Space Shuttle Operations and Infrastructure a Systems Analysis of Design Root Causes and Effects
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NASA/TP—2005–211519 Space Shuttle Operations and Infrastructure A Systems Analysis of Design Root Causes and Effects Carey M. McCleskey Kennedy Space Center, Florida April 2005 The NASA STI Program Office …in Profile Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to • CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Col- the advancement of aeronautics and space sci- lected papers from scientific and technical ence. The NASA Scientific and Technical In- conferences, symposia, seminars, or other formation (STI) Program Office plays a key part meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by in helping NASA maintain this important role. NASA. The NASA STI Program Office is operated by • SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS. Scientific, Langley Research Center, the lead center for technical, or historical information from NASA’s scientific and technical information. 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Scientific and NASA STI Help Desk technical findings by NASA-sponsored con- NASA Center for Aerospace Information tractors and grantees. 1721 Standard Drive Hanover, MD 21076-1320 NASA/TP—2005–211519 Space Shuttle Operations and Infrastructure A Systems Analysis of Design Root Causes and Effects Carey M. McCleskey Kennedy Space Center, Florida National Aeronautics and Space Administration Kennedy Space Center April 2005 Acknowledgments The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of those individuals and organizations who aided in the research and preparation of this material. First, NASA’s Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program management for posing the hard questions to the operations community. At the Kennedy Space Center, this included the support of James Heald, Hugo Delgado, Robert Johnson, and Roger Hall. At the Marshall Space Flight Center, this included the support of Dennis Smith, Garry Lyles, Dr. Dale Thomas, and Chuck Smith. The many individuals and organizations contributing to the research and execution of the study are acknowledged in Appendix A. The author would like, however, to make special acknowl- edgement to several key organizations and individuals. Frank Izquierdo and the KSC Shuttle sys- tems engineers represent the backbone of NASA KSC’s resident knowledge of Shuttle launch operations and infrastructure, and without their knowledge and experience in processing the Shuttle, this work would not have been accomplished. In addition, Kevin Ingoldsby is acknowl- edged for numerous hours, weeks, and months laboring with the author to capture the informa- tion and then designing and organizing a massive electronic database that is sure to be a treas- ured source of knowledge for many years to come. Mr. Ingoldsby was supported by the Lock- heed Martin Michoud Space Systems organization. The author would also like to acknowledge the valuable inputs of his long-time associates, Russel Rhodes and Edgar Zapata. Their shared passion for “design for support” both inspired and encouraged the author to complete and dis- seminate the work presented here. Finally, the engineering support of the professionals at Arctic Slope Research Corporation (ASRC) at KSC is acknowledged. In particular, David Johnson for his software expertise in aid- ing Mr. Ingoldsby in developing and then maintaining the electronic database for the author, and Deborah Doxey for her innovative and responsive support in creating, editing, and publishing this document. Available from: NASA Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI) National Technical Information Service (NTIS) 7121 Standard Drive 5285 Port Royal Road Hanover, MD 21076-1320 Springfield, VA 22161-2171 (301) 621-0390 (703) 605-6000 This report is also available in electronic form at URL http://www.sti.nasa.gov/ and http://techreports.larc.nasa.gov/cgi.bin/ntrs ii Foreword This NASA Technical Publication explores and documents the nature of Space Shuttle opera- tions and its supporting infrastructure in order to address fundamental questions often asked of the Space Shuttle Program—why does it take so long to turn the Space Shuttle around for flight and why does it cost so much? To accomplish this, the report provides an overview of the cause- and-effect relationships between generic flight and ground system design characteristics and re- sulting operations by using actual cumulative maintenance task times as a relative measure of direct work content. In addition, the paper provides an overview of how the Space Shuttle Pro- gram’s operational infrastructure extends and accumulates from these design characteristics. Fi- nally, learning from the experience of operating the Space Shuttle, the report derives a set of en- gineering and technology needs from which future space architects and technologists can revolu- tionize space travel from the inside out by developing and maturing more operable and support- able systems. iii This page intentionally left blank. iv Contents 1 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION ......................................................1 1.1 Purpose...............................................................................................................1 1.2 Scope..................................................................................................................1 1.3 Space Shuttle Vehicle ........................................................................................1 1.4 Original Space Shuttle Operations Concepts Versus Actual Architecture ........2 1.5 Shuttle Operations Accomplishments................................................................4 1.6 Identifying Operations and Infrastructure Cost and Performance Shortfalls.....9 2 ANALYSIS FORMULATION........................................................................12 3 OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCTS CONSIDERED FOR ANALYSIS...........14 4 ANALYSIS APPROACH...............................................................................18 4.1 Overall Cost Analysis Approach .....................................................................18 4.2 Direct Work Content Analysis Approach........................................................18 4.3 The STS Design Root Cause Knowledge Base ...............................................21 5 OVERVIEW OF RESULTS............................................................................23 5.1 Overall Results of Cost Analysis .....................................................................23 5.2 Overall Results of Direct Work Content Concentrations ................................30 5.3 Work Concentrations Across Space Shuttle Vehicle and Ground Systems ....63 5.4 High-Concentration Operations Functions ......................................................64 6 DESIGN CAUSES OF OPERATIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE ............77 6.1 Top-Level Design Root Cause Results............................................................77 6.2 Detailed Turnaround Work Causes..................................................................79 6.3 Flight Element Assembly Work Causes ..........................................................98 6.4 Detailed Vehicle Integration Work Causes....................................................105 6.5 Flight Vehicle Launch Operations Work Causes...........................................109 6.6 OMS/RCS: A “Core Drill” of System-Driven Infrastructure........................119 7 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................131 7.1 Need for Operator-Driven Systems Engineering and Integration..................131 7.2 Need for Managing and Controlling Flight-to-Ground Interfaces.................132 7.3 Need for Effective Balancing of Flight Reliability With Maintainability and Ground Safety .........................................................................................136