495 Foreword 1. a Concept of Qs1a-Synonymity Is Introduced In
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Notes Foreword 1. A concept of Qs1A-synonymity is introduced in the first part of this earlier work. The concept is also introduced in the present study (chapter 7). Let it suffice for now to say that two terms are Qs1A-synonymous for a definite per- son and with respect to a definite text if that person answers affirmatively to a question of the following form: If one term were to be exchanged for the other in this text, would the meaning of the text be the same? Unfortunately, my use of the word «synonymity» as an element in the definiendum has suggested that I believe that the answers to certain crude questionnaires will solve the problem of synonymity, or that the concept of Qs1A-synonymity is proposed as the operational meaning of the term «syn- onymity». Perhaps the best way to explain my purpose is to say that, just as one may apply different tests to an ability or a disposition, so one may apply different tests to something traditionally called «synonymity», and the con- cept of Qs1A-synonymity is merely one test among others. Chapter I: Basic Terms 1. The term «marginal reference» has in this work a meaning not far from that of «qualifying phrase» in everyday English. 2. It is tempting to interpret sentences of the form ««a» is synonymous with «b»» as expressions of universal indiscriminate synonymity, since no ex- ceptions are mentioned and no qualifications are made. Such an interpreta- tion is, however, usually implausible and transintentional (cf. chapter 2, section 2). 3. The use of «a» for «either-or» in formulas is distinguished from the use of «a» for sentences by its placement outside parentheses. 4. For details about axioms adopted for ‘synonymity’, see chapter 2, section 6. 495 NOTES TO PAGES 49–97 5. In a formulation ««a» means b», we call «a» the interpretandum expression and «b» the interpretans expression. 6. We use, in this classification of interpretations, words that are too vague to be admitted in theorems concerning the determination of the choice of interpretations. 7. In Norwegian, «mannlige»; «male» in English. 8. The phrase «that food ---» in Skinner’s item 2) seems to refer to something definite as the cause of a process, whereas «I am hungry» is more likely to re- fer to a state of affairs, one of the symptoms of which might be indicated by a saying such as his item 2). 9. «Incomparability» is introduced as a term in chapter 2, section 7. 10. The introduction of concepts of synonymity has been postponed to chapter 7. The above assertions about the existence of synonymic alternatives common to «a» and «b» are anticipatory. 11. That is, stuff capable of being adequately learned by using one’s memory. 12. Further precizations of «reading» would probably show that a usage com- mon among students is here presupposed known: «studying for examinations by reading». 13. The two last sentences are good examples of sentences sufficiently precise for certain, rather limited purposes, but too ambiguous to contribute, for exam- ple, to a statistical description of denotata fluctuations. What are the criteria of «being on the way from Oslo to Bergen»? Have they to do with plans for future movement along tracks, or is the mere location on the tracks leading to Bergen a sufficient criterion? Is «train» to be interpreted so as to include motor buses on tracks? The list could go on. To make the sentences useful for a statistical survey, we would have to introduce detailed criteria by suitable conventions of terminology. Chapter II: Basic Terms Continued 1. The simpler designation «receiver-ambiguous» is not used because it is needed to designate the ambiguity of an expression within the class or a class of receivers, if at least one receiver sometimes interprets the expression differ- ently from at least one other receiver. 2. The question of comparison of terminologies is taken up in work that is in progress. 3. The terms are translations of the Norwegian legal terms «generalpreventiv» and «spesialpreventiv». The latter has to do with measures preventing an indi- vidual (the criminal offender) from repeating his crime. 496 NOTES TO PAGES 143–218 Chapter III: Misinterpretation and Pseudoagreement 1. In the Syn(T1PS1T2QS2) symbols in the following, «(1)» or any other symbol for a step in a discussion or for a sequence of steps, is put into the place of S1 and S2. The symbols express in such cases, not a specific step or succession of steps in a specific discussion, but kinds of situations characterized by steps of certain kinds. 2. By «pseudoagreement, etc.» we mean «pseudoagreement or pseudodisagree- ment». 3. The Norwegian word for «thin», namely «tynn», permits this interpretation. In English the interpretation may be less plausible. Chapter IV: Definitoid Statements 1. By «definitoid statement» is meant a sentence that for at least one plausible interpretation is intended to express an N-, Ds-, or R-definition (normative, descriptive, or real definition), or that at least shows symptoms of expressing such kinds of assertions or announcements. 2. «Per definitionem» is used as a synonym for «by normative definition». 3. We add the phrase about similarity because it would be unfruitful to limit our description to persons using just the concept ‘normative definition’ that has been introduced here. 4. This has the consequence that there can be no real definition of classes with no member—for example, perpetuum mobile. Maybe real definitions might just as well be defined in relation to connotation. 5. If something, a, is explained by something else, b, «a» is called the explanan- dum expression, and «b» the explanans expression. Chapter V: Elementary Analysis 1. The reader may even be rather sure that Buckman did not use the above- mentioned expression, since it is in the third-person singular of the present tense. 2. If we ask, Does Russell intend to give an interpretative or a synonymic nor- mative definition, our answer is likely to be more uncertain. Does Russell use sentences of the forms «--- means . .» and «--- means the same as . .» with- out distinction? Or does he distinguish, and use quotation marks for inter- pretans expressions? 3. «N-formulation» is an abbreviation for «formulation of a normative defini- tion». «Ds-formulation» stands for «formulation of a descriptive definition». 497 NOTES TO PAGES 241–85 4. If a definiens expression can be brought into the form «x is a K1 and x is a K2 and . , and x is a Kn», then the definitoid statement of which the definiens expression is a part is called a «complex definitoid statement». 5. The following sentences contain one of them. «As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of differences, is not democracy» (Lincoln 1905: 7: 389). In a message to Congress (1861), he also used the term once (cf. Proceed- ings of the American Philosophical Society 88: 366). 6. For a comparison of hypotheses about the Lincoln formula, see, e.g., the col- lection reproduced in McKeon (1951: 29, 30, 71, 124, 132, etc.). 7. If something is considered to be subsumable under a characterization defined as the conceptual characteristics of a concept, that something will be said to be a denotatum of that concept. 8. The case of T2 being a designation is more complicated because, in that case, we have the sentence in which it occurs as a peculiar minimal context requir- ing special treatment. 9. The word «satisfy» is used in relation to definitoid formulations when we speak in general and do not distinguish normative from descriptive defini- tions or related synonymity hypotheses or announcements. 10. This sentence is added because, otherwise, the theorem would not assert any definite synonymities at all, all instances being of concepts 6, 7, etc. 11. We might call it a «multiple usage hypothesis with undifferentiated total field indication». In spite of the importance of such hypotheses and their close similarity to descriptive definitions, it is scarcely fruitful to widen the scope of descriptive definitions in order to include them. 12. This observation suggests that not every occurrence is of interest for the problem «Is occurrence no. x subsumable under the concept ‘occurrence in conformity with the synonymity hypothesis no. y’?». That subclass of the to- tal class of occurrences should be selected which is of special interest for solv- ing this problem. 13. The authors of the SSRC bulletin include some remarks about the expres- sion «as in», as it appears in their introductory note; see SSRC Bulletin 1946: 252. 14. The argument might be made more precise by stating explicitly which hy- potheses the authors would have to accept as tenable if the definiens expres- sion were assumed to be synonymous with the definiendum expression. 15. The quoted five-sense theorem is on the level of preciseness and specification found in dictionaries such as Webster’s New International Dictionary. It is curi- ous that The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary leaves out «history» in the 498 NOTES TO PAGES 291–312 senses suggested by the expression «past events as an aggregate» as used in the Webster’s article. 16. The examples are taken at random from an unpublished list of about 700 definitoid statements about «truth» and related words compiled by the author. Chapter VI: Occurrence Analysis 1. The uncritical belief that meanings are easily found by just asking people what they mean or by merely reporting their learned definitions seems to us sufficiently undermined. It is time to take up another set of assumptions, namely that one can infer meanings by observation of use of terms without grave difficulties demanding patient research.