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2019-08-20 Environment, Risk, and Ideology: The critical theory of the Frankfurt School and Ulrich Beck

Trottier, Brody

Trottier, B. (2019). Environment, Risk, and Ideology: The critical theory of the Frankfurt School and Ulrich Beck (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/110764 master thesis

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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Environment, Risk, and Ideology: The critical theory of the Frankfurt School and Ulrich Beck

by

Brody Trottier

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN SOCIOLOGY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 2019

© Brody Trottier 2019

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the social theories of Ulrich Beck and the first generation of the Frankfurt

School to spur a debate on social transformation and environmental risk. In particular, this confrontation explores a key difference between these approaches—whereas the early Frankfurt

School theorizes how society is capable of containing qualitative change, Beck emphasizes the forces which break apart this containment and transform society. This thesis raises the following critiques: (1) that the theory of risk society provides an insufficient account of power and (2) that the one-dimensionality thesis and the paradigm of the critique of instrumental reason problematizes the normative standpoint of critical theory. The analysis overcomes these key critiques by: (1) advocating for a framework of power and risk which accounts for the role of ideology as a means of social control and (2) attempting to limit the claims of the one- dimensionality thesis by demonstrating that risks have the potential to open up the totalizing system of domination theorized by the early Frankfurt School. In addition to these contributions, this thesis explores the importance of immanent critique as a basis for praxis and compares

Marcuse’s vision for a ‘new science’ with Beck’s concept of ‘reflexive scientization’.

ii

PREFACE

This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Brody Trottier.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not be possible without my supervisor, Dr. Dean Curran who generously gave his time to help me develop this project and my faculties as a student. Thank you for your continued guidance, support, and dedication.

I would also like to thank the following people for contributing to the completion of this thesis: the professors who taught excellent courses in the sociology department including Dr. Tom

Langford, Dr. Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Dr. Jean Wallace and Dr. Matt Patterson who also agreed to be my internal examiner; Dr. Byron Miller for kindly agreeing to be my external examiner; and my peers in the sociology department for their support and collaboration.

Lastly, I wish to acknowledge my friends and family, to whom I am grateful for their love and support.

iv

DEDICATION

For my mother, Debra and my brother, Jake.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... i Preface...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iii Dedication ...... iv Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1 The Firtst-Generation Frankfurt School and Ulrich Beck ...... 2 1.2 Outline ...... 4 Chapter 2: The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School...... 7 2.1 The Influences of the Early Frankfurt School ...... 8 2.1.1 The Influence of Karl Marx ...... 9 2.1.2 The Influence of Max Weber ...... 10 2.2 The Domination of Nature and the Domination of Humanity ...... 13 2.3 Reconciliation with Nature...... 17 2.4 A New Paradigm For Science and Technology ...... 20 2.5 Ideology and Contemporary Society: The culture industry ...... 24 2.6 Ideology and Contemporary Society: Surplus repression and false needs ...... 27 2.7 The Wholly Administered Society and the One-Dimensionality Thesis ...... 30 2.8 The Paradox of the First-Generation Frankfurt School ...... 33 2.9 Conclusion ...... 36 Chapter 3: Ulrich Beck and the Theory Of Risk Society...... 38 3.1 From Odysseus to Risk Society ...... 39 3.2 Towards a New Modernity ...... 42 3.3 Subpolitics in the Risk Society...... 45 3.4 Reflexivity and Rationalization ...... 48 3.5 Power in the Risk Society ...... 50 3.6 The Theory of Metamorphosis and Emancipatory Catastrophism...... 52 3.7 Nature in the Risk Society ...... 56 3.8 Problems With Beck and the Theory of Risk Society ...... 58 3.9 Conclusion ...... 61 Chapter 4: Environment, Risk, and Ideology...... 63 4.1 Limits to Beck’s Theorizing of Power ...... 66 vi

4.1.1 Ideology and Risk Society ...... 70 4.2 Limits to the Early Frankfurt School ...... 75 4.2.1 Breaking Apart the Totality: Risk society ...... 78 4.2.2 Revisiting the Limitations of Risk society ...... 81 4.3 Beck and Marcuse on a New Science ...... 82 4.4 Conclusion ...... 87 Chapter 5: Conclusion...... 88 5.1 Overview of Conclusions ...... 88 5.2 Limitations and Potential for Future Research ...... 90 5.3 Critical Theory and Environmental Crisis ...... 91 References ...... 93

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The climate crisis is a defining feature of contemporary society. The IPCC (2018) warns of the dangers of warming above 2 ⁰C pre-industrial levels. They cite catastrophic effects, even when compared to 1.5 ⁰C of global warming (IPCC 2018). We are currently at 1 ⁰C and already beginning to see consequences in “extreme weather effects, rising sea levels and diminishing

Arctic sea ice” (IPCC 2018). Climate change threatens both natural systems as well as social issues such as human rights, global health and poverty reduction—without even mentioning the possible casualties (Alston 2019). Joseph Stiglitz (2019), Nobel prize winner for Economics, has referred to the climate crisis as “our third world war”. This analogy is certainly apt for how seriously we should be taking this issue. However, the most apparent fact about climate change is that there is a persistent gap between knowledge and action. Despite mass consensus on the facts about climate change, we are also consistently falling short at meeting its challenges.

According to the United Nations Environment Programme’s (2017:xiv) evaluation of the Paris agreement on climate change, this ambitious, coordinated effort “cover[s] only approximately one third of the emissions reductions needed to be on a least cost pathway for the goal of staying well below 2°C”. Even if governments follow through on their promises made at the Paris

Accord, which seems improbable, there is still an urgent need for accelerated short-term action

(UNEP 2017:xiv). Despite all the available knowledge and consensus within the scientific community and the public, the issue of climate change is still more associated with political struggle and inaction than collaboration and investment. Acting on the climate crisis is no small undertaking, and the literature suggests radical changes must be made to lower emissions, but advanced industrial societies across the globe are still either not willing or not able to do enough to tackle this problem. Theoretical investigations are necessary to understand this fact. 2

1.1 The First-Generation Frankfurt School and Ulrich Beck

At the heart of this study is an attempt to grasp the dialectic underlying the climate crisis.

Two opposing questions motivate this analysis: (1) What are the forces in society which break apart the status quo and can potentially drive the social transformations necessary to rise up against the climate crisis? (2) Against this, what are the forces that are containing social change, and upholding the existing state of affairs? To answer these broad questions on the nature of advanced industrial societies in the age of climate risks, this study looks to Ulrich Beck and the

Frankfurt School.

The first-generation of the Frankfurt School, as an identifiable body of thought, usually refers to a group of five thinkers that were associated with the Institute of Social Research established in Frankfurt, Germany: Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Löwenthal and Friedrich Pollock (Held 1980:15). This study’s focus will be on Horkheimer, Adorno, and

Marcuse (hereby referred to as: the Frankfurt School) as the central figures of Critical Theory

(Held 1980:15).1 Although there are variances in their thought which will be noted, generally, the Frankfurt School is united by an interpretation of Marxist thought. This thesis will focus on a development in their thought known as the ‘critique of instrumental reason’ which extends the critique of political economy to the totality of social formations (Benhabib 1994:75; Bottomore

1984/2002:36). What makes the first-generation Frankfurt School worth examining today is that they offer an ecological critique decades before any popular environmental movement took hold.

Despite this, attempts to integrate the early Frankfurt School into contemporary environmental sociology have been limited (Gunderson 2015, 2016). The Frankfurt School has even faced a

1 The use of the term Critical Theory has since broadened—especially since Habermas’s break from the first generation of the Frankfurt School (Held 1980:15). 3

degree of opposition in environmental sociology with some claiming, “Critical Theory has not been extensively engaged with environmental questions” (Buttel, Dickens, Dunlap and Gijswijt

2002:13)2. Through this engagement I hope to more seriously integrate the Frankfurt School within the environmental sociology literature because of Beck’s established status within this field.

At the heart of Ulrich Beck’s project is a theory of modernization. Beck argues that a shift has occurred in the nature of modernity, from the ‘first modernity’—where the central conflict is over the production and distribution of goods—to a ‘reflexive modernization’—the self- confrontation of the latent side-effects of industrial society (Curran 2016a:4; Beck 1992:19).

With the development of the theory of risk society, Beck has sought to challenge and rethink many of the categories employed by sociologists in the 19th and 20th century such as class and the nation-state (Woodman, Threadgold, Possamai-Inesedy 2015:1119). The theory of risk society has been highly influential as sociologists grapple with his arguments3 and adopt his concepts into their own work.4 Risk society is a particularly useful framework for understanding contemporary environmental crises because Beck highlights the commonalities of risks as

‘manufactured uncertainties’ resulting from the existing production of goods (Curran 2016a:5).

Under this framework, we can begin to identify the ways in which society is transformed by

2 In the same edited collection, Wehling (2002:145) distinguishes between Catton and Dunlap’s theorizing of society and the environment (to represent contemporary environmental sociology) and the Frankfurt School’s theorizing of nature and society. The general claim is that nature is an “essentialist” and outdated term—although Wedhling (2002:157-158) is somewhat sympathetic to the Frankfurt School’s use of nature and does not necessarily agree with these critics. I argue that this distinction is largely one of semantics. First, the Frankfurt School acknowledged that the view of nature is societalized (reified) and thus is explicitly non-essentialist (Gunderson 2016:67). Second, by using the term ‘nature’, the Frankfurt School are speaking to both internal (psychological) nature as well as external nature (the environment including humanity). This allows the Frankfurt School to make overcoming the domination of nature and the domination of humanity inseparable goals. 3 One of the most significant of these debates is on the role of class and risk. For an overview see Curran (2016a). 4 The most famous of Beck’s contemporaries and collaborators was Anthony Giddens (1990) who helped develop the theory of risk society and adopted his own understanding of reflexive modernization. 4

environmental risks, as well as the ways in which the environment is shaped by society through the production of risks.

These thinkers were selected to answer the two questions outlined above because of a key divide in their thought—whereas the early Frankfurt School emphasizes the ways in which society contains qualitative change, Beck’s focus is on the forces which break apart this containment. To expand on this, the Frankfurt School focuses their critiques on domination and social control; although they are motivated to overcome these conditions, they resisted laying out a rigid set of political demands and instead emphasized the process of self-emancipation (Held

1980:25). It is for this reason the first-generation Frankfurt School underscores the negative aspects of social life. By contrast, Beck’s focus is on identifying transformations that advanced industrial societies are experiencing in their transition from an industrial society to a risk society.

These changes, for better or for worse, uproot the status quo. Beck is particularly attentive to how modernity is becoming reflexive and increasingly apt to confront its mistakes. It is this divide which allows us to theorize the opposing forces in society that characterize the challenge of climate change.

1.2 Outline

In addition to the two questions outlined above—regarding the identification of the forces which contain and/or disrupt the status quo—this study is motivated by the following research question: what can Beck and the first-generation Frankfurt School learn from one another to improve their overall purchase in theorizing contemporary society? This intentionally open- ended question is answered by identifying the core limitations of the Frankfurt School and the theory of risk society, and then attempting to overcome these weaknesses through an engagement with each other’s’ theories. 5

In the next chapter, I will be closely examining the theories of the Frankfurt School.

Following Gunderson (2016), I will bring attention to the fact that the first-generation Frankfurt

School’s central organizing principle in the critique of instrumental reason, is the relationship between humanity and nature.5 This discussion will primarily focus on exploring the Frankfurt

School’s ecological critique, termed the ‘domination thesis’, and how it relates to science, technology and the domination of both human and non-human nature. In addition, I will be discussing other important theoretical developments found within the work of the early Frankfurt

School including: their relationship to Marx and Weber; pathways to reconciliation with nature;

Marcuse’s conception of a ‘new science’; ideological critique, as expressed through immanent critique, the culture industry, and false needs; and the tendency of the total integration of society

(Held 1980:71; Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:ix). Finally, I will be examining a critique of the Frankfurt School laid out by Seyla Benhabib (1994) which suggests that the totalizing domination of the one-dimensionality thesis (and the critique of instrumental reason in general) problematizes the position from which critical theory can claim to be speaking to norms and values immanent to society.

The third chapter provides an overview of the work of Beck and his theory of risk society.

This chapter argues for an interpretation of Beck’s work that emphasizes its continuity from Risk

Society to Metamorphosis of the World. In addition, this chapter will engage with the relationship of Beck’s work to the early Frankfurt School, provide an overview for the theory of risk society, analyse Beck’s conception of power, critically evaluate Beck’s most recent theoretical developments—the theory of metamorphosis and emancipatory catastrophism, and outline

5 The Frankfurt School use gendered language (i.e. the ‘domination of man’ vs. the ‘domination of humanity’) which, outside of direct quotations, will be avoided in this thesis. 6

Beck’s conception of nature in the theory of risk society. After this overview, I will be advancing a critique of the theory of risk society where it will be argued that Beck provides an insufficient account of power.

The objective in the fourth chapter of this thesis is to overcome the identified limitations of

Beck and the first-generation Frankfurt School by inciting a debate on social transformations and crises. To overcome the critiques laid out in chapters 2 and 3, I will be: (1) demonstrating the importance of a multidimensional framework of power which includes the role of ideology for legitimation and reification and (2) attempting to limit the claims made by the early Frankfurt

School by showing how risks begin to break apart the totalizing system of domination. This chapter will conclude by exploring the possibilities of overcoming the concerns of both theorists through a discussion on ‘new science’ and ‘reflexive scientization’.

In the final, concluding chapter, I aim to summarize the claims made throughout this analysis. In addition, I will be identifying the limitations of this study, new inquiries that could arise from the conclusions made, and discussing the importance of critical theory to engage with the climate crisis.

7

CHAPTER 2: THE CRITICAL THEORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

The aim of this review will be to present the core insights of the first generation of the Frankfurt

School in such a way as to emphasize “a central organizing component of their social theory… their theorization and problematization of society’s relationship with nature” (Gunderson

2015:224). It will be argued that an often-overlooked environmental critique exists throughout the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, and that this critique can be utilized to grasp the contemporary ecological crisis. Because their most important work largely predates what is known as the ‘environmental movement’, there is little explicit reference to, or engagement with, concepts such as ecology or environmentalism.6 Nevertheless, the relationship between humanity and nature—as mediated through reason—is essential for understanding their critique of contemporary Western societies. This theme is taken up in some of their most important works such as: Dialectic of Enlightenment, Eclipse of Reason, Eros and Civilization, One-Dimensional

Man and Essays on Liberation. Beyond this, it will be noted how several of their insights may also be applied to understanding the production of ecological risk in the contemporary age.

Concepts such as culture industry and false needs point to ideological structures which serve to perpetuate the consumerism of capitalism and characterize advanced industrial societies as societies of excess.

This review will finish by identifying the core problems with the Frankfurt School’s paradigm known as ‘the critique of instrumental reason’. While the Frankfurt School can identify the most fundamental contradictions of contemporary society, their characterization of late-

6 Marcuse (1972/2008), as the last surviving member of the School, wrote a short piece near the end of his career entitled “Ecology and Revolution” as well as delivered a talk before his death called “Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society” (1979/1992). What Marcuse lays out in these brief discussions largely aligns with the arguments that are made in this analysis: namely, that the ecological movement is a potential basis for emancipatory politics and overcoming the domination of nature. 8

capitalist societies problematizes the possibility for emancipatory social transformations

(Benhabib 1994:83-88). On the one hand, critical theorists emphasize the ways in which capitalism mitigates economic and social crises without the resolution of contradictions; on the other, they contrast the irrationality of late-capitalism with the values and norms which are immanent to its culture and provide an emancipatory basis (Benhabib 1994:83-84; 87). The

Frankfurt School identifies the key contradictions of late-industrial society, and—to some degree—offer a utopian alternative that is the resolution of those contradictions, but they are unable to theorize how social transformations can escape the totality of late-capitalist societies.

Although Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse collaborated frequently, their divergent thoughts cannot necessarily be treated as a cohesive unit. Instead of attempting to understand the work of the Frankfurt School as offering a unified theory—key concepts, methodologies, and shared concerns will be identified. Where there are differences, it will be noted who these ideas belong to so as not to falsely attribute them.

2.1 The Influences of the Early Frankfurt School

To begin, it will be helpful to briefly discuss the influence of two key thinkers on the

Frankfurt School—Karl Marx and Max Weber. The shared influences of the Frankfurt School are certainly not limited to these two theorists—the likes of Hegel, Lukács, Nietzsche and Freud are more than worthy of a mention—but what they owe to Marx and Weber, will serve as a foundation for understanding their overall sociological perspective. Namely, from Marx and

Weber respectively, critical theorists view capitalism and rationalization as the key interrelated forces which tie the domination of nature to the domination of man (Benhabib:70-74; Gunderson

2015:224). In underlining the explicit environmental critique found throughout the works of the 9

early Frankfurt School, the importance of capitalism and instrumental-rationality will again be stressed as the most central societal forces contributing to environmental destruction.

2.1.1 The influence of Karl Marx

Examining the relationship of the first-generation Frankfurt School to Marx requires a degree of nuance. Critical theorists are in no way orthodox Marxists; they reject the notion that history is a manifestation of economic laws moving towards communism (Held 1980:24).

Critical theorists argue that changes in material conditions since Marx’s time—the development of the welfare state, managerial capitalism, state socialism, and fascism—require Marx’s theories to be revised (Antonio 1981:331). This is not to suggest that they abandon a critique of political economy, in fact as argued by Held (1980:25), “the Frankfurt school as a whole developed a systematic account of the nature of capitalist society”. Rather, the Frankfurt School attempts to understand new forms of control under modern domination, where the direct exploitation of early capitalism is replaced with a new form of administrative power (Antonio 1981:335). With the decline of liberal capitalism and the subsequent rise of “state capitalism” (alternately termed

“monopoly capitalism”), “mass democracies”, and “totalitarian formations of the national socialist source”—the Marxian critique of political economy was extended to a critique of the

“capitalist social formation as a whole” (Benhabib 1994:73). In this way, the critique of political economy begins to be displaced by a new paradigm: the ‘critique of instrumental reason’

(Benhabib 1994:75; Bottomore 1984/2002:36). Because of these developments, some have questioned the extent to which this period of the Frankfurt School can be considered Marxist.

Bottomore (1984/2002:36) notes that some have “interpreted the development of Frankfurt

School in the 1950s and 1960s as a passage from a Marxian to a Weberian conception of the historical tendencies inherent in advanced industrial societies”. However, because Marx’s own 10

critique of capitalism was not restricted to purely economic factors—as he was interested in the dialectical relationship of ideology and economic structures—this interpretation of the Frankfurt

School should be treated with skepticism (Agger 1976:161).

Despite their criticisms of orthodox approaches to Marx, the core of critical theory is based on an interpretation of Marx’s thought (Antonio 1981:331). The Frankfurt School does not merely adhere to the empirical and theoretical content of Marx’s analysis, instead they adopt

“Marx’s analytical categories, [continue] his critique of capitalism and [embrace] his goal of emancipation” (Antonio 1981:331). As will be discussed in greater detail, Marx’s logic of analysis— a historically applied methodology—is retained by the Frankfurt School. The methodologies employed by critical theorists, which are central to the very definition of Critical

Theory, are derived from Marx’s own methods—notably, from his critiques of ideology and commodity fetishism. No matter how far Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse may have drifted from Marx, his influence remains relevant throughout their work.

2.1.2 The influence of Max Weber

From Weber, the Frankfurt school adopts and revises his theory of rationalization. Weber

(2012/1914:289) makes the distinction between two types of rational forms of action: instrumental rationality—the rational calculation of means to achieve a desired subjective end, and value-rationality—the “conscious belief in the value for its own sake”. This bifurcation of reason becomes an important concept for the early Frankfurt School. For them, the difference is between a formal, means-end rationality and a critical, substantive rationality, which can answer questions about values and ends (Held 1980:67). One key difference between the early Frankfurt school and Weber, is that the Frankfurt School does not blame rationalization for the evils of technological civilization, “rather it is the mode in which the process of rationalization is itself 11

organized that accounts for the ‘irrationality of this rationalization’” (Held, 1980:66). For critical theorists, the form that rationalization takes in industrial society, as a calculating pursuit of profits and an increasingly efficient domination of nature, is a historically specific organization of rationalization (Horkheimer 1946/2013:102).

For Lebow (2017:39), the key facet of Weber’s rationalization is the separation of truth and morality. Whereas Marx understood alienation as the relationship between the labourer and the ownership of the means of production, Weber saw this as only one of many forms of alienation (Lebow 2017:39). People in the modern age struggle with the ‘universality of humankind’, as “the differentiation of cultural value spheres undermines the possibility of ethical unification” (Lebow 2017:39). As capitalist competition lost its cultural roots (in Protestantism), it was supplanted by the logic of economic necessity (Weber 1958/2003:180; Lebow 2017:39).

Weber describes a disenchanted world that is struggling to find cultural meaning. Both Beck and the Frankfurt School retain this “dialectical interplay of the ideal and material” as central to their theorizing of rationalization (Lebow 2017:39). This dialectic, and Weber’s crisis of reason, continues in the contemporary age, as science grapples with its foundations and confronts the products of its own disastrous side effects.

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (hereafter: The Protestant Ethic) is an inquiry into the origins of rational capitalism; offering an alternative, cultural explanation to that of Marx’s historical materialism (Weber 1958/2003:55, 183). Here, Weber (1958/2003:105, 157,

180) argues that it was Protestantism that laid the foundation for the spirit of capitalism and the elements of all modern culture— “rational conduct on the basis of the calling”. For Weber, the

Puritan outlook “favoured the development of a rational bourgeois economic life; it was the most important, and above all the only consistent influence in the development of that life. It stood at 12

the cradle of economic man” (Weber 1958/2003:174). As religion produced industry and frugality, it consequently produced wealth (Weber 1958/2003:174). The religious basis for capitalism was lost as rationalization began to overtake all aspects of life, resulting in an “iron cage” (Weber 1958/2003:181).

Weber’s genealogy of rational capitalism is highly dialectical—including the relationship between culture and religion (the ideal), and the institutions and economic structures which make up the iron cage (the material). The Protestant Ethic ends with an insightful recognition of the limitations to Weber’s mostly idealist account of history. Weber’s (1958/2003:183) intentions were not “to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history.” According to Weber (1958/2003:183), “each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, but as the conclusion of the investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth”. Even though Weber is offering an alternative explanation to historical materialism regarding the origins of capitalism, he does not see his singular narrative as being able to grasp the social totality.

For Weber, social institutions such as the state and the market were distinct from cultural

“value-spheres” such as science, art, and morality (Lebow 2017:39). In The Protestant Ethic,

Weber makes clear that “the loss of social freedom imposed by the institutions of rationalized bureaucratic capitalism was causally connected to the erosion of cultural meaning, but it was analytically distinct” (Lebow 2017:49). However, this ambivalent space allowed for “moral personality to resist the iron cage” (Lebow 2017:49). According to Benhabib (1994:74), the

Frankfurt School use ‘rationalization’ and ‘instrumental reason’ “to refer to societal processes, dynamics of personality formation and cultural meaning structures [indicating] that Marcuse,

Adorno, and Horkheimer collapse the two processes of rationalization, the societal and the 13

cultural, which Max Weber had sought to differentiate”. In Benhabib’s (1994:74-75) view, this forces the first-generation Frankfurt School to critique instrumental reason from the standpoint of a non-instrumental paradigm of reason with a utopian character—which is the second major recasting of Weber’s theory of social action. Whereas Weber distinguished between instrumental-rationality and value-rationality—the Frankfurt School are forced to theorize the importance of cultivating a non-instrumental, critical form of reason.

2.2 The Domination of Nature and the Domination of Humanity

In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno “radically rescale the Weberian dialectic and trace the genesis of the crisis of reason “incomparably further back” than the late medieval emergence of bourgeois thought and all the way to the beginnings of Western civilization” (Lebow 2017:46). Although the reading of this book presented here will primarily focus on its themes related to domination, nature, and technology—it is still important to keep in mind the context of its writing. Horkheimer and Adorno, both of Jewish descent, escaped

Nazism by moving the Institute of Social Research7—first to Geneva in 1933 and then to

Columbia University in 1935 (Held 1980:34). Dialectic of Enlightenment, first and foremost, is an attempt to understand the Nazi catastrophe by making the connection between fascism and

Western rationalism (Lebow 2017:45). For the Frankfurt School there is an intimate relationship between Western reason and fascist thought. The shadow of Fascism will continue to be an ever- present concern through the rest of their work.

The thrust of the early Frankfurt School’s ecological critique is expressed most clearly through a series of insights that may be termed the ‘domination thesis’ (Gunderson 2015:225).

7 The organizational home of the Frankfurt School. 14

Combining the theories discussed from Marx and Weber (along with a strong Freudian and

Hegelian element), Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997:xvi) argue that the highly rationalized form that the domination of nature takes place in advanced industrial societies is only a recent manifestation of a much older transgression dating back to the origins of western civilization. It is in this way that “myth is already enlightenment”—one of the two major theses of Dialectic of

Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947/1997:xvi). Key to the Frankfurt School’s understanding of rationalization is its relationship to domination. Domination, of both humanity and nature, is driven by the apparatus of rationalization. In Dialectic of Enlightenment,

Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1997:54) argue that:

As soon as man discards his awareness that he himself is nature, all the aims for which he

keeps himself alive—social progress, the intensification of all his material and spiritual

powers, even consciousness itself—are nullified, and the enthronement of the means as

an end, which under late capitalism is tantamount to open insanity, is already perceptible

in the prehistory of subjectivity.

To justify this claim, Horkheimer and Adorno look to one of the oldest texts in the Western canon, Homer’s Odyssey. They argue that it is Odysseus who represents the “prototype of the bourgeois individual”—using his superior cunning to overcome the mythical creatures on his return to Ithaca (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:43). The interpretation of Odysseus found in Dialectic of Enlightenment serves as a genealogy of enlightenment thought and by extension, a genealogy of reason (Benhabib 1994:79). Horkheimer and Adorno (1943/1997:57) argue that

Odysseus’s use of reason to conquer the natural world is what characterizes those aspects of the

Enlightenment that lead to destruction and domination. 15

The most apparent example of this is found in Odysseus’s struggle to overcome the song of the Sirens. Odysseus binds himself to his ship so that the temptation of the siren song cannot be fulfilled (Horkheimer and Adorno 1943/1997:59). He then plugs his crew’s ears with wax, so that both the song, and the cries of their master cannot be heard (Horkheimer and Adorno

1943/1997:59). While Odysseus is cunning enough to overcome his own nature, his crew’s passions must be dominated, as they are required to ignore what is ahead; “to never learn of their deepest needs—lest they cease their laborious rowing together” (Alford 1993:209; Horkheimer and Adorno 1943/1997:34). Two insights arise from this interpretation. First, the division of labour is not shown to guarantee a greater state of freedom—the labourers must repress their desire to hear the beauty of the songs of the sirens, and the master must physically bound himself to his social role (Biro 2005:122-123; Horkheimer and Adorno 1943/1997:34). Second, the self- sacrifice of Odysseus is repeated in one story after another (Biro 2005:120).8 As stated by

Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997:54):

Man’s domination over himself, which grounds his selfhood, is almost always the

destruction of the subject in whose service it is undertaken; for the substance which is

dominated, suppressed and dissolved by virtue of self-preservation is none other than that

very life as functions of which the achievements of self-preservation find their sole

definitions and determination: it is in fact what is to be preserved.

The self-sacrifice found in these stories is done for no reason beyond self-preservation.

However, this practice “gives away more of his life than is given back to him: and more than the life he vindicates” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:55). For Benhabib (1994:75), Dialectic

8 For instance, in his confrontation with the Cyclops, Odysseus must make the ultimate self-sacrifice and deny his own existence to defeat him. 16

of Enlightenment posits that “the promise of the Enlightenment to free man from his self- incurred tutelage cannot be attained via reason that is mere self-preservation”. It is the fear of the

‘other’ (nature) in pursuit of self-preservation which must be overcome in the process of civilization through domination (Benhabib 1994:75). However, the ‘other’, is not truly alien from humanity—because nature is not truly separate from humanity (Benhabib 1994:75).

Therefore, the “mastery over nature is reproduced within humanity” (Horkheimer and Adorno

1943/1997:110). This fear of the ‘other’ is manifest again in social hierarchy–such as the historical domination of women, the oppression of racial and ethnic minorities, and anti-

Semitism (Horkheimer and Adorno 1943/1997:110).

Although Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997:3, 42) find the origins of the mastery of nature in the journey of Odysseus, it is Francis Bacon, the father of experimental philosophy, who realized scientific knowledge as the key to controlling nature (Held 1980:151). According to

Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997:4), “what men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men” … “that is the only aim” (Held 1980:152). In their view, the programme of the enlightenment is domination. Enlightenment is realized “when the nearest practical ends reveal themselves as the most distant goal now attained” (Horkheimer and

Adorno 1944/1997:42). According to Agger (1974:165), the “critique of enlightenment… was itself a thinly-disguised critique of the ideological functions of science”. Technology—the application of science—is developed as a means to maximize the utility of nature through increasingly efficient and precise processes (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:4). In

Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944/1997:9) words, “the man of science knows things in so far as he can make them”. Rationalization, as “an administrative and political apparatus”, extends to all forms of social life and organizational techniques are developed in “institutions like the factory, 17

the arms, the bureaucracy, the schools and the culture industry” (Benhabib 1994:74). The new techniques of social organization are an application of science and technology used to dominate internal nature (Benhabib 1994:74; Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:4; Marcuse 1964:xv).

This again leads to a form of Weber’s ‘iron cage’ as the individual is forced adapt to the apparatus of rationalization to survive (Benhabib 1994: 74; Horkheimer and Adorno

1944/1997:36; Marcuse 1964:xv). Horkheimer and Adorno’s insights “question the association of increased mastery over nature (an increase in society’s productive forces in Marx’s terms) with a betterment of the human condition” (Biro 2005:123).

The domination thesis serves as a fruitful critique of the relationship society maintains with nature as mediated by the apparatus of rationalization. Their analysis convincingly demonstrates how alienation serves to produce and reproduce the structures of domination in humanity. In the words of Marx (1844/1983), “the alienation of man, indeed every relationship in which man stands to himself, is realized and expressed only in the relationship in which man stands to other men”. As much as I wish to emphasize that the Frankfurt School provides a framework that has value for discussions of ecology and environmental sociology—the dialectical nature of the relationship between humanity and nature must also be recognized. It is not only that societal forces destroy nature (which is undoubtably bad in itself), it is also that this relationship is reproduced within humanity.

2.3 Reconciliation with Nature

Thus far, I have discussed some of the philosophical and sociological concerns that the first-generation Frankfurt School has raised regarding humanity’s relationship with nature. But, what I have failed to do is define what exactly ‘nature’ is for these thinkers. I have only implicated that, following the arguments made in Dialectic of Enlightenment, humans are natural 18

beings. However, this insight plays an essential role in the arguments made concerning how the domination of nature is reproduced within humanity. If there is no real difference between humanity and nature, then the distinction between humanity and nature must be socially constructed. In fact, for Adorno, “it is impossible to arrive at an accurate positive representation of nature” (Biro 2005:124). This line of reasoning is derived from an emphasis on ‘non-identity thinking’; a central feature to Critical Theory, most enthusiastically advocated by Adorno through his negative conception of dialectics. It is through Adorno’s insistence on a negative dialectics that articulates “the divergence of concept and thing, subject and object, and their unreconciled state” (Adorno 2003/2008:6). Non-identity thinking is an extension of the Marxian analysis of fetishism (Biro 2005:131). For Marx, commodities are fetishized when the social character of labour appears as an objective quality in the product. Conversely, Adorno advances this position to a broad critique of misidentifying concepts and objects (Biro 2005:131).

Adhering to the ideas of negative dialectics, nature can thus only be defined negatively, through its relation to a group of other concepts such as history, myth, enlightenment, alienation and property (Biro 2005:129).

In Dialectic of Enlightenment, the domination of nature is based on a conceptual thinking about nature; trying to define it and subjecting it to instrumental-rationality (Biro 2005:130).

However, the Frankfurt School also leave open the possibility for a critical, non-instrumental, and non-dominating form of reason.9 The conception of a reconciliation with nature—the organization of society in such a way that is more harmonious with nature—is theorized quite

9 This is given many terms varying from critical reason, objective reason, and non-instrumental rationality. It is important to note that Habermas’s ‘communicative rationality’ is for him, “another form of rationality to supplant technical-instrumental rationality” which relies on the inherent rationality found in communication (Joas and Knobl 2009:215, 230). 19

differently by Horkheimer and Adorno, who insist on a negative definition, and Marcuse who theorizes a positive utopianism (Gunderson 2016:71).

Consistent with non-identity thinking, a path to reconciliation is not explicitly laid out by

Adorno. From Horkheimer and Adorno we find much more attention placed on reconciliation in its negative form of domination. To overcome the equivalency made with the domination of nature and progress, human beings must collectively “remember that they are part of nature in a state of critical reflection” (Gunderson 2016:72, original emphasis). Both Horkheimer and

Adorno identify artistic mimesis to be a non-destructive representation of nature (Biro 2005:147;

Gunderson 2016:72). Unlike representations of nature found in positive science, mimesis suspends the self-preservation instinct (Biro 2005:148). It is in this way that Horkheimer and

Adorno’s strategy can be roughly summarized as “letting nature be, in the hope that it might teach us how to be happy” (Alford 1993:211). This being said, the practical applications of their understanding of reconciliation remain unclear (Gunderson 2016:72). On what basis can this be the foundation of a society? This is perhaps one limitation to a negative conception of reconciliation. By avoiding utopianism, Horkheimer and Adorno seem to leave us with more questions than answers.

By tying the domination of humanity to the domination of nature, there is a suggestion that the reduction in the “repression of inner nature… should result in a less aggressive stance toward external nature as well” (Alford 1993:217). The goals of the liberation of nature and humanity become inseparable for the early Frankfurt School (Gunderson 2016:71). This is not to say that society should revert to a time before the domination of nature, all three theorists are clear that society must move forward, and their path to progress is found in a non-instrumental form of reason (Gunderson 2016:71). From all the members, we find a faith in art as a contrast to 20

domination. Adorno is clear that not all art is emancipatory, and in fact it loses its significance when it attempts to have specific political effects. For Adorno, “art is most critical, in the contemporary epoch, when it is autonomous; that is when it negates the empirical reality from which it originates” (Held 1980:83). Despite this, the first-generation Frankfurt School is skeptical of the role of art in contemporary society. For them, new trends in cultural media have made it more difficult for art to be a force of negation. Later on, the notion of how the critical function of art is threatened by its relation to capitalism through the culture industry will be explored.

2.4 A New Paradigm for Science and Technology

Marcuse takes a different approach from Horkheimer and Adorno, one that brings about a new set of problems, as he puts forth an explicitly utopian vision for reconciling with nature.

First, like Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse finds recourse in the aesthetic dimension. Drawing on Kant, Marcuse (1955/1966:173-174) wishes to recall the original meaning and function of the aesthetic as the medium which fulfills the faculty of judgement; mediating between theoretical and practical reason. For Marcuse (1955/1966:181), this conception of the aesthetic establishes itself as an independent discipline which can counteract the repressive rule of reason. If the aesthetic is established as a principle of civilization, “nature, the objective world, would then be experienced primarily, neither as dominating man (as in primitive society), nor as being dominated by man (as in the established civilization), but rather as an object of

“contemplation””(Marcuse 1955/1966:189). The aesthetic, therefore, has a much clearer role for

Marcuse as it becomes a basis for a morality or an ethos towards nature. A certain rationality in art is recognized by Marcuse (1964:239). According to Marcuse (1964:239), the rationality of art possesses the ability to “define yet unrealized possibilities” which “could then be envisaged as 21

validated by and functioning in the scientific transformation of the world”. Accordingly, art can reduce “the immediate contingency in which an object (or a totality of objects) exists, to a state in which the object takes on the form and quality of freedom” (Marcuse 1964:239). ‘Aesthetic reduction’ appears as the link which can direct mastery towards liberation (Marcuse 1964:240).

This is why Marcuse (1969:45) sees the goal of an aestheticized science to be “society as a work of art”.

An original link between science, art and technology is theorized by Marcuse (1964:229).

It is the rationality of domination that has separated them because “from the beginning science contained the aesthetic of Reason, the free play and even the folly of imagination, the fantasy of transformation; science indulged in the rationalization of possibilities” (Marcuse 1964:228, emphasis added). By this, Marcuse (1964:229) means that both Mathematics and the metaphysical Ideas of Plato were both “held to be real and good”, but the former became science and the latter became metaphysics. Science has proven its ‘truth’ not because of epistemological conditions, but because scientific abstractions have transformed nature, whereas metaphysics could not (Marcuse 1964:229-230). At the same time, Marcuse leaves open the possibility for science to be transformed from a repressive mastery of nature to a liberating one. It is because

“science and technology has rendered possible the translation of values into technical tasks” that leaves open the possibility for the reversal of the relationship between metaphysics and science

(Marcuse 1964:231-232, original emphasis). The qualitative transformation of values (ends, goals)—could allow for scientific concepts to “project and define the possible realities of a free and pacified existence” (Marcuse 1964:231).

Marcuse suggests that with a qualitative change in society, a new form of science could emerge which seeks to preserve life rather than destroy it (Marcuse 1964:225-246; Feenberg 22

1996:46; Gunderson 2016:72). Science, in this form, would transform substantive goals allowing for new technologies to develop (Gunderson 2016:72). In imagining a ‘new science’, Marcuse

(1964:236) distinguishes between a repressive and a liberating mastery of nature. Unlike

Horkheimer and Adorno who suggest leaving nature alone, Marcuse (1964:237) posits that “all joy and all happiness derive from the ability to transcend Nature—a transcendence in which the mastery of Nature itself subordinated to liberation and pacification of existence”. Marcuse engages with a utopian transformation of nature via science and technology, so that “humanity might transcend nature’s scarcity without labor” (Alford 1993:211). Marcuse is much more explicit in his optimism that technology could potentially provide a sort of freedom for humanity.10 For Marcuse (1964:xvi, original emphasis):

Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put: the technological

society is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and constructions

of techniques… The way in which a society organizes the life of its members involves an

initial choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the inherited level

of the material and intellectual culture. The choice itself results from the play of the

dominant interests. It anticipates specific modes of transforming and utilizing man and

natures and rejects other modes. It is one “project’ of realization among others.

Science and technology are therefore not inherently the source of domination, rather it is the social forms of organization that are bound with it (Marcuse 1964:xvi).11 The negative features

10 This does not mean in any sense that he could be considered a technological determinist, since he is clear that technology within the current social organization is associated with domination. 11 It should be noted that in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997:4) also acknowledge that technology and science are intimately tied to the mode of production and social modes of organization; “As with all ends of bourgeois economy in the factory and on the battlefield, origin is no bar to the dictates of the entrepreneurs: kings, no less directly than businessmen, control technology; it is as democratic as the economic system with which it is bound up”. 23

of science and technology are historical and can be superseded by a new form of instrumental reason intended to generate a new paradigm for science and technology (Feenberg 1996:46;

Gunderson 2016:72). Marcuse (1964:16) thus holds considerable faith in the possibilities of technology to free man from the tutelage of labour—under conditions of a society where “the competing needs, desires, and aspiration are no longer organized by vested interests in domination and scarcity”.

The vision of Marcuse (1964:18) is for a world where advanced industrial society reaches a stage in which “material production (including the necessary services) becomes automated to the extent that all vital needs can be satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to marginal time”. At this stage, “technical progress would transcend the realm of necessity, where it served as the instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby limited its rationality; technology would become subject to the free play of faculties in the struggle for the pacification of nature and of society” (Marcuse 1964:16).

Marcuse’s (1964:16) optimistic vision for a new paradigm of science and technology that is non-dominating and frees the worker from labour, owes a great deal to Marx. Like Marcuse

(1964:16, 22, original emphasis), Marx shared similar hopes for the “absolution of labour”, as the “proletariat destroys the political apparatus of capitalism but retains the technological apparatus, subjecting it to socialization”. Nonetheless, there is still a concern that under the current logic of development, automation can only bring about further domination; Marcuse simultaneously holds the position that technology has the potential to create a better world but 24

can also advance the domination of inner nature.12 Without a qualitative change in society, technology and automation again lead Marcuse to the dead-end of the ‘iron cage’.

Although Marcuse’s remarks are somewhat indeterminate, I am sympathetic to his theorizing of a ‘new science’. Marcuse (1964:236) theorizes a liberating form of pacification of nature which “involves the reduction of misery, violence and cruelty”. Unlike Horkheimer and

Adorno, his understanding cannot be interpreted as a rejection of the ‘modern’, in fact he embraces modernity as a potentially liberating force. Agger (1976:160) is particularly sympathetic to Marcuse’s radicalism, arguing that “it is one of the most timely forms of creative

Marxian theory” and that Marcuse’s critique of science “is one of the most potent modes of the critique of ideology”. Agger (1976:160) sees the treatment of cognition and technology as

“vitally self-expressive forms of human labor which must be liberated from the dominion of positivism” as being essential to Marxism today. Because Marcuse tightly links domination and technical rationality, he injects emancipatory politics with new priorities that can reduce the dominating features of positivism. The biggest question that arises from this analysis is not the specific details of an aestheticized science but rather, how can this become a political project worth pursuing? For Marx, revolution was based on class conflict with the proletariat as a historical agent of change, but Marcuse does not provide the same dialectical basis for historical change. The utopianism that Marcuse deals with becomes both his strength (in comparison to

Horkheimer and Adorno) and his weakness (in comparison to Marx).

2.5 Ideology and Contemporary Society: The culture industry

12 This discussion is only meant to highlight the arguments Marcuse had regarding the possibilities of technology and is not intended as an in-depth discussion of automation. The debate about automation in the contemporary era has long since left Marcuse behind. Although it would be interesting to examine current issues from Marcuse’s perspective, this is beyond the scope of this analysis. 25

Perhaps what the early Frankfurt School is most well-known for—especially in contrast to other Marxist approaches—is their contributions to the field of cultural criticism. As the critique of political economy loses importance in their works, the Frankfurt School instead moves to a new theoretical paradigm known as ‘the critique of instrumental reason’ (Benhabib

1994:75). This paradigm shift, which begins with Dialectic of Enlightenment, directs their attention instead to the realm of culture to develop a critique of bourgeois ideology in the vein of

Marx and Lukács. Their interest in pursuing a critique of ideology is because of an identified crisis in reason whereby “at a certain point, thinking becomes incapable of conceiving . . . objectivity at all or began to negate it as delusion” (Horkheimer 1947/2013:7).

The criticism of ideology employs the method known as immanent critique—a central mode of critical theoretic analysis (Antonio 1981:330). Immanent critique places the material realities of society against its own ideals—and it is this recognition of such contradictions which move history (Horkheimer 1947/2013:178). For Horkheimer (1947/2013:178), this means showing how, for example, the epochal concepts of justice and morality “struck out against the social systems that bore them” and have been used to justify the most unjust regimes. For the

Frankfurt School, the denial of such contradictions, and the portrayal of a false unity of the ideal and the real, denies qualitative change (Antonio 1981:338). The goal of immanent critique is to

“replace the inaction based on the false correspondence with emancipatory praxis aimed at making the ideal real” (Antonio 1981:338).

One of the most prominent and well-known deployments of this critique is in the development of the concept of ‘culture industry’. Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2017:157) describe a fundamental shift in the nature of culture whereby art, even though it has always been sold, is now becoming a mere commodity. This historical development, arising from capitalism, 26

has led to various negative consequences for society, as all mass culture is identical in form, and reinforces an ideology of conformity (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:121, 148). Mass culture, especially film and radio, necessitates a reliance on film studios, industry, and advertising, which turns art into a mechanism for business interests (Horkheimer and Adorno

1944/1997:123). The only motive for creation is economical (Horkheimer and Adorno

1944/1997:161). Consumers and creators of art become mere customers and employees under the logic of late capitalism, exemplifying the spread of rational-capitalism to all realms of life

(Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:147).

Under the alienating reality of capitalism, the labourer can only escape their workplace by the mindless pleasure and simple amusement of the culture industry (Horkheimer and Adorno

1944/1997:137). The cheapness of art makes it accessible to the mass of consumers and suggests a character of disposability (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:157). Through the culture industry, the consumer is exposed to ideological messages and advertising—for instance the emphasis on chance, which implies that the labourer’s position in the hierarchy of capitalism is merely a dice roll and they too had the same possibility of becoming as successful as the film stars they watch (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:147). The existence of the culture industry leads to individuals becoming more alike, as “pseudo individuality” is emphasized and individuals become “merely centres where general tendencies meet” (Horkheimer and Adorno

1944/1997:155). In this way, the culture industry constrains the development of individuals who possess the ability to imagine new possible futures.

The implications of this critique go beyond a critique of culture as Horkheimer and

Adorno emphasize how a totalizing administered society can infiltrate all human activities. The critique of the culture industry conjures images of Brave New World, where the population is 27

pacified by unsubstantial pleasure, unable to think for themselves. This critique is fundamental to the Frankfurt school and is found throughout future work by all of the members because it provides a functional explanation for a key concern of their work’: how “the capitalist development has altered the structure and function of these two classes in such a way that they no longer appear to be agents of historical transformation” (Marcuse 1964:xii-xiii). The enlightenment promised progress— but repression, deception and conformity are the logic of late capitalism. While the study of Odysseus reveals how myth was always present in enlightenment, culture industry demonstrates how "enlightenment reverts to mythology”—the second major theses of Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:xvi).

In sum, the analysis of culture industry describes the ways in which reason can be betrayed and how mass culture can stultify the masses. For the purposes of our analysis, culture industry is an important example of immanent critique, and emphasizes how ideology is employed to contain the possibilities of structural change and limit the imaginations of the individual.

2.6 Ideology and Contemporary Society: Surplus repression and false needs

Like Horkheimer and Adorno’s exploration of culture industry, Marcuse (1964:xv) is interested in exploring the ways in which an advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change. This is most explicitly found in One Dimensional Man, in which Marcuse describes a society where the possibilities for negation are narrowing. While accepting the role that mass culture plays in the perpetuation of repression, Marcuse explores two interrelated concepts influenced by Freud’s sociology: surplus repression and false needs. Like the critique of the culture industry, these concepts expand on an immanent critique of society. Marcuse focuses his attention on the advanced technological processes of mechanization and standardization, 28

which in its ideal form, suggests “an uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity”, but the opposite is found.

Freud’s basic proposition in Civilization and its Discontents is that “civilization is based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts” (Marcuse 1955/1966:3). However, in Eros and Civilization, Marcuse (1955/1966:5) rejects this notion, arguing instead that the interrelation of civilization with repression, destruction and domination “result[s] from the historical organization of human existence”. By placing repression in a historically specific context associated with the social organization of labour, Marcuse also suggests the possibility for a non- repressive civilization. Marcuse (1955/1966:35) distinguishes basic repression— “the

“modifications” of instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization”— from surplus repression which refers to “the restrictions necessitated by social domination”.

Drawing heavily from Marx’s discussion of surplus labour and alienation, Marcuse posits that individuals under contemporary capitalist social organizations of labour work beyond what is necessary to meet their needs (Biro 2005:169). In the words of Marcuse (1955/1966:45):

While they work, they do not fulfill their own needs and faculties but work in alienation.

Work has now become general, and so have the restrictions placed on the libido: labor

time, which is the largest part of the individual’s life time, is painful time, for alienated

labor is the absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure principle.

Because the justifications for surplus repression are psychoanalytical, this argument is a significant reconfiguration of the base-superstructure distinction in Marx’s theory (Biro

2005:169). For Marcuse (1955/1966:45), the form of the reality principal—acting upon the world so as to delay gratification—is dependent on the form of socio-economic organization (the mode of production) (Biro 2005:167). In contemporary society, the performance principle—which 29

stratifies society “according to the competitive economic performance of its members”—has overtaken the reality principle (Marcuse 1955/1966:44). Thus, in Marcuse’s conception, the performance principal would serve as the base and the mode of production can be read as the superstructure (Biro 2005:169).

In this configuration, what is generated through the ideology of capitalism are ‘false needs’ (Biro 2005:169). False needs “are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression” (Marcuse 1964:5). Beyond vital needs, false needs are determined by “external powers” of which the individual has no control (Marcuse 1964:5).

Marcuse argues that needs are historical, and, under advanced capitalism, society must impose needs upon individuals as a result of the tendency of capitalism to maintain the continuation of the system. For him, “the creation of repressive needs has long since become part of the social necessary labour—necessary in the sense that without it, the established mode of production could not be sustained” (Marcuse 1964:246). Because false needs come from outside the individual, this undermines the autonomy posited by ‘free’ societies. Marcuse’s (1964:245) critique of false needs is thus derived from an immanent critique:

The attainment of autonomy demands conditions in which the repressed dimensions of

experience can come to life again; their liberation demands repression of the

heteronomous needs and satisfactions which organize life in this society. The more they

become the individuals own needs and satisfactions, the more would their repression

appear to be an all but fatal deprivation

It follows that a prerequisite for qualitative change is the redefinition of needs (Marcuse

1964:245). The reconfiguration of needs is a significant dimension to Marcuse’s (1969:4) revolutionary ideals. Marcuse’s conception of false needs seems to be closely related to 30

Adorno’s critique of culture industry and other theories of ideology. For Marcuse (1964:245), false needs are imposed on the individual through “the indoctrinating media of information and entertainment”. However, Marcuse also provides a novel insight into the culture industry. He argues that the deprivation of entertainment and education would be unbearable to citizens—the culture industry “might thus begin to achieve what the inherent contradictions of capitalism did not achieve—the disintegration of the system” (Marcuse 1964:246). Because of the culture industry’s absolute necessity to reproduce the structures of capitalism, it endangers capitalism’s very existence.

In the face of climate change, Marcuse’s concepts gain renewed importance. The repression associated with working and producing beyond necessity goes further than the repression of the individual. Surplus repression, and its ideological justification of false needs, directly contribute to the perpetuation of environmental destruction. What is climate change if not a latent effect of demanding more than is necessary? Marcuse theorizes a society of excess.

The question that arises—and is most likely already answered by the unfolding of history—is can this excess be sustained in the face of imminent self-destruction. How powerful is the performance principal to dominate the life instinct (Eros)?

2.7 The Wholly Administered Society and the One-Dimensionality Thesis

With the transition from a Marxist critique of political economy to a Weberian critique of instrumental reason, the Frankfurt School also adopts Weber’s pessimism, expanding upon the metaphor of modern society as an ‘iron cage’. In the preface to Critical Theory, Horkheimer

(1968/1972:vii) states that “the doctrine of Marx and Engels, though still indispensable for understanding the dynamics of society, can no longer explain the domestic development and foreign relations of the nations” (Held 1980:72). The domination of humanity over humanity 31

foreshadows a tendency for the total integration of society (Held 1980:71; Horkheimer and

Adorno 1944/1997:ix). According to Horkheimer (1968/1972:xv), “the fearful events which accompany the trend to rationalized, automated, totally managed world” tends “to eliminate every vestige of even a relative autonomy for the individual” (Held 1980:73). Whereas, under liberalism, what is meant by freedom and justice is that every individual has the potential to

“within limits develop his own potentialities” (Horkheimer 1968/1972:xv). However, as society changes, an increase in justice is matched by a decrease of freedom; “the centralized regulation of life, the kind of administration which plans every detail, the so-called strict rationalization prove historically to be a compromise” (Horkheimer 1968/1972:xv; Held 1980:73). For

Horkheimer (1968/1972:xvi), “the perfecting of technology, the spread of commerce and communication, the expansion of population all drive society towards stricter organization”.

Opposition, however despairing, is itself co-opted into the very development it had hoped to counteract (Held 1980:72).

What Horkheimer articulates here, is the development of society towards a “wholly administered society” (Benhabib 1994:77). Not only is the individual constrained by bureaucratic instrumental rationality, but social and historical conditions have become reified (Benhabib

1994:82). This reification limits the possibilities for opposition. Ideology functions in such a way as to totalize domination, reduce non-conformity and obscure the fact that individuals “are the subjects and functionaries of their own oppression” (Horkheimer 1947/2013). It is the methodology of critical theory—immanent critique and non-identity thinking—which is intended to demystify the “historicization of the natural” (Benhabib 1994:83).13

13 In contrast to Marx who had “demystified that naturalization of the historical” (Benhabib 1994:83). 32

Although a formulation of a totalized society exists throughout the work of Horkheimer and Adorno, it is Marcuse (1964) who most clearly expresses the concept through his ‘one dimensionality thesis’. According to Marcuse (1964:1):

To the degree to which freedom from want, the concrete substance of all freedom, is

becoming a real possibility, the liberties which pertain to a state of lower productivity are

losing their former consent. Independence of thought, autonomy, and the right to political

opposition are being deprived of their basic critical function in a society which seems

increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the individuals through the way in which it

is organized. Such a society may justly demand acceptance of its principles and

institutions, and to reduce the opposition to the discussion and promotion of alternative

policies within the status quo” (Marcuse 1964:1, original emphasis).

Advanced industrial societies are capable of providing its citizens with just enough so as to pacify and contain qualitative change. For Marcuse (1964:24) the development of the mode of production changes the conditions of the labouring class. Automation reduces the intensity of labour, increases the quantity of ‘white-collar’ labour, and further integrates the labouring class with the capitalist class (Marcuse 1964:24-31). The result is that the working class “no longer appears to be the living contradiction to the established society” (Marcuse 1964:31). Labour is no longer experienced in the individual as a painful use of one’s productive energy. Work has become remote and impersonal—at least for those privileged enough to reside in the most economically developed countries (Benhabib 1994:84). Class society, in the traditional Marxist sense, has been altered. The basis for a class consciousness and the revolutionary potential of the proletariat is diminished through the changing nature of labour. Marcuse is not alone in this diagnosis, Adorno also argues that the proletariat has become “socially impotent” (Bottomore 33

1984/2002:35). For Adorno, the “positive unity” of the social classes under liberal capitalism no longer exists (Held 1980:71).

In the next section it will be explored how the one-dimensionality thesis and the abandonment of the proletariat as an agent of historical change conflicts with the emancipatory aspirations of the early Frankfurt School. Seyla Benhabib (1994) proposes this critique which seriously challenges how the first-generation Frankfurt School can move past these clashing propositions.

2.8 The Paradox of the First-Generation Frankfurt School

In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse (1964:xv) proposes “two contradictory hypotheses”:

(1) “that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future” and (2) “forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the society”. Holding these paradoxical positions simultaneously poses a serious problem for not only Marcuse, but the paradigm of the ‘critique of instrumental rationality’ in general (Benhabib 1994:86). While Marcuse upholds the “Utopian hopes and aspirations” of

Western ontology, the one-dimensional society “obliterates the ontological horizon within which it has developed and within which it unfolds” (Benhabib 1994:85). Benhabib (1994:85) argues that critical theory has “acknowledged a fundamental aporia, namely the conditions of its own impossibility”.

Benhabib’s (1994:84-86) critique of critical theory is damning; questioning the position from which the early Frankfurt School can speak to emancipation at all. Benhabib (1994:85) proposes that modern civilization begins with an act of remembering which “sets free” the

Utopian dimension of past revolts. Marcuse seeks to reconstruct this dimension, but it cannot 34

occur “within the continuum of history” because “history now unfolds in such a way as to deny its own past” (Benhabib 1994:85). Therefore, critical theory must occur outside of the continuum of history (Benhabib 1994:85). But, “if it is exactly the continuum of history that critique must reject, then the vision of the emancipated society which it articulates becomes a privileged mystery that cannot be related to the immanent self-understanding of needs and conflicts arising from within the continuum of the historical process” (Benhabib 1994:85). Either critical theory must be reduced to “mere criticism”—as the totalization of late-capitalist societies destroy the normative standards in which critical theory is appealing to, and therefore critical theory must justify its own normative content outside of history—or, it must take up the position that there are still norms and values with an emancipatory content but they have been “emptied out” by rationalization and must be searched for in culture, art, philosophy or within human subjectivity

(Benhabib 1994:86-87). In either case, “critical theory 'must either limit the argument concerning all-encompassing manipulation and must admit the presence of structural leaks within the system of repressive rationality, or it must renounce the claim to be able to explain the conditions of its own possibility” (Benhabib 1994:86).

We must take Benhabib’s critique seriously, but it should be noted that there are examples to be found of Adorno and Marcuse acknowledging the presence of leaks within the structure of the ‘wholly administered society’. First, Benhabib (1994:87-88) herself notes that

Adorno’s conception of negative dialectics illuminates those cracks in the totality. Adorno’s methodology of non-identity thinking reveals the “untruth in the whole” (Benhabib 1994:88).

Beyond this, Adorno explicitly recognizes limitations to the totality of the system of domination as conceived in Dialectic of Enlightenment. As Adorno states in the 1969 preface to Dialectic of 35

Enlightenment, “the development towards total integration recognized in this book is interrupted but not abrogated” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:x).

It is Marcuse (1969:79) who makes the most explicit attempt to search for new historical agents of revolutionary change—pointing to leaks in the system. In An Essay on Liberation,

Marcuse (1969:vii) acknowledges that the “threatening homogeneity has been loosening up, and an alternative is beginning to break into the repressive continuum” which he calls “The Great

Refusal”. Marcuse (1969:vii) points to two social forces which suggest the limitations of “the established societies”. First, Marcuse (1969:viii, 79-81) identifies those who are overlooked in advanced capitalist societies—minorities and the poor (Held 1980:76). Outside of these capitalist nation-states are the underprivileged who fight against colonialism through national liberation movements (Marcuse 1969:xiii; Held 1980:76). The second group are students and young intellectuals who challenge the status quo through “consciousness and instincts” (Marcuse

1969:xii; Held 1980:76). Although these forces are not the basis for a transformation of society, they are “catalysts” and contribute to crisis development (Held 1980:76).

The early Frankfurt School interprets Marx’s critique of domination as going beyond merely economic factors (Agger 1976:158). The holistic view of domination is particularly useful for understanding societal transformations and movements centralized around environmental crisis. What the Frankfurt School fails to do is recognize how domination can be superseded in material terms. In advanced capitalist societies, crises are contained and there is no longer a real revolutionary agent of history. Marcuse attempts to put forth an end to strive towards by proposing a new paradigm of science and technology, but this thinking is subject to critique on the basis of its possibility within the one-dimensionality thesis. We can compare

Marcuse’s theorizing to those pre-Marxist (utopian) socialist writers condemned by Engels 36

(1880/1965:56) for whom “absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered”. According to Engels

(1880/1965:63), Marx’s innovation was adding a real historical basis by establishing socialism as a “necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes”. What makes a liberating form of science and technology inevitable? Who are the agents that will carry out these changes? What is the crisis which will weaken the status quo? From Adorno, Horkheimer, and

Marcuse we have no such answers. We have to look elsewhere to find a basis for this emancipation, to identify those contradictions in the totality that can bring about social transformation.

2.9 Conclusion

This overview has discussed some of the major concepts and methodologies found throughout the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse. I have emphasized the influence of

Marx and Weber, especially concerning the interplay of environmental and social domination.

The ‘domination thesis’ provides a sustained environmental critique that offers a comprehensive and convincing explanation for how the domination of nature is reproduced within humanity.

However, this critique also problematizes the potential for humanity to improve its relationship with nature. The Frankfurt School theorizes some potential ways this may come to fruition, but they fail to provide satisfactory solutions to escaping the totalization of domination.

If only one point were to be taken from the Frankfurt School—and embraced more broadly in both environmental sociology and wider discussions of ecology— it is the emphasis and recognition of relations of domination. While there is much concern and debate about how to

‘solve’ climate change and other environmental crises, we should instead consider the process.

What is our relationship with nature? How does this effect our relationship with other human- 37

beings? How do we reform or cultivate a non-dominating form of rationality? These questions should be central to conceptions of ecology. Addressing these questions may not only be crucial in saving the earth from crisis but may also have broader emancipatory implications within humanity. What will be explored further in this discussion is the relationship between the theory of risk society and reflexivity and the domination of nature. Does the process of reflexive modernization present us with an opportunity to change our relationship to nature, and why does this matter?

While they provide no clear path to utopia, the Frankfurt School finds recourse in arming themselves with ruthless methods of critique. The strength of critical theory lies in their methods of analysis—both non-identity thinking and immanent critique. The immanent critique of ideology, directed to the realm of culture, is perhaps the best example of this. What these insights point to are potential barriers to emancipation—ideological structures which reproduce the status quo.

38

CHAPTER 3: ULRICH BECK AND THE THEORY OF RISK SOCIETY

The focus of this overview will be to identify the core elements which make up Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk society and highlight how this theory can inform our thinking about society today—with a focus on contemporary issues of environmental and climate risk. Additionally, I will be discussing some of Beck’s most recent work which directly engages with the problem of climate change. In a recent review of Beck’s overall body of work, Rasborg (2018:2-3) organizes his development into four main stages: (1) the original formulation of the theory of risk society and reflexive modernization; (2) the development of the theory of the world risk society; (3) the growing importance of cosmopolitanism in the world risk society; and (4) the theory of metamorphosis and emancipatory catastrophism. Although the identification of these stages is helpful for organizing Beck’s development as a theorist, I contend that the distinction between these stages are largely a matter of emphasis and focus. I do not mean to imply that Rasborg necessarily views these phases as distinct breaks in Beck’s development; rather my intention in this review is to highlight the continuity in Beck’s development as a theorist. I aim to demonstrate that the arguments Beck makes in his later writings are largely consistent with the arguments laid out in his seminal work, Risk Society.

After summarizing Beck’s key concepts, I will set out to outline the relevant limitations with the theory of risk society. Namely, I will argue that the problems with Beck’s theorizing stem from an inadequate account of the structures of power and domination which pervade in advanced industrial society. Despite this concern, I do not view the theory of risk society as being incompatible with a more comprehensive view of power and domination. Two main problems with Beck’s account of power will be discussed. First, Beck overlooks ideological 39

structures which conceal and reify the antagonistic relationship of society with nature. Second, the account of power that Beck puts forth in his earlier work has a decreasing emphasis throughout Beck’s development and must be reemphasized. The identification of these problems will lead us to the next chapter which will attempt to reorient risk society by demonstrating how the Frankfurt School can help to theorize the structures of domination relevant to the theory of risk society—as well as how Beck’s theorizing can help to resolve the problems identified with the first-generation Frankfurt School.

3.1 From Odysseus to Risk Society

Part of the motivation to pursue a confrontation between Beck and the first-generation

Frankfurt theorists, is that Beck is often considered to be arising from the same theoretical tradition (Anderson 2000:9). The project of the early Frankfurt School, and Critical Theory more generally, was taken up by subsequent ‘generations’ of the Frankfurt School, most notably

Jurgen Habermas (Anderson 2000:9; Held 1980:15; Bottomore 1984/2002:13). Beck’s connection to Habermas is much more direct as Habermas is frequently cited and referenced in

Beck’s work14. This connection has also been explored by Rosa, McCright, and Renn (2013) in

Risk Society Revisited. Beck’s references to the first-generation Frankfurt School, however, are certainly less frequent and the connection is less travelled—which makes this engagement a novel contribution.15 The hope here is to highlight the ways in which Beck’s theory of risk society is, in a sense, a linear development of the theories of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse.

14 For instance, Risk Society includes a discussion on Habermas’s analysis of the welfare state and so-called “state capitalism” (Beck 1992:189-190). 15 In Reflexive Modernization by Beck, Giddens, and Lash (1994 110:144), Scott Lash discusses how Adorno’s conception of aesthetics is relevant to reflexive modernity, but this is not relevant to the focus of this discussion. 40

One key difference that should be noted is Beck’s rejection of Marx’s relevance to contemporary society (Curran 2016b:280).16 It was discussed in the previous chapters that the influence of Marx had waned in the later writings of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, and was instead replaced by the increasing prominence of a Weberian influenced critique of instrumental rationality. In the same discussion, I also argued that despite criticizing orthodox Marxist approaches, the later developments of the early Frankfurt School are still highly indebted to

Marx through his influence on their methodology, objects of study, and normative framework. In contrast, Beck’s explicit opposition to Marx is largely informed by his rejection of Marx’s claim that class is the fundamental structuring force in society (Curran 2016b:281). Even though the

Frankfurt School broadens their critique of capitalism and become increasingly concerned with the spread of instrumental reason, class still holds an important place in understanding domination for Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse.

The lineage from Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse can be traced to Beck most directly through the primacy of rationalization in both of their analyses. The origin story of the risk society can be viewed as the continuation of the relationship between rationalization and the domination of nature as outlined in texts such as Dialectic of Enlightenment and Eclipse of

Reason. Whereas the Frankfurt School rescaled Weber’s concept by tracing it back to its ancient origins, Beck brings the ‘domination thesis’ into the present age of ecological awareness (and beyond) by examining the unforeseen consequences of rationalization. Despite adopting a similar historical interpretation of Western rationalization, Beck also develops a general critique of both Weber and the early Frankfurt School. Beck’s (1995:29) core argument is that the

16 Curran (2016b) attempts to go beyond the characterization of Beck as being completely antithetical to Marx by highlighting how the structure of Beck’s arguments have much in common with that of historical materialism. 41

apparatus of rationalization has fundamentally changed the conditions of modernity—such that its place in contemporary society has been fundamentally reconfigured. 17

In Beck’s view, the spread of rationality and technological development was so successful, that the relevance of Weber today must be questioned. Beck (1992:22) argues that

“Max Weber’s concept of ‘rationalization’ no longer grasps this late modern reality, produced by successful rationalization. Along with the growing capacity of technical options

[Zweckrationalität] grows the incalculability of their consequences”. The trajectory of instrumental-rationality—sometimes referred to as ‘primary rationalization’ by Beck

(1992:216)—has been so successful in its mastery of nature that it has produced latent side- effects which it can no longer grasp or control. Because of the development of these unintended side effects, society can no longer be exclusively concerned with “making nature useful” or

“releasing mankind from traditional constraints” (Beck 1992:9). The self-confrontation of industrial society results in the production of ‘manufactured uncertainties’ such as climate change, pollution, nuclear radioactivity, toxicity of food, and global financial crises (Curran

2016a:86) The primary concern in a risk society is confronting the “problems resulting from techno-economic development itself” (Beck 1992:19). In Beck’s (1997:23) words, “the motor of social transformation is no longer considered to be instrumental rationality, but rather the side- effects: risks, dangers, individualization, globalization”. Rationalization has produced technology that is wildly successful in controlling nature but, through its side-effects, it threatens to “abolish

17 This is in some way an oversimplification of Beck’s (1995) thoughts on the Dialectic of Enlightenment which he expands on in Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk. Here, Beck (1995:28) admits that he feels “there was always something artificial about [Horkheimer and Adorno’s] arguments”. He goes on to argue that because Horkheimer and Adorno saw the crimes of the Nazi as rooted in the Enlightenment application of reason, they could not see the historical roots of anti-Semitism in the history of Germany (Beck 1995:29). For Beck (1995:29), Horkheimer and Adorno’s account cannot explain why the Germans “made no response to their countrymen’s brutalities”. In short, he sees the account as too one-sided and not accounting for all potential explanations. 42

the foundations and categories according to which we have thought and acted to this point”

(Beck 1992:22).

3.2 Towards a New Modernity

The side-effects of rationalization have produced a fundamental transformation in the character of society; Beck’s theory of risk society is attempting to capture the meaning of these developments. Risk society can be considered a theory of historical periodization which positions contemporary societies at the precipice of a second (reflexive) modernization (Beck

1992:3).18 Other theorists have attempted to understand recent historical developments in modernity, yet Beck (1992:3) argues that the often-used term, ‘post-modernity’, does not accurately encompass our present conditions. For Beck (1992:3), the term “‘post’ hints at a

‘beyond which it cannot name”. To label contemporary society as ‘post-modern’ merely grasps at proceeding conditions. Beck (1989:86) takes up the task of giving meaning to this epoch; to grapple with the conditions of a second modernity which is now eclipsing into reality.

Modernization is being applied to the principles of industrial society and consequently, “the modernization of within the experience of pre-modernity is being displaced by reflexive modernization” (Beck 1992: 10). Society is becoming increasingly concerned with the latent side-effects of our production (Beck 1992:10; Curran 2016a:86). With its reflexive turn, modernity is now more marked by simultaneity, multiplicity, uncertainty and ambivalence, than separation, specialization, efforts at clarity and calculability (Beck 1997:1).

18 In the introduction to Risk Society, Scott Lash and Brian Wynne refer to risk society as a “three stage periodization of social change” comprising of pre-modernity, simple modernity and reflexive modernity” (Beck 1992:3). 43

Although Beck (1992:22) claims we do not yet live in a risk society, we find ourselves at an overlap between the ‘first modernity’ (or industrial society) and risk society (or ‘reflexive modernity’). In this transitionary period, Beck’s primary goal is to develop what he regards as an

“empirically oriented, projective social theory—without any methodological safeguards”

(1992:9). Risk society is thus “intended to allow members of society to identify different possible futures based on the different tendencies and countertendencies emerging from existing social institutions and their social and material consequences” (Curran 2016a:34, original emphasis). Understanding ourselves as situated within a period of epistemic change, Beck

(1992:20) argues that we are experiencing a transition from a ‘wealth-distributing society’ to a

‘risk distributing society’.

One of the ways that Beck (1992:20) theorizes this transition is through identifying the overlap of the paradigms of class society and risk society. As the production of wealth is correlated with a production of risks, so too do the conflicts of scarcity “overlap with the problems and conflicts that arise from the production, definition, and distribution of techno- scientifically produced risk” (Beck 1992:19). This does not mean that the logic of class society disappears, rather that it becomes subordinate to the logic of risk society (Rasborg 2018:3).

Whereas in class society, the focus is on freeing oneself from material-need, risk society is interested in freeing the individual from risk (Beck 1992:49).

Risk positions arise out of this transition of epochs, which distribute risks unequally

(Beck 1992:23). Risk is distributed inversely to class, whereby the lower classes usually receive the greatest amount of risk (Beck 1992:35). Risk positions are also distributed internationally, 44

where the “Third World”19 is exposed to the highest amount of risk out of necessity to meet their material needs (Beck 1992:42). It should also be noted that for Beck (1992:40), risk positions are different from class positions as the accumulation of risk for some groups does not have an effect on other groups—which is the case for wealth inequality. According to Beck (1992:35), what limits the risk of some groups is not necessarily that material wealth provides them protection from risk, but rather because they have access to knowledge of risks that allows them to mitigate the risks themselves. Finally, it is noted that risk has an equalizing, democratic characteristic in the ‘boomerang effect’ (Beck 1992:37). Beck (1992:36) makes the bold claim that “poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic”. The wealthy—who are disproportionately involved in the production of risk—cannot escape the risks in which they are responsible for and are eventually exposed themselves (Beck 1992:37).

Through this analysis, we can begin to see why Beck (1992:87) argues that the sociological classifications and concepts observed in the beginning of the 20th century by theorists such as

Marx and Weber have begun to lose their relevance in the risk society. In Beck’s (1992:87) view, people have been “set free” of sociological distinctions such as class, gender, and race. This does not mean that material inequalities have simply disappeared, rather one’s social identity is losing ties to socially ascribed categories. These developments come about with new opportunities arising from technological change and the welfare state, such as increased mobility and expanded education (Beck 1992:94). Beck’s (1992:94) conception of modernity is quite different from that of Marx and Weber, who theorized that class or status “cushioned” the experience of

19 Although Beck uses this term in Risk Society, ‘global south’ is preferred to describe contemporary global unequal distribution of environmental risk. 45

individualization. Instead the theory of risk society presents us with a picture of “capitalism without class” (Beck 1992:88).

The first-generation Frankfurt School similarly saw class society as being altered by the historical developments of industrial capitalism, but an important distinction must be made. As discussed above, the early Frankfurt School views class as losing its positive unity and the basis for the development of a class consciousness. The conclusion to the Frankfurt school’s analysis is highly pessimistic as it presents a picture of an advanced stage of capitalism where the proletariat is still experiencing the dominating and alienating features of capitalism but cannot find recourse in developing into a class for-itself. By contrast, Beck views the distribution of risks as displacing the distribution of goods in a risk society such that wealth will eventually no longer be relevant to life chances in the risk society (Curran 2016a:86). Beck’s conception challenges both the idea of a class for-itself, as well as a class in-itself.

3.3 Subpolitics in the Risk Society

It was discussed in the previous chapter that the early Frankfurt School had largely given up on the proletariat’s revolutionary potential through the one-dimensionality thesis. Class consciousness, it was argued, is diminished by the enclosing totality of mass society. Beck’s theory of class seems to suggest a similar insight. The proletariat has little place in Beck’s theory of risk society, yet Beck finds a replacement for the proletariat by identifying a new revolutionary subject. The risk society, through the expansion of subpolitics, has the potential to be an emancipatory moment to bring about a new age of cosmopolitan democracy.

In World Risk Society Beck (1999:40) reports on the ‘symbolic mass-boycott' of Shell Energy leading to the disposal of an oil rig on land rather than in the North Sea. Here, the ‘democratic 46

citizen’ engages in a form of ‘global subpolitics’ that exerts democratic power over industry without mediating political institutions (Curran 2016b:290). Hazards, such as climate change, cultivate a sort cosmopolitan justice, as people realize that their problems permeate across national boundaries (Beck 2014:169). For Beck (1992:234), the potential for emancipation is found in the reflexive unbinding of politics, where subpolitical categories are legally recognized and subject to self-criticism. Subpolitics is the development of power arising from below to employ democratic control over science and industry through direct confrontation (Beck

1999:39). Advocating for the expansion of subpolitics is central to the way risks can become emancipatory in a risk society. It is through global subpolitics that the excesses of science and industry can be reined in—democratically, and with a cosmopolitan vision.

Beck (1992:101) makes the claim that subpolitics do not follow the traditional order of left- right; alliances form and disband on the basis of specific situations and personalities as people may “take up seemingly contradictory causes”. In terms of environmental issues, this may have been the case historically—after all, it was Nixon’s administration that set up the US

Environmental Protection Agency—but the left-right distinction becomes relevant again when dealing with climate risk which has become increasingly politicized. Generally, the left-right distinction has been a strong predictor of climate views—with left-wing political association more closely associated with pro-climate views (McCright, Marquet-Pyatt, Shwom, Brechin and

Allen 2016). Addressing climate change necessarily means challenging the order of industrial- capitalism and for this reason, the American conservative movement has been a prominent actor in countering climate change activism and actively suppressing environmental action in recent decades (McCright et al. 2016; McCright and Dunlap 2010). 47

To clarify why the risk society has a potential to be emancipatory, it is helpful to compare the structure of his arguments to that of another theorist. Curran (2016b: 281) argues that for Beck,

“risk occupies the same structural position that class occupies in Marx’s historical materialism”.

In the theory of risk society, risk is both the central problem of which all estrangements arise from, but it is also the solution (Curran 2016b: 290). To overcome the problems of class conflict and risk, for Marx and Beck respectively, there is a need to develop a collective social agent through general democratic control (Curran 2016b:281). Because side-effects are a driver of social change, society is presented with an opportunity to redraw its course. Not only can society respond to risks, but through the increased democratization of the production of risks, society can ultimately overcome the problems arising from our current social conditions. (Curran

2016b:281). This comparison also helps us to think about Beck’s relationship to the first- generation Frankfurt School. Whereas Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse theorize a closing up of the possibility of emancipation (which is antagonistic to the views of orthodox Marxism),

Beck views risk as opening up this opportunity.

Subpolitics have remained an important factor in the politics of climate change. Recently,

Extinction Rebellion has staged various acts of civil disobedience in London to demand the declaration of a climate and ecological emergency, to commit to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2025, and to create a citizen assembly for climate action (Barclay and Irfan

2019).20 Under this pressure, the UK government has officially recognized a climate emergency and the Committee on Climate Change recently recommended a target of 2050 to zero out its emissions (Irfan 2019). Although this is far from the goals proposed—after all, the declaration of

20 According to Extinction Rebellion, a citizen assembly is recommended to “address the inherent inequities of climate change” (Barclay and Irfan 2019). This suggests that this movement is not just based on a singular issue and incorporates the broader intersections of risk and class. 48

this emergency does not commit the UK to anything concrete—it is hard not to be optimistic about the grounds gained through this movement. Extinction Rebellion’s protests are occurring among a series of student strikes to effectively bring attention to the urgency of climate change

(Barclay and Irfan 2019). When traditional forms of politics and sources of struggle are failing to adequately respond to the climate crisis, subpolitics are becoming increasingly relevant as a source for social change.

3.4 Reflexivity and Rationalization

Whereas Weber held a view of rationalization as primarily a linear process, Beck

(1997:21, 37; 1992:140, 216-217) theorizes rationalization of a second type, as “a counter- industrial rationalization process”. According to Beck (1992:216-217, original emphasis),

“primary rationalization, which is marked out by changes in the categories of job, skill and technical system, is being displaced by reflexive rationalizations directed at the premises and invariants of change to this point”. This understanding of a dialectical process of rationalization is contextualized among larger themes found in his work—namely, the tension that is produced as reflexive modernity displaces the order of industrial modernity. Beck is interested in a specific type of rationality—scientific rationality. Here, Beck distinguishes, between a primary and a reflexive scientization. As Beck (1992:155, original emphasis) explains, “at first, science is applied to a ‘given’ world of nature, people and society. In the reflexive phase, the sciences are confronted with their own products, defects, and secondary problems, that is to say, they encounter a second creation in civilization”.

In line with the Frankfurt School’s insights on science and technology, Beck (1992:155, original emphasis) views primary scientization as concerned with “externally caused dangers

(from the gods or nature)”; and its application is “advanced in an authoritarian fashion in 49

external relations”. In Beck’s (1992:159) discussion of primary scientization, the understanding of science arising as a solution to the dangers that nature poses to humanity is retained. However, unlike the early Frankfurt School, Beck does not necessarily hold science and the enlightenment as a means of domination. Whereas there is an implicit understanding of science as a ‘will to power’ found in Horkheimer and Adorno’s writing— especially when referring to Bacon’s development of science—Beck understands the project of science in mostly good faith, yet not without its problems and mistakes.

For Beck (1992:159) the history of science is a history of “mistakes and practical lapses”; whereby science organizes its own theoretical and practical sources of error in a systematic way.

As long as science was able to deal with its mistakes within science, then it does not lose its legitimacy (Beck 1992:159). However, scientific critique has been directed at science in an interdisciplinary manner, projecting the “mistakes and causes of problems that now must bring science and technology into view as possible causes of problems and errors” (Beck 1992:159-

160, original emphasis). In other words, “science is encountering science”; as risks are identified and defined, science comes under the gaze of its own critique (Beck 1992:160).

The environmental movement represents, for Beck (1992:162), a culmination of a critique of civilization, interdisciplinary antagonisms, and publicly effective protests. Although this movement has existed since industrialization, it is now being supported by science which creates its own interpretations of conservation (Beck 1992:162). This has allowed for protest movements to take up scientific arguments and justifications for their own concerns and generalize their complaints as a critique of industrialization and technification (Beck 1992:162).

The environmental movement’s adoption of scientific arguments is an excellent example in the 50

ways that science is “one of the causes, the medium of definition and the source of solutions to risks” (Beck 1992:155, original emphasis).

Whereas primary scientization has enjoyed a monopoly on knowledge that was unchallenged, the internal skepticism of science is beginning to be externalized (Beck 1992:163-

164). Because of the close relationship between knowledge and power, an increased skepticism of science may undermine some of the power relations associated with it (Horkheimer and

Adorno 1944/1997:4; Beck 1992:165). While scientific knowledge can still be used for the control of internal and external nature—the diminishing trust in science, and the uncertainty of scientific validity, means the science can no longer act as an unquestioned authority (Beck

1992:165). On the one hand, as science is demonopolized, leaving room for critiques which have the potential for harm—such as the rise of the anti-vaccination movement and the industry supported campaign of climate change denial (McCright and Dunlap 2010). On the other hand, the risk society allows for the potential for science to become self-critical and democratized

(Beck 1992:176; 229).

3.5 Power in the Risk Society

Beck (1992; 1997:35) presents reflexive modernity as an “unfinished” (and “unfinishable”) dialectic; highlighting the antagonistic forces which propel history. This dialectic recognizes the diverse spectrum of possibilities arising from reflexive modernization, including its more dystopian themes. Not only can society manage and discover risks, but risks can be avoided, denied and reinterpreted (1992:224). Therefore, a key undertaking in the work of Beck 51

(1992:224) is an attempt to grasp the “contradictions between modernity and counter-modernity within industrial society”.21

For Beck (1992:10, original emphasis) reflexivity brings about “a radicalization of modernity which breaks up the premises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to new modernities or counter-modernities”. As an antithesis to reflexive modernity, the core project of counter-modernity is to construct certitude as an opposition to the increasing incalculability and uncertainty of reflexivity (Beck 1997:62). Counter-modernities such as religious movements, esotericism, violence, neo-nationalism, [and] neo-racism” are a product of reflexive modernity as it “promises to create new certitudes, or, better, rigidities, in one way or another, in order to put an end to permanent doubt and self-doubt” (Beck 1997: 90). Counter- modernity emerges as a reaction to reflexive modernization; upholding the old economic, scientific, and political structure and promises to bring back order and certainty to social life.

This dialectic is important for understanding the present climate crisis; as the push and pull of reflexive modernity and counter-modernities will likely determine the unfolding of the future.

A dominant theory in environmental sociology, the theory of ecological modernization, is closely related to Beck’s more optimistic themes. Even though modernity is the root problem of the development of manufactured uncertainties, Beck still calls for ‘more modernity’—but in a reflexive, self-critical form. Likewise, the theory of ecological modernization argues that “the only possible way out of the ecological crisis is by going further into industrialization, toward hyper—or superindustrialization.” (Mol & Spaargaren 1992:334). This perspective views ecological modernization as a specific phase in the development of industrial modernity whereby

21 The term counter-modern may cause some confusion since what Beck means by counter-modernity is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Counter-modernity is seen to be a reaction to reflexive modernization to uphold the status quo of first modernity (or industrial society). 52

an ‘ecological switchover’ takes place, and an economic value is placed on nature itself (Mol &

Spaargaren 1992:335). The similarities between ecological modernization and reflexive modernization are apparent, as Beck has had a significant impact on this body of literature (Mol

& Spaargaren 1993). However, ecological modernization provides a rather one-sided account of reflexive modernization. While Beck can (and will) be challenged for being too optimistic, the theory of ecological modernization is a much worse offender of naïve optimism. Ecological modernization lacks a comprehensive account of the forces of counter-modernity that are opened up by reflexive modernization. The positive developments of technology employed by industry are largely outweighed by the continuing development of the productive forces of industrial society and this must be accounted for in any theory of modernization (Gould, Pellow, &

Schnaiberg 2008:51). As Gould et al. (2008:51) argue, the trends noted by ecological modernization are limited when looking at economic development as a whole and “have emerged in specific (and quite limited) sociopolitical contexts” (Gould et al. 2008:51). Because of Beck’s account of counter-trends to reflexive modernization, Beck’s theory of risk society has a clear advantage over the ostensibly similar theory of ecological modernization.

3.6 The Theory of Metamorphosis and Emancipatory Catastrophism

Before discussing Beck’s most recent theoretical developments—metamorphosis and emancipatory catastrophism—it is important to note its context in Beck’s life. In the midst of writing his final book, Metamorphosis of the World (hereafter: Metamorphosis), Beck died unexpectedly and was unable to finish. His manuscripts were completed by his wife, Elizabeth

Beck-Gernsheim, along with his colleagues, John Thompson and Albert Gröber. It is unclear how much the concepts put forth in Metamorphosis resemble a finished form, but it is assumed 53

that Beck had more to add and clarify concerning the interrelated theories of metamorphosis and emancipatory catastrophism.

Given this, my intention is not to harshly scrutinize this period of Beck’s writings. I believe this development in Beck’s sociology is interesting and worth engaging with because it is

Beck’s most explicit attempt to grapple with climate change and what it means for society and social change. However, what Beck puts forth late in his life is not, I contend, in any significant way a departure from his previous work. Despite Beck framing this stage of his work as different from his older work, emphasizing a particular optimism about the future, most of the theoretical developments found here can be traced to their origins in Risk Society.

The theory of metamorphosis is a theory of social transition that, according to Beck

(2016:xi), is distinct from traditional theories of social change. For Beck, social change “brings a characteristic future of modernity into focus, namely permanent transformation, while basic concepts and certainties that support them remain constant” (Beck 2016:xi). Beck (2016:3) argues that we are living in a time of great turmoil. Events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall,

9/11, the Fukushima reactor disaster, the 2008 financial crises, and catastrophic climate change are all examples of events which reorient our understanding of the world (Beck 2016:xi-xii).

According to Beck (2016:3), the world is metamorphosing; concepts and certainties are being destabilized and falling away allowing for something new to emerge. Metamorphosis is unpredictable and non-linear, making “that what was unthinkable yesterday… real and possible today” (Beck 2016:xii). Unlike a revolution which is goal-oriented and a result of an ideological struggle, the change in metamorphosis “assumes the character of unintended consequences”

(Rasborg 2018:164). Metamorphosis is unintentional—driven by reflex, reflexivity and reflection (Beck 2016:122-123). 54

There are serious concerns that are raised relating to the concept of metamorphosis

(Rasborg 2018:168). Namely, Rasborg (2018:168) challenges the novelty of the concept. From

Marx’s descriptions of the dynamism of capitalism, to Giddens’s characterization of the runaway world, and Harmut Rosa’s high-speed society—much has been written about the radical character of change in modernity (Rasborg 2016:168). Does Beck’s theory go far enough to really distinguish itself as a concept distinct from previous approaches? I am skeptical that the theory of metamorphosis is novel in this way. What it does contribute however, is relating a theory of rapid social change with the theory of reflexive modernization. Although I am not in disagreement with Beck’s insight about the speed of social change in the contemporary moment—the necessary work required to decipher how Beck’s concept differs from those of

Marx’s, Giddens’s, and Rosa’s, cannot be done in this study.

I would argue that the more important development from this period is not in fact metamorphosis, but the interrelated concept of emancipatory catastrophism (2010; 2014; 2015;

2016). While retaining the core insights of risk society, Beck (2016:4) claims to reorient his theory from being about the negative side effects of goods to being about the positive side effects of bads. Emancipatory catastrophism can be seen as counter to the pessimistic and “apocalyptic imaginary that dominates the public sphere” (Beck 2016:37). In the development of this concept,

Beck moves beyond what he sees as the dominant question about climate change: “What can we do against climate change?”; towards a new formulation: “What does climate change do to us, and how does it alter the order of society and politics?” (Beck 2016:36). Given the limitations and problems associated with Beck’s theory of metamorphosis, I argue that the insights and questions derived from emancipatory catastrophism can be discussed separately from metamorphosis. While it is necessary to recognize the potential of radical social transformations 55

to theorize emancipatory catastrophism, beyond this, it is hardly convincing that metamorphosis is integral to understanding this concept.

For Beck (2016:36), “climate change is the embodiment of the mistakes of a whole epoch of ongoing industrialization”. By bringing attention to these mistakes, climate change “produces a basic sense of ethical and existential violation that creates new norms, laws, markets technologies, understandings of the nation and the state, urban forms, and international cooperations” (Beck 2016:38). According to Beck (2016:117-118, 122), the anticipation of global catastrophe violates sacred norms against humanity which causes an ‘anthropological shock’—“when populations feel they have been subjected to horrendous events that leave indelible marks on their consciousness”. In turn, the anthropological shock will lead to a ‘social catharsis’—"a kind of collective memory of the fact that past decisions and mistakes are contained in what we find ourselves exposed to” (Beck 2016:122-123). In other words, climate change can bring about a social recognition that institutions are impermanent and can be revoked

(Beck 2016:117-118, 122-123). Beck (2016:120) emphasizes that a ‘social catharsis’ is the product of ‘active (cultural) work’ (2016:120). The way in which catastrophe and risk are portrayed and discussed in the public sphere is integral to the way that society transforms.

Cultural work develops an aesthetics and discourse around catastrophe (Beck 2016:120). In a sense, Beck is suggesting engaging in utopianism to realize a cosmopolitan vision.22

For Beck (2010), being able to stop or contain climate change is not all that matters, how we do so is also of importance. Within current sociological paradigms, we lose sight of the ability to

22 It is unclear how Beck can emphasise the importance of ‘cultural work’ while at the same time emphasizing that through metamorphosis that social transformations are unconscious. It seems that there is some level in which social change must be guided through the control of discourse. It is difficult to reconcile these contradictions when they are presented as the same framework, which is why it may be useful to make a distinction between metamorphosis and emancipatory catastrophism. 56

analyse the already occurring transformations of the political and imagine new openings (Beck

2014:170). Those that see modernization as a complete opposition to nature and theorize the only solution to climate change as some sort of anarcho-primitivism (or a mixture of Malthusian environmentalism with Hobbesian conservatism), “see the planet [as] too fragile to support the hopes and dreams for a better world” (Beck 2010:263). In contrast to the asceticism of many environmentalists, Beck calls for more modernity (at least in its reflexive form).

3.7 Nature in the Risk Society

It has been identified that a core research paradigm of the first-generation Frankfurt

School is the problematizing and theorizing of society’s relationship to nature. Although touched on throughout this chapter, it is worth examining how exactly Beck sees the relationship of nature to the risk society. For Beck (1992:81), reflexive modernization is already bringing about,

“the end of the antithesis between nature and society”. In Metamorphosis, Beck (1992:80;

2016:41, original emphasis) quotes Risk Society at length:

That means that nature can no longer be understood outside of society or society outside

of nature. The social theories of the nineteenth century (and also their modified versions

in the twentieth century) understood nature as something given ascribed, to be subdued,

and therefore always as something opposing us, alien to us, as non-society. These

imputations have been nullified by the industrialization process itself, historically

falsified, one could say. At the end of the twentieth century, nature is neither given, nor

ascribed, but has become a historical product; the interior furnishings of the civilizational

world, destroyed or endangered in the natural conditions of its reproduction. But that

means that the destruction of nature, integrated into the universal circulation of industrial

production, ceases to be ‘mere’ destruction of nature and becomes an integral component 57

of the social, political and economic dynamic. The unseen side of the socialization

[Vergesellschaftung] of nature is the societalization of the destruction and threats to

nature, their transformation into economic, social and political contractions and conflicts.

Violations of the natural conditions of life turn into global social, economic and medial

threats to people – with completely new sorts of challenges to the social and political

institutions of highly industrialized global society.

The threats made to nature through industrialism become threats to society and culture and are recognized as such (Beck 1992:82). Therefore, the destruction of nature is societalized as risk society proceeds from nature (Beck 1992:81). To illustrate this point, Beck (2016:41-42) cites a recent example of Coca-Cola recognizing the reality of climate change because of the threat it poses to its supply of sugar, citrus and water. Beck supposes that humanity can no longer view nature as external because of the clear threat it poses to humanity as a side-effect. The use of this lengthy quote also gives evidence to the argument that the later developments in Beck’s theorizing are largely in line with his views from Risk Society. Despite our knowledge of the existential threat of climate change growing since that time, Beck (1992:81) still holds that nature is no longer simply being dominated by humanity.

Nature, according to Beck (2016:41-42) is not strictly in opposition to modernity but is becoming more integrated with society because of climate risk (Beck 2016:41-42). We can no longer ignore the mistakes of unbridled industrialization, as even businesses are forced to become aware of their damage they cause to the environment, lest they endanger their own supply of natural resources for which their businesses depend on (Beck 2016:41-42).

58

3.8 Problems with Beck and the Theory of Risk Society

Thus far, I have presented an overview of the relevant concepts to the theory of risk society including some more recent additions to Beck’s body of work that specifically engage with climate risk. The main critique I wish to put forth in this analysis is that Beck’s theorizing of reflexive modernization and risk society does not provide a comprehensive account of the relations of domination and power. The Frankfurt School by contrast, specializes in theorizing these relations through the development of a critique of rationalization that tightly links Weber’s understanding of rationalization with human-nature relationships. Beck recognizes reflexive modernization as an unfinished dialectical process and yet he still misses some key ways that power is expressed in contemporary society in relation to the production and distribution of climate and environmental risk.

It is in The Reinvention of Politics where Beck (1997:61-93) provides the most detailed account of “the other side of modernity”. In many ways, Beck’s predictions are valuable for understanding contemporary political developments. Regarding counter-modernity, readers of this chapter today might be thinking about the recent rise of various nationalist movements such as the election of Donald Trump and Brexit. However, Beck does not provide a suitable explanation for the ideological structures which conceal the antagonisms of society and nature. I contend that this is an important dimension for understanding the production and distribution of environmental risk.

The neglect of the role of ideology in the theory of risk society partially stems from his conception of nature in risk society. In Beck’s view, risk requires us to examine how our industrial development has damaged nature and has returned to threaten us. We thus cannot continue our domination of nature because it threatens our existence and—in Beck’s Coca-Cola 59

example—our profits. However, we know this is not necessarily the case. Governments, businesses, and even workers are regularly pursuing policies, technologies, and economic development which will contribute to the crisis of climate change and the breakdown of the environment. People are willingly and knowingly choosing short-term goals over the long-term destruction of our planet. Despite the knowledge of nature’s revolt and humanity’s place within nature, an antagonistic relationship continues with prejudice. Beck’s understanding of nature in the risk society seems to be the exception, rather than the rule. We must inquire and develop theory to explain why this is the case—and it is the early Frankfurt School which may provide insights into this phenomenon.

Why does Beck propose such a naively deterministic account of nature in a risk society? I argue that it is because he does not consider the legitimizing role of the existing social order. If the end of the antithesis between nature and society is merely assumed as a fact, then this obscures the real contradictions that offer “determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change” (Antonio 1981:332). While there is little doubt that we are starting to see the effects of nature’s domination return to society, the end of the antithesis between nature and society seems to have occurred all too easily. What was once the central contradiction of science since its conception, according to the Frankfurt School, is simply being resolved because we start to see the side-effects of our domination return to society? —this is rather difficult to believe. What must be examined is how society can continue this relationship despite its self-destructive nature.

The role of ideology in the context of the dialectic of reflexive and counter-modernity is explored in “Anti-Reflexivity” by McCright and Dunlap (2010). Here, McCright and Dunlap

(2010) characterize the American conservative movement as a force of ‘anti-reflexivity’ which opposes the environmental movement and reflexive scientization through an ideological 60

campaign to defend the industrial capitalist order of simple modernity. The development of the theory of anti-reflexivity highlights how ideology is employed to legitimize the status quo of the domination and exploitation of nature. Although intended as a sort of critique of reflexive modernization theory (as expressed by both Beck and Giddens), this analysis is not necessarily opposed to the theory of risk society. It takes up Beck’s arguments about counter-modernity and reflexive modernity, introduces a framework to analyse the influence of ideology, and applies it to a specific phenomenon (climate denial). In the following chapter, I aim to take these developments further, by discussing a more general critique of the dominating relationships found between society and nature.

By the time Beck’s final book was published, the dialectical conflict of reflexive and counter-modernity had been mostly dropped from his theoretical framework. Although Beck mentions that “new polarizations arise for which we are not yet sensitized enough and lack descriptive vocabulary”, there is lacking any substantive discussion of potential conflicts or structures of power in the theory of metamorphosis or emancipatory catastrophism (Beck

2016:177). With the theory of metamorphosis, Beck claims to be reorienting his framework from theorizing the negative side-effects of the goods, towards theorizing the positive side-effects of the bads—but this is an over simplification of the arguments found in Risk Society and World

Risk Society. Beck has already laid out the emancipatory potential of risks through the development of subpolitics, reflexive scientization and cosmopolitanism. These themes are emphasized in the context of metamorphosis and emancipatory catastrophism, but the positive side-effects of the bads have always been part of risk society. Whereas Risk Society is a nuanced account of both the positives and the negatives of reflexive modernization, Metamorphosis is a one-dimensional account. This is particularly concerning given that climate change has become 61

almost synonymous with conflict. The dimensions of climate change have heightened existing struggles among international, ideological, and class lines. These conflicts are both on the near- horizon and are already occurring. To not offer commentary on this conflict, especially considering how a theory of conflict is already part of the theory of risk society, is a missed opportunity in this theoretical development.

3.9 Conclusion

As Beck demonstrates, the discovery of the mistakes of industrial society have fundamentally altered how we can analyse science, technology, politics, and nature. The theory of risk society offers a comprehensive framework for understanding these societal transformations. This overview has identified and engaged with the concepts essential to understanding the theory of risk society. Additionally, I discussed how Beck’s work is situated in relation to the early Frankfurt School by presenting risk society as a continuation (and critique) of their developments.

Despite focusing on some of the greatest threats that humanity has ever faced, it is important to remark that Beck remains highly optimistic. Risk society contributes to contemporary social theory in a multitude of ways, but it is worth highlighting how Beck’s theorizing furthers the development of critical theory. Whereas the early Frankfurt School theorized the closing of the possibilities for emancipation, Beck was able to recognize new opportunities opening up. Reflexive modernization opens up a possibility for a new paradigm of science and a new emancipatory subject. Beck informs us of the dual-edge of risk and what this means for society. 62

With the critiques of risk society developed here, I do not intend to challenge the core insights of risk society and reflexive modernization. Rather, I am calling for a broader development of a theory of power and domination in risk society; namely through the incorporation of the methods and insights of the first-generation Frankfurt School. The aim for the next chapter will be a confrontation of the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical paradigm with the aim of syntheses.

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CHAPTER 4: ENVIRONMENT, RISK, AND IDEOLOGY

After outlining the theories of Ulrich Beck and the first-generation Frankfurt School, and identifying some of the key problems and limitations of their respective theories, this chapter will proceed with a confrontation of Beck with the early Frankfurt School in order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each of their frameworks. I will be expanding on the problems of Beck and the Frankfurt School that were noted in the previous two chapters and highlight where the other theory can provide insights to improve the overall purchase in theorizing contemporary society.

What has motivated this confrontation is the insight that each of their respective theories can help to inform the other’s. Beck comes from the same theoretical tradition as the Frankfurt

School, and they are dealing with a similar understanding of the core problems facing modernity—so there is little to overcome when placing them in dialogue. The aim of this chapter will be to incite a debate on social transformation and crises. If I am to characterize a key difference between the two frameworks it is that Beck views society in a period of immense change where the unimaginable becomes possible, whereas the early Frankfurt School emphasizes the ways in which change is contained by a system of domination. As the debate on social change unfolds in this chapter, a degree of synthesis will be achieved. The intention here is to find the limitations of their arguments and come to a consensus somewhere between Beck and the first-generation Frankfurt School.

It should be acknowledged that Beck has had the benefit of witnessing historical developments unfold that the early Frankfurt School did not live for. However, I do not bring this up to discredit Beck’s significance, because early on, he was able to identify the importance of historical events such as the Chernobyl disaster and the burgeoning environmental movement. 64

What must be examined is how these societal transformations that Beck recognized affect the content of the Frankfurt School’s diagnoses of late-capitalist society. At the same time, Beck

(1997:22) dismisses much of the relevance of the theories of the early Frankfurt School. Beck

(1997:22) claims, “the Ma(r)x-Weber consensus of modernization is called into question by the theory of reflexive modernization”. It is important to go back and recover some of the important ideas presented by the Frankfurt School—especially as they pertain to contemporary ecological crises.

In this chapter, I will first be looking at the limitations of Beck’s theorizing. Here, I will be expanding on the argument made in chapter 4 which suggested that the theory of risk society provides an inadequate account of power. Specifically, it will be argued that Beck overlooks how ideological structures conceal the contradictions of industrial society—particularly regarding human-nature relationships. Whereas Beck’s theory of risk society largely neglects the role of ideology, the Frankfurt School develops an important account of how ideology legitimizes and reifies the existing social order. The framework of ideological analysis from the Frankfurt School can be applied to, and expand on, the understanding of ideology’s role in reproducing environmental destruction in the face of climate crisis. By contrast, Beck’s perspective is limited in its ability to explain this phenomenon. Furthermore, the Frankfurt School also (partially) develop and deploy a method of ideological critique with emancipatory intentions (Antonio

1981). I will argue that an immanent critique of ideology has the potential to unwind the reification of nature and becomes increasingly important as new crises emerge and industrial society becomes unable to suppress its own ruptures.

In the second part of this chapter, I will overview the primary critique brought up against the first-generation Frankfurt School—the problematization of the emancipatory goals of critical 65

theory. The one-dimensionality thesis as proposed by Marcuse—along with a similar picture of a wholly administered society from Horkheimer and Adorno—has put into the question the possibility of overcoming the conditions of an “all-encompassing manipulation” (Benhabib

1994:86). In this section, I will argue that the theory of risk society allows us to see beyond the totalizing society of the Frankfurt School. Specifically, it will be recognized how Beck successfully identifies risk as a force which breaks apart the totality of domination in advanced industrial societies. Manufactured uncertainties should be understood within critical theory to be a new historical development which necessitates a re-examination of the one-dimensional society. I will be acknowledging that the latent side effects of modernization have opened up cracks in the one-dimensional society, allowing for new possibilities of transformation which were previously treated with skepticism. The focus of this section will be on identifying the ways in which the conditions of the risk society have an effect on the all-encompassing manipulation of these apparatuses.

I will finish the chapter by outlining the ways in which Beck’s theorizing is much closer to Marcuse’s than that of Horkheimer and Adorno’s. Marcuse is distinct from the other members of the school in various ways, and it is worth examining at least one important concept that he proposes with a parallel counterpart in Beck. I argue here that Marcuse’s aspirations for a “new science” closely resemble Beck’s theorizing of a reflexive scientization. In this discussion, I will be weighing the strengths and weaknesses of each of their respective concepts, and argue that in light of Beck’s observations, Marcuse’s theorizing seems less utopian than some have claimed.

This discussion will ideally serve as a bridge to further discussions and assessments of Beck’s relationship to Marcuse in particular and reinvigorate a forgotten debate on the possibility for a new paradigm of science. 66

4.1 Limits to Beck’s Theorizing of Power

There have been various critiques lauded against Beck for his explicit rejection of the importance of class in contemporary society. According to Curran (2016a:84), these accounts primarily focus on demonstrating the relevance of class for life chances even as risks grow.

Curran (2016a:141) has went farther in this assessment by arguing that not only is class still important, but risks can actually intensify class-based inequalities. Importantly, Curran

(2016a:142) does not claim that the theory of risk society is antithetical to class analysis but can actually serve as a basis for understanding inequalities and risk. These critiques of Beck’s conception of class are important; clearly Beck has overlooked the ways inequalities have impact on life chances even as risks increase in relevance. However, these critiques miss a broader critique of Beck. Beck’s rejection of class is due in part to a larger problem with Beck’s work: an insufficient account of power. With this critique, I will focus on a specific aspect of power that is inadequately discussed in Becks work—the role of ideology as a means of control (McCright and Dunlap 2010:106, citing Steven Lukes). Previously, I had challenged Beck with neglecting to account for the ideological structures which conceal the antagonism of nature and society.

Additionally, I had also acknowledged that there is a recognition of the reactionary tendencies in reflexive modernization through the concept of ‘counter-modernity’ but that the recognition of the dialectic of modernity had lost importance in Beck’s work. These concerns will be further developed as it is demonstrated how the early Frankfurt School’s understanding of power and the role of ideology can illuminate these structures—especially in relation to the production of environmental risk.

It should be noted that I am not alone in challenging Beck’s theorizing of power. Murray

(2009:82, 90) argues that Beck relies too heavily on the assumption that social changes will 67

occur because of the latent side-effects of modernization (Murray 2009:82, 90). For Murray

(2009:82, 90-91), Beck is too hopeful that “the conviction of moral concerns” will emerge from the techno-economic sphere to challenge discourses of consumption and accumulation.

Additionally, Murray (2009:82, 94) supposes that Beck is too optimistic about the ability of subpolitics to exercise power which can disrupt existing political institutions and the economic elite. While Murray is generally correct that Beck overemphasizes these optimistic developments of modernization, it must be acknowledged that Beck has recognized a dialectical conflict of modernity and counter-modernity that speaks to the counter-tendencies against Beck’s hopeful theories of change. The problem is not that Beck does not conceive of conflict in the process of modernization. The process of modernization is necessarily a process of conflict for Beck. As competing expert groups collide with one another over the validity of their claims, “the knowledge of side effects thus opens up a battle-ground of pluralistic rationality claims” (Beck

1999:120). In other words, Beck understands policies as being chosen in “a conflictual public arena where every kind of argument and action can take place” (Pellizoni 1999:118). However,

Beck’s work does not conceive of ways in which conflict is contained by “shaping people’s perceptions, beliefs and subjective interests via ideology”. (McCright and Dunlap 2010:106, citing Lukes 1974, emphasis is added).

Horkheimer (1968/1972:232) understands ideology as “a cohesive force for holding together a social structure threatened with collapse”. It is a subtler expression of power that portrays a false unity between the ideal and the real to stall the contradictions of society (Antonio

1981:338). The openly reactionary tendencies of a counter-modernity are not the only force that are opposing the transition to a more democratic, cosmopolitan, and ecological society as theorized by Beck—we also must look at the ways that change is contained by the apparatus of 68

ideology. This critique is mostly consistent with the findings of Murray (2009:91, citing Mark

Boyle) who found that, in the context of waste management in Ireland, the “state appears more concerned about organising consent around what are acceptable levels of pollution, than radically attacking the roots of the economic policies and systems that generate problems of waste in the first instance”. Although Murray (2009) uses Foucault’s framework of power for a theoretical explanation, the findings of Murray more broadly point to power being exerted by framing an argument in such a way as to reify the economic system that produces waste management problems in the first place.

When considering the insights from the Frankfurt School, the most concerning neglect of ideology is in Beck’s theorizing of the relationship of society to nature. As mentioned in chapter

3, Beck (1992:81) posits that the end of the antithesis between nature and society is already occurring. In both Risk Society and Metamorphosis, Beck (1992:80; 2016:41) suggests that nature has become integrated into the “social political and economic dynamic”. Nature, and the threats to nature, are subject to ‘societalization’—such that the destruction of nature becomes a threat to humanity (Beck 1992:80). Beck’s assumption that the side-effects of the domination of nature will in some way bring nature back to society, neglects the ways in which ideology reifies nature (Gunderson 2016:66). The arguments of the first-generation Frankfurt School point to the fact that “a reified appearance of naturalness… is accepted as undistorted, pure, etc., due to humanity’s forgetfulness of its sociohistorical mediation” (Gunderson 2016:66). 23 In contrast to

Beck, the ‘societalization’ of nature for the Frankfurt School thus refers to the ideological,

23 Beck (1995:35-42) acknowledges the social mediation of nature and the destructive orientation of human beings towards it; he also recognizes the necessity for the end of ‘ecological blindness’ in the social sciences. The discussion in Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk is also an insightful look at the ‘artificiality’ of nature as a human co-creation (Beck 1995: 35-40). Even still, this examination points to the “naturalization of social problems” where the hazards of nature signal the end of the antithesis of nature and society (Beck 1995:42-43). 69

immutable appearance of nature and humanity’s “instrumental view and treatment of nature”

(Gunderson 2016:67).24

To illustrate this critique, we can re-examine Beck’s example of Coca-Cola recognizing the reality of climate change because it threatens its supply of natural resources its business relies on. Beck (2016:42) celebrates this development as a “new awareness among American and

European business leaders”. He sees this example as businesses and economists beginning to internalize the cost of climate change (Beck 2016:42). Instead, I argue—from the perspective of ideological critique—that this is an example of how ideology can dilute the contradiction of capital and the environment by reconciling irreconcilable elements (Gunderson 2017:281).25

Stated in Adorno’s terms, “appearance discloses and conceals its essence at one and the same time. If it did not conceal essence, it would be mere illusion, and if it did not reveal it, it would not be appearance” (Benhabib 1994:80). By accepting climate change, Coca-Cola “recognizes that there is a partial contradiction between capital and the environment but attempts to conceptually weaken the contradiction by reconciling elements that are irreconcilable in reality

(i.e., continued economic growth and environmental protection)” (Gunderson 2017:281). By neglecting the role of ideology in obfuscating socio-ecological contradictions, Beck too soon celebrates the end of the “distinction between nature and society” when nature still appears as a reified category.

Within the framework of risk society and reflexive modernization, Beck is unable to give a suitable answer as to why businesses and states are increasingly accepting the reality of climate

24 This is not to say that there is not a “real” element to nature. The Frankfurt School avoid relativism by claiming “it is ‘inadmissible to run counter to the tested results of science.’” (Gunderson 2016:66, citing Horkheimer 1937/1972) 25 For a systematic account the contradiction of capital and the environment, see Schnaiberg (1980) as well as Gould et al. (2008). The theory of the treadmill of production applies to both capitalist and socialist states. It demonstrates a basic opposition of economic growth (a necessity of capitalism) and the environment. 70

crises, but radical transformations of the techno-economic sphere are not occurring—at least to an extent that would effectually tackle climate change. His primary explanation is offered marcthrough the concept of counter-modernity—but this does not account for those actors who accept the reality and threat of climate crisis but do nothing of substance about it. Furthermore, the dialectic of counter-modernity and reflexive modernity is largely absent from Beck’s later work.

Beck is naïve to point to the environmental outlook of corporations (such as Coca-Cola), when these developments should be treated with skepticism and subject to ideological critique.

His account of power does not consider the role of ideology to impede qualitative change by denying contradictions and consequently Beck points to ideological statements as proof of reflexivity. In the next section, it will be explored how the theories and methods of the Frankfurt

School gives a multidimensional framework of power. However, just as Curran (2016a:142) argues that the theory of risk society can serve as a basis for understanding inequalities and risk,

I argue that the theory of risk society can provide a basis for understanding ideology and risk.

4.1.1 Ideology and risk society

The knowledge of society’s role in the production of ecological risk has not necessarily been translated into qualitative societal change (especially in the economic sphere) as Beck suggests. This is not to say citizens are not concerned with the effects of environmental destruction, or concessions aren’t made, rather, that this knowledge and concern has not translated to concrete action. The antithesis between society and nature continues so long as industry profits from nature’s destruction. As much as we are conscious that the threat of nature is derived from the destructive features of techno-industrialism, the pursuance of its destruction continues. More than a dialectic of reflexive modernity and counter-modernity, the majority of 71

people accept anthropogenic climate change yet “continue to sit on their hands” (Giddens

2009:2). Thus far, risk consciousness has failed to produce changes in the political and economic spheres that Beck (1992:77-78) had predicted. In the literature, this is attributed to a wide variety of factors including: pessimism, barriers in political economy, future discounting, and other social and psychological factors (Beck 2016; Giddens 2009; Schnaiberg 1980; Gould et al 2006;

Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh 2007)—but Beck is not able to give a suitable answer within the theory of risk society. By contrast, the Frankfurt School points to the role of ideology to contain social change. With their ideological critique, they reveal the subtle ways that capitalism and bureaucracy have developed to manipulate society at mass. This insight can be extended to analyse how ideologies conceal socio-ecological contradictions and prevent the development of trends towards ‘ecological modernization’. Additionally, critical theory offers a method of criticism which seeks to emphasize the contradictions of social formations and their ideologies. The method of immanent critique could be key in overcoming the reification of nature.

Before demonstrating the importance of the role of ideology as a dimension of power, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by this elusive and often controversial concept. Although the intention of this analysis is not to develop any sort of framework of ideology, but instead to

(1) advocate for its relevance in contemporary environmental problems and (2) demonstrate how

Beck has overlooked this important concept—it is nonetheless still important to establish an understanding of the concept. When discussing ideology, I am referring to “ideas that conceal contradictions… through descriptive, explanatory and/or normative claims and implicit or explicit assumptions” (Gunderson, Stuart and Peterson 2018:136, citing Larrain 1979, 1982,

1983, Lukes 1974, and Thompson 1984). This definition is largely in line with Adorno’s 72

understanding of ideology as a form of identity thinking—“an equation between things which are in fact incommensurable” (Eagleton 1991/2007:125).26 For the early Frankfurt School, the identity principle “strives to supress all contradiction”; “ruthlessly expunging what is heterogenous to it” (Eagleton 1991/2007:127). In short, ideology is a “‘totalitarian’ system which has managed and processed all social conflict out of existence” (Eagleton 1991/2007). This is perhaps most evident in Marcuse’s (1964:1, original emphasis) One-Dimensional Man which proposes that capitalism is “increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the individuals through the way in which it is organized. Such a society may justly demand acceptance of its principles and institutions, and to reduce the opposition to the discussion and promotion of alternative policies within the status quo”. It is not entirely convincing that all ideology works by the identity principle, certainly there is a degree of self-contradictory discourses in Western capitalist societies as Eagleton (1991/2007) acknowledges. Despite this limitation, a definition of ideology which focuses on those ideas which conceal systemic contradictions, allows for a critique of ideology which emphasizes these contradictions. The Frankfurt School may go too far in describing an “all-powerful, all-absorbent ideology”, yet they manage to provide important tools and methods which are intended to progress history through ideological critique.

The first-generation Frankfurt School’s bleak vision of society, which acknowledges how conflict is contained through ideology, is in stark contrast to Beck who emphasizes social transformations arising from conflict in the techno-economic sphere. Through analyzing ideology, we can begin to see how this dimension of power can minimize the effectiveness of reflexive modernization. When corporations, such as Coca-Cola, make statements about the urgent threat of climate change, they are in fact legitimizing the existence of corporations as a

26 Adorno’s theory of ideology is generated from Marx’s concept of exchange value (Eagleton 1991/2007:125). 73

“central climate change mitigation actor” (Gunderson et al. 2018:137, citing Wright & Nyberg

2014). This discourse would be an example of a solution in the consciousness (or in ‘appearance’ for Adorno) but not in reality (Gunderson 2017:268, citing Larrain 1979). Whereas Beck

(2016:42) interprets Coca-Cola’s statement as evidence that “industry is awakening to the effects of climate change and their real costs”—understanding the role of ideology through the lens of the early Frankfurt School can reveal how corporate environmentalism can serve to reproduce the status quo.

In contrast to Beck’s (1992:80) theorizing of the end of “mere” domination of nature, the problem of nature’s reification is explored through the works of the Frankfurt School.27

Understanding the reification of nature as closely tied to its domination problematizes Beck’s proposition. For Adorno, “our knowledge of nature is really so performed by the demand that we dominate nature that we end up understanding only those aspects of nature that we can control…the more we take possession of nature, the more its real essence becomes alien to us”

(Gunderson 2016:66, citing Adorno 1959/2001). In other words, how nature appears to us is structured by our instrumental relationship to nature. The view that naturalness is ‘that which is pristine’—is itself a historical mediation which has made the reified world seem immutable

(Gunderson 2016:67). Although Beck (1992:80, original emphasis) acknowledges that nature is a

“historical product”, he nevertheless claims that the instrumental view of nature has become

“historically falsified” by the “industrialization process itself”. In Beck’s view, the domination of nature transforms into contradictions and conflicts because of society’s dependence on the natural world (Beck 1992:80). While Beck (1992:80) is correct in his assertion that threats to

27 The ideological critique which seeks to historicize “law-like” social conditions—such as the instrumental view of nature—would be considered an example of “defetishizing critique" by Benhabib (Gunderson 2017:282, citing Benhabib 1986). 74

nature are now being seen as threats to people, he does not consider that these relationships can persist in an unreconciled form. Rather, he naively assumes that these contradictions will inevitably become conflicts. The instrumental view of nature has not been challenged because qualitative change has been stalled by the denial of contradictions. It hardly needs to be said that eventually, these contradictions will become crises through the catastrophic effects of climate change; nevertheless, society is able to contain their eruption (for now) and continue to dominate nature.

If we are to suppose that ideology conceals socio-ecological contradictions, then an important question to ask is: how can we go beyond Beck and develop a framework which can begin to unravel nature’s reification? Beyond a theory to merely critique ideology, the first- generation Frankfurt School also employs a method which is intended to detect “the societal contradictions which offer the most determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change”

(Antonio 1981:332). According to Antonio (1981:330, 334), the method of immanent critique is the definable core of critical theory.28 Unlike Marx who places faith in the inevitable emancipation of the working class, or Beck (2016:122-123) who sees social transformations proceeding latently through “reflex, reflexivity and reflection”—the Frankfurt School is “deeply concerned with the pacification of the working class and with the functioning of science and technology as instruments of domination” (Antonio 1981:337). Immanent critique then, is a means of “restoring ‘actuality to false appearances’ by describing ‘what a social totality holds itself to be and then confronting it with what it is in fact becoming’” (Antonio 1981:338).

28 Antonio (1981:343) acknowledges that “Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, do not restrict the selves to a single method”, but rather engage in numerous modes of analysis—not just immanent critique. 75

In the face of ecological crises, immanent critique could hold a prominent theoretical role with the aim of replacing “the inaction based on the false correspondence with emancipatory praxis aimed at making the ideal real” (Antonio 1981:334). Instead of emphasizing the

“determinate possibilities for new social formations” in light of the contradictions of industrial society; critical theory focuses their attention on “the negative moment of the dialectic” by attacking domination (Antonio 1981:341). Immanent criticism, ruthlessly applied, can bring attention to the contradictions as they are relevant to ecological aims and goals. An applied example of this, is the aforementioned critique of Coca-Cola reproducing the logic of capitalism despite its apparent opposition to the environment. Whereas Beck celebrates this development, and points to it as the end of ‘mere’ domination of nature, I argue it should be subject to critique with the aim of bringing to conscious the ‘real’ contradictions which bring about the destruction of the environment. As Antonio (1981:342) points out, immanent critique is intended to be a basis (not a substitute) for praxis. Critical theory must sustain its ideological critique and apply it to new historical developments.

4.2 Limits to the Early Frankfurt School

Thus far, I have primarily argued for the importance of ideological critique as an important tool in the environmental social sciences. However, as noted in chapter two, the early

Frankfurt School’s critique of instrumental reason problematizes the normative standpoint of critical theory. As the first-generation Frankfurt School moved from a critique of political economy, the members began to emphasize that late-stage capitalism has “eliminated crisis potentials without eliminating the irrationalities of the system” (Benhabib 1994:84). Specifically,

Marcuse’s (1964:xv) one-dimensionality thesis describes how advanced industrial societies are capable of containing qualitative change. For Marcuse, “the very objective conditions that would 76

make the overcoming of industrial-technological civilization possible also prevent the subjective conditions necessary for this transformation from emerging” (Benhabib 1994:84). The Frankfurt

School thus characterize a strictly rationalized society which destroys autonomy (Horkheimer

1968/1972:xv; Benhabib 1994:86).

At the same time, the project of critical theory is a normative one—embracing Marx’s goal of emancipatory change—but it is unclear from what position they can do so (Antonio

1981:330; Benhabib 1994:84-86). This is because the one-dimensional society denies its own past and thus destroys the norms in which critical theory is attempting to appeal to through its

‘immanent critique’ (Benhabib 1994:84-86). As Benhabib (1994:86) points out:

If it is assumed that social rationalization has eliminated crises and conflict tendencies

within the social structure, and that cultural rationalization has destroyed the autonomous

personality type, then critical theory no longer moves within the horizon of prospective

future transformation but must retreat into the retrospective stance of past hope and

remembrance.

Critical theory must either justify its own normative standards (and abandon immanent critique) or acknowledge there are “structural leaks within the system of repressive rationality” (Benhabib

1994:84-87, citing Offe 1968). At the core of critical theory, not just of the Frankfurt School, but also of Marx, is appealing to the immanent principles of society as “necessary weapons in the struggle for progressive social change, because they provide a basis for critique within historical reality” (Antonio 1981:333, citing Marx 1964).

Benhabib (1994:85) suggests that critical theory is forced to either “revise the one- dimensionality thesis or it must question its own possibility”. The former choice—revising the 77

one-dimensionality thesis (and by extension, the concept of a ‘wholly administered society)’—by scaling back the extent to which domination pervades all dimensions of social life, will allow critical theory to retain its goal of emancipation (separating critical theory from ‘mere criticism’).

This does not mean the early Frankfurt School must be criticized for their accuracy in describing their contemporary moment, rather, now is the time to recognize how unforeseen events and trends have come to pass since the time of the first-generation Frankfurt School (crises such as climate change, 9/11, and the 2008 financial crisis for instance) that force us to revise their position. There are numerous observations that the Frankfurt School made about advanced industrial society that still hold true, but their critique of domination cannot simply be rehashed and applied to the contemporary moment without its reassessment.

Marcuse (1964:xiv) argues that when “confronted with the total character of the achievements of advanced industrial society, critical theory is left without the rationale for transcending this society”. To recover the Frankfurt School from this critique then, is to identify these social forces present in society which are breaking apart the totalising system of domination. It is Marcuse (1964:254, original emphasis) who recognizes the early Frankfurt

School’s shortcomings in this regard: “if one considers the critical theory precisely at the point of its great weakness—its inability to demonstrate the liberating tendencies within established society”. It should be noted however, that both Adorno and Marcuse have attempted to identify trends where the total integration of society is disrupted. In their writings, there are examples to be found where the limits of the totalising effects of domination were acknowledged. For instance, the concept of negative dialectics is intended to “illuminate those cracks in the totality, those fissures in the social net, those moments of disharmony and discrepancy, through which the untruth of the whole is revealed, and glimmers of another life become visible” (Benhabib 78

1994:88). In identifying these moments, Adorno does not look for conflict potentials in

“organized, collective protest and struggles, but in everyday gestures”, culture, art and philosophy (Benhabib 1994:88). Additionally, Marcuse identifies those moments of resistance carried out by the underprivileged (minorities, the poor, victims of colonialism) and in student movements (Marcuse 1969:vii; Marcuse 1968:xiii; Held 1980:76).29

It should be acknowledged that Benhabib (1994:88) is skeptical of Adorno’s aim to

“reveal those moments of implicit resistance and suffering in which the human potential to defy the administered world becomes manifest”. Benhabib (1994:88) claims that it is still unclear if by identifying the “‘ciphers’ of possible emancipation” that Adorno can justify the normative standpoint of critical theory. It is not enough to just reveal that moments of resistance exist; these instances must also demonstrate there are still values and norms that are immanent to late industrial society.

4.2.1 Breaking apart the totality: risk society

Whereas the first-generation Frankfurt School theorizes how society is capable of containing qualitative change, Beck emphasizes the forces which break this containment apart and transform society. According to Beck (1992:10), contemporary society is on the cusp of a second modernity which threatens to break up the premises of industrial society. This tendency in Beck’s work is reaffirmed within the development of the concept of metamorphosis—which theorizes a total reorientation of our understanding of the world, as concepts and certainties are

29 History has unfolded in such a way that ‘The Great Refusal’ that Marcuse theorized was not the catalyst to crisis development that he had hoped for. However, by placing faith in the non-traditional sphere of politics to disrupt technocracy, Marcuse anticipates Beck’s concept of subpolitics. Subpolitics is a wider recasting on this idea, with greater explanatory power for the mechanisms of a power from below.

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being destabilized (Beck 2016:xi-xii). Given the critique of the Frankfurt School above, the question is whether these transformations that Beck identifies can begin to break up the totalizing domination of the administered society and recover the potential for emancipation. I argue that as the side-effects of modernization are now becoming apparent, they bring about the presence of new structural leaks and points of resistance.

Whereas Adorno and Marcuse find resistance respectively in culture, art, philosophy, or

“in the deep structures of subjectivity that revolt against the sacrifices demanded by an oppressive society”; Beck has recognized new social movements, spawning from historical events and discoveries (Benhabib 1994:87). For Beck, the relationship between risks and public conflict takes place in two phases (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994:5). In the first phase, risks are developed in industrial society yet tend to escape detection from the institutions for monitoring and protection (Beck et al. 1994:5). In this stage, “the effects and self-threats are systematically produced but do not become public issues or centres of political conflicts” (Beck et al. 1994:5). It is in the second phase where “the dangers of industrial society begin to dominate public, political and private debates and conflicts” as “certain features of industrial society become socially and politically problematic” (Beck et al. 1994:5). It is the fact that attention is brought to the producers and legitimizers of risk, by “social staging”, that creates a catalyst for crises (Beck

1995:43). Beck (1999:92) posits that “the old industrial consensus built into the social systems is encountering new and different fundamental convictions: ecological, feminist and many others.

Technocracy ends when alternatives erupt in the techno-economic process and polarize it”.

These new sets of critiques against industrial society are moments of resistance against the mistakes of industrial society. 80

Beck is correct that these new conflicts have the potential to present a legitimate challenge to the social order. In the words of Beck (2016:36): “climate change is the embodiment of the mistakes of a whole epoch of ongoing industrialization, and climate risks pursue their acknowledgement and correction with all the violence of the possibility of annihilation”. Social movements that have arisen in response to climate change are therefore an opportunity for emancipation since a critique of climate change is necessarily a critique of science, politics, and capitalism.

Additionally, climate risk points to the existence of norms and values immanent to society. Beck (2016:39) goes so far as to claim that new norms are generated through risks; specifically, norms arise “from the public reflection on the horror produced by the victory of modernity” (Beck 2016:39). Protests have centred around climate crises because it produces “a basic sense of existential and ethical violation of the sacred” (Beck 2016:123). At very least, there is a public concern for the environment, and a desire to preserve and protect non-human nature for its inherent value beyond its instrumentality. This points to an unrealized ideal of a non-instrumental view of nature which can provide the basis of critique and potentially become the basis of an “emancipatory terminus” (Antonio 1981:334).

Furthermore, the imminence of the threat of climate change no doubt contributes to its emancipatory potential. Whereas crisis potential in capitalism was subdued by its development, climate risk poses no such option. Either society is transformed through struggle or catastrophe.

The maxim of ‘socialism or barbarism’ is given renewed urgency in the face of the developing climate crisis.

Finally, it should be emphasized that these new forms of struggles are largely occurring outside of politics in the ‘sub-political’ realm. If we are to accept that the principle of democracy 81

has been emptied out by rationalization and economic interests, then genuine forms of resistance cannot occur within the framework of ‘mass democracy’ if they are to present a legitimate challenge to the status quo (Horkheimer 1947/2013:29). Extinction Rebellion, for instance, uses the political system when necessary, but is not bound to it. The movement recognizes the importance of the state to acknowledge the urgency of climate change, but they are also not restricted by any formal rules of politics. It is by existing outside of established politics that allows them to gain traction through forms of protest such as mass civil disobedience with the aim of inciting thousands of arrests (Barclay and Irfan 2019). The symbolism of this act has attracted global media attention which further perpetuates and legitimizes its goals.

4.2.2 Revisiting the limitations of risk society

As much as I have argued for the importance of risks to open up the totality of domination noted by the early Frankfurt School, I do not wish to advance a deterministic position, or overstate the importance of these social movements. As much as risks have the potential to open up the totalizing system of domination and allow for new possibilities, this does not mitigate the role of ideology as discussed previously. We should think of these forms of resistance as cracks or leaks in the totality and not as breaking apart the system. The environmental movement has the potential to be a catalyst for crisis but is not necessarily the basis for the transformation of society.

Overall, we should remain critical of these movements, but hopeful. Even though there is a willingness to mobilize against climate change, there is always the possibility that these movements are based on ideological assumptions. They could be pursuing solutions and goals that are not only ineffective but also reproduce the contradictions which produce risk in the first place (Gunderson 2017:279). For instance, Gunderson et al. (2018) provide a detailed 82

examination of the relationship between ideology and climate policy frameworks. They suggest that popular strategies are underpinned by technological and market fetishism that reproduces socio-ecological contradictions (Gunderson et al. 2018). For the most part, information on climate change is disseminated by the media, but—as we know from Horkheimer and Adorno’s

(1947/1997) critique of the culture industry—there is a potential for the media to reproduce the ideology and interests of capital. How problems are framed is extremely important and often times, they are presented in a way that is does not challenge the major interests of capital. A recent example of this is the generous media attention given to ocean pollution caused by plastic straws, and the subsequent banning of straws globally (Viswanathan 2018). Although plastic straws can be part of a larger conversation on the harmful effects of single-use plastics—and this is the original intention of the movement—straws themselves are estimated to account for only

.003% of total plastic waste, in comparison to abandoned fishing equipment which accounts for

46% of debris (Viswanathan 2018). Despite this, there has been very little, if any, attention placed on the fishing industry for their pollution. In this example, a contradiction is recognized and yet it is displaced by identifying related but different elements (Gunderson 2017:281). There is an inherent limitation to the effectiveness of mass movements when considering the culture industry, and alternative ways to disseminate information must be explored.

4.3 Beck and Marcuse on a New Science

To finish this chapter, I will be exploring an additional theme found in the theories of both Beck and Marcuse. Here, I will be comparing Marcuse’s aspirations for a ‘new science’ to

Beck’s theorizing of a reflexive scientization. Through this discussion, I aim to examine these theories and ultimately apply some of Beck’s observations about recent trends in science to argue against critics of Marcuse who characterize his theorizing as utopian. 83

The first-generation Frankfurt School directs much of their criticism towards science and technology; noting that the techniques developed in the sciences are being used for the domination of both external and internal nature. The latent side-effects of this domination are now becoming familiar as science is acknowledged as one of the sources of manufactured uncertainties. Accordingly, a trend is noted towards a second, reflexive scientization—which

Beck (1992:155) argues is a “complete scientization”. The risks of modernization are becoming scientized, and “their latency is eliminated” (Beck 1992:154).

Beck’s conception of reflexive scientization shares similarities with Marcuse’s theorizing of a new paradigm for science and technology. In some regards, Beck’s concept of reflexive scientization can be viewed as a creative revival of Marcuse’s imaginative vision for a ‘new science’. First, both of these discussions centre around the possibility of a critical form of scientific rationality which is concerned with not only controlling nature, but a transformation of its substantive goals. For Marcuse (1964:225-246), this means a liberating form of scientific rationality that frees the worker from labour. For Beck, this means scientific criticism is extended to the foundations and consequences of science and “both its claim to truth and its claim to enlightenment are demystified” (1992:155, original emphasis). Second, both Beck and Marcuse’s paradigms are also predicated on a qualitative change in society. Reflexive scientization is intimately tied with reflexive modernization and the risk society for Beck; while Marcuse ties the domination of science and technology to contemporary social forms of organization. Finally, both of their paradigms are concerned with giving science a new normative framework. For

Marcuse (1955/1966:173-189) this means reforming science’s relationship to nature as mediated through the realm of aesthetics; and for Beck it is the attention to, and concern for, the latent side-effects of techno-scientific development. 84

One of the most important distinctions between how Marcuse and Beck theorize a ‘new science’ is that Beck argues that we are already beginning to witness science take a reflexive turn, whereas Marcuse (1964:x) opts instead to present possible historical alternatives for the social organization of society. Unlike Beck however, Marcuse is not able to identify the forces which can bring about its realization. Since Marcuse does not recognize a social or historical force which brings about qualitative change in society, it is criticism itself which is intended to be transformative. Functioning as both theory and praxis, Marcuse’s (1964:x) goal is to measure the specific historical practice of science against its own possible historical alternatives, revealing the irrationality of established forms of social organization. Additionally, Marcuse’s methods are problematized by the paradox of the one-dimensionality thesis (as outlined above).

By contrast, Beck’s theorizing is a grounded attempt to employ his ‘projective social theory’; reflexive scientization is firmly rooted in particular historical conditions (the risk society) which are argued to bring about a qualitative change in society.

It should be noted that Habermas has critiqued Marcus’s idea of a ‘new science’ as a

“romantic myth” (Feenberg 1996:48). He rejects the idea that technology is a project of a particular historical epoch and argues that only instrumental relations are possible in the sciences

(Feenberg 1996:48). Beck undermines Habermas’s critique by demonstrating that we are already starting to see changes in scientific practice and that science is already beginning to take on a new form. If we accept Beck’s general arguments that the manner in which science is carried out has already been transformed by risks, then we must also accept that the organization of science and technology is dependent on particular historical conditions. By identifying this trend, Beck not only allows for the possibility of reflexive scientization as he conceives it, but also other potential forms of science that go beyond what is already being seen. 85

Reflexive scientization addresses some, but not all, of the concerns the Frankfurt School hold against science and technology. One of the central criticisms of science from both Beck

(1992:235) and the early Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:4) is its authoritative implementation. Accordingly, Beck (1992:235) emphasizes the need for the expansion of the self-determination of citizens to have input in scientific discussions “on the risks of certain steps and plans in advance”. Beck (1992:229-230) does not mean democratization in the case of the parliamentary democracy or an “ecological variant of the welfare state”—as this impression of democracy only leads to bureaucracy and scientific authoritarianism. It is rather sub-politics that provide the basis for Beck’s (1992:231) vision of scientific democracy. The legal protection and expansion of sub-politics would emphasize opportunities for self-criticism so that we may detect our mistakes in advance (Beck 1992:234).

The thrust of the Frankfurt School’s critique of techno-scientific development is directed towards its dominating orientation to nature—which Beck fails to provide an adequate answer for. In theorizing reflexive scientization, Beck is not necessarily concerned with how society’s relationship with nature is mediated through science and technology, because he understands the end of the antithesis of nature as already occurring with the arrival of the risk society. What is not entirely clear is how reflexive science goes beyond the mastery of nature for the purpose of self-preservation. This is one of the primary concerns of instrumental reason for the Frankfurt

School is when “self-preserving reason” leads to the decline of the individual (Horkheimer

1947/2013:138; Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1997:54-55). As Horkheimer (1947/2013:153) explains:

It is not technology or the motive of self-preservation that in itself accounts for the

decline of the individual; it is not production per se, but the forms in which it takes 86

place—the interrelationships of human beings within the specific framework of

industrialism. Human toil and research and invention is a response to the challenge of

necessity. The pattern becomes absurd only when people make toil, research, and

invention into idols. Such an ideology tends to supplant the humanistic foundation of the

very civilization it seeks to glorify.

If we are taking Horkheimer’s concerns seriously, then reflexive scientization as explicated by

Beck does not have an answer for said ‘absurdity’ found in the ideology of science. Unlike primary scientization, a reflexive science could at least prevent humanity from self-destruction, and it could expand democratic functions—but it may not be able to reform society’s dominating relationship to the natural world. It seems reflexive scientization is a preferable alternative, but not necessarily reconciliation as conceived by either Adorno, Horkheimer, or Marcuse. This does not mean reflexive scientization is incompatible with a less dominating form of science, just that

Beck does not emphasize the importance of the relationship of society with nature.

In conceiving of a new paradigm for science, Marcuse explicitly attempts to provide a historical alternative for science which resolves its central contradiction—the domination of nature. Whereas hitherto reason has been associated with repression, Marcuse (1964:228, 230,

237) theorizes the possibility for a “new idea of Reason” … “not only of domination but also of liberation”. Marcuse’s conception for a ‘new science’ is rooted in art to recognize nature as

“possessing potentialities of its own with a certain inherent legitimacy” and incorporate this recognition within the structure of rationality (Feenberg 1996:48). Marcuse’s formulation thus realizes the full potential for science and technology where “nature would be treated as another subject instead of as mere raw materials” (Feenberg 1996:48). 87

In sum, Beck and Marcuse each present a model of transformed instrumental rationality with important similarities. Beck provides evidence that the organizational form of science is dependent on particular historical conditions and suggests an alternative to the authoritarian implementation of techno-scientific development. However, because of Beck’s insufficient theorizing of the role of nature in the risk society, Beck is not able to provide an adequate alternative to science as an integral structure in the domination of nature. As we are beginning to see science develop in previously unforeseen ways, Marcuse’s more ‘utopian’ theorizing of a

‘new science’ seems more possible now than at the time of his writing.

4.4 Conclusion

I have thus far explored the relevance and the limitations of both the theory of risk society and ideological critique as advanced by Beck and the first-generation Frankfurt School respectively. This debate has led to three identifiable conclusions about the nature of social transformations and environmental risk. First, ideology constrains the possibility for social transformations in the form of reflexive modernization. Second, the latent side-effects of modernization, as culminated in environmental and climate risks, bring about the presence of structural leaks in the totalizing domination of the administered society. Third, the trends noted by Beck in recognizing the process of reflexive scientization, point to the historical contingency of the form of scientific rationality. In the next chapter I will be further discussing these conclusions and identify the significance of these claims.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Over the course of this analysis, the Frankfurt School and Beck have been independently examined and brought together to spur a debate on social transformation and environmental risk.

Through this confrontation, I have sought to gain new insights on these themes in light of environmental risk and ideology. In this chapter, I will first summarize the conclusions made throughout this investigation and highlight where I have offered a novel perspective on these topics. Then, I will be identifying the key limitations to my findings and locating potentialities for future discussions and questions.

5.1 Overview of Conclusions

First, this analysis has advanced a critique of the theory of risk society and advocated for a framework—influenced by the early Frankfurt School’s critique of ideology—which seeks a multidimensional understanding of power and risk. In chapters 3 and 4, I had charged Beck with providing an insufficient account of power. Specifically, I had argued that Beck has overlooked the role of ideology as a means of social control by concealing the contradictions of industrial society and reifying non-human nature. This analysis argues that ideology is still relevant to contemporary society, and that this dimension of power limits the effectiveness of the reflexive transformation of society as theorized by Beck. Particularly, it was explored how the instrumental view of nature persists despite its apparent self-destructive consequences. In addition to establishing the importance of ideology, I also explored the possibilities for the advancement of the method of immanent critique to serve as a basis for ecological aims by identifying those contradictions which offer determinate possibilities for the transformation of society (Antonio 1981:334). 89

The second problem this analysis has sought to resolve was overcoming Benhabib’s

(1994) critique of the one-dimensionality thesis as developed in chapters 2 and 4. As the early

Frankfurt School shifted their focus to a critique of instrumental reason—further examining ideology in late industrial societies—they consequently problematize the normative project of critical theory. At the core of critical theory is the method of immanent critique which seeks to move history by revealing the contradictions of society (Antonio 1981; Horkheimer

1947/2013:178). However, their critique of rationality proposes that the totalizing domination of the administered society (or the one-dimensional society) denies its own past, destroying the norms and values immanent to society (Benhabib 1994:84-86). In chapter 4, I attempted to limit these claims by arguing that risks, as theorized by Beck, begin to reveal the cracks in the totality.

My conclusion in this regard is that risks, especially environmental and climate risks, have the potential to open up the totalizing system of domination, because they are the culmination of the mistakes of industrialization. As Beck (2016:123) points out, climate change has become the axis of global protests because it produces a sense of violation against sacred norms. I have argued that these acts of resistance against the system which has produced climate risks are moments where “the untruth of the whole is revealed, and glimmers of another life become visible”

(Benhabib 1994:88). In other words, they demonstrate the still-existing potential for emancipatory social transformations.

Finally, in chapter 4, I compared Marcuse’s project for a ‘new science’ with Beck’s conception of reflexive scientization. This comparison explored where these theories overlapped and where they diverged. It was found that Beck’s understanding of nature limited its ability to transcend the problems outlined with ‘self-preserving reason’. However, Beck’s recognition of the already-occurring changes in science also undermine Habermas’s critique of Marcuse’s new 90

science. I reasoned that the transformations that Beck identifies in the way science is carried out, point to the historical contingency of scientific rationality, and therefore should be interpreted as evidence for the possibility of an alternative form of science.

In sum, Beck’s undermining of the relations of domination and power lead to a theory that lacks purchase in explaining the complacency associated with climate crisis. By contrast, the first-generation Frankfurt school provides a nuanced account of domination and power organized around socio-ecological relationships. Identifying power relations is an integral aspect of the project of critical theory—whether it be through rationalization, ideology, or authoritarianism.

That being said, the first-generation Frankfurt School did not have the benefit of experiencing the historical conditions brought about by the discovery of global ecological risks. Beck’s project identifies a dialectical moment for a radical societal transformation— whereby industrial society has tended “towards its own negation” (Marcuse 1964:230).

5.2 Limitations and Potential for Future Research

It is necessary to identify the limitations of this study and to outline potential future inquiries that arise from the findings. First, it must be acknowledged that this study was unable to provide a definitive analysis of all the potential ways that ideology impacts socio-ecological relationships. Further investigation is necessary to develop a comprehensive framework which would ideally repurpose key concepts from the Frankfurt School such as false needs and culture industry in light of environmental crisis. It was briefly noted how these concepts can help to explain the production of environmental risk and reproduce the conditions of capital and, yet they have not been significantly incorporated into a study on the environment. 91

Unfortunately, due to the increasing complexity such an engagement might pose, additional thinkers were excluded from this thesis. Future exploration of the themes developed here could potentially benefit from including the social theories of Murray Bookchin. Bookchin is highly influenced by the early Frankfurt School, particularly their analysis of Odysseus and the

‘domination thesis’ (Gunderson 2016:224-225). However, he deviates from the Frankfurt School by reversing the causal relationship of the domination of humanity and nature (i.e. social domination precedes the domination of nature and not vice-versa), and by formulating a new type of objective reason rooted in ecology and neo-Aristotelianism (Gunderson 2015:233).

Contextualizing his political philosophy of social ecology within the framework presented here can potentially offer new pathways for future analysis.

Finally, the discussion of Beck’s and Marcuse’s conception of a new form of science deserves further attention. By putting forth this comparison, I hope to reinvigorate the debate on the possibility of a ‘new science’ and re-examine the relationship between this pairing. Although the exploration put forth in chapter 4 has served the purposes of this inquiry, I hope that this thesis inspires further expansion on this development. Ideally, this research will include an empirical evaluation of Beck’s claims regarding the already-occurring transformations in scientific practice which was unable to be undertaken in this thesis.

5.3 Critical Theory and Environmental Crisis

This examination has led to a characterization of contemporary society struggling with the various competing structures and forces of ideology, risk, instrumental rationality, capitalism, and reflexive modernization. One thing I have learned from Beck and the Frankfurt School is to resist the temptation to oversimplify the complexities of modern life. In their respective writings, they always attempt to take a dialectical approach to theory. The aim in this thesis was to follow 92

their lead and acknowledge the complexity of modern societies; to favour a dialectical approach over a one-sided analysis. By engaging with the insights from some of the most important thinkers in critical theory of the 20th and 21st century, this thesis has gone beyond their independent investigations and developed new ways to theorize contemporary society.

We are arriving at a point in history where the effects of climate change are increasingly imminent. It is at this instance where society will be forced to ask and answer difficult questions.

I agree with Beck that this is a moment of emancipatory potential—but it is also a moment for theory to reflect upon and clarify the significance of these threats. How do we best take advantage of this opportunity? And, importantly, where should we direct our critiques and protests? Critical theory has the potential to answer these questions, but it must continue its normative outlook; not afraid to speak to the negative conditions of society with the aim of opposing and overcoming them. In the words of Horkheimer (1968/1972:233), “the issue, however, is not simply the theory of emancipation; it is the practice of it as well”.

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