THE CUBAN BISHOPS: A CASE OF MISINFORMATION'

A Paper for the Seminar: La Religion y la Iglesia Católica en Contemporánea

Harvard University and the Instituto de Estudios Cubanos

May 22 and 23, 1987. Monsignor Bryan 0. Walsh ,

introduction:

I. A Recent History of misinformation:

On October 13th, 1986, Alfonso Chardy of the Miami Herald's Washington Bureau wrote:

"For three years, the Reagan administration used a State Depart­ ment office to leak information to reporters as part of a sophisticated campaign to discredit Nicaragua and build con gressional support for President Reagan's Central American policies, according to administration officials and government documents.

"The use of selective leaks of classified material was part of a program conceived by the administration's National Security Planning Group. That same task force also approved a recently disclosed campaign of deception that the Reagan administration mounted in August to convince Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi that he was about to be attacked by the United States......

"Although some reporters have complained of exaggeration and dis tortion, few journalists have accused the office's officials of lying and administration officials consider its operations a success One official characterized the office's operation as 2 .

a 'vast operation.'" Miami Herald, October 13, 1986, page 12a.

The head of the office was a former Miami city official, Otto Reich. Reich is an Austrian born former Cuban national who is currently U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. According to the Miami Herald, Reich described his job as correcting some of the "tremendous m isconceptions" about the administration's goals in E l Salvador and the declassification of intelligence data so that it would reach a "variety of audiences" here and abroad. Reich grew up in Cuba and has very close connections with the Cuban exile community in Miami

According to the Miami Herald, this office was set up under a secret National Security directive No. 77, Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security. It was to be d irected by the NSC through four committees overseen by a so-called Special Planning Group led by the President's National Security Adviser and made up of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the d irector of the Agency for international Development. The Miami Herald had characterized the Office of Public Diplomacy "...as one of the best orchestrated public opinion campaigns ever undertaken by a U.S. government."

Unlike its efforts to influence public opinion at home and abroad with regard to U.S. policies in Central America and the Caribbean, the State Department's campaign against Moammar Gadhafi ran into a barrage of criticism when the Washington Post revealed it on October 2. This revelation precipitated the resignation of State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb.

According to Joseph Lai tin, ombudsman for the Washington Post, readers' anger was d irected against the Post for revealing things that were true:

"There was not a shred of indignation that The Post, along with other news media, had unknowingly printed lies. It is also interesting to note that both the truth and the lies were provided by government officials" (miami Herald

10/ 12/ 8 6 ) 3 .

Laitin commented:

"In this recent exercise in official government deceit, it was a case of amateur night: grown men acting like children, but playing with a dangerous toy, which is disinformation— a word, incidentally coined by the Soviets that refers to the practice of slipping into the system negative stories for the purpose of confusing the enemy."

Many questions, ethical and otherwise are raised by these revelations. In themselves, they really add little new to the age old question: Is it lawful for governments to deceive even their own peoples, by such tactics. W inston Churchill is quoted as saying: "--- in time of war, the truth is so precious it must be attended by a bodyguard of lies." It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these issues. Rather the recent h istory of such activities is presented here in very brief fashion to provide the background for another case h istory, namely that of the Roman Catholic B ishops of Cuba, which covers the same time period. The thesis of this paper is that in the case of the Cuban B ishops there are enough suspicious e lements to warrant further investigation. F inal judgments must wait for such objective investigations.

II. A Case H istory: The Cuban B ishops:

In October 1985, three Cuban B ishops, Archbishops Jaime Ortega and Pedro Meurice and B ishop Adolfo Rodriguez accompanied by Monsignor Carlos Manuel de Cespedes came through Miami on their way to Washington to return the visit of a delegation of U.S. b ishops who had visited Cuba earlier in the year. These were the first official visits between the two Episcopal Conferences since the 1950's. While in Washington, they also met with officials of the U . S . government including E lliot Abrams, the Under Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and Robert McFarlane, National Security Advisor to the President.

The exchange of official visits between the two Episcopal conferences was one of a number of developments in church-state relations in Cuba during 4 .

the same time period. February 1986 saw the convening in of the f irst national meeting of the Cuban Church since the early 1960's. The Encuentro Nacional de la Iglesia Cubana was the culmination of seven years of local and regional meetings involving all sectors of the Church— b ishops, priests, religious and laity— which had grown out of the 1979 meeting of the b ishops of Latin America with Pope John Paul II in Puebla, Mexico. Cuban B ishop Azcarate, at a retreat for Cuban priests in E l Cobre in July of that year, proposed such a process and it was approved by the Cuban Episcopal Conference a few months later.

Another development was the possibility of a pastoral visit to Cuba by Pope John Paul II. An official invitation to the Holy Father was extended by the Cuban B ishops. Cuba and the Vatican have maintained d iplomatic relations throughout the revolution despite the severe restrictions imposed on Church activities and personnel

These church events were paralleled by a renewed interest by the Cuban government signaled by the publication in Cuba of Frei Betto's book, "Fidel y La Religion” and an official invitation by the government to Pope John Paul II to visit Cuba. The significance of the publication of Frei Betto's book lay not so much in its contents, but in the fact that its publication signaled that it was proper to talk and write about religion in Cuba for the first time since the early years of the revolution. The book itself, which consists of a 22-hour long interview with the Cuban leader, extending over several days, records Castro's observations on the Catholic Church and religion, his own religious experiences as a youth and student of the Jesuits and his expectations for the future. The book is said to be the best seller of all time in Cuba.

These developments in Church affairs in Cuba did not pass unnoticed in the United States, particularly in Cuban exile circles in Miami Among the political commentators in the Cuban exile media, both printed and radio, there were negative comments on each of these developments. The basic reaction is that any rapprochement between the Church and the regime is seen as being favorable to the perpetuation of the Castro government. There is a widespread suspicion of any contact with Cuba. This is not new. In 1963, when Archbishop Carroll accompanied by this writer, went to Cuba

L 5 . for the funeral of Cardinal Arteaga, there was criticism claiming that even the acceptance of permission to enter Cuba made the Cuban government look benevolent. Catholic c lergy and laity who attended the ENEC meeting were criticized as was Archbishop McCarthy because he had assisted at the installation of Archbishop Jaime Ortega in 1981.

While these reactions have been evident in exile circles for many years, the Washington visit by the Cuban b ishops occasioned a reaction that seems to indicate a definite campaign to influence American public opinion against the thrust of the Cuban Church in its efforts to acquired greater freedom to carry out its pastoral m ission.

The opening shot in this campaign was fired by a very prominent Cuban Catholic layman in Miami Mr. Jorge Mas Canosa. He is the Chairman of the Cuban American National Foundation and also Chairman of the Radio Marti Board, with very close links to the Reagan administration.

On October 18, 1985, radio station WQBA in Miami broadcast a commentary by Mr. Mas Canosa denouncing the Cuban Bishops. He a lleged that their recent visit to Washington was made "...as tools of .... to try to obtain political advantages for Fidel Castro's regime." Their efforts to obtain U. S. visas for Cuban political prisoners such as Ramon Grau A lsina was dismissed as an excuse. Their support for the lifting of the Cuban trade embargo, a position endorsed by the U.S. B ishops Conference for more than twenty years, and their search for some resolution of the impasse on family reunions caused by Radio Marti were described as a "shameful m ission." Their arrival in Miami at 3 AM was described as shameful and an attempt to hide, even though every Cuban in Miami knows that that is the time of the only f light from Habana.

Mr. Mas Canosa a lleged that they "....did not seek the advice of their fellow b ishops in exile, nor of the Catholic laity nor did they seek anyone's counsel inspite of their coming to a foreign etc. etc--- " The facts, easily available to Mr. Mas Canosa, if he had inquired, were that their time of arrival was well publicized in Miami before their arriva l. They were met by a few members of the press There was no delegation of exile leaders to greet them and make them welcome. They did meet with 6 . their fellow bishops and many Cuban laity in Miami; from their hosts they had full access to expert counsel as newcomers "...to a foreign country, to a society with different traditions and language, and especially in a field where they lack mastery and experience: the political arena--- " In Washington they also met with many people, including Cuban exiles and despite Mr. Mas Canosa's a llegation they neither arrived nor left in hiding. From Washington, they went on to Canada.

It is significant that neither in Mr. Mas Canosa's commentary, nor in the exile community in Miami was there any attempt to prepare a welcome for these shepherds of the flock who have kept alive the Faith in Cuba for a quarter of a century while they could have been enjoying the freedoms of Miami. Completely lacking was any understanding of the simple fact that any public denunciation of the Castro regime would have left Catholics in Cuba without their pastors. Even Pope John Paul II has used extreme caution in his comments about the Church in Poland, and Cuba, with its small remnant of practicing Catholics, is no Poland with its 90% practicing Catholic majority. It is difficult to believe that this is not known to Mr. Mas Canosa.

During the months that followed, there were numerous commentaries on Miami area H ispanic radio stations critical of the Cuban B ishops and ENEC. However, they did not attract much attention outside their immediate listening audiences. It was not until August 1986, that the campaign reached the English language media with articles in the Miami Herald and the Wall Street Journal

Their appearance was preceded by a meeting between leaders of the Cuban exile community in Miami and the top echelon of the Miami Herald. The Miami Herald has never been popular with Cubans in Miami and for many years has suffered the image of being anti-Cuban . Despite the publication for the last ten years of a Spanish language edition, c irculation in the Cuban community has remained low, while its English-speaking readership has actually dropped. On the part of the Herald, the meeting was to attempt to remedy its image, and on the part of the Cubans, it was an attempt to reach a wider audience with its concerns, including the eventual liberation of Cuba 7 .

As a result of the meeting articles by H ispanic journalists, previously seen only in El Herald, began to appear also in the Herald. Among these writers appearing regularly was Carlos Alberto Montaner, a Cuban journalist based in Madrid.

On Sunday, August 17th, el Miami Herald carried one such column, entitled "informe Secreto Ante E l Papa." A shorter version of the same article appeared in English in Monday's edition of the Miami Herald, under the title "Cuban Bishops Join Marxtholics". In the articles, Montaner purported to expose a Castro-directed conspiracy that allegedly used the Cuban b ishops and the Catholic Church as willing instruments in promoting marxism.

The Montaner articles are an extraordinary array of half-truths and errors in fact that left one with the impression that he did not check his facts or he did not care as long as they supported his thesis.

On September 18th el Miami Herald and on the 20th, the Miami Herald published an article by the present writer challenging the Montaner a llegations under the titles "La Iglesia Prevalecera" and "Campaign Exists to D iscredit the Cuban Church." These articles prompted a letter to the Editor by Mr. Montaner in which he revealed that his article did not reflect his own investigations, but used "...a long and confidential memorandum sent to the Vatican by European catholics worried by the r ise of what is now called the 'theology of reconciliation...'". Other m isinformation he attributed to a priest in Miami (Miami Herald, 10/17/86). However, the writer was also told, but has no way of verifying it independently that the request to write the article and at least some of the information came from Miami . Perhaps the most significant statement made by Montaner in his letter was the following:

"Monsignor Walsh ought not to be scandalized because differences arise between some Cuban b ishops and those who seek political liberty for the island. In the last century, during the battles for independence, the same occurred. Moreover, I suppose that Monsignor Walsh knows that the interests of the Church do not 8 .

always coincide with the political interest of the people. And in proof of that, there is the battle between the Vatican and Italy during the unification of the Italian nation." (El Miami Herald, 10/17/86).

Meanwhile, on September 19th, another article was published in the Wall Street Journa l written by Manuel A. Tellechea and entitled "Castro Priming Havana's Primate for Papal Recognition". Again this article contained so many h istorical errors that an objective reader would have to question the writer's conclusions, if not his motivations. The writer challenged these assertions in a letter dated Oct. 1, 1986. To the best of the writer's knowledge, the letter was never published.

On September 28, El Miami Herald published an article entitled "An Open Letter to Monsignor Walsh" by Juan A. Suarez-Rivas. It contained a number of a llegations regarding cooperation of the Cuban Church with The Regime.

CONCLUSIONs

The purpose of this paper is simply to pose the following questions:

1. Was there an organized campaign in the media to d iscredit the Cuban B ishops?

2. If so, was it simply the reaction of some Cuban journalists to developments they d isagreed with or were they acting on d irections given by some Cuban leaders in Miami?

3. If so, were these Miami sources acting on their own initia tive or were they being supplied with "... information from cables marked 'unevaluated', which came from either ques tionable sources or was unchecked, even if it tended to support administration positions?" (Alfonso Chardy, Miami Herald, Oct. 13, 1986. page 2a).

Two facts which may lend some credence at least to the possibility of a campaign of m isinformation regarding the Cuban B ishops are the appearance 9 . of the ENEC document in Miami and the efforts of the Justice Department to infiltrate the so-called Sanctuary movement helping Central American refugees

The ENEC document: This was the final document prepared by the Cuban Church for the Havana meeting. Just before the meeting, copies of the document were supplied to Cuban media in Miami by the U.S. Department of State

The Sanctuary movement Throughout the southwest of the United States church meetings and Sunday school classes were bugged by undercover agents of the Justice Department who recorded more than forty thousand pages of conversations, sermons and classes

The writer leaves it to the reader and to further studies to draw conclusions