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Wishful Thinking in Foreign Policy: a Case Study of the Carter Administration and the Iranian Revolution

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Wishful Thinking in Foreign Policy: a Case Study of the Carter Administration and the Iranian Revolution MIAMI UNIVERSITY The Graduate School Certificate for Approving the Dissertation We hereby approve the Dissertation of Matthew H. Wahlert Candidate for the Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Patrick J. Haney Director Adeed Dawisha Reader Monica Schneider Reader Sheldon Anderson Graduate School Representative ABSTRACT WISHFUL THINKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION by Matthew H. Wahlert The purpose of this study is to explore the premise that the concept of wishful thinking, an element of motivational bias, can provide explanations for foreign policy decision-making. I engage the notion of wishful thinking in the form of a case study in order to explore foreign policy decisions made by the Carter Administration toward the Shah and Iran from 1977 through early 1979. International relations scholars typically view foreign policy decision-making in the context of three distinct levels of analysis – the international system, domestic politics, and individual level inputs. Compelling and useful theories attempting to explain foreign policy behavior have come from each of the three levels of analysis and even more recent literature has argued an interactive relationship among them. The individual level of analysis has led to the study of political psychology. Within the literature of political psychology, a preponderance of research concentrates on investigating notions of unbiased motivational errors, theories of cognitive dissonance, and rational actor models. However, the literature devoted to biased motivational errors – those involving hot cognition – is quite sporadic. I contend that the complexity involved in individual decision making calls for an examination of explanations beyond cold cognitive errors. Through the Carter case study - employing qualitative empirical evidence gleaned through a method of process tracing using government documents, primary sources, and memoirs of key actors – I explore whether wishful thinking, as a biased error, impacted Carter policy toward the Shah of Iran in the critical years of 1977, 1978, and the early days of 1979. WISHFUL THINKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science by Matthew H. Wahlert Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2011 Dissertation Director: Patrick J. Haney © Matthew H. Wahlert 2011 Contents Part I – The Argument Chapter One The Psyche of Man: Motivated Bias in the Decision-Making Process, 2. The Agent: Individuals and Self-Serving Bias, 5. The Process: Motivated Processing, 8. The Product: Wishful Thinking, 12. Chapter Two Motivated Bias, the Individual Level of Analysis, and the Linking of Process, Structure, and Outcome in Foreign Policy Analysis, 20. In the Beginning, 20. Levels of Analysis to a Nested Approach and Beyond, 21. Political Science and the Dichotomy of Motivational and Cognitive Perspectives, 27. Chapter Three Motivated Biases in Foreign Policy Decision: A Review of Relevant Cases, 34. Motivated Bias and War, 47. Motivated Bias and Strategic Surprise, 51. Chapter Four Observation and Measurement: Methodological Techniques in the Inquiry into Process, Structure, and Outcome, 59. Selection of Carter and the Shah, 59. Process Tracing and Methodological Discussion, 61. Part II – The Context iii Chapter Five Toward Shahdulation: A Brief Survey of Relations between the United States and Iran, 1851 – 1977, 68. Chapter Six Perspectives on Carter as a Decision-Maker, 84. Carter as a Self-Confident Optimist, 84. The Carter Presidential Image, 87. Carter and Motivated Bias, 90. Carter and Defensive Avoidance, 92. Part III – The Cases Chapter Seven Island of Stability: The United States and the Shah, 1977, 99. Chapter Eight As Tehran Burns: The United States and the Shah, 1978, 107. Chapter Nine The Last Days of America‟s Shah: The United States and the Shah, 1979, 153. Part IV - Implications Chapter Ten Inside the White House and The Curious Case of Carter and the Shah, 168. Explanations for Carter Policy Choices, 170. The Plausibility of a Motivational Bias Explanation, 180. Part V – Appendix and References Glossary of Abbreviations, 188. National Security Meetings – Subjects, 189. Policy Review Committee Meetings – Subjects, 190. Special Coordinating Committee Meetings – Subjects, 193. Significant Dates in the Iranian Revolution, 196. Works Consulted, 200. iv Tables Table 3.1 Decision Making Models of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. 37. Table 3.2 Expanded Decision-Making Models of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, 38. v Illustrations Figure 1.1 Graphical Representation of Forms of Bias, 5. Figure 2.1 Tepid Decision Making Model, 32. vi Acknowledgements I am indebted to many individuals for the completion of this project. First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my Ph.D. dissertation committee. Committee chair Patrick Haney offered constant advice and direction and the encouragement needed to complete the project. Likewise, I would also like to acknowledge Monica Schneider – especially for her comments on my early work – for helping me focus more clearly on a research question. Adeed Dawisha was a helpful advocate in examining my argument from many perspectives and Sheldon Anderson offered helpful criticism through the eyes of an historian. The staff at the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia and the National Security Archives at George Washington University went above and beyond the call in assisting me with my project. Throughout my academic career I have accumulated a number of debts. I would like to thank the late James E. Cebula of the University of Cincinnati for his twenty years of mentorship and friendship. Without Jim, I would have never pursued advanced studies. Thomas Rivers of the University of Southern Indiana laid the groundwork for my constructionist perspective in his challenging coursework in the History of Rhetoric. Special thanks also goes out to Liam Anderson of Wright State for over ten years of mentoring and his colleagues – Laura Luehrmann and Donna Schlagheck – for helping me develop an International Relations mindset. Completing a Ph.D. while teaching high school full time is not an easy task. I would like to acknowledge the principal at St. Henry District High School in Erlanger, Kentucky – David Otte – for his patience and understanding as I completed my studies. The friendships I have built with Jay Graue, Chris Gunkle, Tony Harden, Shawn Schwarz, and Jeanne Vieth made the last few years much more bearable. I thank you for your counsel and friendship. I would also like to acknowledge all of the students and families of the St. Henry community for your unqualified support. Finally, I would like to express my unending gratitude to my mother, Donna, and my sisters – Melissa and Heather. Without the support and understanding of my family I would never have even began such a lengthy project. I also wish to acknowledge those unnamed whose support helped me complete my program of studies at Miami University, the comprehensive exams, and my dissertation. vii Part I THE ARGUMENT 1 Chapter One The Psyche of Man: Motivated Bias in the Decision Making Process Why does the decision-maker select one option over all the others? The answer to that query is certainly complex. Shafir and Tversky suggest that, given the variable of uncertainty, the decision maker assesses “potential consequences and their perceived likelihood.”1 Ultimately, the decision product, then, is the result of what the decision maker deems as “potential” and what the actor “perceives.” In other words, one must understand the process of decision making in order to fully analyze the decision product. One of the explanations for the decision making process is the concept of “wishful thinking.” The presence of uncertainty offers opportunity for the decision maker to perceive a narrative, or incoming data, in a manner that is consistent with desires and wishes. To be sure, wishful thinking appears as an explanation for decisions made in diverse fields that include finance, politics, sports, health, and romance. In literature and music, the protagonist often makes decisions based upon the notion of wishful thinking. Wishful thinking appears also throughout academia. Academic Search Complete yielded 953 and Lexis-Nexis 998 subject results under the term.2 Indeed, the ubiquitous nature of wishful thinking suggests that we, as humans, at least partially allow a place for wishful thinking in the explanation of why a specific decisional option is chosen over others. Wishful thinking, however, is part of a larger study of motivated biases. The operational definition of motivated bias suggests the human process has some innate bias that causes a product of decision making to be influenced by those biases. Research into motivated bias has generally been categorized as hot cognition as opposed to questions of perceptions and beliefs which are typically seen as cold cognition. The purpose of this paper is to theoretically explore the plausibility that human decision making - at the level of agent, process, and product - is influenced by the so-called hot cognitive factors of motivated bias in the form of preferences held by the decision maker. Consequently, explanations into decisions must acknowledge the potential role of hot cognitive factors. Thus, instead of a cold model of cognition, or even strictly hot model, I suggest
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