Running Head: THE SYRIAN CRISIS

The Syrian Crisis from Three Different Approaches to International Relations

Thesis

By

Kayvan Hosseini

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Bachelor of Science

In

International Economic Relations

State University of New York

Empire State College

2018

Reader: Max Hilaire

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 2

Statutory Declaration / Čestné prohlášení

I, Kayvan Hosseini, declare that the paper entitled:

The Syrian Crisis from Three Different Approaches to International Relations

was written by myself independently, using the sources and information listed in the list of references. I am aware that my work will be published in accordance with § 47b of Act No.

111/1998 Coll., On Higher Education Institutions, as amended, and in accordance with the valid publication guidelines for university graduate theses.

Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto práci vypracoval/a samostatně s použitím uvedené literatury a zdrojů informací. Jsem vědom/a, že moje práce bude zveřejněna v souladu s § 47b zákona

č. 111/1998 Sb., o vysokých školách ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a v souladu s platnou

Směrnicí o zveřejňování vysokoškolských závěrečných prací.

In Prague, 27/11/2017 Kayvan Hosseini

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Acknowledgment

I wish to express my sincere thanks to my mentor, Prof. Max Hilaire, for advising me and guiding me.

I place on record; my sincere thank you to Prof. Oscar Hidalgo, the head of International

Economic Relations department at the University of New York in Prague (UNYP). During my four years’ study, he thought me a lot and had a significant impact on the direction of my studies which in the end, resulted in the following thesis.

I take this opportunity to express gratitude to all of the UNYP and ESC faculty members for their help and support.

I am also grateful to Farin Assemi, my partner in life who supported me and helped me in my studies and beyond. Without her, it was not possible to finish the International

Economic Relations bachelor program and write this thesis.

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Table of the Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………...5

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….6

Historical Context…………………………………………………………………...8

Chapter I: The History of the Syrian Conflict……………………………………………...14

Chapter II: International Players…………………………………………………………...24

Iran…………………………………………………………………………………25

Russia………………………………………………………………………………26

United States……………………………………………………………………….28

Saudi Arabia…………………………………………………………………….….30

Turkey……………………………………………………………………………...31

Others………………………………………………………………………………33

Chapter III: Realism………………………………………………………………………..36

Solutions……………………………………………………………………………42

Critical View……………………………………………………………………….43

Chapter IV: Liberalism…………………………………………………………………….46

International Efforts………………………………………………………………..51

Solutions……………………………………………………………………………53

Critical View……………………………………………………………………….54

Chapter V: Constructivism…………………………………………………………………55

Solutions……………………………………………………………………………63

Critical View……………………………………………………………………….64

Chapter VI: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….66

References………………………………………………………………………………….71

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 5

Abstract

The Arab Spring, what once appeared to be a beacon of hope for the Middle East, has become Syria’s worst nightmare. The Syrian civil war, caused by the uprising after the

Arab Spring, has entered its seventh year, and despite significant international efforts, there remains no clear solution on the horizon. Why has the Syrian civil war become such a complex issue? Analyzing Syrian civil war from the lenses of three main International

Relations theories – Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism – can help us to answer these questions. Each of these theories has different assumptions and explains conflicts, such as the Syrian war, differently. Although realism, with its focus on states as the sole actors in the international arena, ignores forces such as ISIS or Kurds and sees the war as an inevitable act of survival, liberalism takes non-state actors into consideration and has a critical approach toward national government for failing to use global tools, such as the

United Nations, to prevent such a disaster. Furthermore, in contrast with both realism and liberalism, constructivism explains the conflict through more in-depth structural backgrounds, such as the historical rivalry between Shia and Sunnis or between liberal democracy and illiberal states.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 6

The Syrian Crisis from Three Different Approaches to International Relations

The Arab Spring, what once appeared to be a beacon of hope for the Middle East, has become Syria’s worst nightmare. The Syrian civil war, caused by the uprising after the

Arab Spring, has entered its seventh year, and despite significant international efforts, there remains no clear solution on the horizon. The conflict has devastated the country, causing approximately half a million casualties and creating the largest refugee crisis since World

War II (Glass, 2016). According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), as of

March 2017, more than five million Syrians have escaped the war, fled their country, and become refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), n.d.).

Furthermore, the United Nations office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that during the war, 6.3 million people have been displaced inside Syria’s national borders (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(OCHA), n.d.). The country is deeply divided into four main factions: the Assad forces,

Assad’s opposition groups, Islamic State (ISIS),1 and Kurdish forces. Furthermore, many global and regional powers are meddling in the situation, and they all have opposing interests. Thus, this outside interference has made the dispute even more complex and unresolvable. United Nations-led peace talks have also failed to initiate any meaningful change.

1 The name of this group has been subject to debate. Their current official name is the which they adopted in ,(الدولة اإلسالمية Islamic State” (in Arabic ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah“ April 2013. However, since they became famous with their previous names of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), some governments still refer to them as ISIL or ISIS. Almost all of Middle Eastern countries, including Iran and Israel, refer to the group as Daesh, which is the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. For the purpose of unity, this paper uses the name ISIS.

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Why has the Syrian civil war become such a complex issue? How did a movement that appeared to have liberal aspirations turn the country into failed state and a haven for some of the world’s most extremist ideologies? Furthermore, what is the motivation for so many outside forces, such as the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, to actively participate in this conflict? Although there are different responses to these questions, answering them is the first step to understanding the Syrian civil war. However, how can one decide which facts are relevant to answering these questions? According to

Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2011), “a theory is a kind of simplifying device” with a series of

“hypotheses and assumptions” (p. 3) to help researchers decide where to start, which facts are important, and how the analysis should be performed to explain an important political process. Scholars have been analyzing world politics for centuries, and international relations (IR) has become a central academic field to study world politics since the end of

World War I (Baylis et al., 2011).

With almost 200 years of academic history, the IR field has produced numerous theories that have evolved over the years. According to Walt (1998), realism, liberalism, and constructivism are three dominant IR theories. He argued that these three theories “shape both public discourse and policy analysis” (cited in Snyder, 2004). Among these three theories, “realism has been the dominant way to explaining world politics in the last one hundred years” (Baylis et al., 2011). Despite the development of other theories, realism is one of the most popular views among Middle Eastern politicians. In contrast, liberalism, the second-oldest international theory, is a fundamental philosophy for government and society; however, it is not favored in the Middle East. Some scholars have described

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 8 constructivism as an idealistic approach, and the academic literature regarding this theory is relatively limited. Each of these theories has different assumptions and explains conflicts, such as the Syrian war, differently. Although realism, with its focus on states as the sole actors in the international arena, ignores forces such as ISIS or Kurds and sees the war as an inevitable act of survival, liberalism takes non-state actors into consideration and has a critical approach toward national government for failing to use global tools, such as the

United Nations, to prevent such a disaster. Furthermore, in contrast with both realism and liberalism, constructivism explains the conflict through more in-depth structural backgrounds, such as the historical rivalry between Shia and Sunnis or between liberal democracy and illiberal states.

Historical Context

On April 17, 2017, Syria celebrated its 71st Independence Day. The date marked the evacuation of French troops from the then Syrian Republic, ending the French Mandate for

Syria and Lebanon. The Syrian government tried to use the occasion to boost nationalism among its supporters, while controlling an area less than one third of what was once the

Syrian Republic 71 years ago. In the Syrian government’s narrative, the current fight is the continuation of the long-time struggle against external powers that have wanted to dominate Syria since the start of 20th century and that were defeated on April 17, 1946.

Syrian President Bashar Assad has frequently criticized the Western powers for having

“colonial demands,” much in the same manner they have displayed throughout Syria’s history (Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), n.d.). Although Assad is not the only Middle

Eastern leader to use many historical references to stimulate his supporters’ emotions, the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 9

Syria region’s unique circumstances help his argument to resonate with more people.

Among the nations that have been born from the colonial decisions made in Paris and

London during and after World War I, Syria has had the longest and most violent battle for independence, which Goldschmidt and Davidson (2013) have called one of “the roots of

Arab bitterness” (p. 193).

The Arab Revolt was a turning point in the modern histories of Syria, Jordan, Iraq,

Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Sharif Hussein, who was the most prominent Arab leader at the time, started the revolt in 1916. He was the Emir of Mecca, the religious center of Islam.

The revolt itself was the result of British policy in the Arab world, a strategy to support

Arab nationalism against the pan-Islamic ideas the British believed were serving the

Ottoman Turks and Germans in the region (Goldschmidt & Davidson, 2013). Sir Henry

McMahon, Britain’s high commissioner in Egypt, exchanged a series of letters with Sharif

Hussein,2 and on behalf of the British government, he promised financial and military support for the revolt, as well as to help create an Arab government in the Arab land of the

Ottoman Empire. However, since the British had made contradictory statements in the

Middle East during the war, they could not possibly fulfill all their promises.3 They decided to honor their agreements with their fellow Europeans: the French and Jews. In 1920,

Faisal, Sharif Hossein’s most successful son in the war, already had his troops in

Damascus. Hence, despite the British betrayal, the Arabs decided to form a country in the northern part of the Arab lands called Great Syria.

2 They became known as the “Hussain-McMahon Correspondence.” 3 The second deal was called the Sykes–Picot Agreement, and it divided the Arab lands into two spheres of influence. The third promise was made to the Jewish community to establish a “national home” in Palestine.

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The short-lived Kingdom of Syria was the consolidation of five Ottomans provinces,4 including today’s Lebanon, Israel, and part of southern Turkey. Although the name of the new country was The Arab Kingdom of Syria, the population was a mix of different ethnic groups with different religions and identities. Furthermore, the new country was established based on the British-French agreement as part of the French sphere of influence. Thus, despite the people’s considerable demand for independence, the French rejected the idea of an independent Arab Kingdom and expelled Faisal from Damascus. The Kingdom died in the same year of 1920; however, the idea of an independent Syria survived. Under the

French rules, Sunnis, for the first time in the region’s history, lost their privileged position as the ruling class to Christians; they were not ready to accept the change. Since then, the

Syrians have had a long struggle for independence, which included a violent revolt.5 It took another World War to push the European powers out of the Middle East. Although the

French tried extremely hard to keep Syria under their rule, pressure from Britain and the

United States to recognize Syria’s independence forced the French to leave the country in

1946.

However, full independence and self-determination was not an era of stability and prosperity. A series of coups paired with the country’s long standoff with the neighboring

Israel perpetuated the instability. Before 1970 and Hafez Assad’s so-called “Corrective

Revolution,” Syria had already experienced six coups. Dubbed “the Strong Man of Syria,”

Hafez Assad used an iron-fist policy to suppress any opposition (Sicherman, 2011).

4 The five provinces were: Aleppo, Dayr Al-Zor, Beirut, Damascus (Syria), and Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem. 5 The Great Syrian Revolt or, as some sources call it, the Great Druze Revolt (1925–1927).

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Although Hafez Assad was from the secular Ba’ath Party like his predecessors, he differed from the previous Syrian leaders in that he was an Alawite Muslim and not a Sunni

Muslim. The Ba’ath Party had a unique characteristic of Arab nationalism mixed with some socialist ideas. The party’s secular ideology let the Alawites emerge as the leadership in a

Sunni-majority country. At the same time, the state of Israel’s creation paired with a series of humiliating defeats in the Arab-Israel wars made Arab nationalism a significant factor, much more important than the religious differences between Muslim groups. According to

Sicherman (2011), “Assad feared peace with Israel because it would reduce him to an

Alawite prince, no longer a would-be Arab leader.” Hafez Assad exploited the situation and continued the hostility with Israel; he never signed a peace agreement and chose an anti-US policy to benefit from the support of the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Pipes, 1999).

Despite the Assad regime’s secular elements, Syria under his rule never became free of sectarian hostility. He has been accused of increasing Alawite influence in Syria’s political scene by appointing officers from his own faith to control the intelligence service and security forces. The Alawites’ domination of the Syrian regime was an extraordinary development that puzzled some scholars. Daniel Pipes (1990), a well-known Middle East historian, wrote “An Alawi ruling Syria is like an untouchable becoming maharajah in

India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia - an unprecedented development shocking to the majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries” (cited in Kaplan,

1993). The Alawites’ rule did not come without a sectarian cost. In 1982, following years of hostility between Hafez Assad’s regime and Sunni Islamists, a Sunni cleric in Hama – a stronghold of conservative Sunnis – called for an uprising against Assad. Rebels attacked government buildings and declared Hama a liberated city. Hafez Assad’s response was firm

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 12 and swift. He sent 12,000 troops and crushed the rebellion in what is known as the “1982

Hama Massacre.” The number of casualties is estimated between 38,000 and 40,000

(Meyers, 2011). Twenty-nine years later, when the Syrian uprising against the second

Assad started in Syria, Hama was one the first cities that embraced the rebellion and expelled pro-Assad forces.

Hafez Assad died at the age 69 on June 2000, and his second son, Bashar, a British- educated ophthalmologist, replaced him. Hafez Assad’s eldest son, Bassel, had died in a car accident six years earlier, leading to Bashar Assad’s presidency. Bassel had been groomed to be the successor. However, his sudden death forced Hafez Assad to ask his second son,

Bashar, to return to the country, start military training, and prepare for the position. In July

2000, Bashar Assad, as the only candidate in the Syrian presidential election, won with

99.7% of the votes. The young Assad quickly sparked a wave of hope for reform. His first memorable action was shutting down the Mezzeh prison in Damascus and declaring amnesty for many political prisoners, which sent a powerful message to the world that

Syria was changing. However, Assad’s foreign policy showed that those assumptions about him were inaccurate. Aside from a lack of concrete political reform within the country, the assassination of Rafic Hariri, a pro-Saudi Sunni politician in Lebanon in 2005, was the turning point that indicated Syria was still the same pariah state that does everything to keep the Shia Lebanese powerful and to ensure its strategic relationship with Tehran.

The assassination of Rafic Hariri became a major news and Syria became the number one suspect. “Syria was widely blamed for Hariri’s murder. In the months leading to the assassination, relations between Hariri and Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad plummeted

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 13 amid an atmosphere of threats and intimidation” (Blanford, 2015). One of the significant revelations from Assad’s confrontation with Hariri and the former Lebanese prime minister’s subsequent death was clarifying the lines of regional coalitions in the Middle

East. At the time, the United States’ intervention in Iraq and the overthrow of long-time

Iraq President Saddam Hussein blurred the Middle East’s regional dynamic. However,

Hariri’s assassination in 2005 once again made it clear that Iran, Assad’s Syria, and the

Lebanese Hezbollah are the main rivals of the Sunni block led by the Saudis. In the end, the series of public protests in Lebanon following Hariri’s assassination forced Syrian troops from Lebanon and ended the influence of the pro-Syrian government in Beirut. Before the end of the year, an independent United Nations investigation concluded that Syrian officials were involved with Hariri’s death. Bashar Assad repeatedly denied any involvement and vowed to punish whoever was involved in the assassination. Assad lost a standoff with the pro-Saudi forces in Lebanon, and this undermined his image as an Arab leader who could play an important role in the Middle East’s post-Saddam era. He also lost credibility in the eyes of his own citizens, and he paid the price six years later.

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Chapter I: The History of the Syrian Conflict

The start of the Syrian conflict is tightly connected to the Arab Spring—a series of protests in the Arab world, which started in December 2010 when Muhammad Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire. Bouazizi was protesting the harassment and humiliation by a municipal official and police “who probably wanted a bribe” (Lesch, 2013, p. 45). His suicide had an unexpected effect and led to protests all around the country. With social media and the wide use of smartphones, Tunisians who were against the rule of Zine El

Abidine Ben Ali, the now former President of Tunisia, staged a series of peaceful demonstrations and asked Ben Ali to resign. In less than a month, the widespread protests forced Ben Ali to leave the country. On January 15, 2011, one day after Ben Ali’s departure and 29 days after Bouazizi’s self-immolation, the Constitutional Court of Tunisia determined that the presidency was vacant and announced that, in the transition period, the speaker of the Parliament would be president. Thus, the so-called Tunisian Revolution achieved its goal to topple the country’s long-time strongman in just four weeks—an exciting fact for a region with many long-time presidents and a civil society desperate for change.

Even before Ben Ali was overthrown, Tunisians’ mass demonstrations inspired their neighbors to do the same. When Tunisians reached their unexpected victory in less than a month, the domino effect became unstoppable. At the end of December 2011, Algerian protestors took the streets. Two weeks after the Algerians, and on the same day Ben Ali left

Tunisia (January 14), Jordanians staged a protest and demanded more political freedom.

Three days after them, on January 17, Omani people started street demonstrations against

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 15 more than 40 years of Sultan Qaboos’ reign. Before the end of the January 2011, Egypt

(January 25), Yemen (January 27), Djibouti (January 28), and Sudan (January 30) saw their first demonstrations, some after decades of repression and restraint. Although some Arab scholars, such as Tariq Ramadan, preferred to use the term “Arab Awakening” (Abdel

Salman, 2015), what once appeared in a Christian Science Monitor editorial on January 14,

2011, stuck and became the name of the events: Arab Spring (Keating, 2011).

The Arab Spring did not stop in January 2011. In the following month, more non- democratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) faced unrest. Bahrain,

Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Mauritania, and Lebanon were among those countries. Some of the Arab leaders, such as King Abdullah II of Jordan, decided to change their strategy and start some sort of reform. He dismissed his prime minister and cabinet members in early

February 2011. In Oman, Sultan Qaboos followed his Jordanian counterpart and announced some economic benefits for youth (“Oman Boosts,” 2011) and shuffled the cabinet (“Oman

Shuffles Cabinet,” 2011). But the most important development of all in February was the resignation of Hosni Mubarak—the President of Egypt who was in the office since 1981.

The Egyptian protestors had a clear solution for Mubarak’s succession: “genuine democracy” (Worth, 2016, p. 8). This message energized, inspired, and resonated with many angry youth in countries such as Libya and Syria who craved for democracy and rule of law. They compared their ruler with Egypt’s strongman and concluded that overthrowing a long-time dictator was achievable by street protests. Apparently, all they needed was someone to organize a protest via social media websites such as Facebook.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 16

However, for Syrians, the situation was not as easy. In fact, they were the very last country among Arab Spring nations to protest against their ruler. Moreover, when they started their first protests in mid-March 2011, the size of demonstrations was not as big as other countries. However, some scholars believe the roots of anger and dissatisfaction with governments in Arab Spring countries share many common characteristics. As Korotayev,

Issaev, Maikov, and Shishkina (2014) noted in their study, factors such as the “sharp and rapid increase in the world food prices”, “the effect of Al-Jazeera”, and “the rapid growth of the number of Internet users in the first decade of the twenty-first century in all Arab countries” played major role in triggering the Arab Spring. Marc Lynch (2012), a professor of political science and director of the George Washington University Middle Eastern studies program, believes the anger of the young Arab population was rooted in different factors such as “generational change, as a frustrated youth population confronts hopeless economies, rampant corruption, blocked politics, and indifferent, abusive state institutions”

(as cited in El Sakhawy, 2015, p. 366). Syrians were not an exception. They shared many of these factors with other Arab countries and their situation was identical. Therefore, why did their protests start later than the others and why was the size of protests at the start not as big as the Egyptian or Libyan protests?

Lesch (2013, p. 53) believes the main reason behind the lack of considerable enthusiasm for regime change at the start in Syria is linked to the fact that Bashar Assad was a much less hated leader by his people compared to other Arab rulers. In addition, Lesch (2013) stated that about 30% of the population who belonged to minority groups, such as Shia or

Christians, were traditionally loyal to the Assad regime. Assad, himself, was a minority

Alawite in a Sunni majority country. Nevertheless, these factors could not have changed

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 17

Syria’s fate. Despite weeks of silence in different parts of the country (even in Sunni populated areas), a small incident triggered the nation and the Syrian Arab Spring finally began. In March 2011, security forces in the small city of Daraa6 arrested a group of teenage students who wrote “down with the regime” on the wall of their schools. Security forces told the students’ families “to forget their children. Go home and make other ones.

And if you do not know how, we can teach you” (Worth, 2016). In response to the children’s torture by government forces, their families protested on March 15. The first protest in Syria was countered by soldiers who started shooting at the protestors. As the

BBC reported on March 18, at least three were killed (“Middle East Unrest,” 2011). They were the first casualties of a crisis that we know today as Syrian Civil War.

The war did not start overnight. It was a long process that gradually elevated the conflict between two sides and, at some point, other sides added to the conflict. What happened in

Daraa, spread quickly to other cities and towns around Syria such as Damascus, Homs,

Aleppo, and Idlib. The Syrian government had to make important decisions in the early days of the protests, including how to deal with dissidents and the growing number of demonstrations? They had the Tunisian and Egyptian model, which was not harsh and heavily violent, and the result was swift regime change. In contrast, in the case of Libya and Yemen, the violent suppression from the government appeared to be effective for a period of time. In Syria, however, Bashar Assad decided to combine both models and contain the demonstrations. He promised political reform “while overseeing harsh military crackdown on the protests” (Glass, 2015). Although at this stage protesters were unarmed,

is located about 13 kilometers north of the border with Jordan and is (درعا) Daraa 6 considered a distant city to the capital. The majority of the population of Daraa is Sunni Muslims.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 18 pictures of Syrian army tanks on the streets of Daraa and Homs emerged on social media.

The violent approach to suppress any street protest united the world against the Syrian government. The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned killing civilians and, in May, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions.

Despite the international condemnation, the Syrian government did not change its violent tactics and, reportedly, in July, Syrian forces killed more than 100 protesters just in Hama

(Glass, 2015). Thus, from early on, the Syrian protesters who were trying to organize themselves—mostly via social media—started discussions about how to protect themselves from the government crackdown. At the same time, the violence and number of civilians who died—sometimes in front of a smartphone camera—angered more people and intensified demonstrations in some cities. Finally, in July, a group of military defectors formed a new armed force and called it the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The formation of the

FSA and its international support was an early sign the Syrian Arab Spring was turning into something more like Libya rather than Tunisia and Egypt. According to Kurt (2016), “the

FSA was expected to organize and control fighters and groups in order to topple the regime and to become a primary part of restructuring the army after Assad” (p. 125). Soon after the

FSA’s formation, some opposition groups in exile established the Syrian National Council

(SNC) in Turkey. As early as mid-August, Barak Obama, former President of the United

States, issued a statement and famously said: “For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside” (Wilson & Warrick, 2011).

Obama’s position against Assad was supported by the leaders of France, Germany, and

Britain (Wilson & Warrick, 2011). It appeared Assad’s days were numbered, especially

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 19 when the United Nations Security Council condemned “widespread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities” (UN Security

Council, 2011, August 03). However, when the UN Security Council wanted to adopt a resolution to threaten Assad with sanctions, Russia and China vetoed it. According to the

UN News Center, China’s Ambassador Li Baodong said “the draft was overly focused on exerting pressure on Syria, and included the threat of sanctions, which would not resolve the situation” (UN Security Council, 2011, October 04). In November, the Arab League suspended Syria and imposed sanctions and, at the same time, France called for military intervention while Russia was arming the Syrian government (Glass, 2015). At the end of

2011, armed conflict between the Syrian government and the FSA, paired with the international dispute over how to deal with the Assad regime made it clear that 2012 was not going to be calm and prosperous for the Syrian people. Especially when, in December, two bombs exploded in Damascus killing 44 people. In the eve of finger pointing by the

Assad regime and opposition groups over who was responsible for the attack, the United

States concluded that neither the Syrian government nor the opposition carried out the attack, but that it was the notorious Al-Qaeda (Glass, 2015).

As 2011 ended with Al-Qaeda’s name appearing in the news regarding Syria; 2012 started with news about the same group injecting itself into the conflict. In January 2012, a new group called Al-Nusra Front emerged as a new Al-Qaeda affiliate (Anzalone, 2016). A month later, Al-Qaida leader Ayman Zawahiri released a videotape and urged all Sunni

Muslims to support the Syrian battle with Bashar Assad’s regime. In the video, Zawahiri who replaced Osama Bin Laden in 2011, called on Muslims from other countries to join the fight against Assad’s “pernicious, cancerous regime, and warned Syrian rebels not to rely

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 20 on the west for help” (Burke, 2012, para. 3). Although the appearance of Al-Qaeda could disappoint the liberal faction of Assad’s opposition groups, support from the international community was overwhelmingly positive and encouraging. In February, the UN General

Assembly, in a non-binding resolution, voted for Bashar Assad to resign. When China and

Russia vetoed this resolution, more than 60 countries, including major powers such as

France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and regional key players such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, formed an international body called the Group of friends of the Syrian

People and proclaimed the SNC a “legitimate representative” of Syria (Glass, 4). The group also announced that it would financially support Syrian opposition to overthrow Assad. On the ground, the fight continued.

From early summer 2012, almost every corner in Syria was engulfed in fighting. From

Sunni populated areas, such as Hama, Deir Ezzor, and Aleppo, to the capital city of

Damascus and most Kurdish towns in the north, reports of heavy fights were published daily. In May the UN Security Council condemned the violence conducted by Assad’s forces but China and Russia blocked a Security Council Chapter VII resolution. Therefore, the international community could not intervene under the UN Security Council’s framework. Before the end of summer, the Kurds reached an agreement with the Syrian government and took control of most Kurdish areas in the north. However, the rest of the country was going in an opposite direction. Assad’s army started to fight with all it had and brought heavy weaponry to the conflict. The opposition—with financial support from countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—launched massive attacks on

Damascus and Aleppo. The pictures of ruined Aleppo at the end of summer 2012 had shocking effects on many people worldwide, some of whom had even been supporting the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 21

Syrian opposition. Finally, in October, a statement by the Secretary of State, Hilary

Clinton, indicated that the dynamic of the Syrian uprising had started to change. She dismissed the SNC “as a bunch of out-of-touch exiles who should be replaced with a group more representative of the fighters on the ground” (Macfarquhar and Gordon, 2012). A month later, with the help of Qatar, Syrian opposition established the National Coalition for

Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which included the SNC.

For the following two years, with intense fighting between the Assad regime and opposition groups, the Syrian conflict encountered a new side that established itself as an important player: the Islamic radicals. First, they made headlines by occasional attacks and armed resistance to the Al-Nusra Front. However, in April 2013, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), announced that the Al-Nusra front merged with his group to continue the fight in both countries. Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman Al-

Zawahiri rejected the claim. In 2014, Zawahiri publicly ordered Baghdadi to dismantle

ISIS. Baghdadi refused and the two groups chose different paths. Despite the Al-Nusra

Front trying to join other Islamic groups among the Syrian opposition and participate in their offense, ISIS started its battle in Iraq. In June 2014, ISIS achieved an unprecedented victory by capturing the major cities of Mosul and Tikrit in Iraq. The group renamed itself the Islamic State (IS) and its leader, Abubakr Bagdadi proclaimed himself a caliphate, an

Islamic leadership role that has been abolished since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Peter Neumann of King’s College London estimates that, before the capture, ISIS had

“cash and assets worth about $900 million. Afterwards, this rose to around $2bn”

(Neumann, 2014). They also captured most of Iraqi army’s weaponry in Mosul and Tikrit.

With money and weapons, they started a series of offenses in Syria and until the end of

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 22

August 2014 and completed their control of the Syrian province of Raqqa. They named

Raqqa city as their capital.

From this point, the Syrian conflict became a four-sided war with the Syrian government, opposition groups, Kurdish militia, and ISIS. Each side held some territory, defended its own areas, and fought for more territory. Moreover, each had some territorial gain and loss during the war. Nevertheless, as shown in picture 1-1, they all controlled a part of Syria and, despite a number of diplomatic efforts, the future of the conflict is unclear.

Picture 1-1

In the meantime, a number of international players such as the United States, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have been engaged in limited military activities, which have reduced the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 23 chances of any upcoming peace agreement. In the next chapter, the characteristics, background, motivation, and activity of each international player will be discussed.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 24

Chapter II: International Players

The Syrian conflict has had an international characteristic since its beginning. Other relevant events outside the Syrian border sparked the uprising that led to the civil war. The

Syrian opposition enjoyed a wide range of support from their counterparts in the Arab world. From Tunisia to Yemen, some young men and women saw themselves in the same fight: to overthrow a long-time dictator and to establish a democratic government. Social media helped connect them, inspire each other, and even exchange tips and know-how about staging a demonstration, facing security forces, and encouraging others to join the fight. However, the solidarity among the Arab youth involved in the Arab Spring protests was not the uprising’s only international aspect. The rivalry between the region’s powers, the long-standing confrontation between different branches of Islam, and the Syrian government and its allies’ position against Israel and its Western allies all resulted in attracting more and more foreign countries to the conflict. These international actors each had different goals and agendas; some were consistent with their policies throughout the conflict, while others changed their strategies over the course of the crisis.

Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Hizobllah within the region, and the U.S., Russia, and

European powers, such as France and the UK in particular and the EU in general, are the key players who intervened in the conflict. In addition to these notable nations, Egypt, the

United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar and Israel played minor roles as well. The

Qatari government released several public statements regarding the conflict, and despite being on the same side as the Saudi bloc, Qatar later became separated and was the central figure in another diplomatic crisis in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, what Qatar did, and the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 25 accusations leveled against its government and wealthy citizens in relation to funding extremists in Syria, needed more attention. The following chapter will examine these players and their actions.

Iran

Iran’s position in the Syrian uprising has been consistent from the early days of the conflict until now. Iran supported Bashar Assad, denounced the uprising, and has continued to show support. The Iranian government’s position on the Syrian uprising contrasted with its support for the Arab Spring in other countries, which they called Islamic Awakenings

(Zaheer, Roofi, Ranjha, & Bukhari, 2016). However, when the Syrian regime intensified the violent crackdown during the early stages of the protests, even some figures close to the

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s conservative President at the time criticized the Syrian Army for the high number of casualties after each demonstration (“Syria Crisis: Iran's,” 2011). At this point, the Arab uprising was a heated topic for the Iranian public, and some even compared it to the Iranian

2009 Green Movement. In fact, after the leaders of the Iran Green Movement - Mir Hossein

Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karoubi – urged their followers to come to the streets to support the Arab Spring in February 2011, their infamous house arrest began, and they are still confined today )Dehghan, 2013(. Therefore, the Iranian regime acted carefully at the start of the Syrian uprising to not provoke any public protests in Iran. Although Iran is not an Arab country, due to the contagious nature of the Arab Spring, some of the Iranian opposition in exile – mostly in Europe and the United States – were hopeful to inspire a

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 26 new wave of protests in Iran and overthrow the Iranian regime in the same manner as Egypt and Tunisia.

When the nature of the Syrian uprising changed, particularly when Islamist groups emerged as considerable actors in the conflict, Iran’s pro-Assad strategy became more visible as well. Iran also made its efforts more apparent when Islamist groups such as ISIS spread their anti-Shia rhetoric. Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader repeatedly praised the role of IRGC’s officers in Syria, who in the official language of the Iranian government held a new title: “Holy Shrine Defenders” (“Supreme Leader Prays,” n.d.). The term “holy shrines” refers to the shrines of Shia Imams in Iraq and the important Sayyidah Zaynab

Mosque in southern Damascus. However, Iranian officials usually avoid admitting any direct military involvement and insist that IRGC officers and soldiers in Syria act as advisers, not battle forces. At the same time, state-sponsored funerals for officers killed in the Syrian war became a routine ritual, and the new term “Martyrs of the Holy Shrine

Defenders” became a frequent part of government propaganda about the war in Syria. The number of Iranian casualties in the battle, the amount of financial aid Iran gave the Assad regime, and the scale of Iran’s military presence in Syria remain unclear.

Russia

Russian relations with Syria became strong during the Cold War. Before the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the communist regime in Moscow considered Syria its ally “in a confrontation with the United States, Israel, and ‘imperialism’ writ large” (Trenin, 2016).

Although there is dispute over Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East after the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 27 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russians kept their naval base in Tartus, a

Mediterranean coastal city in Syria. At the same time, the Syrian regime under Hafez, and later Bashar Assad, continued relations with the Russians to purchase weapons from them

(Trenin, 2016). When the Syrian uprising started, the Russian position was simple and clear: it supported the Syrian government and did not accept any serious international attempts to condemn or limit Bashar Assad’s regime. Therefore, since October 2011 and the first resolution against the Syrian regime in the UN Security Council, Russia constantly vetoed any resolution that could have major consequences for the Syrian government.

Russia’s official statement regarding the veto of the first resolution states that, although it approves the violence of the Assad regime, the extreme violence from the other side should not be forgotten by the international community (UN Security Council, 2011, October 04).

In addition to the Russians’ diplomatic support for the Syrian regime, reports dating to the early days of the conflict indicate they have a military presence in the country as well. In

December 2012, the British newspaper The Guardian reported for the first time that

“Russian military advisers are manning some of Syria's more sophisticated air defenses”

(Borger, 2012). During the next year, despite the Syrian conflict escalating to a full civil war, the Russian military support for Assad’s regime did not stop, and as 2013 reached its final days, the Russians increased their help by sending more military supplies to the Syrian army (Saul, 2014). Finally, in September 2015, the Federation Council - the upper house of the Russian Parliament –voted to send Russian troops into Syria, beginning Russia’s official intervention in the Syrian civil war. The Russian government’s official narrative for the military intervention was fighting extremist groups such as ISIS. At the time, Russian officials stated that since some Russian citizens joined ISIS, the group became a national

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 28 security threat for Moscow, and they were going to help Damascus eliminate extremist groups (“Russia Parliament Approves,” 2015). However, moderate opposition groups have accused the Russians of deliberately attacking their positions and even killing civilians (Al-

Khalidi, 2017).

United States

The United States’ complicated relation with the Syrian regime was on the verge of improvement just a month before the first demonstration in Deraa. On the eve of the Arab

Spring in March 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton defended Bashar Assad by saying: “There’s a different leader in Syria now” (Wilson, 2011, para. 4). Just a month later, the crackdown in Deraa turned many American politicians – notably some prominent congressmen such as John McCain – against the Assad regime. Before April 2011 ended,

Barack Obama, the President of the United States, issued executive orders targeting the

Syrian officials involved in human rights abuses (Wilson, 2011). The American position regarding the Assad regime rapidly changed on July 11, 2011, when Hillary Clinton said

Assad “lost legitimacy” (Wilson, 2011, para. 10). After a series of negotiations between

Obama and his counterparts in Germany, France, and the UK during the first two weeks of

August 2011, the conclusion was reached that Assad should step aside, and a formal announcement was made on August 18, 2011 (White House, 2011). In addition, the United

States supported a series of Security Council resolutions to address the violence in Syria, to impose sanctions against the regime, and to establish an international mechanism to monitor the Syrian regime’s behavior. Russia and China have vetoed all resolutions.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 29

Along with the public pressure on Syrian president Bashar Assad to resign, the Americans were also involved in many overt and covert operations against Assad. According to a report published in the Wall Street Journal in June 2012, American intelligence agents and diplomats “stepped up their contacts with Syrian rebels in part to help organize their burgeoning military operations against President Bashar al-Assad's forces” (Solomon &

Malas, 2012). Since then, numerous reports have indicated the Americans started to financially and militarily support non-Islamist groups among the Syrian opposition involved in the civil war. At one point, on August 21, 2013, when two opposition- controlled areas in Ghouta had been attacked by chemical weapons, some news organizations, such as The Guardian, concluded the United States were on the verge of a military attack against Assad (Ackerman & Lewis, 2013). In fact, on the same day, when a reporter asked President Obama about the chemical attack, he famously stated that using chemical weapons is the red line for the Syrian regime, and if they crossed the line, his calculations would change (Tertrais, 2014). Although the United States never participated in any direct military confrontations with the Syrian regime, the Obama administration continued its support for the opposition. In 2015, shortly after the Russian military intervention, the U.S. administration publicly announced its renewed support for the Syrian

Kurdish groups (Starr, Labott, & Acosta, 2015). In 2017, after President Donald Trump took office, the U.S. launched a series of missile attacks at a Syrian air base following yet another chemical attack by the Syrian army.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 30

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Syria has had many ups and downs. Hafez Assad, the father of Bashar Assad, managed to establish a good relationship with the Saudis in the

1970s because both countries considered Israel their biggest enemy. Although Syria’s support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s strained their relations with other

Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Syria remained on relatively good terms with the

Saudis until 2005 and the assignation of Rafik Hariri, Lebanese prime minister who was a

Saudi citizen and close ally of Saudi Arabia. Since then, the Assad regime has moved closer to the Iranian camp. Both sides’ latest efforts to put the past aside and reconnect failed in 2011 when the Saudis decided to criticize the Assad regime’s violent reaction to the uprising. On August 2011, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia issued an unprecedented statement and asked Assad to stop the “killing machine and end the bloodshed” (Saab,

2011). He then pulled Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Syria, and a long bitter standoff between his country and the struggling Syrian regime began. Later, when Syrian opposition groups started to fight back and the uprising’s peaceful phase slowly faded, Saudi Arabia quickly became the number one financial supporter of rebel groups; a role that had previously belonged to Qatar (Karouny, 2013).

Since then, Saudi Arabia has continued to support Assad’s opposition groups; however, it has supported only Sunni Muslims. The Saudis also decided to not support any non-Arab opposition; thus, the opposition in the north, which operates under the umbrella of Kurdish forces, did not receive backing from Riyadh. Furthermore, the Saudi’s financial support for some of the Islamist groups, such as the Army of Conquest (Jaish al-Fatah), alarmed some

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 31

Western countries and sparked criticism (Sengupta, 2015). According to the BBC, Saudi

Arabia formed another Islamist group, called the Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam), by unifying approximately 50 Islamist groups “to counter the expanding presence of Al-Qaeda affiliates around the Syrian capital, with Salafist groups being offered arms and money in return for loyalty” (“Guide To The Syrian Rebels”, 2013, para. 14). During the 2015 and

2016 peace negotiations, Saudi Arabia rose to the position of a key player who could bring all Syrian opposition under the same roof to send their representatives to the UN-led negotiating table (“Syria Conflict: Opposition Agrees,” 2015). However, since the negotiations did not produce a tangible result, Saudi Arabia offered to send ground troops to Syria to fight ISIS and formed a coalition of 30 Muslim countries to fight terrorism

(Black, 2016).

Turkey

Turkey’s relationship with the Assads – father and son – became relatively strong in 1999 when Hafez Assad decided to expel Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan. Turkey remained friendly with Damascus until 2011. Even then, Ankara sent mixed signals about the Syrian uprising; Turkey condemned the violent crackdown by the Syrian government but objected to the United States’ call for Assad’s resignation in August 2011 (Wilson and Warrick,

2011). However, Ankara took just three months to change its mind and join the Western countries who urged Assad to step down. At this point of the conflict, the United Nations claimed 3,500 had been killed. Racep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, told Assad that “Without spilling any more blood, without causing any more injustice, for the sake of peace for the people, the country and the region, finally step down” (Burch,

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 32

2011). Since then, Turkey has joined Qatar and Saudi Arabia in supporting the Syrian opposition forces, even sheltering the Syrian Free Army in its territories. The tension between Ankara and Damascus reached an unexpected high when the Syrian army shot down a Turkish fighter jet on June 2012. Although the Syrian government insisted they shot down the plane in its airspace, Assad personally regretted the incident in an interview with a Turkish newspaper (Letsch, 2012).

Turkey – just like Saudi Arabia and Qatar – was one of the key supporters of the Army of

Conquest, a coalition of rebel groups including the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group the Al-Nusra

Front. The fact Turkey, a NATO member, supported a group with links to extremist ideologies “has alarmed Western governments and is at odds with the US, which is firmly opposed to arming and funding jihadist extremists in Syria’s long-running civil war”

(Sengupta, 2015). By increasing reports in Western media about the alleged connection between Turkey and extremist groups, Ankara tried to distance itself from the Syrian opposition who believed in Islamist ideologies. In June 2014, Turkey designated the Al-

Nusra Front a terrorist organization to indicate they do not support an Al-Qaeda affiliate

(Jones, 2014). However, an allegation has surfaced in the Western media about Turkey-

ISIS relations, which has yet to be proven. Later, in 2016, ISIS staged a series of attacks in

Turkey, including one on March 19, 2016, in an Istanbul tourist area and one on June 28,

2016, in the Istanbul Ataturk airport. In response, Turkey started artillery strikes against

ISIS targets on its southern borders. In addition to cross-border conflicts, the Turkish government increased its pressure on the Al-Nusra Front and Mevlut Cavusoglu, and the

Turkish foreign minister urged the Syrian opposition forces to separate themselves from the

Al-Nusra Front (“Syria Peace Talks End,” 2016).

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 33

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Kurdish activities in the northern part of Syria was an important aspect of the Syrian conflict for the Turkish government. Turkey has approximately 14 million Kurds, the largest Kurdish population in the world. Although Turkey was in contact with Kurdish leaders in 2013 and 2014, since 2015 and the Kurds’ rapid territorial gains and expansion, the Turkish government has become openly hostile towards Kurdish forces in the country’s southern borders. In August 2016, the Turkish army – alongside its allies among the Syrian opposition groups, including the Syrian Free Army – started a cross- border operation called “Euphrates Shield” and entered Syrian territory. As the result of their fight with the ISIS militia and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Turkish army managed to occupy part of northern Syria. In March 2017, the Turkish government declared the operation a success (“Turkey Can Start New Operation,” 2017). The Syrian government condemned the operation and called it a “blatant violation of its sovereignty”

(Sabbagh, 2016). Turkey answered Syria by stating that the cross-border operation “is in line with the country's rights to self-defense borne out of international treaties and a mandate given to the Armed Forces by the Turkish parliament” (“Turkey Using Right,”

2017).

Others

Among other international players, France – a former ruler of Syria – was more active during the conflict’s first few years and took a strong stand against Bashar Assad’s rule.

Paris also advocated for direct military intervention after a 2013 chemical attack (Bremer &

Irish, 2013). However, Obama’s refusal to attack, paired with a no vote for military

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 34 intervention by the UK’s parliament, isolated France. In August 2014, President Holland confirmed his country sent arms to the Syrian rebels (“France Delivered Arms,” 2014).

Alongside France, the UK was another European voice that urged Assad to resign during the conflict’s early days and publicly supported opposition groups. Despite British intelligence support for the Syrian Free Army (“Syria Rebels 'Aided,” 2012), in 2013,

David Cameron asked the parliament to vote for military action against Assad’s regime.

Cameron’s campaign was defeated (“Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses,” 2013). Therefore, the

UK will not be part of the military coalition. However, both France and the UK drafted UN

Security Council resolutions and orchestrated diplomatic activities against the Syrian government, as well as Russian intervention in Syria.

Among other foreign countries who took a side in the Syrian civil war, Qatar was one of the most notable. Despite its minor role in regional affairs prior to the conflict, Qatar tried to play a much bigger role in the Syrian war. According to one report published by

Financial Times in May 2013, Qatar spent as much as $3 billion in the first two years of the conflict (Khalaf & Smith, 2013). In addition, it has been reported that the CIA ran a training camp for Syrian rebels in Qatar (Youssef, 2014). Qatar also supported the Army of

Conquest (Jaish al-Fatah), which has alleged ties to Al-Qaeda. In 2017, Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain, cut diplomatic ties with Qatar; however, the crisis did not have a major impact on the Syrian rebels. According to one source, the diplomatic problems between Qatar and its Persian Gulf allies “will increase the split between north and south, as the north is mainly funded by Qatar and Turkey, and the south is supported by

Jordan and the (U.S.-led) coalition” (Perry & Al-Khalidi, 2017, para. 15). Furthermore,

Israel supports numerous Syrian opposition forces within the Syrian Free Army. According

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 35 to the Financial Times, Israel “has been regularly supplying Syrian rebels near its border with cash as well as food, fuel and medical supplies for years” (Jones, 2017).

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 36

Chapter III: Realism

In the words of Lebow (2016), two godfathers of the realist paradigm, Thucydides and

Morgenthau, recognized the “extraordinary ability of human beings to harness nature for their own ends, and their propensity to destroy through war and civil violence what took them generations to build” (p. 49). Pictures from war-torn Syria, particularly the new trend of “before and after” war photos, are testimony to what realist thinkers believe as human nature. According to Jackson and Sorensen (2016), “a pessimistic view of human nature” is one of the basic assumptions of realism.”(p. 62) In a photo gallery published by The

Guardian, titled “Destruction of Aleppo: then and now – in pictures,” it is evident how the war has destroyed Aleppo’s beautiful citadel, the ancient market of Al-Madina Souq, the

Hammam al-Nahasin bath house, and of course the historical Umayyad mosque (Ruck,

2016). Although those photos could upset many, for a realist, they prove the dark side of humanity that causes inventible wars. Nonetheless, some scholars believe that, in international relations, realism “is not a theory of despair” (Snyder, 2004). In fact, the theory of realism, which according to Walt (1998) was the dominant theory during the Cold

War, remains one of the most popular theories among scholars.

Although it appears that the human nature argument could explain the cause of the Syrian civil war, the theory still has deeper explanations for such a disastrous conflict. According to Dunne and Schmidt (2011), one of the principles that unites realists “is the assertion that, in international politics, the pre-eminent goal is survival” (p. 94). The notion of survival is one of the themes that has been repeated in many scholarly works about realism. As Henry

Kissinger, one of the most famous realist scholars who became the United States Secretary

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 37 of State in the 1970s, said: “a nation’s survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk (Kissinger, 1975). In 2012 and 2013, when it became clear that Syria’s main regional foes, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, were arming the opposition groups, the response from Damascus was a full-scale military operation to defeat them. As has been mentioned in the first two chapters, Syria is one of the youngest nations on Earth, and there is no modern precedent for such a country in the last 500 years.

At the same time, the country consists of different ethnic and religious groups with historic rivalries. From this perspective, the struggle over survival, even at the cost of a devastating civil war, could be described from a realist point of view as an understandable concern for the Syrian government.

The second basic assumption in realism theory is about the role of the state as the sole player in the international arena. As stated by Dunne and Schmidt (2011), statism – alongside with survival and self-help – is the core element of realism (p. 87). Therefore, this international relations paradigm does not recognize the non-state actor, such as ISIS, to be a legitimate representative of the people. Instead, realists focus on states, such as Syria,

Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, and their behavior to understand the cause of conflict and to suggest a possible solution. ISIS, as a multi-national extremist group, does not recognize international borders and actively undermines those states established during the 20th century. In a 2014 documentary produced by Vice News, ISIS fighters bulldozed the borders between Iraq and Syria and called for a united Arab country

(Dairieh, 2014). Although realism does not recognize non-state actors, ISIS still gained power in a short period of time. Hence, the group itself, even in realist theory, would be considered a threat. Furthermore, the ISIS security threat to other states gives them a

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 38 legitimate excuse to intervene in the Syrian crisis. In fact, the Iranian government’s public narrative to explain actively helping the Syrian regime is that they need to defeat ISIS for the security of the Iranian nation.

Another essential concept for the realism paradigm is the idea of anarchy in the international arena, which causes the state to rely on itself. Wohlforth (2010) wrote that anarchy at the international level is one of the central propositions that define the tradition of realism. Based on his definition, realists believe “the absence of government dramatically shapes the nature of international politics” (Wohlforth, 2010, p. 133). Realist thinkers believe there is no global government, and unlike the situation at the national level, the true status of international relations is an anarchic world. Thus, every statesman should have one primary goal: pursuing the interests of the state. The idea of an anarchic international arena also means “each of the sovereign states consider itself to be its own highest authority and does not recognize a higher power” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p. 87).

That is why, from the early stage of the Syrian conflict, none of Bashar Assad’s adversaries could force him to step down. Despite so many of the most powerful countries in the world

– including the United States, France, the UK, and Germany – urging Bashar Assad to step down, there is no higher authority to enforce such a request.

The notion of an anarchic international arena could explain the attitude and activity of some other actors in the conflict as well. The Iranian government, which supports the Assad regime, is one the main actors who usually undermines any sort of world order. Ayatollah

Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, often criticizes what he refers to as “the world order,” and he calls it “global arrogance” (Sharafedin, 2015).

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 39

Despite the Syrian regime’s brutal crackdown, the Iranian regime did not hesitate to support Assad, even before the conflict escalated to a full-waged civil war. Again, Western powers could not stop the Iranian government from supporting Assad, and they failed to stop Russia as well. Although the Russian government did not intervene militarily during the first two years, they actively blocked any international efforts against the Assad government in the UN Security Council. Until mid-November 2017, the Russian government vetoed as many as 11 resolutions in the UN Security Council about the Syrian conflict; most of them were against Bashar Assad’s regime and the killing of civilians in the war (Nichols, 2017). Allison (2013) believes the reason for Russia to position itself against the Western world, and most of the Arab states, is “Moscow’s long-standing aversion to or fear of Western-led military interventions” (p. 795).

However, the question remains: why is Russia afraid of Western military intervention in

Syria when the Syrian crisis contributes to the rise of radical Islam, which Russia considers a threat? The realist answer to this question rests in the concept of power. Mearsheimer

(2003), in his well-known book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, states that “great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal” (p. 29). He also believes that “great powers fear each other,” and in most cases, do not trust each other (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 32). Russia’s suspicion about American military intervention could be partly because that scenario contributes to

American prestige, not just in the region but across the whole world. The United States already toppled two regimes in Western and Southern Asia during the past two decades – one was the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the other was the Taliban regime in

Afghanistan. However, according to Snyder (2004), some realist scholars believe that

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 40

“armed resistance by U.S. foes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and foot-dragging by its formal allies actually constitute the beginnings of balancing against U.S. hegemony” (p.

56). A realist can argue that the U.S. has a chance to compensate the balance of power problem by intervening in the Syrian conflict and overthrowing a regime which many describe as brutal and violent. In this way, the US government can stablish itself as the world’s moral power, which can act responsibly to stop atrocities around the globe.

The concept of power, and the states’ need to gain more of it, can explain the behavior of regional actors such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey as well. Based on realist theory, states are not equal, and there is a hierarchy among states in the world (Jackson &

Sorensen, 2016). Furthermore, states always have the tendency to move up the ladder and place themselves in a higher position within the international hierarchy. Although states could achieve this goal by expanding their military might and increasing their power, that is not the only possible strategy to gain better position. For example, Stein (2017) stated that

“according to more realist explanations, Iran needs Syria so that it can reliably arm and fund Hezbollah, the better to threaten Israel and boost its power and influence in the

Levant” (p. 677). The same principle could be applicable to Saudi Arabia and Turkey as well. Saudi Arabia can cement its position as the Sunni leader of the region by overthrowing the Alawite government of Bashar Assad and supporting the Sunni alliance of opposition. Turkey can also stablish itself as a regional power if it plays a major role in

Syria. Even Qatar – a small country in the Persian Gulf and just 1/16 the size of Syria – benefited and boosted its image by being actively involved in a conflict far from its borders, establishing itself as a relevant player in the region.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 41

However, in realist theory, the increase of power is a double-edged sword that can have a negative impact. As Snyder (2004) indicated, “when a state grows vastly more powerful than any opponent, realists expect that it will eventually use that power to expand its sphere of domination, whether for security, wealth, or other motives” (p. 55). Since the opponents know their rival will eventually use the power against them, they will choose different strategies to stop it. One such strategy is forming an alliance against the future dominant power. That is why classical realists believe that military power is “as likely to provoke as to prevent conflict” (Lebow, 2016, p. 38). Realist thinkers use the term “security dilemma” to describe this situation (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011). A security dilemma occurs when one country boosts its power to pursue its goal of security, and consequentially make another country feel insecure. The realists’ answer to the security dilemma is balance of power, which they argue “will emerge even in the absence of a conscious policy to maintain the balance” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p. 95). Thus, in the eyes of a realist, the less confrontational period before the Syrian civil war was the result of a balance of power between regional actors. Realists also argue that the conflict ends when the balance of power is restored.

Nevertheless, the prospect of regime change in Syria can drastically change the balance of power in the MENA region. As Lebow (2016) stated, “when a society broke down, as it did from the first partition of Poland in 1772 through the Napoleonic wars, the balance of power no longer functioned to preserve the peace or existence of the members of the system” (p. 39). Syria is an old ally of Shia Iran in the region, where most countries are

Sunni-majority Muslim states. Furthermore, all MENA countries – except Iran, Turkey and

Israel – are ethnically Arabs. Thus, they are ethnically and religiously closer to Saudi

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 42

Arabia than Iran. That is why Iran allocated considerable financial and diplomatic resources to the Shia population in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Among them, Syria was always the key ally. Many ordinary Iranians still remember that during the devastating years of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Hafez Assad of Syria, unlike every other Arab leader, supported Iran. Overthrowing Bashar Assad in Syria can remove this country from the list of Iran allies in the region and add its name to the Sunni bloc, led by

Saudi Arabia. The considerable impact of this change in the region’s balance of power is another reason for both sides to actively try to achieve it (in the case of Saudi Arabia) or stop it (in the case of Iran).

Solution

How can the Syrian conflict end? What can the players – including the Syrian government

– do to finish the conflict? Who can initiate peace between the conflict’s different factions?

Realists answer these questions based on the theory’s core assumptions, such as statism, a self-help system, the security dilemma, survival, power politics, and the balance of power.

According to Snyder (2004), “realism claimed to be an antidote to the naive belief that international institutions and law alone can preserve peace.”(p. 55). Consequently, in this theory, there is no room for international organizations, such as the UN, to find a proper solution. Jackson and Sorensen (2016) wrote that, in realism theory, states are the only actors and “all other actors in world politics – individuals, international organizations

(IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc. – are either far less important or unimportant” (p. 62). Thus far, most peace talks – initiated by the UN Security Council resolutions – have failed to produce tangible results. Although states are the primary actors

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 43 in these talks, the framework has been established by an international organization, which in a realist point of view does not have the legitimacy for enforcing any decisions on participants. That is why, based on the realism assumption, more peace negotiations or

Security Council resolutions will not end the Syrian conflict.

Instead, what can help end the Syrian conflict is a military victory by the Syrian government or its opposition; thus, the conflict ends on the battlefield, not behind a diplomat’s desk. If the Syrian government gains more power – either military or financial – or receives more military support from its allies (Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah), then it can launch a more effective offensive against all opposition groups and regain its territory. That would be the most effective way for Syria to end the civil war and secure its survival. However, the victory of opposition groups with help of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United States is another possible solution. If the opposition wins the war, then they should quickly consolidate the power, form a state army, and increase the army’s power to guarantee the country’s security and the state’s survival. Since that scenario ends the region’s balance of power, it is likely the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia would ignite another war, possibly in Yemen. Furthermore, the Russian-U.S. disagreement over of the new Syrian regime would escalate their confrontation and could cause other conflicts between the two countries.

Critical View

Realism theory provides answers for the root of a conflict or the reasons behind a state’s behavior. However, in this theory, there is no significant place for non-state actors, like

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 44

“ideologically driven terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p.

94). In the Syrian conflict, not just Al-Qaeda is an important player; the extremist group

ISIS has played a substantial role over the course of the war. ISIS occupied many important cities and announced the Syrian city of Raqa as its capital. Furthermore, they radicalized thousands of Syrians and created a situation that weakened the Syrian liberal opposition. In addition to ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, which became well-known as an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group, joined the Syrian opposition coalition and damaged its reputation. Scholars such as

Lister (2014) believe the rise of Jabhat al-Nusra as a transnational movement is a threat for the U.S. and the West. Therefore, Cragin (2014) suggests the U.S. should intervene in Syria to halt the danger of spreading Islamic extremism, which can eventually become a major threat to the U.S. and Western countries. In fact, a considerable amount of American military intervention in the Syrian conflict is connected to the rise of ISIS and Jabhat al-

Nusra, all because non-state actors that have no clear place in realism theory can pose a real threat to dominant world powers.

In addition to ignoring non-state actors, realism theory fails to explain the international efforts to end the conflict, the different rounds of peace talks, and the number of ceasefires for different purposes. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, the UN general assembly and the UN Security Council had tens of meetings and discussed a possible solution for the conflict. Although the power politics and the Russian and Chinese vetoes stopped the UN

Security Council from establishing any legal framework for an international military intervention in Syria, the actions were successful in initiating peace talks that eventually brought representatives from the Syrian government and from the opposition forces to the same table. Due to the international pressure – mostly by the UN Security Council

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 45 resolutions – the work of humanitarian organizations became easier, and they forced both sides to respect basic humanitarian principles. According to Egeland (2015), two of the UN

Security Council resolutions (resolutions 2165 and 2191) “authorized UN aid operations to enter Syria from neighboring countries with or without consent from the Syrian government. Together, these resolutions provide a framework for how we could end the suffering of civilians in Syria” (p. 298). Although one might argue the impact of these international efforts was not sufficient to stop the war, completely ignoring them is another shortcoming of the realism theory.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 46

Chapter IV: Liberalism

If the pictures of a ruined Syrian city are a good reminder of a realist’s pessimistic approach to human nature, the pictures of four rounds of Syrian peace talks in Geneva can be refreshing for a scholar who believes the liberal theory of international relations is the more relevant and accurate explanation of how world politics work at the international level. In the photos of Syrian peace talks, sometimes the top diplomats from countries without any diplomatic relations, such as Iran and the United States, are seen sitting together, trying to find a solution for the Syrian conflict. Although a realist can argue the states participating in the peace talks are merely trying to pursue their own interests, including security, a liberal scholar could argue Syrian peace talks are an effort for collective security, which is a concept that does not exist within the realism paradigm and that contrasts one of the liberal solutions for wars (Dunne, 2011). In many other aspects, the liberal theory of International relations is different from realist theory, with completely different – sometimes opposite – assumptions about global politics and states’ behaviors and with different answers to the basic questions, such as why the Syrian war started and how it can be ended.

According to Moravcsik (2010), the first assumption of liberal theory regards the role of societal actors. He states that liberals assume “globalization generates differentiated demands from societal individuals and groups with regard to international affairs” (p. 236).

The notion of globalization and its effects on the economy, society, and politics is one of the repeated themes in liberal theory. Dunne (2011) explains that, because of globalization, the state’s capacity to govern has been weakening and the “reconfiguration of the relationship between territoriality and governance” is necessary (p. 103). Furthermore,

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 47 reading the ideas of liberal giants, such as German philosopher Immanuel Kant, indicates that individuals in society have a strong tendency to improve their situation and to reform their governance toward a more responsible and humane way of ruling. According to

Russett (2016), the crucial liberal assumptions mapped by Kant include “the belief in the rational qualities of individuals, faith in the feasibility of progress in social life, and the conviction that humans, despite their self-interest, are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society” (p. 69). The German philosopher theorized these ideas “at the cusp of a new age of rights, citizenship, and constitutionalism” (Dunne, 2011, p. 104). Furthermore, liberals predict that human progress will result in a “better life for at least the majority of individuals” (see Figure 4.1; Jackson & Sorensen, 2016, p. 99).

Human Human Cooperation progress reason

The process of modernization: development of the modern state

Figure 4.1 (Jackson & Sorensen, 2016, p. 99)

By considering Kant’s core assumption about individuals and pairing it with what

Moravcsik (2010) describes as “the nature of societal actors,” the start of the Syrian uprising can be understood as the people’s will for changing their society, improving their government, and eliminating illiberal barriers. As stated in chapter I, the Arab Spring and

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 48 what happened in nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, had a significant role in inspiring the Syrians to go to the streets and express their discontent with the Assad regime. A study of what ordinary people in the Arab Spring countries, including Syria, published on Twitter between 2011 and 2013 (in English and Arabic) suggests that:

Early Syrian uprising modeled itself after counterparts across the region, employing

similar rhetorical frames, attempting to seize public places without arms, presenting

a civic, non-sectarian and non-Islamist face at home and abroad, and in some cases

hoping to attract a NATO intervention like Libya’s. (Lynch, Freelon, & Aday,

2014)

The Syrians did not just want a better life for themselves, they were heavily under the influence of similar developments outside their own borders, and they were fully aware of the micro-details of how their peers in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya overthrew their governments. From a liberal point of view, this is one of the direct impacts of globalizations and is in line with human nature’s progress toward a better future.

The second major assumption of liberal theory, according to Moravcsik (2010), regards the nature of states. Based on his definition, in contrast with the realist primary goal for security and survival, states “represent the demands of a subset of domestic individuals and social groups” (Moravcsik, 2010, p. 237). Thus, a government such as the Syrian Bashar

Assad regime cannot ignore the demands of individuals within the society due to the excuse of more extreme danger from foreign actors. The liberalism theory formulates a framework that recognizes the roots of the Syrian conflict not being the threats from outside forces but the undemocratic nature of the Assad regime. Assad and his father ruled Syria for more than four decades without allowing any opposition group to be politically active. No free

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 49 election has been held under the Assad family’s rule. Although their regime is a secular one, the religious differences between the Assad family and the majority Sunni population of Syria means average citizens cannot see themselves as having chance to be the president, which is a key factor that contributes to the unrepresentative characteristics of the Assad regime. According to Moravcsik (2010), “representation is a key determinant (alongside the basic nature of social demands themselves) of what states want, and therefore what they do.”(p. 238). Assad’s regime has never been recognized as a representative system, and that is why a confrontational conflict between opposition forces and the government was inevitable.

The nature of the international system is the third assumption of liberal theory (Moravcsik,

2010), which could explain the actions of other actors and present a solution for the Syrian civil war. This is yet another point in which the liberal theory of international relations distinguished itself from other theories, particularly realism. In contrast with the idea of the anarchic international arena in realism, liberals believe that, due to the rational behavior of states, international cooperation is possible and can be achieved by the collective efforts of world leaders. Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States during World War I, addressed his famous Fourteen Points speech to the U.S. Congress in January 1918, and it was the first time an important 20th-century leader showed a willingness to participate in such international cooperation. In point number thirteen of his speech, Wilson said: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike” (Throntveit, 2011, p. 471). Wilson was referring to an unprecedented

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 50 organization called the League of Nations, which was formed two years later; a turning point in the relations between states.

Although the United States never joined the League of Nations, and the organization failed to prevent another world war 30 years later, it still became a symbol of hope for liberals who support the Kantian idea of global governance. The League of Nations and the United

Nations (after World War II) are both far different in nature and characteristics than the

Kantian idea of the Federation of Republics; however, both organizations, by principle, resemble a world government. Furthermore, despite the shortcomings of the United Nations

– particularly the Security Council – in stopping a conflict such as the Syrian civil war, in liberal theory, the UN is the region’s main hope for peace and stability. That is why

Woodrow Wilson, “the most famous advocate of an international authority for the management of international relations,” believed “peace could only be secured with the creation of an international organization to regulate international anarchy” (Dunne, 2011, p.

105). Some realist thinkers still insist that international bodies, such as the UN Security

Council, do not have legal authority or the necessary efficiency to function in the way that liberal thinkers such as Wilson envisioned. However, as Stein (2010) stated, despite the debate over the impact of international institutions, they are rising in numbers. According to Stein (2010), “how much and how adequately these institutions of international governance tame anarchy is open to question, but the world is witnessing an increase in supranational governance, created by states and in which states increasingly live” (p. 217).

Hence, from a liberal standpoint, international organizations have an essential role in solving the Syrian conflict.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 51

International Efforts

The first initiative to end the Syrian conflict started with an intergovernmental Middle

Eastern organization called the Arab League. Despite the Arab League usually refusing to intervene in the internal affairs of its members due to potential violence, they dispatched their envoy to Syria to meet both sides of the conflict. The rounds of negotiations between the Arab League’s envoy and the representatives of the Syrian government and its opposition resulted in a roadmap to peace called the Arab Action Plan (“Report of the Head of the League of Arab,” 2012). However, the Syrian government was skeptical about the plan and considered it a “proxy intervention by Qatar and Saudi Arabia” (Lundgren, 2016).

Nonetheless, after increased pressure from the Arab League due to imposing sanctions on

Syria and even suspending Syrian membership in the League, Assad’s government accepted the ceasefire, and the Arab League later deployed an observer mission to Syria.

According to Lundgren (2016), “the mission was ill-trained, lacked adequate equipment, and suffered from disunity among member states regarding to its mission and mandate” (p.

3). However, what became a major obstacle for the Arab League in pursuing its goal to end the conflict was the confrontational strategy of two of its important members: Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The two countries decided to take the side of Assad’s opposition and pressure him to step aside. Consequently, they pressured the Arab League to take a tougher position, which in the end, resulted in a suspension of their mission “while the ball was passed to the

UN” (Lundgren, 2016, p. 3).

The UN efforts to end the Syrian crisis fell short after the uprising turned to violence. From the conflict’s early days, international activities were focused on the UN Security Council.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 52

The United States, the UK, and France were looking for a strong response from the

Security Council; however, Russia and China did not accept calls for regime change and used their veto power to stop any resolutions that contained severe language against the

Assad regime (Lundgren, 2016). By March 2012, the situation in Syria worsened, and the

UN secretary general at the time, Ban Ki-Moon, appointed his predecessor, Kofi Annan, as the special UN envoy in Syria (United Nations Secretary General, 2012 March 21). Annan quickly undertook a trip to Syria, as well as all the important capitals in the region. His efforts resulted in a proposal that later became known as the Six-Point Plan and formalized as an annexation to the UN Security Council resolution 2042 (“UN Security Council resolution 2042”, 2012). With the Security Council’s support, the Six-Point Plan resulted in a ceasefire and the deployment of a strong 300-member UN peacekeeping mission in Syria.

While it appeared that international efforts could achieve a tangible result, disagreements among the Syrian opposition, paired with the critical dispute about the role of Bashar Assad in the country’s future, forced the UN to end its mission in Syria. In response, Annan assembled a meeting in Geneva and invited all involved parties to the negotiation table. The result of the first Geneva talks was a document called the Geneva Communique, which became the roadmap for the peace-talks until today (“Action Group for Syria,” 2012).

However, even though the document was praised as an important milestone at the time,

“agreement swiftly eroded as interpretations of the adopted text diverged, especially with regard to the question of Assad’s inclusion in a future political process” (Lundgren, 2016).

Annan’s mission ended in the summer of 2012 when he became frustrated with disagreements about Assad’s future. He resigned, “criticizing international and regional powers for failing to join up behind his efforts and provide the kind of leverage that the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 53 execution of his plan required” (Lundgren, 2016). His successor, Lakhdar Brahimi – an

Algerian diplomat with experience as a UN special envoy in Iraq and Afghanistan – made a controversial decision to include Iran for the first time in the peace process. He also made it clear that Assad’s departure was not his main objective. Therefore, his position became weak, and it took him two years to host the second round of talks, which became known as

Geneva II, in January and February 2014. During this period, the rise of ISIS forced both the United States and Russia to change their approaches (Lundgren, 2016). However, unlike Annan, Brahimi could not advance the peace process, and with “the exception on limited agreements on humanitarian aid, Geneva II generated little progress” (Lundgren,

2016). Nonetheless, the Geneva II talks were the first time that representatives from the two sides – the Syrian government and the opposition – faced each other and talked since the war had started.

Staffan de Mistura, an Italian-Swedish diplomat, was the next UN special envoy, and he has remained in this position until today. His period started with a more skeptical approach, and after a failed attempt for a ceasefire, he organized a series of meetings in Vienna in

2015. The result was the formation of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG); a group of 20 states and international organizations for the negotiation of a peace plan based on the Geneva Communique. ISSG drafted a new plan, which “was formalized in a

Security Council resolution 2254” (Lundgren, 2016). The new plan’s aims were to negotiate a ceasefire, to establish a timetable for achieving peace between the warring parties, and to form a “credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance” for Syria (“UN

Security Council”, 2015, December 18). Since then, de Mistura has organized two series of peace talks in Switzerland, known as Geneva III (2016) and Geneva IV (2017). The most

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 54 notable points from these talks was excluding Islamic radicals from all deals regarding ceasefires and inviting Kurdish groups – despite Turkey’s opposition – to the last round of negotiations in 2017. The Kurds withdrew from the peace talks later in 2017. Both parties accused each other of breaking the ceasefires, and in the meantime, all parties, including

Russia and the United States, have continued attacks on Islamic groups such as ISIS.

Solutions

Unlike the realist theory, liberal theory is not seeking an end to the conflict through military victory. In contrast, liberal thought advocates for cooperation and negotiations. Based on liberal theories, the Syrian government should be an inclusive institution representing all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or religion. Since liberal thinkers, such as Danielle

Archibugi, David Held, Mary Kaldor, and Jan Aart Scholte, believe global politics must be democratized (Dunne, 2011), one important way of ending the Syrian conflict can be implementing liberal-democratic ideas at the international level. Liberals emphasize the role of international organizations. Therefore, the full implementation of UN Security

Council decisions – notably resolution 2254 – is one of the liberal theory’s central solutions. In this resolution, ending the conflict is not the only achievable goal; the future of a democratic Syria is envisioned as well. Liberals also believe that all regional players, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, must obey the UN Security Council decision, which would eventually stabilize Syria and benefit them all. The elimination of

ISIS (as a common threat for all MENA countries), the development of Syria as a reliable business partner, and ending the Syrian refugee crisis, which became a burden to other

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 55 countries, are some of the benefits that could motivate Middle Eastern countries to support peace talks.

Critical View

Although liberals were advocates for the enlightenment views, for instance the application of reason and science to politics, it appears these ideas have not brought communities together (Dunne, 2011). In contrast, the Syrian conflict indicates that, in some societies, the gap between different religious groups can be extremely severe. According to Dunne

(2011), some critics of the liberalism theory in international relations “argue that universalizing mission of liberal values, such as democracy, capitalism, and secularism, undermines the traditions and practices of non-Western cultures.”(p. 112). Syrians are not the first nation in the Middle East to confront their secular government and, in part, turn to

Islamic ideas of governance. Prior to them, the Iranians overthrew their secular monarchy in 1979 and replaced it with a non-secular regime. Even among Arab Spring countries,

Egyptians voted for an Islamist president in their first free election after Mubarak. For a liberal, it is difficult to find the cause of such behaviors. Furthermore, the liberals’ confidence in international institution can be challenged by the limited result of the UN

Security Council’s achievements in the Syrian conflict. The numerous vetoes showed how much these international organizations are under the influence of global powers and how significant power politics are in their final decisions.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 56

Chapter V: Constructivism

Just two weeks after the peaceful protests started in Syria, Bashar Assad firmly stated that protestors are “part of an external conspiracy to undermine the country's stability and national unity” (“Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” 2015). However, protestors were insisting that they just wanted the government to recognize their rights as citizens and to transform the Syrian regime from authoritarian to democratic. They stated the Syrian government is dominated by a religious minority and is not inclusive. They also wanted free elections, a free press, and transparent government, all of which were modern ideas already discussed in other Arab countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt. When the confrontation between the government and the protestors escalated to a more violent clash, and even when the fight between the two sides elevated to a full-scale war, both sides insisted on their initial claims. Assad’s position was that the protestors were serving foreign interests and not the Syrian people. The Syrian opposition contended that Assad had lost legitimacy and could not stay in power without the help of foreign countries, such as Iran and Russia. In the meantime, the international community failed to broker peace. Who is right? Why do both sides accept the help of foreign players and then accuse the other side of being a foreign agent? How much has the division between the Alawite minority and the

Sunni majority affected the Syrian conflict? How much has the U.S.-Russia rivalry or the

Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry impacted the Syrian crisis? Is Syrian history relevant when analyzing the recent conflict? Realism and liberalism theories in international relations fail to answer most of these questions.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 57

In contrast, constructivism, the theory that considers international relations as complex sets of intersubjective discussions, opens the door to a social construction perspective with multilayer aspects. Realists can explain the importance of power politics and the balance of power for the Syrian conflict, helping understand some of the motives behind the states’ decision-making processes. The liberal theory can explain the rationale behind more cooperation between states, peace talks, and the role of international organizations, such as the UN security council, or non-state actors, such as ISIS. However, many questions remain unanswered with these two theories, requiring a deeper dive than the two traditional approaches to international relations can provide. Therefore, since the 1980s, scholars such as Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt have introduced another theory and coined the term constructivism to shed light on the less discussed topics related to international relations and to transform the field to a much broader range of issues (Jackson & Sorensen,

2016). According to Barnett (2011), constructivists establish “how attention to norms and states’ identities could help uncover important issues neglected” by other international relations theories (p. 154). Therefore, new sets of concepts, such as identity, norms, context, agency, and structure, became relevant discussion points, which can explain why an unexpended event such as the Syrian civil war happens and why the key players have reacted to it in the ways they have over the past seven years.

As stated by Hurd (2010), “the constructivist approach does not imply any unit of analysis as fundamental in the study of international relations” (p. 306). However, there are still some pillars to the theory that can help researchers navigate their analyses. The social construction of reality is one such pillar, which Barnett (2011) called “the core observation” that distinguishes constructivism from other theories (p. 155). Constructivists believe the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 58 social construction of reality suggests there is no single objective reality, the social dimensions of international relations are important, and, as Onuf (1989) emphasized, the structure of the international arena is “a world of our making” (as cited in Fierke, 2016, p.

163). Questioning one true reality leads researchers to rethink the concept of social facts.

According to Barnett (2011), social facts “are dependent on human agreement and are taken for granted” (p. 155). However, since the constructivist approach does not necessarily take the social facts for granted, it is necessary to revisit some of the major social facts of a conflict to understand why it happened and what elements played a major role in it. In the

Syrian conflict, social facts, such as the Syrians’ identity, their connection to the rest of

Arab world, the position of the Alawite population in the society, and the rational beliefs regarding national interests, are some of the social facts that will be reexamined in this paper.

Although realists emphasize the importance of the state as the sole player in international relations, they do not discuss the idea of the state and its background. In contrast, the constructivist approach urges researchers to analyze the historical and cultural aspects of a state. Hurd (2010) wrote: “Historical construction of the states as sovereign may well be an important element of any story about how states interact with norms” (p. 306). As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Syrian state was created based on an agreement between the UK and France during and after World War I. A sovereign political entity called Syria never existed in the history of the region. Instead, Syrians were part of the

Ottoman Empire for centuries. Even during World War I, when Arabs within the Ottoman

Empire revolted against their Turkish rulers, they were looking for a united Arabia, consisting of what is known today as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Israel (Hourani,

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 59

2013). Furthermore, the British government agreed with the idea and promised to help them achieve their independence in letters exchanged between Sharif Hussein (Arab’s leader) and Henry McMahon (British high commissioner to Egypt), which later became known as

The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence (Goldschmidt & Davidosn, 2013). The contradictory agreement between the British and French governments to divide the region into two spheres of influence ultimately resulted in the creation of different countries, such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel, and is one of the roots of the so-called “Arab bitterness”

(Goldschmidt & Davidosn, 2013).

In addition to the distrust caused by the Syrian state’s historical background, Syria’s connection to other Arab countries is vital to understand the country and its soundings.

From a constructivist point of view:

What makes an Arab state an Arab state, is not the fact that the populations speak

Arabic but rather that there are rules associated with Arabism that shape the Arab

states’ identity, interests, and foreign policies that are deemed legitimate and

illegitimate. (Barnett, 2011)

Arabism is not just part of the Syrian identity but an important element of Assad’s Ba’ath party. Syria, alongside Egypt and Iraq, was the forerunner of Arab nationalism during the

1960s. Furthermore, Hafez Assad, the father of the current president and the country’s first

Alawite ruler, purposely chose a clear Arab nationalism approach to maximize his similarity to the majority as an Arab rather than his major difference as an Alawite (Worth,

2016). That is why Syria’s relationship with the rest of the Arab world is important compared to its close ties to Iran, as the most powerful non-Arab state of the Middle East.

The Iranian government – for different reasons, which will be discussed later in this chapter

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 60

– support Assad’s regime against any winds of change. Consequently, Assad became closer to the Tehran regime after the crisis started in 2011. In contrast, many opposition groups acted based on the social fact of being Arab and aligned themselves with Arab countries willing to help: Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Both warring parties in Syria and their foreign allies legitimize their decisions by claiming their actions are to support Syria’s national interests. For instance, the Assad government claims that the opposition groups are puppets of old colonial rulers to weaken Syria, while he is defending Syria’s national interests. In contrast, some liberal groups advocate for democracy and argue it is in Syria’s national interest to have a transparent, functioning liberal democracy. However, what are the Syrians’ national interests? Hurd (2010) believes the constructive approach is extremely productive in this area “because of its focus on the social content involved in the production of international relations, including state interest”

(p. 302). For understanding the positions of each actor in the Syrian civil war, it is important to consider the process of “socialization and internalization” (Hurd, 2010). In the level of socialization, Syrian society is part of the international community and, thus, influenced by other countries, particularly those who are geographically, culturally, and socially close to Syria, such as Egypt. In the meantime, modern values, including human rights, citizenship, democracy, and rule of law, are some of the internal structures of many countries in the world, and they can influence the Syrians too. The call for more democratic regimes throughout the Arab world, particularly after the Arab Spring, seems rational and legitimate. In contrast, what Assad’s regime presents as the Syrians’ national interests can be interpreted as the interests of his government, which are not necessarily the same as the

Syrians’ national interests.

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The religious structure of Syrian society is another element that can influence determining the national interests for those who are in the government and those who consider themselves as the opposition. Although the Assad regime is a secular political system in nature, and its Ba’ath party ideology is based on Arab nationalism rather than any religious doctrine, Assad’s religious affiliation plays a major role in the recent conflict. He is an

Alawite, which is a minority sect of Islam that is closer to the Shia branch than the Sunni.

While some Muslims – both Shia and Sunni – and some Alawites do not consider their religion as Islam, Hafez Assad ended the dispute in the 1970s by granting Fatwas from Shia clerics in Iran and Iraq and by establishing his religion as a branch of Shia Islam (Worth,

2016). According to Worth (2016), the historical discrimination against the Alawite population was severe, and the Alawite elite, including Salman Assad (Father of Hafez

Assad and grandfather of the current president), urged their former French rulers to let them have their own Alawite independent country within Syria as a different political entity.

They believed that being in the same country with the Sunni majority population would threaten their existence (Worth, 2016). However, when Hafez Assad climbed the ladder in the Ba’ath party, as a minority, he saw an opportunity in secular Arab nationalistic ideology. In fact, Michal Aflaq, the Ba’ath party founder, was a Syrian Christian. Assad used the party as a political tool for increasing his power, took control of the country, and created a sophisticated network of Alawite officials who ran the Syrian army and security forces. Bashar Assad inherited the Alawite network from his father.

For Sunnis, the Alawite ruling class was a new phenomenon. From the time Arab conquerors forced the Levant to become Muslim until 1970, the Sunnis had never

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 62 experienced an Alawite ruler. Assad not only outmaneuvered all his Sunni competitors within the Ba’ath party, he also managed to end Syria’s political instability and to remain in power for 30 years, which made him the longest serving Syrian head of state. Adding to the non-democratic aspect of his rules, he also used his network of Alawite officials in high- ranking government positions to pass the crown to his son Bashar and to turn the already authoritarian regime into a dynasty. In this context, the Syrian opposition’s anger and uncompromising stand with most Sunni politicians is more understandable, while the

Alawites are afraid of discrimination and revenge from the majority. As Worth (2016) noted, in the current situation, some Alawites believe if Assad falls, their very existence within Syrian society will be in danger, and they are desperate to prevent that from happening. No matter if that is a fair and accurate assessment by the Alawite minority in

Syria, this is the socially constructed reality they believe based on the region’s historical precedence.

Another aspect of constructivism that can help answer questions regarding the behavior of other actors, including Iran and the United States, in the Syrian conflict is analyzing the relationship between the structure and the agent. Hurd (2010) defines the structure as

“institutions and shared meanings that make up the context of international action,” and the agent is “any entity that operates as an actor in that context” (p. 303). Based on these definitions, the international world order, including the UN security council, can be described as a structure, and all players, including Iran, the United States, Russia, and Saudi

Arabia, are agents. According to Alexander Wendt, one of the main constructivist theorists in the field of international relations, the relationships between the agents and the structure are not fixed and are based on their social context (as cited in Hurd, 2010). Thus, by

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 63 considering the social context, it appears that part of the Syrian conflict is the result of the confrontational relationship between Iran and the world. The Iranian government is against

U.S. dominance in global politics and is actively trying to undermine U.S. policies in the region. Any liberal movement with the intention of overthrowing an anti-American ally of

Iran in the region will face backlash from Tehran. In retaliation, the U.S. supports all forces who oppose the Iranian regime, regardless of their system of government and ideologies.

With the same tools used for analyzing the relationships of agents and structures, another external division can be traced in the Syrian conflict: the Sunni vs. Shia historical rivalry, which has been constructed due to the history of Islam in the region. The context of the confrontation between the two main branches of Islam is centuries old. However, with the establishment of Iran’s Shia Islamic government in 1979, the rivalry entered a new era.

Therefore, this is not just a confrontation over balance of power, as a realist would argue; rather, it is a fundamental disagreement over ideas. Abdelal et al. (2010) believes “The central insight of constructivism is that collectively held ideas shape the social, economic, and political world in which we live” (as cited in McCourt, 2016). The collective ideas about Islam in Shia-majority countries, such as Iran and Iraq, are ultimately different from what Sunnis believe as Islam. They projected their disagreement into the Syrian conflict to the degree that many describe the fight as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

According to the constructivist point of view, this confrontation is more than a fight over power, domination, and security, and it has a serious ideological aspect as part of the social construction of Islamic societies.

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The idea of Islamism, the rise of ISIS in the region, and the recruitment tools they use to attract Syrians and foreign fighters could all be analyzed as part of the social construction of reality, which Barnett (2011) indicates “shapes what is viewed as legitimate action” (p.

155). Islamism as an idea for governance needs to undermine the current social facts about the government, sovereignty, international borders, and world order. Radical Islamists actively undermine the norms through extreme violence, which has been purposely chosen as a strategy and theorized in the book Management of Savagery (Stern & Berger, 2016).

Warrick (2015) believes the U.S. invasion of Iraq is the central element that contributed to the rise of ISIS, not the Syrian civil war nor the formation of Al-Qaeda by Osama bin

Laden. However, the creation of ISIS and the momentum it gained during the Syrian civil war significantly influenced the conflict and changed the course of developments. Both

Russia and the United States named ISIS as their primary reason for military involvement in Syria. ISIS activities and its influence proved that, as constructivists suggest:

Power is not only the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what they would

not do otherwise, but also as the production of identities, interest, and meanings that

limit the ability of actors to control their fate. (Barnett, 2011, p. 159)

Solutions

Since the constructivism theory focuses on the social construction of actors, international organizations, and historical events, the solutions proposed are not fundamentally different from other international relations theories. If a society’s collective beliefs lean toward power politics and a tendency to dominate the opposition, then as a realist would suggest, a military victory could be the solution. However, if the social construction of reality created

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 65 a society with more liberal approaches, a deeper trust in international organizations, and a belief in cooperation with other nations, then the peace talks with the UN security council framework could solve the conflict. In Syria’s case, the sectarian nature of the conflict paired with the ideological differences between foreign actors made it difficult for both sides to reach a compromise. The socially constructed content of this conflict about international relations, friends and enemies, us and others, are so divided that finding a middle ground appears almost impossible. Therefore, a constructivist suggestion for ending the Syrian conflict would caution about the division and consider the socially constructed content of the conflict regarding Assad’s regime, Islamism, and Syria’s national identity.

Critical View

Unlike the other two main international relations theories, constructivism fails to theorize a concrete roadmap to end a conflict and to progress to the next step. Although constructivism has more tools to analyze the conflict, it has difficulty going beyond the current situation and formulating a meaningful result. As Hurd (2010) indicated,

“constructivists disagree among themselves on the nature of the international system” (p.

308). Thus, their ideas about the anarchy at the international level can be divisive and confusing. As Jackson and Sorenson (2016) stated, based on the constructivism approach, states can pursue military power and potentially threaten each other or follow a friendly path based on their social interactions. However, Hurd (2010) suggested that most constructivists believe in something that Ashley (1988) called the “anarchy problematique,” which recognizes the existing anarchy within the international system. The lack of a clear

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 66 position regarding the international system and focusing just on the socially constructed meanings leads to a theory that is highly fluid and can change from one society to another.

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Chapter VI: Conclusion

In a world with complex sets of ideas and actions from different governments, understanding global politics without theatrical tools can be a fruitless process. According to Smith (2016), international relations researches focus “on the causes of war and the conditions of peace” (p. 3). International relations theories are groups of assumptions that can formulate the actions of states and interpret their meanings. That is why studying international relations theories can be an essential part of any research about a conflict in the modern world. Smith (2016) suggests that international relations theories are necessary tools to understand why things happened and the questions that most often remain unanswered in political debates due to the involvement of actors from the international community. The Syrian civil war, with its unprecedented effects on people’s lives and its deep influence, is one of the most important recent events within the MENA region, and it requires intense analysis and research. Analyzing the Syrian war, which features so many questions and multilayer problems, is possible with the tools and framework already established in international relations theories. Among those theories, realism, liberalism, and constructivism are three distinctive theories that can produce answers to some essential questions. According to Walt (1998), these theories are the three dominant theories in the international relations field.

The oldest theory among these three is realism, which “has been the dominant way to explaining world politics in the last one hundred years” (Baylis et al., 2011). Since realists have “a pessimistic view of human nature” (Jackson & Sorensen, 2016), they see the Syrian war as more proof that war, destruction, and competition for power are inevitable. Realists

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 68 believe that a state’s “pre-eminent goal” is its survival (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011).

Therefore, they legitimize the Syrian government’s reaction to the armed rebellion as an act of survival. Syria consists of different ethnic and religious groups with a historic rivalry between them. From this point of view, the struggle over survival, even at the cost of a devastating civil war, could be described as an understandable concern. Realists also believe that states are the sole players in international politics. Thus, the realism paradigm does not recognize non-state actors, such as ISIS, as legitimate representatives of the people. Furthermore, the assumptions that the world does not have a global governance and that anarchy exists at the international level explain why no one can force Bashar Assad to resign or enforce the UN security council resolutions.

Realism also has answers for the reasons behind the decisions of the other countries involved in the Syrian conflict. For example, the idea of an absence of international authority explains why Iranian government can constantly undermine global norms. Or the notion of a security dilemma suggests that Russians are constantly worried about the power of the United States and must actively challenge the Americans. According to Mearsheimer

(2003), a leading scholar in the field of offensive realism, “great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal” (p. 29). Realists believe there is a hierarchy in the world, and states, depending on their economic and military power, have a position in this hierarchical system. The same principles are applicable in the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. All of them, and even smaller states such as Qatar, are using the Syrian civil war to increase their influence in the region. From a realist point of view, stability is attainable if all states reach a balance of power. Realists believe that a balance of power “will emerge even in the

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 69 absence of a conscious policy to maintain the balance” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p. 95).

Therefore, realists conclude that if the Syrian civil war ends, and the Assad regime defeats the opposition, the balance of power will be restored. However, if the opposition successfully overthrows Assad, the balance of power in the Middle East changes, and Sunni countries, with Saudi Arabia as their leader, gain considerable power compared to their rival Shia forces.

In sharp contrast with the realist theory, liberalism tackles the issue from a different prospective, and instead of seeing a confrontational rivalry, believes cooperation between nations is possible. Liberals believe that globalization affects individuals and social actors and forces them to reconsider their relationships with their state and government. One of the liberals’ central assumptions is that “the belief in the rational qualities of individuals, faith in the feasibility of progress in social life, and the conviction that humans, despite their self-interest, are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society” (Dunne, 2011, p. 69). These ideas can describe the Syrian people’s motivation to start mass demonstrations and protests against Bashar Assad’s authoritarian regime. The

Arab Spring rebellion’s impact on Syria indicates that, as the liberal theory of international relations suggests, societal developments can spread across borders due to the current world’s globalized characteristics. Furthermore, liberalism theory emphasizes the undemocratic nature of Assad’s rule as one of the conflict’s roots. According to Moravcsik

(2010), “representation is a key determinant (alongside the basic nature of social demands themselves) of what states want, and therefore what they do” (p. 238). However, Assad’s regime is an undemocratic regime that does not tolerate any opposition and, consequentially, should face a confrontation to stay in power. The role of international

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 70 institutions is another element of liberal theory. In contrast with realism’s anarchy, liberalism insists that international cooperation is possible due to states’ rational behaviors.

Therefore, in the Syrian civil war, it is critical to respect the UN security council resolutions to reach a necessary peace.

Finally, the constructivist theory recognizes the socially constructed reality of international relations and suggests a more holistic view of the conflict compared to the two traditional approaches of realism and liberalism. Constructivists consider international relations as sets of intersubjective discussions. Thus, concepts such as identity, norms, context, agency, and structure are important in analyzing the Syrian conflict. From this point of view, the religion of Syria’s ruling family plays a significant role in the crisis because in the Sunni- structured Syrian society, the ruling class are Alawites. By considering the Middle East’s political structure within the context of the centuries-old Sunni vs. Shia rivalry, the Syrian civil war is a battlefield for other confrontations as well. The so-called proxy war between

Iran and Saudi Arabia is the result of this external issue within the Syrian borders. The historical context of Syria’s creation as a nation-state contributes to the Syrians’ constructed reality in defining foreign actors, such as the UK and France, and in taking positions against them. In addition to the distrust caused by the Syrian state’s historical background, Syria’s connections to other Arab countries is vital to understanding the country and its soundings. Syria is an Arab country with a long history of Arab nationalism, and it is currently in a coalition with the biggest rival of Arab countries in the MENA region. That is another explanation for the Syrians’ anger with their government and its close relationships with other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 71

Three different international relations theories use different assumptions and find different answers for the same conflict. Which one is correct? The answer depends on the point of view of the scholarly work and the context of the research. Despite realism being described as the most popular international relations theories among the foreign ministries of Middle

Eastern countries, the theory still cannot answer the full complexity of the regional issues and historical rivalry between some nations in the region. At the same time, liberalism and constructivism, despite their clear explanations about the roles of international organizations or religious rivalries, both fail to analyze the power politics of Middle

Eastern leaders. While all three theories provide some answers for the Syrian crisis, all three theories face some unanswered questions that challenge their views, and none of them can solely explain the complex Syrian civil war.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS 72

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