Situation Overview Since the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement Came Into Effect on February 27, There Has Been a Considerable Reduction in Hostilities Across Syria
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Policy Notes for the Trump Notes Administration the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2018 ■ Pn55
TRANSITION 2017 POLICYPOLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP NOTES ADMINISTRATION THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2018 ■ PN55 TUNISIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA AARON Y. ZELIN Tunisia should really open its embassy in Raqqa, not Damascus. That’s where its people are. —ABU KHALED, AN ISLAMIC STATE SPY1 THE PAST FEW YEARS have seen rising interest in foreign fighting as a general phenomenon and in fighters joining jihadist groups in particular. Tunisians figure disproportionately among the foreign jihadist cohort, yet their ubiquity is somewhat confounding. Why Tunisians? This study aims to bring clarity to this question by examining Tunisia’s foreign fighter networks mobilized to Syria and Iraq since 2011, when insurgencies shook those two countries amid the broader Arab Spring uprisings. ©2018 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 30 ■ JANUARY 2017 AARON Y. ZELIN Along with seeking to determine what motivated Evolution of Tunisian Participation these individuals, it endeavors to reconcile estimated in the Iraq Jihad numbers of Tunisians who actually traveled, who were killed in theater, and who returned home. The find- Although the involvement of Tunisians in foreign jihad ings are based on a wide range of sources in multiple campaigns predates the 2003 Iraq war, that conflict languages as well as data sets created by the author inspired a new generation of recruits whose effects since 2011. Another way of framing the discussion will lasted into the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. center on Tunisians who participated in the jihad fol- These individuals fought in groups such as Abu Musab lowing the 2003 U.S. -
Security Council Distr.: General 22 December 2016 English Original: Russian
United Nations S/2016/1081 Security Council Distr.: General 22 December 2016 English Original: Russian Letter dated 20 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 16-19 December 2016 (see annex). I should be grateful if the text of this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) V. Churkin 16-22832 (E) 301216 030117 *1622832* S/2016/1081 Annex to the letter dated 20 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (16 December 2016) Reconciliation of opposing sides Over the past 24 hours, four ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas in Ladhiqiyah governorate (3) and Homs governorate (1). The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,061. Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with field commanders of armed groups in Damascus governorate and armed opposition units in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Qunaytirah governorates. The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 94. Observance of the ceasefire regime Over the past 24 hours, there were 29 reports of shelling by armed group s in Damascus governorate (13), Aleppo governorate (12), Hama governorate (2) and Dar‘a governorate (2). -
Syrian Qanat Romani: History, Ecology, Abandonment
Journal of Arid Environments (1996) 33: 321–336 Syrian qanat Romani: history, ecology, abandonment Dale R. Lightfoot Department of Geography, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078, U.S.A. (Received 21 April 1995, accepted 10 July 1995) Syrian qanat Romani (subterranean aqueducts) were studied as part of a broader project examining the role of qanats in a modern world. Fieldwork was designed to: (1) produce a comprehensive map showing the location and current status of all Syrian qanats; (2) determine the relationship between qanat sites, ancient settlements, and ecological zones; and (3) evaluate the degree to which modern water technology has displaced qanat systems and assess the impact of these changes on Syria’s ground-water resources. A map showing the distribution and status of qanats across Syria presents a picture of widespread abandonment of recently desiccated qanats, implicating ground-water depletion and underscoring the need for coordinated and sustainable aquifer management in Syria. ©1996 Academic Press Limited Keywords: qanets; Syria; aquifers; water resources; ground-water Introduction New and often rapacious water technologies have all but replaced traditional irrigation systems in the Middle East, aggravating an impending water crisis and further complicating regional water compacts in an already politically complex region. ‘Out with the old and in with the new’ is, however, the inevitable outcome in a region that is modernizing its modes of production and geometrically multiplying its population. Traditional, lower-impact irrigation technologies can no longer support the region’s rapidly burgeoning numbers of people. Yet newer technologies — especially ground- water pumping devices — cannot for long keep pace with rising water needs, and may instead deplete now viable aquifers and preclude their use even for lower-impact traditional irrigation. -
Security Council Distr.: General 17 September 2012
United Nations S/2012/433 Security Council Distr.: General 17 September 2012 Original: English Identical letters dated 11 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council Upon instructions from my Government, and following my letters dated 16-20 and 23-25 April, 7, 11, 14-16, 18, 21, 24, 29 and 31 May and 1, 4, 6, 7 and 11 June 2012, I have the honour to attach herewith a detailed list of violations of cessation of violence that were committed by armed groups in Syria on 8 June 2012 (see annex). It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) Bashar Ja’afari Ambassador Permanent Representative 12-51172 (E) 240912 260912 *1251172* S/2012/433 Annex to the identical letters dated 11 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council [Original: Arabic] Friday, 8 June 2012 Rif Dimashq governorate 1. At 2030 hours on 7 June 2012, an armed terrorist group opened fire on the battalion headquarters of the border guard forces in Yabrud. 2. At 2130 hours on 7 June 2012, an armed terrorist group opened fire on two guard posts at the Nasiriyah pumping station. 3. At 2215 hours on 7 June 2012, an armed terrorist group attempted to steal from the oil pipeline and opened fire on the Jubb Marhaj and Shurayqi guard posts in Burayj. -
Les Principales Offensives Menées Sur Alep Et Sa Province, Chronologie Et Bibliographie
SYRIE Chronologie 4 mars 2016 Conflit syrien – Les principales offensives menées sur Alep et sa province, chronologie et bibliographie Résumé Chronologie non exhaustive des principales opérations militaires menées sur Alep et sa province durant la période allant de janvier 2012 à janvier 2016. Abstract This chronology, which does not aim to be comprehensive, compiles the key military offensives on Aleppo and its province during the period from January 2012 to January 2016. Avertissement Ce document a été élaboré par la Division de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra en vue de fournir des informations utiles à l’examen des demandes de protection internationale. Il ne prétend pas faire le traitement exhaustif de la problématique, ni apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d’une demande de protection internationale particulière. Il ne doit pas être considéré comme une position officielle de l’Ofpra ou des autorités françaises. Ce document, rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices communes à l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) [cf. https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/lignes_directrices_europeennes.pdf], se veut impartial et se fonde principalement sur des renseignements puisés dans des sources qui sont à la disposition du public. Toutes les sources utilisées sont référencées. Elles ont été sélectionnées avec un souci constant de recouper les informations. Le fait qu’un événement, une personne ou une organisation déterminée ne soit pas mentionné(e) dans la présente production ne préjuge pas de son inexistence. La reproduction ou diffusion du document n’est pas autorisée, à l’exception d’un usage personnel, sauf accord de l’Ofpra en vertu de l’article L. -
Report About the Conditions of the Inter
Violation Documentation Center in Syria Preface Among all the miseries Syrians are going through, being internally displaced might be the worst. Unlike those who fled to Syria’s neighboring countries, the internally displaced people are in daily danger of death because those fleeing to rural areas from towns and cities are often no safer there - the regime forces continuously target the area around Aleppo with barrel bombs, for instance. Whatever the cause of displacement, citizens who flee their country are “legally” supposed to be un- der the protection of their government, even if this government was the cause of their displacement; they should have all the rights due to national citizens including the right to protection, according to Human Rights Laws and the International Human Law. Internally displaced people aren’t specifically included in the mandate of the United Nations High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR) yet it does, in view of its experience with refugees, provide shelter for millions of internally displaced people and supervise their basic needs. Internally displaced people are high on the agenda of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which clearly distinguishes between refugees and internally displaced people, the latter being defined as people who have fled their homes for some reason but not crossed internationally recognized state borders. International Humanitarian Law provides for protecting civilians during their displacement, provid- ed they do not participate directly in the hostilities. It also provides for the access of humanitarian relief and assistance organizations to the internally displaced people, requiring the “parties” of the conflict to ensure relief supplies reach these people. -
Of 6 WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY 4 – 10 NOVEMBER 2019
WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 4 - 10 NOVEMBER 2019 WHOLE OF SYRIA SUMMARY • NORTHWEST | Government of Syria (GoS) aerial activity increased in the Hayyat Tahrir ash Sham (HTS)-dominated northwest this week. Inside the de-escalation zone, 14 civilian demonstrations were held in reaction to HTS action in Kahr Takharim. In the Turkish-occupied areas of Aleppo Governorate, elevated levels of conflict continued, and local armed groups continued extortion and looting activities. • SOUTH & CENTRAL | ISIS-linked activity continued in southern Syria this week in addition to attacks against GoS-aligned personnel and former opposition members. Two improvised explosive devices (IED) struck the Damascus area, and two GoS-aligned personnel were assassinated in western Homs Governorate. • NORTHEAST | Advances from Turkish-led Operation Peace Spring slowed in the northeast of Syria this week. However, Turkish-backed Syrian opposition groups looted civilian property in newly seized areas. US and Russian military patrols continued in the northeast. Figure 1: Dominant actors’ areas of control and influence in Syria as of 10 November 2019. NSOAG stands for Non-state Organized Armed Groups. Also, please see the footnote on page 2. Page 1 of 6 WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY 4 – 10 NOVEMBER 2019 NORTHWEST SYRIA1 GoS/Russian airstrikes increased in the Hayyat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-dominated northwest with 124 events recorded in comparison to 50 events in the previous week. This is the first time the number of airstrikes have exceeded the incidents of shelling since late August. GoS continued shelling the de-escalation zone, with 103 events recorded (Figure 2). Nearly 65% (143) of GoS aerial and shelling this week focused on just seven sub-districts.2 The US State Department condemned the escalation in activity in a statement on 8 November, which also documented the impact on a school and hospital.3 Figure 2: GoS aerial activity (Blue) and shelling (Red) in Northwest Syria since August 2019. -
Reporters Without Borders Reported-27-11-2013,45521.Html
Reporters Without Borders http://www.rsf.org/syria-two-swedish-journalists- reported-27-11-2013,45521.html Middle East/North Africa - Syria More abductions Two Swedish journalists reported missing near Lebanese border 27 November 2013 Reporters Without Borders is very concerned about two Swedish journalists, Magnus Falkehed and Niclas Hammarstrom, who went missing in Syria near the Lebanese border on 23 November. The Swedish government confirmed their disappearance yesterday, as the United Nations General Assembly adopted its first-ever resolution on the safety of journalists. Normally based in Paris, Falkehed works for many Swedish publications including the daily Dagens Nyheter and the magazine Sydsvenskan. Hammarstrom is a freelance photographer. According to a Reporters Without Borders tally, their disappearance brings to 18 the number of foreign journalists who are kidnapped, detained or missing in Syria. Two more Syrian news providers have meanwhile been kidnapped. One is Muhaemin Al- Halabi, a French literature student at Aleppo University and a news and information activist, who abducted at a checkpoint on the Zakia (Maskana) road east of Aleppo as he was travelling to Khanasir yesterday. Fellow passengers said their vehicle was stopped by gunmen who asked them to identify themselves. When Halabi gave his name, they beat him and took him away. The other is Shahba Press reporter Yasser Al-Sattouf (also known as Abu Ahmed Al- Deirahafri), who was kidnapped by gunmen outside Deir Hafir Hospital in east Allepo on 20 November. Ziad Al-Homsi, a Damascus-based photographer kidnapped at a checkpoint north of Aleppo on 28 October, was released on 24 November. -
SITUATION REPORT Hawala Registration in Idleb Governorate
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TEAM (HAT) SITUATION REPORT Hawala Registration in Idleb Governorate JUNE 15, 2017 Executive Summary Since mid-May 2017, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has taken several noteworthy steps toward regulating the hawala sector in northwestern Syria. These actions could pose a significant challenge to international and local humanitarian organizations implementing projects in northwestern Syria due to potential donor-compliance issues related to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. This report provides a brief overview of the hawala market in northwestern Syria, a summary of the steps that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has recently taken to establish control over this sector, an analysis of the goals of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham recent actions, and an assessment of the immediate impact with respect to the hawala market. On May 9, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham attempted to formally regulate the hawala industry in Idleb by establishing a new governing body, the General Institution for Cash Management and Customer Protection, and demanding that hawalas in northwest Syria register and pay associated fees. Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s attempt was initially unsuccessful; few hawala agents in northwestern Syria accepted Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s new regulations. Subsequently, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham waived all fees, and as a compromise, hawala agents in Idleb governorate registered with Hay’at Tahrir Al- Sham. This regulatory initiative occurred shortly after multiple large-scale fluctuations in the USD-SYP exchange rate, the consequence of a substantial cash infusion into opposition-controlled Idleb in mid-April as a part of the Foah and Kefraya evacuation negotiations. -
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North West Syria Situation Report No. 5 27th February to 18th March Situation Overview • On 5th and 6th March UNICEF Executive the UN announced that the US will provide an Director, Ms. Henrietta Fore came on a mission additional US$ 108 million in humanitarian aid to Turkey and to the Cross-Border Operation for the people in Syria. from Gaziantep, as the last leg of her visit to the UNICEF Syria operation, advocating • Following months of escalations in hostilities for the rights of children of Syria. ED Fore’s and conflict in southern Idlib, southern and mission was accompanied by the Regional western Aleppo, the Governments of Turkey Directors of MENARO and ECARO, Mr. Ted and Russia reached a ceasefire agreement on Chaiban and Ms. Afshan Khan. During her visit, 5th March. The ceasefire as led to a significant ED Fore met with Government Officials from reduction of violence and hostilities on Turkey, humanitarian actors, the UN Deputy the ground. The agreement stipulated the Humanitarian Coordinator, and attended trans- establishment of a security corridor north and shipment operations from Turkey to North West south of the M4 highway. It further agreed Syria (NWS) from Bab Al Hawa. on joint Russian and Turkish patrols along the M4. The overall situation in Idlib and • On 3rd March, at the border with Syria, in surrounding areas remained relatively calm, Turkey, the UN Under-Secretary-General for limited and intermittent armed clashes between Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Government forces and Non-State Armed Coordinator Mark Lowcock provided a briefing Groups (NSAGs) have been reported in front on the latest developments in northwest Syria lines areas in eastern rural Idlib and western to a delegation from the United States including rural Aleppo. -
The Tiger Forces Pro-Assad Fighters Backed by Russia
THE TIGER FORCES PRO-ASSAD FIGHTERS BACKED BY RUSSIA GREGORY WATERS OCTOBER 2018 POLICY PAPER 2018-10 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * KEY POINTS * 1 METHODOLOGY * 1 ORIGINS AND HISTORY * 3 RESTRUCTURING * 6 THE TIGER FORCES IN 2018 * 8 TIGER FORCES GROUPS * 22 ENDNOTES * 23 ABOUT THE AUTHOR * 24 ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY The Tiger Forces is a Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian government and backed by Russia. While often described as the Syrian government’s elite fighting force, this research portrays a starkly different picture. The Tiger Forces are the largest single fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, with approximately 24 groups comprised of some 4,000 offensive infantry units as well as a dedicated artillery regiment and armor unit of unknown size. Beyond these fighters are thousands of additional so- called flex units, affiliated militiamen who remain largely garrisoned in their hometowns along the north Hama and Homs borders until called on to join offensives as needed. Despite a decentralized command structure, the Tiger Forces’ capabilities far exceed any other unit currently fighting in the Syrian civil war. The main source of the unit’s success stems from its two full-strength infantry brigades with dedicated logistical support and the ability to call on the Syrian air force—and after September 2015 the Russian air force—at will. While there is likely some degree of higher-than-average competence among the Tiger Forces’ officer corps, this research demonstrates that the true power of the unit does not come from their alleged status as elite fighters but instead from their large size, supply lines, and Russian support. -
ALEPPO – Governorate Profile Turkey, and Cross-Border Trade Is Booming, Food Security Is One of the Main Problems Facing Aleppo’S Population
security and health as main priority sectors. Although the governorate borders ALEPPO – Governorate profile Turkey, and cross-border trade is booming, food security is one of the main problems facing Aleppo’s population. Access to food is very limited, primarily Syria Needs Analysis Project because prices are high and people have lost their main source of income. Widespread destruction of health infrastructure and a lack of supplies and staff March 2013 make access to appropriate care increasingly difficult. Some 99% of homes were connected to the electricity network before the start of the crisis but long power Content This document is the first Governorate cuts are now common and in some areas electricity has been unavailable for profile published by the Syria Needs Data sources months. This lack of power, together with the exodus of many Government Analysis Project (SNAP). The profile describes the current situation in Aleppo, Information gaps and limitations employees who run and maintain public services has impacted public services with regards to the conflict, the Governorate profile (pre-2011) (such as urban water supply; solid waste removal, health services). With the subsequent displacement situation and increase in temperatures, up to 23oC in April, WASH related concerns are the humanitarian needs, where available Conflict overview becoming more pressing, with communicable diseases such as Hepatitis A on the per district. The Syria Needs Analysis Project welcomes all information that Displacement rise. could complement this report. For Governorate profile (current) additional information, comments or questions please email Map - Severity of needs per sector [email protected]. The north-western governorate of Aleppo is home to around one fifth of Syria’s total population and experienced a large influx of IDPs as the crisis escalated in Dara’a, Hama, Homs and Idleb in 2011 and early 2012.