority groups in public debates (Kroon et al. 2016: 376). According to Phalet and Gijsberts Moroccan Muslims are distrusted, devalued in the Dutch society and the prime target of anti-Islam feelings (Phalet et al. 2010: 762). Roggebrand and van der Haar (2017) state that from the 1990s boys and young men with a Moroccan background have been portrayed as a social and a security threat and that they represent the failure of the multicultural society. A different study found that young Dutch-Moroccan men were often portrayed in the media as youngsters who misbehave and terrorize urban neighbourhoods (Koning 2014). The disturbances caused by Moroccans youngsters are partly caused by a lack of integration and a low socio-economic position of Moroccans (Roggebrand & van der Haar 2017: 2). The victims of the assault in Cologne stated that many of the perpetrators had a North African or Arab origin (The Washington Post 2016). Later, in February 2016, the police stated that some men with different nationalities were arrested, including 23 Moroccans, 25 Algerians and some other nationalities (Die Welt 2016b). Therefor I expect that the Moroccan communities in the Netherlands will be more negatively in the news after the event in Cologne than before the event. The hypothesis is:

H5: The Moroccan community is being portrayed more frequently and more negative in statements of liberal and populist politicians after the event in Cologne than before.

2.6 Framing in newspapers In the last two decades many researchers have dedicated themselves to the study of sensational and qualitative newspapers (Grabe et al. 2003; Tai & Chang 2002, Djupsund & Carlson 1998). Researchers showed in European countries, Finland, The United Kingdom and Sweden, that the news coverage in newspapers have become more sensationalist (Djupsund & Carlson 1998; Uribe & Gunter 2004). Based on the work of two studies, the Dutch newspapers NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant were described as qualitative papers and De Telegraaf and Het Algemeen Dagblad were described as sensationalist newspapers (Bakker & Scholten 2006; Schaap & Pleijter 2012). British tabloids, also seen as sensationalist newspapers, are believed to contribute to hostility toward migrants (Crawley 2005; Innes 2010, Blinder & Allen 2016).

Because British sensationalist newspapers are believed to be contributing to hostility towards migrants, we would expect that they would portray the migrants as intruders and offenders. This is in line with the position of the populist political parties on migration topics. However, Van Gorp (2005) stated in 2005 that sensationalist newspapers use more frequently the victim frame than the intruder frame. These contrasting observations make it difficult to set up a hypothesis. Since Van Gorp’s research was conducted more than a decade ago, we will follow the British research. Therefor the hypothesis is:

H6: Intruder frames are more frequently identified in sensationalist newspapers than in qualitative newspapers.

2.7 Hypotheses In this study the following hypotheses were determined based on the theoretical section.

H1: The populist will use more frequently the call for action frame than the reassurance and the conflict frame. H2: The victim frame is more frequently used by liberals than the populists after the event in Cologne. H3: The populist political parties will more likely be identified as policy entrepreneurs than the liberal political parties. H4: The intruder frame is more frequently used by populist than by liberals after the event in Cologne. H5: The Moroccan community is being portrayed more frequently and more negative in statements of liberal and populist politicians after the event in Cologne than before.

H6: Intruder frames are more frequently identified in sensationalist newspapers than in qualitative newspapers.

3. Methodological approach To research the framing of the Dutch and Flemish liberal and populist political parties after the assault in Cologne, this mixed methods research will be divided in two parts: a quantitative and a qualitative part. The statements in news articles and on Twitter will be analysed by using a content analysis. The main advantage of conducting a content analysis is that it is a very transparent method, as the coding scheme and sampling procedures can be set up conveniently (Bryman 2012: 304). Another advantage is dedicated to the flexibility of the method, as it can be applied to myriad kinds of textual information and the coding scheme can be adjusted during the research process (idem: 304-305). Descriptive statistics will be used to show who used what frame for spreading their message. These descriptive statistics will also provide insight at what date the publication of the document was. A mix of discursive policy analysis from Bacchi (2009) and critical framing analysis from Lombardo and Verloo (2007) will deepen the understanding of the position of populist and liberals. It will focus on the effects of their calls for action. In both parts the statements of the liberal (D66 and Open VLD) and the populist political parties (PVV and VB) will be included. To study the content of news articles there are two approaches to analyse the frames, the deductive and the inductive approach (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000: 94). With the inductive approach an open view is used to find and reveal all kind of possible frames. Some loose definitions of the frames might already exist. By using this method many possible ways of framing can be detected. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is a labour-intensive method. This approach is also perceived as a method which is difficult to replicate (ibid). With a deductive approach the frames are already predefined (idem: 95). To use this approach, you will need to have a clear idea of the different kind of frames that are likely to be found in the news. With the predefined frames it is easy to replicate the study and to analyse large samples. This huge disadvantage of this approach is that some frames might be overlooked because they are not in the framework. In this study a deductive approach is used. The frames are predetermined and included in Appendix A. The main advantages of using a coding scheme in combination with only one researcher is that it cannot be interpreted differently. When multiple researchers are using the coding scheme to analyse data, one of the researchers can interpret the scheme differently than another researcher (Bryman 2012: 169 & 248).

3.1 Sample. The units of this sample will include samples of Belgian and Dutch national newspapers, twitter statements and press releases of politicians and political parties. The Dutch newspapers, De

Telegraaf (circulation: 400,000), het Algemeen Dagblad (350,000), de Volkskrant (220,000) and de NRC Handelsblad (140,000) will be included in this research, as these newspapers have the highest circulation (Volkskrant, 2016). Moreover, a distinction can be made between popular newspapers, such as het Algemeen Dagblad and de Telegraaf, and the qualitative newspapers De Volkskrant and de NRC (Schaap & Pleijter 2012). The Dutch newspapers were retrieved from LexisNexis, an online databank for newspapers. The sample of Flemish newspapers included the popular newspapers Het Laatste Nieuws (circulation: 309,000), Het Nieuwsblad (264,000) and the qualitative newspapers De Morgen (52,000) and De Standaard (98,000) (CIM 2018). To avoid that one part of the sample had to be translated from French to Dutch and linguistic and grammatical errors occurred, this study chose only to include Dutch-Flemish newspapers. Because not many Flemish newspapers are available on LexisNexis, the GoPress databank was used to search for Flemish articles. The twitter statements of members of parliament of the liberals (D66 and Open VLD) and the populists (PVV and VB) will be analysed. Twitter, as a mean to analyse is fairly new to the academic studies, as it only has been analysed for a decade. Politicians, parties, journalists and a part of the public have been using twitter to interact, to search for public shared or contrasting opinions (Jungherr 2016: 72). Uploading statements on Twitter is a form of digital storytelling, which people frequently use to tell and share personal stories, narratives or opinions (Siapera et al. 2018: 2). Scholars found that young politicians are more likely to use Twitter and to share those stories than old people and they also found that in general political parties and candidates from the opposition are more likely to use the internet or Twitter than governing parties (Vergeer et al 2011; Vergeer & Hermans 2013; Jungherr 2016). A study conducted in the United States showed its more likely that politicians, who were using Twitter, live in an urban district or state than a rural area (Straus et al 2013: 62). Although that the studies have been conducted in the Netherlands or the US and some articles are seven years old, it is good to keep the previous mentioned limitations of analysing Twitter in mind. It is important to know about that impact of Twitter. Politicians send tweets every day, some even send tweets more frequently. These tweets do not only influence their own followers. When a follower of the politician comments, likes or retweets a post of this politicians, then it is possible that all this person’s followers see this post. Imagine that politician ‘A’ has a thousand followers who read the post and hundred followers, with each 200 followers, retweet this post. When we do the calculations for this example then we expect that around the potential Twitter reach is around 21,000 (1000 + 100*200) people (Simply Measured 2018). The impact of spreading a message on Twitter can be enormous, especially when the traditional

23 mass media use the Tweet in one of their newspapers. However, it should be kept in mind that the potential twitter reach can differ greatly per send tweet.

3.2 Period of study The study will be analysing the period between the 30st of November 2015 and 31st of January 2016. The 30st of November is the first day of analysis due to the fact that the assaults started on month after this day. Till the 31st of January 2016 the documents will be analysed to explain whether the event in Cologne transformed the framing on migrants.

3.3 Procedure In this research I will be including all statements of liberal and populist political parties in news articles. Based on the theory and the taken samples there are several ways how the coding will take place. The quantitative part, where a content analysis was conducted, used the guidelines for analysing texts, included in Appendix A. The second part, a mix of critical framing analysis and discursive policy analysis will make use of the questions in Appendix B. On the online databank for newspapers, LexisNexis and GoPress, I entered the search words: Keulen, migranten, immigranten, vluchtelingen or asielzoekers, Marokkaan, Marokkanen. These words were then combined with D66, Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), Vlaams Belang (VB) and Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open VLD). The abbreviations of the political parties were also included in the search words. Of all the collected articles a list was made. This action was followed by the deleting all the articles which had two or more copies in the list. After the creation of the list I searched for statements from the members of the political party concerning the topic of migration. With the “Codebook: Guidelines for coding Tweets and articles in newspapers”, included in appendix A, I started to analyse the statements of populists and liberals in Belgium and the Netherlands. The data collection was added in a SPSS file, so it was possible to analyse the frequencies. The statements on Twitter were collected on the Twitter account of the political parties and the personal accounts of its members of parliament. All the twitter accounts, of those who were a member of parliament in the Netherlands or in Flanders, from the D66 (12), PVV (13), VB (6) and Open VLD (19) were searched for relevant data. Most of these Twitter accounts were publicly accessible. In the search bar on Twitter it is possible to limit the search with entering a specific year, month and day. This makes it convenient to search for the needed data. All the tweets were put together in a list. The document “Codebook: Guidelines for coding Tweets and articles in newspapers”, included in appendix A, was used to analyse the statements 24 of liberal and populist political parties in Belgium and the Netherlands. The data was added to the already existing SPSS file, as described in the paragraph above. To know whether politicians deleted their tweets, the names of the politicians were searched on the website Politwoops. This website records all the deleted tweets of politicians. I found that of all political parties, only two members of the PVV deleted both one tweet between the 1st of January 2016 and the 31st of January 2016. These statements were not included in the research as it is unknown at what date these tweets were deleted. Politwoops (2018) states that ‘a tweet is deleted mostly after less than an hour.’ So, it is likely that not everyone has seen this post and the maximum potential Twitter reach was not reached. The second part of this research included the combination of critical framing analysis and discursive policy analysis to analyse texts on the website of the political party. On the website of every political party (D66, PVV, OpenVLD, VB) I searched for articles made between the 1st of January 2016 and the 31st of January 2016. I decided to only analyse one of the texts which represented the other texts and give a deeper understanding of the position of populists and liberals. With the “Guidelines for analysing large articles on the websites of the political parties”, included in appendix B, I started to analyse the statements of populists and liberals in Belgium and the Netherlands to get a deeper understanding of their position and their way of framing.

3.4 Operationalization An important part of doing research is knowing how to measure the concepts. In theoretical section the different frames were explained. These were schematically portrayed in figure 1.

Frame Purpose Thematic frame Gives information about the larger historical context. Conflict frame Focusses on a conflict of opinions between certain individuals, groups, institutions or organizations. Action frame Calls for a needed action for a certain reported issue Reassurance frame Expresses the idea that public should not be worried.

Victim frame Migrants are described as innocent and victims who have been fleeing from their country for reasons such as war, political instability or poor economic circumstances, et cetera. Intruder frame Migrants are described as profiteers or criminals who enter a certain country, and this is being a threat to someone’s cultural ideas and economic situation. Table I: Frames These definitions were used by determining the frames per statement of the populist and liberal politicians. Besides determining the frames, this study also included whether the migrant was named as a refugee, an asylum seeker, a foreigner, etcetera and the nationality of the migrant. The other important information that was collected included: the source, the date, the mentioned political party and. overarching theme of the statement. The coding schedule is included in appendix A. Also, the information as word count and Twitter statistics (likes, retweets and comments) were measured.

3.5 Methodological weakness Although the combination of a quantitative and qualitative approach offers some advantages, this way of researching comes with certain disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that the collection of the statements made by politician is done in newspapers. It is questionable whether the journalist writes the statement exactly down as the politician stated in reality. Due to the fact that a third person is between the spoken statement and the publication in the newspaper article, it influences the reliability. Subjectivity is an often-heard critique of qualitative research (Bryman 2012: 405). The second part of this study includes a discursive policy and critical framing analysis, in which texts are analysed. These texts could be analysed and interpreted differently per researcher. Fortunately, the usage of mixed methods, combining qualitative and quantitative methods, generates a higher reliability of this research. Another disadvantage is the external validity of this research. External validity focusses on the generalizability of the research, in other terms, whether the results are applicable to other countries or other situations (Bryman 2012: 47). Due to the fact this study is focussed on one

26 case it is not easy to generalize this to the larger debate or too multiple countries. However, a collection of several case studies could increase the generalizability.

4. Case description: To understand the aftermath of Cologne it is necessary to know what occurred in Cologne on New Year’s evening 2015 and how the news developed after the assault on women. This will be explained in section 4.1. In section 4.2 the characteristics, such as the numbers of arriving and living migrants in 2015 and the public opinion towards migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands will be explained.

4.1 Cologne 2015: The assault on women On the night of 31 December 2015, around 1054 criminal charges were reported after the assault on women in Cologne (Welt 2016b). These criminal charges included begin robbed, intimidated or separated from their friends at Cologne’s central train station (The Washington Post 2016). The numbers of the women who were sexually assaulted differ. While the Washing Post (2016b) reported that around 650 women had been sexually assaulted, the Welt (2016) spoke of 454 cases. The victims alleged that many of the perpetrators had a North African or Arab origin between the ages of 15 to 35, although not much is known about the perpetrators (ibid). Later, in February 2016 the police stated that some men with different nationalities were arrested, including 23 Moroccans, 25 Algerians and some other nationalities (Welt 2016b). The men were described as drunk and aggressive (The Guardian 2016). After the calls came in, the police deployed 70 federal officers and 143 local police officers to the city’s main railway station or the area around the railway station (Independent 2016b). In the police report the officers stated that the situation was chaotic as they were hindered to help people who were calling for help (Spiegel Online 2016a). Also, many orders from police officers were ignored, fights broke out and arresting the offenders was not possible due to the lack of resources (ibid). Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, expressed her outraged and called for immediate action to punish the perpetrators without regard to their origin or background (The Guardian 2016). As Cologne is one of the most ethnically diverse cities in Germany and it welcomed more than 10,000 refugees in 2015, (New York Times 2016) the right-wing anti-immigration movement Pegida held protests against the arrival of more migrants in Germany (Independent 2016a). It was also reported that after the assault on New Year’s Eve the attitude of Germans to welcome refugees has dropped (YouGov 2016). In January 2016, the survey of YouGov (2016) showed that 62 percent of the Germans thought the number of asylum seekers in the country was too high, compared to 53 percent in November 2015. In November 2016 the policed reported that around 1616 crimes in 1205 criminal charges were registered, including 509 sexual motivated crimes and 22 rapes (Welt 2016a). In 369 cases no suspects were identified. In July 2016, 7

28 months after the assault, it was reported that only 2 men were convicted for sexual assault due to the lack of available evidence (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016). In November only 6 perpetrators had been sentenced (ibid).

4.2 A brief summary of characteristics: Belgium and the Netherlands Belgium has a current population of 11,3 million people (Statbel 2018). Almost 10 million people have Belgium nationality. The group of 1,3 million people includes many foreigners, such as people with Dutch, Italian, French or Moroccan passports (Nieuwsblad 2015; Statbel 2018). Around 17% of the foreign-born population came from Morocco (OECD 2017). In proportion to the general Belgian population is the number of immigrants in cities the highest in Brussel (Vangoidsenhoven & Pilet 2015: 54). In 2016, Belgium welcomed around 14,250 asylum applicants, around 0,126% percent of the total population (Eurostat 2017). The Public Tableau (2015) reported that the public attitude towards immigrants, with 30 percent positive towards immigrants, was lower than most of Germany’s neighbours. Around 67 percent of the Belgium population has a negative attitude towards immigrants. More than 6,5 million people are living in the Flemish region (Statistics Flanders 2017). In 2014, more than 1.22 million people with a foreign background lived in this area (Statistics Flanders 2018). The statistical institute of Flanders reported in 2013 that around 181.575 people of a population of almost 1,2 million people had a North African background (ibid). Another research of the Statistics Flanders reported that in 2015 around 27,950 Moroccan aliens were living the Flanders region (ibid). The SCV survey provides the data on the public attitude towards migrants for Flanders (ibid). Around 13 percent of the population in Flanders think that guest workers cannot be trusted, while 53 percent think they can. Over 32 percent of the population in Flanders think that migrants come to Belgium to receive social and economic rights. Also, 37 percent of the population beliefs migrants are a threat for the Belgium culture and norms; the same percentage thinks migrants are not a threat. Lastly, around 51 percent of the population has a positive attitude towards the existence of different cultures due to the fact it is an asset for the society (ibid). In 2017 around 17,1 million people were living in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands 2018). Around 77 percent of the population is Dutch and around 12,7 percent has a non-western background. It was reported in 2017 that 391,088 Moroccans, 2,2 percent of the population, were living in the country (ibid). While Belgium welcomed around 14,250 immigrants in 2016, the Netherlands welcomed 19,285 immigrants, 0,113 percent of the total population (Eurostat 2017). The Public Tableau (2015) reported that the public attitude towards

29 immigrants was one of the highest among Germany’s neighbours with 46% of the population which stands positive towards immigrants and 50 percent stands negative towards immigrants.

5. Results Central to this study is the framing of migrants by populist and liberal political parties in Flanders and the Netherlands after the assault on women in Cologne on new year’s evening 2015. The emphasis of this study focussed in particular on the victim and intruder frame. Whether or not the large Moroccan communities living in Flanders and the Netherlands were named and blamed was also included in this research. To understand whether this event changed the framing of populist and liberal political parties it important to know how the political parties published in the month before the Cologne. Therefor I will first describe the month before Cologne. Second, a content analysis is conducted to analyse the statements of populists and liberals on Twitter and in newspapers. The list of newspaper articles which were used to answer the research question are included in appendix C. The list with Tweets are included in appendix D. Third, a combination of critical framing and discursive policy analysis will provide insights in the position of liberals and populist.

5.1 Pre-Cologne In the month before Cologne, the party leader Geert Wilders of the PVV spoke about the incoming migrants, which he labelled as ‘fortune seekers’ (gelukzoekers) (Wilders 2015). By the end of December Wilders send questions to the prime minister about the statements of the labour party, one of the coalition parties, that the Netherlands could handle the entry of 200,000 asylum seekers in the Netherlands (PVV 2015a). Although Wilders was mainly focussing on the incoming migrants, he publicly criticized the Greek minister of Migration for letting in Moroccans, who were given the refugee status (Wilders 2016). Besides criticizing the minister, the party also published some Eurosceptic statements about the migration policy (PVV 2015b). Similar as the PVV, the populist party in Belgium, the VB, is criticizing the entry of asylum seekers. The main reason for the critique is that large sums of money are spend on asylum seekers and the asylum system (Vlaams Belang 2015a). These budget issues could not be identified in the statements of the PVV in December. However, in June 2015 Wilders published that an asylum seeker costs 36,000 euros per year and that the government must stop this madness (PVV 2015c). According to the VB the money that went to asylum seekers could also be invested in houses for senior people (Vlaams Belang 2015b). The party also sees the ‘asylum tsunami’ as the cause of the increasing numbers of Roma-beggars on the streets of Brussel (Vlaams Belang 2015c). The liberal party D66 did not post any press releases on their website in December 2015 which concerned migration topics. However, on 31 October 2015, the party requested the

31 government to show leadership in dealing the refugee crisis and at the same time the leader publicly criticized the PVV for presenting ‘stereotypical images, full of fear, of thieving, raping and unpleasant refugees’ (D66 2015a). Later that month, the D66 portrayed the refugees as victims by describing how they have been fleeing from the war in Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan (D66 2015b). At the same time called the leader Alexander Pechtold for action to have a better reception for refugees and to fasten the integration process. The liberal party in Belgium, the Open VLD, did not post any press releases on their website in December 2015 about migration topics. In November 2016 they the president of the political party mentioned that she understands the concerns of people about refugees, but at the same time she mentioned that the Belgian people should not see refugees and terrorists as the same (Open VLD 2015a). She also stated ‘We are not the party who does not want to help ‘these people’ or isolate them from society. We are counting on our people in the cities and municipalities, on who will be asked today to give shelter to refugees during the winter months.’(ibid). Guy Verhofstadt, a Belgian European Member of Parliament, was concerned about the position of refugees in the refugee camps: ‘Sophie went to visit the camps here and her report is horrific. Refugees treated like criminals, not as human beings. It’s even a more shameful fact that every year nearly four thousand people die in misery in the Mediterranean Sea (Open VLD 2015b).’

5.2 Post-Cologne The content analysis will provide insights in how populists and liberals framed the arrival of migrants after the assault on women in Cologne. To analyse the data, statements in newspapers and on twitter were collected (N=117). Of the 117 statements, 11 (9.4%) were published by D66, 50 (42.7%) by the PVV, 13 (11,1%) by the Open VLD and 43 (36,8%) by the VB. The consequence of this is that the statements of populist political parties (N=93; 79.5%) are more included in the sample than those of liberal political parties (N=24; 20,5%). This is a conclusion. The results also show that populist parties, PVV (N= 36) and VB (N= 39) are more actively interacting about migration issues on Twitter than liberal political parties, D66 (N= 6) and OpenVLD (N=5) are. Other results show that statements of liberal political parties do more show up in qualitative newspapers than in sensationalist newspapers. However, the results between the populist parties is contrasting. The PVV statements are more frequently mentioned in the Dutch qualitative newspaper NRC Handelsblad than any other political party. Around 50 percent of all statements of the PVV were published in this newspaper. The statements of the

VB on other hand, were more frequently published in sensationalist newspapers, such as the Het Laatste Nieuws and Het Nieuwsblad than in qualitative newspapers. The results in figure 2 show that the publication of statements about migrants has increased after the 4th of January 2016 and dropped after the 11th of January, while the events Cologne occurred on the morning of the 1st of January 2016. Almost 13% of the all statements about migrants were published on the 7th of January 2016. The data in figure 3 shows us that the PVV and the VB, both populist parties, published more statements between the 4th and 11th of January 2016.

Figure 1: Frequencies of published statements of all Figure 2: Frequencies of published statements about asylum political parties about asylum seekers, refugees and seekers, refugees and other migrants divided per political party. other migrants.

5.2.1 Frames used by liberal and populist political parties Populist political parties have used different frames than liberal populist parties. Table 1 shows that the action frame (N=52; 44.4%) and the blame frame (N=38; 32.5% was used the most between 1st of January and the 31st of January 2016. The action frame was more used by the populist political parties as the PVV (N=20; 38.5%) and the VB (N=19; 36.5%) than the liberal political parties as the D66 (N=4; 7.7%)and the Open VLD (N=9; 17.3%). This confirms the hypothesis “The populist will use more frequently the call for action frame than the reassurance and the conflict frame.” The blame frame was only used by the populist political parties PVV and the VB. The victim and reassurance frame were only used by the liberal political parties D66 and Open VLD, although these frames were not frequently identified.

Frames No frame/ Conflict Action Reassurance Victim Blame Total Political Just frame frame frame frame frame parties information D66 0 3 4 1 3 0 11 % of D66 0% 27.3% 36.4% 9.1% 27.3% 0% % of frame 0% 20.0% 7.7% 33.3% 75.0% 0% PVV 5 4 20 0 0 21 50 % of PVV 10.0% 8.0% 40.0% 0% 0% 42.0% % of frame 100.0% 26.7% 38.5% 0% 0% 55.3% Open VLD 0 1 9 2 1 0 13 % of OpenVLD 0% 7.7% 69.2% 15.4% 7.7% 0% % of frame 0% 6.7% 17.3% 66.7% 25.0% 0% VB 0 7 19 0 0 17 43 % of VB 0% 16.3% 44.2% 0% 0% 39.5% % of frame 0% 46.7% 36.5% 0% 0% 44.7% Total 5 15 52 3 4 38 117 Frame 4.3% 12.8% 44.4% 2.6% 3.4% 32.5% 100% percentage % of total

Table 2: Used frames by political parties

Populist political parties used more frequently the intruder frame than liberal political parties. Table 2 shows that the PVV (N=44; 52.4%) and the Vlaams Belang (N=36; 42.9%) used 95.2 percent of all the intruder frames. The remaining intruder frames were used by the Belgian liberal political party Open VLD. Only six victim frames were identified in statements from D66 from the 1st till the 31st of January 2016. Normally, a chi square test can be conducted to analyse whether the distributions in the cells of categorical variables differ from each other (Agresti & Franklin 2013: 544). In this case a Chi-Square test cannot be conducted due to the fact that conditions for conducting this test are not met. The first condition includes that none of the expected cell frequencies may be lower than 1 (ibid). This condition is not met because the populist parties PVV and VB do not use victim frame. However, the Fisher’s Exact test can be used when the frequencies are small (idem: 567). Fisher Exact test shows that the two variables ‘victim’ and ‘intruder’ are independent from each other (X² = 52,295; p < 0.00). Therefor we can confirm the following hypothesis: “The intruder frame is more frequently used by populist than by liberals after the event in Cologne.” It is partly possible to confirm the other hypothesis “The victim frame is more frequently used by liberals than the populists after the event in Cologne.” As only D66 of all political parties, including the Belgian liberal party Open VLD, have been using the victim frame it is not possible to completely confirm this hypothesis.

Frames Not/Neutral Intruder frame Victim Frame Total Political parties D66 5 0 6 11 % of D66 45.5% 0% 54.5% % of frame 4.3% 0% 100% 9.4% PVV 6 44 0 50 % of PVV 12.0% 88.0% 0% % of frame 22.2% 52.4% 0% 42.7% Open VLD 9 4 0 13 % of OpenVLD 69.2%% 30.8% 0% % of frame 0% 4.8% 0% 11.1% VB 0 36 0% 43 % of VB 0% 83.7% 0% % of frame 0% 42.9% 0%% 36.8% Total 5 84 6 117 % of Pol Party 23.1% 71.8% 5.1% 100%

Table 3: Political parties and the use of the victim-intruder frame

Surprisingly, the intruder frame was more frequently found in qualitative newspapers than in sensationalist newspapers. It was found that the Dutch newspapers, the NRC Handelsblad and Volkskrant, and the Belgian newspapers, De Morgen and De Standaard, added many populist statements, which included the intruder frame, in their newspapers. Therefor I can state that the next hypothesis cannot be confirmed: “Intruder frames are more frequently identified in sensationalist newspapers than in qualitative newspapers.

5.2.2 Nationality and mentioned migrant Although the PVV made 50 statements about asylum seekers, refugees or other migrants, only 18 of those statements were directly towards a group of migrants with a certain nationality or background. The word Islamic (N=8) was most frequently counted, followed by Arabic/North African (N=5), Syrian (N=3), Moroccan (N=1) and Afghan (N=1). Vlaams Belang was only referring to the Islamic origin of the intruders (N=4). This does not confirm the following hypothesis as the Moroccan community was not mentioned very frequently after the events: “The Moroccan community is being portrayed more frequently and more negative in the statements of populist and liberal politicians after the event in Cologne than before.” In general, the mentioned migrant or group of migrants were most frequently labelled as asylum seekers (N=36) on Twitter and in the newspapers, followed by refugees (N=23). The category other (N=10) included terms as migrant, immigrant, illegal and allochthon. More than half of the statements of the PVV on Twitter and in the press, 52 percent, did not mention any

35 status of the migrant or the group of migrants. Asylum seekers were mentioned the most frequently by the PVV (50.0%) of all parties, followed by VB (22.2%), D66 (13.9%) and Open VLD (13.9%). Looking at the statements within the political parties, the D66 (45.5%) and the Open VLD (38.5%) labelled both the person or groups most frequently as asylum seekers. Open VL (38.5%). The used term among populist political parties is not the same. The PVV mentioned more frequently asylum seekers in their statements while the VB mentioned refugees more frequently.

Mentioned Term None Refugee Asylum Other Total Political parties seeker

D66 3 3 5 0 11 % of D66 27.3%% 27.3% 45.5% 0% % mentioned 6.2% 13.0% 13.9% 0% PVV 26 4 18 2 50 % of PVV 52.0% 8.0% 36.0% 4.0% % of mentioned 54.2% 17.4% 50.0% 20.0% Open VLD 5 3 5 0 13 % of OpenVLD 38.5% 23.1% 38.5% 0% % of mentioned 10.4% 13.0% 13.9% 0%

VB 14 13 8 8 43 % of VB 32.6% 30.2% 18.6% 18.6% % of mentioned 29.2% 56.5% 22.2% 80.0% Total 48 23 36 10 117 % of Pol Parties 41.0% 12.8% 30.8% 15,4% 100%

Table 4: Political parties and whether they mentioned the intruder by their status

5.2.3 Framing on specific topics While categorizing the statements into overarching categories it was remarkable to notice some differences between statements in the Netherlands and Belgium. First, the Open VLD (N = 5; 38% of the Open VLD statements) and the VB (N = 8; 18% of the VB statements) gave attention to the protection of women and their rights, while at the same time none of the statements of political parties in the Netherlands was about protecting the women and their rights. This in line with other found newspaper articles. In the weeks after Cologne the Belgian media focussed on more incidents with asylum seekers who looked at, spoke to or assaulted Belgian women. The Dutch populists, the PVV (N = 11; 22% of the PVV statements) called for action to defend everyone against male asylum seekers, but they did not in particular call to respect the position

36 and rights of women. Second, the VB (N= 16; 37% of all VB statements) had more than any other political party critique on the policy or the actions of the ruling government. In the Netherlands, the PVV (N=5) only mentioned in 10 percent of their statements critique on the current government.

5.2.4 Twitter statistics With 36 published tweets the PVV exceeded the total number of tweets of the liberal political parties. It is striking to see that the average comment (39), like (107) and retweet (137) is very high compared to other political parties. The most liked (320), commented (95) and retweeted (400) tweet was send by the party leader Geert Wilders: “A code of conduct for women?? Total madness, women are victims, not perpetrators. Lock up the perpetrators and force them to leave.” This call for action is line with the previous described results about the PVV. Although the populist party VB has send more tweets (39), they have by far received less comments, tweets and likes than the PVV. The average tweet received 2 comments, 9 retweets and 7 likes. The following tweet send by a member of parliament of the VB received 11 comments, 63 retweets and 47 likes: “Course ‘how to deal with women’ in #asylum centres… Maybe we should first ask the question whether these people who need these courses are welcome here?” Of all D66 members of parliaments only six tweets were send. The impact of those tweets was likely small. Only one tweet was almost equal, with the same number of comments (78), likes (229) and retweets (77), as those of the PVV: “If you are in favour of or in opposite to asylum centres: Trying to silence democracy with violence is awful #heesch”. This tweet was focussed on the demonstrations that occurred in Heesch after the arrival of 500 asylum seekers was announced (NU.nl 2016). A different tweet that had likely a smaller range, with only 41 comments, 24 likes and 75 retweets, was a direct attack on the opinion of PVV party leader Geert Wilders: “First it was forcing to leave, now Wilders wants to detain asylum seekers…I rather see them learning the language and get started!” Wilders did not respond on this comment. All range of the tweets of the Open VLD can be considered as very small. On one tweet, send by the account of the political party, only 5 comments, 22 likes and 14 retweets were counted. The political party stated: “Asylum seekers are not standing above the law. If you are committing criminal acts, then you cannot stay here.” It is remarkable to see that the tweet gained the most attention on twitter while this political party is known to be in favour of migrants.

These Twitter statistics and the findings described above show that the populist parties can be considered as policy entrepreneurs. On the 4th of January 2016, the PVV was the first political party which responded on event in Cologne. Since then, they have devoted their resources and time to spreading their message.

5.3 In-depth findings To get a deeper understanding about the framing of the arrival of migrants by populist and liberal political parties it is necessary to analyse texts with a method for discursive policy analysis from Bacchi (2009) and critical framing analysis from Lombardo and Verloo (2007). The press releases of the populist and liberal political parties will be analysed by asking the following questions:

1. What is represented as the problem? Why is this the problem? 2. What assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’? 3. Who is seen responsible for causing the problem? 4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? 5. What effects are produced by this representation of the problem? 6. Which action is necessary and why? 7. What effects are produced by this action?

It should be kept in mind that at question number 5 and 7 only a few of the possible effects are named, while other effects are not mentioned. Comments could also be made on the fact that the statements reach only a limited audience and not the complete resident number of the Netherlands. Therefor it is uncertain whether these effects will likely occur. The decision was made to name some of the effects to provide insights of what this presentation of the problem and the call for action exactly means for the Dutch and Belgian society. In line with the previous results, it became clear that the Dutch liberal political party, the D66, did not publish or respond with a press statement on the occurred event in Cologne.

5.3.1 PVV On the 6th of January 2016 the populist political party PVV released a press statement with the title ‘Wilders in open letter to prime-minister Rutte: Where are you?’ The party stated that the assault on women in Cologne has led to an increased feeling of fear among the Dutch population towards, what the party labels as ‘testosteronbombs’. The problem is also presented as ‘sexual terrorism’ or ‘sexual jihad’. According to the party many women are worried about their own

38 safety and thousands of Dutch men are at the same time worried about the safety of their women and daughters. Not only the migrants are blamed for the fear in the Netherlands, the current government is also found responsible for the incoming Islamic young men. The party did not focus on the European migration policy, neither did it mention the national integration policy or the differences between the Dutch and German policy. Presenting the incoming migrants as the problem could have some effects. First, it is possible that this message might affect the relationships between groups in the Dutch society, for example the relationship between the Dutch native population and the Dutch-Moroccan group with an Islamic background. A study found that after the attacks on 9/11 the hate crimes against Muslims living in the United States increased very sharply (Gould & Klor 2014). Second, more fear could affect the lives of the people. People might be afraid to go out, to walk on the streets at night or to live nearby asylum centres. However, as stated before these statements made by populists could have effects, but it might absolutely not be certain that they occur. Therefor the effects of the statements should not be exaggerated. When political parties spread a message with a worrying content, it is possible that it only reaches the people who have voted on them before and their other supporters. In their statement they asked the prime-minister of the Netherlands to immediately close the borders and to de-Islamize, so that the Dutch population can feel safe again. This call for action might have some worrying effects. First, polarisation could occur in the Dutch society. The relationship between certain groups in the society will become alienated from each other (Gould & Klor 2014). Second, closing the borders could result in more custom controls at the border between Netherlands Germany or Belgium (The Economist 2016). This will likely have a severe impact on the Dutch economic activities and its economy. Third, implementing a closed borders policy will possibly lead to tensions between the Netherlands and the European Union. As the EU has a single market strategy this call for action by the PVV is in contrast of this principle (European Commission 2018). In this strategy the EU is seen as one territory without any internal borders and its goal is to create a free movement of goods and services.

5.3.2 Vlaams Belang The Belgian populist political party Vlaams Belang (VB) released a press statement with the title “Return ticket for ‘asylum offenders’” on the 8th of January 2016. The assault on women in Cologne was according the party caused by the incoming Muslim-immigrants. According to the Parliament member Filip Dewinter is the cultural attitude in Islamic countries anti-women: “In the Islamic culture are women second-class citizens, sexual utensils and it is allowed to

39 discriminate them.” The European asylum policy, the national integration policy and the thoughts of the population are left unproblematic. According to the party is the proposed sexual education for new asylum seekers by the Belgian Secretary of State not a solution who will fix the real problem. The incoming migrants are seen as the problem and therefor the party thinks that the government should make clear that the migrants do not belong here and should return to their country of origin. When this call for action is accepted this could have some concerning effects. First, certain groups in the society could become alienated from each other (Gould & Klor 2014). The tensions between the Belgian native population and the Belgian with a foreign background will increase. Second, forcing the return of immigrants will likely result in tensions on a European level. EU-members states have an obligation to accept refugees when there is an unequal distribution among EU members (Europa NU 2018). Similar as the PVV, the effects of these statements with a worrying content, might not even influence the debate, the political opinion or the people. It should be not exaggerated.

5.3.3 Open VLD The liberal political party in Belgium, the Open VLD published ‘The role of women should be more important in integration courses’ on the 7th of January 2016. The assault on women in Cologne is by the party seen as an attack on the fundamental principle of the western society: The equality between men and women. The perpetrators, who were likely male refugees, and the government are responsible for the rights of women. More attention should be paid to the role and position of women in society during the integration courses for new asylum seekers. The physical integrity of the woman and the equal position of women in society should be the focus of the sexual education for newcomers. What is left unproblematic is the arrival migrants, the European policy and fear among the Belgian population towards migrants. This call for a more important role for women in integration courses will likely assure the Belgian population. Also, the role of the women in society is empowered by this decision. However, others such as the populist political parties and its political support will be unsatisfied with this measure, due to the fact that the incoming migration flows are not stopped.

6 Conclusion & Discussion 6.1 Research questions This research paper attempted to show how the framing of the arrival of migrants by populist and liberal political parties developed in the Netherlands and Flanders after the sexual assault in Cologne on new year’s evening 2015. Special attention was given to the victim-intruder frame and whether the large Moroccan community was named and blamed. In line with the expectations, this study found that the intruder frame was mostly used by the populist political parties and the victim frame was often used by the liberal political parties. The theory in the theoretical section supported the claim, which stated that populist parties, such as the Belgian party Vlaams Belang and the Dutch parties Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) addressed anti-immigration positions (Akkerman 2005 :340). When the view went broader to the usage of multiple frames, the call for action frame was also frequently used by populist political parties. As expected the populist political parties had by far made more statements about the arrival of migrants after the Cologne than the liberal political parties. They can be identified as the policy entrepreneurs after Cologne for two reasons. The first reasons is that they have been using the right time window to address the issues, which were important for their followers (Kingdon 2003: 20). The second reason is that they were the first political party, which devoted their resources and time to recognize the problem (idem:166). The liberals have been avoiding to address the issue or did not feel they should react on the occurred event in Cologne. Another remarkable result was that the potential twitter reach of the PVV could be described as very high. The average comment, retweet and like was by far much higher than those of the other political parties. As it was stated in the methodological section, the potential twitter reach of some messages can be enormous (Simply Measured 2018). For example, the retweets of the original posts can be retweeted and so on. Therefor it is possible that their tweets influenced the debate. However, there is chance that the tweets only reached the already existing network of the politician and the audience of the tweet was not expanded to more people. Therefor it is possible that the debate was not influenced at all. When pre- and post-Cologne were compared to each other a continuous trend of the intruder frame was identified, however some differences could be found. First, surprisingly the Moroccan community was more in the centre of attention before Cologne than after the event on new year’s evening 2015. Although some of the perpetrators were identified as Moroccans, they were not frequently named or blamed (Welt 2016b). Second, the PVV used more Eurosceptic statements before Cologne than after. Instead of criticizing the European migration policy, the populist in Belgium and the Netherlands blamed the policy and acting of the

41 government on a national level. Third, the populist parties and the liberal Open VLD stood up for the safety and rights of women. It is interesting to see that women rights played a more important role in the statements in Belgium than in the Netherlands. Fourth, it could be concluded that the mentioned status of the perpetrator was different among the populists in the Netherlands, compared to Belgium. The PVV used more frequently the term ‘asylum seeker’, while the VB called the perpetrators ‘refugees’. The PVV did also used the terms ‘testosteronbombs’, ‘sexual jihadist’ and ‘sexual terrorists’ to blame the intruders. Lastly, it was not expected that many statements of populist politicians, which included the intruder frame, were identified in qualitative newspapers. This was in contrast of the observations which were conducted in Great Britain (Crawley 2005; Innes 2010, Blinder & Allen 2016).

6.2 Reflection on methods The combination of mixed methods proved to be a worthy research design. A combination of quantitative and qualitative research provided an in-depth analysis to get a better understanding of the framing and position of liberal and populist political parties. However, this study could have been improved in myriad ways. First, it is questionable whether all data is reliable. The liberals, especially in the Netherlands, have not been responding very often on the events in Cologne. With more available data, this research could provide a more reliable answer to our question. It would be interesting to see whether politicians gave attention to the published police report in November 2016 (Welt 2016a). This could possibly be an opportunity for politicians, as this is likely when a policy windows opens, to set the agenda (Kingdon 2003: 166). Unfortunately, due to the limited available time to collect data, this could not be done. Second, no pilot or pre-testing was used to test the coding scheme. It is always desirable to conduct a pilot study to determine whether the asked questions were right (Bryman 2012: 263-264). Fortunately, an open approach was used so more questions could be added to the coding scheme. Lastly, the cross-border interaction between political parties has not been included in this research. The Belgian Society is regularly following what happened in neighbouring countries. For example, the Flemish region is closely watching, listening and reading the news in the Netherlands (Vangoidsenhoven & Pilet 2015: 70). Therefor it is likely that actions or statements of Wilders’ PVVs affected the politicisation of immigration topics in Belgium (ibid). Future research could closely look at the interaction between political parties, although this could problematic as it is impossible to gain data or knowledge from private conversations and meetings behind doors.

6.3 Generalising outcomes Generalising outcomes to other countries may be difficult. As the context, in which the political parties operate, and the positions of liberal and populist political parties differ per country and change over time, it is difficult to generalize the outcomes of this research. However, this research provided a broader understanding of the immigration debate in the Netherlands and Flanders. By learning more about the populists and liberal’s way of framing and the used frames, this could explain more kind of topics in more debates than just about the migrants who enter the Netherlands or Flanders. As stated before, framing plays an important role in the message of the media and politicians. Frames show how stereotypes and characterizations are created and how citizens of a country understand political, economic and social issues (Van Gorp 2005: 489; Chong & Druckman 2007; Slothuus & De Vreese 2010). The media and politicians can play a major role in increasing the public support for asylum policies. As migration flows, asylum and integration are considered as a common concern for governments of the EU members states, it becomes more important how actions of political parties influence these debates (Triandafyllidou 2014). The way how populist and liberal political party frame is also useful to understand discussions about integration, border control, the role of minority groups in the society and numerous other topics. The populist and liberal positions towards topics concerning immigration and the way of framing could be used by other political parties to predict the opinions of populist and liberal political parties for discussions in the next years. Besides the emphasis of this research on the victim-intruder frame, there was also a focus on whether the event in Cologne led to a more frequently mentioning and blaming of the Moroccan community in Flanders and the Netherlands. This study did not found evidence that Moroccans were more frequently mentioned or blamed. Unfortunately, it is therefore not possible to generalize the outcome. However, a research focussing on more countries and possibly more events could provide a better insight on the position of the Moroccan and Arab communities in Europe.

6.4 Theoretical implications and future research This research has theoretical implication in numerous ways. This research provided insights in the concept of policy entrepreneurs. It showed whether political parties recognized problems and tried to set the agenda. In line of the expectations did the populist political parties start with recognizing the issue as immigration is one of their main issues. Due to the fact the populist political parties were the first to react when the policy window opened, they devoted

43 their communication, time and resources to the issue, they were identified as policy entrepreneur (Kingdon 2003; 20 & 166). The research on policy entrepreneurs could be expanded in many ways. It would be interesting to research multiple political parties in the Netherlands and Belgium when they tend to be the policy entrepreneur. This could explain how policy entrepreneurs act within a national political landscape, but also how they act on events on a European or international level. Similar research could be conducted in multiple countries or even at the level of an intergovernmental organization, such as the United Nations. It might even be more interesting to see whether or not these policy entrepreneurs interact with each other and whether some messages might be similar when the national and international level are compared to each other. The study on framing of populist and liberal political parties contributed to the understanding of the actions of political actors in the (anti)migration debate. At the same time, it compared two political landscapes, Flanders and the Netherlands, to discuss how actors use the information to frame certain migration issues. By understanding the position of political parties, it is possible to know how framing could plays a role in shaping policies (Kangas et al. 2013). Inside an economic region, such as the European Union, the position or actions of a national government plays a role in shaping the debate on an intra-national level (European Union 2018). One of the main questions that was asked is in this research was whether migrants were framed as victim or intruders in the aftermath and whether Moroccans were frequently named (Van Gorp 2005). As Moroccans are part of the described ‘North African men’ and a large Moroccan community that lives in the Netherlands and Flanders, it was interesting to see whether Moroccans were named more frequently by politicians and how they were framed after this event. As stated before no substantial evidence was found that Moroccans were named and blamed after the event in Cologne. The implication of this is that other ways have to be found to analyse how Moroccans are named and blamed in newspapers. It became clear that by ‘just’ taking an event, which involved the mentioning of Moroccans, could not explain everything. One of the recommendation of future research is to conduct this study in multiple European countries. One of the conditions for this, is that a large Moroccan community is living in this country. This could be one of the many ways to measure whether Moroccans, or North- Africans, are named and blamed on a large scale. Future research could start by analysing statements of populist and liberal political parties in the French part of Belgium, which is called Wallonia, and France. It should be taken in mind that linguistic and grammatical errors could occur when statements are analysed in other countries with different languages.

It was found that statements of populist, which included the intruder frame, were more frequently published in qualitative newspapers, such as the Dutch Volkskrant and NRC and the Belgian De Morgen and Standaard. This was not line with the expectations as observations of previous research stated that for example the British tabloids, also seen as sensationalist newspapers, are believed to contribute to hostility toward migrants (Crawley 2005; Innes 2010, Blinder & Allen 2016). It is possible that the results of such observations in different countries do not match to each other. Many factors, such as the media rhetoric, public attitude towards immigrants, numbers of arriving immigrants and political mood may influence the results of those observations. Surprisingly, the gender perspective came forward in this research. In some statements was found that politicians thought that women could not protect themselves. One member of parliament even stated that ‘our own men should follow a course, so they know how to protect their women’. This implicates that women are characterised as weak and dependent, which is related to the gender and feminist studies in the international relations (Tickner 2014: 260). In this case it is clear that this politician has not learned from the ideas of gender and feminist studies yet. Creating awareness is of great interest to improve the role of women in the society. Future research could reflect on the statements of politicians and whether these statements start from a masculine or feminine point of view.

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Appendices

A: Codebook: Guidelines for coding Tweets and articles in newspapers 1) Which media source published the text? 1. Telegraaf (NL) 2. Volkskrant (NL) 3. AD (NL) 4. NRC Handelsblad (NL) 5. De Morgen (BE) 6. De Standaard (BE) 7. Het Laatste Nieuws (BE) 8. Het Nieuwsblad (BE) 9. Twitter 2) On which date is the text published? 3) Which political party mentions the asylum seeker, refugee or other immigrant? 1. D66 (NL) 2. PVV (NL) 3. Open VLD (BE) 4. Vlaams Belang (BE) 4) Does the text mentions the following terms? 1. Refugees, 2. Migrant 3. Immigrant 4. Asylum seeker 5. Foreigner 6. Other: 7. Aslyum Seeker and immigrant 8. Illegals 9. Asylum seeker and refugee 10. Allochtone 11. No (=0) 5) How many words is the statement? 6) Are the asylum seekers, refugees or other immigrants portrayed as an a inhabitant of a country or does the migrant have a certain origin? Which country? 1. Islam 2. Syrian 3. Arabic/N-African 4. Iran 5. Algeria 6. Moroccan 7. Afghan 8. No (=0) 7) Is the Moroccan community named in the text?

1. Yes 2. No 8) Is the asylum seeker, refugee or other immigrant portrayed as a victim or an intruder? 1. Intruder: Asylum seekers, refugees and other immigrants can be described as criminals, profiteers or a threat to someone’s cultural ideas, personal and economic situation. 2. Victim: Asylum seekers, refugees or other immigrants can be described as innocent victims as they could have been fleeing from their country for reasons such as war, political instability or poor economic circumstances 3. None/Neutral (=0) 9) Which frame fits the best? 1. Conflict Frame: Portrays conflicting opinions about a certain topic 2. Action Frame: Calls for a needed action for a certain reported issue. 3. Reassurance frame: expresses the idea that public should not be worried. 4. Victim frame: Asylum seekers, refugees or other immigrants can be described as innocent victims as they could have been fleeing from their country for reasons such as war, political instability or poor economic circumstances. 5. Intruder frame: Asylum seekers, refugees and other immigrants can be described as criminals, profiteers or a threat to someone’s cultural ideas, personal and economic situation. 6. No (=0) 10) What is the overarching theme of the statement/article? 1. Help migrants 2. King should be more involved in topics about migration 3. NL should relocate asylum seekers to NL 4. Inform public to not be worried 5. Lock up male asylum seekers 6. Defend against male asylum seekers 7. Call for demonstrations 8. Government lacks policy 9. Refugees receive privileges above the native population 10. Close the borders 11. Refugees are victims 12. Ask questions to PM 13. Arrest and deport migrants 14. Just blame migrants 15. Step up for women’s rights

B: Guidelines for analysing large articles on the websites of the political parties 1. What is represented as the problem? Why is this the problem? 2. What assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’? 3. Who is seen responsible for causing the problem? 4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? 5. What effects are produced by this representation of the problem? 6. Which action is necessary and why? 7. What effects are produced by this action?

C: List of newspapers articles PVV

16/01/06 Telegraaf: Agressie, geweld en diefstal; verdubbeling van het aantal incidenten in opvangcentra voor vluchtelingen

16/01/08 NRC: Sociale media #Keulen voer voor polarisering

16/01/15 NRC: Klacht over ‘doofpot’ bij politie

16/01/15 AD: Wilders deelt verzetsspray uit

16/01/16 NRC: Wilders overtroeven, dat lukt ze niet

16/01/18 NRC: Even de grens over voor pepperspray

16/01/19 Telegraaf: PVV wil azc op slot

16/01/19 NRC: Wilders gaat stap verder: Sluit mannen op in AZC’s.

16/01/23 Telegraaf: Wilders scoort met ‘verzetsspray’

16/01/23 de Volkskrant: acht woorden en een hashtag

16/01/25 NRC: De mannen bestaan vandaag even niet voor Geert Wilders ; Partij Voor de Vrijheid In de Kamer is de PVV de aansluiting met andere partijen nagenoeg kwijt. Maar op straat vindt de partijleider nog volop supporters

16/01/25 AD: Arrestaties bij bezoek Wilders

16/01/26 NRC: Timmermans: 60 procent migranten kan teruggestuurd; Asielcrisis Volgens nieuwe Brusselse cijfers komt meerderheid migranten nu uit economische motieven naar Europa; bondskanselier Merkel staat in Duitsland onder toenemende druk

16/01/29 Telegraaf: Agressie, geweld en diefstal; Verdubbeling van aantal incidenten in opvangcentra voor vluchtelingen

D66

16/01/19 Telegraaf: PVV wil AZC op slot

16/01/22 NRC: Heel Europa kijkt nu naar premier Rutte

16/01/23 NRC: Azc Meed de koning asielzoekers expres?

16/01/26 NRC: De nieuwe Rutte, waarom niet?

16/01/09 Het Laatste Nieuws: “Filmpje is dom en degoutant”

16/01/11 Het Laatste Nieuws: Filip Dewinter krijgt pv voor busje pepperspray…

16/01/11 Het Nieuwsblad: Dewinter wil pepperspray uitdelen

16/01/27 Het Laatste Nieuws: “Wij zijn Keulen aan de Dijle niet”

Open VLD

16/01/07 De Morgen: Blaming the victim is een slag in het gezicht van vrouwen wereldwijd

16/01/09 Het Laatste Nieuws: Cursus omgaan met vrouwen

16/01/18 De Standaard: Slachtoffers seksueel geweld meld u

16/01/21 Het Nieuwsblad: Mannen maken ongevraagd filmpjes en foto’s van vrouwen

16/01/26 De Morgen: Wetstraat mispakt zich aan Kokszijde

16/01/26 De Morgen: De aanranding die er geen was

16/01/27 De Standaard: Zachte bezorgdheid over impulsief gedrag Francken

16/01/30 De Morgen: Koudwatervrees

D: List of twitter statements D66

1) Alexander Pechtold – 22 januari 2016 (36C, 40R, 41L) In Eritrea kon #Idris nooit naar school, in NL volgt hij een studie. #movingpeople geeft vluchtelingen een gezicht. https://twitter.com/APechtold/status/690472743620448256

2) Sjoerd Sjoerdsma – 12 januari 2016 (4C, 18R, 5L) Ik krijg hier een vieze smaak in mijn mond van... https://twitter.com/swsjoerdsma/status/687015891796639744

3) Sjoerd Sjoerdsma – 13 januari 2016 (3C, 9R, 2L) Schandalig gedrag! Het COA moet zorgen dat LHBT asielzoekers veilig zijn en zich veilig voelen. https://twitter.com/swsjoerdsma/status/687193230249693184

4) D66 – 14 januari 2016 ( 35C, 35R, 16L) "Laat vluchtelingen zsm werken en taal leren" #D66 @KajsaOllongren #Amsterdam bij @JinekLive http://bit.ly/1JM7sJd https://twitter.com/D66/status/687629067483504640

5) Sjoerd Sjoerdsma – 18 januari 2016 (41C, 75R, 24L) Eerst was het uitzetten, nu wil Wilders asielzoekers vastzetten...Ik zie liever dat ze de taal leren en aan de slag gaan! https://twitter.com/swsjoerdsma/status/689128219434467329

6) Sjoerd Sjoerdsma – 18 januari 2016 ( 78C, 229R, 77L) Of je nu voor of tegen AZCs bent: met geweld proberen de democratie stil te leggen is schandalig. #heesch https://twitter.com/swsjoerdsma/status/689164184999841793

PVV

1) Geert Wilders – 4 januari 2016 (77C, 173R, 106L) “Mannen met een Arabisch en Noord-Afrikaans uiterlijk die zwaar beschonken waren". http://nos.nl/l/2078604 via @NOS https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/684097266722979840

2) Geert Wilders – 5 januari 2016 (74C, 181R, 168L) Kamervragen aan premier Rutte over arabische testosteronbommen in Duitsland: http://pvv.nl/index.php/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/8863-kamervragen-wilders-en- fritsma-aan-de-minister-president-over-arabische-testosteronbommen-in- duitsland.html …

https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/684316294880096256

3) Geert Wilders – 5 januari 2016 (16C, 113R, 72L) Wilders: Cologne Assaults May Soon Happen on Large Scale http://bit.ly/1TCI8Fu via BreitbartNews https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/684473075161804804

4) Geert Wilders – 5 januari 2016 (95C, 400R, 320L) Een gedragscode voor vrouwen?? Totale gekte, vrouwen zijn slachtoffer géén dader. Daders oppakken en snel uitzetten! https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/684420415071072256

5) Geert Wilders – 6 januari 2016 (22C, 118R, 117L) Criminele asielzoekers. #grenzendicht https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/684804734209884162

6) Geert Wilders – 7 januari 2016 (74C, 198R, 199L) Grenzen dicht en het tuig eruit! #grenzendicht https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/685095727027077120

7) Geert Wilders – 7 januari 2016 (71C, 222R, 221L) Syriërs. Op uitnodiging van Merkel/Rutte massaal hier. Bedankt hè Angela en Mark. #kominverzet #wegmetrutteenmerkel https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/685137532825264129

8) Geert Wilders – 8 januari 2016 (38C, 175R, 113L) Verdachten sexuele jihad Keulen: 8 uit Marokko, 4 uit Syrië, 5 uit Iran, 9 uit Algerije. #genoegisgenoeg #stopislam https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/685430416334000129

9) Geert Wilders – 9 januari 2016 (45C, 171R, 142L) Het wordt steeds erger met de #sexjihad. No more. #nomoreislam https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/685869914738016256

10) Geert Wilders – 11 januari 2016 (73C, 209R, 210L) Politieverslag voorlopige lijst verdachten aanrandingen Keulen. 7 X Marokkanen. Meer of minder? #minder https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/686579479188234240

11) Geert Wilders – 12 januari 2016 (78C, 289R, 285L) Hef verbod pepperspray op, geef vrouwen het recht en de mogelijkheid zich te verdedigen tegen testosteronbommen! https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/686932870749896704

12) Geert Wilders – 13 januari 2016 ( 33C, 111R, 123L) Na Keulen – Geef vrouwen het recht zich te verdedigen http://politiek.tpo.nl/column/na-keulen-geef-vrouwen-het-recht-zich-te-verdedigen/ … via @TPOnl https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/687212075148554240

13) Geert Wilders – 14 januari 2016 (168C, 273R, 328L) PVV deelt verzetsspray uit! Markt Spijkenisse, 23 jan. 12.00 uur. Tegen islamitische testosteronbommen. #kominverzet https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/687636320521424896

14) Geert Wilders – 15 januari 2016 ( 53C, 270R, 152L) Aanrandingen, doofpotten en €36.000 kosten pppj en Rutte laat er nog wat meer invliegen. #knettergek #kominverzet https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/687940370680909824

15) Geert Wilders – 15 januari 2016 (44C, 185R, 136L) Ook hier dus? Doofpot. Aanrandingen. Asielzoekers. Het Nederland van Mark Rutte #grenzendicht #rutteweg #kominverzet https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/687909322244943872

16) Geert Wilders – 18 januari 2016 (117C, 160R, 235L) Geweldig. Poll op telegraaf.nl meer dan 8000 reacties en meer dan driekwart voor opsluiten mannelijke asielzoekers! https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/689186419806474244

17) Geert Wilders – 19 januari 2016 (23C, 156R, 113L) In heel Europa sexuele jihad door asielzoekers. Grenzen en AZC's sluiten. Genoeg is genoeg! #nomoretestosteronbombs https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/689488071021080576

18) Geert Wilders – 21 januari 2016 (26C, 148R, 93L) Update Keulen: 1049 slachtoffers. 30 verdachten. Allemaal Noord-Afrikanen, de helft ervan asielzoekers. #kominverzet https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/690126252468994048

19) Geert Wilders – 23 januari 2016 (32C, 161R, 192L) Fantastic so much people and enthusiasm in Spijkenisse. People resist against islamic invasion and testosteronbombs! https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/690874300014972929

20) Geert Wilders – 23 Januari 2016 (38C, 135R, 116L)

Ook Nederlandse vrouw voelt zich minder veilig sinds aanrandingen Keulen http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/ook-nederlandse-vrouw-voelt-zich- minder-veilig-sinds-aanrandingen-keulen … https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/690972428609150976

21) Machiel van der Graaf – 4 januari 2016 (4C, 16R, 2L) Oud integratienieuws (http://bit.ly/1IN17go ) over het nieuwe Europa na 4 dagen 'al' bij NOS: http://nos.nl/artikel/2078604-tientallen-vrouwen-aangerand-en-beroofd-in- keulen.html … Dames, zet u schrap! https://twitter.com/GraafdeMachiel/status/684066245042372608

22) Fleur Agema 27 januari 2016 (17C, 50R, 30L) Gaan asielzoekers straks óók ontslagen thuishulpen vervangen? - Honderdvijftig Stadjers zitten zonder thuiszorg https://twitter.com/FleurAgemaPVV/status/692440297704439808

23) Martin Bosma 7 januari 2016 ( 26, 146R, 51L) En nu @tanjajess @Viggowaas @Jan_Slagter @HumbertoTan @PubliekeOmroep ? Arrestanten (op 1 na) ALLEMAAL Syriers. https://twitter.com/Martinbosma_pvv/status/685023621048365056

24) Martin Bosma 27 januari 2016 (13C, 65R, 15L). Zeer scherp ! "Alleen uitspraken die het beeld van 'zielige vluchtelingen' verstoren zijn een factcheck waard." https://twitter.com/Martinbosma_pvv/status/692435437756010496

25) Martin Bosma 25 januari 2016 (33C, 208R, 86L) Als zelfs Timmermans zegt dat 60% voor 't geld komt. Dan hebben de media ons dus een jaar voorgelogen. Met hun "vluchtelingen." Lügenpresse https://twitter.com/Martinbosma_pvv/status/691680163487207424

26) Martin Bosma 22 januari (40C, 192R, 119L) Wat zijn ze stil. Al die BN'ers die hun goedheid kwamen etaleren door op te komen voor de zielige vluchtelingen. https://twitter.com/Martinbosma_pvv/status/690466109213011971

27) Martin bosma 21 januari 2016 (12C, 65R, 26L) Even voor Annemarie Jorritsma: Al 1049 slachtoffers Keulen. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/innenausschuss-im-live-ticker-straftaten- verdaechtige-jetzt-legt-nrw-innenminister-jaeger-die-wahren-zahlen- vor_id_5226649.html … https://twitter.com/Martinbosma_pvv/status/690109008636674048

28) Martin Bosma 17 januari 2016 (21C, 161R, 43L)

Welkomstfeest op boot voor vluchtelingen in Bonn. Binnen minuten beginnen de aanrandingen. #refugeeswelcome https://twitter.com/Martinbosma_pvv/status/688690927188217857

29) Harm Beertema 19 januari 2016 (1C, 29R, 13L) Policor: onbekende, ongedocumenteerde mannen los laten lopen. PVV is de enige partij met oplossingen #gezondverstand https://twitter.com/harmbeertema/status/689483992421138433

30) Harm Beertema 25 januari 2016 (8C, 23R, 7L ) PvdA legt aan de barbaren uit dat homo's rechten hebben, net als vrouwen. PVV deelt verzetsspray uit in Spijkenisse. https://twitter.com/harmbeertema/status/691577777347256320

31) Reinette Klever 4 januari 2016 (2C, 15R, 4L) Tientallen vrouwen aangerand en beroofd in Keulen https://twitter.com/rjklever/status/684063328034025472

32) Reinette Klever 6 januari (3C, 19R, 3L) Politie weet het: aanranders Keulen waren criminele asielzoekers' https://twitter.com/rjklever/status/684810894665187328

33) Reinette Klever 7 januari 2016 (3C, 9R, 3L) 'Meeste daders Keulen waren asielzoekers uit Syrië' http://www.nu.nl/buitenland/4194173/meeste-daders-keulen-waren-asielzoekers- syrie.html … https://twitter.com/rjklever/status/685137728607006720

34) Reinette Klever 7 januari 2016 (1C, 2R, 2L) Nederlandse Syriër betrokken bij verkrachting meisjes van 14 en 15 jaar in Duitsland http://www.telegraaf.nl/t/24963653 via @telegraaf https://twitter.com/rjklever/status/685138068299509761

35) Reinette Klever 7 januari (2C, 17R, 2L) Drie Afghanen probeerden vrouw te verkrachten in een verlaten wagon https://twitter.com/rjklever/status/685369858385702912

36) Reinette Klever 9 januari (5C, 76R, 9L) En ook in Bielefeld was het raak. 500 mannen drongen met geweld disco binnen #massa-aanranding https://twitter.com/rjklever/status/685771605901996033

Open VLD

1) Anne Brusseel 7 januari (0C, 1R, 2L) Rol van de vrouw moet ook sterker aan bod komen in inburgeringscursussen | Ann Brusseel http://www.annbrusseel.be/bericht/rol-van-de-vrouw-moet-ook-sterker-aan- bod-komen-inburgeringscursussen#.Vo5fd3ev3r8.twitter … https://twitter.com/AnnBrusseel/status/685081640629055488

2) Ann Brusseel 7 januari (2C, 2R, 3L) Cursus 'omgaan met vrouwen' zeker nodig: strijd tegen #seksisme op alle fronten, zonder taboes #hautekiet #gender https://twitter.com/AnnBrusseel/status/685009949672488960

3) Daniélle Vanwesenbeeck 6 januari (000) ook als het gaat over vluchtelingen :'laat ons blijven roepen dat we zélf beslissen wie ons aanraakt' http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20160105_02050272 … #ikbesliszelf https://twitter.com/Danielle_VWB/status/684665896200192000

4) Open VLD 25 jan (0C, 2R, 2L) Visie @RuttenGwendolyn op een strijdbaar liberalisme #vrijheden #samenleven @Nieuwsblad_be http://www.gwendolynrutten.be/nieuws/de-vluchtelingen-zijn- welkom-maar-het-blijft-onze-samenleving/ … “De Vluchtelingen zijn welkom, maar het blijf wel onze samenleving”. 5https://twitter.com/openvld/status/691578672868921344

5) Open VLD 10 januari (5C, 14R, 22L) "Asielzoeker staat niet boven de wet. Als je criminele feiten pleegt, kan je hier niet blijven. @CarinaVanCauter #7dag https://twitter.com/openvld/status/686153048293531648

VB:

1) Ortwin Depoortere – 6 januari 2016 (0C, 11R, 9L) "230.000 Vlaamse werklozen en intussen druk op werkgevers om asielzoekers aan te werven. Onaanvaardbaar!" @chrisjanssensVB @vlaparl https://twitter.com/OrtwinDepo/status/684761989726470144

2) Ortwin Depoortere – 20 januari 2016 (0C, 2R, 0L) Vlaams Belang opent meldpunt asieloverlast http://knack.be/s/r/c/648253 via @knack https://twitter.com/OrtwinDepo/status/689823113278832640

3) Chris Janssens – 7 januari 2016 (1C, 4R, 0L) 230.000 werklozen maar #vlareg wil 'vluchtelingen' activeren. "Jobs voor vluchtelingen? Help eerst eigen mensen!”

https://twitter.com/chrisjanssensVB/status/685134117135101953

4) Chris Janssens – 7 januari 2016 (1C, 9R, 6L) De aanvallen in #Keulen hebben nog iets gemeenschappelijk met immigranten en asielzoekers: te veel tegelijkertijd. https://twitter.com/chrisjanssensVB/status/685172335956115457

5) Chris Janssens 16 januari 2016 (0C, 2R, 0L) De toekomst van ons land wordt bepaald door t antwoord op de vraag hoe wij opkomen voor de vrijheid van onze vrouwen http://www.dm.be/s/ax5ea63f5/cMAkO … https://twitter.com/chrisjanssensVB/status/688393985409298432

6) Chris Janssens 15 januari 2016 (2C, 8R, 5L) "60% van alle 'vluchtelingen' zijn niet op de vlucht voor oorlog." Vlaams Belang krijgt steeds sneller gelijk. https://twitter.com/chrisjanssensVB/status/691718372178944000

7) Stefaan Sintobin 18 januari 2016 (1C, 7R, 7L) Hoezo, er is geen geld? @VlaamseRegering trekt 500.000 euro uit voor #traumateam voor #vluchtelingen!?Bespaar op asiel, niet op eigen mensen https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/689350892982824960

8) Stefaan Sintobin 28 januari 2016 (0C, 3R, 2L) Een efficiënt uitwijzingsbeleid is nodig. Al de rest is stoerdoenerij! @FocusWTV https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/692743280405143554

9) Stefaan Sintobin (28 januari 2016 (0C, 1R, 1L) Illegalen krijgen een beleefd briefje met de vraag om aub het land te verlaten. Wanneer efficiënt uitwijzingsbeleid? https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/692742492584808449

10) Stefaan Sintobin 24 januari 2016 (3C, 28R, 17L) Asielzoekers weren uit zwembad en progressief #Vlaanderen gaat uit zijn dak, gescheiden zwemmen toelaten en het blijft oorverdovend stil..!? https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/691516227559251968

11) Stefaan Sintobin 10 januari 2016 (0-0-0) Onbegrijpelijk: @FranckenTheo laat duizenden en duizenden vluchtelingen binnen en is toch de ster op @de_NVA nieuwjaarsfeest...? https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/686232394400182273

12) Stefaan Sintobin 10 januari 2016 (1C, 2R, 1L)

Nog verder besparen zegt #BDW tegen de Vlamingen. Voor asielzoekers, vluchtelingen is geld vinden blijkbaar geen probleem! @de_NVA https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/686227399650971648

13) Stefaan Sintobin 7 januari 2016 @FranckenTheo misschien eens nakijken hoeveel migranten van de afgelopen jaren werken en niet werken.Dan kunnen we de juiste optelsom maken! https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/685358507089104896

14) Stefaan Sintobin 5 januari 2016 (000) Heeft men uit protest tegen de massa-aanranding van vrouwen door allochtonen de Dom in #koln al verlicht...!? #pegida https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/684387156354273282

15) Stefaan Sintobin 5 januari 2016 (1C, 0,0) Stel u even voor dat duizend autochtonen tientallen allochtone vrouwen zouden bestelen, betasten en aanranden...#koln @demorgen @VTMNIEUWS https://twitter.com/StefaanSintobin/status/684385902949482496

16) Anke Van dermeersch 7 januari 2016 (4C, 9R, 14L) Vrouwen moeten vrij niet-dodelijke wapens kunnen kopen en dragen op publieke plaatsen! #peperspray #stopislamisation #stopislam https://twitter.com/Anke_online/status/685063397919080448

17) Anke van dermeersch 7 januari 2016 (8C, 17R, 23L) Ónze mannen moeten een cursus krijgen: 'Hoe verdedig ik mijn vrouw en dochters tegen moslims en de islam'. https://twitter.com/Anke_online/status/685064932627464193

18) Anke van dermeersch 11 januari 2016 (7C, 14R, 7L) Een legaal illegalenkamp in #Calais voor mensen die zo snel mogelijk #Frankrijk willen verlaten... Onbegrijpelijk! https://twitter.com/Anke_online/status/686814819064897536

19) Tom van Grieken 4 januari (2C, 11R, 6L) Half miljoen werklozen, maar Kumpen (@vokavzw) noemt ' vluchtelingen a/h werk' een prioriteit voor 2016 #facepalm https://twitter.com/tomvangrieken/status/684097622852907008

20) Tom van Grieken 7 januari (11C, 63R, 47L) Cursus 'met vrouwen omgaan' in #asielcentra... Misschien ons eerst de vraag stellen of mensen die zo'n cursus nodig hebben hier welkom zijn? https://twitter.com/tomvangrieken/status/685014010077523968

21) Tom van Grieken 13 januari (0C, 3R, 2L) "300 asielzoekers in luxehotel" Kracht van verandering inderdaad, maar niet ten goede! http://r.hln.be/aQ17?s=t #HLNKasterlee via @HLNbe https://twitter.com/tomvangrieken/status/687264168408387585

22) Tom van Grieken 16 januari (1C, 3R, 2L) Testosteronbommen zijn niet op de vlucht voor terreur, maar hebben terreur hier geïmporteerd!' @vlbelang #vb2016

23) Tom van Grieken 20 januari (0C, 8R, 3L) Verplichte lectuur voor de 'refugees welcome'-types! "Asielzoekers zijn opdringerig en veeleisend" http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/960/Buitenland/article/detail/2590682/2016/01/20/Medewerk ster-asielcentrum-onthult-Ze-zijn-opdringerig-en-extreem-veeleisend.dhtml … via @HLN_be https://twitter.com/tomvangrieken/status/689810474687406080

24) Tom van Grieken 20 januari (2C, 5R, 1L) Vlaams Belang opent meldpunt asieloverlast http://knack.be/s/r/c/648253 via knack https://twitter.com/tomvangrieken/status/689821647214395394

25) Tom van Grieken 25 januari (1C, 27R, 27 L) Niet het zwembad, maar de grenzen moeten dicht! #asielcrisis #koksijde https://twitter.com/tomvangrieken/status/691538934711607296

26) Tom van Grieken 27 januari 2016 (0C, 14R, 11L) 96% van de burgers vindt dat we genoeg of te veel #vluchtelingen opvangen. Grootste deel van de politici behoort tot de 4%. #wereldvreemd https://twitter.com/tomvangrieken/status/692327935689281536

27) Vlaams Belang 29 januari (2C, 14R, 3L) Vrouw aangerand in #AZC #Sijsele @StefaanSintobin van VB vraagt oplijsting asielincidenten #asielcrisis http://vlaamsbelang.org/persberichten/2576 … https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/693084257745530880

28) Vlaams Belang 26 januari (3C, 12R, 4L) 15-jarige vluchteling stak 22-jarige medewerkster van asielopvang in Zweden dood. http://m.telegraaf.nl/buitenland/article/25080289/slachtoffer-zweden-is-medewerkster- asielopvang … #asiel #azc #asielcrisis https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/692043013619617793

29) Vlaams Belang 20 januari (1C, 7R, 5L)

Vlaams Belang lanceert #meldpunt asieloverlast. http://vlaamsbelang.org/persberichten/2567 … #sijsele #koksijde #steenokkerzeel #kapellen https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/689826622371930112

30) Vlaams Belang 11 januari (1C, 0, 1L) @HLN_BE Registratie asielzoekers moet grondiger & databanken met persoonsgegevens moeten internationaal beter op elkaar worden afgestemd. https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/686505435550072833

31) Vlaams Belang 12 januari (1C, 9R, 6L) Politioneel apartheidssysteem in het voordeel van criminele 'vluchtelingen'. https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/686838841311899648

32) Vlaams Belang 10 januari (4C, 19R, 22L) Criminele asielzoekers land uitzetten is achter de feiten aanhollen. Schade is dan al gebeurd en niet voorkomen. Sluit de grenzen. #7dag https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/686152617047814144

33) Vlaams Belang 10 januari (1C, 12R, 12L) Feiten als #Keulen volledig nieuwe vorm vn criminaliteit. Bijproduct opengrenzenbeleid. Stop immigratie uit moslimlanden @Barbara_Pas #7dag https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/686151752719151104

34) Vlaams Belang 10 januari (4C, 5R, 3L) Contractjes&cursusjes vr asielzoekers. Volgens N-VA oplossing tegen crimineel gedrag asielzoekers. Kwestie vn tijd vr hier wat gebeurt #7dag https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/686150025903239169

35) Vlaams Belang 10 januari (1C, 4R, 3L) Om 12:30u Barabara Pas in De @De7deDag over gebeurtenissen in #Keulen #7dag “Criminele asielzoekers onmiddellijk terugsturen” https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/686146801364299777

36) Vlaams Belang – 8 januari (0, 8R, 15L) Jobs voor vluchtelingen? Help eerst eigen mensen aan job! @chrisjanssensVB in het #VlaParl http://vlaamsbelang.org/persberichten/2561 … https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/685381174181675009

37) Vlaams Belang 6 januari (3C, 14R, 9L) "Morele druk op bedrijven om vluchtelingen aan te werven is fout. Eerst 230.000 Vlaamse werklozen aan job helpen." @chrisjanssensVB #vlaparl https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/684762487833673728

38) Vlaams Belang 6 januari (3C, 6R, 3L) "U wil vluchtelingen inburgeren en werk geven, maar hoe valt dit te rijmen met net ingevoerd tijdelijk statuut?" @chrisjanssensVB #vlaparl https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/684761067768135680

39) Vlaams Belang 6 januari (1C, 4R, 1L) "Minister, U wil activering vluchtelingen op arbeidsmarkt. Eigen laaggeschoolden mogen niet slachtoffer worden!" @chrisjanssensVB #vlaparl https://twitter.com/vlbelang/status/684760349942398978