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Glory Restored 1-20-11 GLORY RESTORED? __________________ THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2008–2009 GAZA WAR IN TIMES OF EXTENDED CONFLICT RUSSELL W. GLENN August 25, 2010 Sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center This material is based on work supported by the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and the Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) under Contract No. N00140-06-D-0060/065. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJFCOM or the JIWC. ii Preface The closing of the July–August 2006 Second Lebanon War left the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) an introspective organization. Once an example looked to by much of the world for lessons on martial prowess, the nation’s military—indeed, the country at large—found its performance against the Hezbollah enemy a far more punishing and less effective experience than expected. Some of that outcome was attributable to the foe’s preparations. Yet there were also self‐admitted deficiencies in the areas of leadership, intelligence, inter‐arms cooperation, decisiveness, and other areas that political and military leaders alike recognized had to be addressed. It was more than a matter of pride. In a region none too friendly, reestablishing the reputation of the IDF was felt to be a deterrent against further assaults. Twenty‐eight months later, the IDF attacked into Gaza after rocket attacks on Israel originating there spiked late in 2008. It was an attack made after a number of adjustments over the two‐plus years since the Second Lebanon War. Operation Cast Lead, the designation for the undertaking, demonstrated renewed confidence blended with improved tactics, leadership, and joint cooperation. This document reviews those adjustments, analyzes their effectiveness, and considers Israel’s performance in Gaza more generally. The report concludes with 12 recommendations pertinent to future U.S. operations in what has emerged as an era of persistent conflict. This document will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibilities include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, or other forms of stability operations in both the immediate future and longer term. iii This page intentionally left blank iv Contents Preface .............................................................................................................................................. iii Contents ............................................................................................................................................. v Figures ............................................................................................................................................... ix Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... xi DO NOT OVER‐FOCUS ON THE ENEMY OF TODAY .................................................................................... XII CONSIDER ASYMMETRY IN MORE THAN A MILITARY CONTEXT ........................................................... XII FOCUS ON THE MONEY .................................................................................................................................. XII EXPAND CURRENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND DECISIVE POINTS ....... XIII MAINTAIN THE MORAL HIGH GROUND WITHOUT CRIPPLING FRIENDLY FORCE EFFORTS ........... XIII INFLUENCE IS MORE THAN INFORMATION. PLAN THE INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN ACCORDINGLY .... XIV TREAT THE MEDIA AS A (DIFFICULT) COALITION PARTNER ................................................................ XIV FORMALIZE SUCCESSFUL PROCEDURES ..................................................................................................... XV COMMIT RESOURCES TO THE STUDY OF NON‐STATE DETERRENCE .................................................... XV ASSIGN LIAISON OFFICERS TO NONGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS .................................................................................................................................................................. XV CONTINUE TO REFINE TECHNOLOGIES OF VALUE IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS, IN PARTICULAR PRECISION‐GUIDED MUNITIONS AND ANTI‐FRATRICIDE CAPABILITIES ................................... XVI ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT COUNTERINSURGENCY AND OTHER IRREGULAR WARFARE OPERATIONS LIKE A CONDUCTOR DOES AN ORCHESTRA ..................................................................................... XVI Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... xvii Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ xix 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 BACKDROP ......................................................................................................................................................... 2 The Second Lebanon War and Its Influence on Operation Cast Lead .................................... 4 A SAMPLING OF ISRAEL’S POST‐SECOND LEBANON WAR ADJUSTMENTS .......................................... 11 Importance of Ground Maneuver ....................................................................................................... 11 IDF Joint Operations ................................................................................................................................. 12 Intelligence ................................................................................................................................................... 14 v Other Adjustments ..................................................................................................................................... 15 2. Operation Cast Lead: Description and Analysis ............................................................ 18 BACKGROUND: GAZA AND HAMAS .............................................................................................................. 19 The Origins of Hamas ............................................................................................................................... 19 The Theater of Operations and Hamas Military Capabilities ................................................. 22 Israel and Hamas: A Difficult History ............................................................................................... 25 OPERATION CAST LEAD: A SUMMARY OF TACTICAL ACTION ................................................................ 28 REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF OPERATION CAST LEAD ............................................................................ 36 3. Observations and InsigHts from Operation Cast Lead ............................................... 40 A POSITIVE LEGACY OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR: A RESTRAINED HEZBOLLAH ....................... 40 THE IDF AS A LEARNING ORGANIZATION: APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE SECOND LEBANON WAR .................................................................................................................................................................. 41 Intelligence and Operations Security ................................................................................................ 41 Logistics ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 Fighting in Urban Areas .......................................................................................................................... 44 Other Technologies ................................................................................................................................... 45 ADDITIONAL LESSONS FROM OPERATION CAST LEAD ............................................................................ 46 Humanitarian Relief and Other Aid as a Tool of Influence ...................................................... 47 Additional Influence Operations Observations ............................................................................. 54 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE EFFICACY OF OPERATION CAST LEAD ................................... 58 4. Recommendations for U.S. Armed Forces in LigHt of Operation Cast Lead ......... 61 DIFFERENCES IN THE ISRAELI AND U.S. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS ........................................... 61 RECOMMENDATION 1: DO NOT OVER‐FOCUS ON THE ENEMY OF TODAY .......................................... 64 RECOMMENDATION 2: CONSIDER ASYMMETRY IN MORE THAN A MILITARY CONTEXT .................. 65 RECOMMENDATION 3: FOCUS ON THE MONEY...BUT DON’T FORGET OTHER FORMS OF AID ........ 66 RECOMMENDATION 4: EXPAND CURRENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND DECISIVE POINT .................................................................................................................................... 68 RECOMMENDATION 5: MAINTAIN THE MORAL HIGH GROUND WITHOUT CRIPPLING FRIENDLY FORCE EFFORTS .................................................................................................................................... 69 RECOMMENDATION 6: INFLUENCE IS MORE THAN INFORMATION. PLAN THE INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN ACCORDINGLY
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