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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015 Interview with Hilary Putnam 2 European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy VII-1 | 2015 The Pragmatist Method Interview with Hilary Putnam Michela Bella, Anna Boncompagni and Hilary Putnam Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/357 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.357 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Michela Bella, Anna Boncompagni and Hilary Putnam, « Interview with Hilary Putnam », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], VII-1 | 2015, Online since 07 July 2015, connection on 15 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/357 This text was automatically generated on 15 September 2020. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Interview with Hilary Putnam 1 Interview with Hilary Putnam Michela Bella, Anna Boncompagni and Hilary Putnam EDITOR'S NOTE The interviews are part of the project “Strengthening the relevance of the American Philosophy to Contemporary Philosophia in Europe and America” sponsored by the Society for the Advancement of Amercian Philosophy and University of Molise. Michela BELLA & Anna BONCOMPAGNI – This conversation will focus on your role and your position with respect to pragmatism; those who you consider allies and enemies in the field; and then finally your ideas about the future of philosophy and the future of pragmatism. You worked with famous philosophers like Carnap, Reichenbach and many others. But let us start from the beginning. Hilary PUTNAM – My alma mater was the University of Pennsylvania. The first teacher who really influenced me there was a pragmatist. His is an interesting story. His name was C. West Churchman. (I do not know what his first name was, because he obviously did not like it.) He was a philosopher of science for a while, but then he eventually left the field of philosophy, and became Professor of Operations Research at the University of California. He was a pragmatist, and he was a student – which makes me a “grandstudent” – of a philosopher named E. A. Singer Jr., who was in turn a student of William James. Singer created a pragmatist tradition at the University of Pennsylvania. The other pragmatist at that point – she did not even have tenure, she was just an assistant professor but later she became a full professor – was Elizabeth Flower. So, there was a pragmatist tradition at the University of Pennsylvania. Singer was retired by the time I came, I never met him, but I heard about him from West Churchman, and I read one of his books, a little book called Modern Thinkers and Present Problems. I was strongly influenced by Churchman in my undergraduate years. For me, the pragmatist theory of truth is not that important (in fact, I regard it as mistaken), and I don’t think Churchman mentioned the pragmatist theory of truth, nor do I remember Singer’s book talking about it. But what Churchman talked about was what I call the entanglement of fact and value. I quoted in one of my books European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015 Interview with Hilary Putnam 2 E. A. Singer, saying four things (which were in turn quoted by Churchman in his lectures): 1) knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values; 2) knowledge of values presupposes knowledge of facts; 3) knowledge of theories presupposes knowledge of facts; and 4) knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of theories. I think by “facts” Singer probably meant observational facts, and by “theories” he meant things beyond observational facts. So, the idea of a triple entanglement of theory, value, and fact is what I got from Churchman and Singer. Unfortunately, I forgot all about it for quite a few years, and had to rediscover it for myself. M. B. & A. B. – This is one of the main topics of your whole work. Hilary PUTNAM – Yes, this is also a central topic of my recent work. The other teacher at the University of Pennsylvania who was very interested in and sympathetic to pragmatism, trying to bring pragmatism, logical empiricism and perhaps a little Wittgenstein together, was Morton White. (Morton White was the professor who suggested that I go to graduate school in philosophy!) He is author of a great book titled Toward Reunion in Philosophy. He and at the same time Quine attacked the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. Quine and White were friends, but neither got the idea from the other. In fact, in a paper titled “A Philosophical letter from Alfred Tarski” (published in The Journal of Philosophy in 1987), White reports that both he and Quine were influenced by Alfred Tarski, with whom Quine discussed the dichotomy and with whom White corresponded about it. In Toward Reunion in Philosophy White makes a point which Quine unfortunately rejected. White argued rightly that if the analytic/ synthetic distinction or dichotomy is untenable, so is the fact/value dichotomy. There is an argument in Toward Reunion in Philosophy that I remember very well in which White argues that when the positivists try to explain how you recognize a factual judgment, they talk about “observation predicates,” but the only way they tell you what an observation predicate is is by giving a list. So, if I say that “steal” is an observation predicate, then “he stole a purse” must be a “factual” judgment, but if I say it is a value predicate, then it must be “cognitively meaningless.” This is wholly unsatisfactory. The idea that the fact/value dichotomy falls if the analytic/synthetic distinction falls, is due to Morton White. For me, the essence of pragmatism is the idea of the entanglement of fact-value-theory. And that idea you find in James, in a lot of places, and in Dewey and in all the classical pragmatists. M. B. & A. B. – What about your successive steps? Hilary PUTNAM – I did my graduate work in three years. I spent one year at Harvard, and coincidentally Morton White left Pennsylvania and went to Harvard the same year I did. I was Morton White’s teaching fellow in a course in American philosophy at Harvard in 1948-49. But Harvard, although it admitted me, did not give me money, and when I asked if I could get financial support for the next year, they said: “You have to wait to the spring and pass the preliminary examinations for the Ph.D..” I did not want to make my future dependent on that. I wrote away for a teaching fellowship. I was offered one at Penn (where I had already been) and one at UCLA. I took the one at UCLA. There was a pragmatist there too, Abraham Kaplan, who had been a student of both Dewey and Carnap. I thought that I was going to UCLA to work with Kaplan, but he did not impress me, and I ended up working with Reichenbach, who fascinated me from day one. A wonderful human being and one of the greatest teachers on the planet. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015 Interview with Hilary Putnam 3 M. B. & A. B. – You had conversations with him. Hilary PUTNAM – Many times. Reichenbach was a great teacher. It was not just a natural gift, although a natural gift he certainly had, it was not just his charisma: he loved pedagogy, he loved thinking about how to teach. But he also could do it and not just think about it. He gave a course in inductive logic which had 300 students. When he died, the number went down to 30, to 10, and then it was discontinued! Incredibly fascinating, his course on the philosophy of space and time. He never called himself a logical positivist. He always called himself a logical empiricist, because he didn’t like the term “positivist,” and he had the same objection Dewey had, namely that the whole idea of sense data, that everything is a construction out of our own sense data, is wrong. Reichenbach probably regarded “metaphysics” as a dirty word. However, unlike Carnap – who was always saying that metaphysics is nonsense – Reichenbach talked about Leibniz and Kant with considerable respect, especially referring to philosophy of space and time. Carnap is still much more highly reputed than Reichenbach by analytic philosophers, but I think Reichenbach’s work deserves to last, not because his views were right, but because they can be built on. Reichenbach was interested in the metaphysical implications of these great new scientific theories like quantum mechanics and relativity theory for traditional problems about the nature of time, the nature of space, causality, and so on. At this time, for example, there are philosophers like Tim Maudlin at NYU who are continuing that very well, and I think it is something that should and will continue. When I got my job at Princeton – I got my Ph.D. in 1951, I taught one year at Northwestern in Illinois, and then I got a job in Princeton starting in the fall of 1953, and that was where I met Carnap – I was hired as a philosopher of science: I had been trained by Reichenbach; my job at Northwestern had been in philosophy of science, and at Princeton I was also a philosopher of science. At the same time I was developing as a mathematician. I think that in my first decade I probably published more mathematical papers than philosophical papers. My first philosophical paper came from something I said in a conversation with Carnap, who told me “you have to published that.” It was “Synonymity, and the Analysis of Belief Sentences,” in the journal Analysis.
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