Südosteuropa 59 (2011), H. 2, S. 214-237
DAREG A. ZABARAH
The Role of the Orthodox Churches in Defining the Nation in Post-Soviet Moldova
Abstract. This study looks into current nation-building processes in Moldova on both sides of the Dniester and the role of Orthodoxy in enforcing them. It demonstrates how the clerical and political hierarchy of Moldova utilized the category of Orthodoxy in order to construct and implement their respective ideas on nation- and statehood. The paper argues that institutional heritages had a strong influence on the autocephalous churches, which led to a divergence in interpreting canonic issues, especially regarding nationalism. This allowed both political and church elites to agree on an understanding of nation- and statehood that was conducive to their respective nation- and state-building processes. The article further argues that the collapse of communism enabled Orthodoxy to quickly fill in the resulting ideological gap by replacing the discursive fields previously occupied by communist discourse.
Dareg A. Zabarah is a post-doc researcher at the Faculty of Southeast European History at the Humboldt University in Berlin.
Introduction: Offered Identities and Their Construction
Although the interconnections between the Church and state in the Republic of Moldova have drawn the attention of scholars in ecentr years,1 a study putting the Church-state relationship into a wider comparative perspective is still miss- ing. The debates on nation- and statehood in Moldova involve two competing Orthodox Churches who have been fighting over jurisdiction in Moldova – the Romanian Orthodox Church (RomOC) and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). In order to understand the current lines of conflict, a closer look at the legacies and institutional heritages of these churches is much needed. Today, at least four different ideas on nation- and statehood in Moldova are supported
1 For a comprehensive study see Lucian Turescu / Lavinia Stan, Church-State Conflict in Moldova: the Bessarabian Metropolitanate, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003), n. 4, 443-465. For Pridnestrovie see Kimitaka Matsuzato, Inter-Orthodox Relations and Transborder Nationalities in and Around Unrecognised Abkhazia and Transnistria, Religion, State & Society 37 (2009), n. 3, 239-262. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 215 by the respective clerical hierarchies. This article shows how they have worked within the category of Orthodoxy in order to construct and implement their respective ideas on nation- and statehood. The paper argues that different institutional heritages had a strong influence on the autocephalous churches, leading to a divergence in interpreting canonic issues, especially regarding na- tionalism. This in turn allowed both political and church elites to agree on an understanding of nation- and statehood that was conducive to the respective nation- and state-building processes. This study further argues that Orthodoxy quickly filled the ideological gap created by the collapse of communism by re- placing the discursive fields previously occupied by the communist discourse.
Religion as a Category of Group-Building
In line with the constructivist stream within modernist approaches, this paper views groups neither as fixed and unchangeable nor as completely open, but rather as socially constructed by human interaction. An individual’s choice of identity is not merely a choice of his or her own, but is embedded in social interactions. With changes in these interactions, conceptions of group-building evolve as well. Therefore this study analytically defines a group as a category while simultaneously examining the processes of group-building (or groupness) from within a given group.2 Group-building processes differ widely. For some groups, common descent and features play an important role in enforcing what is widely referred to as ethnic nationalism. Others in turn may constitute on the basis of an imagined common destiny in which an exclusive ideology provides the main pillar of their groupness. Communism, Islam, Christianity, and Liberalism are a few examples of such exclusive ideologies. Groups may also base their group loyalty on com- mon space. Various territorial nationalisms are results of common space based group-building processes. The group-building processes based on these three categories can be mutually exclusive or reinforce each other. Their construc- tion and the subsequent mobilization of masses around them are embedded in complicated socio-political contexts, in which the elites of a given society play a leading role in determining their shape and structure. After the collapse of the bipolar world order, the elites of the Soviet Union and Moldova were not able to present a liberal alternative to the communist ideol- ogy. Although a diffuse ideological conglomerate which was widely referred to as “western values” had gained popularity in many intellectual discourses since the late 1980s, these “western values” were not able to replace the exist- ing ideology or substantially influence the institutionalization of nation- and
2 For further details see Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups. Cambridge/Mass. 2006, 11-27. 216 Dareg A. Zabarah statehood. The ideological gap left by the decline of the discursive category communism was instead quickly filled in by those of Orthodoxy as well as by those of different ethnic nationalisms.3 In Moldova, nationalism based on common descent and features was highly connected with Orthodoxy, and the two strains of thought often reinforced each other. Since the principle of autocephaly in Orthodoxy allows each nation to have its own autonomous church, clerical elites supported differing ideas on nation and statehood depending upon their own clerical organization and political views. The Moldovan case is of particular interest not only because of such intra-Orthodox group-building processes, but also because the dispute between the various Orthodox Churches in Moldova represents a struggle for power and influence within the same organization, rather than a dispute over rites or fundamental beliefs.
Defining Ethnos: Orthodox and Communist Ideological Heritages
According to the apostolic canon 34, which dates back to around 380 A. D., churches are allowed to organize along ethnic lines. The word ethnos – as it ap- pears in the original Greek texts – is not comparable to today’s understanding of an ethnic group or a nation, but instead open to wide-ranging interpretations. Various Orthodox churches have interpreted the canon differently. While the Romanian Orthodox Church (RomOC) interprets the term ethnos as a com- munity of descent and features (a neam),4 the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) interprets the term as inhabitants of a land and thus a community of common space (a narod). The difference in interpretation is clearly reflected in the stat- utes of each respective organization. In the statutes of the ROC, articles 1 and 3 read as follows: “(1) The Russian Orthodox Church is a multinational Local Autocephalous Church in doctrinal unity and in prayerful and canonical communion with other Local Orthodox Churches. […]
3 For a broader discussion on the return of nationalism see Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institu- tions. The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State. Cambridge 1999; and Juan J. Linz / Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore/MD, London 1996. For Moldova see Dareg Zabarah, Nation- and Statehood in Moldova. Ideological and Political Dynamics since the 1980s. Wiesbaden 2011 (Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen, 53). 4 Ioan N. Floca, Canoanele bisericii ortodoxe. Note şi comentarii. Sibiu 1992, 2. However, Floca points out that the ethnic or national basis is not the only principle for establishing an autocephalous church. Idem, Drept canonic ortodox. Legislaţie şi administraţie bisericească. Bucharest 1990, 324. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 217
(3) The jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church shall include persons of Ortho- dox confession living on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Estonia, and also Orthodox Chris- tians living in other countries and voluntarily joining this jurisdiction.”5 The current Patriarch of Russia, Kirill, explains his position on the meaning and understanding of the word Russian as follows: “The church is called ‘Russian’ not for ethnic reasons. This naming indicates that the Russian Orthodox Church fulfils its shepherd mission among those people, adopting the Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as a basis for their national identity, or, at least, as their essential element. This is why, in this context, we re- gard Moldova as part of the Russian World [Russkij Mir, D. Z.]. At the same time the Russian Church is the most multinational Orthodox church in the world and aspires to develop its multinational character.”6 In contrast, the RomOC defines itself according to Article 5 of its statutes as follows: “(1) The Romanian Orthodox Church comprises the Orthodox Christians both from the country and from abroad, as well as those canonically received in her communities. (2) The Romanian Orthodox Church is national and in majority according to her apostolic age, tradition, number of faithful and her special contribution to the life of the Romanian people. The Romanian Orthodox Church is the Church of the Romanian nation.”7 In the original Romanian text, the word nation appears in Romanian as neam. This word, crucial for understanding the RomOC self-understanding, contains several semantic connotations that can be translated as nation, family, kin or tribe. Thus, unlike the ROC which follows a territorial approach, the RomOC follows an approach based upon common descent. These contradictory interpretations of ethnos have been an issue of ongoing debate between these churches. Even the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul has weighed in on the matter.8 The Ecumenical Patriarchate – which claims
5 Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Church, Official Web Site of the Department for External Church Relations, available at
9 See Maximos von Sardes, Das Ökumenische Patriarchat in der Orthodoxen Kirche. Auftrag zur Einigung. Freiburg/Br., Basel, Wien 1980, 397, as well as Patriarchats- und Synodalurkunden zur bulgarischen Frage [August 1872], 405-416, quoted in: ibid., 398-408. 10 Theodoros Nikolaou, Die Orthodoxe Kirche im Spannungsfeld von Kultur, Nation und Religion. St. Ottilien 2005, 85-92. 11 Matsuzato, Inter-Orthodox Relations (above fn. 1), 1. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 219 importance of the Russian folk or people. The narod, in this sense, was the peas- antry – the carrier of the features of the Russian nation. The ruling elites viewed Russia as an empire that legitimized itself in dynastic and autocratic terms. Its borders were a consequence of wars and treaties rather than the nation’s will to self-determination. Group-rights were mainly granted on the basis of religious belonging. National categories were structured in a much wider sense and seen mostly in cultural-Orthodox terms. Once a person was in command of the Russian language, baptized as an Orthodox Christian, and assimilated into the dominant Russian culture, he or she was seen as a Russian – regardless of his or her descent. Since the 1830s, this was especially true for the Ukrainians and Belorusians, who were not only seen as part of the Russian nation, but were actually forced to integrate and assimilate. Other Orthodox believers, such as the Moldovan/Romanian speakers of Bessarabia, the Greek and Bulgarian colonists, the Armenians, Georgians, baptized Muslims and baptized Siberian Animists were also seen as Russians in a wider sense. This concept, however, did not apply to the Poles, who were not perceived as Russians and could not become Russian by virtue of their linguistic and religious differences; to a certain extent, the concept did not apply to the Lithuanians either.12 Unlike the Russian Empire, which covered a wide geographical span, the territories that later became Romania were split between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires. During the period of national awakening in the 19th century, the Romantic nationalists thus centered their nation-building project on the Romanian language and the Orthodox faith because these two features were seen to unify the Romanian people. As White argues, it was not the Orthodox Church – controlled mainly by the Serbs and strongly hellenized by the Greeks – that brought the national “awakening”, but rather the Habsburg-friendly Uni- ate Church. Its members included key clerical figures from the Transylvanian School that played a role in defining the boundaries of the Romanian nation. As the Uniate church recognized the supremacy of the Pope, its clerics came into contact with Rome and other Central and Western European ideas that influ- enced their thinking.13 The land desired for the Romanian nation was ethnically divided and many non-Romanian speakers had settled there at different times. For this reason, the nation builders promoted a historiography that supported their territorial claims by arguing that Romanians were the first people to have arrived. As the Roman Empire was too broad to claim, the Daco-Roman idea was adapted as more suitable and later became an absolute postulate in Romanian historiography. Thus, common descent and features played an important role in defining not only the Romanian nation, but also in asserting Romanian’s
12 Andreas Kappeler, Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. München 2001, 228. 13 George W. White, Nationalism and Territory. Constructing Group Identity in South- eastern Europe. Lanham/MD 2000, 119-128. 220 Dareg A. Zabarah absolute claims over the territory. Relations between the RomOC and the state grew strong at the end of the 19th century. Under Alexandru Ion Cuza (1820- 1873) the church was brought under the state’s tutelage and effectively became a state institution after proclaiming its autocephaly from Constantinople. The acquisition of Transylvania, Bessarabia and the Bukovina after the First World War led to a sudden increase in the percentage of minorities relative to the total population, rising from 8 % to 30 % over a very short period of time. Defining who was considered a genuine member of thenation became a central political concern during the interwar period.14 The ideas of traditionally con- servative currents of Romanian society, such as the autochtonists and peasantists, were replaced by far right discourses. These new discourses blended xenopho- bia and anti-Semitism with a nostalgic view of Christian Orthodox values as expressed within patriarchal peasant society. The Church also successfully took over the “Latin” (i. e. Daco-Romanian) discourse from the Uniate Church, which further increased its legitimacy and recognition within society and by the state.15 It was precisely this unique blend that enabled the Romanian Orthodox Church to position itself in such a way as to participate in Romania’s nation-building efforts. Korkut summarizes this relationship as follows: “It is true that the Romanian Orthodox Church had an enduring position in Roma- nian collective memory. Yet, it is also true that the Romanian state has generally dominated the Orthodox Church.”16 An increasingly nationalist interwar Romania drew heavily on Christian values. The League of the Archangel Michael (later called the Iron Guard), which was very influential until 1941, blended Christian and nationalist discourses. The Church clearly took sides in the conflict by promoting the exclusion of other religious groups (mainly Jews but also Uniate Christians, Roman Catholics and Protestants) from the Romanian national project.17 While Romania witnessed a continuity in its nation-building project and a clear Church-state symbiosis until 1945, the outbreak of the October Revolu- tion interrupted these processes in Russia. The Russian Bolsheviks developed a concept of the nation and state that was quite different from the existing tsarist and clerical worldview. In their approach, they combined rights of self- determination with a strong socialist content and hoped that the latter would
14 Umut Korkut, Nationalism versus Internationalism: The Roles of Political and Cultural Elites in Interwar and Communist Romania, Nationalities Papers 34 (2006), n. 2, 131-155, 133. 15 Lavinia Stan / Lucian Turescu, The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-Communist Democratisation, Europe-Asia Studies 52 (2000), n. 8, 1467-1488, 1468. 16 Korkut, Nationalism versus Internationalism (above fn. 14), 137. 17 Ibid., 138. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 221 make the former obsolete and theoretical.18 By adhering to the formula “national in form – socialist in content”, their initial aim was to move from a pre-national dynastic order directly to a post-national, proletarian-internationalist one and thus effectively skip the nation-state phase.19 This concept, however, was never put into practice. The main Bolshevik thoughts on the nation and its relation to the state came from Stalin, who was appointed People’s Commissar for Nationalities Affairs as soon as the Bolsheviks took over. Stalin provided a conception of the nation and its relation to the state that served as a template for forming all subsequent worldviews on the subject throughout Soviet history. It likewise had a strong influence on the Moldovan national discourse. Stalin departed from the postu- late that a nation can be formed on the basis of a common destiny and argued, to the contrary, that the nation is defined by certain “objective” characteristics. He conceptualized a nation as a “historically developed and stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological predisposition manifesting itself in the community of culture. […] the absence of at least one of these attributes is enough for a nation not to be a nation.”20 Especially after Stalin ascended to power, the promotion of alternative or un- sanctioned interpretations of the nation became virtually impossible. Academics subsequently adopted the official categorizations of what constituted a nation and thus failed to produce any alternative scholarly discourses on the subject. However, a striking contradiction existed between the officially sanctioned definition of a nation and the ideological socialist doctrine of creating an inter- national of workers and toiling people, devoid of cleavages along national lines and united through the class struggle. Soviet and Moldovan historians faced a dilemma due to the incompatibility between the Marxist theory, which sees class as the main actor in human society, and a nationalist-patriotic interpreta- tion that instead views the nation as the spiritus movens. Depending on their own worldviews, historians would stress one element over the other, often fail- ing to make clear distinctions between the two ideologies. This tendency often produced blurred and contradictory interpretations.21 Soviet and Moldovan politicians and historians often used the two narratives simultaneously and interchangeably in order to suit their particular purposes. This was largely pos-
18 Edward W. Walker, Dissolution. Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union, Lanham/MD et al. 2003, 23. 19 Kappeler, Rußland als Vielvölkerreich (above fn. 12), 301. 20 Iosif Stalin, Marksizm i nacionaľnyj vopros, in: idem (ed.), Marksizm i nacionaľno- koloniaľnyj vopros. Sbornik izbrannych statej i rečej. Moscow 1934, 3-45, 5. 21 Wim van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography. Nationalist and Communist Politics and History-Writing. New York 1994, 153. 222 Dareg A. Zabarah sible because of the polysemy of the word narod, which could be interpreted as meaning both “nation” in an ethno-national sense and “people” in the Marxist class sense. Contrary to Stalin, who had pursued a nation-merging process towards the goal of fostering a Russian nation, the beginning of the Khrushchev era was characterized by a change in policy in favor of a more ideological and less (Russian-)nationalist approach. When Brezhnev assumed power he revised many of Khrushchev’s decentralization programs and local nationalisms were again suppressed, although not on a scale comparable to the Stalin era. The main feature of this period was the social mobilization of various republican cadres throughout the Union and the increasing role of the Russian language as a “lingua franca”. The latter both opened up career opportunities and eased communication between the republics. The use of Russian as a language of com- munication, and the proximity to Russian culture that this engendered, created a specific sort of self-understanding among speakers of Russian that could be described as Sovietness. Furthermore, in accordance with the socialist doctrine of a class-based rather than a nation-based society, the party and political leader- ship were interested in achieving a so-called “merger of the nations” into one Soviet nation. The Soviet rulers never elaborated on the concept of a Soviet nation. The doctrines of “new historical communities” in the 1960s and 1970s were explicitly conceived as supranational rather than national. This identity was distinguished from the sub-state nationhood based on ethnicity along the criteria set forth by Stalin. What was problematic about the notion of Sovietness was not so much its failure to take root among the population – indeed many people did identify as Soviets –22 but the existence of this concept exclusively within the totalitarian framework. Thus, when the dominant ideology collapsed, the supranational identities pertaining to Sovietness were discredited, as they could not exist out- side the ethnic framework. Furthermore, the cultural legacy of Russianness and its significant overlap with Sovietness can be considered another factor for the reluctance of non-Russian speaking nations to identify with a Soviet identity. It was, in fact, not perceived as truly supranational, but rather as associated with Russian cultural hegemony. When the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) assumed power in Romania in 1945, nationalist thoughts – well-established among the intelligentsia – stood at odds with the new ideology. Thus, after a brief period in which the RCP leader- ship switched to an internationalist discourse, the Romanian variant of national
22 On Sovietness cf. David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation. The Russian-speaking Popula- tions in the Near Abroad. Ithaca/NY 1998. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 223 communism supplanted internationalism in the early 1950s.23 The RCP took up the nationalist discourse developed in the interwar period and creatively combined it with the communist one, forming a nationalism unprecedented in other communist states of Eastern Europe. By arguing that the nation was complementary rather than antagonistic to a communist society, the nation was reintroduced to the agenda as the sole factor deserving attention and devotion.24 The coming to power of Ceauşescu and the worsening relations between Ro- mania and the Soviet Union only increased such nationalist tendencies. This resulted in the regime’s repression of minorities, which had the teleologically constructed aim of achieving a homogenous Romanian nation built around a common language, ancestry, and Orthodoxy. Although still regarding religion as a capitalist remnant, the regime re-acti- vated the symbiosis between the church and the state due to their promotion of a religiously homogenous national identity. The Romanian patriarch Justinian (Ioan Marina), who served from 1948 until 1977 and was a personal friend of RCP leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, supported the communist regime. He blended Orthodox and communist views into what he called the concept of a “social apostolate”.25 The RomOC church benefitted from a privileged status, while other religious organizations were suppressed or forcefully incorporated into the RomOC (for example, the Uniate Church in 1948). Justinian’s successors Iustin (1977-1986) and Teoctist (1986-2007) were also handpicked by the com- munist regime and were able to spare church followers from harsh repression by showing loyalty and avoiding criticism of the regime’s oppressive policies. When communism collapsed in the late 1980s, the aforementioned contra- diction between class and nation in the interpretative framework of Soviet historiography also fell by the wayside. At this point, the nation superseded class as the main focus of action. This facilitated an interpretation of history based exclusively on common descent and features. The erosion of the Soviet regime further led to a gradual weakening of the centre. While the Soviet core was associated with communist ideology, counter-elites began to emerge on the level of the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union. Thus, the struggle against the communist regime took place in national terms. The failure of the centre to provide legitimate structures facilitated the emergence of exclusive ethnic nationalisms as the most dynamic force in politics. The reference to na- tionalism was very appealing, as it provided the elites within the constituent
23 For a detailed account on the events see Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania. Berkeley/CA, Los Angeles/ CA, London 1995 (Societies and Culture in East-Central Europe, 7), chapter three. 24 Ibid., 117-121; and Korkut, Nationalism versus Internationalism (above fn. 14), 143. 25 Korkut, Nationalism versus Internationalism (above fn. 14), 147; and Stan / Turescu, The Romanian Orthodox Church (above fn. 15), 1468. 224 Dareg A. Zabarah republics with both legitimacy against the centre (in referring to rights of self- determination) and a possibility to use the institutionally available (national) resources. It is thus not surprising that the advocates of the Romanian national idea in Moldova saw their natural ally in the RomOC, as the latter defined itself in (Romanian) national terms. The ROC in turn was able to attract both Russian nationalists as well as those who saw themselves as Soviets, even if they did not necessarily adhere to com- munist values. This was mainly because the Church filled the ideological gap left by the demise of communism with Orthodox values. Since it viewed the narod in a wider imperial sense, it did not need to resolve the problematic cul- tural overlap between Russianness and Sovietness. It carried on these notions by simply replacing the Soviet man doctrine with the Orthodox man doctrine. As a result, the ROC succeeded in becoming a natural ally also for those parts of the Moldovan elite who rejected the Romanian national idea and opted for ideological alternatives. The collapse of communism in Romania did not result in an ideological vacuum. State sponsored rhetoric had long been directed towards the cat- egory nation. Thus, the national idea did not experience discontinuity, as was the case in the Soviet Union. After the Ceauşescu regime had been toppled in Romania, the Orthodox Church “rushed to follow the pattern of subservience to the state to which it was historically accustomed”.26 The Church therefore played an important role during the election campaigns in Romania, with each candidate’s success depending to a considerable degree on their proximity to the Orthodox Church.27
Competing Actors: The Different Moldovan Churches and the Political Elite
Similar to other Soviet Republics such as the Ukraine and Estonia, divisions among the political elite in the Republic of Moldova are well reflected in the religious hierarchy. While about 93 % of the country’s population adhere to Orthodoxy,28 there exist two different Orthodox churches – each claiming to be the only true church in the country. One of them, and currently the larger of the two, is the Metropolitanate of Chişinău and all Moldova (MOC) with 1,281 parishes. Its competitor is the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia (MOB), which
26 Stan / Turescu, The Romanian Orthodox Church (above fn. 15), 1473. 27 Ibid., 1473. 28 National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Population Census of 2004, available at
As the table shows, the jurisdiction and ownership of the Moldovan churches changed hands frequently between the RomOC and the ROC, depending on political circumstances. On the left bank of the Dniester the situation was different. Since Pridnestrovie (Transnistria) was historically neither part of the principality of Moldova, nor of Greater Romania during the world wars, its church was under the jurisdiction of the ROC. The political functionaries’ attitude towards the church was par- ticularly repressive when the Moldovan Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (MASSR) was created within the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1924. The MASSR was intended to function as a communist showcase republic and as a magnet for Bessarabia, which at that time was part of Greater Romania. Religious life in the region was restored for only for a brief period, between
29 U.S. Department of State, Moldova, International Religious Freedom Report 2010, 17 November 2010, available at
1941 and 1944, when Pridnestrovie was under Romanian military administra- tion and its churches came under the jurisdiction of the RomOC.30 Churches and monasteries were built under the Romanian military administration, which led to a revitalization of the church previously suppressed under Soviet rule. When Bessarabia was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, the Soviet regime was eager to reduce the influence of the RomOC by increasing the influ- ence of the ROC. The Soviets thus resorted to a policy of selective repression of religious life in Moldova.31 It was not until the late Khrushchev era, after 1958, that over 300 churches were closed in the Moldovan Socialist Soviet Republic. At the end of the Soviet period, only three churches had survived in Pridnestrovie, while in right-bank Moldova 190 of them were still operative.32 Soviet authorities had filled political posts in the MSSR mostly with people from Pridnestrovie, who were regarded as more loyal communists than the right-bank Moldovans. They mimicked this pattern in religious life. From 1948 until 1951, the Eparchy of Chişinău-Moldova was ruled from Tiraspol. When the Soviet Union began to liberalize and various national discourses began to surface, the ROC started to federalize its church hierarchy. In order to prevent separatist tendencies, it upgraded a number of churches – including the Moldovan – to Metropolitan sees. In so doing, the Russian Orthodox Church in fact accomplished what Gorbachev had failed to achieve on a political level.33 The current bishop Vladimir (Nicolae Cantarean), a Romanian/Moldovan speaker, who replaced the Russian-speaking bishop Serapion (Fadeyev) in 1989, has been at the helm of the MOC for 22 years. During his leadership, Vladimir has managed to position himself securely within the political establishment of Moldova, especially among those favoring a Moldovan national idea. In late 1992 the conflict between the bishop of Bălţi, Petru (Ion) Păduraru and his faithfuls escalated due to Păduraru’s radical pro-Romanian stance. As a consequence, the bishop decided to claim the MOB as the legitimate heir to the Orthodox Church in Moldova.34 A few months later, in December of the same year, the RomOC received the MOB under its jurisdiction. The RomOC saw this act as legitimate, since the Moldovan Church had been uncanonically incorporated into the ROC after the Soviet Union seized the territory in 1945.
30 Although the RomOC jurisdiction over the territory of Pridnestrovie is considered uncanonical by the ROC, the latter acknowledges the positive effects for the religious life in the region. See Istorija, Russkaja Pravoslavnaja Cerkov’, Moskovskij Patriarchat, Moldavskaja Mitropolija, Tiraspoľsko-Dubossarskaja Eparchija, available at
Since the Romanian Patriarch Teoctist did not consult with the ROC on the matter, relations between the two churches deteriorated, with each church accusing the other of acting uncanonically. Between 1997 and 1999, and again in November 2007, delegations of the RomOC and the ROC met to discuss the issue of jurisdiction, without any conclusive results.35 The ruling political elite of Moldova sided with the MOC and until 2002 de- nied registration to the MOB. The Moldovan government, which has favored a Moldovan national idea since 1993, argued that the existence of two churches on the same territory would cause cleavages among the Moldovan population and stir national tensions due to the political nature of the issue. It was not until the European Court of Human Rights intervened that the Moldovan govern- ment was forced to officially register the church in July 2002, one day before the deadline set by the court expired.36 During the armed conflict between Moldova and Pridnestrovie between November 1990 and July 1992, the stance of most priests in Pridnestrovie was pro-Moldovan.37 Pridnestrovie belongs to the canonical territory of the MOC. Despite the desires of separatist elites, it proved impossible for them to secure an agreement with the Russian Patriarchate to subordinate the church in Prid- nestrovie under the direct jurisdiction of the Russian Patriarchate in Moscow. A compromise seems to have been reached in 1995 with the establishment of the Dubossary-Tiraspol curacy and the appointment of bishop Justinian (Viktor Ovečnnikov) to its helm. The curacy, which was upgraded into an eparchy in 1998, comprises the territory of the non-recognized Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR) and seems to fulfill the functions of a state church. Bishop Justinian, who handed over his post to bishop Savva (Sergej Volkov) in March 2010, has maintained good relations with the political elite of the PMR, especially with its “president”, Igor Smirnov.
Orthodoxy after Communism: Filling the Ideological Gap in Moldova
As mentioned earlier, the Orthodox Church quickly filled the ideological gap left by the collapse of communist ideology in the Soviet Union. This section demonstrates how advocates of the main competing ideas regarding Moldova’s nationhood and statehood have referred to Orthodoxy in their programmatic
35 Întâlnirea delegaţiilor Patriarhiei Române și Patriarhiei Ruse pe tema canonicităţii jurisdicţiilor bisericești din Republica Moldova, Curierul Ortodox, 14 December 2007, 1. 36 On the details of the case, as well as the physical and moral harassments suffered by the clergy of the MOB, see European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova, Application no. 45701/99, Strasbourg, 13 De- cember 2001, 1-39, available at
Bringing the Nation Back into the Discourse: The Romanian and the Moldovan National Idea
The Romanian national idea gained significance in 1988, during the late Perestroika era. Its key advocates were the socalled ”informals”, mainly repre- sented through the Popular Front of Moldova (PFM). Its leading members were mostly recruited from the ranks of the Moldovan Writers Union, the Depart- ment of Philology at the Moldovan Academy of Sciences, and the Department of History of the same academy. A prominent figure in the movement was father Petru Buburuz, who in 1989 became the only cleric ever to be elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union and who is now a cleric in the MOB. In 1992, the PFM split over the issue of unification with Romania into the Congress of Intellectuals and Peasants (cultural Romanianists) and the Christian Democratic People’s Front (political Romanianists). In 1999, the latter was reorganized into the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDPP), which is currently also a cultural Romanianist party. According to the Romanian national idea, which its advocates in Moldova adopted in an unquestioned manner from Bucharest, the Romanian nation is the central concept and everything else is subordinated to it. In this narrative, the “ethnos-based and achieved nation-state is a priori modern, all other orders are seen as backward. It becomes clear that the Romanians were able to develop only under the umbrella of one nation-state of all Romanians.”38 Thus, a merger with Romania is seen as indispensable and the existing state – the Republic of Moldova – is viewed as an artificial construct, a pre-modern formation that ought to be overcome in order to reach the final stage of national development. Just as the communist ideology was based on the teleological goal of establishing a communist society by overcoming capitalism, the Roma- nian national idea applies the same principle to the nation-state. The narrative creatively reshuffles the inherited Marxist-Leninist dogma of class conflicts. Although such conflicts are excluded within the Romanian nation, they are applied for the purpose of fighting foreigners “who unnaturally rule over
38 Stefan Ihrig, Wer sind die Moldawier? Rumänismus versus Moldowanismus in Histo- riographie und Schulbüchern der Republik Moldova, 1991-2006. Stuttgart 2008, 119. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 229
Romanians”.39 Just as the communist regime nourished the image of the Soviet Union as constantly under siege by its (capitalist) enemies, the Romanian na- tional narrative depicts almost every surrounding nation as an enemy. Minori- ties are never portrayed as equals, but as either traitors or unthankful people living at the cost of the Romanian nation and hindering its development. The nation is exclusively seen as a community of common descent and features. It remains closed to those without blood ties to the community, as reflected in the understanding of the word neam.40 This concept of a closed community stands in opposition to any conception of the nation as a community of common space, since borders are not seen as constitutive to the nation, but rather as a constraint to its development. For this narrative a concept of a common destiny based on an exclusive ideology is equally absent, since belonging to the nation already per definitionem constitutes a common destiny, and thus a more specific nationalidea is not needed. The link between being Romanian and being an Orthodox Christian is complementary. The narrative foresees that being a “good Romanian” implies being a “good Orthodox Christian”. To demarcate group boundaries vis-à-vis other Ortho- dox Christians, mainly the Russians, this narrative favors the subordination of Christian believers under the RomOC, as the latter is seen as the only truly representative of the Romanian neam. This stance was first communicated by the PFM during its second congress in 1990: “Until today, the Russian Church Empire holds all Romanian Orthodox inhabitants of the territories annexed by the SSSR forcefully as subjects. On the basis that the majority of the members of the PFM are Romanians of Orthodox faith, the congress views it as a vital necessity, in the interests of the Romanian nation, to achieve an autocephalous independence of those parts of the Romanian Orthodox Church, which were incorporated by non canonical means into the Russian Patriarchy in 1940, and later in 1944.”41 In its 1994 election campaign, the successor of the PFM, the Christian Demo- cratic People’s Front, raised the church issue again. The party drew heavily on Christian values, which it saw as the “highest spiritual values of human history”, and Orthodoxy as “the main orientation of national existence”.42 The canonical argument was brought up in the campaign. The party insisted that Orthodoxy
39 Vladimir Solonari, Narrative, Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova, East European Politics and Societies 16 (2002), n. 2, 414-445, 441. 40 Ihrig notes that the “Romanianists use the terms ‘neam’ (people, tribe, lineage), ‘popor’ (people) and ‘naţiune’ (Nation) and ‘băştinaşi’ (natives) consistently in a synonymous way; no matter which period or societal aspect is concerned”. Ihrig, Wer sind die Moldawier? (above fn. 37), 103. 41 Rezoljucii II s‘‘ezda NFM, Ţara, 1 (5), July 1990, 5. 42 Blocul electoral “Alianţa Frontului Popular Creştin Democrat” [Alliance of the Christian Democratic People’s Front], Nezavisimaja Moldova, 10 February 1994, 3. 230 Dareg A. Zabarah was based on the unity of the nation and did not allow the creation of another autocephalous Orthodox church in the ethnic space of one nation. The separation of the church from its Romanian mother church was presented as the result of Russian religious imperialism that continued to enslave the Moldovan people. The Christian Democratic People’s Front – and later the CDPP – continued to staunchly support the MOB and fight for the church’s recognition. Vlad Cubrea- cov, a leading member of this party and a Moldovan parliament deputy from 1994-2009, was one of the applicants who brought the MOB’s issue before the European Court of Human Rights. However, after the Church’s registration, Cubreacov was criticized by leading intellectuals and clerics from the Romanian national camp – among them father Petru Buburuz – for his increasing influence on the MOB and on its Metropolitan leader. Cubreacov’s aspiration to secure an autocephalous status for the MOB has especially enraged the activists.43 After its proponents were defeated in the 1994 elections, the Romanian na- tional idea began to lose its predominance over the political discourse in Mol- dova and was confined to a societal discourse led mainly by Romanian-speaking intellectuals of cultural institutions.44 The political executive leadership – the Agrarian Party (PDAM), and later the Communists (PCM) under Vladimir Voro- nin – began supporting the Moldovan national idea as an ideological alternative. The identity offered to the titular nation is now Moldovan rather than Roma- nian. Its proponents argue for a separate identity and consciousness between the Romanians and the Moldovans.45 Contrary to the Romanianists, the Moldovan national idea interprets the will of the Moldovan nation not as lying in the unifi- cation of all Romanian territories, but in gaining its self-affirmation – especially vis-à-vis Romania – through rigorous independence. Although the narrative uses a conciliatory tone towards non-titular groups, this does not imply the inclusion of these groups into the nation, or the legitimization of any territorial claims by minorities.46 Similar to the Romanian national idea, the state is a nation-state belonging exclusively to the titular nation and based upon common descent. After Moldova’s independence, a parallel discourse to the national one emerged.47 This discourse, which included all the country’s inhabitants ir-
43 Biserica e mai sus de politică şi ideologii, Curierul Orthodox, 17 July 2008, 3, and Cine a pricinuit degradarea imaginii Bisericii Neamului? (Declaraţia unui grup de intelectuali cu privire la evenimentele recente din cadrul Mitropoliei Basarabiei), Curierul Orthodox, 15 August 2008, 3. 44 For details see Elizabeth A. Anderson, “They are the Priests”: The Role of the Moldovan Historian and Its Implications for Civic Education, Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education 37 (2007), n. 3, 277-290. 45 Vasile Stati, Istorija Moldovy. Chişinău 2003; and idem, Moldavane: istoričeskoe i etnopolitičeskoe issledovanie. Chişinău 2009. 46 Ihrig, Wer sind die Moldawier? (above fn. 38), 136, 143. 47 Anika Zeller, Konstruktion im Wandel: Nationale Identität in der Republik Moldau. Eine Analyse der staatlichen Zeitung “Nezavisimaja Moldova” (1991-1994). Hamburg 2005. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 231 respective of their ethnic origins, can be described as the citizen discourse (or even civic discourse, to a certain extent). This discourse is centered on Moldova’s statehood. Although the citizen discourse had been present since the early nine- ties, PCM-deputy Victor Stepaniuc clearly elaborated this narrative in print for the first time in a 2005 monograph.48 Here the argument shifted from ethnicity or language as a constitutive element of the nation towards a focus on state- hood. Not only is the long historical tradition of the Moldovan state stated as a fact, but the consolidation of Moldovan statehood is presented as a leitmotif of all Moldovan heroes and protagonists. Although the term “statehood” is frequently used in the monograph and acts as the central theme, it remains a blurred concept. Stepaniuc remains centered on the Moldovans as a nation. However, while the existence of the Moldovan nation- and statehood are viewed in primordialist terms, this does not necessarily imply an ethnically exclusive character. This is a fundamental difference from the previous concept. Although the state primarily is seen as belonging to the titular nation, it is nevertheless the homeland (patria / rodina) of all its citizens. Multi-ethnicity is no longer viewed as an obstacle to the nation’s well-being, but functions as an asset for Moldova to exist as an independent state. The Moldovan national idea includes both an ethnic component found in the Romanian national idea as well as a common space element. This common space is centered on a nation within the borders of Moldova. Although what Moldova means is not always clear, the tendency towards promoting a Moldovan nation within the borders of today’s Republic of Moldova is evident. Both the ethnic and the common space discourses occur parallel to one another. On the one hand, the role of the Moldovans as a titular nation, as rightful owners of the state – or, as they have been called since 2004, the “state forming nation” – is emphasized, whereas, on the other hand, members of non-titular ethnicities are seen as citizens of Moldova whose rights should be respected. Unlike in the Romanian national idea, the Orthodox element does not play an explicit role in the Moldovan national narrative. This is mainly because its main protagonists are either communists (PCM) or former communists (PDAM). Despite various re-formations and splits within the political land- scape of Moldova, parties advocating the Moldovan national idea have held power since 1994. Although Moldova is de jure a secular state, the role of the church in forming and shaping the national discourse remains significant. The Moldovan government has begun to actively show its support for the MOC, particularly since the appearance of the MOB as a potential second Moldovan Orthodox Church. The political actors have feared that a strengthening of the MOB, which supports the Romanian national idea, would have an unwelcome
48 Victor Stepaniuc, Gosudarstvennost’ moldavskogo naroda. Istoričeskie, političeskie i pravovye aspekty. Chişinău 2006. 232 Dareg A. Zabarah influence on the rural electorate.49 In a letter to the European Court of Human Rights, former president Vladimir Voronin stated that the recognition of the MOB by the authorities “would have unforeseeable consequences for Moldovan society”.50 The government further “admitted that this conflict, an administrative onen i appearance, concealed a politi- cal conflict between Romania and Russia; were it to intervene by recognizing the applicant church, which it considered to be a schismatic group, the consequences were likely to be detrimental to the independence and territorial integrity of the young Republic of Moldova”.51 Church-state relations began to intensify after July 2002, when the state was forced to register the MOB. Not only did the MOC sign a concordat with the government in which the former attained a privileged relationship with the state, but it also persuaded the government to transfer the property of the MOB to the MOC.52 The MOC in turn supported the communist government in the 2003 elections. Government officials and former president Vladimir Voronin often portrayed themselves as protectors and patrons of the MOC, while dis- criminating against the MOB.53
The Left-Bank Alternative: From a Pridnestrovian Narod towards a Russkij Mir
Pridnestrovian political and intellectual elites began creating parallel state structures in 1989, after the Language Laws issued in Chişinău declared Moldo- van (= Romanian) the state language. These elites began to carve out a program- matic idea that can be described as “Pridnestrovism” following the region’s uni- lateral declaration of independence from Moldova. This idea gained significance after the regime in Tiraspol moved away from the concept of a multinational people (narod) and towards the creation of a Pridnestrovian narod. This was essentially a regional identity embedded within a greater “Slavic Orthodox civilization” with Russian leadership.54 Due to the multiethnic character of the region, Pridnestrovian historiography never imagined the narod – in the sense of an ethno-nation – as a central his- torical agent. Since narod, in the sense of class-struggle, had lost its appeal and
49 Igor Munteanu, Political Contradictions in Moldova – Or, the New Religious Crusades under Political Considerations, South-East Europe Review 1 (2002), 97-108, 101. 50 ECHR, Case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia (above fn. 36), 11. 51 Ibid., 22f. 52 Turescu / Stan, Church-State Conflict (above fn. 1), 462. 53 Sergiu Panainte, Secularism in Republic of Moldova – Politics of Religion or Religious Politics, Romanian Journal of Political Science 6 (2006), n. 2, 89-100, 97. 54 Vladimir Solonari, Creating a ‘People’: A Case Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4 (2003), n. 2, 411-438, 431. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 233 explanatory value, the PMR historians chose to define thenarod in a territorial sense. Unfortunately, what is meant by this “territory” is not especially clear, as the PMR never had its own statehood, nor is the current PMR territory equiva- lent to that of the interwar Moldovan Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (MASSR). As a result, an alternative narrative had to be formulated. According to this narrative, “Dniestria” is constructed as a borderland belonging to the East Orthodox Slavic civilization. By being a “bulwark” of the “Slavic Orthodox civilization”, it is supposed to function as a substitute for an “ethno-nation”.55 On the one hand, the narrative highlights the ethno-cultural character of na- tions. On the other hand, by using the Soviet narratives of the friendship among the peoples and the merger of the nations, the narrative gives the impression of Pridnestrovie as a nation in the making.56 Since a “bulwark”, contrary to an ethno-nation, did not justify claims to inde- pendent statehood, proponents of the idea had to situate it in a wider context. Such a project could imply “either the restoration of the Russian imperial state or the consolidation of the East Slavic civilization, whether politically, militarily or whatever else that could mean in practice”.57 It is therefore not surprising that Pridnestrovie finds great support among Russian nationalists in Moscow who favor the same project. The identity offered by the Pridnestrovian elites to Romanian/Moldovan speakers in the region is exclusively Moldovan.58 In the conflict with Moldova, the PMR has portrayed itself as the state that protects the Moldovan nation from Romanization, which is not only evident in its name (Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic), but also in keeping the Cyrillic alphabet for their language.59 The PMR‘s narrative postulates that it is not the well-being of a particular nation, in the primordial sense, that justifies claiming one’s statehood. Instead, state- hood expresses the collective will that has emerged over time and through the historic bonds formed between the region’s inhabitants.60 The will of the people to have their own state is highlighted throughout the narrative.61 All acts that contributed to the establishment of the PMR’s statehood are seen as an expres-
55 Ibid., 431. 56 Stefan Troebst, Staatlichkeitskult im Pseudo-Staat. Identitätsmanagement in Transnis- trien, Osteuropa 53 (2003), n. 7, 963-983, 977. 57 Solonari, Creating a “People” (above fn. 54), 431. 58 Vasilii Iacovlev / Nicolae Babilunga / Boris Bomeşco (eds.), Bessarabskij vopros i obra- zovanie Pridnestrovskoj Moldavskoj Respubliki. Sbornik oficialnych dokumentov. Tiraspoľ 1993, 3f. 59 Igor’ Smirnov, Žit’ na našej zemle. Moscow 2001, 51. 60 Nicolae Babilunga, Pridnestrov‘e. Kratkij istoričeskij očerk, in: V. F. Gryzlov (ed.), Nepriznannaja Respublika. Očerki, dokumenty, chronika. Dokumenty gosudarstvennych organov Pridnestrov‘e, Vol. 1. Moscow 1997, 18-33, 19. 61 Vladislav Grosul / Nicolae Babilunga / Boris Bomeşco et al. (eds.), Istorija Pridnestro- vskoj Moldavskoj Respubliki, Vol. II/2. Tiraspoľ 2001, 72-95. 234 Dareg A. Zabarah sion of the people’s will, whereas those acts contributing to the contrary are portrayed as illegitimate.62 The concept of a titular nation owning the territory does not exist in Pridnestro- vism. The PMR’s constitution explicitly mentions the “multinational people” (mnogonacionaľnyj narod) and not a “multinational nation” (mnogonacionaľnaja nacija). The wording implies the right of all people to maintain their specific ethnic (national) belonging.63 The multicultural and multiethnic composition of the region is highlighted throughout, especially in the narration for the period of the 18th century, when the territory became part of the Russian Empire. It is emphasized that these nations (naciji) lived together peacefully and that assimila- tion processes took place between Moldovans, Ukrainians and Russians in their respective environments, which led to the formation of a specific Pridnestrovian character.64 The narrative underscores the idea that the “people of Pridnestrovie – of which the left-bank Moldovans constitute a harmonic part, really differ from the Moldovans in Bessarabia in their mentality and identity; even more they differ from the Romanians”.65 Despite the multiethnic character of the community, “a careful reading of the texts suggests that some etnosy are considered more equal than others, and that not all of them are equally welcome in the community”.66 While the peaceful character of both (Pridnestrovian) Moldovans and Slavs is acknowledged (Cossack atrocities are excused with the mores of the epoch), other groups are portrayed as “brutish by definition” (the Tatars) or as unreliable exploiters (the Poles). It becomes clear that the desired identity in these narratives is Orthodox and Eastern Slav, explicitly including Russians and – depending on the politi- cal climate – the Ukrainians and implicitly also the Belorusians. Moldovans are tolerated, but Poles as well as other Catholic Slavs are excluded.67 Groups are measured according to their distance from the “East Slavic Orthodox civiliza- tion” in what Solonari calls a “limited and hierarchical pluralism” that closely resembles the defunct concept of the “Soviet people”, the concept of a multi- ethnic community led by Russia. In this context, Orthodoxy also replaces and fills in the gaps left by the abolished Marxist-Leninist ideology.68
62 Babilunga, Pridnestrov’e. Kratkij istoričeskij očerk (above fn. 60), 29. 63 Michail Guboglu, Tjažkoe bremja konkurirujuščich identičnostej. Opyt Pridnestrov’ja, in: V. F. Gryzlov (ed.), Nepriznannaja Respublika. Očerki, dokumenty, chronika. Dokumenty gosudarstvennych organov Pridnestrov’e, Vol. 3. Moscow 1999, 43-96, 53. 64 Babilunga, Pridnestrov’e. Kratkij istoričeskij očerk (above fn. 60), 27. 65 Ibid., 30. 66 Solonari, Creating a “People” (above fn. 54), 432. 67 Ibid., 429f.; and Stefan Troebst, “We are Transnistrians!” Post-Soviet Identity Manage- ment in the Dniester Valley, Ab Imperio 1 (2003), 437-466, 449. 68 Solonari, Creating a “People” (above fn. 54), 433. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 235
With the takeover of Vladimir Putin in Russia in 2000, the Pridnestrovian elites reinforced this traditional orientation towards Russia. This in turn led to the divergence from the concept of a Pridnestrovian nation towards a pure Russification of the region in what can be described asthe Russkij Mir program- matic idea.69 Unlike the Pridnestrovian idea, which postulates the existence of a Pridnestro- vian nation as a narod (people) consisting of different nationalities embedded in a Slavic-Orthodox realm (the “bulwark”), the Russkij Mir idea is centered on Russia. The function of the Slavic Orthodox community here is not simply a men- tal map uniting all Slavic-Orthodox nations under a common understanding of destiny, but a clear preference for Russian cultural hegemony. The orientation towards Russia is absolute. Russia is not only seen as the successor of the Rus- sian Orthodox Empire, but also as the successor of the Soviet Union and as the carrier of its values, both in a legal and an imperial sense.70 A major break with the Pridnestrovian idea is also reflected in the attitude towards Pridnestrovian statehood. Whereas for the backers of Pridnestrovism, achieving absolute in- dependence was the main priority, those following the concept of Russkij Mir would readily give up this independence for unification with Russia.71 In this narrative the categories of Rossian – i. e. citizens of the Russian Federa- tion – and Russian – i. e. ethnic Russians – are used interchangeably according to need. When the existence of other nations and their rights is highlighted, the concept of Rossian is evoked as an umbrella-like concept which allows all na- tions to develop freely under it. However, this umbrella is exclusively filled with Russian symbolism (Slavic Orthodoxy, Russian language, culture, etc.), leaving no room for non-Russian cultural elements. It therefore has a merely declarative character. On the other hand, the narrative uses the category Russian in order to highlight scientific or cultural achievements and thereby demonstrates the superiority of the Russian, not the Rossian, people. The PMR no longer defines itself as the real Moldovan state committed to protect Moldovan culture from Romanization, but as a willfully russifying state. The Pridnestrovian narod is no longer defined as multinational, but as Slavic, emphasizing Slavic brotherhood under Russian rule.72
69 Troebst, Staatlichkeitskult im Pseudo-Staat (above fn. 56), 963. 70 Irina Blagodatskih, Gosudarstvennaja pravopreemstvennost’ Pridnestrov’ja v kontekste obščego uregulirovanija “Sovetskogo Nasledstva”, Istoričeskij Vestnik Pridnestrovskoj Mol- davskoj Respubliki 2 (2008), 21-24; Ilia Galinschi, Pridnestrov’e kak faktičeskoe gosudarstvo: problemy opredelenija političeskogo statusa, Obščestvennaja Mysl Pridnestrov’ja 1 (2005), 66- 71, 71; idem, Rossijskaja sostavljajuščaja pridnestrovskoj političeskoj kuľtury, Obščestvennaja Mysl Pridnestrov’ja 2 (2006), 74-77, 74; and Igor Smirnov, Vmeste s Rossijej. Tiraspoľ 2007, 31. 71 Galinschi, Rossijskaja sostavljajuščaja (above fn. 70), 77; and Smirnov, Vmeste s Rossijej (above fn. 70), 100f. 72 Smirnov, Vmeste s Rossijej (above fn. 70), 6. 236 Dareg A. Zabarah
In both programmatic ideas, the PMR’s elites have referred to an alternative to the ethno-nation and adapted their idea to the existing realities by defining the nation as a community of common destiny based upon an exclusive ideology. Since the anti-communist and anti-Soviet discourses were associated with a na- tionalist Romanianist rhetoric, the elites of the left bank associated themselves with the rival grouping, the conservatives, by keeping “Soviet values” in high esteem. The Pridnestrovian elites had to unite and mobilize their population not according to national categories but according to a unifying common cul- ture, that of “Sovietness”. When Sovietness began to lose its significance, they replaced it with the idea of a “Slavic bulwark”, a concept in which Orthodoxy played an important role. Co-operation between the Pridnestrovian leadership and the Orthodox Church intensified after the establishment of the Tiraspol-Dubasary eparchy in 1995, which comprises almost exactly the entire territory of Pridnestrovie. With the eparchy, the PMR elites nearly received their “state church”. Its bishop Justinian referred to Igor Smirnov as “president” and never used the terms unrecognized or self-proclaimed when referring to the PMR. Smirnov in turn often appears on television alongside clerics and emphasizes the role of Orthodoxy in the history of the PMR. Bishop Justinian is in line with the official state rhetoric, defending the Cyrillic alphabet for the Moldovans and pointing out the “uniqueness” of the Pridnestrovian state in which all citizens enjoy equality in the state polity. An eventual unification with Moldova – according to Justinian – would put the national harmony at risk, since Moldova will “unavoidably drag us under Romanian [rule]”.73 Bishop Justinian has participated in official celebrations, such as laying down wreaths on the various memorials that commemorate the war between Pridnestrovian and Moldovan forces in 1992.74 Except for oc- casional conflicts between Smirnov and the envoy for religious matters, Petr Založkov,75 church-state relations in the PMR seem to be non-conflictual. The Orthodox Church benefits from a privileged status, at the expense of other religious communities which are seen as “alien” or “foreign”.76 During the self- staged blockade of the Smirnov regime in 2006,77 the Church wrote letters to both the Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Ukrainian president Viktor Juščenko to support the citizens of Pridnestrovie and to put an end to the so-
73 Vy daže ne znaete gde ėto – Pridnestrov‘e, Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 9 (2007), 2. 74 See for example Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 17 (2004), 4; Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 6 (2006), 4; Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 7 (2008), 1; Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 13 (2009), 4; and Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 16 (2009), 4. 75 Odin v pole – voin?, Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 7 (2005), 3. 76 Turescu / Stan, Church-State Conflict (above fn. 1), 453. 77 For details see Zabarah, Nation- and Statehood in Moldova (above fn. 3), 165-177. The Orthodox Churches and the Nation in Moldova 237 called blockade.78 On the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War, the Russian Patriarch Kiril I. received a medal from Smirnov who – accompanied by Justinian’s successor Savva (Sergei Volkov) – visited the church leader in his Moscow residence.79
Conclusions
This study analyzes the connection between the current nation-building processes in Moldova on both sides of the Dniester and the role of Orthodoxy in enforcing them. It demonstrates how the same religious community – the Orthodox believers – can offer two fundamentally different interpretations of ethnicity, based on their political and institutional heritages. While the RomOC views ethnos as a community of common descent and features, the ROC sees ethnos as a community of common space. These differing interpretations are in turn embedded in a wider national as well as state discourses that originated in the respective home countries of these churches and have been transferred to the Republic of Moldova. Due to the collapse of communist postulates, the Orthodox Church played a significant role in Moldovan group-building processes. Orthodoxy helped fill an ideological gap by drawing on discursive fields previously occupied by the communist regime. Both the clerical and the political hierarchy worked freely with the category of Orthodoxy in order to construct and implement their re- spective ideas of nationhood and statehood. This subsequently led to increased co-operation between political and church elites. The Moldovan Orthodox Church will always be subject to political influence from Romania and Russia. The RomOC and the ROC are connected to the politi- cal elites in their respective home countries and a strong symbiosis between state and church exists in both Romania and Russia. As long as autocephaly is not (yet) an option for the Moldovan Orthodox Church, this influence will persist.
78 Prezidentu Rossijskoj Federacii V. V. Putinu, Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 5 (2006), 3; and Prezidentu Respubliki Ukraina V. A. Juščenko, ibid. 79 Sostojalas’ vstreča Svjatejšego Patriarcha Moskovskogo i Vseja Rusi Kirilla s Episkopom Savvoj i Preszidentom PMR I. N. Smirnovym, Pravoslavnoe Pridnestrov’e 7 (2010) 1.