Educational Provision for Officers of the Royal Navy 1857 - 1877 by Harold William Dickinson Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Education, University of London Institute of Education 1994 1 Abstract This thesis examines the nature and extent of initial and higher education for officers of the Royal Navy from 1857 to 1877 - a period that constituted the most vigorous years of educational reform in the history of the Service. That this activity should arise in a period of general stasis In naval affairs, is the central paradox this work seeks to explore. To this end the system of examination and entry into the Service is explained and the origins and development of the training ship HMS Britannia are identified. Existing assessments of her curriculum and routine are challenged and the various attempts to found an alternative shore based college are outlined. The extent and efficiency of education conducted post- Britannia in operational warships is also discussed and the efficiency of the sea-going Naval Instructor system lS questioned. In higher education the work of the Royal Naval College Portsmouth and its successor at Greenwich is considered and in particular the process by which this more expenslve, overwhelmingly less popular institution was chosen as the Navy's new higher education establishment, is analysed and explained. 2 \ , Contents Introduction Page 6 Chapter One The Origins of Officer Education Page 57 and the Foundation and Early Development of the Training Ship, HMS Britannia to 1862. Chapter Two The Origin and Development of Page 121 Continuing and Higher Education in the Royal Navy to 1869. Chapter Three The Progress of the Training Ship Page 180 1862 - 1868 Chapter Four The Development of Higher Page 241 Education and the establishment and early years of the Royal Naval College Greenwich 1869 - 1877 Chapter Five The fortunes of HMS Britannia Page 318 1869 - 1877 Conclusion Page 386 3 List of Tables The Royal Navy 1850-1900 - Total Supplies Granted Page 9 The Royal Navy 1850-1900 - Total Personnel Voted Page 21 Naval Instructors 1840-1857 Page 71 Naval Instructors - Active/Inactive 1857-1870 Page 140 Naval Instructors - Clergy v. Laymen 1857-1870 Page 144 Examination Mark Profile - HMS Britannia 1862-1867 Page 215 4 List of Illustrations HMS Britannia Cadet Training Ship 1859-1869 Page 91 Cadets' Sleeping Space HMS Britannia Page 98 Site of the Royal Naval College, Portsmouth Page 166 Position of the Britannia and the Hindostan Page 189 at Dartmouth The fifth Britannia moored stem to stern with Page 195 with Hindostan Punishment Regulations HMS Britannia 1862/63 Page 205 Goschen at the Admiralty - Punch 18 March 1871 Page 275 The Royal Naval College Greenwich Page 288 5 Introduction In June 1897 the Queen's Diamond Jubilee Review provided the greatest display of naval force the world had ever seen. At Spithead more than 160 modern warships were assembled in a vivid demonstration of the nature and quality of British sea power. Only modern vessels were deployed and not a single foreign station had been weakened to provide a spectacle of almost 30 miles of ships-in-line. The number of personnel borne, at 92,322, was the highest since the end of the Napoleonic wars and the Estimates for 1897, in excess of £22 million, had never previously been equalled. Such a lavish organisation was fully in accordance with the public mood for a country that dressed its children in sailor suits and created a whole body of 'genre' art, around images of the Royal Navy. 'All classes', Marder has suggested, 'had or thought they had something to gain from the growth of the Navy'. 1 Yet the most striking aspect of this demonstration of naval power and public enthusiasm often taken to be synonomous with the Victorian era, was that it was in sharp contrast to the bulk of the nineteenth century naval exper1ence. Just a decade before the Diamond Jubilee Review for example, the ships taking part in a similar evolution were described by one Admiral as 'a motley collection of ancient constructions' and by another as 'mere ullage'. 2 Their unsatisfactory state was emphasised 6 by a series of accidents and collisions that indicated equally poor levels of training and efficiency of those who operated them. This was undoubtedly a more typical picture of the Royal Navy in the Victorian era. In contrast to the glittering display and public enthusiasm of the last decade, for the bulk of the nineteenth century the Service was a relatively small, overworked, chronically ill-manned institution struggling to come to terms with a plethora of policy objectives and technological innovation. This thesis examines the years 1857 to 1877, a period when the fortunes of the Royal Navy were arguably at their lowest. In the introduction the background and nature of the Service at this time, particularly in terms of politics, finance, administration and personnel will be summarised so that educational developments within the organisation may be properly understood. A sound grasp of the wider naval context is particularly important, for these years have been seen as 'the dark ages of the Victorian navy' 3 and an era where the Service was content to see itself as 'apart from all ordinary knowledge involving a mass of technicalities and contradictions not 4 to be unravelled by inexperienced persons'. The second part of the introduction surveys the extent and nature of previous comment on the period. In particular, it examines existing accounts of the development of naval education, so that a datum for the purposes of contrast and comparison on the subject may be established. 7 Finance and Politics Any attempt to scrutinise the activities of the mid­ Victorian Royal Navy must commence with some appreciation of its financial context and in particular the fluctuation of the yearly sums voted in the Estimates. In general terms spending falls into three principal and distinct periods. For about 25 years after Victoria's acceSSlon there was a gradual approximately three fold increase in naval spending, which supported a doubling of the numbers of seamen and boys voted. This situation was maintained for several years after the Russian wars, principally ln response to French ironclad construction. From 1862 expenditure began to fall and although there were fluctuations over the following 25 years, the 1862 figure was not matched again until 1885. Thus for over two decades the Estimates were relatively static. The third distinct phase in naval spending is apparent with the advent of rumours of a Franco-German alliance and an increase in foreign ship building programmes synthesised in the 'naval scare' of 1884. In the next 15 years both the Estimates and the number of personnel in the Service doubled, as the international naval rivalry which was to characterise the late Victorian era took a grip on the politics and public interest of the country. The years of this study coincide largely with frugality and general stasis in naval spending. The exception was the period of four years from 1857, which through a combination of invasion fever and concern about 8 Table A The Royal Navy 1850-1900 Total Naval Supplies Granted £35 M 30 25 20 15 10 5 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 9 new construction in the French navy saw the Estimates rlse from almost £10 million to well over £12 million in 1861. However, this figure represented the zenith of naval spending and was not matched again for more than 20 years. Year by year attempts were made to limit the budget and by 1869 it had fallen below £10 million for the first time ln a decade. Although it rose slightly after 1870, it only once exceeded £12 million up to 1885 and financial retrenchment remained the primary aim. (See Table A). Thus despite the numerous international calls on British naval assets and the need to fund a technological revolution in ship design, this was an era when the Service, year by year, represented less of a burden upon the national economy. It is doubtful, suggests Bartlett, whether at any other time Britain was able to purchase securlty. at so c h eap a prlce.. 5 Politically the early years of the period were dominated by Liberal government. The exception was the brief interlude from February 1858 until July of the following year, when the Conservatives under Lord Derby, with Sir John Pakington as First Lord, formed the administration. Their policy favoured an overall strengthening of Navy in response to a French challenge, particularly in ironclad construction. Thus in February 1859 Pakington asked for an increase of about £1 million over the previous years spending, noting that 'whatever may be the cost we have no option in the discharge of our duty but to commence the construction of ironclad ships,.6 The programme was duly initiated in April, amid growlng 10 fears of an invasion threat and public concern about Britain's wartime capability. To some extent these were factors that could be exploited by the succeeding Liberal government under Palmerston, with the Duke of Somerset as First Lord, which came to power in July 1859. Yet any naval expansion they proposed, while finding support from the Crown, the Conservatives and a large section of the electorate, often foundered within their own party. Even the Cabinet contained men of every shade of Liberal opinion from Whig aristocrat to Cobdenite radical and while The Times suggested that 'There never was a more powerful cas t ... ' 7 , the result was that every budget brought a fight over naval expenditure. Despite a deep rooted desire from Gladstone and the Treasury to achieve economies in the Service budget, fear of the French and the considerable range of foreign policy objectives that required naval support, made economies difficult to achieve up to 1862.