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Risk, class, crisis, hazards and cosmopolitan solidarity/risk community - conceptual and methodological clarifications Ulrich Beck

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Ulrich Beck. Risk, class, crisis, hazards and cosmopolitan solidarity/risk community - conceptual and methodological clarifications. 2013. ￿halshs-00820297￿

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Ulrich Beck N°31 | april 2013

his paper discusses four problems. (1) Risk and class: why ‘class’ is too soft a category to capture the explosi- veness of social inequality in World Risk Society? (2) Risk and crisis: how do these two concepts relate to each other? (3) Risk and hazards: by hazards I mean material substances that are sources of threat. (4) Risk and cosmopolitan community/solidarity: how do cli- mate risks liberate politics from given rules and enemy images and/or produce new ones?

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Risk, class, crisis, hazards and cosmopolitan solidarity/risk community – conceptual and methodological clariications Ulrich Beck

April 2013

The author Professor Ulrich Beck is Professor for at the University of , and has been the British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in the Department of Sociology since 1997. He has received Honorary Doctorates from several European universities. Professor Beck is editor of Soziale Welt, editor of the Edition Second at Suhrkamp. He is founding director of the research centre at the University of Munich (in cooperation with three other universities in the area), Sonderfors- chungsbereich - Relexive Modernisation inanced since 1999 by the DFG (German Research Society). Among his recent works : Power in the Global Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); & Edgar, G., Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); World at Risk (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). About this paper his text was written for a workshop on « Risk and Climate Change: he Shaping of a Cosmopolitan Future », held in Paris on 10-11 December 2012, in the frame of the Chaire of Ulrich Beck entitled « Cosmopolitan Risk Communities » at the Collège d’études mondiales. Citing this document Ulrich Beck, Risk, class, crisis, hazards and cosmopolitan solidarity/risk community – conceptual and methodo- logical clariications, FMSH-WP-2013-31, april 2013.

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Abstract his paper discusses four problems. (1) Risk and class: why ‘class’ is too soft a category to capture the explosiveness of social inequality in World Risk Society? (2) Risk and crisis: how do these two concepts relate to each other? (3) Risk and hazards: by hazards I mean material substances that are sources of threat. (4) Risk and cosmopolitan community/solidarity: how do climate risks liberate politics from given rules and enemy images and/or produce new ones? Keywords classe, , risk society, climate risks, crisis Risque, classe, crise, dangers et solidarité cosmopolitaine/communauté de risque. Clariications conceptuelles et méthodologiques Résumé Ce papier discute quatre problèmes. (1) Risque et classe : pourquoi la catégorie de « classe » est-elle une catégorie trop molle pour capturer l’explosion des inégalités sociales dans la société mondiale du risque ? (2) Risque et crise : comment ces deux concepts sont-ils liés l’un à l’autre ? (3) Risque et dangers : par dangers [hazards] je vise des éléments matériels qui sont sources de menaces. (4) Risque et communauté/ solidarité cosmopolitaine : comment les risques climatiques afranchissent-ils les politiques des règles données et des représentations de l’ennemi et/ou en produisent de nouvelles ? Mots-clefs cosmopolitisme, classe, société du risque, risque climatique, crise

Sommaire

1. Risk and class 4 2. Risk and crisis 6 3. Risk and hazards 6 4. Risk community/Cosmopolitan solidarity 8 Cosmopolitan empathy 8 Cosmopolitan empathy is not enough, ‘work’ in networks of a cosmopolitanism from below creates ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’/’risk communities’ 9 References 9

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1. Risk and class What I mean by this becomes clear when one Why ‘class’ is too soft a category to capture the thinks of the major risk events of recent decades explosiveness of social inequality at the beginning – Chernobyl, 9/11, climate change, the inancial of the twenty-irst century? crisis, Fukushima, the euro crisis. hree features are common to them all. (1) Because they give In my book ‘Risk Society’ (25 years ago) I used rise to a dramatic radicalization of social ine- the metaphor: ‘Hunger is hierarchical, smog is quality both inter-nationally and intra-natio- democratic.’ (an ongoing discussion) Dean Cur- nally, they cannot continue to be conceptualized ran attempts in his article, ‘Risk Society and the in terms of the established empirical-analytical Distribution of Bads’ (Curran 2013) to chart how conceptual instrumentarium of class analysis as the growing social production of risk increases ‘class conlicts in the class society’. By contrast, the importance of class. He argues, that my they indeed vary the narrative of discontinuity as theory of the risk society contains the basis of a contained in the theory of the world risk society. critical theory of class relations in the risk society. (2) Before they actually occurred, they were He tries to show “how not only is the ‘risk society inconceivable. (3) hey are global in character and thesis’ not antithetical to class analysis, but that in in their consequences and render the progressive fact it can be used to reveal how class antagonisms networking of spaces of action and environments and associated wealth diferentials will gain even tangible. hese ‘cosmopolitan events’ were not greater importance as risks continue to grow” only not envisaged in the paradigm of the repro- (Curran 2013). his is undoubtedly an important duction of the social and political (class) system, step which is apt to make the sociology of class, but they fall outside of this frame of reference whose self-understanding is rooted in the expe- in principle and as a result place it in question. riences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, In contrast, the theory of the ‘world risk society’ receptive to the new realities at the beginning of consciously starts from the premise of the self- the twenty-irst century. My objection is: Even if endangerment of modernity and attaches central this might be helpful at the national level, ‘class’ importance to the question of how, in view of the is too soft a category to capture the transnational, impending catastrophe, the nation-state social cosmopolitical explosiveness of social inequality and political system is beginning to crumble. in world risk society. Let me give you a short overview how class is being theorized in world risk society.

Figure I: Theorizing class in world risk society

Classe

Reproduction Transformation

Bourdieu (1984), Goldthorpe (2002), herborn (2011): Scott (2002), he return of class Goods without bads Atkinson (2007): in the age of global he continuity of class in inequality national societies Distribution of

Dean Curran (2013): Gabe Mythen (2005): Risk radicalizes/trans- Goods and bads Risk reinforces the logic of forms the logic of class class distribution distribution

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or underdeveloped areas, territories, nations. By 2000, it has been estimated that 80 percent of the We can distinguish four positions on the conti- income in equality among households depended nuing, or maybe even increasing, relevance of the on the country you live in (Milanovic 2011: 112). category of class at the beginning of the twenty- his is currently changing. Inter-national inequa- irst century depending on the extent to which lity is declining overall, although the gap between they accord central importance to (1) the repro- the rich and poor has not stopped growing. But duction or (2) the transformation of social classes intra-national inequality is, on the whole, increa- with regard to (3) the distribution of goods wit- sing, albeit unevenly, denying any pseudo-univer- hout bads or (4) the distribution of goods and sal determinism of ‘’ or of technolo- bads. he irst group of ‘reproduction theories’ gical change. his amounts to a return of class as can be deined by the fact that they ignore the an increasingly powerful global determinant of unequal distribution of bads/risks and deine the inequality…Now, nations are growing closer, and diferentiation between classes solely in terms of classes are growing apart.” (herborn 2011: 3) the distribution of ‘goods’, i.e. of wealth. Here the ‘narrative of continuity’, the resistance of classes What makes herborn’s argument so challenging to transformation throughout all upheavals, is and interesting is that he combines the re-trans- emphasized. My critique of the antiquatedness formation of global inequality with the return of of the category and theory of class is rejected national classes. he dramatic increase in income by appeal to the empirical fact of the enduring disparity between ‘the richest 1% and the rest’ is in strong connection between class positions and fact a dramatic development that places the legi- income and educational diferences (Atkinson timacy of in question, as the globalized 2007; Bourdieu 1984; Goldthorpe 2002; Scott Occupy movement importantly demonstrates. In 2002). hereby the class theorists and researchers the USA in particular – as (Vanity normally miss the cosmopolitization of the poor Fair, May 2012) has highlighted – the richest 1 (but also the middle classes and, of course, the per cent owns 40 per cent of the national wealth; elites), their multi-ethnic, multi-religious, trans- moreover, almost a quarter of the annual national national life forms and identities (Hobbs 2013). income lows into their pockets and this richest 1 per cent controls almost all of the seats in the his debate sufers from the fact that class theo- US Congress. Yet it is questionable whether this rists, trapped in the ‘class logic’, can conceive of dynamic can be appropriately conceived in socio- the antithesis to the persistence of classes only in logical terms as a ‘return of class’ and whether it terms of the ‘disappearance of classes’ – specii- is not instead an exemplary case of the radicaliza- cally, in terms of a decrease in inequality and an tion of social inequality through individualization increase in equality. However, that is precisely not – where individualization must be understood as my perspective. he antithesis to the sociology of a precondition of radicalization. class that I propose and develop attaches central importance, on the contrary, to the radicalization herborn’s own characterization contains some of social inequality. his forces us to overcome the pointers for this interpretation that these deve- epistemological monopoly of the category of class lopments involve a post-class society aggravation over social inequality and to uncouple historical of social inequality. It “would derive its primary classes from social inequality, something which is dynamic from the heterogeneous popular classes evidently inconceivable for analysts of class. of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and their, perhaps, less forceful counterparts in the rich world. he second position, which appears here under Empowered by a rise of literacy and by new means the heading of the ‘Transformation of Class’, is of communication, the popular class movements represented by Göran herborn’s he Return of face great hurdles of division – ethnicity, religion, Classes in the Age of Global Inequality: and particularly the divide between formal and “We are experiencing a historical turn, not only informal employment – as well as the dispersion in geo-politics but also in terms of inequality. he of activities, for example in street hawking and 19th and 20th century international development small sweatshops …” (herborn 2011: 5). of underdevelopment meant, among other things, Some people might even read herborn’s ‘return that inequality among humans became increa- of national class’ as an empirical justiication of singly shaped by where they lived, in developed ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck 2006; 2007;

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Beck and Grande 2010), hence of the unrelective speak of ‘risk’? How do these two concepts relate choice of the nation-state class society as the unit to each other? he term ‘risk’ goes beyond the of research. But that would certainly be a mistake. term ‘crisis’ in three respects. For herborn’s approach actually the cri- conirms First: he concept of crisis blurs the distinction tique of methodological nationalism – namely, between the (staged) risk as the future-in-the- that the nation-state orthodoxy of class analysis present and catastrophe as the present-in-the- must irst be broken through by a global analy- future (of which we can ultimately know nothing). sis of inequality in order to (possibly) conirm his he talk of crisis may be said to ‘ontologize’ the thesis of the ‘return of class’. diference that is central here, between an antici- My decisive objection is a diferent one, howe- pated catastrophe and an actual one. ver (and here I take up Curran’s critique of class Second: he use of ‘crisis’ deceives us into imagi- analysis). Like Goldthorpe and others, herborn ning that by overcoming the crisis today we shall only captures a partial aspect of the new proble- be able to revert to a pre-crisis state of afairs. matic of inequality. his is because that everything In contrast, ‘risk’ exposes the ‘secular diference’ is confounding not only the nation-state class between the impending global threat and the res- system but also the global system, both at the ponses to it available to us in the framework of categorial and the empirical level, is left out of national policies. account by his theoretical framework and image of the world ixated on this class diference. It And – third – that implies, that risk is – unlike was the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy four years crisis – not an exception but rather the normal ago that actually plunged the global inancial sys- state of afairs and hence will become the engine tem into a crisis that threatened its very survival. of a great transformation of society and politics. Combined with the global climate risk, the glo- bal inancial risk – now also exacerbated into the 3. Risk and hazards threat to the existence of the euro and of Europe he notion of risk society puts onto the socio- – has generated a new kind of transnational logical agenda the very nature of the physical redistribution from above, which the paradigm of world and the need to create a sociology of-and- class theory and class analysis fails to grasp. For with the environment. No longer is it possible this is a matter of state-mediated redistributions to believe that there is a pure sociology conined of risk across nation-state borders which cannot and limited to exploring the social in-and-of be forced into the pigeonhole of ‘class conlict’. itself. he distinction of society and nature dis- he risks posed by big banks are being socialized solves. he thesis of risk society brings out that by the state and imposed on retirees through most important phenomena within the world austerity dictates. Risk redistribution conlicts are social-and-physical, such as global warming, are breaking out between debtor countries and extreme weather events, risks such lender countries across the world – or between as AIDS, biological warfare, BSE, nuclear terro- countries which produce risk and those countries rism, worldwide automobility, nuclear accidents, being afected by the risk production of other and so on. None of these is purely social but nor powerful countries. are they simply physical either. Both the epistemological monopoly of class ana- I think there is a problem in the way our research lysis on the diagnosis of social inequality and the project is designed and heading: the more we methodological nationalism of the sociology of concentrate on the mediation and medialization inequality have contributed essentially to the fact of risk, the more we are in danger to ignore the that established sociology is empty-handed and nature-society-synthesis of risk society. Here the practically blind and disoriented in the face of the notion of hazards becomes important: I quote radicalized, transnational and post-class society from a paper I reviewed; referring to risk society power shifts and conlicts of climate change theory, the authors argue: which rightly agitating the global public. “As useful as these insights are, however, they 2. Risk and crisis ofer little guidance about how to move from general theoretical claims about risk society Normally people speak of ‘crisis’ in relation to cli- to empirically grounded research with testable mate change, inancial turbulences etc. Why do I

Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France http://www.msh-paris.fr - FMSH-WP-2013-31 Risk, class, crisis, hazards and cosmopolitan solidarity/risk community 7/11 propositions. One reason for this shortcoming be anthropogenic and catastrophic, occurs in the lies in the theory’s emphasis on risks rather than shape of a new kind of synthesis of nature and hazards. For Beck risk is a statement about the society. he inequality of life chances arises from likelihood of future harm, and its essence lies in the ability to dispose of income, educational qua- the anticipation, expectation and potential action liications and passports, and their social charac- that this anticipated harm produces among social ter is very evident. he radical inequality of the actors. Yet unlike most risk analysts, Beck col- consequences of climate change takes material lapses the distinction between actual (i.e. scien- form in the increasing frequency or exacerbation tiically produced) risk and perceived risk (Slovic of natural events – such as loods or tornadoes 2000), instead treating risks and social deinitions – which are in principle familiar natural occur- of risk as equivalent. his approach permits a rences and are not self evidently the product of relexive account of the unintended consequences societal decisions. he expression ‘force of nature’ of risk, but it also paradoxically renders the theory takes on a new meaning: the natural law evidence of risk society – which is premised on the increa- of ‘natural’ catastrophes produces a naturaliza- sing difusion and intensity of real and present tion of social relations of inequality and power. ecological threats – fundamentally non-ecological. he political consequence is that the conception his trade of is unnecessary. of the natural equality of human beings tips over into the conception of a natural inequality of We contend that it is possible to retain something human beings produced by natural catastrophes. of the ecological basis of risk society theory by shif- ting analytical attention from risks to hazards. he facts are well known – global warming, mel- By hazards we mean the material substances ting polar ice caps, rising sea levels, desertiica- (e.g. industrially produced toxins) and biophysi- tion, increasing numbers of tornadoes and all of cal conditions (e.g. loods, hurricanes, contami- it usually treated as a natural catastrophe. But, nated soils) that are the actual sources of threat. nature is not in itself catastrophic. he catastro- From this perspective, hazards presuppose risk. phic character is only revealed within the ield of [As risks presuppose hazards.] Moreover, because reference of the society afected. he catastrophic they exist in actual time and space, whereas risks potentials cannot be deduced from nature or from characterize future possibilities, hazards are empi- scientiic analyses, but relect the social vulnerabi- rically measurable in ways that risks are not. hus, lity of certain countries and population groups to shifting attention from risks to hazards provides the consequences of climate change. a way to recover the ecological basis of the risk Without the concept of social vulnerability it society while at the same time providing irmer is impossible to understand the catastrophic ground for empirical analysis. In making this content of climate change. he idea that natural analytical shift, we theorize hazards not merely as catastrophe and social vulnerability are two sides discrete outcomes of modern industrial produc- of the same coin is familiar wisdom to a way of tion but as spatial and historical processes of urban- thinking that sees the consequences of climate that have become increasingly ecological change change as a co-product. In recent years, howe- ‘unbounded’ in time and space, compounding ver, social vulnerability has become a key dimen- uncertainties about how, where and when they sion in the social structural analysis of world risk come to do harm (Beck 1992). Focusing on these society: social processes and conditions produce urban change processes is where recent research an unequal exposure to hardly deinable risks, and on environmental inequalities becomes useful for the resulting inequalities must largely be seen as our framework.” ( he Historical Nature of Cities: A an expression and product of power relations in Study of Urbanization and Hazardous Waste Accu- the national and global context. Social vulnerabi- mulation, pp. 7f.) lity is a sum concept, encompassing means and I do think this is an important objection/obser- possibilities, which individuals, communities or vation, because of many reasons; one of them is whole populations have at their disposal, in order bridging between natural climate sciences and to cope – or not – with the threats of climate . change (or inancial crises). Along with this there goes an important obser- A sociological understanding of vulnerability cer- vation: social and natural inequality fuses in the tainly has a crucial relationship to the future, but course of climate change. Climate change, held to also has historical depth. he ‘cultural wounds’

Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France http://www.msh-paris.fr - FMSH-WP-2013-31 Risk, class, crisis, hazards and cosmopolitan solidarity/risk community 8/11 that, for example, result from the colonial past, If we have a look at our research project all three constitute an important part of the background working packages are on this line; Anders’ ‘gree- to understanding border-transcending climate ning cosmopolitan urbanism’ is looking “for the conlicts. he more marginal the available econo- emerging global moral geography of carbon emis- mic and political options are, the more vulnerable sions, and the way cities construct themselves as are a particular group or population. he question ‘responsible actors’ within it”. David is looking for that allows the unit of investigation to be deter- ‘cosmopolitan innovations’ and Dani and Joy are mined is this: what constitutes vulnerability in a looking for ‘medialization of climate risk creating particular context, and how did it become what cosmopolitan risk communities’. it is? My irst point is: hose three responses are also strategies of action and in order to study the stra- 4. Risk community/ tegies of new beginnings we have also to study Cosmopolitan solidarity the strategies of denial and fatalism. I repeat, risk society theory refers to catastrophes We have to understand the dialectics between, that are still to come and that we have to anti- on the one hand, denial and fatalism and, on the cipate and forestall in the present. hus we dis- other hand, making the unimaginable imagi- cover the catastrophic subjunctive that forms the nable, the impossible possible. conceptual framework of our theory and project. Many people confuse risk society with the catas- Fatalism and denial are only perceptions. he trophe society. An example of the latter would be power of new beginnings consists of more than something like a ‘Titanic society’. Such a society perception, namely a package of three compo- is dominated by the motto ‘too late’, by a fated nents: knowledge, vision and action. Its motto doom, the panic of desperation. World risk society could be: ‘save the world through transgressing is concerned to demonstrate, to stay within the borders!’ metaphor, that the clif can still be avoided if we My second point is: In order to understand the change direction. In this sense there is a certain politics of new beginnings we have to answer the ainity between the theory of the risk society and question (to theorize the problem): What does Ernst Bloch’s Principle of Hope. ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ mean and how does it Risk implies the message that it is high time for us become real? In order to conceptualize and study to act! Drag people out of their routine, drag the ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’ (or ‘cosmopolitan risk politicians out of the ‘constraints’ that allegedly communities’) we have to distinguish two inter- surround them. Risk is both the everyday insecu- related dimensions – irst: cosmopolitan empathy; rity that is no longer accepted and the catastrophe second: the (sub)politics of cosmopolitanism from that has not yet occurred. he global medializa- below. tion of global climate change risks opens our eyes Cosmopolitan empathy and also raises our hopes of a positive outcome. hat is the paradox of fatalism and encourage- I am not sure at all what cosmopolitan empa- ment we derive from global risks. To that extent thy does include – this actually is an important global climate change risk is always also a politi- research question. But here are some necessary cal category since it liberates politics from given conditions and ingredients: public, pictures (art), rules, institutional shackles and enemy images. a language creating a language which bridges the geographical distance and the national his is a very important point for the architecture diferences. of world risk society theory. Actually we have to distinguish three possible responses to global risk: he horror has a face for us, it has many faces irst denial, second fatalism and third new begin- and all of them look like our own. How does this nings (Hannah Arendt); or what I called before identiication of ‘our faces, my face’ with the ‘faces the elective ainity between the theory of world of distant others’ become real? here must be a risk society and Ernst Bloch’s Principle of Hope speciic quality of images (language, art) which – ‘the global risk paradox of enforced encoura- creates this planetary sense of pain and sufering. gement’, ‘cosmopolitan moment’, ‘cosmopolitan May it be images and narratives of faces that imperative: cooperate of fail!’. break the world’s collective hearts? How is the knowledge/image being created that the face of

Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme - 190 avenue de France - 75013 Paris - France http://www.msh-paris.fr - FMSH-WP-2013-31 Risk, class, crisis, hazards and cosmopolitan solidarity/risk community 9/11 the tragedy could have been our own? Of course, ‘Greening’ that is changing the worldview and these are open questions. self-consciousness of urban and national actors can be only successful if its worldview is deeply Cosmopolitan empathy is not engrained in the right to cultural diference and enough, ‘work’ in networks the idea that strength lies in diversity, principles of a cosmopolitanism from that are strategically useful as rhetorical anti- below creates ‘cosmopolitan dotes to the cultures of denial and apathy. What solidarity’/’risk communities’ the study of the work and work conditions in the urban and national contexts in the name of a Mediation and medialization of climate change greening cosmopolitanism from below could – I risks in all its forms is necessary but not sui- say could! – demonstrate the embrace of global cient to create cosmopolitan risk communities, cultural heterogeneity must not occlude the exis- as Fuyuki Kurasawa argues. As important are tence of socio-economic asymmetries. transnational modes of ‘work’ (‘praxis’) whereby actors construct bonds of mutual commitment To give this argument a turn which connects it and reciprocity across borders through public to ongoing climate change conference in Doha discourse and socio-political struggle. In other its consequence is: those global conferences are words, the crux of the matter lies in grasping becoming useless, they are more or less of only the work of constructing and performing a cos- symbolic value. Why? Because they are looking mopolitanism from below via normatively and for universally binding norms, neglecting the politically oriented forms of global social action. importance of local-national-urban activities as I follow Fuyuki Kurasawa by claiming that this starting points for constructing cosmopolitan work-oriented perspective of (sub)political actor- solidarity and risk communities. networks allows us to question three of the main assumptions imbedded within previous versions References of global solidarity, namely cultural homogeniza- Atkinson, W. 2007 ‘Beck, Individualization and tion, political fragmentation, and social thinness. the Death of Class: A Critique’, British Journal of Hence, against the argument that ‘integration’ Sociology 58(3): 349–66. requires a diference-blind cultural assimila- tionism, I argue, that the recognition of global Arendt, H. 1958 he Human Condition, Chicago: cultural pluralism is becoming a sine qua non for University of Chicago Press. establishing viable solidaristic ties. Beck, U. [1986] 1992 Risk Society: Towards a Why is the category of ‘work’ necessary? Because New Modernity, London/Newbury Park/New this kind of work connects local-urban and natio- Delhi: Sage Publications. nal conditions and histories with transnational Beck, U. 1999 World Risk Society, Cambridge, UK/ actor-networks of global publics. Only if those Malden, MA: Polity Press/Blackwell Publishers. working groups in their speciic contexts succeed Beck, U. 2006 he Cosmopolitan Vision, Cam- in creating local and national coalitions with ins- bridge, UK/Malden, MA: Polity Press. titutional actors on the level of community, busi- nesses etc. and transnational corporate networks Beck, U. 2007 ‘Beyond Class and Nation: Refra- connecting diferent world cities ‘thick’ cosmopo- ming Social Inequalities in a Globalizing World’, Bri- litan risk communities can be established. tish Journal of Sociology 58(4): 679–705. What I actually want to say is: the creating of Beck, U. 2009 World at Risk, Cambridge, UK/ cosmopolitan bonds and solidarity depends very Malden, MA: Polity Press. much on the work of local actor-networks redei- Beck, U. 2010 ‘Remapping Social Inequalities in ning or (as we say) ‘greening’ the self-description, an Age of Climate Change: For a Cosmopolitan self-images and self-consciousness of world cities Renewal of Sociology’, Global Networks 10(2): or nations, which then, thereby and therefore are 165-81 intimately connected to ‘greening Others’. My assumption is that the local and national resis- Beck, U 2011 ‘Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Com- tance to the domination of denial and apathy munities of Global Risk’, American Behavioral Scientist can be only successful if this resistance is inti- 55(10): 1346-61. mately tied to the search for inclusion of others.

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Beck, U. and Grande, E. 2010 ‘Varieties of Second Modernity: he Cosmopolitan Turn in Social and Political heory and Research’, British Journal of Sociology 61(3): 409–43. Beck, U. and Sznaider, N. 2011 ‘he Self-Limitation of Modernity: he heory of Relexive Taboos’, heory and Society 40(4): 417–36. Bloch, E. [1954] 1995 he Principle of Hope, Cam- bridge MA: MIT Press. Blok, A. 2012: ‘Greening Cosmopolitan Urban- ism? On the Transnational Mobility of Low- Carbon Formats in Northern European and East Asian Cities’, Environment and Planning A 44(10): 2327–2343. Bourdieu, P. 1984 Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. Curran, D. 2013 ‘Risk Society and the Distribu- tion of Bads: heorizing Class in the Risk Soci- ety’, British Journal of Sociology 64(1). Goldthorpe, J.H. 2002 ‘Globalization and Social Class’, West European Politics 25(3): 1–28 Hobbs, D. 2013 Lush Life: Constructing Organ- ized Crime in the UK, Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni- versity Press. Kurasawa, F. 2004 ‘A Cosmopolitanism from Below: Alternative Globalization and the Crea- tion of a Solidarity without Bounds’, European Journal of Sociology 45(2): 233-55 Milanovic, B. 2011 he Haves and the Have-Nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequal- ity, New York: Basic Books. Mythen, G. 2005 ‘From Goods to Bads? Revis- iting the Political Economy of Risk’, Sociological Research Online 10(3) at http://www.socreson- line.org.uk/10/3/mythen.html. Scott, J. 2002 ‘Social Class and Stratiication in ’, Acta Sociologica 45(1): 23–35. Slovic, P. 2000 he Perception of Risk, London: Earthscan Publishers. Stiglitz, J. 2012 ‘he 1 Percent’s Problem’, Vanity Fair May 31, 2012. herborn, G. 2011 ‘he Return of Class’, Global Dialogue: ISA-Newsletter 2(1): 3–5.

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Working Papers : dernières parutions

Hervé Le Bras, Jean-Luc Racine conclusions, FMSH-WP-2012-12, comme lignes de fracture, FMSH- & Michel Wieviorka, National juin 2012. WP-2012-23, octobre 2012. Debates on Race Statistics: towards an Rodolphe De Koninck & Jean- Danièle Joly, Race, ethnicity and International Comparison, FMSH- François Rousseau, Pourquoi et religion: social actors and policies, WP-2012-01, février 2012. jusqu’où la fuite en avant des agricul- FMSH-WP-2012-24, novembre , Ni dieu ni maître tures sud-est asiatiques ?, FMSH- 2012. : les réseaux, FMSH-WP-2012-02, WP-2012-13, juin 2012. Dominique Méda, Redeining Pro- février 2012. Jacques Sapir, Inlation monétaire gress in Light of the Ecological Crisis, François Jullien, L’écart et l’entre. Ou ou inlation structurelle ? Un modèle FMSH-WP-2012-25, décembre comment penser l’altérité, FMSH- hétérodoxe bi-sectoriel, FMSH- 2012. WP-2012-03, février 2012. WP-2012-14, juin 2012. Ulrich Beck & Daniel Levy, Cos- Itamar Rabinovich, he Web of Rela- Franson Manjali, he ‘Social’ and the mopolitanized Nations: Reimagining tionship, FMSH-WP-2012-04, ‘Cognitive’ in Language. A Reading Collectivity in World Risk Society, février 2012. of Saussure, and Beyond, FMSH- FMSH-WP-2013-26, february WP-2012-15, july 2012. 2013. Bruno Maggi, Interpréter l’agir : un déi théorique, FMSH-WP-2012-05, Michel Wieviorka, Du concept de Xavier Richet, L’internationalisa- février 2012. sujet à celui de subjectivation/dé-sub- tion des irmes chinoises : croissance, jectivation, FMSH-WP-2012-16, motivations, stratégies, FMSH- Pierre Salama, Chine – Brésil : indus- juillet 2012. WP-2013-27, février 2013. trialisation et « désindustrialisation précoce », FMSH-WP-2012-06, , Feminism, Capita- Alain Naze, Le féminisme critique mars 2012. lism, and the Cunning of History: An de Pasolini, avec un commentaire Introduction, FMSH-WP-2012-17 de Stefania Tarantino, FMSH- Guilhem Fabre & Stéphane Grum- august 2012. WP-2013-28, février 2013. bach, he World upside down,China’s R&D and innovation strategy, Nancy Fraser, Can society be commo- halia Magioglou, What is the role FMSH-WP-2012-07, avril 2012. dities all the way down? Polanyian of “Culture” for conceptualization in relections on capitalist crisis, FMSH- Political ? Presentation Joy Y. Zhang, he De-nationalization WP-2012-18, august 2012. of a dialogical model of lay thinking and Re-nationalization of the Life in two cultural contexts, FMSH- Sciences in China: A Cosmopolitan Marc Fleurbaey & Stéphane Zuber, WP-2013-29, mars 2013. Practicality?, FMSH-WP-2012-08, Climate policies deserve a negative avril 2012. discount rate, FMSH-WP-2012-19, Byasdeb Dasgupta, Some Aspects september 2012. of External Dimensions of Indian John P. Sullivan, From Drug Wars to Economy in the Age of Globalisa- Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Car- Roger Waldinger, La politique tion, FMSH-WP-2013-30, april tels, Criminal Enclaves and Crimi- au-delà des frontières : la sociologie 2013. nal Insurgency in Mexico and Cen- politique de l’émigration, FMSH- tral America. Implications for Global WP-2012-20, septembre 2012. Ulrich Beck, Risk, class, crisis, Security, FMSH-WP-2012-09, hazards and cosmopolitan solida- Antonio De Lauri, Inaccessible avril 2012. rity/risk community – conceptual Normative Pluralism and Human and methodological clariications, Marc Fleurbaey, Economics is not Rights in Afghanistan, FMSH- FMSH-WP-2013-31, april what you think: A defense of the eco- WP-2012-21, september 2012. 2013. nomic approach to taxation, FMSH- Dominique Méda, Redéinir le pro- WP-2012-10, may 2012. , Tout grès à la lumière de la crise écologique, se transforme. Vraiment tout ?, Marc Fleurbaey, he Facets of Exploi- FMSH-WP-2012-22, octobre FMSH-WP-2013-32, mars tation, FMSH-WP-2012-11, may 2012. 2013. 2012. Ibrahima hioub, Stigmates et Jacques Sapir, Pour l’Euro, l’heure mémoires de l’esclavage en Afrique de du bilan a sonné : Quinze leçons et six l’Ouest : le sang et la couleur de peau

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