SE9900005 DISK RE&EARCH REPORTS CENTER FOR DISK RESEARCH Stockholm 6chool of Economics Attitudes and opposition in siting a high level nuclear waste repository Lennart Sjoberg Mattias Viklund Jana Truedsson Report No. 32 ;h September 1998 30- 07 ISSN 1101-9697 ISRN HHS-CFR-B--32--SE RHIZIKON: Risk Research Reports No. 1. Sjoberg, L. Center for Risk Research 1988-91. March 1991. No. 2. Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M., & Sjoberg, L. Trains and transports: Perceived and real risks. June 1991. No. 3. Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Non-expert definitions of risk and risk perception. July 1991. No. 4. Sjoberg, L. Risk perception by experts and the public. September 1991. No. 5. Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Man, nature and wastes. Conceptions of the environmental situation. October 1991. No. 6. Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Perception of wastes and threats to the human life environment. October 1991. No. 7. Sjoberg, L., & Tore", G. The development of risk acceptance and moral valuation. December 1991. No. 8. Sjoberg, L. Center for Risk Research: A review of work 1988-91. January 1992. No. 9. Sjoberg, L. Risk perception and credibility of risk communication. October 1992. No. 10. Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Medical and psychological aspects of crisis management during a nuclear accident. June 1993. No. 11. Sjoberg, L., & Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Moral value, risk and risk tolerance. July 1993. No. 12. Sjoberg, L., & Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Attitudes to nuclear waste. August 1993. No. 13. Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M., Rumyantseva, G. M., & Martyvshov, A, N. Perceived risks and risk attitudes in southern Russia in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident October 1993. No. 14. Sjoberg. L. Life-styles and risk perception. November 1993. No. 15. Gullstrom Nyland, L. Risk perception in Brazil and Sweden. November 1993. No. 16. Sjoberg, L., & Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Risk perception of nuclear waste: experts and the public. December 1994. No. 17. Magneberg, R. The effect of nicotine misuse on everyday behavior and the effect of smoking cessation. December 1994. No. 18. Sjoberg, L. Perceived risk vs demand for risk reduction. December 1994. No. 19. Magneberg, R. The effect of electronic surveillance on alcohol misuse and everyday behavior. December 1994. No. 20. Rundmo, T., & Sjoberg, L. Risk perception by offshore personnel related to platform movements on a mono-tower offshore oil installation. December 1994. No. 21. Drottz-Sjoberg, B.-M. Experiences of nature and the environment. November 1994. No. 22. Sjoberg, L. Explaining risk perception: an empirical and quantitative evaluation of cultural theory. August 1995. No. 23. Sjoberg, L., Kolarova, D., Rucai, A.-A., Bernstrom, M.-L, & Flygelholm, H. Risk perception and media risk reports in Bulgaria and Romania. January 1996. Center for Risk Research Box 6501 Stockholm School of Economics 113 83 Stockholm Sweden Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION 2 2. METHOD AND SOURCES 4 3. DISPOSAL OF HIGH LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE 5 3.1 INSTITUTIONS 5 3.2 METHODS FOR FINAL DISPOSAL 6 3.3 DEEP REPOSITORIES: CONSIDERATIONS AND RISKS 6 3.4 FINDING A SITE 8 4. REGULATIONS 9 4.1 THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN THE SWEDISH MUNICIPALITIES 10 5. RISK PERCEPTION AND ATTITUDES 11 5.1 EXPERTS, POLITICIANS AND THE PUBLIC 13 5.2 REACTIONS TO A SUGGESTED NUCLEAR WASTE SITING IN SWEDEN 13 6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 14 7. THE MUNICIPALITIES 17 7.1 STORUMAN 17 7.2 MALA 23 7.3OVERKALIX 29 7.4ARJEPLOG 32 7.5TRANEMO 34 7.6 VARBERG 37 7.7NYKOPING 39 7.8 OSKARSHAMN 44 7.9 OSTHAMMAR 48 7.10 GALLIVARE 53 7.11 PAJALA 56 8. THE POLITICAL PARTIES 59 9. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 62 9.1 INTRODUCTION OF THE MAIN ACTORS 62 9.2 ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE COMPETING VALUES APPROACH 63 9.2.1 The rational perspective 63 9.2.2 The empirical perspective 64 9.2.3 The consensual perspective 65 9.2.4 The political perspective 66 9.3 FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 67 9.3.1 Clarity of Programs and Siting Process 67 9.3.2 Public Involvement 68 9.3.3 Continuing Political Support and Leadership 70 9.3.4 Mitigation and Compensation Packages 71 10. DISCUSSION 72 10.1 REASON VERSUS EMOTION 72 10.2 FEASIBILITY STUDY VERSUS FINAL REPOSITORY 73 10.3 ECOLOGY VERSUS PROGRESS 75 10.4 CENTRE VERSUS PERIPHERY 76 10.5 DAVID vs. GOLIATH 77 11. FINAL DISCUSSION 78 11.1 MANAGEMENT OF THE SITING PROCESS 78 11.2 INHERENT "CHAOTIC" PROCESSES AND/OR FACTORS 80 11.3 RISK PERCEPTION 82 REFERENCES 84 ATTITUDES AND OPPOSITION IN SITING A HIGH LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY1 Lennart Sjoberg, Mattias Viklund and Jana Truedsson ABSTRACT In Sweden, the owners of the nuclear power plants are responsible for final disposal of nuclear waste. The owners have formed the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (Svensk Karnbranslehantering AB, SKB), which handles all issues concerning nuclear waste. SKB handles the siting process in Sweden, in which the final outcome is intended to be that a repository for high level nuclear waste is placed relatively deep down in bedrock. The main objective of the siting process is to find a host community where two important conditions exist: the security demands have been met and agreements with the municipality in question can be accomplished. Only in such municipalities, so-called feasibility studies will be conducted. After conducting general studies in the whole country, SKB, in October 1992, sent a letter with information about the intended feasibility studies to all Swedish municipalities. As a result, feasibility studies are or have been considered - and in some cases also been conducted - in eleven Swedish municipalities up until 1998. These are the municipalities in which the attitudes and opposition towards a feasibility study, and possibly a final repository, are studied here. The discussion can be divided into three main parts: Management of the siting process; Inherent "chaotic" processes and/or factors and Risk perception. It is argued that two important problems could have been avoided at least partly: The citizens in many municipalities were not sure of the relationship between a feasibility study and a final repository, and in many municipalities the citizens were afraid of the ability of the Government to overrule the municipal veto. Because of these fears, a common argument among the opponents of a feasibility study was: "To be sure of not receiving a final repository, we say no to a feasibility study". Some inherent factors, more or less prevalent in the municipalities as well as in society in general, may also partly explain the outcome of the siting process. The municipalities in which the debate has been heated, and where public support has been more difficult to reach, share some common characteristics. Especially in the municipalities in the north of Sweden, there have been worries of becoming the "nuclear rubbish-heap of Europe", and there have been hostile feelings towards SKB. Linked to these debates have been underlying perceptions of SKB as coming from the central power of Sweden - a tension between the Centre versus Periphery and a situation of David versus Goliath. Finally, risk perception of the citizens has been an important factor. Earlier research suggests that three predictors, of which two were possible to discuss here, explain about 60 % of the variance in risk attitude. The present study supports the idea of the attitude towards nuclear power as an important predictor of the attitude towards nuclear waste. The second suggested predictor is the trust in experts. It has been noted that experts and citizens differ very much in their risk perception concerning nuclear waste. Both scientists advocating a final repository and SKB have to quite a large extent focused on the local benefits of a final repository, while the citizens have been more concerned about the risks. The scientists opposing a final repository have confirmed the worries of the citizens by focusing on the risks. 1 This is a study within CEC project RISKPER.COM (Contract FI4PCT950016), supported also by the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research (FRN), the Swedish Council for Humanistic and Social Science Research (HSFR), the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), and the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI). Asa Larsson and Anders af Wahlberg participated in preliminary stages of the project. Mr. Olof Soderberg, National Nuclear Waste Coordinator, gave many valuable comments on a preliminary version of the report. RHIZIKON: Risk Research Reports No 32 1. Introduction It is more than 25 years since nuclear power production was started in Sweden. Today, twelve nuclear power plants contribute to almost 50% of the electricity and 15% of the country's total energy production [191]. Most of the Swedish nuclear waste is a result of this activity, with only a small amount coming from hospitals, industries and research institutes [13]. Sweden also receives some nuclear fuel from other countries for testing, which, when spent, is not returned to the country of origin [23]. On the other hand, import of nuclear waste is against Swedish law and not considered a likely future scenario [114]. Nuclear waste is classified in three categories: low, intermediate and high level. This report concentrates on high level nuclear waste, which, in turn, is mainly spent nuclear fuel. This kind of waste will remain dangerously radioactive for more than 100 000 years, and has to be shielded in order to guarantee safety. In Sweden, it is at the present kept in a central interim storage facility. In 40 years, the temperature and radioactivity are decreased by about 90 percent [13]. The Swedish Parliament decided, after a referendum in 1980, that the nuclear power production should be abolished by the year 2010. If all power plants are still in use then, the amount of high level nuclear waste is estimated to be about 8 000 tons with a volume of 12 000 cubic meters [191].