495 Foreword 1. a Concept of Qs1a-Synonymity Is Introduced In

Notes

Foreword 1. A concept of Qs1A-synonymity is introduced in the first part of this earlier work. The concept is also introduced in the present study (chapter 7). Let it suffice for now to say that two terms are Qs1A-synonymous for a definite person and with respect to a definite text if that person answers affirmatively to a question of the following form: If one term were to be exchanged for the other in this text, would the meaning of the text be the same? Unfortunately, my use of the word «synonymity» as an element in the definiendum has suggested that I believe that the answers to certain crude questionnaires will solve the problem of synonymity, or that the concept of Qs1A-synonymity is proposed as the operational meaning of the term «synonymity». Perhaps the best way to explain my purpose is to say that, just as one may apply different tests to an ability or a disposition, so one may apply different tests to something traditionally called «synonymity», and the concept of Qs1A-synonymity is merely one test among others.

Chapter I: Basic Terms 1. The term «marginal reference» has in this work a meaning not far from that of «qualifying phrase» in everyday English. 2. It is tempting to interpret sentences of the form ««a» is synonymous with «b»» as expressions of universal indiscriminate synonymity, since no exceptions are mentioned and no qualifications are made. Such an interpretation is, however, usually implausible and transintentional (cf. chapter 2, section 2). 3. The use of «a» for «either-or» in formulas is distinguished from the use of «a» for sentences by its placement outside parentheses. 4. For details about axioms adopted for ‘synonymity’, see chapter 2, section 6.

495 NOTES TO PAGES 49–97

5. In a formulation ««a» means b», we call «a» the interpretandum expression and «b» the interpretans expression. 6. We use, in this classification of interpretations, words that are too vague to be admitted in theorems concerning the determination of the choice of interpretations. 7. In Norwegian, «mannlige»; «male» in English. 8. The phrase «that food ---» in Skinner’s item 2) seems to refer to something definite as the cause of a process, whereas «I am hungry» is more likely to refer to a state of affairs, one of the symptoms of which might be indicated by a saying such as his item 2). 9. «Incomparability» is introduced as a term in chapter 2, section 7. 10. The introduction of concepts of synonymity has been postponed to chapter 7. The above assertions about the existence of synonymic alternatives common to «a» and «b» are anticipatory. 11. That is, stuff capable of being adequately learned by using one’s memory. 12. Further precizations of «reading» would probably show that a usage common among students is here presupposed known: «studying for examinations by reading». 13. The two last sentences are good examples of sentences sufficiently precise for certain, rather limited purposes, but too ambiguous to contribute, for example, to a statistical description of denotata fluctuations. What are the criteria of «being on the way from Oslo to Bergen»? Have they to do with plans for future movement along tracks, or is the mere location on the tracks leading to Bergen a sufficient criterion? Is «train» to be interpreted so as to include motor buses on tracks? The list could go on. To make the sentences useful for a statistical survey, we would have to introduce detailed criteria by suitable conventions of terminology.

Chapter II: Basic Terms Continued 1. The simpler designation «receiver-ambiguous» is not used because it is needed to designate the ambiguity of an expression within the class or a class of receivers, if at least one receiver sometimes interprets the expression differ- ently from at least one other receiver. 2. The question of comparison of terminologies is taken up in work that is in progress. 3. The terms are translations of the Norwegian legal terms «generalpreventiv» and «spesialpreventiv». The latter has to do with measures preventing an individual (the criminal offender) from repeating his crime.

496 NOTES TO PAGES 143–218

Chapter III: Misinterpretation and Pseudoagreement

1. In the Syn(T1PS1T2QS2) symbols in the following, «(1)» or any other symbol for a step in a discussion or for a sequence of steps, is put into the place of S1 and S2. The symbols express in such cases, not a specific step or succession of steps in a specific discussion, but kinds of situations characterized by steps of certain kinds. 2. By «pseudoagreement, etc.» we mean «pseudoagreement or pseudodisagreement». 3. The Norwegian word for «thin», namely «tynn», permits this interpretation. In English the interpretation may be less plausible.

Chapter IV: Definitoid Statements 1. By «definitoid statement» is meant a sentence that for at least one plausible interpretation is intended to express an N-, Ds-, or R-definition (normative, descriptive, or real definition), or that at least shows symptoms of expressing such kinds of assertions or announcements. 2. «Per definitionem» is used as a synonym for «by normative definition». 3. We add the phrase about similarity because it would be unfruitful to limit our description to persons using just the concept ‘normative definition’ that has been introduced here. 4. This has the consequence that there can be no real definition of classes with no member—for example, perpetuum mobile. Maybe real definitions might just as well be defined in relation to connotation. 5. If something, a, is explained by something else, b, «a» is called the explanan- dum expression, and «b» the explanans expression.

Chapter V: Elementary Analysis 1. The reader may even be rather sure that Buckman did not use the above- mentioned expression, since it is in the third-person singular of the present tense. 2. If we ask, Does Russell intend to give an interpretative or a synonymic normative definition, our answer is likely to be more uncertain. Does Russell use sentences of the forms «--- means . . .» and «--- means the same as . . .» without distinction? Or does he distinguish, and use quotation marks for interpretans expressions? 3. «N-formulation» is an abbreviation for «formulation of a normative definition». «Ds-formulation» stands for «formulation of a descriptive definition».

497 NOTES TO PAGES 241–85

4. If a definiens expression can be brought into the form «x is a K1 and x is a K2 and . . . , and x is a Kn», then the definitoid statement of which the definiens expression is a part is called a «complex definitoid statement». 5. The following sentences contain one of them. «As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of differences, is not democracy» (Lincoln 1905: 7: 389). In a message to Congress (1861), he also used the term once (cf. Proceed- ings of the American Philosophical Society 88: 366). 6. For a comparison of hypotheses about the Lincoln formula, see, e.g., the collection reproduced in McKeon (1951: 29, 30, 71, 124, 132, etc.). 7. If something is considered to be subsumable under a characterization defined as the conceptual characteristics of a concept, that something will be said to be a denotatum of that concept. 8. The case of T2 being a designation is more complicated because, in that case, we have the sentence in which it occurs as a peculiar minimal context requiring special treatment. 9. The word «satisfy» is used in relation to definitoid formulations when we speak in general and do not distinguish normative from descriptive definitions or related synonymity hypotheses or announcements. 10. This sentence is added because, otherwise, the theorem would not assert any definite synonymities at all, all instances being of concepts 6, 7, etc. 11. We might call it a «multiple usage hypothesis with undifferentiated total field indication». In spite of the importance of such hypotheses and their close similarity to descriptive definitions, it is scarcely fruitful to widen the scope of descriptive definitions in order to include them. 12. This observation suggests that not every occurrence is of interest for the problem «Is occurrence no. x subsumable under the concept ‘occurrence in conformity with the synonymity hypothesis no. y’?». That subclass of the total class of occurrences should be selected which is of special interest for solving this problem. 13. The authors of the SSRC bulletin include some remarks about the expression «as in», as it appears in their introductory note; see SSRC Bulletin 1946: 252. 14. The argument might be made more precise by stating explicitly which hypotheses the authors would have to accept as tenable if the definiens expression were assumed to be synonymous with the definiendum expression. 15. The quoted five-sense theorem is on the level of preciseness and specification found in dictionaries such as Webster’s New International Dictionary. It is curi- ous that The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary leaves out «history» in the

498 NOTES TO PAGES 291–312

senses suggested by the expression «past events as an aggregate» as used in the Webster’s article. 16. The examples are taken at random from an unpublished list of about 700 definitoid statements about «truth» and related words compiled by the author.

Chapter VI: Occurrence Analysis 1. The uncritical belief that meanings are easily found by just asking people what they mean or by merely reporting their learned definitions seems to us sufficiently undermined. It is time to take up another set of assumptions, namely that one can infer meanings by observation of use of terms without grave difficulties demanding patient research. 2. The term «excerpt analysis» would perhaps evoke more appropriate associa- tions for lexicographers than the term «occurrence analysis». 3. In our discussions of definitoid statements, when no field of application is mentioned, then the present work is meant. 4. This is a rough way of introducing a technical term, but attempts to delimit more precisely a concept of ‘occurrence implicate’—for example, in terms of syntax—have so far been without convincing results. 5. We do not exclude the possibility that the latter sentence is a contradiction in Vyshinsky’s terminology. Whether it is or is not can only be decided on the basis of wider material, not on the basis of these implicates. Because of this uncertainty and dependence on further context, the inference should perhaps not be classed as an implicate and not be included in the occurrence implicate list. 6. A subsumption may be divided into the major premise of the subsumption, in which certain properties of certain things are described; the minor premise, in which the conceptual characteristics of the concepts are listed; and the conclusion, by which the things are judged either subsumable or nonsubsumable under the concept. The concluding statement may be untenable because of untenable premises, because of untenable inference from premises to conclusion, or because of both kinds of mistakes. By the term «subsumption inference» we refer to the inference alone. We are not concerned with the tenability of the author’s views about things he subsumes under his concept of ‘democracy’. The tenability of the major premise is not asserted in our occurrence implicates. The minor premise is the x we should like to discover or invent (in the sense that intervening variables [constructs] are invented). 7. It should be noted that as interpretation proceeds through the list of implicates, the premises of already performed interpretations may change, which

499 NOTES TO PAGES 313–46

may make reconsideration urgent. We get «interpretational vibrations» (see chapter 2, section 13). 8. If the particular government in power in the USSR at the time of Zaslavski’s edition of this book is identified (conceptually) with ‘le régime soviétique’, opposition to that particular government is opposition to the most perfect democracy, that is, the most perfect government. If, on the other hand, the particular government at the time of Zaslavski is considered but one instance of a kind of government, ‘le régime soviétique’, then opposition to a particular government is not by definition opposition to ‘the regime’. The delimitation of concepts of ‘regime’ is important to the whole discussion of concepts of democracy. 9. In principle, there is a chance that the analyst and the author use different systems of logic in the sense of incompatible rules of inference, or sets of axioms. In most fields of discussion, this possibility is far-fetched. 10. The sentence can also plausibly be interpreted as a descriptive definition, or as a combination of N- and Ds-definitions. 11. Even if this question of intention is considered of no importance or of subordinate importance, there is still room for questions: Which of the descriptive definitions are most satisfactory as the basis for normative definitions? Which is the most precise, the simplest to use? 12. How this should be possible, I do not know. I would tend to regard the sentence as incapable of being given a precise meaning different from a sentence speaking about nondefinitive knowledge. 13. We shall write in the following as if we thought the translation perfect and as if our translations from French to English were undoubtful. This is done in order to concentrate on more central problems. 14. «par les conservateurs [?] les plus réactionnaires». 15. We do not consider «feelings may be classed as democratic» to be an implicate, because we consider «democratic feelings» to be synonymous with «feelings in favor of democracy». I mention this because in many cases a grammatical structure with adjective and substantive is misleadingly taken as indicating a classification in which the adjective refers to a subclass of a class expressed by the substantive. 16. Evidence from occurrences in other texts is, in principle, not taken into account. Lenin’s terminology may suggest that he would favor T2, and this together with the status of Zaslavski as an adherent of Marxism-Leninism may suggest that Zaslavski also uses T2 rather than T1. An example of an occurrence supporting T2 is «The Soviet order . . . signifies . . . the rise of a new type of democracy in world history, that is to say proletarian democracy, . . .» (Lenin 1927: 26).

500 NOTES TO PAGES 351–90

17. This would not imply that Zaslavski would not also hold that the press con- siders the Soviet Union not to be a democracy in other senses, possibly current in that press. 18. This expression cannot be used without qualification; see chapter 2, section 9. 19. In this book, «or» is always used for the inclusive or, symbolized by «v». The exclusive or is indicated by «either-or» and symbolized by «a» (for the Latin «aut»). 20. The broad concept of «people», which is explicitly advocated by Zaslavski, is not generally adopted by Marxist ideologists. Clear instances of a narrower concept are found, for example, in Mao Tse-tung’s writings: «Our government is benevolent to the people only, and not towards the reactionary acts of the reactionaries and reactionary classes divorced from the people»; «The right to vote is given to the people only, not to the reactionaries» (Guillain 1950). 21. This assumption belongs to the many hypotheses that could possibly be ruled out as based on assumptions of too great definiteness of intention on the part of Zaslavski. 22. This word is added because, when the power is in this group’s hands, it cannot be said to be underprivileged any longer. 23. A methodological argument against hypotheses with small fields of intended application is discussed in section 8. The amount of evidence with specific relevance to each hypothesis decreases with increased partition of the intended field of application. 24. There are 192 occurrences of «democracy» in Zaslavski’s text. The negation of our synonymity hypothesis implies, therefore, that it is more likely that 96 or more senses of «democracy» are used by Zaslavski in his text than that fewer than 96 are used. 25. One may talk of occurrence analysis of implicates, evaluative occurrences, etc. 26. For more detailed argumentation concerning subordinate analyses, see p. 312. 27. See discussion of the predictional theory of usage in chapter 4, section 15.

Chapter VII: Introduction of a Group of Concepts or Tests of Synonymity 1. As closely related terms we take the conventional translations of the English terms into French, German, and the Scandinavian languages. 2. Compare the synonymity hypothesis of Davidson (1885: 89): «When --- Aristotle, in his Categories, refers to synonymous words, he means by «syn-

501 NOTES TO PAGES 391–420

onymous» what Boëthius afterwards translated by the Latin univocal, i.e., the generic name which is equally applicable to each and all of the species contained under it». 3. This expression is taken from the class of synonymity sentences introduced in chapter 1. Others could just as well have been used.

4. We write b, but not ai in guillemets because ai is considered to be an abbreviation for «the occurrence no. i of the expression «a»». 5. «N-concept» may be read «norm concept», but «normative concept» would be misleading. The definiens expression (T 1.31) is not an announcement. It is a conjunction of three hypotheses. 6. In the following it is presumed that the fruitfulness of a concept introduced by means of definite definiendum expressions is also judged by the conve- nience of using the definiendum expressions to express the concept. Thus, the verdict «unfruitful» may not imply a criticism of having a concept expressed by the definiens. The verdict may sometimes only be based on criticism of the use of the definiendum to express the concept. This is the case in our example. 7. Compare the opening sentence of section 17, Encyklopädie der Elementar- Mathematik (1906/07: 1:2). Auflage. If we do not take into account the first three occurrences of «Primzahl(en)» in section 17, which are metaoccurrences or interpretable as metaoccurrences, the exclusion of 1 as a Primzahl is obvious, at least after the first thirty-four use occurrences. The «obviousness» is one of psychology and sociology, not of mathematics, however. From the thirty-four use occurrences it cannot be proved mathematically or logically that 1 is not a Primzahl. 8. There is in the following a constant need for use of the expression «something closely similar to, or identical with». To avoid a cumbersome exposition, I have left it out in several places. 9. «T is true» is written, not ««T» is true». One reason for this is the convenient rule of abstaining from guillemets when using the letters T, U, V, because they always stand for sentences. 10. It is explicitly mentioned in the questionnaire that it is not concerned with the tenability of the assertions, but with their power as arguments, if they are tenable. 11. A precization of «physical law» is summarily described in Løvestad 1945. 12. We need not here discuss the possibility of other concepts of «understanding a text written by an author x». There are important distinctions to be made, particularly in connection with the theories of subjective and objective interpretation of laws and other legal documents.

502 NOTES TO PAGES 431–81

13. At several places in this work, precizations of «strong confirmation», «strong disconfirmation», and a number of related terms have been needed. We have found it justifiable to abstain from discussing these terms in order not to take up more controversial issues than strictly necessary. 14. In cases of inconsistency, one may divide the occurrence class into as many classes as are required to make the inferences concerning the members within each class consistent with each other. In the final conclusions, the different classes can be made the subject of ambiguity hypotheses. Or one may con- clude that there are internal contradictions in the views of the author of the text. There is no way of separating ambiguities from contradictions that does not have its foundation in uncertain auxiliary hypotheses. 15. Strictly speaking, several expressions are considered: «démocratie», «démocra- tique», and others. 16. The term «a-intentional» would be better suited as concept designation, but it is awkward to pronounce.

Chapter VIII: Synonymity Questionnaires in Use 1. In the first two chapters a number of designations were introduced, but not given any definite cognitive meaning. Something, however, was said about how they were to be used in the present work. For example, certain relations between the designations, and concerned with their cognitive meaning, were announced (stipulated, postulated). In other words, parts of their cognitive meaning were introduced. To remind ourselves of this incomplete determination of meaning, we have called the designations «terms» (or «technical terms») but not talked about concepts being introduced. 2. The Norwegian expression «flere» actually involved ‘more (as regards number)’. 3. «A theorem of QsxA-synonymity» is an abbreviation for «a theorem of Qs1A-, Qs2A-, . . . , Qs8A-synonymity». The distinction between A- and B- synonymity is made on page 400ff. In the present chapter, tests of, for example, Qs6-synonymity, are not reported. On the basis of auxiliary hypotheses about similarity among the various Qsx questionnaires, a confirmation of a correspondence hypothesis covering Qs5A is taken as a confirmation of the more general hypothesis covering QsxA-synonymity. The latter confirmation is (of course) taken to be of a weaker degree. 4. Compare the discussion of relation between numbers of positive answers and possibilities of disconfirmation of symmetry and transitivity (page 469ff.).

503 References

Ahlman, Ferd. 1883. Svensk-Finsk Ordbok. 2 Tillokta Uppl. Helsingfors: G. W. Edlung. Anastasi, Anne. 1937. Differential Psychology: Individual and Group Differences in Be- havior. New York: Macmillan. Aristotle. 1950. The Politics, with an English translation by H. Rackham. London: Heinemann. Ast, Frederick. 1808. Grundlinen der Grammatik Hermeneutik und Kritik. Landshut: Thomann. Austin, John. 1875. Lecture on Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Positive Law. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Baldwin, James Mark, ed. 1960. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Gloucester, MA: P. Smith (1925). Barnes, Harry, Howard Becker, and Francis Bennet Becker. 1940. Contemporary So- cial Theory. New York: Appleton-Century. Beard, Charles Austin. 1934. The Idea of National Interest. New York: Macmillan. Becker, Howard P. 1950. Through Values to Social Interpretation: Essays on Social Con- text, Actions, Types and Prospects. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. See Gurvitch and Moore for related writings. Bennett, Albert A., and Charles A. Baylis. 1939. Formal Logic: A Modern Introduc- tion. New York: Prentice-Hall. Bentham, Jeremy. 1879. An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legisla- tion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1988. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Blaich, Theodore Paul, and Joseph C. Baumgartner. 1966. The Challenge of Democracy, 5th ed. St. Louis: McGraw-Hill. Bleuler, Eugen. 1923. Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie,4 vols. Berlin: Springer.

505 REFERENCES

Bradley, Francis H. 1914. Essays on Truth and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bryce, James. 1888. The American Commonwealth, 3 vols. London and New York: Macmillan (1906). ———. 1921. Modern Democracies, 3 vols. London: Macmillan. Bryn, Alf B. 1932. Opfindelser og Patenter, 2 opl. Oslo: Steenske Forlag. Bryn, Alf B., with Per Onsager. 1938. Patentloven: Den Norske Lov om Patenter. Oslo: Tanum. Burks, Arthur W. 1951. “A theory of proper names.” Philosophical Studies 2: 36–54. Carnap, Rudolf. 1936. “Testability and meaning.” Philosophy of Science 3: 419–71. ———. 1942. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1961). ———. 1945. “Hall and Bergman on semantics.” Mind 54: 148–55. ———. 1947. Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 1950. “Empiricism, semantics and ontology.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: 20–40. Cooley, John C. 1942. A Primer of Formal Logic. New York: Macmillan. Crew, Henry. 1928. The Rise of Modern Physics. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins (1935). Croce, Benedetto. 1909. Aesthetics as a Science of Expression and General Linguistics, translated by Douglas Ainslie. New York: Macmillan. ———. 1921. History: Its Theory and Practice. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Dacqué, Edgar. 1935. Organische Morphologie und Paläontologie. Berlin: Gebruder Borntraeger. Davidson, William L. 1885. The Logic of Definition: An Explanation and Application. London: Longmans. Dewey, John. 1939. Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey’s Philosophy, edited by Joseph Ratner. New York: Random House, Modern Library. ———. 1944. Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan. Encyklopaedie der Elementar-Mathematik, vols. I–III. 1906/1907. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner. Erdmann, Benno. 1877. Die Axiome de Geometrie. Leipzig: L. Voss. ———. 1907. Logische Elementarlehere, 2 vols. Halle: M. Niemeyer. Erdmann, Johann E. 1841. Grunriss der Logik und Metaphysik: Fur Vorlesunger. Halle: Johann Friedrich Lippert. Euclid. 1933. Euclid’s Elements, edited by Isaac Todhunter. London: Dent, Every- man’s Library.

506 REFERENCES

Fairchild, Henry Pratt, ed. 1957. Dictionary of Sociology. Ames, IA: Littlefield, Adams (1944). Fisher, Irving. 1919. Elementary Principles of Economics, 3d ed. New York: Macmillan. ———. 1930. The Nature of Capital and Income. New York: Macmillan. Fitch, Frederic B. 1942. “A basic logic.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 7: 105–14. ———. 1952. Symbolic Logic: An Introduction. New York: Ronald Press. Fleming, William, with Henry Calderwood. 1887. Vocabulary of Philosophy, Psycho- logical, Ethical, Metaphysical. London. Fluge, F. 1944a. “Medvetsproblemet.” Mimeograph. Oslo. ———. 1944b. “Noen logisk analytiske retninger i filosofien.” Mimeograph. Oslo. Foner, Philip. 1944. Abraham Lincoln: Selections from His Writings. New York: Inter- national Publishers. Frazer, R. A., W. J. Duncan, and A. R. Collars. 1938. Elementary Matrices and Some Applications to Dynamics and Differential Equations. London: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. Free, Edward Elway, and Travis Hoke. 1929. Weather: Practical, Dramatic and Spec- tacular Facts About a Little Studied Subject. New York: McBride. Frege, Gottlob. 1950. Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Inquiry into the Concept of Number, translated by J. L. Austin. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1952. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of G. F. Frege, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black. Oxford: Blackwell. Gardiner, Alan H. 1940–54. The Theory of Proper Names. London: Oxford Univer- sity Press. Goodenough, Florence L. 1949. Mental Testing: Its History, Principles and Applica- tions. New York: Rinehart. Grimm, L. 1954. “On the application of the concept of precization.” Synthese 9. Guillain, Robert, Otto Van der Spernkel, and P. N. Berkelbach, eds. 1950. New China: Three Views. London: Turnstile Press. Gullvåg, I. 1951. Definiteness of Intention. Mimeograph. Oslo. ———. 1954. “Criteria of meaning and analysis of usage.” Synthese 9. Gurvitch, Georges, and Wilbert Moore, eds. 1946. Twentieth Century Sociology. New York: Philosophical Library. Haaland, A. 1947. “Exposition and critical examination of Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ philosophy.” Mimeograph. Oslo. Haas, O., and George G. Simpson. 1946. “Analysis of some phylogenetic terms,

507 REFERENCES

with attempts at redefinition.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 90: 319–49. Hall, Everett W. 1943. “The extra-linguistic reference of language.” “The object language.” Mind 53: 230–46. ———. 1944. “II: The designation of the object language.” Mind 53: 25–46. ———. 1952. What Is of Value? New York: Humanities Press (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Hamilton, William. 1870. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. 4. Edinburgh: Blackwood. Hilbert, David, and Wilhelm Ackermann. 1938. Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik, 2d ed. Berlin: Springer. ———. 1950. Principles of Mathematical Logic. New York: Chelsea. Hodgson, Brian H. 1874. Essays on the Languages, Literature and Religions of Nepal and Tibet. London: Trubner. Hodgson, Leonard. 1930. Early Essays in Christian Philosophy. London and New York: Longmans, Green. ———. 1956–57. For Faith and Freedom. The Gifford Lectures. Oxford: Blackwell. Hull, Clark L. 1943. Principles of Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. ———. 1952. A Behavior System. New Haven: Yale University Press. Husserl, Edmund. 1931. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W. R. Boyce. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1950. Husserliana: Gessammele Werke, edited by Samuel I. Jsseling. Dor- drecht: Nijhoff. Jespersen, Otto. 1922. Language: Its Nature, Development and Origin. London: Allen and Unwin. Jevons, William Stanley. 1890. Pure Logic and Other Minor Works, edited by Robert Adamson and Harriet A. Jevons. London and New York: Macmillan. Jorgensen, J. “Det brede og det smale demokrati.” (Publication information not available.) Kaufmann, Felix. 1943–44. “Verification, meaning and truth.” Philosophy and Phe- nomenogical Research 4. Keynes, John Maynard. 1962. A Treatise on Probability. New York: Harper and Row. Klein, Felix. 1898. Enzyklopaedie der mathematisher Wissenschaften. Leipzig: Teubner. Korsch, Karl. 1923. Marxism and Philosophy. Berlin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970). ———. 1938. Karl Marx. New York: Wiley.

508 REFERENCES

Lasswell, Harold Dwight. 1948. The Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Ap- proach. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1951). Le Bon, Gustave. 1931. Bases scientifiques d’une philosophie de l’histoire. Paris: Flammarion. Lenin, V. I. 1927. Collected Works of V. I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers. Lincoln, Abraham. 1905. The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, 12 vols., edited by John Nicolay and John Hay. New York: Lamb Publishing. Love, Augustus E. H. 1897. Theoretical Mechanics: An Introductory Treatise on the Principles of Dynamics with Applications and Numerous Examples. Cambridge: The University Press. Løvestad, Ludwig. 1944. Filosofiske problemer 1: 63. Mimeograph. Oslo. ———. 1945. “Bidrag til en metodelúre for de eksakte naturvitenskaper.” Mimeo- graph. Oslo. Lundberg, George Andrew. 1942. Social Research: A Study in Methods of Gathering Data. New York and London: Longmans, Green. MacIver, Robert M. 1951. The Web of Government. New York: Macmillan. Madariaga, Salvador de. 1958. Democracy vs. Liberty. London: Pall Mall Press. Marx, Karl. 1920. Capital. London: Glaisher (New York: International Publishers, 1929). ———. 1932. Das Kapital, edited by Karl Korsch. Berlin. McKeon, Richard. 1951. Democracy in a World of Tensions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Murray, James A. H., ed. 1884–1928. A New English Dictionary on Historical Princi- ples. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Naess, Arne. 1938. Truth as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Science and Jacob Dybwad. ———. 1942. “Pressisjonsundersøkelser ved ekvivalensmetoden.” Mimeograph. Oslo. ———. 1946. “Begreper ‘Demokrati’.” Mimeograph. Oslo. ———. 1947–51. Interpretation and Preciseness, I–VI. Mimeograph. Oslo. ———. 1953. An Empirical Study of the Expressions “True,” “Perfectly Certain” and “Ex- tremely Probable.” Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Science and Jacob Dybwad. ———. 1954. “Objectivity of norms: Two directions of precization.” Mimeo- graph. Oslo (1948). Naess, Arne, K. Kvaløe, and J. Christophersen. 1954. Democracy, Ideology and Objec- tivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy. Oslo: University of Oslo Press.

509 REFERENCES

Nagel, Ernest. 1930. On the Logic of Measurement, Ph.D. diss. New York. Ofstad, Harald. 1950a. “Alf Ross’ bestemmelse av begrepet ‘rettsregel’.” Mimeo- graph. Oslo (1949). ———. 1950b. “The descriptive definition of the concept ‘legal norm’ as proposed by Hans Kelsen.” Theoria 16. ———. 1951. “Objectivity of norms and value judgements according to recent Scandinavian philosophy.” Philososphy and Phenomenological Research 12: 42–68. ———. 1952. “Om deskriptive definisjoner av begrepet rettsregel.” Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap. ———. 1953. An Inquiry into the Freedom of Decision, I—IV. Mimeograph. Oslo. Owen, Robert Dale. 1846. Wealth and Misery. London: J. Watson. Owen, Robert Dale, with Francis Wright. 1843. Tracts on Republican Government and National Education. London: J. Watson. Pap, Arthur. 1944. Elements of Analytic Philosophy. New York: Macmillan (1949). Peirce, George James. 1926. The Physiology of Plants: The Principles of Food Production. New York: Holt. Pirsson, Louis V. 1924. A Textbook of Geology, vol. 1. New York: Wiley. Quine, Willard V. 1945. “On the logic of quantification.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 10: 1–12. ———. 1952. Methods of Logic. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reichenbach, Hans. 1947. Elements of Symbolic Logic. New York: Macmillan. Richards, Ivor Armstrong. 1949. Interpretation in Teaching. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ries, John. 1931a. Beiträge zur Grundlegung der Syntax. Prague: Taussig & Taussig. ———. 1931b. Was ist ein Satz? Prague: Taussig & Taussig (Darmstadt: Wiss Buchgesellschaft, 1967). Ross, Alf. 1946. Hvorfor Demokrati? 2nd ed. 1967. Københaven: Nyt Nordisk Forlag. Roucek, Josephy S. 1944. “A history of the concept of ideology.” Journal of the His- tory of Ideas 5: 479–88. Russell, Bertrand. 1931. The Scientific Outlook. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1934. Freedom and Organization, 1814–1914. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1946. History of Western Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin. Russell, Bertrand, and Alfred North Whitehead. 1910–13. Principia Mathematica, 3 vols. Cambridge: The University Press. Sandburg, Carl. 1944. Abraham Lincoln: Demokrat Manniskovain. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur.

510 REFERENCES

Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. 1942. The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston, IL: North- western University. Schlick, Moritz. 1938. Gesimmelte Aupsatze (collected essays, 1926–36). Wien: Gerold. Schmitt, Carl. 1928. Verfassungslehre. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot (1965). Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. Seidel, Eugen. 1935. Geschichte und Kritik der wichtigsten Satzdefinitionen. Jena: Frommann. Sering, Max. 1917. “Der Anstrum der weslichen Demokratie.” In Die deutsche Frei- heit, edited by A. von Harnack, F. Meinecke, et al. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. Shull, A. Franklin. 1926. Heredity. New York: McGraw-Hill. Skinner, B. F. 1945. “The operational analysis of psychological terms.” Psychology Review 52: 270. Smith, David Eugene. 1925. History of Mathematics, vol. 2. Boston and New York: Ginn. ———. 1929. A Source Book in Mathematics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Smith, Norman Kemp. 1918. A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Lon- don: Macmillan. ———, trans. 1964. Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New York: St. Martin’s. Social Science Research Council (SSRC). 1946. Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography. SSRC Bulletin 54. Stringham, Emerson. 1930. Patent Claim Drafting. Washington, D.C. Tarski, Alfred. 1944. “The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.” Philosophy and Phenemological Research 4. ———. 1946. An Introduction to Logic and the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences, 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Terrell, Thomas. 1927. The Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 7th ed., revised and rewritten by Courtney Terrell and D. H. Corsellis. Lon- don: Sweet and Maxwell. Theimer, Walter. 1947. Lexikon der Politik, 7 neubearb. Aufl. Bern: Francke (1967). Thucydides. 1921–30. History of the Peloponnesian War, with an English translation by Charles Forster Smith. Cambridge and London: Heinemann. Tolman, Edward C. 1932. Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men. Berkeley: Univer- sity of California Press. ———. 1951. Collected Papers on Psychology. Berkeley: University of California Press.

511 REFERENCES

Tønnessen, Herman. 1948. “Det private initiativ: En semantisk-sosiologisk under søkelse” (Private enterprise: a semantical-sociological study). Filosofiske Prob- lemer (Oslo) 11. ———. 1949. “Typebegreper I, II.” Mimeograph. Oslo. ———. 1950–51. “The fight against revelation in semantical studies.” Synthese 8. Torm, Frederik. 1938. Nytestamentlig Hermeneutik. Copenhagen: Gad. von Mises, Richard. 1939. Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus. The Hague: van Stockum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). Vyshinsky, Andrej Y. 1948. The Law of the Soviet State, translated by H. W. Babb. New York: Macmillan. Wade, Donald William. 1946. The Way of the West. London: H. Joseph. White, Leonard D., ed. 1942. The Future of Government in the United States: Essays in Honor of Charles E. Merriam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wilson, Alice Evelyn. 1945. “Rafinesquina and its homomorphs Öpikina and Öpikinella and Strophomena and its homomorphs Trigrammaria and Mi- crotrypa.” Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, paper 90-9, sect. IV, pp. 238–98. Woodger, J. H. 1939. The Technique of Theory Construction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Woodruff, Lorande L. 1932. Animal Biology. New York: Macmillan. Wyld, Henry Cecil Kennedy. 1932. The Universal Dictionary of the English Language. New York: Dutton. Zaslavski, David. 1946–47. La démocratie soviétique. Paris: Editions Sociales.

512 Index

agreement assumptions, 49–50, 144, 211 expressed interpersonal and propositional, 139 asymmetrical relation, 112 latent, 159 of preciseness, 111 verbal (to assent and agree), 137–38 See also pseudoagreement Baumgartner, Joseph C., 295 ambiguity sentences, 30 Baylis, Charles A., 217–20 description of hypotheses expressed by, 209– Beard, Charles Austin, 207, 387 15 Becker, Howard P., 208 ambiguity(ies), 30–33, 104 Bennett, Albert A., 217, 218 of definiens, harmless vs. harmful, 289 biased vs. unbiased interpretations, 55–56 definitions/meanings, 30 Blaich, Theodore Paul, 295 intrapersonal, 96 “blind,” 16 preciseness and, 68–69 Bourne, 213 receiver, 83–85 Bradley, Francis Herbert, 264–65, 287 ambiguous expressions, synonymity between, Bridgman, P. W., 301 33–39 Bryce, James American Commonwealth, The (Bryce), 249–53 definitoid formulations of democracy, 294, analogy, 217 296 Anastasi, Anne, 174–75 classification of, 251 announcement sentences, 23, 42, 168 in Modern Democracies and The American synonymity, 161–63, 214–15 Commonwealth, 249–53 intended subject matter, 161 tentative precizations of, 256–64 announcements, 172–73, 269 Bryn, Alf B., 229, 230 interpretive, 170–72 Buckman, 213 terminological, 163 Burks, Arthur W., 28 Apostel, Dr. Leo, 489–90 argumentational status, 412–13 Carnap, Rudolf, 23–24, 27, 217, 236–38, 266 argumentational synonymity, 412–14 clarifiers, 152 Aristotle, 9, 32 class property, 218–19 assenting, act of, 137, 155 class reference, 9 asserter, 54 See also reference class(es) asserter interpretation, 54, 55 Clifford, W. K., 173 asserter-preciseness, 119, 120 cognitive communication, semantics of, 2 assertions cognitive meaning, 79 vs. announcements, 42 cognitive signification, 79 motives for making, 49–50 cognitive synonymity, 167

513 INDEX cognitive-weight-condition concepts of descriptions of explicit, 238–39 synonymity, 412 descriptive (Ds-definitions), 191–93, 215–17, commands, and groups commanded, 155 221, 224, 226, 248 communicable interpretation, 55 giving and making them more precise, 194– communication 95 to many people, schematic view of require- descriptive synonymic, 191 ments of, 125–26 vs. formulation of definition, 220, 226 single acts of interpreting definiens on basis of examples limited importance to science and tech- supporting, 296–97 nique of interpretation, 124–25 “true by definition,” 187–91 See also specific topics types of, 163–65 communism. See under Zaslavski, David See also normative (interpretative) concept designation. See designation definition(s) concept subsumability, 82 See also field of (intended) application; concepts, 183 meaning(s) conceptual characteristic expressions, 80– definitoid formulations 81 analysis of groups of, 244–48 connotation, 79–82 on “democracy,” 249–53 See also occurrence analysis, connotational definitoid sentences, interpretation of, 215–17 context definitoid statements interpretational vibrations caused by broad- inconsistencies and contradictions within ening of, 128–32 complex, 241–44 preciseness and knowledge of, 126–28 levels of preciseness of descriptions of, 230– See also under preciseness 38 contradiction, 243, 244 democracies, various, 350–51 conviction, 216 “democracy,” 33, 37–40, 162, 199, 271, 295, Cope, E. D., 397 296 copies of the same instance (occurrence), 6–7 broad concepts of (authentic and non- Crew, Benedetto, 25, 26, 211 authentic), 361–65 precization possibilities of, 366–72 decisions, 178–79 defined, 230–33, 235, 245 expressing, 237 Lasswell on, 230–33, 235, 236 motives/reasons justifying, 179–84 Mussolini on meanings of, 207 reinforcing dispositions, 178 narrow concepts of (authentic), 361–65 definiendum expressions, 161, 166–68, 175–77, precization possibilities of, 372–76 196 occurrence analysis and, 305–11 definiendum indications, lack of preciseness and See also occurrence analysis, connotational, elaborateness of, 286–89 illustration of a definiens expressions, 79, 161, 166, 170 Schumpeter on, 289 reformulation to facilitate comparison and in- “total,” 373–74 crease preciseness, 253–56 Vyshinsky on, 305–09 definiens indications, lack of preciseness and See also Bryce, James; “government of . . . by . . . elaborateness of, 289–93 and for the people”; Zaslavski, David definitional function, sentences with complex, “democratie” 200–204 occurrence list of, 334 definition(s), 163–66, 237 See also “democracy,” occurrence analysis and concepts of, 204–06 democratic regimes/governments, 230–33, 236, as condensed characterizations (see real defini- 312–13 tions) and antidemocratic regimes, 312, 347–48 description of, 219, 239–40 See also Bryce, James; “democracy”

514 INDEX

democratic society, 230, 233, 235–36 field of (intended) application, 166, 168–69, 192, See also Bryce, James; “democracy” 220–25, 296 denotata, 72, 90, 196, 197 indications of, 293–96 denotation, 81–82, 217–19 and practical testability of hypotheses, 325– denotational explicatum, 90–92 29 denotatum hypotheses, 82 field of validity, intended, 167–68 denotatum sentences, 82 Fisher, Irving, 275–77, 286 deprecization, 62 Fitch, F. B., 238 descriptive concepts. See under synonymity, fundamentum divisionis, 87 concepts of intrapersonal descriptive definition (Ds-definition) Gottschalck, Professor, 277–78 formulation of (Ds-formulation), 193, 218, 220, “government of . . . by . . . and for the people,” 226 5–9, 247, 248 See also definition(s), descriptive See also “democracy” designation, concept, 165–66 designations, 53, 132 Haas, O., 213, 217, 397 on equal footing, 223–24 Hall, Everett W., 30 disagreement hermeneutical circle, 128, 132 expressed interpersonal and propositional, Herodotus, 252 139 heteronymity, 28–30, 86, 101, 107–9, 407, 422– latent, 157–58 23 See also pseudoagreement, and pseudo- See also under reference class(es) disagreement heteronymity sentences, 28–29 discrimination, 152 heteronymous (reference) lists, 52–54, 68, 94, discussions, types of sequences of steps in, 148– 102 49 intrapersonally, 94–96, 98 Ds-definitions. See definition(s), descriptive history, meanings of, 277–85 hypotheses elaborateness, 293–96 describing, 212–14 elaboration, 77–79 involved/assumed, 211 elementary analysis, illustrations of, 226– practical testability and intended field of 30 application, 325–29 empirical inconsistency, 243 See also field of (intended) application empirical reflexivity and irreflexivity, 104, 109 See also specific topics See also irreflexivity Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (Carnap), 23– identity of intended meaning, 175 24 “if-then” statements, 288–90 equality, 24–25 imperatives, synonymity and preciseness of, 132– Euclid, 41 35 exemplification, 74–77 inconsistency exhortation, and groups exhorted, 155 logical vs. empirical, 243 explication in questionnaire answers, 482–83 connotational, 88–89 instances. See occurrences denotational, 89–91 intended field of application. See field of (in- process of, 91–93 tended) application expression(s), 6–7, 238 intended obeyers of a sentence, group of, 154–55 use and interpretation of an, 8–9 intention, definiteness of, 85–88, 179, 380–81, 489 Fairchild, Henry Pratt, 294 interpretans expressions and lists of interpreta- “false,” 176 tions, 50–57

515 INDEX interpretation relation, 112 McKeon, Richard, 37 interpretational epoché, 84, 85 meaning(s) interpretation(s), 112–13 multiple (see heteronymity) authoritative systems as guides for, 447– references to norms of, 10 50 revealed by use, 301–02 biased vs. unbiased, 55–56 meta-analysis, 222 designations, sentences, and, 53 metaoccurrence analysis, 265–66 of an expression, 8–9 metaoccurrences, 7–8, 27, 42–44 nontrivial, 56 descriptions of, 214 preliminary lists of, 423 metaquestionnaires, empirical evidence from, preliminary second-order lists of, 433 473 principle of implied synonymity in, 49 comparison of meta-results, 480 process(es) of, 9, 120 differential procedure, 478–82 suspension of, 83–85 MetaQSII/MetaI, 473–77 See also specific topics MetaQSIII, 477–78 interpretative sentences, 45–50 misinterpretation, 85, 88, 115, 124–25, 145 interpretative announcements, 170–72 concepts of preciseness based on frequency and intraintentional misinterpretation, 88 gravity of, 152–53 intransitivity, 467 and pseudoagreement in relation to impera- irreflexivity, 104, 108–10, 112 tives, 154–57 of questions, 157–59 James, William, 7, 240 with weight effects, 150–52 Jespersen, Otto, 290 Modern Democracies (Bryce), 249–53 Moore, G. E., 175 Kant, Immanuel, 78 Mussolini, Benito, 207 Kaufmann, Felix, 47–48 Kelsen, Hans, 239 “N-synonymity,” 391–94 limited fruitfulness of, 394–96 language, 290 N-synonymity hypotheses, how to test, 396–98 “correct,” 44, 45 neologisms, 184 See also linguistics; semantic systems Newton, Isaac, 9–10, 18, 19 Lasswell, H. D., 230–32, 235, 236 norm concept (N-concept) of synonymity. See lexicography, 394–95 “N-synonymity” limited choice analysis, 329–31 normative concepts. See under synonymity, Lincoln, Abraham, 7, 9, 175, 248 concepts of intrapersonal linguistic norms, references to, 16 normative (interpretative) definition(s) (N- linguistics, and occurrence analysis, 381– definitions), 163, 166–68, 170–71, 216–17, 84 221, 224, 226, 231, 248, 267–68, 320–22 logic, classical, 217 complex, 169–70 logical inconsistency, 243 conditions of two sentences expressing the Love, A. E. H., 200, 201, 420–21 same, 175–78 Løvestad, Ludwig, 242 exemplified, 172–75 questionnaire, 414–16 formulation of (N-formulation), 218, 226 Lundberg, George Andrew, 60–61 how they are criticized or appraised, 187–91 identification of, 168–69 Mach, Ernst, 19 interpreting definiens on basis of examples Malinowski, Bronislaw, 301 supporting, 296–97 marginal references. See references, marginal preciseness of definiendum and definiens in, Marx, Karl, 305 184–87 mathematical sentences, 65–66 purpose, 178–84

516 INDEX normative interpretative vs. synonymity opposites, looking for, 383 sentences, 228 Owen, Robert Dale, 213–14, 217 normative vs. descriptive statements, 215–16 normative synonymity sentences, 228 Pap, Arthur, 26–27 persuasion, 216 occurrence analysis, 299, 325–31 Pirsson, L. V., 292–93 analysis of single designation on basis of hy- Plato, 38, 39 potheses about structure, 331–32 popularizations, 234 assumptions about definiteness of intention, pragmatists, 240 380–81 preciseness, 77, 110–12, 176, 293–96, 486 connotational, 319, 325, 329–31, 384, 388 and ambiguity, 68–69 delimitation of class of occurrences to be an- asymmetrical relation of, 111 alyzed, 332–33 concepts of, based on frequency and gravity of illustration of a, 359–76 misinterpretation, 152–53 implicate list, 333–44 equality of, 113–14 inferences in relation to occurrences, 344– incomparability and transintentionality in 54 relation to, 113–16 main steps of standard, 304–16 interpretation and, 66–68 consistency problems, 316–25 interpersonal relations of, 435–36 disregarding authors and intended meanings, knowledge of context and, 126–28 447–50 of n sentences, comparison to heteronymous function of assumptions about uniformity of reference class, 116–19 use, 376–80 normative definitions, 62–65 linguistics and, 381–84 occurrence, 445–46 nonintentional, 448–50 relation to the vernacular, 65–66 synonymity of, 436–50 of single acts of communication, 119–24 types of, 384–88 precization, 62, 232 See also limited choice analysis directions of, 86 occurrence classes, 439–40 levels of, 86–87 occurrence implicates maximal, 87 interpreting, 312–16 “predicate,” 265 listing, 306–11 predictional theories, 207–08 occurrence inferences, 439–41, 443 predictions, 172–73 occurrence preciseness, 445–46 “proposition,” 24–25, 266 occurrence synonymic alternatives, 445–46 See also history occurrence synonymity pseudoagreement concept of, 438–42 latent, 159 and connotational occurrence analysis, 442– and misinterpretation in relation to impera- 45 tives, 154–57 “occurrence-heteronymous,” 440 and other undesired properties, communica- occurrences, 6–7 tions that show symptoms of, 142–48 identifying and specifying, 304–06 and pseudodisagreement, 139–42 natural and artificially produced, 302–04 pseudoexpressed agreement, 139 past, future, and possible, 16–18

reference to single pair of, 9 QS4-synonymity relations, transitivity of, 469 references to many (kinds of ), 9–10 QS4A-synonymity relations, symmetry of, 465– relation of synonymity between definite, 14 66 in text, references to, 13–16 QSI-synonymity relations, transitivity of, 469 See also metaoccurrences QSIA-synonymity, 495n1 Ofstad, Harald, 174, 217, 239 QsxA-synonymity, theorem of, 503n3

517 INDEX

Qsxy questionnaires, 473 sender-receiver synonymity, 20 Qsxy-synonymity, 417–18 sentences questionnaires. See Løvestad, questionnaire; types of, 41 synonymity, concepts of intrapersonal; See also specific topics synonymity questionnaires Shull, A. Franklin, 202, 203 questions Simpson, George G., 213, 217, 397 misinterpretation of, 157–59 simultaneity, 426, 427 synonymity and preciseness of, 135–36 Skinner, B. F., 61–62 “slave democracy,” 377, 383 real definitions (R-definitions), 195–96, “Soviet democracy” 216–17 occurrence analysis of, 345–47 exemplified, 196–200 See also Zaslavski, David formulation of (R-formulation), 199–200 specification relation between designations, 72– realist theory of law, 45 73 receiver ambiguity, 83–85 specification(s), 69–72 See also ambiguity(ies) vs. precization(s), 73–77 receiver preciseness, 119 of sentences, 74 See also preciseness speech receiver synonymity, 20 admitted/preferred usage, 44, 45 See also synonymity vs. language, 39–40 receivers, 55, 154 See also semantic systems reference class(es), 9, 93–95, 430–31 Stringham, Emerson, 197 branched, 86 subject matter reference, 11–12 heteronymous, 98, 103 substitutability, complete mutual, 38 preciseness of n sentences in relation to, substitutability synonymity, 24 116–19 See also synonymity, substitutional ordinary, first-order, 423–26 subsumability, 16 ordinary, second-order, 433–35 subsumability problems, 82 preciseness in relation to, 96–98 subsumption analysis, 90, 99, 396 quantitative measures of, 98–104 difficulties of testing descriptive definitions unambiguity in relation to, 95–96 by means of, 285–86 references illustrations of, 275–85 marginal, 11–13, 47, 162, 168, 396 occurrence analysis and, 299, 325 obscure, 10–11 preliminaries involved in (schematical survey), reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of rela- 268–75 tions, 104–13 scope and definition, 266–69 Reichenbach, Hans, 27 subsumption, unlimited possibilities of, 331 response choices, questionnaire suspension, interrelational, 83–85 effects of reversal of order of, 489–90 symmetry, 106–07, 110 Russell, Bertrand, 216, 222, 291–92 of synonymity relations, 452–66 See also asymmetrical relation scatter diagram of interpretations, 96 Syn(aM1bM2), 12–13 Schlick, Moritz, 291 synonymic alternatives, 57–59, 171, 445–46 Schumpeter, Joseph A., 289 and interpretations, examples of lists of, 59– scientific hypotheses and theories, 22 62 semantic systems, 39–45 See also specific topics semantics, 1–2 synonymities, method of of cognitive communication, 2 obstacles endangering fruitfulness of (see semiotic relations, 161 synonymity questionnaires, difficulties sender synonymity, 20 of questionnaire procedures)

518 INDEX

synonymity, 104–07, 205, 426 effect of training on classifiability of argumentational, 412–14 answers (QS5), 490–92 asymmetry of, 469 general considerations, 482–84 cognitive, 167 empirical symmetry of relations of Qsxy- concepts of interpersonal, 1, 18–21, 418– synonymity, 452–54 36 evidence of symmetry of synonymity relations interpersonal relations of interpretation as defined by, 454–66 and preciseness, 435–36 evidence of transitivity of synonymity concepts of intrapersonal, 1, 18–21, 389–91, relations as defined by, 467–70 410–11 interviews used to study previously given cognitive-weight-condition, 412 answers, 470–73 Ds-concepts, 398–406 transitivity of synonymity relations and, 466– N-concepts, 391–96 67 reported sameness of meaning, 398–99 See also Løvestad, questionnaire; meta- rule of sameness of sense, 391–94 questionnaires; synonymity, concepts truth-condition, 406–10 of intrapersonal verification, certainty, and truth-condition, synonymity rules, 41 410–11 synonymity sentences, 5–11, 70 concepts/meanings of, 69, 71, 204–06, 269, description of hypotheses expressed by, 209– 495n1 15 defined, 210 examples, 23–28 in terms of occurrence analysis, 436–37 normative, 228

intrasituational (Syn(aiSlbjS1)) and intersitua- See also synonymity hypotheses tional (Syn(aiSlbjS2)), 21, 25 systems, semantic. See semantic systems substitutional, 33–39 See also substitutability synonymity Tarski, Alfred, 24 See also specific topics terminological announcements, 163 synonymity expressions, 11 terminology, questions of, 153–54 synonymity habits, modifying. See decisions Tønnessen, Herman, 296–97 synonymity hypotheses, 48–50, 238–39, transintentional misinterpretation, 88 269 transintentional precizations, 87 broadness and definiteness, 21–22 transintentionality, preciseness and, 85–88, 114– intended subject matter, 11 16 interpersonal, 424–26, 433–35 transitive relations, 107–10, 112 based on information about intrapersonal transitivity of synonymity relations, 466– synonymity, 418–23 67 interpreting occurrences offered in support empirical evidence of, 467–70 (and on basis) of, 298–99 truth, 287, 288, 290–92 intrapersonal, 24–25 Bradley on, 264–65 testability, 11–22 theories of, 292–93 See also synonymity sentences, description of Voltaire on, 207 hypotheses expressed by See also “false” synonymity question, 400 truth-condition questionnaires, 412 synonymity questionnaires, 416–17, 451–52, 466, 492–93 unambiguity, 95–96 difficulties of questionnaire procedures, 482 “use of an expression,” 8–9 difficulties of QS1, 484–87 difficulties of QS2, 487–89 Valentine, L. I., 226, 229 effect of reversal of sentences in QS3, 489– validity, intended field of, 167–68 90 value judgment, 217

519 INDEX

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de, 207 Zaslavski, David von Mises, Richard, 265–66 on communism and Soviet Union, 500n16 Vyshinsky, A. Y., 305–09 definitoid statements on democracy, inferences from, 354–59 Wade, Donald William, 295 La démocratie soviétique, 312–13, 315–16, 326, wealth, Irving Fisher on, 275–77 332–54, 359–88, 436–37, 442–43, Whitehead, Alfred North, 222 500n8 Woodruff, Lorande L., 197–99

520 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

521 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a visiting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ- ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Per- son for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visiting researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philosophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for ecocultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

Alan R. Drengson, Ph.D. is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Uni- versity of Victoria, in Victoria BC Canada. He is a former Director of Envi- ronmental Studies and is currently an Adjunct Professor of Graduate Stud- ies. He is the author of numerous articles, reviews, and books, as well as the editor of three anthologies and the founding editor of two journals, The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy and Ecoforestry.

522 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Notes

Chapter I: Pyrrho’s Scepticism According to Sextus Empiricus 1. See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, bk. 1: secs. 12 and 26. (In all references to this work, hereafter referred to as Outlines, Arabic numbers refer to sections unless explicitly noted as specifying chapters.) The German translation by Eugen Pappenheim (1877: 26) of bk. 1: 12 is very good on this point: “Hochbegabte Menschen nämlich kamen, beirrt durch die Ungleichmäs- sigkeit in den Dingen und unentschieden, welchen von ihnen sie sich mehr fügen sollten, dahin, zu suchen, was wahr sei bei den Dingen und was falsch, um in Folge der Entscheidung hierüber unbeirrt zu sein.” 2. In this connection, the second to the last sentence of Outlines (bk. 1: 12) is important. Robert G. Bury (1933: 9) translates, “The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. . . .” But here we should first of all reject the term system. Second, the term basic principle somewhat unhappily suggests a rule or proposition claimed to be valid. Third, an impression of deliberate policy is conveyed by talking of a principle of doing such and such. Pappenheim (1877: 26) has avoided most of these unsceptical suggestions, translating systaseos arché as des Verharrens Anfang: “Des skeptischen Verharrens Anfang (Grundprincip) aber ist hauptsächlich, dass jeder Rede eine gleiche Rede gegenübersteht.” 3. [Editor’s note: In discussing this revision of Scepticism with Naess, he was em- phatic about asserting that it is no longer his view that the mature sceptic, by definition of being a mature sceptic, has peace of mind.] 4. For study of the use of apangello and related words, see especially chapters 23, 25, and 27 of Outlines, bk. 1. 5.Ten occurrences of foné are found in chapters 7, 8, 19, and 28 of Outlines (bk. 1: 14, 15, 187, 188, 191, 207). 6.Ifall utterances, then “perception” must be taken in a rather wide sense. 7. The dogmatist also “puts forward” but “with affirmation” (Outlines, bk. 1: 197). 8.Pappenheim (1877: 71) translates very well: “Eine Redensart, welche unseren Zustand kundthut.”

149 NOTES TO PAGES 11–20

9. For some important occurrences of adoxastos, see Outlines (bk. 1: 15, 23, 24; bk. 2: 13). And of adiaforos (bk. 1: 195, 207). 10. Nevertheless, Sextus sometimes uses the term to opine when referring to his own (or to sceptical) utterances (see Outlines, bk. 1: 4, 17). In bk. 1: 19, the re- ﬂexive “they seem to me” is used. 11. Whereas considerations of style may have perverted Hume’s argumentation in a dogmatic direction (or did he perhaps wish to convert the reader to a system?), the dictates of intellectual sincerity can sometimes pervert the style of the sceptic. In the writings of Ingemund Gullvåg, a contemporary sceptic, repeated expressions of uncertainty and perplexity leave the reader wander- ing in a structureless plain of if’s, presumably’s, and perhaps’s (cf. his “Scepti- cism and Absurdity,” 1964). One wonders how many important manuscripts by sceptics have remained unpublished because they ultimately led nowhere. Hume’s writings are eminently readable in part because of the provoking dogmatism of their style and the highly interesting general conclusions that crop up in every chapter. 12. Outlines, bk. 1: 7, Fainesthai hémin. 13. For example, ta aisthéta (Outlines, bk. 1: 9), fantasia and pathos (bk. 1: 13). 14. Hicks wrote in 1910, but as recently as 1964 there have been writers who think that scepticism essentially concerns itself with the belief in an external or material world. The Dictionnaire de la philosophie (Didier 1964) says some quite astonishing things: “Hegel a distingué, d’une manière très lumineuse: 1° le skepticisme antique (Pyrrhon, Aenésidème), qui consiste à douter de la réalité du monde extérieur et à croire néanmoins en la réalité d’un monde spirituel, et l’existence de Dieu; 2° le scepticisme moderne (positivisme, scien- tisme), qui consiste à ne croire que ses sens, à afﬁrmer la seule réalité du monde matérial et à douter de Dieu. Le Philosophe Berkeley rentrerait dans la première catégorie, Auguste Comte dans la seconde.” 15. Chisholm (1941) writes: “In this context he seems to suggest that metaphysical statements might be true, even though not known to be true, but it is doubtful that he intended this, in view of his doctrine that indicative signs have no reference. He opposed such statements, not merely because he regarded them as nonsense, but also because he believed them to engender futile controversy which seriously interferes with that quietude or ataraxy which is the sceptic’s ultimate goal. The objection is primarily a pragmatic one” (p. 375). 16. “C’est dans le raisonnement que le scepticisme montre toute sa faiblesse. Il est clair, en effet, que du désaccord des opinions et des systèmes on ne pourra conclure légitimement à l’impossibilité, pour l’esprit humain, d’atteindre la vérité qu’à une condition, c’est que ce désaccord ne puisse s’expliquer que s’il n’y a pas de vérité ou si elle nous est inaccessible.”

150 NOTES TO PAGES 34–54

Chapter II: The Psychological Possibility of Scepticism 1. Russell (1948: 191) distinguishes sceptical solipsism, the view that “there is not known to be anything beyond data” from dogmatic solipsism, the view that “there is nothing beyond data,” although according to Sextus, both views should be distinguished from scepticism. Russell’s tendency to equate scepticism with the view that knowledge of something or other does not exist or is impossible leads him to quite astonishing assertions. Thus, in a discussion of Pyrrho, he states that sceptics “of course, deny that they assert the impossibility of knowledge dogmatically but their denials are not very convincing” (1945: 234). Russell does not say why he finds the denials uncon- vincing. But surely, if all Sextus’s efforts to use ways of announcement compatible with his rejection of negative dogmatism, and all his efforts to show that he could not possibly take the sceptical phrases (“Nothing is known,” etc.) as true, are to be registered by the critical historian as mere “camou- flage,” the most surprising results might be expected from other philosophical sources. Maybe, in his heart, Plotinus was a follower of Democritus? 2. In Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field of Scientific Method in Philosophy (1914), and later, in various epistemological and ontological works, Russell has tried to develop philosophically satisfactory solutions to problems that many have considered to be pseudo-problems. 3. In some circumstances, of course, it might be more appropriately thought of as tantamount to acceptance of some other proposition, for example, “This is how a confident man walks into a room.” But the view would be that some proposition or other is implied, and, perhaps, that enough information about the circumstances would determine which proposition. 4. The terminology here is that of Chisholm in, for example, Theory of Knowledge (1966). See especially chapter 1. 5. “Choose to go out or not to go out” might seem at first sight to be a genuine option, but it is unclear that in subsequently going out or not going out, one has necessarily chosen to do so. What if one forgets the option, or goes immediately to sleep, or is swiftly carried out before having decided? Even if one cannot (and perhaps one can) avoid the choice, it may elude one. James, however, does not give this as an example of a genuine option. Instead he gives the following example: “Either accept this truth or go without it.” But, according to our discussion above, even this would be a genuine option only when nonacceptance of the truth could be shown to exclude all ways of participat- ing in it. 6. On the other hand, the terms do not connote something invariable. Pyrrho- nism, as described by Sextus, is, after all, only one kind of sceptical philosophy according to the terminologies using sceptical in more or less broad senses. To

151 NOTES TO PAGES 58–78

take an example, the existence of Carneades and sceptics adhering to his probabilism does not directly support the hypothesis that there also existed Pyr- rhonists.

Chapter III: Scepticism and Positive Mental Health 1.Unless otherwise noted, this and all subsequent quotations in this section are from Jahoda (1958: 33–65). The book is a report written for the Joint Com- mission on Mental Illness and Health. Its purpose, according to the author, is “to clarify a variety of efforts to give meaning to this vague notion” of mental health. The qualiﬁcation “positive” indicates that one is looking for something more than mere absence of illness. 2. By “sceptical personalities” I mean personalities with a more or less pro- nounced sceptical bent of mind. I am not thinking only of persons adhering to the radical scepticism of Sextus. 3.Jaspers (1946: 112 ff.) describes a case with obvious relevance for studies of states of deep and general doubt. It is plain from Jaspers’s classiﬁcation of the sceptical frame of mind in his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1954) that his own psychopathological experience colors his perception of philosophical scepticism. Scepticism is classed as a form of nihilism and is clearly taken to be a form of deep and general doubt that is incompatible with mental health.

Chapter IV: Conceptual Complementarity of Evidence and Truth Requirements 1. Apparently Plato could only explain how such knowledge is generated by re- course to theories or myths about remembering: knowledge is not reached, but found introspectively in a way in which reaching for it is not called for. Aristotle in no way weakens the “Platonic” requirement that knowledge should comprise an absolute relationship to truth: Quite the contrary, he explicitly and repeatedly affirms that what is known is true, and that such knowledge (epistémé) is incorrigible. We only know things about which we cannot be mistaken. If truth is claimed, a kind of incorrigibility claim must follow (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1956: 15–36). To say “I know it but it may be false” is strange, at best. I may admit that as a human being I am always fallible, but if I say “I know that p,” I must claim that p’s truth is incorrigible, or that I cannot even make sense of attributing corrigibility or incorrigibility to truth. A belief, a working hypothesis, is corrigible, but if p is accepted only as a good working hypothesis, I would not say “I know that p.” 2.Other representative subfamilies of such truth-requiring concepts of knowledge can be introduced by variation of interpretation of the “” in a formula AB, in which A is defined as “He knows that p” and B is defined as “He is

152 NOTES TO PAGES 78–88

sure that p, he has adequate grounds for being sure, and p is true.” In this way the following kinds of sentences (among others) are constructed: 1. A means the same as B. 2. The criterion of A is B. 3. The necessary and sufficient condition of A is B. As an example of an individual member of the family, we may take the following: “He knows that it rains” means the same as “He is sure that p, he has adequate grounds for being sure, and p is true.” The expression “means the same as” can be made more precise in various directions, for instance, by introducing references to particular people and situations: “A means for P1 in S1 the same as B for P2 in S2”—or by introducing criteria of synonymity of various degrees of strength. In what follows, it is largely (but certainly not totally) irrelevant how the schema AB is interpreted. At least three possible functions should be distinguished: (1) use of the requirements for decisions concerning the social or ethical justification for calling, or of having called, a proposition knowledge. “You said you knew the gun was unloaded; were you entitled to do so, did you have adequate grounds?”; (2) use of the requirements as a criterion or reminder when deciding whether p is known or not; (3) use in defining what is meant by “p is known.” The set of three requirements may function more or less well in these ways. But these functions must be carefully distinguished. It is dangerously misleading if, for example, one applies the requirements in ways (2) and (3) to our own momentary decisions. 3. In many cases the question is closely related to such questions as “Is N. N. aware of the fact that . . .” or “Does N. N. know it or is he ignorant of it?” The questionnaire is not intended to take care of this usage. 4. Efforts to make this formulation of Ayer’s more precise soon evoke a question: Does Ayer intend by “is the case” (in the phrase “knowing that something is the case”) something different from “be true” (in “to know to be true”)? If not, the first part of his formulation can be reformulated: “Thus necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are first that it is the case. . . .” The nonepistemological, purely ontological weight of “to be the case” makes the expression better suited to bringing out the difference between the first and the third requirement. The expression “to be true” has too many uses with epistemological shades. It very often resembles “to be (to have been) verified.” 5. It is interesting to note that positive answers to the questions “Is he sure that p?” and “Is p true?” may, in a very natural way, be introduced by the phrase “I am perfectly convinced that . . .” but not so the synthesis “Do you know that p?” 6. Some will object that the truth requirement is apt to enter anyway. How do I know that a specified standard is fulfilled? If this requires such and such to be the case, truth must be reached in the matter. There is no compelling reason,

153 NOTES TO PAGES 88–108

however, why standard evidence should not replace truth here as well, if it can do such a thing at all. There remains the objection that the replacement would lead to an infinite regress. We must have adequate evidence that there is adequate evidence. . . . The objection is not a serious one, however, as long as it is not shown that the regress is vicious or fatal. 7. It is crucial that (1a), (1b), (1c) are not taken to introduce general concepts of the terms knows, knew, and mistaken. In order to make use of (1a), (1b), (1c), there must by definition be references to an N. N., a t, and a p, and these references must be part of the conceptualizations. 8. This would be better considering the frequent occurrence of an extremely high degree of evidence in relation to standards nevertheless combined with disbelief. Scientists with strong intuitions have been led to important discoveries through mistrusting evidence that has more than fulfilled the requirements of the scientific community—and they have sometimes stuck to a theory that has prestige in spite of counterevidence that seems completely compelling to later generations. 9. In my article “Can knowledge be reached?” (1961 [in SWAN VIII]), I did not sufficiently stress the difference between viewing the distinction between knowing and not knowing as inapplicable or inappropriate in certain situations and denying that knowledge (in certain senses) can be reached. As a consequence of this, I considered the negative answer to the question in the title automatically to comprise a kind of scepticism. It is more accurate to say that it may be used to support sceptical conclusions, but only if other premises are added. 10.“To say that I know . . . is not so much to report my state of mind as to vouch for the truth of whatever it may be” (Ayer 1956: 17). 11. The concept is introduced in my Interpretation and Preciseness (1953 [SWAN I]).

Chapter V: Dialectics of Modern Epistemological Scepticism 1.We should recall that some of the phrases ( fonai) that Sextus calls sceptical do not, when uttered by sceptics, express any doctrine or view whatsoever. 2. Cf. especially Russell in Human Knowledge (1948) and Ayer in The Problem of Knowledge (1956). 3. In the following, the phrase “I know” is fairly consistently adhered to instead of the long series of phrases “I know,” “He knows,” “I knew,” “He knew,” “knowledge,” “It is known,” etc. Having made up one’s mind about the functions and use of “I know,” the conclusions on the other phrases are in the main predetermined—but only in the main. If one wishes to talk about all the expressions of the series, there turns out to be very little to say. However, there are so many differences to be noted that a painstaking exposition concerned with all these phrases would be rather confusing.

154 NOTES TO PAGES 109–28

4. The comparison of relative severity of requirements across different situations or topics is extremely difficult. It would seem that the attempt to make such a comparison must lead to the construction of conceptual frameworks of methodology. However interesting in themselves, these throw little light on everyday (or even scientific) evaluation and comparison of standards. The whole idea of definite standards is, of course, to some extent an artificial creation; there is little basis in the everyday use of “I know” for that fiction— however useful it is in the debate on scepticism. 5. In this example, an individual modifies his requirements. In other cases, the group or community does. The use of “I know he does not cheat” is perhaps less restricted in Middletown because “it is now years since those shocking revelations—well, you remember.” 6. This sounds as if I were to say to myself, “From now on, do not use ‘I know’ in important matters.” The adjustments and modifications in usage are, of course, normally made without articulation. Freud would call them prebewusst (preconscious); there are no barriers to their being made conscious (as with the unconscious); they simply do not occur to one. 7. It is not entirely clear to me why general fallibility in the sense of “acute sense of general fallibility” should not rationally (“psychiatrically rationally”) prevent somebody using “I know” or adequately expressing his attitude by “I know nothing.” It all depends on the way of announcing “Alas! we are all of us always fallible” and “I know nothing.” If the announcement amounts to a knowledge claim, a position Sextus calls “Academic” (cf. chapter 1, pp. 4 and 11–12) is taken. There are some very strong objections to that position, some of them formulated by Sextus himself. If something less than a knowledge claim is made, and the way of announcement is consistent with one of Sextus’s “sceptical phrases,” I see no reason to reject “I know nothing.” According to some definitions of philosophy, it would not belong to philosophy, but that should not detract from the propriety of the expression. 8. One can learn by denotation or by connotation. “Perpetuum mobile,” “eternal bliss,” and many other expressions are learned by their connotations. 9. The same lack of clear distinction between social and cognitive factors goes back to the father of British commonsense philosophy, Thomas Reid (1941: vii, viii), who insists that if anything is self-evident, then “to desire more evidence is absurd,” and that this is a valid argument against sceptics. It is perhaps absurd to say “This is self-evident, let me look for more evidence,” but not “this fulfills standard requirements justifying the pronouncement ‘this is self-evident,’ but let us look for some additional evidence beyond that which is required.” 10.Ofcourse, in what I have been saying in the foregoing, there is no doubting about the justification of saying “I verified it” in very many situations. What

155 NOTES TO PAGES 129–33

has been discussed among verification specialists is verifiability in highly technical (in part purely logical) senses under maximum-requirement conditions. 11. One is reminded of the possibility of constructing infallible statements (“This is pink”) and fallible ones (“This is magenta”), or infallible (“This seems to me pink”) and fallible ones (“This is pink”). Do we really mean to say that here is an infallible difference? 12. Austin (1961: 66) says that “being aware that you may be mistaken doesn’t mean merely being aware that you are a fallible human being: it means that you have some concrete reason to suppose that you may be mistaken in this case. Just as ‘but I may fail’ does not mean merely ‘but I am a weak human being’ (in which case it would be no more exciting than adding ‘D. V.’): it means that there is some concrete reason for me to suppose that I shall break my word. It is naturally always possible (‘humanly’ possible) that I may be mistaken or may break my word, but that by itself is no bar against using the expressions ‘I know’ and ‘I promise’ as we do in fact use them.” Very well, but from using “I know” in a socially convenient way, it does not follow that anything is known. (Cf. our use of the terms demon, devil, superhuman, eternal fame, never to be forgotten, and so on.) 13. Suppose N. N. says, “Alas, I am always liable to be mistaken in whatever I say, but I know London is sometimes rather foggy,” would we not interpret this “but” to refer to an exception from the liability? That is, in his use of the term know, N. N. excludes the possibility of being mistaken. 14. It seems that Wittgenstein would deny the necessity of a conceptual framework here and hold that all “proper” use of the expression “not know” implies awareness of how to know. 15.Ayer (1956: 25) puts it elegantly: “[I]t is inconsistent to say ‘I know but I may be wrong.’ But the reason why this is inconsistent is that saying ‘I know’ offers a guarantee which saying ‘I may be wrong’ withdraws.” It is inconsistent, in a social sense, to give a guarantee and immediately withdraw it. Making a gift and withdrawing it are two actions related to each other in a particular way. But what is guaranteed in asserting “I know that p”? That it is so, that p is true. The wrongness referred to in the qualification “but I may be wrong” is then wrongness about p’s being true, that is, the falseness of p—that it is not as I say it is. This is the crux of the matter, not the inconsistency of two be- haviors as such. However important it is not to neglect the performative aspect of “I know,” it is the cognitive inconsistency that counts in the debate on scepticism. 16. Stock answers would be to say that if the statement is true by convention, logically true, necessarily true, analytic, or a priori, then it is incorrigible. But the conventions referred to are mostly obscure and the relation between a convention and the statements said to be true by that convention are compli-

156 NOTES TO PAGES 134–44

cated and far from “self-evident.” (Do statements that are true solely by convention express knowledge?) Similar things hold for the criteria that a statement is necessarily true, analytic, or a priori. 17. Cf. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions (1962). The basic sceptical and relativist framework of this book has been clearly pointed to by Paul K. Feyerabend (1965: 250). 18.I may say “p was true, but is not true any longer.” Here the truth has not been corrected. It is still true that p was true. At time t, A says, “There is a rainbow toward the East”; at time t + 1, B says, “You are wrong, there is no rainbow,” at which A answers, “I was right. What I said was true but is no longer true.” That is, if I repeated it now, the statement would be false. If “It is true that p” is retracted, not the truth but the belief is said to have been wrong. 19. It would be interesting to hear the personal experiences of university philosophers on this issue. All too little has been said about the personal background from which, in part, different points of view may be understood. Some sort of personal understanding is perhaps a necessary condition when judging fundamental positions in philosophy. At the opening of my own commonsense and trivialism period, I remember the shock I received looking at about 150 philosophers advancing toward the food placed on a big table at a congres- sional banquet. There were no characteristic differences in behavior, looks, talk, or speed corresponding to disagreements in their books. Later in life, I believe I have seen so much disconformism behind conformism and behind strikingly similar ways of behaving and talking in daily life that I am convinced that styles of life and general attitudes color everything—including the kind of statement I am making now. 20. The following remarks refer to Husserl (1913: sec. 32). 21.We have not discussed various subclasses of statements (empirical, logical, mathematical, analytic, necessary, and so on) because the arguments are in the main unaffected by the differences.

157 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identiﬁed by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Works Cited Aristotle. 1956. Nicomachean Ethics, 1139b, with an English translation by Harris Rackham. The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (London: Heinemann). Arner, Douglas. 1959. “On knowing.” Philosophical Review 68. Augustine, St. 1961. Confessions, translated by R. S. Pine-Cofﬁn. Baltimore: Pen- guin Books. Austin, John L. 1961. “Other minds.” In Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ayer, Alfred J. 1956. The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. ———. 1961. “A reply to Mr. Stigen.” Inquiry 4, no. 4. Broad, Charlie Dunbar. 1925. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Brochard, Victor. 1887. Les sceptiques grecs. Paris: F. Alcan (Paris: J. Vrin, 1923). Chisholm, Roderick M. 1941. “Sextus Empiricus and modern empiricism.” Philoso- phy of Science 8. ———. 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ———. 1966. Theory of Knowledge. Foundations of Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Didier, Julia. 1964. Dictionnaire de la philosophie. Paris: Larousse (Paris: Librarie Larousse, 1984). Feyerabend, Paul K. 1965. “Problems of empiricism.” In The Edge of Certainty, edited by Robert G. Colodny. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

159 REFERENCES

Gullvåg, Ingemund. 1964. “Scepticism and absurdity.” Inquiry 7, no. 2. Hicks, Robert D. 1910. Stoic and Epicurean. London: Longmans Green. Hume, David. 1911. A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 1, pt. 4. Everyman’s Library Edition, vol. 1. London: J. M. Dent and Sons. ———. 1949. A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 1, edited with an analytical index by Lewis A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1951. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2d ed., edited with an introduction and analytical index by Lewis A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Husserl, Edmund. 1913. Logische Untersuchungen, 2d ed., vol. 1. Halle: Max Niemeyer- Verlag. Jahoda, Marie. 1958. Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health. New York: Basic Books. James, William. 1957. “The will to believe.” In Essays in Pragmatism, edited with an introduction by Alburey Castell. New York: Hafner. Jaspers, Karl. 1946. Allgemeine Psychopathologie, 4th ed. Berlin: Springer Verlag. ———. 1954. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 4th ed. Berlin: Springer Verlag. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Naess, Arne. 1953. Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to the Theory of Com- munication. Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I) ———. 1961. “Can knowledge be reached?” Inquiry 4, no. 4. (in SWAN VIII) Pap, Arthur. 1949. Elements of Analytic Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. Pappenheim, Eugen. 1877. “Einleitung.” In Des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneïsche Grundzüge. Philosophische Bibliothek. Leipzig: Erich Koschny (L. Heimanns Verlag). Popkin, Richard H. 1967. “Skepticism.” In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 7, edited by Paul Edwards. London: Collier-Macmillan. Reid, Thomas. 1941. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, edited and abridged by Anthony D. Woozley. London: Macmillan Co. Russell, Bertrand. 1914. Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field of Scientific Method in Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin. ———. 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin. ———. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: George Allen and Unwin. ———. 1967. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Paperback Series. Ox- ford: Oxford University Press (first published 1912). Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.

160 REFERENCES

Sánchez, Francisco. 1988. Quod nihil scitur (Why nothing can be known), with introduction, notes, and bibliography by Elaine Limbrick; Latin text established, annotated, and translated by Douglas F. S. Thomson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sextus Empiricus. 1933. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, translated by Robert G. Bury. The Loeb Classical Library. Sextus Empiricus, vol. 1. London: W. Heinemann. ———. 1935. Against the Logicians, translated by Robert G. Bury. The Loeb Classi- cal Library. Sextus Empiricus, vol. 2. London: W. Heinemann. ———. 1936. Against the Ethicists, translated by Robert G. Bury. The Loeb Classi- cal Library. Sextus Empiricus, vol. 3. London: W. Heinemann. Spearman, Charles Edward. 1937. Psychology Down the Ages, vol. 1. London: Macmillan. Stigen, Anﬁnn. 1961. “Descriptive analysis and the sceptic.” Inquiry 4, no. 4. Wasiuty´nski, J. 1963. Universet. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef. 1958. Philosophical Investigations, translated by Gertrude E. M. Anscombe, 2d ed., sec. 246. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Other Works Ayer, Alfred J. 1956. “Philosophical scepticism.” In Contemporary British Philosophy, edited by H. D. Lewis. The Muirhead Library of Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin (New York: Macmillan). Bayle, Pierre. 1740. “Pyrrho.” In Dictionnaire historique et critique, 5th ed., edited by P. Brunel et al. (Amsterdam); and in The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Pierre Bayle, British ed. (2d ed.), printed for J. J. and P. Knapton et al. (London, 1734), p. 38; translated and edited by Richard H. Popkin as Pierre Bayle: Histori- cal and Critical Dictionary, Selections (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs- Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts, 1965). Beropsky, Bernard. 1958. “Minkus-Benes on incorrigibility.” Mind 67, no. 266: 264–66. Bevan, Edwyn. 1913. Stoics and Sceptics: Scientiﬁc Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1965. “Knowledge and certainty.” Review of Metaphysics 18, no. 3. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1964. “Theory of knowledge.” In Philosophy, edited by Roderick M. Chisholm et al., pp. 244–344. The Princeton Studies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Cicero. 1933, 1951. De natura deorum: Academica, with an English translation by H. Rackham. The Loeb Classical Library. London: W. Heinemann. ———. 1951. De ﬁnibus bonorum et malorum, translated by H. Rackham. The Loeb Classical Library. London: W. Heinemann.

161 REFERENCES

Colodny, Robert G., ed. 1965. The Edge of Certainty. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren- tice-Hall. Goedeckemeyer, Albert. 1905. Die Geschichte des Griechischen Skeptizismus. Leipzig: Dietrich. Gullv˚ag, Ingemund. 1964. “Truth, belief and certainty.” Det kgl. Videnskaps Sel- skaps Skrifter, no. 2. Trondheim. Harrison, Jonathan. 1962. “Knowing and promising.” Mind 71, no. 284. Hegel, Georg W. F. 1807. Die Phänomenologie des Geistes. Bamberg and Wurzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt. ———. 1833. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1. Berlin: Verlag von Dunder und Humblot. Heintz, Werner. 1932. Studien zu Sextus Empiricus. Schriften d. Königsberger gelehrten. Gesellschaft Sonderreihe bd. 2. Halle: M. Niemeyer. Hoffmeister, Johannes. 1955. Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, 2 Auﬂ. Ham- burg: F. Meiner, p. 562. Hönigswald, Richard. 1914. Die Skepsis in Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Wege zur Philosophie. Schr. zur Einf. in das philos. Denken, Nr. 7. Göttingen: Vanden- hoeck und Ruprecht. Maccoll, Norman. 1869. The Greek sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus. London: Macmillan. Mannheim, Karl. 1929. Ideologie und Utopie. Bonn: F. Cohen. Translated as Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge by Louis Wirth and Ed- ward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1946). Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de. 1922. “L’apologie de Raymond Sebond.” In Les es- sais de Michel de Montaigne, edited by Pierre Villey. Paris: F. Alcan. Natorp, Paul. 1884. “Protagoras, Demokrit, Epikur und die Skepsis.” In Forschun- gen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Altertum, vol. 8. Berlin: Hertz (Hilde- sheim: G. Olms, 1965). Pappenheim, Eugen. 1881. Erläuterungen zu des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneïschen Grundzügen. Philosophische Bibliothek. Leipzig: Erich Koschny (L. Heimanns Verlag). ———. 1885. Die Tropen der griechischen Skeptiker, chaps. 1–3, sec. 6. Wiss. Beil. zum Programm des Köllnischen Gymnasiums. Berlin: R. Gaertners Verlags- buchhandlung. ———. 1889. Der angebliche Heraklitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos, 30 s. Wiss. Beil. zum Programm des Köllnischen Gymnasiums. Berlin: R. Gaertners Ver- lagsbuchhandlung H. Heyfelder. Pascal, Blaise. 1961. Pensées, (Leon Brunschvicg ed.) with introduction and notes by Charles Marc Des Granges. Paris: Garnier Frères.

162 REFERENCES

Patrick, Mary Mills. 1899. Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism, Ph.D. diss. Cam- bridge: Deighton Bell and Co. Popkin, Richard H. 1950–51. “David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his critique of Pyrrhonism.” Philosophical Quarterly 1: 385–407. Reprinted in Hume, edited by Vere C. Chappell (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 53–98. ———. 1951–52. “Berkeley and Pyrrhonism.” Review of Metaphysics 5: 223–46. ———. 1952–53. “David Hume and the Pyrrhonian controversy.” Review of Meta- physics 6: 65–81. ———. 1953–54. “The sceptical crisis and the rise of modern philosophy,” parts 1, 2, and 3. Review of Metaphysics 8: 132–51, 307–22, 499–510. ———. 1955. “The sceptical precursors of David Hume.”Philosophy and Phenome- nological Research 16: 61–71. ———. 1964. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, rev. ed. University of Utrecht Publications in Philosophy. Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum and Co. ———. 1965. “The high road to Pyrrhonism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 1–15. Richter, Raoul. 1904–08. Der skeptizismus in der philosophie, vols. 1 and 2. Leipzig: Verlag der Dürrschen buchhandlung. Robin, Léon. 1944. Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Rokeach, Milton. 1960. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books. Sextus Empiricus. 1840–41. Sexti Empirici opera: Graece et Latine, edited by Johann Albert Fabricius, Editio emendatior, 2 vols. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. ———. 1912. Opera. Recensuit Hermannus Mutschmann, vol. 1. Pyrrhoniarum in- stitutionum libri 3. Lipsiae: B. G. Teubner. ———. 1914. Opera. Recensuit Hermannus Mutschmann, vol. 2. Adversus dog- maticos, libri 5. Lipsiae: B. G. Teubner. ———. 1954. Opera. Recensuit Hermannus Mutschmann, vol. 3. Adversus mathe- maticos, with Greek text, libros 1–6 continens iterum ed. J. Mau. Lipsiae: B. G. Teubner. Strawson, P. F. 1953. “A. J. Ayer’s The Problem of Knowledge.” Critical notice in Phi- losophy 28. ———. 1959. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen (1961). Thomas, L. E. 1955. “Philosophic doubt.” Mind 64, no. 255. Wagner, Hans. 1959. Philosophie und Reﬂexion. Munich: E. Reinhardt. Zeller, Eduard. 1865. Die philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen ent- wickelung. Leipzig: Fues Verlag.

163 Index

Academic scepticism against propositional universality of evidence Augustine’s scepticism and, 63 requirement, 74, 111 deﬁned, 4 rejection of scepticism by, 142 dogmatic ways of announcement in, 11–13, Ayer, Alfred J. 149n7, 155n7 on knowledge claims, 71–72 modern scepticism and, 105 inconsistency of qualifying claim, 156n15 as negative dogmatism, 26, 142, 151n1 requirements of, 80–82, 84, 111, 112, 115, philosophers’ evaluation of, 26, 142 153n4 rashness of, according to Pyrrhonist, 25, 142 vouching for, 96, 117, 154n10 reality unintelligible to, 51 on scepticism, 33, 71–72, 142, 154n2 self-reference and, 3 See also dogmatism behavior. See action action, sceptics’ views on, 24–25, 33 belief in Pyrrhonian scepticism, 35–43, 67, 151n3 action and, 36–40, 43 Aenesidemus, 150n14 evidence for, 45–46 Agrippa of Nettesheim, 125 experimentation with, by sceptic, 37–38, 39 Allport, Gordon, 58, 59, 68 incorrigibility not required for, 140–41 analytic statements, incorrigibility and, 156n16, linguistic learning and, 119, 155n8 157n21 possibility of, for sceptic, 43–48 appearances, in Pyrrhonian scepticism religious, 44–45, 46–47, 119 acquiescence in, 8, 11, 31, 41–42, 107 conversion to, 63–64 essences and, 13, 15–16 as requirement of knowledge, 71–72, 84–85 knowledge not conveyed by, 31 reaching knowledge and, 86, 93, 154n8 Sextus’s terminology for, 15, 16, 150n12, 150n13 in sense data, Russell’s views on, 22–23 subjectivism and, 15–16 variable meanings of, 43 truth and, 7, 15–16, 18, 41 ways of announcement and, 11, 12, 13 utterances about, 8, 11, 13, 149n6 Berkeley, George, 17, 150n14 vs. reality, 50–52 Broad, Charlie Dunbar, 138 a priori knowledge, incorrigibility and, 156n16 Brochard, Victor, 20, 21, 26 Aristotelian physics, relativism about, 134 Bury, Robert G., 7, 13, 21, 61, 149n2 Aristotle, 73, 95, 139, 152n1 Arner, Douglas, 121, 144 Carneades, 31, 151n6 ataraxia. See peace of mind Cartesian scepticism, 137–38 Augustine, St., 63 certainty Austin, John L. in Academic scepticism, 12, 25 on fallibility, 116–17, 130, 156n12 belief and, 43 on incorrigible statements, 123–26 evidence for, 89, 118 veriﬁcation of, 128–29, 141 in moderate, unphilosophical sceptic, 65

165 INDEX certainty (continued) doubting promoted by, 48 momentary, in Pyrrhonian sceptic, 24 in Hume’s writings, 13–14, 150n11 right to make assertions vs., 120–23 negative, 26, 142, 151n1 uncertainty in modern science, 49–50 obligation of dogmatist to reconsider, 25 See also incorrigibility in philosophies of Sextus’s time, 50 Chisholm, Roderick M., 18–19, 80, 150n15, 151n4 Pyrrhonian sceptic’s arguments with, 20, 21, commonsense philosophy, 142, 155n9, 157n19 29, 31, 49 Comte, Auguste, 150n14 wider sense of, 4 conceptual frameworks Wittgensteinian does not accept as meaning- definiteness of intention and, 94 ful, 30 empirical semantics as, 83 See also Academic scepticism in modern scepticism, 105–08, 147 Dogmatists, 3, 4 fallibility and, 130–31 doubt incorrigibility requirement and, 135, 146 Descartes’s methodical doubt, 22 standards of evidence in, 110–11, 118, of dogmatist induced by Pyrrhonian sceptic, 31 143–44, 155n4 psychopathology associated with, 64, 68, and Wittgenstein on use of expressions, 152n3 156n14 of Pyrrhonian sceptic, 24–25, 26, 39, 48–49 in Pyrrhonian scepticism sceptical, serious vs. theoretical, 33 avoidance of, 14–15, 18, 107 suspension of judgment (epoché ) distinguished suspension of judgment (epoché ) about, 34 from, 26, 39, 49 talking loosely vs., 9–10, 11, 28 dualism. See external world required for accepting propositions, 46 Duhem, Pierre, 50 contradiction, principle of. See principle of contradiction empirical semantics. See definiteness of intention; Cyrenaics, subjectivism of, 17–18 precization; questionnaires empiricism definiteness of intention of Hellenic physicians, 62 directions of precization and, 97–98, 100–101 standards of evidence and, 127 general idea of, 11, 96–97 twentieth-century of knowledge expressions, 94, 97, 98–103 Sextus’s Pyrrhonism and, 19 in dialogue, 109 truth claims and, 28 principle of limitation and relativity of, 100 See also appearances; sense data in Pyrrhonian scepticism is of low degree, epistemological scepticism. See modern scepticism 10–11, 15, 16, 107 epoché. See suspension of judgment See also precization essence, in Sextus’s Pyrrhonism, 12, 13, 16 Democritus, 151n1 evidence Descartes, René, 132 conclusive, 120–23, 127–28, 155n9 existence of external world and, 137–38 Wittgensteinian interpretation of, 29 methodical doubt of, approved by Russell, 22 as knowledge requirement, with truth, 71–73 phenomenalism of, vs. Sextus’s appearances, complementarity of truth and evidence, 15 75–76, 84, 85, 102–03 dialogues, standards of evidence in, 108–10, 145 definiteness of intention and, 94, 97–102 conclusive evidence, 121 game analysis of, 83 incorrigibility requirement, 135, 144, 146 irrelevance of evidence in some situations, for introspective accounts, 112 73–74 Didier, Julia, 150n14 questionnaires about, 78–83, 153n3 Diogenes Laertius, 54 rational reconstructions of, 83–85 dogmatic ways of announcement, 11–13, 149n7, reaching knowledge and, 73–75, 76–77, 155n7 85–88, 93–95, 102 dogmatism shifts of ground with, 76–78, 84,

166 INDEX

153n5 fallibility and, 129–31, 132, 156n11, 156n12, without separate truth requirement, 87–93, 156n13 153n6, 154n7, 154n8 fluctuations in standards for, 126–27, 143–44 Pyrrhonist’s attitude toward, 45–46 requirement, 131–32, 156n15 for scientific propositions, 95–96 unsatisfiability of, 133–43, 144, 146–48 truths that do not rest on evidence, 95 scientific knowledge is corrigible, 131–32 See also knowledge, definitions of; standards of supposed examples of, 123–29 evidence logical truths as, 143, 156n16, 157n21 the evident, 8 of truth, 106, 139, 152n1, 157n18 external world truth vs., 89 dualism about internal world and See also certainty; standards of evidence Cartesian, 137–38 isosthenia (state of mental suspense), 5, 6, 20, 27 Pyrrhonian sceptic and, 16, 34, 138 Russell’s assumption of, 34, 151n2 Jahoda, Marie, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 152n1 existence of James, William, 68 Ayer on scepticism about, 71–72 on belief measured by action, 37, 43, 44–45, Moore’s antisceptical position, 136–37 47 as problem in history of scepticism, 17, living options and, 46, 151n5 150n14 Jaspers, Karl, 17, 152n3 suspension of judgment about, 17, 137 Jeans, James, 141 See also appearances; reality justification maximum requirements of evidence for, 111 faith, religious, 45, 47 in modern epistemology, 105–08 fallibility by shifts to evidence requirement, 76, 77 abstaining from knowledge claims because of, verification distinguished from, 144 116–17, 155n6, 155n7 See also evidence incorrigibility and, 129–31, 132, 156n11, 156n12, 156n13 Kant, Immanuel, 25, 142 Feyerabend, Paul K., 157n17 Kierkegaard, Søren, 47 Freudian analysis, scepticism resulting from, knowledge 68–69 abstaining from claims of Freud, Sigmund, 97, 155n6 in certain circumstances, 93–96 fallibility as motivation for, 116–17, 155n6, game analysis, of knowledge claims, 83 155n7 Gullvåg, Ingemund, 150n11 linguistic counterargument to, 118–20 definitions of, with three requirements, 71, 78, Hegel, Georg W. F., 150n14 152n2 Heraclitus, 54 Ayer’s use of “is the case” in, 80, 153n4 Hicks, Robert D., 17, 150n14 in Husserl’s refutation of scepticism, 142 Huet, Pierre-Daniel, 45 precizations of, 98–101 Hume, David questionnaires and, 78–83, 153n5 on belief, 43 rational reconstructions and, 84–85 dogmatic tendencies of, 13–14, 150n11 reaching knowledge and, 85–87, 93 moderate scepticism approved by, 22 introspection as source of, 111, 112 social autonomy of, 60–61 Sextus’s views on, 18, 74, 151n1 Husserl, Edmund, 142–43, 157n20 knowing distinguished from, 132 possibility of incorrigibility denied by modern sceptic, 105 beliefs do not require, 140–41 despite conceptual problems, 72, 93, 103, defined, 106 154n9 in face of sceptic’s arguments, 33

167 INDEX knowledge (continued) See also Pyrrhonian scepticism in Pyrrhonian scepticism mental health, 57–69 as an ideal, 58 criteria of, confronting scepticism, 57–62, appearances do not convey knowledge, 19, 31 152n1 suspension of judgment about, 95–96, of moderate, unphilosophical sceptic, 64–66 102–03 personalities disposed to scepticism, 62–64, reaching, by increase in evidence, 73–75, 152n2 76–77, 85–88 psychological distress associated with scepti- everyday communication and, 93–95, 102 cism, 63–64, 68, 152n3 Plato does not require, 152n1 psychotherapy involving sceptical issues, scepticism and, 154n9 66–69 requirements of, belief as one of, 71–72, 84–85 mental suspense (isosthenia), 5, 6, 20, 27 reaching knowledge and, 86, 93, 154n8 Mill, John Stuart, 127 requirements of, truth and evidence as, 71–73 modern scepticism, 105–08 complementarity of truth and evidence, conceptual frameworks in, 105–08, 147 75–76, 84, 85, 102–03 fallibility and, 130–31 definiteness of intention and, 94, 97–102 incorrigibility requirement and, 135, 146 game analysis of, 83 standards of evidence in, 110–11, 118, irrelevance of evidence in some situations, 143–44, 155n4 73–75 and Wittgenstein on use of expressions, questionnaires about, 78–83, 153n3 156n14 rational reconstructions of, 83–85 conclusions on, 143–48 reaching knowledge and, 73–75, 76–77, dialectical nature of, 108 85–88, 93–95, 102 vs. Pyrrhonian scepticism, 4, 105, 107 shifts of ground with, 76–78, 84, 153n5 See also incorrigibility; standards of evidence without separate truth requirement, 87–93, Moore, George E., 136 153n6, 154n7, 154n8 sceptical locutions about (“I know nothing”) Naess, Arne in epistemology vs. everyday life, 123, 138, definiteness of intention introduced by, 154n11 143–44, 146–47 as metasceptic, 147, 148 linguistic analysis of, 118–20 on peace of mind of mature sceptic, 149n3 sense data as, 22–23, 126 necessary truth, incorrigibility and, 156n16, variations in phrasing about, 154n3 157n21 See also incorrigibility; scientific knowledge; Neothomism, probabilism and, 50 standards of evidence Neurath, Otto, 79 Krueger, David, 129 Newton, Isaac, 132 Kuhn, Thomas S., 157n17 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 17 nihilism, confused with scepticism by Jaspers, 17, logical empiricists, truth claims and, 28 152n3 the nonevident, 8, 13, 142 Maslow, Abraham H., 58–59, 61 mature sceptic Pap, Arthur, 136, 137, 138 ad hoc nature of scepticism in, 27 Pappenheim, Eugen, 7, 16, 149n1, 149n2, 149n8 defined, 6, 24, 149n3 peace of mind (ataraxia) development of of mature sceptic according to Sextus, 3–6, 26, 62–63 development of, 3, 5, 6, 25, 53 from modern unified outlook, 52–53, 55, doubt alleviated by, 26 68–69 preservation of, 31, 39 possibility of, 53–55 metaphysical statements interfere with, 19, dogmatism in, transitory, 11, 13 150n15 requirements for being regarded as, 23–26 of sceptic in conformist society, 62

168 INDEX

See also suspension of judgment (epoché) dogmatism in, transitory, 11, 13 perception. See appearances; sense data doubt in, 24–25, 26, 39, 48–49 phenomenalism, neutrality of Pyrrhonism to- evidence and, 45–46 ward, 14–19 existence of, in Sextus’s time, 54, 151n6 phenomenology, rejection of scepticism in, inadequate accounts of, 1, 2, 17, 30–32 142–43 knowledge in Piaget, Jean, 67 appearances do not convey knowledge, 19, 31 Plato, 10, 25, 50 as an ideal, 58 on knowledge, 73, 123, 152n1 suspension of judgment about, 95–96, Plotinus, 151n1 102–03 politics, sceptical influence on, 69 modern scepticism vs., 4, 105, 107 Popkin, Richard H., 30–31, 45, 46 as a philosophy, 26–30, 59–60 Popper, Karl R., 50 possibility of, 53–55 pragmatism, 68, 73 probabilism rejected in, 11, 13, 27, 31, 38 Prantl, Karl von, 134 rashness charge against dogmatism by, 25, 142 precization, 97–98 rejected by British and German philosophy, of concepts of external world, 138 142 directions of, 97–98, 100–101 requirements to be regarded as Pyrrhonist, of “I know that p,” 98–102 23–26 of “one must be sure,” 100, 101 Russell’s “sceptical solipsism” vs., 34, 151n1 See also definiteness of intention science is compatible with, 49–50 principle of contradiction social relations of sceptic, 5, 55, 60, 62 does not rest on evidence, 95 superiority of, in consistency and in German philosophy, 142 radicalness, 1 truth and, 139 supported by complementarity of truth and probabilism evidence, 103 conceptualization of, 92 and trust, 30 of dogmatist, 14 in everyday realism, 34, 137 Pyrrhonian scepticism rejects, 11, 13, 27, 31, 38 in one’s own impulses, 67 about scientific knowledge, 50 vs. doubt, 24–25 Protagoras, 54 truth in psychology appearances and, 7, 15–16, 18, 41 standards of evidence in, 112 as goal, 5, 58 See also mental health; scepticism, psychologi- is not asserted, 6 cal possibility of misinterpreted by Brochard, 20–21 Pyrrho, 2, 15, 26, 45, 150n14 reduced need for, 48 Jaspers on, 17 seeking of, 25 Russell on, 34, 151n1 suspension of judgment about, 20–21, 23, Pyrrhonian scepticism 25, 26, 28, 58 ad hoc nature of, 21, 27 true/false distinction retained, 28 arguments and counterarguments in, 6, 20–23, See also appearances; Sextus Empiricus; 29, 31 suspension of judgment (epoché ); conceptual frameworks in ways of announcement avoidance of, 14–15, 18, 107 suspension of judgment (epoché ) about, 34 questionnaires, about requirements of knowl- vs. talking loosely, 9–10, 11, 28 edge, 78–83, 153n3 conclusions about, 147–48 defined, 6, 24, 149n3 radical scepticism development of mature sceptic in, 3–6, 26, ad hoc nature of, 21 62–63 justification of, 72 dogmatic cultural environment of, 50 radical scepticism (continued)

169 INDEX

mental health and, 57, 69 scientific knowledge and, 49–50 Pyrrhonism as, 1, 6, 30, 31–32 for Sextus’s mature sceptic, 53–55 rarity of, 65 rejected by British and German philosophy, See also Pyrrhonian scepticism 142–43 reality science is compatible with, 49–50, 96 scepticism about real nature of things, 30–31 social and political implications of, 69 suspension of judgment about, 51 unified outlooks conducive to, 52–53, 55, ways of announcement and, 12 68–69 See also appearances; external world variable usages of the term, 2–3, 31–32 Reid, Thomas, 155n9 See also Academic scepticism; modern scepti- relativism, about scientific knowledge, 134, 157n17 cism; Pyrrhonian scepticism; radical religious beliefs scepticism conversion to, 63–64 scientific knowledge justification of, according to James, 44–45 corrigibility of, 131–32 of sceptic, 44, 45, 46–47 performative function irrelevant in, 135 use of knowledge expressions and, 119 probability and, 50 Riesman, David, 60 relativism about, 134, 157n17 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 60–61 scepticism is compatible with, 49–50, 96 Russell, Bertrand, 79, 151n2, 154n2 standards of evidence for, 90, 92, 95–96 on belief, 22, 40, 43, 46 disbelief and, 154n8 on Descartes’s methodical doubt, 22–23 fluctuations in, 109–10, 155n4 on psychological impossibility of scepticism, maximum requirements, 112 34, 151n1 truth in relation to, 28, 49–50, 95–96 Ryle, Gilbert, 36–37 self-actualization, 58 self-evidence, 155n9 Sanches, Francisco, 119 self-reference, in Pyrrhonian scepticism, 3 sceptical ways of announcement. See ways of an- semantics, empirical. See definiteness of inten- nouncement, sceptical tion; precization; questionnaires scepticism sense data approximation to, 54–55 incorrigibility of statements about, 126 Cartesian, 137–38 Russell on, 22–23 circularity of, alleged, 120 See also appearances duration of, for individual, 54 Sextus Empiricus of Hume, 13–14, 22, 150n11 on appearances, 15–18, 41 incorrigibility and, 136–38, 141–42 on arguments of sceptic, 20–22 knowledge requirements and, 71–72, 154n9 on belief, 43, 44 linguistic counterargument to, 118–20, 155n8 on development of mature sceptic, 5–6, 26, 27, logical impeccability of, 33–35, 105 53, 149n1 mental health and, 57–69, 152n2, 152n3 dogmatic scepticism and, 4, 14, 25, 26, 142, moderate, unphilosophical version of, 64–66 151n1 psychological possibility of, 33–55 on dogmatic ways of announcement, 11–13 actions and, 33, 35–43, 151n3 doubt and, 26, 48 appearance vs. reality and, 50–52 as expositor of Pyrrho’s scepticism, 1–2 belief and, 36–40, 43–48 knowledge requirements and, 74, 102–03, conclusions about, 54–55 128 doubt and, 33, 39, 48–49 mental health and logical impeccability and, 33–35 criteria for, 58, 60, 61, 62 with modern unified outlooks, 52–53, 55, psychopathology, 64 68–69 sceptical personalities, 65, 67, 152n2 Russell on, 34, 151n1

170 INDEX

modern philosophers’ misunderstandings of, about phenomenalism or subjectivism, 15, 16, 18–19, 20–21, 23, 30–31, 105, 120 17 on sceptical ways of announcement, 6, 7–11, philosophers’ rejection of, 22, 143 150n10, 154n1, 155n7 about propositions, 38–39 on sceptics existing in his time, 54, 151n6 psychotherapeutic encouragement of, 67 science and, 49–50 about reality, 51 suspension of judgment and, 21, 38–39, 52, about truth, 20–21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 58 143 See also mental suspense (isosthenia); peace of truth and, 20, 48 mind (ataraxia) See also Pyrrhonian scepticism Socrates, 5, 28 transintentional entities, 98 solipsism, sceptical, Russell on, 34, 151n1 knowledge requirements as, 101 Spearman, Charles Edward, 112 truth Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch), 25, 27 in Academic scepticism, 12 standards of evidence actions do not imply commitment to, 37, in epistemology vs. everyday usage, 107 42–43 fluctuations in, 125, 126–28, 143–45, 155n4, in Aristotle’s analysis of knowledge, 152n1 155n5 of first principles, 95 in collectivities, 115 incorrigibility of, 106, 139, 152n1, 157n18 in dialogues, 109–10, 144, 145 of incorrigible statements, 89 incorrigibility requirement and, 133 as knowledge requirement, with evidence, maximum requirements, 110–13 71–73 in face of mistakes, 113–18, 155n6 complementarity of truth and evidence, with finite series of tests, 128–29 75–76, 84, 85, 102–03 in precization of “I know that p,” 98–99 definiteness of intention and, 94, 97–102 in science, 90, 92, 95–96 game analysis of, 83 disbelief and, 154n8 irrelevance of evidence in some situations, fluctuations in, 109–10, 155n4 73–74 maximum requirements, 112 questionnaires about, 78–83, 153n3 without truth requirement lead to paradoxes, rational reconstructions of, 83–85 88–92 reaching knowledge and, 73–75, 76–77, See also evidence; incorrigibility 85–88, 93–95, 102 Stigen, Anfinn, 144 shifts of ground with, 76–78, 84, 153n5 Stoics, 7, 19, 50, 134 without separate truth requirement, 87–93, subjectivism 153n6, 154n7, 154n8 of Cyrenaics, 17–18 necessary, 156n16, 157n21 knowledge claims and, 73 in Pyrrhonian scepticism neutrality of Pyrrhonism toward, 14–19 appearances and, 7, 15–16, 18, 41 suspension of judgment (epoché ) as goal, 5, 58 action and, 67 is not asserted, 6 ad hoc nature of, 25, 27 misinterpreted by Brochard, 20–21 belief and, 38, 44 reduced need for, 48 about conceptual frameworks, 34 seeking of, 25 defined, 38 suspension of judgment about, 20–21, 23, doubt distinguished from, 26, 39, 49 25, 26, 28, 58 about existence of external world, 17, 137 true/false distinction retained, 28 about knowledge in three situations, 95–96, scientific, 28, 49–50, 95–96 102–03 true/false distinction loss of, 23, 53–54 in Pyrrhonian scepticism, 28 peace of mind and, 5, 6, 26, 39 relativism about, 134

171 INDEX truth (continued) Wasiutyński, J., 125 Wittgensteinian views on, 28, 29–30 ways of announcement See also certainty; incorrigibility; knowledge, dogmatic, 11–13, 149n7, 155n7 definitions of sceptical, 7–11, 13 adoxastos and adioforos in, 11, 150n9 verification apangello and related words in, 7, 149n4 Austin’s analysis of, 128–29 dokeo in, 11–12, 150n10 justification distinguished from, 144 foné in, 7–8, 9, 102, 149n5, 149n8, 154n1 in maximum-requirement conditions, formulas, phrases, or sayings in, 6, 8–9, 26, 155n10 151n1 See also evidence “I do not know anything” as, 120, 155n7 vouching for a statement perception and, 8, 149n6 Ayer on, 96, 117, 154n10 profero in, 9, 149n7 does not apply in science, 96, 135 Wittgenstein, Ludwig in precization of “I know that p,” 98 on introspective knowledge, 111 Pyrrhonian sceptic refrains from, 12 truth claims and, 28, 29–30 social aspect of, 117, 118 use of “not know” and, 156n14

172 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

173 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a visiting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ- ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Person for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visiting researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philosophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for ecocultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

174 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Notes

Chapter I: Descriptions of Maximally Comprehensive Perspectives 1. “We use the term world pictures to refer to that which for human beings has object character, that which confronts the mind and is conceived of as expressions of the power of the mind. World pictures are capable of being described as something objective in the same way as rooms or houses; spiritual kinds of views have such pictures as their essential form of expression and their necessary condition, but the nature of the forces creating worldviews is such that it does not always express them as object-directed, they are also expressed as value hierarchies” ( Jaspers, 1919: 161). 2. This quotation from Koestler (1949: 68) is used by Polanyi in a similar context (1952: 218). 3. A Cretan says: “All Cretans always lie.” Is this sentence true? 4. Russell’s antinomy concerns the class of all classes that are not members of themselves. Is this class a member of itself? If it is, then it is not, and if it is not, then it is. Hence it both is and is not a member of itself: a contradiction. 5. For a criticism of the doctrine that different logics can be described in the way attempted by some social scientists, see Naess, et al. (1956: 203 ff.). 6. See chapters 1–4 of Outlines of Pyrrhonism in Sextus Empiricus (1933–44). Most authors connect the word scepticism with Academic scepticism, or more pertinently, negativism. The Pyrrhonic sceptic, however, can subject all of his own arguments and their presuppositions to examination. But he may participate in the presupposition-research that thereby results without pretension of (true) knowledge of what the presuppositions are—indeed without beforehand denying (with claim to truth for the denial) that a philosopher who says that not everything has presuppositions may be right. The one who does research seeks. The one who seeks can stop and ask himself, Exactly what am I looking for? If it is a thumbtack, the answer is rather simple. But if it is the “presuppositions of all questioning,” it is not simple. If he stops long enough, he gets at least one new task of research. For the external spectator, it may often seem as if the questioner, by us-

151 NOTES TO PAGES 25–79

ing certain distinctions in the question-formulation itself, presupposes that certain answers are definitively decided, but the questioner does not need to have a definite answer, he may have a questioning (not-definitively-deciding) basic attitude, an attitude characterized by the fact that any answer with him seems to acquire a nondefinitive status. For example: Sceptic: Is perleungetunge a kind of cactus? Dogmatist: Aha, you presuppose the existence of perleungetunge ! Sceptic: I read about them. I have neither time nor capacity to take a definitive standpoint to the truth of everything that I read. But I have much trust; that much I grant you willingly.

7. See Jaspers (1919); the fourth edition (1954) has an interesting foreword concerning the evolution of Jaspers’s ideas. 8. For an example of such a debate, see the discussion between Naess and Sir Al- fred Ayer on Empiricist vs. total views in “The Glass Is on the Table,” which originally appeared in Reﬂexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind, edited by Fons Elders (1974 [in SWAN VIII]). 9. A method for successively more adequate— and therefore complicated— presentation of an ethical system is described in chapter 3 of my Gandhi and Group Conﬂict (1974 [SWAN V]). 10. Page references to the work of Nordenstam refer to his unpublished doctoral dissertation, “An Analysis of the Traditional Sudanese Virtues” (1968b). 11. Translation of “Erscheinungen für uns.” The formulation of Hegel’s system follows in the main Ueberweg (1898–1903, vol. 4). 12. Formulated in all essentials in accordance with the formulations in Ueber- weg (1898–1903, vol. 4).

Chapter II: Comparison of Different Total Views 1. Generally, this cannot be claimed entirely, since the near-total systems perceive the other within the system (in the widest sense), and therefore do not reach “all the way” out to the outsider. 2. It is essential to believe that when one looks at the first page of the Ethics and reads the first sentence, one is confronted with “Spinoza’s doctrine itself.” It is merely required that one understands Latin. 3. On the different substance concepts of Descartes and Spinoza and their relationship to the things they derive, see an interesting but somewhat unclear note by J. Bennett (1965: 379–80). 4. Leibniz employs two of the Aristotelian substance criteria— substance as the place of change and substance as logical subject—but adds a concept of non- composedness. In the first paragraph of the Monadology he defines monad as

152 NOTES TO PAGES 79–109

“nothing but a simple substance . . . ; simple, that is to say, without parts.” Elsewhere, Leibniz has stated that Spinoza would have been right if there were no monads and he also probably intended to stress the need for a substantial basis in the things different from God (see Leibniz’s “Refutation of Spinoza” in Leibniz [1908]).

Chapter III: Metaphysics as Exposure of Presuppositions 1. This section makes extensive use of David Rynin’s article “Donagan on Col- lingwood: Absolute Presuppositions, Truth, and Metaphysics” (1964), in which Rynin convincingly repudiates Alan Donagan’s (1962) narrow-minded criticism of the prolific and discerning British philosopher R. G. Colling- wood. Donagan criticizes Collingwood’s Essay on Metaphysics (1940) on the basis of a kind of naive empiricism seldom encountered among philosophers since John Dewey’s glory days. According to Donagan, systems can be verified or falsified by comparing them with experience: “The principle of theoretical simplicity enables us to subject not only answers to questions, but whole complexes of questions and answers, to the verdict of experience. When one whole complex is rejected in favour of another, its absolute presuppositions are rejected along with it; like the answers contained in that complex, they are rejected as false” (1962: 82). Here it is presupposed that when empirical tests are conceptually articulated, system differences will not result in articulation differences. 2. On the relevance of differences in truth definitions, truth criteria, and methodology, I have expressed my opinion in connection with the question of whether we know that norms cannot be true or false; see Naess (1962 [in SWAN VIII]).

Chapter IV: Can There Be, Ultimately, Only One Valid Total System? 1. If this is correct, one may say that Aristotle is about to make his basic view analytic. Perhaps it is a tendency of precisely the deepest premises that they seem obvious because they are analytical (for that purpose), while they simul- taneously pretend to constitute the point of departure of a philosophy as a synthetic statement. If the statement is perceived as synthetic by opponents who question it, it is defended by being interpreted in such a direction that it becomes analytic. The tendency, however, can also be the reverse: one per- ceives something as analytic because it appears evident and fundamental.

Chapter V: Cultures Construed as All-Embracing Systems 1. Because Barth’s (1977) article is only ﬁve pages long, I have omitted page numbers in the many references that follow.

153 NOTES TO PAGES 109–117

2. In “Reﬂections About Total Views” (1964 [in SWAN X]), I try to show that whatever one asserts (or denies), be it ever so modest, one presupposes a total system in doing so. 3. The example is taken from Geertz (1973: 121), where the sentences in question are related to the conception, in cultures, of the basic nature of reality.

154 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Ayer, Sir Alfred and Arne Naess. 1974. “The glass is on the table.” In Reﬂexive Wa- ter: The Basic Concerns of Mankind, edited by Fons Elders. London: Souvenir Press. (in SWAN VIII) Barth, Fredrik. 1975. Ritual and Knowledge Among the Baktaman of New Guinea. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. ———. 1977. “Et samfunn må Forstås ut fra egne fortutsetninger (A society must be understood on the basis of its own assumptions).” In Sosialantropologi, A mimeographed collection of articles for students. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 5–9. Bateson, Gregory. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. San Francisco: Chandler Pub- lishing Company. Bennett, Jonathan. 1965. “A note on Descartes and Spinoza.” Philosophical Review 74: 379–80. Brandt, Richard. 1959. Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Bruemmer, Fred. 1981. “Eskimos are warm people.” Natural History 90: 42–49. Cassirer, Ernst. 1906–07. Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (The problem of knowledge), 2 vols. Berlin: B. Cassirer. ———. 1963. Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (The individual and the cosmos in Renaissance philosophy), translated and with an introduction by Mario Domandi. New York: Harper and Row. Castberg, Frede. 1966. Retten og staten (Justice and the state). Oslo: Universitetsfor- laget. Christie, Nils. 1978. Hvor tett et samfunn? (How tight a community?) Oslo: Univer- sitetsforlaget.

155 REFERENCES

Cohen, Felix S. 1939. “The relativity of philosophical systems and the method of systemic relativism.” Journal of Philosophy 36: 57–72. Collingwood, Robin G. 1940. An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dahl, Ottar. 1956. Om årsaksproblemer i historisk forskning; forsøk på en vitenskaps- teoritisk analyse (Problems of causation in historical research). Oslo: Univer- sitetsforlaget. Dammann, Erik. 1981. Talofa Samoa!: gjensyn med sydhavsøya som forandret vår tilværelse (Hello Samoa!). Oslo: Gyldendal. Descartes, René. 1649. Les passiones de l’âme (The passions of the soul). Amsterdam: chez Louys Elzevier. ———. 1931. The Philosophical Works of Descartes, translated by Elizabeth S. Hal- dane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols., 2d ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Donagan, Alan. 1962. The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Durant, Will. 1938. The Story of Philosophy. Garden City, NY: Garden City Pub- lishing. Elders, Fons, ed. 1974. Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind. London: Sou- venir Press. Evans-Pritchard, Edward E. 1937. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fink, Eugen, 1934. Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwär- tigen Kritik, with foreword by Edmund Husserl. Berlin-Charlottenburg: Pan- verlagsgesellschaft. Fløystad, Guttorm. 1967. “Problemet om personlig identitet.” Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4. Galtung, Johan, and Arne Naess. 1955. Gandhis politiske etikk (Gandhi’s political ethics), 2d ed. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum (1968). Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. London: Hutchinson. Hall, Everett W. 1960. Philosophical Systems: A Categorical Analysis. Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press. Hallett, Harold Foster. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza: The Elements of His Philosophy. Lon- don: University of London, Athlone Press. Hegge, Hjalmar 1967. “Noen vitenskapsteoretiske spørsmål belyst ved Goethes naturvitenskapp.” Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 2. Heidegger, Martin. 1927. Sein und Zeit (Being and time). Halle: M. Niemeyer.

156 REFERENCES

———. 1949. Über den Humanismus (Letter on humanism). Frankfurt: Kloster- mann. Høffding, Harald. 1926. Etik: en fremstilling af de etiske principer og deres anvendelse og deres anvendelse paa de vigtigste livsforhold. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghan- del Nordisk Forlag. Horton, Robin. 1970. “African traditional thought and western science.” In Ratio- nality, edited by Bryan R. Wilson. Evanston and New York: Harper and Row, pp. 131–71. Huizer, Gerrit, and Bruce Mannheim, eds. 1979. The Politics of Anthropology: From Colonialism and Sexism Toward a View from Below. The Hague: Mouton. Husserl, Edmund. 1959. Recueil commémoratif publié à l’occasion du centenaire de la nais- sance du philosophe, edited by the Committee of Phaenomenologica, H. L. van Breda, president. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Jarvie, I. C., and Joseph Agassi. 1970. “The problem of the rationality of magic.” In Rationality, edited by Bryan R. Wilson. Evanston and New York: Harper and Row, pp. 172–93. Jaspers, Karl. 1919. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Psychology of worldviews). Berlin: Springer. Kant, Immanuel. 1781. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of pure reason). Leipzig: P. Reclam (1878). Keesing, Roger M. 1974. “Theories of Culture.” Annual Review of Anthropology 3: 73–97. ———. 1976. Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. Concluding Unscientiﬁc Postscript, translated by D. F. Swenson and W. Lowerie. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kneale, W. M. and Martha Kneal. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Claren- don Press. Koestler, Arthur. 1949. Untitled essay in The God That Failed, edited by Richard H. S. Crossman. New York: Harper, pp. 15–75. Lange, Friedrich. 1925. History of Materialism and Critique of Its Present Importance. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Ledang, Ola Kai. 1981. “Afrikansk musikk idag: eit globalt kraftsentrum” (“Afrikan music today: A global hub) Forskningsnytt 26: 18–23. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1908. “Refutation of Spinoza, c. 1708.” In The Philo- sophical Works of Leibnitz, edited by George Martin Duncan. New Haven, CT: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, pp. 264–73.

157 REFERENCES

———. 1925. Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, translated by Robert Latta. London: Oxford University Press. Lukes, Steven. 1970. “Some problems about rationality.” In Rationality, edited by Bryan R. Wilson. Evanston and New York: Harper and Row, pp. 194–213. Mannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowl- edge, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt Brace. Marx, Karl, 1938. Die Deutsche Ideologie (The German ideology). London: Lawrence and Wishart. Mates, Benson. 1968. “Philosophical scepticism and the logical antinomies.” In Proceedings of the 14th International Congress of Philosophy, Vienna. Vienna: Herder. Naess, Arne. 1936. Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches verhalten (Science as behavior), Ph.D. diss. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Sciences. ———. 1953. Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to the Theory of Communi- cation. Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I) ———. 1962. “We still do not know that norms cannot be true or false: A reply to Dag Österburg.” Theoria 28: 205–09. (in SWAN VIII) ———. 1964. “Reflections about total views.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re- search 25: 16–29. (in SWAN X) ———. 1974. Gandhi and Group Conﬂict. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN V) ———. 1980. History of Philosophy, 2 vols. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Naess, Arne, Jens Christophersen, and Kjell Kvalø. 1956. Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Contro- versy. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Natorp, Paul. 1893. Die Ethika des Demokritos. Marburg: N. G. Elwert. Nordenstam, Tore. 1968a. Sudanese Ethics. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. ———. 1968b. “An Analysis of the Traditional Sudanese Virtues,” Ph.D. diss. Universities of Bergen and Khartoum. ———. 1972. Empiricism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. Oslo: Universitets- forlaget. Pepper, Stephen C. 1942. World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. Berkeley: University of California Press (1961). Polanyi, Michael. 1952. “The stability of beliefs.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3: 217–32. Quine, W. V. O. 1953. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

158 REFERENCES

Rescher, Nicolas, and Robert Brandom. 1980. The Logic of Inconsistency. Oxford: Blackwell. Roberts, John M. 1964. “The self-management of cultures.” In Explorations in Cul- tural Anthropology, edited by Ward H. Goodenough. New York: McGraw- Hill, pp. 433–54. Russell, Bertrand. 1937. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. London: G. Allen & Unwin. Russell, Bertrand, and Frederick Copleston. 1957. En samtale om Guds eksistens (A conversation on the existence of God). Oslo: Cappelen. Rynin, David. 1964. “Donagan on Collingwood: Absolute presuppositions, truth, and metaphysics.” Review of Metaphysics 18: 301–33. Schutz, Alfred, 1962–66. Collected Papers, 3 vols, edited and introduced by Maurice Natanson, with a preface by H. L. van Breda. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Sextus Empiricus. 1933–44. Sextus Empiricus, 4 vols., translated by R. G. Bury. Cambridge, MA and London: Loeb Classical Library. Spinoza, Benedictus de. 1914. Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Stalin, Joseph. 1940. O dialekticheskom i istoricheskom materializme (Dialectical and historical materialism ). New York: International Publishers. Ueberweg, Friedrich. 1898–1903 (9th edition). Grundriss der geschichte der philosophie (A history of philosophy from Thales to the present time), 4 vols. Berlin: E. S. Mittler and Son. Vaihinger, Hans. 1911. Die Philosophie des Als-Ob (The philosophy of “as if”). Berlin: Reuther and Reichard. van Breda, H. L. and J. Taminiaux, eds. 1959. Husserl et la pensée moderne. Husserl und das Denken der Neuzeit. Actes du deuxième Colloque international de phénoménologie, Krefeld, 1-3 novembre 1956. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Walsby, Harold. 1947. The Domain of Ideologies. Glasgow: W. MacLellan. Wedberg, Anders. 1958–66 Filosoﬁns historia (History of philosophy), 3 vols. Stock- holm: Bonniers. Wilson, Bryan R., ed. 1970. Rationality. Evanston and New York: Harper and Row. Wolfson, Harry Austryn. 1934. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning, 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wyller, Egil A. 1960. Platon. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

159 Index

Absolute, the, 32, 33, 34, 47 Ayer, Alfred, 152n8 absolute presuppositions, 83, 85–86, 89, Azande culture, 123, 135, 141 153n1 absolutization Baktaman culture of logic and truth-concepts, 138–39 anthropologist’s understanding of, 123 of models, 30 contact with other cultures, 141 of one’s own culture, 134–40, 141 experience of, 112–13 of world pictures, 28–32, 33 initiation in, 117–18, 119–22, 132–33 Academic scepticism, 2, 21–22, 151n6 ontology of, 125–27, 132 Agassi, Joseph, 110 Barth, Fredrik analytic statements, 60–61, 153n1 Baktaman cultural change and, 141 in logical antinomies, 19 on Baktaman initiation, 119, 120, 121, Anselm, 63 133 anthropology. See cultural anthropology culture concept of, 108–09, 110, 113, 115, 132, antinomies, logical, 19, 151n3, 151n4 153n1 a priori, concepts of, 60–61 on method in anthropology, 124, 136, 137 Aquinas, Thomas, 6, 46, 65, 116, 145 Bateson, Gregory, 131 Aristotle’s system, 6, 21, 36, 54 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 111 as all-inclusive, 145 beholding type of world picture, 32, 35 Collingwood and, 83, 90 being, 33, 77, 97–98 fundamental ontological distinction in, 96– See also existence; ontology 98, 153n1 belief, 22 integration of, 116 Bennett, Jonathan, 152n3 other systematizers and, 52, 57 Berkeley, George, 8, 73 semantics in, 105 Brandom, Robert, 98 Spinoza’s concepts and, 63 Breda, H. L. van, 74 substance in, 152n4 Brandt, Richard, 43, 44 assumptions Bruemmer, Fred, 135 implicit, of systems, 5, 14–17, 25 Bruno, Giordano, 26 See also presuppositions Buddha, 33 atomic theory Buytendijk, 73 ancient, 30, 59 modern, 100, 110 Carnap, Rudolf, 22, 49 Avenarius, Richard, 73 Cassirer, Ernst Averroes, 63 on Cusanus, 41–42 Avicenna, 63 on Hume, 66–68 axiology, 45 Castberg, Frede, 23

161 INDEX categories in systems, 21 general statements about, 148 equivalence of systems and, 98 as information economies, 106–08, 113, 115, Hall’s sense of, 22–23, 45, 101 117–20, 125, 132 presuppositions as, 84 norms of, 111, 115, 117, 122, 132 in total systems, 54 conflicting, 144 causation reality and, 148 historians’ concepts of, 72 ontologies of, 110, 125–27, 132 in Kant’s system, 84, 86 vs. philosophical systems, 105–10, 115 presuppositions about, 84–85, 86 branches of philosophy and, 125–26 Russell vs. Copleston on, 37 communication of knowledge and, 119, 120, in Spinoza’s system, 63–65 121–22 Chiricahua Apache culture, 107, 108 conclusions on, 143–49 Christie, Nils, 126 differences and, 125, 126, 131–34 Church, Alonzo, 45 familiarization and, 112 cognitive affinity, 58, 59 integration and, 116–18, 126 Cohen, Felix S., 93–94, 95 premises and, 109–10 Collingwood, Robin G., 83–90, 153n1 possible vs. actual, 148 Columbus, Christopher, 102 presuppositions of, 85, 89, 137 combinatorics of systems, 60, 61 reality and commonsense world, 71, 72–73, 102–03, 135 experience of, 111, 133, 134, 147, 153n3 concepts of a system, 22–23 interpretation of, 109, 110, 111, 140, 1 identity of, between systems, 77–79 48 in presuppositions, 84 relativity of values of, 144–45 conceptual frameworks. See frames of reference; as total views, 110, 143, 144 presuppositions world pictures of, 110, 111, 123, 132, 140 contradiction. See principle of contradiction Cusanus, Nicholas, 34, 41–42 Copleston, Frederick, 37 Crescas, 63 Dahl, Ottar, 72 cultural anthropology Dammann, Erik, 112, 115–16, 127, 128, 129 Collingwood’s system concept and, 90 Darwin, Charles, 5 cultural differences and, 123, 124 definiteness (or depth) of intention definitions of culture in, 108–09, 113–16, in comparing systems, 24–25, 38, 61, 82 135 of different logics, 139 in different cultures, 136–37, 139, 141–42 within systems, 24, 38 frames of reference in, 135–36, 137, 145 in understanding cultures, 111 structure vs. content and, 110–11, 112, 113, 139– in vernacular, 72 40, 147 See also precization cultures Democritus, 6, 28, 59 absolutization of one’s own, 134–40, 141 Descartes, René as all-inclusive, 145–46 Leibniz’s concepts and, 77, 96 changes in, 140, 141, 146, 148 Spinoza’s concepts and, 63, 94, 96 classification of, 147 on feelings, 38 conflicts within, 144 on substance, 77–79, 130–31, 152n3 definitions of, 108–09, 113–16, 135 system of, 6, 36, 54, 57 differences between determinism, of Democritus, 59 comparison and, 132, 135–37, 147 Dewey, John, 54, 153n1 depth of, 125–30, 131, 132–34 dialectical materialism, 51, 52 in experienced content, 111 dialectical method, of Hegel, 55 limits to, 137–38, 147–48 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 29, 49 translatability and, 122–25 dogmatism, 4–5, 14

162 INDEX

Donagan, Alan, 153n1 frames of reference, 14–15, 16, 17 Durant, Will, 93 for comparison of systems, 53–54, 61–62, 80 in ideology research, 18 Einstein, Albert, 26 of social scientist, 20 Elders, Fons, 152n8 supersystematic, 33–34 empiricism See also metasystems Ayer vs. Naess on, 152n8 free will, 19, 23–24, 131 naive, of Donagan, 153n1 Frege, Gottlob, 57 synoptic formulation of, 49 vs. rationalism, 52–53 Galtung, Johan, 43 See also experience Gandhi, Mahatma, 43, 152n9 Epicurus’s system, 41, 50, 52 Gassendi, Pierre, 58 epistemology Geertz, Clifford, 114, 116–17, 153n3 cultural differences and, 126 Gestalt psychology, 27 in synoptic systems, 45, 49, 50, 53 God system differences and, 131 causation and, 37, 63–64 in total systems, 54 presuppositions about, 87, 88, 89 See also knowledge; scepticism Spinoza on, 63–64, 130 epoché (suspension of judgment), 61 substance and, 130, 152n4 Eskimos, 135 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 29 ethics cultural differences and, 125, 126 Haeckel, Ernst, 28 descriptive vs. deductive, 43–44 Hall, Everett W., 22–23, 42, 45, 101 stepwise system construction in, 152n9 Hallett, Harold Foster, 62–63, 64–65 in synoptic systems, 45, 49, 50, 53 Hartmann, Nicolai, 5 in total systems, 54 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich See also values on the Absolute, 33 Evans-Pritchard, Edward E., 123, 135, 141 all-inclusiveness of system, 47, 145 everyday speech, 24–25, 71–74, 81–82, 95 metasystems and, 96 existence Newton and, 5 different concepts of, 77 traditional presentations of system, 36, 55–56, Spinoza on, 63–64 152n11 See also being; ontology Hegge, Hjalmar, 29 experience Heidegger, Martin, 20, 37, 71, 73 cultural differences and, 111, 112–13, 133–34 Heraclitus, 33 culture as, 140, 147, 148 Herman, Imre, 19 presuppositions and, 84, 153n1 Herskovits, Melville Jean, 113 in synoptic systems, 49, 50, 53 historians system differences and, 133–34, 147 causation and, 72 world pictures and, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33 Collingwood’s system concept and, 89–90 See also empiricism historicism, 31–32, 33 extrapolation Hobbes, Thomas, 21, 58 from scientific worldview, 1 Hoffding, Harald, 125 of systems, 57–61 Horton, Robin, 110 Huizer, Gerrit, 137 Fechner, Gustav, 28 Hume, David Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 33 avoidance of technical terminology, 73 Fink, Eugen, 73 didactic formulations of, 66–67 Floystad, Guttorm, 48 Kant and, 8, 67–70, 86 formal world pictures, 32, 35 logical antinomies and, 19

163 INDEX

Hume, David (continued) Lapland, 108, 126 rejection of system construction, 21 Lebenswelt, 71, 73, 74 world hypothesis of, 54 Ledang, Ola Kai, 111 Husserl, Edmund, 71, 73–74 Leibniz on the Absolute, 33, 34 Ibsen, Henrik, 110 vs. Descartes, 77, 96 ideology research, 18–19, 20, 137 in se/in alio distinction and, 140 Indian philosophy, 48 on possible worlds, 101, 148 infinity, spatio-temporal, 26 Russell on, 22 information economies, 106–08, 113, 115, 117–20, vs. Spinoza, 95, 96 125, 132 semantics and, 40 isothenia (state of mental suspense), 59 on substance, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4 total view expressed by, 48 James, William, 11 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 140 Jarvie, I. C., 110 Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, 19, 138 Jaspers, Karl Lewin, Kurt, 99 cultures and, 144 liar antinomy, 19, 151n3 metatheory of, 33 Linton, Ralph, 113 on “the whole,” 46–47 Locke, John, 76 on world pictures, 12–13, 25–36, 151n1, logic 152n7 cultural differences and, 137–39 mental and cultural, 31–32 different logics, 20, 45, 138–39, 151n5 metaphysical, 32–36 formal vs. natural, 138–39 sensible in space, 26–31 problems of total systems and, 13, 16, 24 on worldviews, 13, 35–36, 151n1 substance and, 45, 152n4 in synoptic systems, 45, 52 Kalabari culture, 110 in total systems, 24, 54 Kant, Immanuel See also methodologies; principle of on the Absolute, 33 contradiction on causation, 84, 86 logical antinomies, 19, 151n3, 151n4 definitions and, 40 logical positivism, of Rynin, 86 education about, 120 Löwith, Karl, 73 Hume and, 8, 67–70, 86 Lucretius, 54 rejection of system construction, 21 Lukes, Steven, 138 total view expressed by, 48 world hypothesis of, 54 magic, 110, 123 Keesing, Roger M., 113, 114, 115, 117, 135 Maimonides, 63 Kierkegaard, Soren, 2, 15, 132 Mannheim, Bruce, 137 Kluckhohn, Clyde, 114 Mannheim, Karl, 18, 19 Kneale, Martha, 46 Maritain, Jacques, 42 Kneale, W. M., 46 Marx, Karl, 103 knowledge materialism Aristotle on, 96–97 of Democritus, 59 cultural, 108, 118–22, 126, 133 as general orientation, 21 limits of, 148–49 synoptic formulation of, 49–50 See also epistemology; scepticism variants of, 58 Koestler, Arthur, 17, 151n2 of world pictures, 33 Kroeber, Alfred, 114 Mates, Benson, 19 meaning La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, 58 culture and, 122, 135, 140, 142 Lange, Friedrich, 50 in individual’s world picture, 31

164 INDEX

in philosophical systems, 60–61, 81, 82, 105, nonviolence, 44 140 Nordenstam, Tore, 43–44, 61, 152n10 synoptic formulations, 49, 50, 53 norms real world and, 140 of cultures, 111, 115, 117, 122, 132 See also semantics conflicting, 144 meaning of life, 109 reality and, 148 mechanical world pictures, 28, 29, 30, 33 of philosophical systems, 90–91, 131–32, 148 metaphysical presuppositions, 83–90, 153n1 truth or falsity of, 153n2 metaphysical world pictures, 32–36 Nuer culture, 122–23 metasystems, 42 for comparing cultures, 135–36 objects, represented by system, 20–21, 22 for comparing systems, 42, 79, 80, 81, 82, 96 Objectual, the, 12, 13, 31, 46, 151n1 of Goethe and Newton, 29 Ockham, William of, 88 semantic, 24 ontology superficiality of, 33–34 of Aristotle, 96–98 traditional presentations of systems and, 55 of cultures, 110, 125–27, 132 See also frames of reference of Democritus, 59 methodologies in synoptic systems, 45, 49, 50, 52 comparison of systems and, 52, 53–54, 80, 90– in total systems, 54, 131 91, 131 See also being; existence in synoptic systems, 52, 53 Opler, Morris, 108 in total systems, 16, 54 orientations, 21, 22 See also logic models pan-logistic world pictures, 32, 33 relativity of, 30 Parmenides, 33 of the world, 100 Pepper, Stephen C., 54–55 Moore, G. E., 22 personal identity, 48 Mounier, Emmanuel, 48 phenomena, in Schopenhauer’s system, 56 Munch, Edvard, 13 phenomenology, 27, 73 mythical world pictures, 12, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35 of philosophy, 95 philosophical systems. See systems Naess, Arne philosophical world pictures, 14, 28–36 on descriptive ethics, 43 Plato on different logics, 151n5 on examined life, 11 Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches verhalten ontology of, 97 (Science as behavior), 30 system expresses personality, 6 Interpretation and Preciseness, 68 theory of forms, 21 on relativity of models, 30 on ultimate reality, 33 on total views, 152n8, 153n2 world hypothesis of, 54 on truth of norms, 153n2 pleasure, Democritus on, 59 Natanson, Maurice, 102 pluralism Natorp, Paul, 59 about cultural anthropologies, 141 naturalism, 28, 33 of James, 11 nature-historical world pictures, 28, 29 of Leibniz, 94 nature-mechanical world pictures, 28, 29, 30, 33 about logics, 138–39 nature-mythical world pictures, 28, 29 about truth-concepts, 91, 139 negative theologies, 32, 34–35 about worlds, 99–103 negativism. See Academic scepticism Polanyi, Michael, 151n2 Newton, Isaac, 5, 21, 29, 68 Porphyry, 63 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 49, 57 possibilism, cultural anthropology and, 141 nonstandard worlds, 98 possible worlds, 148, 149

165 INDEX pragmatism, 21 culture’s interpretation of, 109, 110, 111, precization 140, 148 in comparing logics, 139 not apprehended by one person, 96 in comparing systems, 39, 60–61, 82, 95, 132 referred to by systems, 105–06, 140, 146– of conceptual framework, 12 47 of culture concept, 115 in Schopenhauer’s system, 56 of everyday speech, 71–72, 73, 74, 81–82, 95 singularity of, 98–100, 134, 140, 146–47 of general statements about systems, 148 social, 102–03 of presuppositions, 24 of system comparer, 90–91 of system concept, 143 vs. world, 134 See also definiteness (or depth) of intention world pictures and, 33, 140, 147 presuppositions real world absolute, 83, 85–86, 89, 153n1 abstractions from, 27–28 of any assertion at all, 153n2 all-inclusiveness of, 140 Collingwood on, 83–90, 153n1 ambiguity of, 143 of commonsense world, 102 criteria for, 148 common to all systems, 89 cultures and, 109 conflicting, 23–24 vs. possible worlds, 148, 149 of a culture, 85, 89, 137 See also worlds experience and, 84, 153n1 relativism, 81, 144–45 frames of reference and, 14–15 See also world pictures, relationality of identification of, 46 Rescher, Nicolas, 98 inside or outside of system, 84, 86–88 Rickert, Heinrich, 45 vs. principles within system, 88–90 Roberts, John M., 107, 108, 113, 115 Pyrrhonian scepticism and, 151n6 Roman civilization, presuppositions of, 85 in science, 2, 84–85 Russell, Bertrand, 22, 37 temporary suspension of, 3–4, 12 Russell’s antinomy, 19, 151n4 tensions within clusters of, 85–86, 90 Ryle, Gilbert, 58 truth of, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89 Rynin, David, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 153n1 “primitive” cultures, 20, 138, 142 principle of contradiction Samoan culture, 112, 115–16, 127–28, 129 cultural differences and, 137–38, 139 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 37 in equivalent systems, 96, 97 scepticism, 2, 3, 4, 14, 21–22, 151n6 in synoptic systems, 49, 50, 53 Scheler, Max, 73 See also logic; presuppositions, conflicting Scholastic systems, 22–23 psychologism, 31–32, 33 Schopenhauer’s system, 56, 152n12 Pyrrhonism, 2, 21–22, 151n6 Schutz, Alfred, 102 Pythagoras, 33 science cultural differences and, 147–48 Quine, W. V. O., 45 excluded from systems, 55 Goethe’s view of, 29 rationalism vs. magic, 110 as general orientation, 21 openness of, 146 synoptic formulation of, 52–53 philosophical interpretation of, 2, 147 rationalistic world pictures, 32, 33 presuppositions in, 2, 84–85 rationality, cultural differences and, 138, 139 reality and, 148 reality uncritical use of, 5 criteria of, 148 worldview of, 1–2 of cultural anthropologist, 135 self-reference, 24 culture’s experience of, 111, 133, 134, 147, semantic depth, 132 153n3 See also precization

166 INDEX semantics vs. Descartes, 77–79, 130–31, 152n3 for comparison of systems, 39–40, 79 Hallett on, 65 cultural differences and, 123–24 vs. Leibniz, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4 in systems, 45, 50, 54 synonymity hypothesis about, 77–79 of systems, 24–25, 105 substance-directed world pictures, 32, 35 See also meaning synonymity, 53, 77 Semiotic Triangle, 24, 79 synoptic systems, 42, 44–45 Sextus Empiricus, 21, 151n6 comparisons of, 52–53 social anthropology, 108 examples of, 49–51, 53 See also Barth, Fredrik; cultural anthropology explicitness of, 47 social reality, 102–03 philosophers’ personalities and, 47–49 Socrates, 22 topics included in, 45–47 Spencer, Herbert, 5 synthetic statements, 153n1 Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch) systems all-inclusiveness of system, 145 vs. antisystematic orientations, 5, 21, 22 Berkeley and, 8 basic concepts about, 20–25 on causation, 63–65 classification of, 36, 147 Collingwood’s system concept and, 90 Collingwood’s concept of, 89–90 deductive method of, 43–44 combinatorics of, 60, 61 vs. Descartes, 63, 94, 96 comparison of, 37–40 on feelings, 38 adequate representation and, 74–79, 147 on substance, 77–79, 130–31, 152n3 debates between philosophers, 37, 39, essence and, 74 152n8 on feelings, 38, 130 definiteness of intention and, 24–25, 38, 61, Hall’s system concept and, 45 82 inconsistency of system, 116 discontinuous character of, 68–70 in itself/in something else distinction, 76, 86, everyday speech and, 24–25, 71–74, 81–82, 88, 140 95 vs. Leibniz, 95, 96 experience and, 133–34, 147 semantics and, 40 extrapolation in, 57–61 on substance, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4 frames of reference for, 53–54, 61–62, 80 personality of, 6, 48 metasystems for, 29, 79, 80, 81, 82, 96 presentations of his system, 7, 75, 76, 152n2 methodologies and, 52, 53–54, 80, 90–91, presuppositions of, 86, 88 131 semantics of, 39–40 personalities and, 6, 48 on substance pluralism of worlds and, 100–101 as the Absolute, 33, 34 semantics for, 39–40, 79 vs. Descartes, 77–79, 130–31, 152n3 simple examples, 52–53 Hallett on, 65 simplified presentations for, 40, 41, 152n9 vs. Leibniz, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4 structures and, 140, 147 world hypothesis of, 54 of total systems, 53–57, 68, 76, 81 worldview of, 35–36 truth and, 40, 79–82, 90–91, 153n2 spiritual world pictures, 33, 151n1 world pictures and, 29, 81 Stalin, Joseph, 51 concepts in, 22–23, 77–79, 84 Stirner, Max, 101 connections between things in, 11–12 Stoic philosophy, 41 contradictions in, 23–24 structuralism, 139–40 vs. cultures, 105–10, 115 substance branches of philosophy and, 125–26 Aristotelian criteria for, 152n4 communication of knowledge and, 119, 120, Spinoza on 121–22 as the Absolute, 33, 34 conclusions on, 143–49

167 INDEX systems (continued) third system. See metasystems differences and, 125, 126, 131–34 total systems or total views familiarization and, 112 absolutization of world pictures and, 29–30 integration and, 116–18, 126 “artificial” combinations as, 57–61 premises and, 109–10 cannot describe everything, 46–47, 55 deduction and, 43–44 comparison of, 53–57, 68, 76, 81 defined, 20–21, 105–06 comprehensibility to outsider, 146 definiteness of intention in, 24, 38 consistency of presuppositions in, 24 definitions in, 40 cultures as, 110, 143, 144 different defined, 20, 21, 24, 54–55 criteria for, 24–25 vs. Empiricist views, 152n8 depth of difference, 130–31 improvement of, 146 empirical verification and, 153n1 include the outsider, 152n1 understanding of, 8–9 logical problems of, 13, 16, 24 dogmatic, 4–5, 14 personal identity and, 48 equivalence of, 89, 93–98 possibility of, 16, 17–18, 143–44, 145 extrapolation of, 57–61 presupposed by any assertion, 153n2 general orientations and, 21 reality and, 146–47 general statements about, 148 scepticism toward, 2 Hall’s concept of, 22–23, 42, 45, 101 scientific research and, 1, 147 historical overviews of, 6–9, 36–37, 61– social scientists and, 20 62 striving for totality, 22 implicit assumptions of, 5, 14–17, 25 system vs. view, 21 incompleteness of, unavoidable, 16, 19– traditional examples, 55–57 20 as world hypotheses, 54–55 information content of, 107 See also systems introductory expositions of, 61–70 translatability, 122–25 norms of, 90–91, 131–32, 148 truth vs. other creative works, 49 Aristotle on, 97, 98 partial, 24, 42, 54 in Baktaman culture, 133 personalities of philosophers and, 6, 47–49 combinatorics of systems and, 61 pluralism of worlds and, 99–103 comparison of systems and, 40, 79–82, 90–91, pyramidal reconstructions of, 40, 41–42, 43, 153n2 67–68 cultural differences and, 138, 139 Pyrrhonism and, 21–22 liar antinomy and, 151n3 relativism about, 81, 144, 145 of norms, 153n2 science and, 5, 55, 146 of presuppositions, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89 semantic characteristics of, 24–25, 105 scepticism about, 2, 3, 4, 151n6 structure vs. content of, 139–40, 147 in Scholastic systems, 22, 23 synonymity and, 53, 77 in synoptic systems, 50, 53 synthesis and, 5 of systems, 105 total views as, 21, 36, 37, 54–55 Tylor, E. B., 113, 114 worldviews and, 35–36 See also metasystems; presuppositions; synoptic Ueberweg, Friedrich, 152n11, 152n12 systems; total systems or total views; utilitarian ethics, 49 world pictures Vaihinger, Hans, 65 Taminiaux, J., 74 values Thales, 52 cultural relativity about, 144–45

168 INDEX

Jaspers on, 27, 151n1 mechanical, 28, 29, 30, 33 reality of, 91 mythical, 12, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35 in total systems, 54 nature, 28, 29,30, 33 See also ethics pan-logistic, 32, 33 vernacular. See everyday speech philosophical, 14, 28–36 reality and, 33, 140, 147 Walsby, Harold, 18, 19 relationality of, 12 Wedberg, Anders, 61 scientific, 1–2, 147 Whitehead, Alfred North, 54 spiritual, 33, 151n1 Wilson, Bryan R., 142 substance-directed, 32, 35 Winsnes, A. H., 42 worlds Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef, 21, 22, 58 different, 99, 100, 109, 111, 134 Wolfson, Harry Austryn, 63, 65 nonstandard, 98 world hypotheses, 54–55 of philosophical systems, 100–101 world pictures, 12–14, 151n1 possible, 148, 149 absolutization of, 28–32, 33 real, 27–28, 109, 140, 143, 148, 149 commonsense, 71 vs. realities, 134 comparison of systems and, 29, 81 See also reality of cultures, 110, 111, 123, 132, 140 worldviews defined, 12, 151n1 Jaspers’ definition of, 13, 151n1 formal, 32, 35 magical, 110 Jaspers’ typology of, 25–36, 152n7 philosophical systems and, 35–36 mental and cultural, 31–32 metaphysical, 32–36 Zeteticism, 2 sensible in space, 26–31

169 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

171 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a visiting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ- ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Person for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visiting researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philosophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for ecocultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

172 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Appendix

Historical Note on Possibilistic Pluralism

A prominent Popperian and a historian of the Vienna Circle asked me to write a few words about the historical background of some of my ideas. In 1934 and 1935, I spent fourteen months in Vienna and profited immensely from the friendliness, eagerness, and intellectual fertility of Otto Neurath, R. Carnap, M. Schlick, and F. Waismann. I saw little of K.R. Popper and P. Frank, but certainly learned from them. During my stay I wrote the final version of my Erkenntnis und wissenchaftliches verhalten (1936)—an effort to use biological rather than physical or logical models in epistemology and methodology. It is fiercely “scientistic” in the sense of proclaiming that an attempt should be made to investigate epistemological problems by existing scientific methods or techniques or by new ones created for the purpose. But because of the many-sidedness and perhaps inexhaustiveness of philosophical questions, research in different sciences would always be relevant. Logic and psychology are equally relevant. I found Neurath’s term Ballungen excellent for characterizing philosophical sentences.1 (“Will is free,” “Matter is discrete,” “Truth is agreement with reality,” etc.) Pluralism and proliferation of theories on the highest level are necessary because of the inexhaustible many-sidedness of philosophical formulations. My own total, behavioral approach I characterized as one model among an indefinite plurality, just as relative in its achievement as opposite models (Naess 1937–38a). Thought models such as mine or those of the biologist Jakob Von Uexküll may be used to survey other models and to make a theory of the relativity of any model. But other models may in turn survey all the biological ones, including the bio- logically inspired theory of relativity of models just mentioned. There is no end anywhere, and, therefore, not even an ultimate relativity. (A defense of this position against certain arguments is found in Naess 1937.)

135 APPENDIX: HISTORICAL NOTE ON POSSIBILISTIC PLURALISM

Because of intervening initial-condition statements, auxiliary hypotheses, postulates, and ad hoc assumptions, falsification and verification are symmetrical: “observations” can only give theories faint pluses and minuses, and one and the same observation always supports (in principle) a variety of mutually contradictory theories. This goes directly against Popper’s views as many of us interpreted him in 1934–35 in Vienna. Let me go into certain details here. The Vienna Circle was a nucleus of a movement for “rationality” and against certain forms of metaphysics, which at the time were closely allied with fascism and national socialism. It had all the missionary zeal of a movement, and it was touching, but also somewhat alarming, to watch Otto Neurath embrace aloof and aristocratic Polish logicians of various philosophical affiliations and proclaim, “We agree! You are one of us!” If Neurath sensed that one was somehow on the right side, one was identified as a sort of logical positivist. Protestations were of little use, and disagreements were conceived as due only to “unhappy formulations” (unglückliche formulierungen), and there was always a remedy for that. When friends who certainly were on the right side persisted in remon- strating, saying, “No, no, I definitely disagree”—and Popper and myself belonged to this category—the situation became somewhat awkward. How could we continue to misconceive our own views? Personally, I felt the nagging questions: Do I try to be original, do I cling to a view because it is mine? I do not know how Popper felt, but in the air there was a suspicion that he grossly overrated his disagreement with the inner members of the circle. A groundless and unfortunate suspicion! Looking back I see more clearly how we should have made better use of the resources of positive, original ideas in Logik der Forschung. In my case, little was lost because I had only a handful of ideas and some of them were too scepti- cally colored to inspire concentrated research. In the case of the theory of falsification, I sided with Neurath against Popper, as we conceived his position at that time, but tried to avoid the implicit conventionalism of the former by taking sets of criteria of confirmatory and disconfirmatory instances to have an objective, testable status on the metalevel and therefore not taking them to be a matter of “decisions” (Neurath’s Beschlüsse). I believed in a broad, many-faceted science of science in which decisions were looked on as ultimately based on (not implied by) logical and empirical research.

136 APPENDIX: HISTORICAL NOTE ON POSSIBILISTIC PLURALISM

In Vienna in 1934–35 the hypothetico-deductive method was taken to be the central method of natural science, and natural science the most “scientific” of all kinds of science. It was therefore a crucial question to ask to what extent potential pluralism of mutually inconsistent or incomparable theories was derivable from an exact account of the method itself. Accepting neither Popper’s theory of refutation with its antirevivalism nor the idea that theories in an interesting sense could be rated as more or less probable, I maintained in Innføring i logikk og metodelære (1949) and Symbolsk logikk (1942 and 1961) an extreme pluralism coupled with the opinion that “assertion strength” (proportional to improbability) is a plus (but not the only plus) for a theory. The pluralism presented in my small, stenciled works in the 1940s (we used this method in Norway around this time as a substitute for printing, but distributed selected items internationally) was a pluralism of models in the broad sense in which we talk about atomic models and thought models (gedankenmodelle). However sweeping in their range of application, they should be distinguished from systems with theorems and theses. From models one was to derive, not general theses, but general working programs (of research). Against the physicalism of Neurath and Carnap, I (1937–38b) insisted that generalizations were not guesses or inductions but mainly disguised programs. (See also Wie fördert man heute die empirische Bewegung. Eine Ausenandersetzung mit dem Empirismus von Otto Neurath und Rudolph Carnap, written in 1937–39, but published as late as 1956, by Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.) The “radical empiricism” I fought for was to replace physicalism (“Zeit- und Raumangaben schützen nicht vor Anti-Empirismus”) and consisted only of a superprogram of holding all conceivable approaches to all conceivable problems “open.” In this light I conceived the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and when early in the game I was asked to write on psychology in its second volume, the pluralism of psychologies of the 1930s was to occupy a central place. It was later decided that the eminent psychologist Egon Brunswik, who was closely associated with the Vienna Circle, should work together with me, but as he was a believer in his own sophisticated approach within psychology, collaboration was difficult. So, in 1945, I resigned as an author of the volume. The comparison of theories condensed on page 31 in the present work is taken from a chapter in my “Encyclopedia” manuscript, some chapters of which were later published (Naess 1948).

137 APPENDIX: HISTORICAL NOTE ON POSSIBILISTIC PLURALISM

Thanks to amicable relations with both C. L. Hull and E. C. Tolman, I was able to alternate between their research centers, Yale and Berkeley, and study intimately their mutual “refutations” and their competing research programs. Such metastudies, with strong ingredients of “sociology of knowledge,” inevitably suggest a pluralism: some theories are good for some things, and no theory is good for all things—for “all” psychological problems. The same was suggested by my own experiments within rat psychology at Berkeley in 1938–39. Under the influence of Carnap, Popper, and others, I finally gave up my pragmatical and instrumental bias (really an attempt to use biology as a fundamental science), and also my empiricism. That is, I made the transition from scientism to philosophy, from theory of (scientific) models to theory of philosophical systems, using Spinoza’s as a paradigm. After all, there are wider possibilities of understanding than those that can be stated as research programs! More specifically, I see the transition from belief in empiricism to belief in the possibility of valid, but mutually inconsistent or incomparable, wide systematization, in terms of a rejection of the theory-observation asymmetry: that theories are tested by observation rather than vice versa. The realist, not instrumentalist, view of models, such as the atomic, implies that theoretical possibilities are cognitively on par with any kind of observation sentences, and these in turn are never “pure,” but, as far as they are understandable at all, are so in terms of a theoretical framework. They are therefore liable to be rejected from theoretical considerations; that is, observations are tested by theory.

138 Notes

Chapter I: The Impact of the New Historiography of Science 1. Where in the literature does one find “the neat image” expressed? It would be better to ask “Where does one not find the neat image?” In textbooks, with very few exceptions, such as Gerald Holton (1958). Among prominent philosophers of science, the early works of Popper, Carnap, and Carl Hempel present the neat image at its best. 2. [Editor’s note: source not identified.] 3. Authors, among many others, who have recently contributed (and to whom I feel in debt) include: J. Agassi, H. Butterfield, R. S. Cohen, J. B. Conant, A. C. Crombie, E. D. Dijksterhuis, B. Ellis, P.K. Feyerabend, M. Jammer, A. Koyré, T. S. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, L. Laudan, M. Polanyi, R. Popkin, K. R. Popper, and A. Wolf. 4. See Koestler’s eminently readable The Sleepwalkers (1959). 5.We take “historiography” to be a synonym for “writing of history”—for example, Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon—whereas “historiology” is taken to be a synonym for “doctrine or science about historical writings.” Only the latter is at the metalevel. 6. The word praxis is used to denote the integration of practice and cognitive content in the total scientific enterprise. 7. Cf. Hans Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 281: “Es genügt zu sagen, dass man anders versteht, wenn man überhaupt versteht.” 8. Cf. Gadamer, p. 288: “Es macht die geschichtliche Bewegtheit des mensch- lichen Daseins aus, dass es keine mitwandert.” 9. See Lakatos (1968a: 176). His later discussion (1970) of the same matter does not seem to have resulted in a new conclusion.

Chapter II: Experimental Setup, Rank Dimensions, and Pluralism 1. The term “methodological prediction” is shorthand for “prediction in the wide nonchronological sense used in methodology.” Thus, if a prediction

139 NOTES TO PAGES 17–33

about tomorrow’s weather is worked out from a meteorological theory, it is a methodological prediction even if it takes ten days to work it out. Common sense, not methodology, might insist that a prediction must be formed before the event predicted. When we start calculating, using T, we do not know the next day’s weather, and the day after’s observations do not affect the continuing calculation during the next nine days. 2. Relative strength of an assertion (of a formula in propositional calculus) is defined in my Symbolsk logikk (Symbolic logic) (1961: 30), as k⁄2 n, where k is the number of “falses” in the truth-table and n the number of variables in the formula. Compared with the calculus of probabilities, it is easily seen that the relative strength of assertion is equal to 1 – s, where s is the probability of the assertion that emerges if the variables in the formula are replaced by propositions, all with the same probability, 0.5. Let us take the example [( p ∨ q) ⊃ r]. The truth-table gives t f t f t f t t and the relative strength of assertion is 3½3 0.375. The formula is equivalent to ~ ( p ∨ q) ∨ r, which gives the probability 1 –(1 –(0.5 × 0.5) × (1 – 0.5) 0.625, when p, q, and r all have the probability 0.5. Thus, 0.375 1 – 0.625. The term “strength of assertion” in the following is sometimes also used in a generalized, intuitive sense. 3. In diagrams of hypothetico-deductive systems undergoing tests, I generally place the peripheral initial-condition sentences to the left of the level of the theory formulations and the hypotheses, in a big bag. From this stems the name “the left-hand bag” (venstresekken), or “the surplus bag”—used in earlier publications. Considering the largely arbitrary character of the decision—as long as no particular research situation is pictured—the mass of conditions are aptly symbolized by a voluminous dark bag of strange, unsurveyable content. 4. It was the opinion of Duhem (1962: 294) that “Henri Poincaré was the first to proclaim and teach in a formal manner that the physicist could make use, in succession, of as many theories, incompatible among themselves, as he deemed best.” It is my impression that, in his lectures on mechanics, Poincaré already asserted that if one “explanation” (explanatory hypothesis) covered a phenomenon (described observationally), an indefinite number of other explanations could be found. 5. Did Popper or Lakatos ever have an unemotional confrontation with psychoanalysts of some standing and training in the philosophy of science? Lakatos maintains that psychoanalysts never answered the question concerning refutation. Were they asked? Not only talked down to? If the psychoanalyst does not have to be more specific than Lakatos in answering the crucial question, anyone can offer a satisfactory answer: “I, [of ] course, can easily answer the question when I would give up my criterion of demarcation: when another one is proposed which is better according to my metacriterion” (Lakatos MS 1971, published in 1974).

140 NOTES TO PAGES 36–61

6. For elaboration on Feyerabend’s hedonistic proclamation see p. 98. 7. Nagel continues: “A theory is confirmed to the degree that it performs its specific instrumental function. From this point of view, which has been developed with much detail by Dewey, the degree of confirmation for a theory may be interpreted as a mark of its proved effectiveness as an intellectual tool for the purposes for which it has been instituted.” It is not clear from the text whether Nagel thinks there is a possibility of introducing a useful measurement of “degrees of confirmation” of this kind. In the passage quoted there seems to be a confusion of retrospective with prospective evaluation. Let us say a theory already has been brilliantly used to bridge two parts of physics—for example, parts of mechanics with parts of optics—and gets a ++ mark for confirmation. This would tell us very little about the prospects for its future use. It may be a very awkward theory to use in solving certain current problems within mechanics. The fruitfulness of a tree is the potentiality of another basket of fruit. The multiplicity of kinds of functions and uses makes it difficult to introduce a score—which is better confirmed, a hammer or a saw? And it is certainly difficult to get a score of value for decisions on what to choose in the future. 8. See Feyerabend (1969) on the desirability of working with refuted theories. The paradoxical formulation is due to the use of the Popperian identification of “direct disconfirmation by observation” with “refutation.” 9.With reference to the conflict between Copernican and pre-Copernican cosmology at the time of Galileo, Feyerabend (1970b: 293–94) says: What is needed for a test of the Copernican cosmology is therefore not just a simple-minded and direct comparison of its predictions with what is seen, but the interpolation, between the “perfect world” and “our world” of a well-developed meteorology (in the good old sense of the word, as dealing with the things below the moon) and of an equally well- developed science of physiological optics dealing both with the subjective (brain) and the objective (light, lenses) aspects of vision, telescopic vision included.

Chapter III: Theory and Theoretical Idea 1. In Carnap’s work, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (1966), there is nothing to prevent a physical interpretation of all levels. 2. Concerning the latter see, e.g., Feyerabend (1969: 251). 3. These are thought by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962: 32–33) to be attempts to refor- mulate Newton’s theory in an equivalent but logically and aesthetically more satisfying form. The equivalence is perhaps not meant to be equivalence (or even consistency) of logical content, but somehow equivalence of

141 NOTES TO PAGES 61–78

functions. According to Nagel (1961: 159), the versions of Lagrange and Hamilton are mathematically equivalent to Newton’s own “version.” Physical equivalence would, however, require identity of physical interpretations. 4. For recent interpretations, see, e.g., the contributions by Brian Ellis and Hilary Putnam in Colodny (1965), and Peter Zinkernagel (1962) for laws of motion as part of precise formulation of the language of things. See also Hanson (1958: chap. 5), where he presents at least nine uses—i.e., meanings—of F ma. 5. For a discussion of theoretical ideas as “point-of-departure formulations” for “precizations,” see Naess (1966: chap. 2 [SWAN VII]), and as Ballungen (Otto Neurath). 6. Used as a motto by the editors of Kramers’s Collected Scientific Papers (1956: 1). “Well-defined” I take in a nontechnical sense. 7. See, e.g., Hermann Bondi (1968: 19–24). 8. Carnap offers an interesting example on p. 242 (Maxwell’s theory).

Chapter IV: The Unimpressiveness of Impossibilities 1. Sir Oliver Lodge reminded his contemporaries in 1893 of what might happen to the optimist in the following forceful way: [B]ut I have met educated persons who while they might laugh at the men who refused to look through a telescope lest they should learn something they did not like, yet also themselves commit the very same folly. . . . I am constrained to say this much: Take heed lest some prophet, after having excited your indignation at the follies and bigotry of a bygone generation, does not turn upon you with the sentence “thou art the man.” (Quoted in Holton and Roller 1958: 160) 2.A second reservation: the tenability of the historical generalization does not preclude the tenability of a hypothesis concerning the future. Given favorable conditions for pluralism, it is possible that intolerance, egotistic narrowness, and “unshakeable” convictions will prove less important in mobilizing maximum energy for limited projects. 3. For more about the relativity of a pronouncement of “possible!” to kind and stage of a discussion—the dialectic aspect of possibilism—see Naess (1967). 4.I propose to interpret the exposition of theories as implying pretension of truth, or of the possibility of truth, if nothing is explicitly said to the contrary. That is, even if the “acceptance” of a theory may primarily be intended to be an acceptance of it as an instrument, a rule of inference, a working hypothesis (in a large sense of “hypothesis”), I shall assume that the acceptance also implies that it is taken to be “true or false,” and not false. The view that a theory is simply true is rare among workers in physics because of its

142 NOTES TO PAGES 78–111

tremendous “strength of assertion.” An unbroken series of confirmations over the next centuries is viewed as nearly miraculous or a sure sign of some kind of circularity in the testing process. A theory is expected to break down sooner or later. 5. Empirical investigations suggest that even among nonprofessionals, there is a strong tendency to hesitate to call theories true or false, an even stronger tendency than in the case of sentences about future events (Naess 1953a). 6. From a biological and ecological point of view, humans have a built-in need to combat uncertainties that have daily threatened their lives in an inimical Pleistocene environment. The frantic effort to increase levels of certainty is no longer functional, but is sustained by instinctual mechanisms (cf. works of authors quoted in the highly readable R. Ardrey, African Genesis [1961]). 7. The suggestion that excessive tolerance may be involved has been made by Wolfgang Yourgrau (1970) and others. 8. “Observations on mental education,” Experimental Research in Chemistry and Physics (1959: 480); quoted in Williams (1968: 236). 9. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 18 (1967: 186) (diagram). I do not consider the terms positivism and metaphysics helpful in the writings of Polanyi. Too many, too different views are termed positivistic. 10. The existence of a single P– P* relation is already a sufficient condition for calling the theories incommensurable. The more comprehensive the changes in conceptual matters, the more the changes affect the frameworks and thereby produce indefinability of the one theory in terms of the other. 11. Existentialismus und Marxismus: Eine Kontroverse zwischen Sartre, Garaudy, Hyppolite, Vigier und Orcel. Mit einem Beitrag von Alfred Schmidt (1965: 65–85). 12. These five points are formulated in close agreement with points made by Wartofsky (1967: 138 ff.) and attributed to Popper. 13. Agassi (1964) speaks about science as interpretations of metaphysical views. One may also conceive of philosophical propositions as derived from interpretations of scientific ones. What is the ontological status of electrons? 14. Letter 13 (in the posthumous works, letter 11) to Oldenburg (1663), translated by A. Wolf (Spinoza 1928). 15. This point is elaborated in Naess (1948). The characteristics of “near-total systems” are elaborated in Naess (1969).

Chapter V: The New Historiography Applied to Itself: General Possibilism 1. For historical trends influencing the conception of Plato’s Parmenides, see, for example, Knud Johansen (1964: 230, 277). 2. Cf. Ingemar Düring, Aristoteles (1966). 3. Ernst Bernheim’s (1914) survey of philosophies of history is still one of the

143 NOTES TO PAGES 117–35

most informative, even if, of course, his own perspective colors his classifica- tions and characterizations. See section 5 of chapter 5 in his monumental Lehrbuch der historischen Methode.Auseful modern reader, Joseph Kockel- mans’s Philosophy of Science: The Historical Background (1968), contains selections from Kant, Herschel, Whewell, J. S. Mill, von Helmholtz, Boltzmann, and others. 4.“[M]ost scientists tend to understand little more about science than fish about hydrodynamics” (Lakatos 1970: 145). 5. Fresh material has been gathered by R. Rosenthal and associates. See, for example, Rosenthal and Fode (1963). 6. Perhaps not surprisingly, Feyerabend seems to see himself as the old Nordic god Thor using “the hammer of history” to smash false images of science in thunder and lightning. His source of authority—“actual scientific practice.” Proliferation at the metalevel is not consistent with his belief that one can show “the tremendous abyss that exists between a certain philosophical picture of science and the real thing” (Feyerabend 1970b: 277). 7. For detailed argumentation, see Naess (1965 [in SWAN IX]). 8. It is heartening to see a thinker from the continent, Karl O. Apel (1962), elaborate this theme: “Kann es ein wissenschaftliches ‘Weltbild’ überhaupt geben....” 9. The idea is discussed in Naess (1967). 10. Against this, one could say with Horkheimer and Adorno (1969: 4): “Die falsche Klarheit ist nur anderer Ausdruck für den Mythos.” See also Feyerabend (1967b).

Appendix: Historical Note on Possibilistic Pluralism 1. [Editor’s note: Ballungen are literally “agglomerations.” They are imprecise and complex terms or notions (“verbal clusters”) that are built from more simple terms or statements, but they cannot merely be replaced by the sum of these more precise terms or statements. For a definitive discussion of Neurath’s Ballungen see Cartwright (1996: 81, 190–93, 208–36).]

144 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Abel, Theodore. 1953. “The operation called Verstehen.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Agassi, Joseph. 1963. Towards an Historiography of Science. History and Theory series, vol. 2. S-Gravenhage: Mouton. ———. 1964. “The nature of scientific problems and their roots in metaphysics.” In The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, edited by Mario Bunge. Glencoe: Free Press. ———. 1966. “Sensationalism.” Mind 75. Apel, Karl O. 1962. “Kann es ein wissenschaftliches ‘Weltbild’ überhaupt geben.” Zeitschrift für philosophische. Forschung 16. ———. 1968a. “Szientifik, Hermeneutik, Ideologiekritik: Entwurf einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnis-anthropologicher Sicht.” Man and World 1. ———. 1968b. “Das Verstehen.” In Historisches Wortertbuch der Philosophie, vol. 1, edited by Joachim Ritter. Basel: Schwabe. Ardrey, Robert. 1961. African Genesis. London: Collins. Aron, Raymond. 1961. “Max Weber and Michael Polanyi.” In The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His Seventieth Birthday, 11th March 1961. Glencoe: Free Press (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Asch, Solomon E. 1965. “Studies of independence and conformity.” Psychological Monographs 70, no. 9. Bartley III, William W. 1964. “Rationality versus the theory of rationality.” In The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, edited by Mario Bunge. Glencoe: Free Press.

145 REFERENCES

———. 1968. “Theories of demarcation between science and metaphysics.” In Problems in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Bernal, John D. 1939. The Social Function of Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1967. The Origin of Life. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Bernard, Luther L. 1924. Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology. New York: Holt. Bernheim, Ernst. 1914. Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, der 5. und 6. aufl. München and Leipzig: Dunker and Humblot. Betti, Emilio. 1967. Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Bohr, Niels. 1924. “On the spectrum of hydrogen.” In The Theory of Spectra and Atomic Constitution, 2d ed. London: Cambridge University Press. Bondi, Hermann. 1968. Cosmology, 2d ed. London: Cambridge University Press. Bunge, Mario, ed. 1964. The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy. Glencoe: Free Press. Burtt, Edwin A. 1924. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Butterfield, Herbert. 1957. The Origins of Modern Science—c. 1300–1800, new ed. London: G. Bell. Carnap, Rudolf. 1966. Philosophical Foundations of Physics, edited by Martin Gardner. New York: Basic Books. Cartwright, Nancy et al. 1996. Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chadwick, James. 1932. “The existence of the neutron.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, A 136. Christiansen, B. 1964. “The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence.” Inquiry 7. Cohen, Robert S. 1963. Comments (to paper by Grünbaum). In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, edited by Marx W. Wartofsky. Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel. Cohen, Robert S., and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds. 1965. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2. Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel. ———. 1967. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3. Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel. Colodny, Robert G. 1962. Frontiers of Science and Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

146 REFERENCES

———. 1965. Beyond the Edge of Certainty. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. ———, ed. 1970. The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. Pittsburgh: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press. Conant, James B. et al., eds. 1957. Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science, vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Crombie, Alistair C., ed. 1963. Scientific Change. New York: Basic Books. D’Abro, A. 1951. The Rise of the New Physics, 2d ed. New York: Dover. Danto, Arthur, and Sidney Morgenbesser, eds. 1960. Philosophy of Science. New York: Meridian Books. Darwin, Charles. 1986. Diary of the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle, edited from the MS by Nora Barlow. London: William Pickering. d’Espagnat, Bernard. 1965. Conceptions de la physique contemporaine; les interpretations de la mecanique quantique et de la mesure. Paris: Hermann. Duhem, Pierre. 1962. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, translated by Phillip P. Wiener. New York: Atheneum. Düring, Ingemar. 1966. Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens. Heidelberg: Winter. Ellis, Brian. 1965. “The origin and nature of Newton’s laws of motion.” In Beyond the Edge of Certainty, edited by Robert G. Colodny. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Faraday, Michael. 1959. “Observations on mental education.” In Experimental Researches in Chemistry and Physics. London: R. Taylor and W. Francis (Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation, 1969). Feigl, Herbert, and May Brodbeck, eds. 1953. Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Feyerabend, Paul K. 1962. “Problems of microphysics.” In Frontiers of Science and Phi- losophy, edited by Robert G. Colodny. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. ———. 1964. “A note on the problem of induction.” Journal of Philosophy 11. ———. 1965a. “Problems of empiricism.” In Beyond the Edge of Certainty, edited by Robert G. Colodny. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. ———. 1965b. “Reply to criticism.” In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky. Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel. ———. 1967a. “Bemerkungen zur Geschichte und Systematik des Empirismus.” In Grundfragen der Wissenschaften und ihre Wurzeln in der Metaphysik, edited by Paul Weingartner. Salzburg: Pustet. ———. 1967b. “On the improvement of the sciences and the arts, and the possible identity of the two.” In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky. Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel.

147 REFERENCES

———. 1969. “A note on two ‘problems’ of induction.” Synthese 20: 251–53. ———. 1970a. “Against method.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 4, edited by Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur. Minneapolis: Univer- sity of Minnesota Press. ———. 1970b. “Consolations for the specialist.” In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. London: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1970c. “Problems of empiricism II.” In The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, edited by Robert G. Colodny. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Friedrichs, Robert W. 1970. A Sociology of Sociology. New York: Free Press. Gadamer, Hans G. 1960. Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method). Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. Galtung, Johan. 1967. Theory and Methods of Social Research. Oslo: Universitets- forlaget. Gellner, Ernest. 1968. “The new idealism—cause and meaning in the social sciences.” In Problems in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Glass, Bentley. 1963. “The establishment of modern genetical theory.” In Scientific Change, edited by Alistair C. Crombie. London: Heinemann. Grene, Marjorie. 1969. The Anatomy of Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Gruenberg, Benjamin C. 1929. The Story of Evolution. New York: D. Van Nostrand. Habermas, Jürgen. 1967. “Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften.” Philosophische Rundschau, Beiheft 5. ———. 1968a. “Erkenntnis und Interesse.” In Technik und Wissenschaft als “Ideologie.” Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. English translation in Inquiry 9. ———. 1968b. “Technik und Wissenschaft als ‘Ideologie.’” In Technik und Wissen- schaft als “Ideologie.” Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Also in Man and World 1. ———. 1968c. Erkenntnis und Interesse. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Hanson, Norwood R. 1958. Patterns of Discovery. London: Cambridge University Press. Hempel, Carl Gustav. 1952. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 7. Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press. Holton, Gerald T., and Duane H.D. Roller. 1958. Foundations of Modern Physical Science. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (London: Addison-Wesley, 1962).

148 REFERENCES

Holtsmark, T. 1969. “Goethe and the phenomenon of color.” In The Anatomy of Knowledge, edited by Marjorie Grene. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Horkheimer, Max. 1968. Kritische Theorie, vol. 2. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. 1969. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. Johansen, Knud F. 1964. Studier over Platons Parmenides i dens forhold til tidligere platoniske dialogers, Ph.D. diss. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. Kneale, William C. 1968. “Scientific revolution forever?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19: 27– 42. Kockelmans, Joseph J. 1968. Philosophy of Science: The Historical Background. New York: Free Press. Koestler, Arthur. 1959. The Sleepwalkers. London: Hutchinson. Kramers, Hendrik A. 1956. Collected Scientific Papers. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. “The structure of scientific revolutions.” In International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kyburg, Henry E., Jr. 1968. “The rule of detachment in inductive logic.” In The Problem of Inductive Logic, edited by Imre Lakatos. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Lakatos, Imre. 1963. “Proofs and refutations I.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14: 1–25, 120–39, 221– 43, 296, 342. ———. 1968a. “Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, October 28, 1968, 69: 149–86. ———. 1968b. The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland. ———. 1970. “Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs.” In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. London: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1971. “Popper on demarcation and induction” MS. In The Philosophy of Sir Karl Popper, edited by Paul Schilpp (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1974). Lakatos, Imre, and Alan Musgrave. 1968. Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: North-Holland. ———. 1970. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. London: Cambridge Univer- sity Press. Lange, Friedrich Albert. 1873. Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart, 2. verb. und verm. Aufl. 1. und 2. Buch. Iserlohn: Bacdeker. Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press. Morrison, Philip. 1965. “The physics of the large.” In Beyond the Edge of Certainty, edited by Robert G. Colodny. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

149 REFERENCES

Müller-Markus, Siegfried. 1966. “Niels Bohr in the darkness and light of Soviet philosophy.” Inquiry 9. Naess, Arne. 1936. Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten. Oslo: I kommisjon hos J. Dybwad. ———. 1937. “Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten: Entgegnung von A. Naess auf die Bemerkungen von H. J. Pos.” Theoria 3: 117–24. ———. 1937–38a. “Contribution to discussions.” Erkenntnis 7. ———. 1937–38b. “Über die Funktion der Verallgemeinerung.” Erkenntnis 7. ———. 1948. “Notes on the foundations of psychology as a science.” Filosofiske Problemer, no. 9, stencil. ———. 1949. Innføring i logikk og metodelære. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. ———. 1953a. An empirical study of the expressions “true,” “perfectly certain” and “extremely probable.” Oslo: I kommisjon hos J. Dybwad. ———. 1953b. Interpretation and Preciseness. Oslo: I kommisjon hos J. Dybwad. (SWAN I) ———. 1959. Via Metaempirica and Possibilism. Stenciled translation of Norwegian edition. Berkeley: University of California (Oslo, 1953). ———. 1961. Symbolsk logikk, 3d ed. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (Oslo, 1942). ———. 1964. “Pluralistic theorizing in physics and philosophy.” Danish Year- book of Philosophy, vol. 1. ———. 1965. “Science as behavior: Prospects and limitations of a behavioral metascience.” In Scientific Psychology, edited by Benjamin B. Wolman. New York: Basic Books. (in SWAN IX) ———. 1966. Communication and Argument. London: Allen and Unwin. (SWAN VII) ———. 1967. “Physics and the variety of world pictures.” In Grundfragen der Wissenschaften und ihre Wurzelu in Metaphysik. Salzburg: Pustet. ———. 1969. Hvilken verden er den virkelige? Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. ———. 1970. “A plea for pluralism in philosophy and physics.” In Physics, Logic and History, edited by Wolfgang Yourgrau. Denver: Plenum Press. (in SWAN IX) Nagel, Ernest. 1960. “Probability and degree of confirmation.” In Philosophy of Science, edited by Arthur Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser. New York: Meridian Books. ———. 1961. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Needham, Joseph. 1963. “Poverties and triumphs of the Chinese scientific tradition.” In Scientific Change, edited by Alistair C. Crombie. New York: Basic Books.

150 REFERENCES

Ostwald, Wilhelm. 1917. Grundriss der allgemeinen Chemie, 5. Aufl. Dresden: T. Steinkopff. Parsons, Talcott. 1968. The Structure of Social Action. London: Collier-Macmillan. Polak, Frederik L. 1961. The Image of the Future, vol. 1. New York: Oceana (Leyden: Sythoff, 1961). Polanyi, Michael. 1958. Personal Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1967. “Science and reality.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18: 177–96. Popper, Karl R. 1961. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books (New York: Science Editions, 1959). ———. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (New York: Basic Books, 1962). ———. 1968. “Remarks on the problems of demarcation and rationality.” In Problems in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1953. “Two dogmas of empiricism.” In From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Radner, Michael, and Stephen Winokur, eds. 1970. Minnesota Studies in the Philos- ophy of Science, vol. 4. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Radnitzky, Gerard. 1968. Continental Schools of Metascience, vols. 1 and 2. Göteborg: Akademiförlaget. Riesenfeld, Ernest. 1939. Lehrbuch der anorganischen Chemie, vol. 2. neubearb. Aufl. Wien: Franz Deuticke. Robson, Reginald A. H. 1968. “The present state of theory in sociology.” In Problems in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Rosenthal, R., and K. L. Fode. 1963. “The effect of experimenter bias on the performance of the albino rat.” Behavioral Science 8. Rutherford, Ernest. 1911. “The scattering of a and b particles by matter and the structure of the atom.” Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 22. Schilpp, Paul. 1971. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. Schlegel, Richard. 1967. Completeness in Science. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts. Schweitzer, Albert. 1913, 1951. Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. Spearman, Charles. 1937. Psychology Down the Ages, 2 vols. London: Macmillan. Spinner, Helmut F. 1968. “Theoretical pluralism,” Kommuninikalion 4.

151 REFERENCES

Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch). 1928. The Correspondence of Spinoza, translated and edited with introduction and annotations by Abraham Wolf. London: Allen and Unwin. Tennessen, Herman. 1959. “On worthwhile hypotheses,” Inquiry 2. Timasheff, Nicholas S. 1957. Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth, rev. ed. New York: Random House. Velikovsky, Immanuel. 1950. Worlds in Collision. London: Gollancz. Vigier, Jean-Pierre. 1965. Existentialismus und Marxismus: Eine Kontroverse zwischen Sartre, Garaudy, Hyppolite, Vigier, und Orcel. Mit einem Beitrag von Alfred Schmidt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Wartofsky, Marx W., ed. 1963. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1. Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel. ———. 1967. “Metaphysics as heuristics for science.” In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky. Dordrecht-Holland: Reidel. Watson, James D. 1968. The Double Helix. New York: Atheneum. Wehr, Mentzer R., and James A. Richards. 1960. Physics of the Atom. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Weingartner, Paul, ed. 1967. Grundfragen der Wissenschaften und ihre Wurzeln in der Metaphysik. Salzburg: Pustet. Wellmer, Albrecht. 1967. Methodologie als Erkenntnistheorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Whyte, Lancelot L. 1963. “Some thoughts on certainty in physical science.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14: 32–38. Williams, Leslie P. 1968. “Epistemology and experiment: a reply.” In Problems in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Am- sterdam: North-Holland. Winch, Peter. 1958. The Idea of a Social Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1964. “Understanding a primitive society.” American Philosophical Quarterly 1. Wolman, Benjamin B. 1965. Scientific Psychology. New York: Basic Books. Yourgrau, Wolfgang, ed. 1970. Physics, Logic and History. New York: Plenum Press. Zetterberg, Hans L. 1965. On Theory and Verification in Sociology, 3d ed. Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press. Zinkernagel, Peter. 1962. Conditions for Description, translated by Olag Lindum. New York: Humanities Press.

152 Index

abandonment of theories Burtt, Edwin A., 99 due to weak disconfirmatory instance, 27–28 Butterfield, Herbert, 139n3 and economics, 47 reasons for compared to social rejection and Carnap, Rudolf, 139n1 ostracism, 46–47 influence on Naess, 135, 138 without refutation, 15, 48 theory and power to predict new empirical accumulation of knowledge, 8 laws, 67 noncognitive accumulation in science, 110 theory, conceptualization of, 51, 52, 141n1 accumulative nature of science, 1, 86 central assertions, 19, 20 Adorno, Theodor, 127–28, 144n10 Chadwick, James, 19 Agassi, Joseph, 99, 102, 139n3 Christiansen, B., 33 science as interpretation of metaphysical cognition theories views, 143n13 and initial conditions, 20 anarchism in methodology, 98, 106 integration of empirical and praxis models, “Anything is possible!” See possibilist slogan 26 Apel, Karl O., 144n8 cognitive content of theories, changes in, 61, 63 appearance of continuity, 43–44 Cohen, Robert S., 139n3 approximation to truth, 2 coherence and general systems, 103 Ardrey, Robert, 143n6 coherence theories of truth and connectability, Aristotle’s physics, 111 90–91 Aron, Raymond, 65 coherence view of science, 87, 98 Asch, Solomon E., 121 comparability of theories, 96–98 Austin, John L., 78 competing theories autonomous sciences, 1 derivability and, 67 and metatheories of observation, 24 Ballungen, 135, 142n5, 144n1 rank dimensions, 27 Bernal, John D., 73 theory-observation relation, 40–41 Bernard, Luther L., 43 See also theories Bernheim, Ernst, 143n3 completed theories, 87–88 bias verification in experiments, 121 completeness in science, 88 Bohr, Niels, 15, 58–59 Comte, Auguste, 111 response to argument against quantum Conant, James B., 139n3 mechanics, 83–84 confirmatory instances, 9 Boltzmann, Ludwig E., 71 conformity within science Bondi, Hermann, 142n7 abandonment of a theory, 27 Boring, Edwin G., 71 Glass on, 13 Boyle, Robert, 104 group psychology and conformance, 121 Bridgman, Percy W., 14, 122 possibilism diminishes, 127 Brunswik, Egon, 31, 137 “scientifically” sanctioned conformism, 127

153 INDEX connectability, 90–91 experimental check on a theory, 45–46 constancy of energy principle and impossibility, laws and theory, 45–46 74 on Poincaré, 140n4 Copernican theory reformulation of contextual testing, 17 possibilist slogan supports, 93–94 testing of isolated hypothesis, 15–16, 41 pre-Copernican cosmology conflict, 20, theory, narrow conceptualization of, 51–52 141n9 See also Mach-Duhem-Poincaré principle “the” Copernican theory, 61–62 Düring, Ingemar, 143n2 crazy ideas, 89–90, 92 critical attitude echolalia and historians, 5 immanent not transcendental criticism, economics and theory rejection, 47 119–20 Einstein, Albert, 84, 86 of the new historiographer, 5–6 Ellis, Brian, 105, 139n3, 142n4 Crombie, Alistair C., 139n3 empirical cognition, 25, 120 crucial experiments and the overthrowing of empirical laws research programs, 12 mutually inconsistent theories and deriva- cultural background tion of, 44 and observation, 25 theory and power to predict, 67 social context of communities, 118–19 See also laws of Spinoza, 127 Epicurus, 103 essential definition of a theory, 53 59 60 D’Abro, A., , everyday formulations. See T0-formulation Dalton, John, 10–11 experience Darwin, Charles, and the theoretical idea, 63–64 inexhaustibility of, 80 definiteness of intention, 16, 72, 128–30 and observation, 25–26 limitation of, 72 experiments definitive completeness and theories, 87–88 bias verified by, 121 derivability crucial experiments, 12 and competing theories, 67 of Gay-Lussac, 10, 11 derivations may crop up at any time, 68 inconclusive due to problems with initial of an idea, 63 conditions, 18–19 indefiniteness of theory content and, 66–67 philosophical ignorance impedes, 104 of laws from mutually inconsistent theories, of seventeenth-century scientists, 7–8 43–45 See also testability pluralism of derivation, 44 experimentum crucis, 11 of a theory, 63 theory and power to predict new empirical Faraday, Michael, 93 laws, 67 Feyerabend, Paul K., 105, 126, 139n3 of theory from laws, 45–46 “any idea can become plausible,” 85 Descartes, René, 105, 110 cognition theories, 20 d’Espagnat, Bernard, 126 on comparing two successive theories, Dijksterhuis, Eduard J., 139n3 96–97, 98 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 133 confirmatory instances, dispensing with, 9, disconfirmatory instances, 9 10 discrimination and preciseness, 128–30 Copernican and pre-Copernican cosmology levels illustrated, 129 conflict, 20, 141n9 dogmatism on elaboration of new cosmology, 84 acceptance of theories and, 13–14 Galileo and testing of his theories, 62 in scientific communities, 72, 83 hedonistic proclamation of, 36, 98 Duhem, Pierre, 14 Nordic god Thor comparison, 144n6 derivability and agreement of theory and refuted theories, desirability of working established laws, 42–43 with, 39, 141n8

154 INDEX

theories and different interpretations of, nonaccumulative historiography, 110–19 53 pluralism, historiological, 119–25 Fode, K. L., 144n5 and rejection of theories, 46–47 Frank, P., 135 social context of, 119 freedom of choice, 127, 128–30 theoretical idea rather than exposition of free society and “genuine” science as a threat, 33 theory important, 94 Freud, Sigmund, 31 historiology, meaning of, 139n5 futurology, 116–17 Holton, Gerald T., 139n1 Holtsmark, T., 89 Gadamer, Hans G., 139n7, 139n8 Horkheimer, Max, 127–28, 144n10 Galileo Hull, Clark L., 31, 33, 67, 138 influences of, 105 human values and research policy, 35 testing of his theories, 62 Hume, David, 75 Galtung, Johan, 26 hunches and theory, 56–57 Gay-Lussac, Joseph-Louis, 10, 11 hypothetico-deductive systems Gellner, Ernest Duhem on physical theory, 51–52 on characteristics of societies, 7 social science theorizing and, 65 rejection of Wittgensteinian social science of Vienna Circle and, 137 Winch, 117–18 general systems. See systems (general) ideas and theory, 55–56, 63 Glass, Bentley, 13 “any idea can become plausible,” 85 Gruenberg, Benjamin C., 121 Bohr’s theory, Bohr’s ideas, 58–59 crazy ideas, 89–90, 92 Habermas, Jürgen, 56 Darwin’s theoretical idea, 63–64 dependence of methodological frameworks heuristic role of ideas, 98 on research interests, 112 idea rather than exposition of theory impor- and “scientifically” sanctioned conformism, 127 tant, 94 Hanson, Norwood R., 78, 79, 80, 142n4 inexhaustiveness of, 88–89 hedonistic proclamation of Feyerabend, 36, 98 loose, fragmentary ideas, 57 Hegel, Georg, 133 revival of ideas, 95 Hegelian perspective undefinable nature of, 65–66 new historiography of science and, 117 See also theories worldview typology is self-defeating, 133 impossibility Helmholtz, Hermann von, 21, 56 possibilist slogan and, 73 Hempel, Carl Gustav, 139n1 possibility of impossible physical event, Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 105 37–38 historical scepticism, 110–11 proofs have little weight, 75 historiography proofs of, 73–74 critical attitude toward, 5–9 incomparability and methodologies, 95–98 cultural context of, 120 indefiniteness, value of, 68 as echolalia, 4–5 index tabulation regarding status of a theory, job of the critical historian, 7 48–49 meaning of, 139n5 inexhaustiveness of ideas, 88–89 mutually incompatible historical accounts, initial conditions 111 and contextuality of testing, 18 new historiography as total class of central and peripheral asser- applied to itself, 109–33 tions, 20 Kuhn and, 113–15 See also Randbedingungen sentences outline of conclusions about, 124–25 instances. See confirmatory instances; disconfir- suspension (Aufhebung) of, 117 matory instances transcending one’s historical situation, institutionalized vigilance of science, 105 117 instrumentalism, 39, 126, 141n7, 142n4

155 INDEX interdeterminacy relation, 130 Lewin, K., 31 intersubjectivity, intercultural agreement and Lodge, Sir Oliver, 142n1 science, 105 logic of indices, 48–49 isolated hypothesis Duhem on testing experimentally, 14–16 Mach-Duhem-Poincaré principle testing of hypothesis and nothing else, formulation of, 37 41–42 indefinite multiplicity of theories, 122 and observation, 23 Jammer, Max, 139n3 pluralism of derivation of, 44 Jaspers, Karl, 133 in social science, 122 Johansen, Knud F., 143n1 See also metatheory Joule, James Prescott, 56 Mach, Ernst, 86, 112 joy in research (hedonistic proclamation), 36, 98 many-many relation, 23, 24 Marcel, Gabriel, 132 Kneale, William C., 88 Marcuse, Herbert, 56 knowledge, research as striving for, 83 and “scientifically” sanctioned conformism, Kockelmans, Joseph J., 143n3 127 Koestler, Arthur, 3 “marriage” example of Gellner, 118 Koyré, A., 139n3 mature science, immature science and, 99 Kramers, Hendrik A., 65–66 mature theories, 87–88 Kuhn, Thomas S., 139n3 Kuhn on, 109 on reformulation of theory, 141n3 Mayer, Julius Robert, 55–56 relativism in regard to new historiography, Merton, Robert, 105 113–15 metaphysical theories, 92 way of doing science, old and new, 109–10 metaphysics See also scientific revolution defined by Wartofsky, 99 as near-total system, 102 Lakatos, Imre, 126, 139n3 and science, 98–106 critical standards of growth of science, and systematizations of scientific results, 34–35 101–02 crucial experiments, 12 two-way criticism with science, 104 metaphysics and science, 104 metascience, 81 Naess questions Lakatos’s fairness about psy- metatheory choanalysis, 140n5 of confirmation and disconfirmation, 32–33 progress and growth rate of science highly of observation, 23–25, 120, 123 valued by, 106 pluralist approach to scientific theorizing, research programs, notions of, 58, 107 94 scientists’ understanding of science is lim- See also Mach-Duhem-Poincaré principle ited, 144n4 methodological prediction, 16, 139n1 “Truth does not flow upwards,” 122 methodologies Lange, Friedrich Albert, 103 dependence on research interests, 112 language and formulation of theories, 78–80 pluralism of, 95–98 Laudan, Larry, 139n3 mirroring conception of theory, 56 laws Mises, R. von, 90 derivability of laws from mutually inconsis- monthly bulletins on the status of a theory, tent theories, 43–45 48–49 law sentence assertion, 78–79, 80 Morrison, Philip, 68 and physical necessity, 76–77 Müller-Markus, Siegfried, 15 theory and power to predict new empirical laws, 67 Naess, Arne, 1, 122n7, 143n5, 143n15, 144n9 laws of motion, multiplicity of interpretations definiteness of intention and preciseness, 128 of, 61, 79, 142n4 dialectic aspect of possibilism, 142n3

156 INDEX

Encyclopedia of Unified Science activities, 137 conception of images that fit observations, nonphilosophers’ empiricism, 120 112–13 relative strength of an assertion, 140n2 of derivation, 44 theoretical ideas as point-of-departure for- historical note on possibilistic pluralism, mulations for precizations, 142n5 135–38 and the Vienna Circle, 135–38 historiological pluralism, 119–25 Nagel, Ernest, 38–39, 52, 141n3, 141n7 of interpretations of theories, 61–62, 67–68 near-total systems, 100–101 in methodology, 95–98 neat image of science, 1–2 in philosophy, 105 Needham, Joseph, 105 possibilism and alternative theory considera- Neurath, Otto, 136 tion, 93 Ballungen, 135, 142n5, 144n1 of refutation, 46–49 new, gaudy image of science, 2–3 relationalism not relativism, 123 and philosophy, 3–4 scientific theorizing, 94 new historiography. See under historiography Poincaré, Henri nonaccumulative historiography, 110–19 Duhem on, 140n4 nonaccumulative knowledge in science, 109–10 See also Mach-Duhem-Poincaré principle point-of-departure formulations, 66, 142n5 observation about general systems, 103 conflict with theory, 62 point-of-view, possibilist formulations about, groups and conformance of, 121 131–33 metatheory of, 23–25, 120, 123 Polak, Frederik L., 116 multiple witnesses and multiple accounts, Polanyi, Michael, 65, 89, 139n3 121 on Copernicus, 93 plurality of conceptions, 122–23 political advantages of freedom from conformity, problems with in regard to historiography, 127 120–23 politicians and scientists, truth-value of utter- proliferation of theories of, 21–22 ances of, 5 See also testability Popkin, Richard, 139n3 Oldenburg, Henry, 104 Popper, Karl R., 48, 92, 126, 139n1, 139n3, one-many relation between a theory and versions 143n12 of a theory, 68 influence on Naess, 135, 136, 137, 138 operationalism, 14 Naess questions Popper’s fairness about psy- optimist epistemology, 100 choanalysis, 33, 140n5 progress and growth rate of science highly Parsons, Talcott, 54 valued by, 106 Pauling, Linus, 77 psychoanalysis as pseudoscience, 33, 34 Pavlov, Ivan P., 121 rejection of coherence by, 91 peripheral conditions, 19–20 structurally different worlds, 77 perpetuum immobile, 43 theory, use of term by, 51 perpetuum mobile claim, 75–76, 78 possibilism personal freedom and possibilism, 127–28 “any idea can become plausible,” 85 phenomenon identification. See observation conforming effect diminished by, 127 philosophies of history, 111 formulations proposed, 131–33 physical necessity, 76–77 general possibilism, 125–33 Piaget, Jean, 31 historical note on possibilistic pluralism, Planck, Max, 60 135–38 Platonism, 111 and permissiveness, 89–92 pluralism personal freedom and, 127–28 applicability widespread, 80 Popper’s view on different worlds consistent of approaches rare in research communities, with, 77 105 and reflection, 82

157 INDEX possibilistic pluralism, historical note on, 135–38 refutation possibilist slogan, 72–75 absence of and death of a theory, 15, 48 for consumers of research, 73 absence of and development of research, 38 only for use in research situations, 92 difficulty determining, 4–5 overworking of, 86 historical perspective, 9–12 and praxis, 82–83 imperfect decidability of the weight of, 45 Pyrrhonian sceptics, 82 index tabulation for, 48–49 theory consideration in atmosphere of plu- and lack of crucial experiments, 12 ralism, 93 pluralism of concepts of, 46–49 possibilities from wider perspectives, 37–38 pragmatic-heuristic component of concep- possibility, new theory as, 40 tions of, 38–41 postulates of impotency, 73, 74 social context of meaning of, 118 praxis suspension (Aufhebung) not identical to, 117 and acceptance of possibilist slogan, 82–83 regulative ideas, metaphysical views function as, meaning of, 139n6 102 of scientists, 7 regulative ideas of philosophical systems, 103–04 theory proliferation, 92–94 relative strength of an assertion, 17, 140n2 preciseness, 128–30 relativism of Kuhn, 113–15 precization, 85, 89 relevance and criteria changes, 14–15 departure from everyday formulations and research programs survey precizations, 66 intrinsic value of, 106–07 philosophical systems as, 103 multiple communities and multiple inter- pseudoscience, 33, 34 ests, 35, 36 psychology pedestrian tasks of, 99 group psychology and conformance, 121 pluralism in as a liberating force, 128 instinct theories, 43 possibilistic slogan and, 73, 92 intuitive ranking of broad theories in, 28–31 rationality of policy and value priorities, 35 learning theories in, 67 relation to theories, 57–58 philosophical psychology of Herbart, 105 spiraling character of a project, 100 pluralism of, 137–38 revolution. See scientific revolution as pseudoscience, 33 Robson, Reginald, 54 types of theories compared (table), 31 Rosenthal, R., 144n5 of witnessing, 121 rules of correspondence, 52 Putnam, Hilary, 142n4 Rutherford, Ernest, 46

Quine, Willard Van Orman, 36 Schlegel, Richard, 88 Schlick, M., 135 Ramanujan, 95 Schroedinger’s wave equation, 32 Randbedingungen sentences, 18 Schweitzer, Albert, 111 experimental setup expressed as, 19 science peripheral conditions, 19–20 a complete, 87–88 See also initial conditions and general systems, outline of relationship, rank dimensions of theories, 26–38 101–02 Galtung’s ten dimensions, 26 institutionalized vigilance of, 105 multiplicity of, 27 interlocked with philosophy, 104–05 psychology theories compared (table), 31 intersubjectivity and intercultural agree- strength of assertion and, 28 ment, 105 rationality and research policy, 35–36 and intrinsic value of research, 106–07 rational process and neat image of science, 1 mature vs. immature ruled out, 99 reality, metalevel models mistaken for, 27 meaning of, 104–05 reflection and possibilism, 82 metaphysical barbarism and, 99

158 INDEX

and metaphysics, 98–106 and metaphysics, outline of relationship, misinterpretations of the seventeenth cen- 101–02 tury, 7–8 near-total systems, 100–101 neat image of, 1–2 nontechnical utterances about, 102–03 new, gaudy image of, 2–3 philosophical systems, 98, 103–04 pseudoscience and, 33–34 plurality of systems, 125, 126 as a social activity, 118–19 and science, outline of relationship, 101–02 two-way criticism with metaphysics, 104 two-way criticism with science, 104 scientific revolution, 3

derivability and agreement of theory and T0-formulation established laws, 42–43 applied to the pluralist thesis, 128–30 evolutionary compared to revolutionary, precise formations and, 98 87–88 testability open-mindedness of scientists, 81–82, 84 broad contextual testing, 18–26 revolutionary theory defined, 87–88 experimental setup, 14–15 social changes presupposed, 8 initial conditions problems, 18–19 Watson open to re-evaluation of established of isolated hypothesis, 14–16, 41–42 laws, 77 narrow contextual testing, 15–17 See also Kuhn, Thomas S. as a rank dimension, 26 scientific worldview true/false distinction of formal logic and, 38 dark side of, 33 See also observation expectation of is based on misconceptions of theoretical alternatives and drastic adjustments, science, 125 37 monolithic, soul-shrinking jargon prevails, theories 130 acceptability of, 87 political consequences of “scientifically” authoritative formulation not required, 61 sanctioned conformism, 127 cognitive content of, 15 substitute for comprehensive worldview, 125 comparability of, 96–98 and the “unenlightened” public, 71–72 completed theories, 87–88 Skinner, Burrhus F., 31 essential definition of, 53 social context of communities formal or linguistic structure of, 53 criticism impossible from outside of, 118–19 function of, 94 cultural background and observation, 25, 127 generality of, 63 social determinism, 82 general structure, 52 social sciences “holding true,” 36–37 comparison of historiographies in, 120 hunches and, 56–57 mirroring conception of theory, 56 ideas and theory, 55–56 and natural sciences, is there a basic differ- indefiniteness of content and derivability, ence, 122 66–67 theory in, 54–55, 65 inexhaustible class of consequences of, Spearman, Charles, 15 67–68 Spencer, Herbert, 1 instances of disconfirmation/confirmation, 9 Spinner, Helmut, 33 as instruments in specific contexts, 39, Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch), 110, 127 141n7 on Boyle’s experiments, 104 language for formulation of, 78–80 suspension (Aufhebung) of the new historiogra- life expectancy of, 13, 67–68, 71 phy, 117 mature theories, 87–88 systems (general) modifications made to, 36–37, 59–60 cultural traditions and, 127 mutually inconsistent, 43–45 heuristic and systematic role of, 98–106 naming, 58–61 historical examples, 100–101 observational basis of, 22

159 INDEX theories (continued) truth observation conflicting with, 62 connectivity and coherence, 90–91 one-many relation between a theory and ver- implied in theories, 142n4 sions of a theory, 68 typologies of general views, 3–4 plurality of interpretations, 61–62, 67–68 proliferation and diversity of praxis, 92–94 Uexküll, Jakob Von, 135 refutation and verification, 5 uncertainties and the human need to combat, refuted theories, desirability of working 143n6 with, 39, 141n8 unsurveyability of theories, 66–68 revivals of, 71–72, 85 status value priorities and policy choice, 32 and long histories of, 11–12 Vienna Circle and possibilistic pluralism, monthly bulletins announcing, 48–49 135–38 within a scientific community, 6–7, Vigier, Jean-Pierre, 99–100 11–12 terminology for discussing, 64 Waismann, F., 135 “the” theory, 61 Wartofsky, Marx W., 99, 101, 143n12 truth implied, 142n4 Watson, James D., 57, 77 types of theories compared, 31 Weingartner, Paul, 98 unsurveyability of, 66–68 Winch, Peter, 117–19 variety of notions about, 51–58 wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung. See scientific See also abandonment of theories; com- worldview peting theories; ideas and theory; testa- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 78, 118 bility pluralism and “form of life” holism of, 120 theorizing Wolf, Abraham, 139n3 and images of the future, 116–17 working hypothesis, 57 sociology and, 54 choosing ones to work with, 92–93 theory distinguished from, 53–54 working theory, 57–58 Watson on the discovery of DNA structure, 57 Yourgrau, Wolfgang, 143n7 Thurstone, Louis L., 31 Timasheff, Nicholas, 65 Zetterberg, Hans, 54, 55 Tolman, Edward, 31, 67, 138 Zinkernagel, Peter, 142n4 true/false distinction of formal logic, 38 Zuordnungsdefinitionen, 44, 52, 96

160 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Denmark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwegian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship

161 to the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a visiting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Person for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visiting researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philosophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for ecocultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

Alan R. Drengson, Ph.D. is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria, in Victoria BC Canada. He is a former Director of Environmental Studies and is currently an Adjunct Professor of Graduate Studies. He is the author of numerous articles, reviews, and books, as well as the editor of three anthologies and the founding editor of two journals, The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy and Ecoforestry.

162 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Appendix I

Life of Gandhi: Chronology of Saty¯agraha

[Editor’s note: Liberal use has been made of the chronology of saty¯agraha in Prabhu and Rao’s The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi. The roman letters I–VI suggest the six phases of struggles.]

1868 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi born October 2, youngest of three sons. Father: Karamchand (Kaba) Gandhi. Mother: Putlibai, his fourth wife. Caste: Vaishya (trading caste). 1876 Betrothed to Kasturbai, daughter of a merchant. Lives at Rajkot state. 1883 Marries Kasturbai. 1885 Father dies. 1887 Matriculation. 1888 Travels to London and therefore expelled from his caste. Studies jurisprudence. Lessons in dancing and music. Becomes a vegetar- ian. Does not experience race discrimination. 1889 Rediscovers the Bhagavad Gita. Lives in increasingly spartan manner. 1891 Called to the bar. Sails for India. 1892 Legal draftsman in Rajkot.

I 1893 Sails for South Africa. Joins a Muslim legal ﬁrm. Exposed to crude race discrimination. Decides to stay in South Africa and ﬁght discrimination. 1894 Advocate of Supreme Court of Natal. Studies Tolstoy, Koran, Bible.

153 APPENDIX I. LIFE OF GANDHI: CHRONOLOGY OF SATYA¯ GRAHA

1896 Picks up his family in India. Discovered by politician and religious philosopher Gokhale, who becomes Gandhi’s guru. 1897 Continues ﬁght against race discrimination. Attacked in Durban, hospitalized. 1899 Organizes Indian Ambulance Corps in Boer War. 1901 Returns to India. Practices in Rajkot. 1902 Sails for South Africa. Continues ﬁghting. 1904 Organizes hospital during plague. Reads Ruskin’s Until This Last. Founds a collective farm. Birth of “prophet” Gandhi.

II 1906 Supports home rule for India. Vow of chastity (brahmacarya) for life enhances nonpossession (aparigraha). Organizes ﬁrst saty¯agraha in Transvaal. Calls it passive resistance. 1908 Adopts term saty¯agraha. Sentenced to prison after prosecution by General Smuts. Compromise with General Smuts results in release. Attacked and nearly killed by Pathans because of compromise with the opponent. 1909 Arrests and releases. Correspondence with Tolstoy. 1910 Tolstoy farm. 1913 Faces severe race discrimination. Saty¯agraha march into Transvaal. Arrested. Released. 1914 Agreement with Smuts, “Indian Relief Act.” 1915 Back to India. Continues ﬁght for South Africa Indians. 1917 Saty¯agraha on behalf of indigo plantation laborers. 1918 Fasting on behalf of textile workers.

III 1919 Saty¯agraha against Rowlatt Bills. Arrested. Three hundred and seventy-nine killed at Amritsar. Confesses “Himalayan miscalculation” and suspends saty¯agraha. 1921 Boycott of foreign cloth as part of escalating saty¯agraha against British domination.

154 APPENDIX I. LIFE OF GANDHI: CHRONOLOGY OF SATYA¯ GRAHA

1922 Saty¯agraha in Bardoli. Twenty-one members of police burned. Saty¯agraha suspended. Sentenced to six years in prison. Writes The Story of My Experiments with Truth. 1924 Hospitalized. Released. Fast for Hindu-Muslim unity.

IV 1929 Declaration of complete independence for India. 1930 Salt march. Arrested with more than one hundred thousand others. 1931 Released. Irwin-Gandhi pact. 1932 Arrested. “Fast to death” concerning casteless people (Harijan). 1933 Starts weekly paper Harijan. Imprisoned. Released. 1934 Decides to retire from politics and devote himself to village industry.

V 1940 Meets Viceroy on war. Civil disobedience. 1942 “Quit-India” resolution. Arrested. 1944 Death of Kasturbai. Release. Talks with Jinnah on Pakistan.

VI 1946 Impending division of India and civil war between religious groups. Talks with Viceroy, Cripps, and others concerning independence and Pakistan. Riots in Calcutta. 1947 Tours riot-affected areas. Collaborates with new Viceroy, Mount- batten. Tries to quell riots. 1948 Works for settlement with Pakistan. Works for Muslim refugees. Bomb explosion at prayer meeting, January 20. Shot on way to prayer meeting, January 30.

155 Appendix II

Norms and Hypotheses: A Survey

First-Level Norm: N1 Act in group struggle and act, moreover, as an autonomous person in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence (p. 57).

Second-Level Hypotheses: H1 The character of the means used in a group struggle deter- mines the character of the results (p. 59). H2 In a group struggle, you can keep the goal-directed motivation and the ability to work effectively for the realization of goals stronger than the destructive, violent tendencies and the tendencies to passiveness, despondency, or destruction only by making a constructive program part of your total campaign and by giving all phases of your struggle, as far as possible, a positive character (p. 62). H3 Short-term violence counteracts long-term universal reduction of violence (p. 63).

Second-Level Norms: 63 N2 Make a constructive program part of your campaign (p. ). 63 N3 Never resort to violence against your opponent (p. ). N4a Choose that action or attitude that most probably reduces the tendency toward violence of all parties in a struggle (p. 64). N4b Never act as a mere functionary, a representative of an institution, or an underling, but always as an autonomous, fully responsible person (p. 65).

157 APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

Third-Level Hypotheses: H4 You can give a struggle a constructive character only if you conceive it and carry it through as a struggle in favor of human beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists (positive struggle) (pp. 66–67). H5 It increases your understanding of the conflict, of the participants, and of your own motivation to live together with the participants, especially with those for whom you primarily fight. The most adequate form for living together is that of en- gaging jointly in constructive work (p. 67). H6 If you live together with those for whom you primarily struggle and do constructive work with them, this will create a natural basis for trust and confidence in you (p. 67). 67 H7 All human beings have long-term interests in common (p. ). H8 Cooperation on common goals reduces the chance that the actions and attitudes of participants in conflict will become violent (p. 68). H9 You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating or provoking him (p. 68). H10 Thorough understanding of the relevant facts and factors increases the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign (p. 68). H11a Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your case and the plans for your struggle reduce the chances both for a nonviolent realization of the goals and for the success of future struggles (p. 68). H11b Secrecy reduces the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign (p. 69). H12 You are less likely to take on a violent attitude if you make clearer to yourself the essential points in your cause and struggle (p. 69). H13 Your opponent is less likely to use violent means the better he understands your conduct and your case (p. 70).

158 APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

H14 There is a disposition in every opponent such that whole- hearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favor of a good cause is able to convince him ultimately (general convincibility) (p.70). H15 Mistrust stems from misjudgment, especially of the disposition of your opponent to answer trust with trust and mistrust with mistrust (p. 71). H16 The tendency to misjudge and misunderstand your opponent and his case in an unfavorable direction increases both his and your tendency to resort to violence (p. 71). H17 You win conclusively when you turn your opponent into a believer and active supporter of your case (p. 72).

Third-Level Norms: N5 Fight antagonisms, not antagonists: conceive of your struggle and carry it through as a positive struggle in favor of human beings and certain values (p. 72). N6 Live together with those for whom you struggle and do constructive work for them (p. 73). N7 Try to formulate the essential interests that you and your opponent have in common and try to establish a cooperation with your opponent on this basis (p. 74). 74 N8 Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent (p. ). N9 Acquire the best possible understanding of the facts and factors relevant to the nonviolent realization of the goals of your cause (p. 74). N10 Do your utmost to present unbiased descriptions, to be in full accordance with the truth when describing individuals, groups, institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle (pp. 74–75). 75 N11a Do not use secret plans or moves or keep objectives secret (p. ). 76 N11b Withdraw the intended victim from the wrongdoer (p. ). N12 Announce your case and the goals of your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from nonessentials (p. 77).

159 APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

N13 Seek personal contact with your opponent and be available to him. Bring conﬂicting groups into personal contact (p. 77). 78 N14 Do not judge your opponent harder than yourself (p. ). 78 N15 Trust your opponent (p. ). N16 Turn your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or exploit him (p. 78).

Fourth-Level Hypotheses: H18 You provoke your opponent if you deliberately or carelessly destroy his property (p. 79). H19 Adequate understanding of your opponent presupposes personal empathy (p. 79). H20 Avoiding misjudging and misunderstanding your opponent and his case requires understanding him and his case (p. 79). H21 If you keep in mind your own fallibility and failures, you are less likely to exaggerate those of your opponent. Opponents are then less likely to be misjudged in an unfavorable way, and their case is also less likely to be underestimated intellectually or morally (p. 79). H22 Every political action, your own included, is likely to be based, in part, on mistaken views and to be carried out in an imperfect way (universal imperfection) (p. 79). H23 You make it difficult for your opponent to turn and support your case if you are unwilling to compromise on nonessentials (p. 79). H24 It furthers the conversion of your opponent if he understands that you are sincere (p. 79). H25 The best way of convincing your opponent of your sincerity is to make sacrifices for your cause (p. 80). H26 During a campaign, change of its declared objective makes it difficult for opponents to trust your sincerity (p. 80).

Fourth-Level Norms: 80 N17 Do not destroy property belonging to your opponent (p. ).

160 APPENDIX II. NORMS AND HYPOTHESES: A SURVEY

81 N18 Cultivate personal Einfühlung with your opponent (p. ). N19 Do not formulate your case, the goals of your campaign, or those of your opponent in a biased way (p. 82). N20 Try to correct bias in your opponent only insofar as it is necessary for the campaign (p. 82). N21 Keep in mind and admit your own factual and normative mistakes, and look for opportunities to correct your judgments (p. 82). 82 N22 Always be willing to compromise on nonessentials (p. ). N23 Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent (p. 83). 83 N24 Be willing to make sacriﬁces and suffer for your cause (p. ). N25 During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its goals wider or narrower (p. 83).

161 Appendix III

Key Expressions in Norms and Hypotheses

Admit failure N21 Humiliation H9, N8 Antagonisms H4, N5 Imperfection H22 Availability N13 Living together H5, H6, N6 Bias H11a, N10, N19, N20 Long-term H3, H7, N1 Change of objective H26, N25 Means and ends H1, N1 Coercion N16 Mistakes H22, N20, N21 Common goals H8 Mistrust H15 Common interests H7, N7 Misunderstanding H16, H20 Compromise H23, N22 Nature, human H14 Conﬁdence H6 Personal contact N13 Constructive character H4, H5, Positive H2, H4, N2, N5 H6, N6 Property destruction H18, N17 Constructive program H2, N2 Provocation H9, H18, N8 Constructive work H5, H6, N6 Sabotage H18, H23, H25, N17 Contact N13 Sacriﬁce H25, N24 Conversion H17, H24, N16 Secrecy H11b, N11a Convincibility, general H14 Sincerity H24, H25, H26 Cooperation H8, N7 Suffering N24 Destruction of property H18, N17 Support from opponent H17, H23, Distortion H11a H24, H25, N16 Einfühlung H19, N18 Truthful description N10 Ends and means H1, N1 Trust H6, H15, H26, N15 Essentials H12, H23, N7, N12, N22 Unbiased description N10 Explicitness H20, H24, N9, N12 Understanding H5, H10, H13, H19, Exploit a weakness N23 H20, H24, N9 Facts H10, N9 Violence H9, H16, N3 Fallibility and failures H21, N20, N21 Violence, reduction of H3, N1, N4a Goodness of human nature H14 Violence, short-term H3 Hard judgment N14 Withdrawal N11b

163 Notes

Chapter I: Gandhi’s Experiments 1. [Editor’s note: A source for this quote did not appear in the original edition of this work. The editor has been unable to find the correct source; however, a corroborating assessment of Gandhi’s view on atheism appears in Young India 5.3.1925.] 2. My refusal to judge Gandhi’s personal level of morality does not mean that I consider that level low. I am against such judgments for reasons best formulated by S. Kierkegaard in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1941). 3. Compare the two opposing trends in crowd psychology led, respectively, by Gustave Le Bon and F. H. Allport. Le Bon (1934; originally 1895) proposed that a crowd’s conduct and psychology differ essentially from the individual’s. Among his pupils, W. D. Scott (1907) stressed that a crowd has a high emotional level and lacks the feeling of responsibility, and E. O. Martin (1920) described the psychopathic character a crowd can display in giving vent to its repressed impulses to aggression and sadism. William McDougall (1920) and later psychologists have done something to correct this view, Le Bon’s account being shown to apply only to spontaneously formed groups that have no firm inner organization. McDougall grants that groups may act recklessly and in a primitive and uncontrolled way, but that there are conditions under which they may also behave rationally and display considerable morale and unselfishness. In opposition to Le Bon’s school, Allport (1924: 295) proposed that individuals in crowds acted as though they were alone, “only more so.” Allport does not accept Le Bon’s claim that a “crowd mind,” with its own characteristics, is formed. 4. Accounts of this episode have been chronicled in many places (Tendulkar 1951, vol. 1: 146–48; Gandhi 1950: 325; Dhawan 1946: 201). 5. This, of course, is not to say that the amount of energy that an individual is actually able to put into realizing a moral principle is a direct measure of moral worth. A man of quite ordinary ability, placed in an environment that restricts his development, perhaps wasted by disease and with a number of unde- served disabilities, is not thereby prevented from reaching as great a level of

165 NOTES TO PAGES 15–19

moral excellence as a man who is brilliantly endowed in every way. Very likely, however, the former individual will be far less effectual, and the actual energy of his attempt to comply with a moral principle may never be sufﬁ- cient to give rise to any signiﬁcant result (characters in Graham Greene’s nov- els might be mentioned here). If we are not to confuse moral worth with greatness, with what Kierkegaard called “the world-historical,” the weak must be put on an equal footing with the mighty.

Chapter II: The Metaphysics of Saty¯agraha 1. See also D. Bonhoeffer’s (1954) Prisoner for God and other writings referred to in John A. T. Robinson (1963). They make important reading for the many who ﬁnd traditional religion and spirituality completely meaningless. A clear, but narrow criticism of Tillich’s conceptualizations is found in A. Edward (1970). 2. See note 1, chapter 1. 3. Cf., for instance, Bonhoeffer’s distinction between Gospel and Christianity in his Prisoner for God (1954). 4. From a speech of Gandhiji before a gathering of conscientious objectors in Villeneuve in Switzerland that appeared in Desai’s Letter from Europe. 5. In order to understand the saying that nothing is, except God, one must take into account the usual distinction between “to be” and “to exist.” God is; he does not exist in certain philosophical senses. Gandhi takes changelessness as a criterion of (real) being (Young India 11.10.1928: 340–41; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 47–48): “I do dimly perceive that whilst everything around me is ever-changing, ever-dying, there is underlying all that change a Living Power that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves, and re-creates. That informing Power or Spirit is God. And since nothing else I see merely through the senses can or will persist, He alone is.” Gandhi’s terminology conforms in many places with the religious poem Bhagavad Gita as, for example, in 17.26–17.28 of that work: (26) The word sat is employed in the sense of reality and goodness; and so also, O P¯artha (Arjuna), the word sat is used for praiseworthy action. (27) Steadfastness in sacriﬁce, penance, and gift giving is also called sat, and so any action for such purposes is also called sat. (28) Whatever offering or gift is made, whatever penance is performed, whatever rite is observed, without faith, it is called asat. O P¯artha (Ar- juna); it is of no account hereafter or here. Regarding this last saying, one is reminded of Kierkegaard’s distinction between factual truth and “being in Truth.” Whoever prays with inwardness and passion is in Truth even when factually or theologically wrong about the object of prayer, whereas whoever prays without this is in Falsity even if praying to the Christian God.

166 NOTES TO PAGES 20–44

6. E.g.: “Whatever difficulties we encounter, whatever apparent reverses we sus- tain, we may not give up the quest for Truth which alone is, being God Him- self” (Gandhi 1957: chap. 2). Here the ontological aspect is dominant, but the pragmatic is also present: doing the right things. 7. One must, I think, be permitted to assert that Gandhi often violated his own principles of freedom of conscience. As we have noted, his family life shows an authoritarian attitude with imposition of his own standards of conduct on his wife and sons. He admitted this himself. But the principles have a standing in Indian and other traditions that make Gandhi’s personal failures of little relevance. 8. Pyarelal is here perhaps slightly rhetorical. Gandhi rarely, but sometimes, uses harsh terms that seem to be intended to be applied to persons, not only to their actions. See the quotation from his autobiography (Gandhi 1948: 507): “. . . the planters engineered against me a poisonous agitation.” This occurrence is characteristically associated with a symptom of self-righteousness: “. . . my insistence on truth, even to the minutest detail. . . .” 9. Except for Gandhi himself, there is scarcely anyone who does not consider him a karmayogin. “Gandhiji was a Karmayogi par excellence” (Gandhi 1961, vol. 3: viii). 10. After outlining the virtues of the devotee and the selfless actor, he says (Desai 1946: 130): “We thus see that to be a real devotee is to realize oneself.” 11. On Gandhi’s relation to the Bhagavad Gita and the Advaita Ved¯anta, see De- sai (1946), passim. 12. The last three lines of the quotation are taken from Ved¯anta-Sutras, I, 3.19 (Badaraya 1962, vol. 34: 187). 13.We are here at the source of the distinction between mah¯ay¯ana and hin¯ay¯ana, the two Buddhist movements, the latter asserting the possibility of individual salvation, the former denying it. Gandhi’s Hinduism is heavily influenced by Buddhism. Indeed, he seems simply to regard reformed Hinduism as embracing the teachings of Buddha. 14. The following quotations are all to be found in the collections of Prabhu and Rao (1967) and of Gandhi (1961) under “nonviolence” and related headings. 15. Concerning Islam, Gandhi says: “I would like to say that I claim to have studied the life of the Prophet and the Koran as a detached student of religions. And I have come to the conclusion that the teaching of the Koran is essentially in favour of nonviolence” (Harijan 13.7.1940: 193; quoted in Gandhi 1961, vol. 3: 349). Regarding the Muslim practice of nonviolence, Gandhi would refer to the formidable fighter for India’s freedom, and later against Pakistan’s dictatorship, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Kahn! The followers of the ancient Vedic religion are called Sanatanists.

167 NOTES TO PAGES 46–117

16. Cf. “But it is impossible for us to realize perfect Truth . . .” (Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 25), “. . . how is one to realize this Truth . . . ,” “This freedom from all at- tachment is the realization of God as Truth” (Gandhi 1957: chap. 2), “Man’s ultimate aim is the realization of God” (quoted in Gandhi 1965: 250). Gandhi did not strive after two different things, Self-realization and the realization of God! The two must be thought of as identical in extension, if not in both extension and intension. 17. Cf. “The existence of the body is possible only by reason of the ego. The complete annihilation of the body is salvation (or self-realization). He who has completely destroyed the ‘ego’ becomes an embodiment of Truth. There is no harm in calling him even God” (Gandhi 1961, vol. 2: 15; Harijan 27.11.1949: 340). See also the second quotation in the previous note, and “These produc- tions of man’s Art have their value only in so far as they help the soul onward towards self-realization” (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 55). 18. In this respect, Gandhi sides with mah¯ay¯ana Buddhism rather than hin¯ay¯ana. The “degree of self-realization” can be equated with degree of freedom, power, “being in itself,” substantiality, and nearness to God in Spinoza’s Ethics (see Naess 1969).

Chapter III: Norms and Hypotheses of Gandhian Ethics and Strategy of Group Struggle 1. By norm, we mean in this chapter the same as “not completely instrumental norm.” Something recommended purely and completely as a means to something else is not characteristic of a norm in our terminology. And the goal or aim must itself have a “normative plus” component: it must itself be required to be realized—if not under any circumstances, at least under the circumstances in which the means are recommended. 2. Sometimes what Gandhi says, rather than what he does, has determined our systematization. Gandhi himself pointed out weaknesses, mistakes in his political activities, and errors in his campaigns and in his decisions, more generally. Then, too, we have ourselves certain doubts about his activities that are not aired by the Mahatma himself. An important instance: we do not think he contacted the Moslem League (with Jinnah as its leader) as energetically as his norms required. In such cases, our formulations adapt themselves to Gandhi’s sayings rather than to a historically adequate account of what he did.

Chapter IV: Nonviolence and the “New Violence” 1. For Gandhi’s views on exploitation as violence see, e.g., Harijan 1.9.1940: 271–72; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 264–66. 2. Absence of retaliation or even masochistic provocation of violence from the opponent is, of course, also taken to be the essence of nonviolence by people

168 NOTES TO PAGES 123–48

who have nothing to do with Black Power. On receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Martin Luther King, Jr. was addressed in the following words: “The name of Martin Luther King will live because of the way he conducted his ﬁght. He has through this given life to the words that were spoken to mankind. If somebody hits your right cheek, turn also the other towards him. 5,000 Negroes followed this commandment in December 1955, and won” (from the translation of G. Jahn’s speech, 10.12.1964). Absence of retaliation goes against the norms of nonviolence. They require only absence of retaliation in kind, that is, absence of violence in retaliation, not absence of response— absence of communication with the opponent when he expects and waits for a response. 3. Black-owned “soul banks” are now [in 1969] fairly common in the United States. They “demonstrate that the Negro doesn’t want everything handed to him” (a black banker quoted in Time 23.2.1969). However, they also demonstrate a belief in reform rather than revolution.

Chapter V: Comparison with Certain Other Philosophies of Conﬂict 1.Personal communication from Ramachandra Prabhu. According to this source, the young Gandhi astonished his followers by his optimism and conservatism on this topic, whereas the old Gandhi astonished them by his radical rejection. 2. For a detailed, nonliteral interpretation of Zarathustra, see Messer (1922). 3.Tolstoy’s letter, with an introduction by Gandhi, appears in Tolstoy and Gandhi (Nag 1950: 86). 4.Other quotations are from this book or from the English translation, The Fu- ture of Mankind (Jaspers 1961). Just before he died (February 1969), Jaspers wrote a short article on Gandhi, published in Unesco Courier (October 1969: 26). It contains no essentially different formulations from the above works. 5. The quotation was not translated in the English edition, the original German follows: Max Weber fragt daher, “was für ein Mensch man sein muss, um seine Hand in die Speichen des Rades der Geschichte legen zu dürfen?” Und er erfährt es als “unermesslich erschütternd,” wenn ein Mensch, der die Ver- antwortung für die Folgen real und mit voller Seele empﬁndet, an irgen- deinem Punkte sagt: Ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich. Denn diese Lage muss freilich für jeden von uns, der nicht innerlich tot ist, irgendwann ein- treten können.

169 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identiﬁed by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Allport, Floyd H. 1924. Social Psychology. New York: Houghton. Badaraya. 1962. The Ved¯anta-Sutras, vol. 1, translated by George Thibaut. New York: Dover. Bhagavadgita, The. 1956. With English translation by S. Radhakrishnan. Bombay: Allen and Unwin. Bondurant, Joan V. 1958. Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conﬂict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. 1954. Prisoner for God: Letters and Papers from Prison, edited by Eberhard Bethge and translated by Reginald H. Fuller. New York: Macmillan. Bose, Nirmal K. 1947. Studies in Gandhism, 2d ed. Calcutta: India Associated Pub- lishing Co. ———. 1948, 1957. Selections from Gandhi. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1953. My Days with Gandhi. Calcutta: Nishana. Datta, Dhirendra M. 1953. The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Davis, Harry R., and Robert C. Good, eds. 1960. Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics. New York: Scribner. Desai, Mahadev. 1946. The Gospel of Selﬂess Action, or, the Gita According to Gandhi. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. Dhawan, Gopi N. 1946. The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. Bombay: Pop- ular Book Depot (2d rev. ed., Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1951). Diwakar, Ranganath R. 1946. Satyagraha: The Power of Truth. Bombay: Hind Kitabs.

171 REFERENCES

Edward, A. 1970. “Professor Tillich’s confusions.” In Philosophy of Religion, edited by Steven M. Cahn. New York: Harper and Row. Erikson, Erik H. 1969. Gandhi’s Truth on the Origins of Militant Nonviolence. New York: Norton. Fanon, Frantz. 1966. The Wretched of the Earth, translated from the French by Con- stance Farrington with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre. New York: Grove Press (London: Penguin). Fischer, Louis. 1943. A Week with Gandhi. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1950. The Life of Mahatma Gandhi. New York: Harper (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951). Abridged as Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World. New York: Signet Key Book (1954). Galtung, Johan. 1992. The Way Is the Goal: Gandhi Today. Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidyatyth. Gandhi, Mahatma. 1930. Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story, edited by Charles F. An- drews. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1941, 1945. Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1942, 1944. Non-violence in Peace and War, vol. 1. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1948. Gandhi’s Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth, translated by Mahadev Desai. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press (Ahmedabad: Navajivan 1927–29). ———. 1949a. Non-violence in Peace and War, vol. 2. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1949b. For Paciﬁsts. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1950. Satyagraha in South Africa, revised 2d ed., translated by Valji G. Desai. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1951a. Satyagraha: Non-violent Resistance. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1951b. Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, compiled and with an introduction by Ronald Duncan. Boston: Beacon Press (London: Faber and Faber). ———. 1951c. Towards Non-violent Socialism, edited by Bharatan Kumarappa. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1957. From Yeravda Mandir: Ashram Observances, translated by Valji G. Desai. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1958–84. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (1884–1948), 90 vols. New Delhi: Publications Division of the Ministry of Information and Broad- casting. ———. 1959. Ashram Observances in Action, translated by Valji G. Desai. Ahmed- abad: Navajivan.

172 REFERENCES

———. 1960. My Non-violence, compiled and edited by Sailesh Kumar Bandopa- dhaya. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1961. In Search of the Supreme, 3 vols., edited by V. B. Kher. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1965. Glorious Thoughts of Gandhi, compiled by N. B. Sen. New Delhi: New Book Society of India. ———. 1968. A Thought for the Day, compiled and translated by Anand T. Hingo- rani. New Delhi: Publications Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Guru, Nataraja, trans. 1961. The Bhagavadgita. Bombay and New York: Asia Publi- cation House. Harijan. Weekly paper, started 11.2.1933. Published in Poona, later in Ahmedabad. Edited chieﬂy by Gandhi. An important source, but difﬁcult to obtain. Hingorani, A. T., ed. 1968. A Thought for the Day. New Delhi: Ministry of Education. Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule. 1958. Edited by Mahatma Gandhi. Ahmed- abad: Navajivan. Hygen, Johan. 1954. Albert Schweitzers tanker om kulturen. Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke. Jaspers, Karl. 1958. Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen. München: Piper. Translated as The Future of Mankind by E. B. Ashton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1961). ———. 1969. “One of Karl Jaspers’ last commentaries: Gandhiji.” Unesco Courier. Kabir, H., ed. 1953. Gandhian Outlook and Techniques. New Delhi: Ministry of Edu- cation. Khosla, Gopal D. 1963. The Murder of the Mahatma. London: Chatto and Windus. King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1967. Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? New York: Harper and Row. Klitgaard, Robert E. 1971. “Gandhi’s non-violence as a tactic.” Journal of Peace Re- search 2: 143. Le Bon, Gustave, and F. H. Allport. 1934 (originally 1895). Psychologie des Foules. Paris: F. Alcan. Translated as The Crowd. New York: Viking (1960). Majumdar, S. K. 1966. Jinnah and Gandhi. Calcutta: Mukhapadhyay. Malcolm X. 1965. The Autobiography of Malcolm X, with the assistance of Alex Haley. New York: Grove Press. Martin, Everett O. 1920. The Behavior of Crowds. New York: Harper and Brothers.

173 REFERENCES

Mascaró, Juan, trans. 1962. The Bhagavad Gita. Baltimore: Penguin Books. Mashruwala, Kishorlal G. 1951. Gandhi and Marx. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. McDougall, William. 1920. The Group Mind. Cambridge: The University Press. Messer, August. 1922. Erläuterungen zu Nietzsches Zarathustra. Stüttgart: Strecker und Schroder. Monier-Williams, Monier. 1970. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, new ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Naess used this work to assess the meaning of words of San- skrit origin used by Gandhi. Mühlmann, Wilhelm E. 1950. Mahatma Gandhi. Der Mann, sein Werk und seine Wirkung. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. Naess, Arne. 1969. “Freedom, emotion and self-subsistence.” Inquiry 12 (enlarged edition, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1975 [SWAN VI]). ———. 1965. Gandhi and the Nuclear Age. Totowa, NJ: The Bedminster Press. Nag, Kalidas. 1950. Tolstoy and Gandhi. Patna: Pustak Bhandar. Nicolas, Marius P. 1938. From Nietzsche Down to Hitler. London: W. Hodge and Company. Nygren, Anders. 1942. “Luther och staten.” Svensk Tidsskrift. Organ, Troy W. 1964. The Self in Indian Philosophy. The Hague: Mouton. Paullin, Theodore. 1944. Introduction to Non-Violence. Philadelphia: The Paciﬁst Re- search Bureau. Prabhu, Ramachandra K., and U. R. Rao, eds. 1967. The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, 2d ed., revised and enlarged. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. Pyarelal, N. 1932. The Epic Fast. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1956–58. Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, 2 vols. Ahmedabad: Navaji- van. Robinson, John A. T. 1963. Honest to God. London: SCM Press (Philadelphia: West- minster Press). Rolland, Romain. 1924. Mahatma Gandhi: The Man Who Became One with the Univer- sal Being. New York and London: Century. Scott, Walter D. 1907. The Psychology of Public Speaking. Philadelphia: Pearson Bros. Sharp, Gene. 1960. Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. Shcherbaskoi, Fedor I. 1965. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. The Hague: Mouton. Shridharani, Krishnalal. 1962. War Without Violence. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.

174 REFERENCES

Tendulkar, Dinanath G. 1951–54. Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, 8 vols. Bombay: Publications Division of the Ministry of Information with Jhaveri and Tendulkar. Tillich, Paul. 1948. The Shaking of the Foundations. New York: Scribner’s Sons. Young India. English weekly journal edited by Gandhi from 8.10.1919 to February 1932 in Ahmedabad. An important source, but difﬁcult to obtain (republished in 13 vols., Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1981). Zaehner, R. C. 1969. The Bhagavad Gita, with commentary based on the original sources. London: Oxford University Press. Zimmer, Heinrich. 1961. Philosophies of India, edited by Joseph Campbell. Cleve- land: World Publishing.

Other Works Bose, Nirmal K. 1957. Selections from Gandhi, 2d ed. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles V. Hamilton. 1967. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Random House. Förster-Nietzsche, Elizabeth. 1912–15. The life of Nietzsche, 2 vols., translated by Anthony M. Ludovici. New York: Sturgis and Walton. Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. Concluding Unscientiﬁc Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, translated by W. Lowerie. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Luther, Martin. 1527. Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können (Whether the soldier can be considered a Christian). Nurnberg: Jobst Gutknecht. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1910–11. Human All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, 2 vols., translated by Helen Zimmern (vol. 1) and Paul V. Cohn (vol. 2). Edin- burgh and London: T. N. Foulis. ———. 1960. Also sprach Zarathustra. Stuttgart: A. Kroner. Reyburn, Hugh A. 1948. Nietzsche: The Story of a Human Philosopher, in collaboration with H. E. Hinderks and J. G. Taylor. London: Macmillan. Roos, Carl. 1940. Nietzsche und das Labyrinth. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Roy, Kshitis, ed. 1949. Gandhi Memorial Peace Number. Santinikelar: Prabhatkumer Mukhopadhyaya.

175 Index

action ahims¯a in, 31, 38 ˙ direct actions, 84, 107 Gandhi’s enemies and, 26–27, 81 norms of Gandhian ethics and, 56–57, 59, Gandhi’s relation to, 26, 167n10 84, 116–18 on humility, 31–32 selfless, 33–34, 37, 38, 167n8 on sacrifice, 51, 80, 166n4 self-respect created by, 115 sat in, 166n4 Advaita Ved¯anta, 34, 167n10, 167n11 self-realization and, 28, 29, 32, 46 ahims¯a, 38–44 on truth, 22–23 ˙ in Bhagavad Gita, 31, 38 bias compromise and, 82–83 vs. Einfühlung toward opponent, 81 in conceptual reconstruction, 42–43, 47 in presenting case, 68, 74–75, 82, 104 conversion of opponent and, 36, 78 Black Power, 111–12, 113, 114, 115, 116, 168n2 toward criminals, 36, 73 Bondaref, T. M., 51 degrees of, 40–42, 61, 93 Bondurant, Joan V., 89–90, 91, 117, 118, 128 Gandhi’s striving for, 36 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 166n1, 166n2 secrecy and, 75–76 Bose, Nirmal K., 74, 83, 110, 128 self-realization and, 47, 61 Bradley, F. H., 49 Truth and, 20, 45–46, 47 brahmacarya See also nonviolence as celibacy, 36 Ahlberg, A., 139 as mental discipline, 105 Allport, Floyd H., 165n3 Brahman, 34 am¯anitva, 32 Buddha, 2, 63 Andrews, Charles F., 149 Buddhism, 30, 167n12, 168n17 antagonisms, not antagonists Gandhi’s view, 22, 66–67, 72–73, 129, 141–42 campaigns vs. movements, 84 in Marxism, 107 Carmichael, Stokely, 98, 123 in New Violence, 100, 129 caste system, 134, 169n1 Tolstoy’s view, 141 untouchables, 67, 84, 86, 91, 123 aparigraha, 36 celibacy, 36 atheism, 2, 16, 17, 165n1 center of conflict, seeking, 59, 101, 107, Atman¯ , 34–35 150 atman¯ , 32 change of objective, 80, 83–84 autonomy, 57, 65–66, 135 in salt campaign, 128 axiological approach, 121–22 Christianity Bonhoeffer on, 166n2 Badaraya, 167n11 Gandhi and, 2, 44 being, 19, 166n4, 167n5, 168n17 Kierkegaard and, 139, 166n4 Bhagavad Gita Luther on, 132, 134, 136–37 acognitive inspiration from, 17 Nietzsche and, 139

177 INDEX

Christianity (continued) Desai, Mahadev, 28, 46, 54, 166n3, 167n9, nonviolence and, 44, 137–38 167n10 Schweitzer on, 136 destruction. See property, destruction of civil disobedience detachment, 29–30, 37, 44, 79 constructive programs and, 62, 85–86 devotion, 29–30, 80, 167n9 Himalayan miscalculation and, 25 Dhawan, Gopi N., 82, 90, 92, 165n4 during World War II, 88 direct actions coercion within campaigns, 84 fasting as, 78–79, 91–92, 147, 148–49 radicalizing effect of, 107 in imperfect saty¯agraha, 91–92, 101 distortion. See bias, in presenting case norm about, 78–79 Diwakar, Ranganath R., 86 vs. persuasion, 78, 89–92, 149–50 domination. See exploitation as violence, 53, 79, 97, 106 duties vs. rights, 7 colonialism, 97 Fanon on, 98–99, 100–101, 103–04, 114–15 E, 54–57, 89 See also India See also ethics of group struggle; hypotheses; common goals, 66, 68, 72 norms common interests, 67, 74, 100–101, 129 *E (metaphysical systematization), 48–51, 61, compromise 89, 92 on nonessentials, 70, 72, 79, 82–83, 143 H2 and, 56 rejection of N1 and, 57, 58, 64–65 by “new violence,” 97 ecology movement, lxviii, 41–42 by Tolstoy, 143 economics in student revolt, 105 moral values and, 20 conscience structural violence and, 106 plurality of, 21–22, 23, 27, 74, 167n6 Edward, A., 166n1 See also inner voice egotism, 30–31, 32–33, 34, 35, 37–38, 168n16 Constructive Programme, 86 Nietzsche vs. Gandhi on, 140–41 constructive programs, 85–87, 123–25 Einfühlung (empathy), 79, 81 New Violence and, 115–16, 123, 129, 169n3 Einstein, Albert, 1 norms and hypotheses about, 62–63, 66–67, empathy (Einfühlung), 79, 81 72–73 ends and means. See means and ends conversion of opponent, 72, 78, 79–80 enemy. See opponent vs. coercion, 91 epoché (suspension of judgment), 26 vs. surrender, 88 Erasmus, Luther condemned by, 134 convincibility of opponent, 66, 70–71, 72, 136 Erikson, Erik H., 14, 115 denied in fanonized struggle, 105 essentials cooperation, 68, 72, 74 clariﬁcation of, 69–70, 77 Tolstoy vs. Gandhi on, 141, 143 in common with opponent, 74 courage, 40, 44, 71, 110–12 compromise on nonessentials, 70, 72, 79, of violent people, 143–44 82–83, 143 See also fearlessness ethics of group struggle cowardice, 40, 44, 111–12, 121–22, 144 ahims¯a as designation for, 39 ˙ criminals, 36, 73, 76, 77, 138 humility in, 32 crowd psychology. See mass psychology systematizations of aims of system, 42–43, 94–95 Davis, Harry R., 138 deontological character, 121–22 decentralization, lxviii, 36, 92, 109 general ethics and, 5–6, 55 democratic leadership, 69 graphical presentation, 48–51 democratic societies, lxvii, 90, 92 limits of application, 12–13 deontological approach, 121–22 logical status, 63–64

178 INDEX

metaphysical (*E), 48–51, 56, 57, 58, 61, freedom 64–65, 89, 92 self-realization and, 168n17 moral judgments and, 135 svar¯aj (swaraj) as, 62, 86 positive character of, 53, 55–56 primary sources, 53–54, 55, 168n2 game theory, 119 pyramidal structure, 56–58 Gandhi, Mahatma saty¯agraha conforming to, 92–95, alternative philosophies and 116–19, 128 Jaspers, 144–52, 169n4 scope, 54–55 Luther, 131, 134–36, 137, 138 terminology, 46–47, 53, 168n1 Nietzsche, 138–41 See also hypotheses; norms Tolstoy, 141–44, 169n3 euthanasia, 41 asceticism of, 4 evil assassination, 18, 27, 81 Gandhi’s views, 53, 81–82 attempted assassination, 81, 144 vs. Luther’s, 134 caste system and, 134, 169n1 vs. Tolstoy’s, 143 untouchables, 67, 84, 86, 91, 123 Luther’s views, 131–33, 134 chronology of life, 153–55 New Violence and, 98, 99 democracy envisioned by, 90, 92 experiments with nonviolence, 6–11, 58, essential aspect of teachings, 5–7 165n4 ethics of group struggle explicitness, 53, 77 ahims¯a as designation for, 39 ˙ exploitation humility in, 32 exploiter as evil, 98 systematizations of, 5–6, 12–13, 42–43, exploiter harmed by, 64 46–95, 116–19, 121–22, 128, 135, of opponent, 78 168n1, 168n2 of opponent’s weakness, 83, 87–89 experiments with nonviolence, 6–11, 58, 165n4 selfless action for the exploited, 38 on fallibility, 10, 21–27 as violence, 42, 47, 53, 64, 106, 129, his own, 1, 2–4, 24–25, 28 168n1 family life, 1–2, 167n6 structural, 47, 97–98, 106, 122 glorification by supporters, 2–4 Hindu opposition to, 16, 27, 81, 144 *F, 48, 50 influence on masses, 108, 113 fallibility as karmayogin, 28–29, 34, 59, 142, 167n8 Gandhi on, 10, 21–27 metaphysics of, 15–51, 166n3, 166n4, 167n5, his own fallibility, 1, 2–4, 24–25, 28 167n9, 167n13, 167n14, 168n15, 168n16, humility and, 31 168n17 nonviolence and, 21, 25–26, 46, 152 moral character of, 1–5, 9–10, 165n2 in systematizations of ethics, 50, 79, 82 self-righteousness, 167n7 Fanon, Frantz striving for virtues, 36 on colonialism, 98–99, 100–101, 103–04, New Violence vs. 114–15 constructive programs, 115–16, 123–28 on journalists, 102 ethical norms, 99–105 utilitarianism of, 56, 103-04 metaphysical concepts, 98–99 fanonization, 99, 105 revolutionary character, 97–98, 107 fasting, 4, 78–79, 91–92, 147, 148–49 saty¯agraha misunderstood, 117 fearlessness, 44, 78, 110–12, 121–22 self-respect and, 108–16 Nietzsche and, 141 similarities, 106–08, 168n1 See also courage summary, 128–29 Fischer, Louis, 24, 82, 128 pragmatism of, 11–14, 16, 29 forgiveness, 24 about Truth, 20, 103, 167n5 Förster-Nietzsche, Elizabeth, 139 psychological motivations of, 14

179 INDEX

Gandhi, Mahatma (continued) Buddhism and, 2, 167n12 religious beliefs of, 2, 15–19, 134, 165n1, on purification of Hinduism, 134 167n10, 167n12 Muslims vs. Hindus, 62, 64, 67, 120 as revolutionary, 76, 97–98, 107, 134 Tolstoy on, 142 sense of humor, 11 See also Bhagavad Gita violence justified by, 25–26, 71, 111, 112–13, Hitler, Adolf, 11, 63, 70, 71, 144, 150 119–22, 150 Hobbes, Thomas, 54 Gandhi, Manilal (son), 126 Hume, David, 13 Gewalt, 145–46, 147, 149 humiliation Ghenghis Khan, 63 by opponent, 112–13 goals of opponent, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101 change in, 80, 83–84 humility, 30–33 in salt campaign, 128 Hygen, Johan, 136 common, 66, 68, 72 hypotheses constructive programs and, 85 descriptive character of, 13–14, 49 destructive, 55–56 empirical character of, 58 explicitness about, 77 exceptions to, 93 God fourth-level, 79–80 Gandhi’s concept, 15–19 Gandhi’s psychology and, 14 atheism and, 2, 16, 17, 165n1 key expressions in, 163 being and, 166n4, 167n5 levels of, defined, 57 Self and, 34–35 of metaphysical systematization, 48–51, 56, self-realization and, 27–28, 32, 35, 58, 65 46–47, 61, 168n15, 168n16 New Violence and, 99–105 in systematization of ethics, 49 saty¯agraha conforming to, 12–13, 116–19 Truth and, 18–19, 26, 27–28 second-level, 59–63, 66 Luther’s concept, 131–34 selection of, 55–57, 168n2 Spinoza’s concept, 19, 168n17 survey of, 157–61 Tillich’s concept, 15–16 third-level, 66–72 Godse, Nathuram, 27 See also ethics of group struggle Goebbels, Joseph, 104 Good, Robert C., 138 imperfection. See fallibility; mistakes goondas, 73, 76, 77 imprisonment, institution of See also criminals Gandhi rejects, 135, 143 “Gora” (G. Ramachandra Rao), 16 Tolstoy rejects, 142 Greene, Graham, 165n5 India group struggle. See ethics of group struggle crisis of 1947, 21 Guru, Nataraja, 32 Gandhi’s influence on masses, 108, 113 independence Hamilton, Charles V., 98, 123 campaigns during World War II, 24, Harijan, 54, 123 88–89, 107 Hegel, Georg, 64 constructive programs and, 62, 87 Himalayan miscalculation, 4, 25 Jaspers on, 145, 146–47, 148–49 hims¯a, 38–43 readiness of masses for, 108 ˙ in conceptual reconstruction, 47 for sake of British also, 64 German translations of, 149 Khadi movement, 108–09, 123 See also violence politicians and Gandhi, 108, 120 Hinduism religious conflicts, 62, 64, 67, 84, 120 Advaita Ved¯anta, 34, 167n10, 167n11 salt campaign, 72–73, 84, 87, 109–10, 124–28 Gandhi as traitor to, 16, 27, 81, 144 injury Gandhi’s beliefs, 2, 15, 17, 18 to opponent, 25

180 INDEX

vs. violence, 93–94 Malcolm X, 98, 114 inner voice Mao Tse-tung, 124 militant nonviolence and, 98 Martin, Everett O., 165n3 truth and, 20, 22, 23 Marx, Karl, 64 See also conscience Marxism, lxviii, 107, 109 Islam Mascaró, Juan, 31 Gandhi and, 2, 44, 167n14 mass psychology, 6, 9, 165n3 Hindus vs. Muslims, 62, 64, 67, 120 McDougall, William, 165n3 means and ends, 59–61 Jahn, G., 169n2 in New Violence, 99 Jaspers, Karl, 144–52, 169n4 norms are not means, 168n1 Jesus, 2 saty¯agraha is not a means, 116 Jinnah, 77–78, 81, 155, 168n2 meliorism, 136 j¯ıva, 34 Messer, August, 169n2 journalists, 102 metaphysical concepts of Gandhi, 15–51, 166n3, 166n4, 167n5, 167n9, Kahn, Abdul Ghaffar, 103, 167n14 167n13, 167n14, 168n15, 168n16, 168n17 Kant, Immanuel, 13 of New Violence, 98–99 karmayogin, 28–29, 34, 59, 142, 167n8 See also God; oneness of life; self-realization; Khadi movement, 108–09, 123 Truth Kierkegaard, Søren, 23, 139, 165n2, 165n5, 166n4 metaphysical systematization (*E), 48–51, 61, killing, justiﬁcation of 89, 92 by Fanon, 99, 115 H2 and, 56 Gandhian ethics and, 57, 71 N1 and, 57, 58, 64–65 Indian moral tradition and, 6 Miller (journalist), 126, 127 by Jaspers, 147–48 misrepresentation. See bias by Luther, 133 mistakes, 79, 82 See also war See also fallibility King, Martin Luther, Jr. mistrust, 71 patience and, 107 misunderstanding opponent, 71, 79 retaliation and, 168n2 Mohammed, 2 self-respect and, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115 moksa, 28 ˙ violence and, 116, 117 moralism vs. pragmatism, 11–14 Klitgaard, Robert E., 119 moral systems. See ethics of group struggle Koestler, Arthur, 109 moral worth vs. greatness, 165n5 Le Bon, Gustave, 165n3 perfectibility of, 136 Lenin, 2, 143 movements vs. campaigns, 84 living together, 67, 73 Mühlmann, Wilhelm E., 149 love mukti, 28 ahims¯a as, 82 Mussolini, Benito, 63 ˙ God as, 18 justice and, 133–34, 135 Nag, Kalidas, 142, 143, 169n3 Luther on, 133–34 Naidu, Sarojini, 126, 127 nonviolence as, 61 Napoleon, 138 Tolstoy on, 142–43 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3 violence motivated by, 144 New Violence Luther, Martin, 98, 131–38 deﬁned, 97, 98 vs. Gandhian nonviolence mah¯atman, 4 constructive programs, 115–16, 123–28 Majumdar, S. K., 77 ethical norms, 99–105

181 INDEX

New Violence (continued) levels of, defined, 57 metaphysical concepts, 98–99 of metaphysical systematization, 48–51, 57, revolutionary character, 97–98, 107 58, 64–65, 92 saty¯agraha misunderstood, 117 New Violence and, 100, 102 self-respect and, 108–16 saty¯agraha conforming to, 12–13, 92–95, similarities, 106–08, 168n1 116–19, 128 summary, 128–29 second-level, 63–66, 85 Nicolas, Marius P., 139 selection of, 55–57, 168n2 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 137–38 specificity of, 56–57 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 54, 138–41 survey of, 157–61 nirv¯ana, 30 third-level, 72–79 ˙ nonviolence truth of, 20 antagonisms and, 72 violations of, 92–95, 128 Christianity and, 44, 137–38 See also ethics of group struggle constructive programs in, 62–63, 86 Nygren, Anders, 131–32 defined, 53 in democratic ideal, 90, 92 oneness of life effectiveness of, 5–11, 12 New Violence and, 98, 115 experiments with, 6–11, 58, 165n4 nonviolence derived from, 26, 35–37 fallibility as argument for, 21, 25–26, 46, 152 in E, 57 fasting in, 148–49 in *E and *F, 47, 48, 49, 50 fundamental norm of, 57–59, 63, 64–65, opponent 93–94 common interests with, 74, 100–101, 129 Hinduism and, 44 constructive intent and, 86–87 in Bhagavad Gita, 31, 38 conversion of, 72, 78, 79–80 human nature and, 6 vs. coercion, 91 as instrumental value, 12, 65 vs. surrender, 88 Islam and, 44, 167n14 convincibility of, 66, 70–71, 72, 136 Jaspers on, 144–52 denied in fanonized struggle, 105 in New Violence, as goal, 99–100 Einfühlung with, 79, 81 oneness of life and, 26, 35–37, 47, 48, 49, 50, exploitation of, 78, 83, 87–89 57 humiliation of, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101 in philosophical traditions, 6 injury to, 25 powerlessness and, 150 judging of, 78 reinforces itself, 100 misrepresentation by, 82 self-respect and, 110, 115 misunderstanding of, 71, 79 strategy and tactics, 13, 53 personal contact with, 77–78, 127 Truth and, 44–46 property of, destruction, 79, 80–81, 93, 100 See also ahims¯a; ethics of group struggle; provocation of, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101 ˙ saty¯agraha; violence vs. confrontation, 102 norms exception to hypothesis, 93 for campaigns vs. movements, 84 by property destruction, 79 deontological, 121–22 in salt raid, 127 vs. descriptive assumptions, 5–6, 13–14, taken to be nonviolence, 168n2 49 trust in, 71, 78 empirical character of, 58 Organ, Troy W., 34 first-level (N1), 57–59, 63, 64–65, 93–94 “Forgive!,” 24 pacifism, 57, 107, 111 fourth-level, 80–84 panchayat system, lxviii instrumental, 56–57, 168n1 parallel institutions, 123–24, 129 key expressions in, 163 passive resistance, 83

182 INDEX

passivity of Gandhi being and, 19 about devotion, 29 vs. constructive programs, 62 about Truth, 20, 103, 167n5 vs. direct action, 107 vs. moralism, 11–14 powerlessness and, 150 See also utilitarianism Paullin, Theodore, 90 prayer, 78, 148 perfectibilism, 136 preciseness, of *E and *F, 50 personal contact with opponent, 77–78, 127 pride, 30–33, 35 Plato, 54 propaganda, 104, 127 pluralism, 21–24, 26, 27, 45, 74 See also bias Gandhi’s personal failures with, 167n6 property, destruction of, 79, 80–81, 93 of Gandhi vs. Tolstoy, 141–42 innocent people’s property, 69–70 rejected by New Violence, 99 New Violence and, 100 police provocation informing to, 76 by opponent, 112–13 violence by, 76, 101–02, 127 of opponent, 55, 59, 68, 74, 101 positive struggle. See constructive programs vs. confrontation, 102 power exception to hypothesis, 93 Jaspers on, 144–47, 149 by property destruction, 79 New Violence and, 99 in salt raid, 127 nonviolence and, 150 taken to be nonviolence, 168n2 self-realization and, 146, 168n17 psychotherapy, reciprocity in, 37 powerlessness, 108, 150 p¯urna svar¯aj, 62, 87 ˙ Prabhu, Ramachandra K. Pyarelal, N., 1, 24, 35–36, 54, 63, 167n7 on caste system, 169n1 Pyrrho, 26 See also Prabhu and Rao Prabhu and Rao, The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, 1 Radhakrishnan, S., 32 asceticism, 4 Rao, G. Ramachandra (“Gora”), 16 bias, 82 Rao, U. R. See Prabhu and Rao capital and labor, 67, 68 religion compromise, 82–83 conflicts in India, 62, 64, 67, 84, 120 convincing opponent, 71, 78 Gandhi’s beliefs, 2, 15–19, 134, 165n1, cooperation, 72, 74 167n10, 167n12 detachment, 30 Truth and, 20 economics, 20 See also Buddhism; Christianity; Hinduism; exploitation, 64, 106, 168n1 Islam fearlessness, 111 revolution God, 26, 166n4 Gandhi as revolutionary, 76, 97–98, 107, 134 Hinduism, 16, 18 violent, 97 imperfections, 1, 3, 4 Reyburn, Hugh A., 139 means and ends, 60 rights vs. duties, 7 nonviolence, 167n13 Robinson, John A. T., 166n1 oneness of life, 35, 36, 37 Rolland, Romain, 142 plurality of conscience, 21, 74 Roos, Carl, 139 prayer and fasting, 78–79 Roy, Kshitis, 1 sacrifice, 80, 83 self-realization, 168n16 sacrifice, 50–51, 80, 83, 85 truth, 23, 26 Jaspers on, 147, 150 violent methods, 63 sat and, 166n4 pragmatism Saheb, Imam, 126 of Fanon, 103 salt campaign, 72–73, 84, 87, 109–10, 124–28

183 INDEX samny¯asin, 4 selfless action and, 33–34, 37, 38 ˙ Sanatanists, 44, 167n14 self-respect and, 110, 112–13, 141 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 64, 98, 114, 115 svar¯aj as, 33 sat, 19, 34, 166n4 in systematization of ethics, 46–49, 56, 57, saty¯agraha 61, 65, 67 benefits all, 64, 67 Truth and, 27–28, 37–38, 46–47, 48–49, change of goal in, 84, 128 168n15 clarity about essentials in, 69–70 violence as means to, 99 coercion in, 78, 89–92, 147, 148–49 self-respect, 108–13, 129, 141 compromise in, 82–83 violence as means to, 114–16 constructive programs in, 85–87, 123–25 semantics, in ethical formulations, 50–51 detachment and, 79 Shcherbaskoi, Fedor I., 30 effectiveness, vs. violence, 12 sincerity, 79–80, 152 exploitation of weakness in, 83, 87–89 Smuts, General Jan, 88 fallibility as argument for, 21 Sorel, Georges, 138 injury to opponents in, 25 South Africa, 7–9, 10–11, 13, 88 means and ends in, 61, 116 Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch) vs. New Violence, 98–105, 117, 128–29 evil and, 82 norms of, 55 immanent God and, 19 personal contact with opponent, 77–78 self-realization and, 168n17 sacrifice in, 83 truth and, 151 salt campaign, 72–73, 84, 87, 109–10, Stalin, Joseph, 63 124–28 strategy of group struggle, 13, 53 strictness of, 10, 61, 92–95 student revolt, 97, 101, 105, 119 techniques vs., 116–19 suffering, 36, 80, 83 translations of, 10, 146 suspension of judgment (epoché ), 26 trust and, 76, 78 svar¯aj (swaraj), 33, 76, 84, 86, 87, 108 See also ethics of group struggle; nonviolence p¯urna svar¯aj, 62, 87 ˙ scepticism, 20–21, 26 Systematization E, 54–57, 89 Schweitzer, Albert, 3, 136 See also ethics of group struggle; hypotheses; Scott, Walter D., 165n3 norms secrecy, 69, 75–76, 94, 102 Systematization *E, 48–51, 61, 89, 92 seek the center of conflict, 59, 101, 107, 150 H2 and, 56 Self, 32, 33, 34–35 N1 and, 57, 58, 64–65 universality of, 35–38 Systematization *F, 48, 50 self, 30–33, 34, 35 selfless action, 33–34, 37, 38, 167n9 Tagore, Rabindranath, 109 Self-realization, 33, 35, 168n15 tapas, 4 self-realization Tendulkar, Dinanath G., 7, 39, 54, 81, 126, 128, courage and, 40, 110–11 165n4 decrease or increase in, 47, 168n17 Tillich, Paul, 15–16, 166n1 devotion and, 167n9 Tolstoy, Leo, 51, 141–44, 169n3 of exploiter is damaged, 64 trust Gandhi’s use of term, 46, 168n16 constructive work and, 67, 85, 86, 87 God and, 27–28, 32, 35, 46–47, 61, 168n15 informing to police and, 76 humility and, 32 in opponent, 71, 78 limitation of, as violence, 53, 106 sincerity and, 80 in mundane sense, 33 threat of violence and, 151–52 Nietzsche on, 140 Truth oneness of humanity and, 35–38, 39, 67 ahims¯a and, 20, 44–46, 47 ˙ power and, 146, 168n17 being and, 19, 166n4, 167n5

184 INDEX

fearlessness and, 111 distortion of truth and, 69 Gandhi’s use of term, 17–21 effectiveness vs. nonviolence, 5 God and, 18–19, 26, 27–28 hims¯a as, 39–41, 47, 149 ˙ pluralism about, 21–23, 26, 27, 45, 74 impotency causing, 119–21 Self as, 34 Jaspers on, 144–52 self-realization and, 27–28, 37–38, 46–47, justiﬁcation of 48–49, 168n15, 168n16 by Gandhi, 25–26, 71, 111, 112–13, strict standard of, 93 119–22, 150 as top norm, 48–50 in New Violence, 98–101, 105, 111–12, vs. truth, 46–47 114–16 truth Luther on, 132, 133 autonomy and, 65–66 Nietzsche on, 138–39 in colonial situation, 103–04 positive motivations for, 143–44 compromise and, 83 self-respect and, 114–16 experiments with, 9 short-term, 63, 100, 104, 129 Gandhi’s use of term, 17–18, 19, 20 structural, 47, 67, 97–98, 105, 106, 111, 122 self-righteous, 167n7 in systematization of ethics humility about, 31 common goals and, 68 Jaspers on, 151 deﬁned, 53 of norms, 20 in *E, 48 pluralism about, 21–24, 26, 45, 141–42 essential points and, 69 scepticism about, 20–21, 26 humiliation and, 68 self-realization and, 56 provocation and, 68 vs. Truth, 46–47 short-term, 63, 100 unbiased, 74–75, 82 top norm N1 and, 57–59, 63, 64–65, Tyabji, Abbas, 126 93–94 understanding and, 70, 71 understanding, 66, 72 threat of, 151–52 empathy for opponent, 79, 81 Tolstoy on, 142 of facts, 68, 74 violates pure saty¯agraha, 61 misunderstanding opponent, 71, 79 See also killing; New Violence; nonviolence by opponent, 70 working together and, 67, 85 Wales, Prince of, 135 unity of humanity. See oneness of life war untouchables, 67, 84, 86, 91, 123 Jaspers on, 150 utilitarianism long-term effects of, 63 experiments in nonviolence and, 10 Luther on, 137 of Fanon, 56, 103–04 Nietzsche on, 138–39, 140 minority interests and, lxvii See also killing norms of Gandhian ethics and, 56, 57, 65 Weber, Max, 148, 169n5 See also pragmatism working together. See constructive programs

Ved¯anta, Advaita, 34, 167n10, 167n11 yajña, 80 violence Young India, 54, 123 deﬁned broadly, 42, 47, 53, 79, 168n1 is mutual, 64 Zeteticism. See scepticism by supporters of violence, 106, 129 Zimmer, Heinrich, 34

185 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

187 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a visiting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ- ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Person for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visiting researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philosophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for ecocultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

188 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Appendix I

Approximate Signifaction of Single-Letter Symbols

A something else (alius) C conceive, understand (concipere, intelligere) D cause (causa) E existence, being (existentia and esse) F affect (affectus) G act (agere) H person, human being, man, we (homo, nos) L free (liber) N not . . . (non) O striving (conatus) P possibility, ability ( posse), power ( potentia) R require something in order to something S itself (se)

131 Appendix II

Approximate Meaning of Multiple-Letter Symbols

The following list does not contain all combinations of symbols used in the text, but all that might not be understood from inspection of Appendix I. Acq(x) x is in a state of self-satisfaction (acquiescentia in se ipso) Ad adequate (adequatus) Ali(x) x is in a state of alienation Bon(xyz) x is good for y in relation to z (bonum) C(xy) y is conceived through x, adequately or inadequately, totally or partially CA(x) x is conceived through something else CS(x) x is conceived through itself D(xy) x causes y, partially or totally de decrease Dol(x) x is in a state of pain E(xy) y is in x EA(x) x is in something else EANO(x) x strives against an increase in its level of being in something else ENPC(x) existence of x belongs to that without which x cannot be conceived NPC(xy) x belongs to that without which y cannot be conceived

133 APPENDIX II

ES(x) x is in itself ESO(x) x strives to increase its level of being in itself F(x) x is in the state of emotion (affectus) G(xy) x is active in relation to y, adequately or inadequately, partly or totally H(x) x is a person (homo) Hil(x) x is in a state of cheerfulness (hilaritas) Id(xy) x is identical to y in increase In inadequate (inadequatus) Inu(xyz) x is not useful to y in relation to z L(x) x is free (liber), partially or totally, adequately or inadequately Lae(x) x is in a state of joy (laetitia) Mal(xyz) x is bad for y in relation to z (malum) Mel(x) x is in a state of melancholy (melancholia) Mix(x) x is in a state of mixed emotions . . . NO(x) x strives against an increase in its level of ...... O(x) x strives to increase its level of . . . P(xy) x has adequate or inadequate, in part or total, power in relation to y PCNE(x) it is possible to conceive x as nonexistent Per(xy) x is perfect in relation to y Pes(xy) x preserves itself in relation to y Rat(xy) x acts rationally in relation to y RC(x) x requires another concept in order to be conceived

134 APPENDIX II

RC(xy) concept x is required by y in order to exist RE(x) x requires something else in order to exist RE(xy) x is required by y in order to exist, y requires x in order to be Refl(xy) x reflects upon or contemplates y (contemplari) Sre(xy) x realizes itself in relation to y Tit(x) x is in a state of pleasurable excitement (titillatio) Tri (x) x is in a state of sorrow (tristitia) Uti(xy) x is useful to y Vir(xy) x acts virtuously in relation to y (virtus)

135 Appendix III

Basic Equivalences

SA2 ES ekv -RE SB14 L ekv ES SA3 EA ekv RE SB16 L ekv CS SA7 CS ekv -RE SB18 L ekv -RE SA8 CA ekv RE SB19 L ekv -RC SA11 ES ekv -RE SC10 AdD(xx) ~ ENPC(x) SA12 EA ekv RE SC11 AdC(xx) ~ ENPC(x) SA13 ES ekv CS SC22 AdD(xx) ~ AdL(x) SA14 EA ekv CA SC23 AdC(xx) ~ AdL(x) SA15 CS ekv -RE SC24 InD(xx) ~ -ENPC(x) SA18 RE ekv RC SC27 InD(xx) ~ EA(x) SB2 -PCNE ekv ENPC SC34 AdG(xy) ~ AdD(xy) SB3 PCNE ekv -ENPC SC36 AdC(xy) ~ AdG(xy) SB3a ENPC ekv CS SC41 InG(xy) ~ InD(xy) SB4 PCNE ekv CA SC42 InG(xy) ~ InC(xy)

SB5 -PCNE ekv CS SD46 P<∞(x) ~ PCNE(x)

SB6 PCNE ekv EA SD47 P<∞(x) ~ EA<∞(x)

SB10 L ekv ENPC SD48 P∞(x) ~ ES∞(x)

SB12 L ekv -PCNE SD51 P<∞(x) ~ InD(xx)

137 APPENDIX III

SD59 P0(x) ~ EA∞(x) SF24 Srein(x) ekv ESin(x)

SD62 P(xy) ~ G(xy) SF27 Aliin(x) ekv EAin(x)

SD65 Pin(x) ~ Gin(x) SF28 Hil(x) ~ (y) Pin(xy)

SD66 Pin(x) ~ ESin(x) SF37 Tit(x) ~ InPin(x)

SD68 Pin(x) ~ Lin(x) SF40 Tri(x) ~ Pde(x) ∨ SE1a F(x) ~ Pin(x) Pde(x) SF48 Mel(x) ~ (y) Pde(xy)

SE4 AdF(x) ~ Pin(x) SF53 Dol(x) ~ InPde(x)

SE10 AdF(x) ~ ESin(x) SG1 Uti(xy) ~ D(x(Perin(yz)))

SE14 AdF(x) ~ Lin(x) SG2 Bon(xyz) D=ef Uti(xyz)

SF1 Lae(x) ~ Pin(x) SH1 Vir(x) ekv P(x)

SF7 Perin(x) ~ Pin(x) SH2 Vir(xy) ~ CS(xy)

SF12a Perin(x) ~ ESin(x) SH17 Vir(x) ekv Rat(x)

SF17 PesO(x) ~ ESO(x) SH24 Ratin(x) ~ Lin(x)

SF20 Pesin(x) ~ Pin(x)

138 Notes

Introduction 1. [Editor’s note: A mimeographed, fairly comprehensive survey containing about 4,000 relations was prepared by the Institute of Philosophy at the Uni- versity of Oslo (Naess and Fløistad 1963–64; issue 1 was produced by Naess and Fløistad in 1963, issues 2 and 3 by Fløistad alone in 1964).]

Chapter I: The Fundamental Dual Distinction: “In Itself” and “In Something Else” 1. Occurrences of quatenus referring to God are found among other places in IP23Dem (quatenus absolute consideratur); IP28Dem (quatenus aliquo modo affec- tum consideratur —reference to God or an attribute); IP28Dem (quatenus affec- tum est modificatione); IP28Dem (quatenus modificatum est modificatione quae finita est); IP29Sch (Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur); IP32Dem (quatenus substantia absolute infinita); IIP9 (quatenus alia rei singularis actu exis- tentis idea affectus consideratur); IIP9Dem (quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur); and IIP12Dem (quatenus naturam humanae Mentis constituit). The use of quatenus is central to Spinoza’s way of handling not only the general immanence of God, but also the participation of particular beings in the nature and essence of God.

Chapter III: Causation, Cognition, and Action 1. A detailed textual confrontation and test of a somewhat narrower hypothesis of parallelism with reference to different classes of x’s and y’s is given in Rag- nar Naess (1969), an unpublished dissertation. Its largely positive conclusion has strengthened my confidence in my general hypothesis of parallelism stated above. 2. A set of different criteria of inadequate cognition is discussed in Naess and Wetlesen (1967: 11). 3. The complex families of terms connected with percipere, concipere, and intelligere, as well as the other terms of cognition, are surveyed and discussed in

139 NOTES TO PAGES 35–57

the second part of Naess and Wetlesen (1967); see especially pp. 143, 156, and 188. 4. For systematic analysis of evidence, see R. Naess (1969). C1 and C2 together are designed to do justice to reconstruction Nos. 5 and 8, and C5 and C6 to Nos. 4 and 7 in Naess and Wetlesen (1967). 5. Concerning subclasses of causes, see Gueroult (1968: 245 ff.). Gueroult’s work is outstanding in reliability and solidity. What I write I find in no case to be inconsistent with what he writes—but our goals are far apart. My goal is to help make Spinoza’s work accessible to modern readers, not help them to work with Spinoza’s own, enormously complex terminology. 6. For a discussion of Spinoza’s finite God see Naess (1981 [in SWAN IX]). 7. Four references concerning immanence include: Carl Gebhardt, “Der Zentralgedanke, aus dem heraus Spinoza die über- kommenen Begriffe umgestaltet, ist der Gedanke der Immanenz” (1922: xvii). Wilhelm Windelband: “God is Nature as the universal world-essence, he is the natura naturans; as sum-total of the individual things in which this essence exists modified, he is the natura naturata. If in this connection the natura naturans is called occasionally also the efficient cause of things, this creative force must not be thought as something distinct from its workings: this cause exists nowhere but in its workings” (Windelband 1926: 409). God exists modified, that is, as modes, particular things, not as anything else. Harry A. Wolfson: “Spinoza’s statement that God is the immanent cause of all things is thus not an assertion that God is identical with the aggregate totality of things, it is only a denial that God is the external and separable and hence immaterial cause of all things” (1961, vol. 1: 324). Wolfson quotes the Short Treatise, which says that the immanent cause is that in which “the effect remains united with its cause in such a way that together they constitute a whole” (Sec. Dial. §3). As regards “whole,” Wolfson takes it in a strong sense suggested by Aristotle (Met. 5, 1023b, 27–33). “A whole means . . . that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity.” Evelyn Underhill (1930: 99 ff.) treats immanence from a point of view not completely foreign to Jewish philosophy. “‘He is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live and move and have our being,’ is the pure doctrine of Immanence: a doctrine whose teachers are drawn from amongst the souls which react more easily to the touch of the Divine than to the sense of alienation and of sin, and are naturally inclined to love rather than to awe.” Spi- noza was such a soul. We may put it this way: substance is but does not exist independently of modes. Accordingly, ES(x) reads, when we wish to be careful, “x is in itself,” not “x exists in itself.”

140 NOTES TO PAGES 103–13

Chapter IV: Grading Basic Distinctions 1. The principle of grading of freedom is accepted by some Spinoza specialists, for instance Wolf (1966: 451) and Wetlesen (1969). 2. One of the reasons we avoid the term mode (modus) is that Spinoza lets affects such as amor be modes (IIA3). We need a notion of ‘particular thing’ that avoids properties. Affects are primarily properties. States of joy are properties of living beings, not particular beings “inside” the living ones.

Chapter VI: Joy 1. A few more quotations will show the context in which Gandhi uses the term self-realization: “What I want to achieve . . . is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain moksha.” For God one may here substitute truth, as Gandhi holds Truth to be God. Moksha (moksa). is total, not partial freedom and not completely realizable for any human being. “Life is an aspiration. Its mission is to strive after perfection, which is self-realization. . . . The silent cry daily goes out to Truth to help me . . .” (Young India 11.8.1927; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 46). It is the opinion of Gandhi that self-realization is the highest aim according to the great religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Chris- tianity, and Islam (cf. the discussion in Young India 6.8.1941; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 76). The religious atmosphere of Gandhi is of course very different from that of Spinoza; Gandhi is no philosopher. But the source of their beliefs is not very different.

Chapter VII: Good and Bad and Usefulness 1. See Giancotti Boscherini (1970–71) regarding the lexical articles bonum, bonus, malum, and malus. A preliminary survey of occurrences and interpretations is found in Naess and Wetlesen (1967: 381 ff.).

141 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Gebhardt, Carl, trans. and ed. 1922. Kurze Abhandlung von Gott, dem Menschen und seinem Gluck (Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and Human Welfare). Leipzig: Meiner. Giancotti Boscherini, Emilia. 1970–71. Lexicon Spinozanum. 2 vols. The Hague: Nijhoff. Gueroult, Martial. 1968. Spinoza, vol. 1. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne. Naess, Arne. 1973. “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement.” Inquiry 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X) ———. 1981. “Spinoza’s finite god.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 135: 120–26. (in SWAN IX) Naess, Arne, and Guttorm Fløistad. 1963–64. Spinoza’s Etikk. Systematiske re- konstruksjoner, 3 issues. Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo. Naess, Arne, and Jon Wetlesen. 1967. Conation and Cognition in Spinoza’s Theory of Affects. Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo. Naess, Ragnar H. 1969. Noen undersøkelser omkring forholdet mellom erkjennelse og kausalitet i Spinoza’s filosofi, Ph.D. diss. Oslo: University of Oslo. Prabhu, R. K., and U. R. Rao, eds. 1967. The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, with foreword by Vinoba Bhave and S. Radhakrishnan. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. Saw, Ruth L. 1969. “Personal identity in Spinoza.” Inquiry 12: 1–14. Underhill, E. 1930. Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiri- tual Consciousness. London: Methuen. Wetlesen, Jon. 1969. “Basic concepts in Spinoza’s social psychology.” Inquiry 12: 105–32.

143 REFERENCES

Windelband, Wilhelm. 1926. A History of Philosophy, translated by James H. Tufts. New York: Macmillan. Wolf, A., trans. and ed. 1966. The Correspondence of Spinoza. New York: Russell and Russell. Wolfson, Harry A. 1961. The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 1. New York: Meridian.

144 Index

acquiescentia in se ipso (self-satisfaction), 125–30 existence and, 36, 44 active emotion, 83–86, 87, 88–91 freedom and, 45, 46 activeness and, 37, 88, 90 by God, 35, 39, 41 adequate causation and, 41, 84, 90 the good and, 115 of animals, 129 by human beings, 35, 38–39, 40–41, 51, 62 being in oneself and, 84, 89, 97 of itself, 45, 46, 62, 78 freedom and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91 power and, 63, 78, 80, 127 the good and, 115 self-satisfaction and, 125–26, 127 power increase and, 83, 84, 86, 88, 95 of something else, 46–48, 80 symbol for, 87 See also causation understanding and, 84, 97 adequate conception See also emotions (affects) causation and, 31–36, 40, 41, 43–44, 61 activeness, 37–39, 46–48, 50–51 by every particular thing, 51 active emotion and, 37, 88, 90 freedom and, 45, 62 causation and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62 grading of, 55–56, 64 cheerfulness and, 105 by human beings, 40 of every particular thing, 50–51 part/whole terminology and, 110–11 freedom and, 37 self-satisfaction and, 125–26 of God, 51 through itself, 45 of the good, 116 See also conception (cognition, understand- increase or decrease in, 80, 81 ing) melancholy and, 109 adequate ideas, 40, 41 partial, 39, 48 adequate power, 80, 127–28 perfection and, 98 affects. See emotions (affects) in personal relations, 38, 40 affectus, 84, 87 power and, 63, 64, 80, 125, 126 agendi potentia (active power), 63, 125, 126 self-satisfaction and, 125–26 agere, 37 striving for, 101 alienation, 104 symbols for, 42 alius understanding and, 2, 32, 37–38, 46, 47–48, symbol for, 14 64 See also in something else (in alio) See also passivity amor intellectualis Dei, 84, 86 active power (agendi potentia), 63, 125, 126 animals, 129–30 adequate, symbol for, 41 See also living beings adequate causation animism, 92–93, 96 active emotion and, 41, 84, 90 Aristotle activeness and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62 Spinoza’s ontology and, 27 conception and, 31–36, 40, 43–44, 61 “whole” defined by, 140n7 by every particular thing, 50, 116 a¯tman, Gandhi on, 103

145 INDEX ataraxia, 84 reflection and, 128 attributes, 2, 4, 6 virtue and, 121, 122 extension and thought as, 15–16, 59 children, 41 particular things and, 17 cognition. See conception (cognition, understand- aut, 17, 19 ing) cognitive-causal parallelism. See causation, cogni- bad (malum), 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 141n1 tion and being (esse) conatus. See striving (conatus) vs. existence, 9, 10, 23–24, 59, 63, 71, conceived as nonexistent, 23, 24–29 140n7 adequate conception and, 45, 46 symbol for, 14 being in something else and, 77 See also existence; particular beings grading of, 60, 61, 77 being in itself. See in itself (in se) person as, 39, 49 being in something else. See in something else (in power and, 77 alio) striving and, 91 body through existing things, 11 joy and, 95, 104 conceived through itself, 1–5 self-satisfaction and, 128 adequately, 45 bonum. See good (bonum) attributes as, 15 basic theorems about, 10–13, 18 Cartesian dualism, 129 causation and, 36, 44 causation cheerfulness and, 105 activeness and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62 existence and, 23–24, 26, 44–45, 46 being in something else and, 17, 46 freedom and, 27, 45, 46, 54, 62 cognition and, 31–36, 42–44, 139n1 the good and, 116 by human beings, 2, 38, 40, 41, grading of, 55–56, 58, 61, 62, 64 61, 62 survey using symbols, 71–74, 77 essence and, 38–39, 125 melancholy and, 109 existence and, 36, 44, 45–46 pain and, 111 freedom and, 45, 46 power and, 78 by God, 35, 39, 41, 50, 63, 116, 140n7 striving for, 85, 91 the good and, 114–17 substance as, 65 grading of, 68, 72, 100 symbol for, 14, 15 power and, 63, 78, 80, 127 virtue and, 119, 120 subclasses of causes, 35, 140n5 See also conception (cognition, understand- symbols for, 42 ing); fundamental dual distinction; in it- usefulness and, 113–14, 116–17 self (in se) See also adequate causation; inadequate (par- conceived through something else, 1–5 tial) causation activeness and, 38, 47–48, 51 cause of itself (causa sui) basic theorems about, 10–14, 18 adequate/inadequate, 45, 46, 62, 78 causation and, 31, 33–35, 38, 42–44, 139n1 existence and, 25, 36, 44–45, 46 existence and, 23, 26 grading of, 72 freedom and, 27 joy and, 97 grading of, 61, 62, 71–74, 78, 100 power and, 63 human beings as, 39, 49, 62 striving for, 101 power and, 80 understanding and, 36 striving and, 91 cheerfulness (hilaritas), 86, 104–06 symbols for, 15, 42 the good and, 116 through God, 16, 26 melancholia and, 107 See also conception (cognition, understand- rationality and, 122 ing); fundamental dual distinction; in

146 INDEX

something else (in alio); require some- freedom and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91 thing in order to be/be conceived mixed states of, 86, 106, 108 conception (cognition, understanding) modes and, 16, 140n2 activeness and, 2, 32, 37–38, 46, 47–48, 64 power and, 62, 81, 83–84, 86, 87–90, 95 causation and, 31–36, 42–44, 139n1 rationality and, 122 by human beings, 2, 38, 40, 41, 61, 62 Spinoza’s positive attitude toward, 6 emotion and, 84, 86, 87, 97 symbol for state of, 87 existence and, 23, 24–26, 44–46, 60, 77 virtue and, 121 grading of, 55–56, 57, 64 See also active emotion; joy (laetitia); love; by nonhuman beings, 85, 93 pain (dolor); passive emotion; sorrow (tris- power and, 64 titia) striving for, 85 ens rationis of substance, 11–12, 23 freedom and, 64–65 symbols for, 42 God as, 59 terminology for, 34, 139n3 hilaritas and, 105 See also adequate conception; conceived as sensation as, 98 nonexistent; conceived through itself; See also reason (rationality) conceived through something else; ideas; epistemology inadequate (partial) conception; knowl- in human situation, 97 edge lambanological-ontological parallelism, 1–5, concipere, 2, 14, 34, 139n3 9, 10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18 contemplation, 126–28 See also conception (cognition, understand- context ing); knowledge in grading predicates, 55 equivalences, 3, 6 as third variable, 42–43 table of, 137–38 See also extensional equivalence decrease. See graded predicates, increase or de- esse. See being (esse) crease in essence deep ecology, 38 causation and, 38–39, 125 See also ecology defined by Spinoza, 25–26 degrees, 55, 67 of every being, 100 See also graded predicates existence and, 2, 25–26, 36, 65, 129 Democritus, 98 of God, 40, 50, 140n7 Descartes, René, 59, 129 of substance, 65 dolor (pain), 107, 108, 109–10, 111 Ethics dual distinction. See fundamental dual distinction centrality of IP36, 50 dualism, Cartesian, 129 hidden structures of, 27 reference format, xvii ecology terminological relations in, 1–7, 139n1 causation by humans and, 38 Euclid, 24 deep ecology, 38 existence, 23–29 equalitarianism and, 130 vs. being, 9, 10, 23–24, 59, 63, 71, self-preservation and, 102 140n7 worldview and, 76 causation and, 25, 36, 44, 45–46 ekv. See extensional equivalence conception and, 23, 24–26, 44–46, 60, 77 emotions (affects) essence and, 2, 25–26, 36, 65, 129 of animals, 129 freedom and, 26–29, 61–62 classes of, 85–86 of God, 25, 59, 128 cognition (understanding) and, 84, 86, 87, of human beings, 49 97 of particular things, 59 defined by Spinoza, 84 power and, 63

147 INDEX existence (continued) sorrow and, 108 survey of, 24–28 striving and, 84, 85, 92, 101 using symbols, 28–29 virtue and, 54, 120 See also being (esse); conceived as nonexistent; free (liber) require something in order to be/be Spinoza’s usage, 26, 27, 123 conceived symbol for, 28 existential quantification, 19 free will, 84 ex parte, 32, 35 fundamental dual distinction, 1–4, 5, 6 See also part/whole distinction existence and, 24 extension, as attribute, 15–16, 59 survey of, 9–14 extensional equivalence, 5–6, 7, 17 using symbols, 14–21 See also equivalences See also in itself (in se); in something else (in alio) Fløistad, Guttorm, 139n1 formalization, 5 Gandhi, Mahatma, 103, 141n1 See also symbolization Gebhardt, Carl, 140n7 freedom Gestalt psychology, 98 active emotion and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91 Giancotti Boscherini, Emilia, 141n1 activeness and, 37 God of all particular things, 116 adequate conception of, 40 being in itself and, 27, 54, 64–65, 76 in Cartesian dualism, 129 causation and, 45, 46 causation by, 35, 39, 41, 50, 63, 116, 140n7 cheerfulness and, 105 “conceived through” relation and, 16, 26, of children, 41 100 conceiving and emotions and, 90 adequate, 45, 62 essence of, 40, 50 through itself, 27, 45, 46, 54, 62 existence of, 25, 59, 128 through something else, 27 as expendable term, 3–4, 56 existence and, 26–29, 61–62 as finite, 140n6 fundamental dual distinction and, 6 freedom of, 77 Gandhi on, 141n1 fundamental dual distinction and, 10 of God, 77 Gandhi on, 103, 141n1 the good and, 116 graded predicates and, 58–59, 68, 77 grading of, 53–55, 61–62, 63, 64–65, 140n1 immanence of, 130, 140n7 increase, 80 activeness and, 51 partial increase or decrease, 81, 107 causation and, 50, 63, 116, 140n7 survey using symbols, 67, 68, 76–77, 81, dependence of God and, 41, 59 107 personal identity and, 86 total, 49, 62, 76–77, 100 power and, 63 zero level, 100 quatenus terminology and, 16, 56, 66, joy and, 96, 107 139n1 pain and, 111 “in something else” relation and, 13, 15–17 perfection and, 100 love for, 56, 84, 86 of a person, 49, 62, 76 as maximum concept, 120 Gandhi on, 141n1 modes and, 16–17, 41, 51, 59, 140n7 pleasurable excitement and, 107 nature of, 128 power and, 63, 79, 80 power of, 63, 64, 90 reason and, 53, 64–65, 122–24 virtue of, 120 reflection and, 128 See also substance self-preservation and, 101, 102 good (bonum), 113, 114–17, 141n1 self-satisfaction and, 127 virtue and, 121

148 INDEX graded predicates, 53–81 symbols for, 65–68, 81 vs. absolutist dichotomies, 49, 54–55, 58, three levels of, 54, 67–68 66 zero level, 67, 100 “cause of,” 68, 72, 100 See also predicates “conceived adequately,” 55–56, 57, 64 Gueroult, Martial, 140n5 “conceived as nonexistent,” 60, 61, 77 “conceived through itself,” 55–56, 58, 61, 62, Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 38, 86 64 hilaritas. See cheerfulness (hilaritas) survey using symbols, 71–74, 77 Hobbes, Thomas, 81 “conceived through something else,” 61, 62, human being (person) 100 activeness of, 51 survey using symbols, 71–74, 78 adequate causation by, 35, 38–39, 40–41, 51, defined, 55 62 dimensions of, 55–57, 64 adequate conception by, 40 freedom as, 53–55, 61–62, 63, 64–65, 140n1 vs. animal, 129 increase, 80 child, 41 partial increase or decrease, 81, 107 conceivability of something through, 64 survey using symbols, 67, 68, 76–77, 81, conceived as nonexistent, 39, 49 107 conceived through himself, 62, 72, 85 total, 49, 62, 76–77, 100 conceived through something else, 39, 49, 62 zero level, 100 existence of, 49 increase or decrease in, 64, 68 freedom of, 49, 62, 76 in every relation, 88 Gandhi on, 141n1 partial, 81, 110 God and, 40, 68 striving for, 87 in itself, partially, 41, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86 infinite level, 67, 68, 100 personal identity of, 40, 86–87 “in itself,” 56, 57–62, 63–65, 66, 67–68, power of, 39, 79, 96, 97 69–71 requirements to exist or be conceived, 49 freedom and, 64–65, 76, 77 situation of, Spinoza’s synthesis, 97 partial increase or decrease, 81 in society vs. alone, 53, 123 power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80 in something else, 39–41, 48, 62 zero level, 100 striving by, 84–85, 91–92 “in something else,” 58, 61, 62, 69, 70–71 to be joyous, 96 decrease, 80 to increase perfection, 101 power and, 77, 78, 79, 80 to increase virtue, 121 symbols for, 66, 67 toward being in itself, 85, 86 justification of, 6, 58–60 symbol for, 41, 42 knowledge as, 57 See also particular beings; particular things perfection as, 53, 57, 95, 99, 100 Hume, David, 86 power as, 54, 62–64, 68, 77–78, 79–81 humility, 125 increase in every relation, 88 Husserl, Edmund, 12 increase or decrease, 68 infinite level, 78, 79, 90 idealism, 42 partial increase or decrease, 81, 89 ideas zero level, 97, 100 adequate, 40, 41 reason as, 55 of animals, 129–30 “require something in order to be,” 58, 61, clear and distinct 74–76 part/whole terminology and, 110–11 self-preservation as, 56–57 of substance, 12 self-satisfaction as, 127 confused, 40, 129 substantiality as, 59–60, 65, 97 emotions as, 129

149 INDEX ideas (continued) sorrow and, 108 inadequate, 110, 111 striving for, 84–85, 87, 91, 92, 101 See also conception (cognition, understand- substantiality and, 97 ing); ens rationis symbol for, 14, 19 inadequate, symbol for, 41 See also conceived through itself; fundamental inadequate ideas, 110, 111 dual distinction inadequate (partial) causation, 33, 35 in something else (in alio), 1–5 activeness and, 39, 48 alienation and, 104 conception and, 43–44 causation and, 17, 46 emotion and, 84 conceivability as nonexistent and, 77 existence and, 45–46 freedom and, 27 of itself, 45, 46, 78 in God, 13, 15–17 power and, 78 grading of, 58, 61, 62, 69, 70–71 inadequate (partial) conception, 110–11 decrease, 80 activeness and, 39, 48 power and, 77, 78, 79, 80 causation and, 43–44 symbols for, 66, 67 grading of, 55–56, 57 human beings as, 39–41, 48, 62 pain and, 111 striving against, 87, 91 of particular things, 32–33 symbols for, 14, 15, 19, 42 increase. See graded predicates, increase or de- two meanings of, 13, 15–16, 17 crease in See also conceived through something else; indiget, 14 fundamental dual distinction infinite being, 62–63 intelligere, 14, 34, 85, 139n3 infinite degree, 67, 68 See also conception (cognition, understanding) infinite perfection, 99 “is”. See being (esse) infinite virtue, 120 in itself (in se), 1–5 joy (laetitia), 95–111 active emotion and, 84, 89, 97 adverse effects of, 111 adequately, 45 of animals, 129, 130 cheerfulness and, 105 centrality in Spinoza’s vision, 95, 97 conceived as nonexistent and, 26, 28 defined by Spinoza, 95 equivalences to, 6–7 freedom and, 96, 107 not introduced, 128–29 the good and, 117 freedom and, 27, 54, 64–65, 76 kinds of, 83, 104–07 God as, 59 love and, 125 the good and, 115, 116 as mode, 140n2 grading of, 56, 57–62, 63–65, 66, 67–68, pain and, 109–10 69–71 perfection and, 57, 95, 97–98, 99, 106 freedom and, 64–65, 76, 77 power and, 95–96, 97, 106, 108, 110, 128 partial increase or decrease, 81 self-preservation and, 102, 108 power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80 self-satisfaction and, 125–26, 127, 128 zero level, 100 sensation of, 98 human being as, 41, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86 sorrow and, 107, 108 joy and, 96 virtue and, 121 particular things as, 57–58, 69 See also cheerfulness (hilaritas); pleasurable ex- perfection and, 99 citement (titillatio) personal identity and, 86 pleasurable excitement and, 106–07 knowledge, three kinds of power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80 emotions and, 16 self-preservation and, 56–57, 101, 103 grading and, 57 self-realization and, 103 particular things and, 58

150 INDEX

second kind, as inadequate, 32 as expendable term, 3–4, 6, 140n2 third kind God and, 16–17, 41, 51, 59, 140n7 fundamental dual distinction as, 19 particular things and, 17, 140n2 increase in, 85 persons as, 48 about particular beings, 87 properties as, 140n2 See also conception (cognition, understand- substance and, 41, 51, 140n7 ing); epistemology; ideas moksa, self-realization and, 141n1 ˙ motion, 15–16 laetitia. See joy (laetitia) mutual implication lambanological-causal parallelism, 31 vs. extensional equivalence, 5–6 See also causation, cognition and symbol for, 17 lambanological-ontological parallelism, 1–5, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18 Naess, Arne Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 59 on deep ecology, 38 liber. See freedom; free (liber) on Spinoza’s terminology living beings bonum and malum, 141n1 activeness of, 37 about cognition, 139n3 conceiving by, 85, 93 survey of relations, 139n1 joy and, 96 on Spinoza’s view of cognition knowledge of, 58 adequate, 139n4 range of predicates and, 58, 129–30 emotion and, 87 striving of, 85 inadequate, 139n2 See also human being (person); particular terminology, 139n3 beings Naess, Ragnar, 139n1, 139n4 logical formalization, 5 Nature modal logic and, 10, 42 absolute virtue of, 120 See also symbolization as expendable term, 4 logical symbols, 17, 18 God as, 140n7 See also symbols reason and, 113 love nature defined by Spinoza, 125 cognition and, 32, 33, 111 for God, 56, 84, 86 of God, 128 hate and, 110 of a thing immanence of God and, 140n7 existence and, 25, 26, 129 of self, 113 virtuous action and, 129 Spinoza’s inclination to, 140n7 necessity freedom and, 26, 54 malum (bad), 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 141n1 fundamental dual distinction and, 10 man. See human being (person) negation Marx, Karl, 38 of predicates, 58, 66 material implication, 17 symbol for, 17 melancholia, 107, 109, 122 nonexistence. See conceived as nonexistent; mind existence in animals, 129 God expressed in, 56 ontological-lambanological parallelism, 1–5, 9, joy and, 95 10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18 self-satisfaction and, 128 ontology See also thought Aristotelian, 27 modal logic, 10, 42 equalitarian, 130 modes in human situation, 97 emotions and, 16, 140n2 “or,” exclusive and inclusive, 17, 19

151 INDEX pain (dolor), 107, 108, 109–10, 111 Gandhi on, 141n1 partial activeness, 39, 48 grading of, 53, 57, 95 partial causation. See inadequate (partial) causa- complete, 99, 100 tion zero level, 100 partial conception. See inadequate (partial) con- joy and, 57, 95, 97–98, 99, 106 ception kinds of, 83 partial decrease or increase, 81, 110 Latin connotations of, 95, 98 particular beings power and, 95, 98, 99, 100 essence of, 100 self-preservation and, 102 God and, 86, 139n1 sorrow and, 108, 117 perfection level of, 100–101 striving for, 85, 100–101, 141n1 striving of, 92–93, 100–101 usefulness and, 113–14 See also living beings person. See human being (person) particular things personal identity, 40, 86–87 activeness of, 37, 50–51 pleasurable excitement (titillatio), 106–07 adequate causation by, 50, 116 pain and, 107, 109–10, 111 adequate conception by, 51 posse, 14, 63, 131 cannot be God, 68 possible to conceive as nonexistent. See conceived causal relations between, 31, 139n1 as nonexistent caused by human beings, 38–39 power (potentia) conceived by human beings, 64 activeness and, 63, 64, 80, 125, 126 essence of, 38–39 adequate, 80, 127–28 existence of, 59 the bad and, 114–15 freedom of, 116 being in itself and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80 God expressed through, 50–51, 56, 66, 116, causation and, 63, 78, 80, 127 130, 140n7 cheerfulness and, 104, 105 human beings as, 39–41 conceiving and, 64 inadequate conception of, 32–33 emotions and, 62, 81, 83–84, 86, 87–90, 95 “in itself” applied to, 57–58, 69 existence and, 63 “in something else” applied to, 17 freedom and, 63, 79, 80 modes and, 17, 140n2 of God, 63, 64, 90 power of, 63 grading of, 54, 62–64, 68, 77–78, 79–81 striving of, 92–93 increase in every relation, 88 See also human being (person); particular increase or decrease, 68 beings infinite level, 78, 79, 90 part/whole distinction, 32, 35, 110–11 partial increase or decrease, 81, 89 passion, 84, 87 zero level, 97, 100 passive emotion, 39, 41, 84 of human being, 39, 79, 96, 97 of animals, 129 joy and, 95–96, 97, 106, 108, 110, 128 power and, 89 kinds of, 83 symbol for state of, 87 melancholy and, 109 See also emotions (affects) pain and, 109–10, 111 passivity, 37, 39, 40 perfection and, 95, 98, 99, 100 inadequate cognition and, 32 self-preservation and, 85, 102 striving to avoid, 85 self-realization and, 103 symbol for, 42 self-satisfaction and, 125, 126 See also activeness sorrow and, 107–08, 117 pati, 37 striving for, 85, 92, 101, 102 percipere, 34, 139n3 symbols for, 68, 131 perfection (perfectio), 97–101 usefulness and, 114 cheerfulness and, 106 virtue and, 119, 120

152 INDEX

Prabhu, R. K., 103 usefulness and, 113, 115 predicates virtue and, 120, 124 negation of, 58, 66 self-realization, 102–03, 141n1 ranges of, 19–20, 58, 129–30 self-satisfaction (acquiescentia in se ipso), 125–30 for usefulness, 116 sorrow (tristitia), 95, 97, 107–08, 110 symbols for, 5, 131 good or bad and, 111, 117 See also graded predicates Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch) psychoanalysis, repression and, 105 animism of, 92–93, 96 Cartesian dualism and, 129 quantification, 19 on cognitive-causal parallelism, 2, 31–35, 38, quatenus, 16, 56–57, 66, 139n1 40, 41, 61 deep ecology and, 38 ranges. See predicates, ranges of finite God of, 140n6 Rao, U. R., 103 on free will, 84 rationality. See reason (rationality) fundamental dual distinction and, 6, 10, 11, reality, perfection and, 57 12, 15, 49, 53 reason (rationality), 121–24 Gandhi and, 103, 141n1 freedom and, 53, 64–65, 122–24 on graded predicates, 6 grading of, 55 freedom, 54–55, 65, 68, 77, 140n1 self-satisfaction and, 128 power, 64 usefulness and, 113 self-satisfaction, 127 virtue and, 55, 121–22, 124 substantiality, 60 See also ens rationis on human beings, 39, 40, 41 reflection, 126–28 idealism and, 42 relationism, 40, 41 on immanent God, 130, 140n7 require something in order to be/be conceived, 1, causation and, 50, 63, 116, 140n7 9, 11, 13–14 dependence of God and, 41, 59 freedom and, 27 personal identity and, 86 grading of, 58, 61, 74–76 power and, 63 human being and, 49 quatenus and, 16, 56, 66, 139n1 inadequate conception and, 46 optimism of, 97 striving to reduce extent of, 91 on perfection, 100–101 symbol for, 14, 15, 20 joy and, 57, 83, 95, 97–98 See also conceived through something else; in self-preservation and, 85 something else (in alio) sorrow and, 117 res particularis. See particular things usefulness and, 114 ranges of predicates and, 19–20, 58, 129–30 Saw, Ruth, 40, 86 on rationality, 53, 65, 122–23 se reconstructions of his views, 1, 86–87, 124 symbol for, 14 terminology of, 1–7 See also in itself (in se) about activeness, 37 Self, Gandhi on, 103 affects as modes in, 140n2 self-preservation, 84–85, 92, 101–04 about causes, 35, 140n5 cheerfulness and, 106 about conception, 32, 34, 110–11 the good and, 115 about emotions, 84, 95, 107 grading of, 56–57 about existence, 19, 23–25, 59 joy and, 102, 108 hilaritas, 86, 104, 105, 107 melancholy and, 109 liber, 26, 27, 123 rationality and, 124 perfectio, 95, 98 sorrow and, 108 potentia, 62–63, 64, 95 striving for, 101–02 quatenus, 16, 56–57, 66, 139n1

153 INDEX

Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch) (continued) logical, 17, 18 terminology of (continued) for striving, 87 about self-preservation, 102 tables of, 131, 133–35 about self-satisfaction, 125 symbolization and, 18–21 things. See particular things tristitia, 117 thought about usefulness, 114 as attribute, 15, 16, 59 vel, 17, 19 See also ens rationis; ideas; mind about virtue, 119, 120 titillatio. See pleasurable excitement (titillatio) on three kinds of knowledge, 16, 19, 32, 57, tristitia. See sorrow (tristitia) 58, 85, 87 truth Stoics Gandhi on, 103, 141n1 self-preservation and, 102 self-satisfaction and, 125 Spinoza and, 84 striving (conatus), 84–85, 87, 91–93 Underhill, Evelyn, 140n7 for activeness, 101 understanding. See conception (cognition, under- to avoid passivity, 85 standing) to avoid sorrow, 108 universal quantification, 19 for being in itself, 84–85, 87, 91, 92, 101 usefulness, 113–14, 115, 116 to be joyous, 96–97 virtue and, 113, 121 freedom and, 84, 85, 92, 101 Gandhi on, 141n1 vel, 17, 19 for perfection, 85, 100–101, 141n1 virtue, 119–22 for power, 85, 92, 101, 102 as acting according to one’s nature, 129 relations between goals and, 96–97 freedom and, 54, 120 for self-preservation, 101–02 reason and, 55, 121–22, 124 for virtue, 121 self-satisfaction and, 128 substance striving for, 121 as adequate cause, 35, 39, 41 usefulness and, 113, 121 conception of, 11–12, 23 emotions and, 90 Wetlesen, Jon, on Spinoza as expendable term, 3–4, 6, 56, 128 bonum and malum, 141n1 God as, 59 cognition gradation of, 59–60, 65, 97 adequate, 139n4 modes and, 41, 51, 140n7 emotion and, 87 one and only one, 65 inadequate, 139n2 in particular beings, 86 terms of, 139n3 virtue and, 120 freedom, grading of, 140n1 See also God power, 62 Substance, absolute virtue of, 120 whole substantiality, 59–60, 65, 97 concept of, 59–60 sunt, 9, 19 part/whole distinction, 32, 35, 110–11 symbolization will, 84 vs. formalization, 5 Windelband, Wilhelm, 140n7 value of, 20–21, 45, 66 Wolf, A., 140n1 symbols Wolfson, Harry A., 59, 140n7 for fundamental dual distinction, 14–15 Wordsworth, William, 130 for graded predicates, 65–68, 81 worldview, 76 heuristic use of, 5, 18–19, 21

154 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

155 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a visiting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ- ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Person for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visiting researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philosophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for ecocultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

156 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 References

Bryce, James B. 1921. Modern Democracies. New York: Macmillan. James, William. 1974. Essays in Pragmatism. Edited and with an introduction by Alburey Castell. New York: Hafner Publishing (1907). Le Bon, Gustave. 1931. Bases scientiﬁques d’une Philosophie de l’historie. Madrid: M. Aguilar. Nearing, Scott. 1945. Democracy Is Not Enough. New York: Island Workshop Press. Russell, Bertrand. 1917. Mysticism and Logic, 2d ed. London: G. Allen and Unwin. ———. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Simon and Schuster (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1948, 1966). Sinding, Thomas. 1949. Pengevesen og Konjunkturer. (Finance and the State of the Market). Oslo: Grøndahl. Schjelderup, Harald Krabbe. 1957. Innføring i Psykologi. (Introduction to Psychol- ogy). Oslo: Gyldendal. Wisniewski, Bohdan. 1970. Karneades, Fragmente, Text und Kommentar. Wroclawi Zaklad Narodowy Imienia Ossolinskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

111 Index

actions, reasons for, 76, 77, 78 assertion, 3, 8 advertising, 52, 97, 108 asymmetrical relation, 27 “A” entities, 4–5 agreement and disagreement begging the question, 42 pseudo-, 63–69 B entities, 4 examples, 66–72, 73–74 bias real, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68 vs. irrelevance, 109 verbal, 63–64, 65, 66, 67 in presenting opponent’s view, 99–100, alleged implication, 102–05, 107 102–05, 106–07 alternation, 56 Bryce, James B., 34 ambiguity, 2, 5, 47, 100–102, 107, 108 analytic conclusions, 61–62 Carneades, 78 analytic statements, 37, 55–61 catchphrases, 38, 51–53, 70 defined, 56 causa (motivation), 76–77 apodosis, 62 ‘C’ entities, 4–5 arguments certainty, 78 defined, 75 circle diagrams of precization, 30 meaning in, 2 circular definition, 43–44 pseudo-agreement in, 73–74 circulus vitiosus, 42–43 relative merits of, 79 clarity, 44–46 relevance in cognitive content, lxvii vs. persuasion, 97, 98, 106, 108–09 effective discussion of, 97 principles of, 97–109 of equivalent expressions, 7–8, 9, 11 in surveys, 83, 84–86, 87 in prescriptive definition, 33 surveys of, 79–84 statements as thought-content, 2–3, 4–5 completeness of, 75 cognitive equivalence, 7–8, 9, 11 examples, 86–95 in prescriptive definition, 33 issue expressions of, 80, 81–82, 83, 84, communication, lxvii 85–86, 87, 98, 109 concepts as method of thinking, 78 fruitful, 50–51 neutrality in, 100 statements as, 4–5 pitfalls, 78–79 See also ideas; statements quick decisions and, 82 conclusions reasons vs. motives in, 76–78 analytically drawn, 61–62 relevance in, 83, 84–86, 87 from opponent’s views, 102–05, 107 tenability in, 84–86 of pro aut contra surveys, 79, 80, 84 See also debate; persuasion conditional sentences, 62 Aristotle, 97 consequences, in argument, 75, 86

113 INDEX context statement equivalence, 8, 9 of argument, 106, 107 tenability and, 12 of definition, 32 essential definitions. See real definitions of expression eulogisms, 70 equivalence and, 9, 14–15 evading the issue, 42–43 interpretation and, 19 existence meaning and, 1–2, 3, 5 denotation of terms and, 20–21 precization and, 66 states of affairs and, 4 of term, 22 expressions See also situation; state of affairs context of contra arguments, 83 equivalence and, 9, 14–15 contradiction, 60 interpretation and, 19 counterarguments, 76–78 meaning and, 1–2, 3, 5 precization and, 66 debate, 97 functions of, 3 definitions in, 37 vs. sentences, 2 meaning in, 2 sentences as, 3, 4 precization and, 46–47 vs. statements, 2–3, 4–5 See also arguments; persuasion terms in, 4, 20–22, 27, 28 definiendum, 32, 39 See also equivalent expressions; interpretation; definiens, 32, 39 issue expressions; meaning; precization definitions 43–44 circular, F0. See issue expressions kinds of, 32, 34 facts the word “definition,” 31–32 arguments and, 75, 78 See also descriptive definitions; prescriptive distortion of, 105–06, 107, 109 definitions; real definitions first-order arguments, 82–83 democracy definitions of, 34, 36, 71–72 generalization presupposes competent discussion, 109 of opponent’s view, 99 denotation vs. precization, 28, 29–30 of expression, 4 of term, 20–21 Herriot, Édouard, 71–72 deprecization, 27, 53–54 Hitler, Adolf, 15, 16, 70 in political organizing, 70 depth of meaning, 22–24, 38 Ibsen, Henrik, 52 descriptive definitions, 31, 34–35 ideas combined with prescriptive, 31, 36 argument about, 97 descriptive issue expressions, 85–86 statements as, 2–3, 4–5 disagreement. See agreement and See also concepts; statements disagreement implication discussion. See arguments alleged, 102–05, 107 disjunction, 56 See also conclusions distortion of facts, 105–06, 107, 109 influence. See persuasion dyslogisms, 70 interpretation, 16–18 ambiguous, 100–102 equivalent expressions, 9–11 correct, 6–7, 20 cognitive equivalence, 7–8, 9, 11, 33 defined, 17 defined, 7, 16 depth of understanding and, 22–24 interpretations as, 17 finding interpretations, 18–19 nonequivalence and, 12–16 logical properties of, 18

114 INDEX

practical need for, lxviii, 2 muddying the issue, 44–46 precization as, 8, 26–31 Mussolini, Benito, 71, 72 in prescriptive definition, 32, 33 reasonable, 19–20, 26–28, 30–31 Nearing, Scott, 34 of terms, 21–22 negative analytic statements, 56, 57, 58 intransitive relation, 18 neutrality. See bias irrelevant arguments, 98–99, 102 nonequivalent expressions, 12–16 accusations of, 108 defined, 12, 15 vs. bias, 109 normative issue expressions, 85, 86, 87, 109 precization and, 109 “not,” 56 in pro et contra surveys, 83, 98 See also relevant arguments obscurum per obscurius, 44–46 80 81–82 83 84 85 38–39 issue expressions (F0), , , , , opinion polls, descriptive, 85–86 “or,” 56 normative, 85, 86, 87, 109 relevance and, 98, 109 P. See person person (P) James, William, 37–38 equivalent expressions and, 9–16 interpretation and, 17–20 language persuasion functions of, lxvii, 3, 26 cognitive content of, lxvii usage distortion of opponent’s views in, 46–47 describing vs. prescribing, 31 pseudo-agreement and, 70 truth and, 55–57 vs. relevant argument, 97, 98, 106, 108–09 variations in, 5–6, 48–49 See also arguments; debate; preaching; propa- Le Bon, Gustave, 71, 72 ganda logical argument, 2 petitio principii, 42 logical conclusions, 61–62 Plato’s dialogues, 97 popularization, 53–54, 69–70 meaning positive analytic statements, 56, 58, 59 changes in, 6, 48–49 preaching, lxvii, 48, 97, 109 cognitive vs. total, 7, 11 preciseness context of expression and, 1–2, 3, 5 of isolated expressions, 5 context of term and, 22 in science, 5–6, 25–26 depth of, 22–24, 38 vs. tenability, 28–29 descriptive definition and, 31, 34 of two expressions compared, 30–31 equivalence and, 10, 11, 12 precization interpretation and, lxviii, 6–7, 16–17 aims of, 25, 37–39 precization and, 38 of catchphrases, 51–53 metaphors, 51–52 circle diagrams of, 30 Mill, John Stuart, lxvii defined, 8, 26–31 misunderstanding vs. definition, 31, 39 ambiguity and, 2, 5, 47, 100–102, 107 degrees of, 25–26, 40–41 definition and, 39, 44 pseudo-agreement and, 65–66, 68–69, in everyday life, 1 73–74 of opinion polls, 38–39 deprecization, 27, 53–54, 70 precization and, 40–41, 46–47 describes existing usage, 31 relevance and, 98 for different groups, 41, 47, 60 See also pseudo-agreement; pseudo- of equivalence, 11 disagreement; understanding errors in, 46–48 motivation (causa), 76–77 formal structure of, 27

115 INDEX precization (continued) reason (ratio), 76, 77 vs. generalization, 28, 29–30 reference vs. interpretation, 27 of statement, 4 of issue expressions, 81–82 of term, 20–21 of metaphors, 51–52 reflexive relations relevance and, 109 interpretation is reflexive, 18 vs. specification, 29–30 precization is nonreflexive, 27 of terms, 27, 28 relevant arguments See also preciseness vs. persuasion, 97, 98, 106, 108–09 premises, 61–62 principles of, 97–108 prescriptive definitions, 31–33 in surveys, 83, 84–86, 87 aim of, 39–40 See also irrelevant arguments analytic statements and, 37, 57, 60–61 rhetoric, two forms of, 97 circular, 43–44 Russell, Bertrand, 35 defined, 32, 34 vs. descriptive definitions, 31, 34 S. See situation descriptive definitions combined with, 31, 36 science examples, 33–34, 35–37 analytic statements in, 59 pitfalls, 41–46 argument vs. persuasion in, 108–09 vs. precization, 31, 39 changing meanings in, 48–49 vs. real definitions, 34, 36 as context of expressions, 14–15 truth and, 55, 57 definitions in, 40 pro arguments, 76, 82–83 fruitful concepts in, 50–51 pro aut contra surveys, 79–80 popularization of, 53–54, 69–70 after pro et contra surveys, 82, 84–85, 100 preciseness in, 5–6, 25–26 example, 87 pro and contra arguments in, 78 relevance in, 87 pseudo-agreement about, 69–70 See also issue expressions pseudo-disagreement about, 69 pro et contra dicere, 78 second-order arguments, 83 pro et contra surveys, 79–84 sentences examples, 86, 87–95 as expressions, 3, 4 quick decisions and, 82 vs. expressions, 2 relevance in, 83, 84–86 vs. terms, 21 tenability in, 84–86 side issues, 98–99, 106, 108 See also issue expressions situation (S) proof potential of argument, 85 equivalence and, 9, 12–16 propaganda, 38, 48, 52, 97, 108 function of expression and, 3 protasis, 62 interpretation and, 17, 18–20 pseudo-agreement, 63–69 See also context; state of affairs in argument, 73–74 slogans. See catchphrases political examples, 70, 71–72 specification, 29–30 scientific example, 69–70 Stanislavsky, Konstantin, 2 pseudo-disagreement, 63–69 statement equivalence, 8, 9 political examples, 70–71, 72 See also equivalent expressions scientific example, 69 statements pseudo-problems, 37–38 equivalent, 10 equivalent expressions and, 7, 8, 9 rationalizations, 76 vs. expressions, 2–3, 4–5 ratio (reason), 76, 77 vs. states of affairs, 4 real definitions, 34, 35, 36 terms and, 21

116 INDEX

state of affairs, 4 transitive relations equivalence and, 9, 12, 16 interpretation is transitive, 18 See also context; situation precization is intransitive, 27 surveys. See arguments, surveys of truisms, 59–61 symmetrical relations truth interpretation is symmetrical, of analytic statements, 55–56 18 of arguments, 85 precization is asymmetrical, 27 of expressions, 2, 7, 8 synonyms, 9 prescriptive definitions and, 55, 57 by definition, 32 pseudo-agreement about, 64 synthetic statements, 37, 56–61 of statements, 4 defined, 56 of synthetic statements, 56–57 See also tenability; validity tautology, 56 tenability understanding of arguments, 84–86, 98 depth of, 22–24 of expressions in everyday life, 1 vs. equivalence, 12 See also misunderstanding vs. preciseness, 28–29 of statements, 4 validity See also truth; validity of arguments, 76, 86, 87 terms, 4, 20–22 of conclusions, 61 for concepts, 50–51 of expressions, 6–7 interpretation of, 21–22 of statements, 4 precization of, 27, 28 See also tenability; truth thought-content. See cognitive verbal agreement or disagreement, 63–64, 65, content 66, 67

117 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

119 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a visiting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ- ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Person for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visiting researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philosophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for ecocultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

120 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Notes

Chapter 2: Logical Equivalence, Intentional Isomorphism, and Synonymity as Studied by Questionnaires 1. In Interpretation and Preciseness (SWAN I) the terminology is sometimes misleading, suggesting as it does that Qs5B-synonymity and, in general, concepts of questionnaire synonymity are offered as candidates for the title “adequate definition of synonymity.” 2. The term synonymity is not taken here in any technical sense; it corresponds to the occurrences of “learning” or “intelligence” in the titles of articles in which certain technical concepts of learning or intelligence are introduced and made use of. 3. See pp. 61 ff., and particularly D14–B2 on p. 70. Strictly speaking, I do not know for certain what Carnap would wish to mean by L-equivalent if used in reference to ordinary language. The following rests on one interpretation among many possible ones. 4. A questionnaire question is here said to be misinterpreted if the interpretation differs from that intended by its framer. 5. See Naess 1954a. 6. In school we learn that the correct vernacular is based on explicit rules (usually having some exceptions), but in the light of linguistics such a view is not tenable—without heavy modifications. 7. Qs1A- rather than Qs1B-synonymity is used in this hypothesis because the respondents seldom interpret the question sentence of Qs1 as its framer does.

Chapter 3: A Study of Or 1. The study of how the child’s logical concepts arise has been approached with nonverbal techniques by J. Piaget and by B. Inhelder. See Piaget 1953. 2. The percentages here and below are percentages of the total number of classifi- able answers. The percentage of unclassifiables was high for some of the groups.

349 NOTES TO PAGES 48–79

Chapter 4: Typology of Questionnaires Adapted to the Study of Expressions with Closely Related Meanings 1. See Naess 1958: 476 (in this volume). 2. The objection that Qs-family-1-synonymity is not real synonymity is of the same nature as the objection that intelligence as measured by this or that test is not real intelligence. See Naess 1957. 3. If questionnaires have been used in a study the results of which have been published, a reference is made to the publication, here and below. 4. See species 1 of genus 1, family 1. No definite event of interpretation is presumed analyzed. Under strange, imagined conditions, the text may acquire other meanings, and these may be conceived by the subject. Qs5-synonymity is present if T and U make similar changes in meaning with similar changes of conditions. 5. See especially note 7 in Carnap’s “Meaning and synonymy in natural languages” (1956). 6. The choice of hypotheses leads to the main problems of meaning analysis of occurrences of terms in natural languages (see Naess 1954b).

Chapter 5: The Empirical Semantics of Key Terms, Phrases, and Sentences: Empirical Semantics Applied to Nonprofessional Language 1. Referred to (briefly) on pp. 383–84 in Erkenntnis 7. 2. In using this example, I do not take up the question of how “strong” the equivalences are. Some are certainly too weak to serve as a basis for substitutability.

Chapter 6: A Necessary Component of Logic: Empirical Argumentation Analysis 1. As an example of the neglect of empirical components in logic, let me re- count an amusing incident that occurred at the Congress for Unified Science convened by the logical empiricists at the Sorbonne in the 1930s. As a central feature of that congress, the organizers had chosen the presentation of Alfred Tarski’s theory of truth. This theory has an empirical component: the “ade- quacy” of definitions in relation to common usage. Although I had a large amount of material on the subject, only a small fraction of it could be said directly to confirm or corroborate the empirical pretensions of Tarski’s paper. The material was declared largely irrelevant, however, because intuitive understanding was considered sufficient.

350 NOTES TO PAGES 95–110

Chapter 7: “You Assert This?”: An Empirical Study of Weight Expressions 1. Measuring the length of text by the number of words is less adequate, because the average word in, for example, German texts is longer than in Eng- lish. As a consequence, one would overestimate the frequency of weight expressions in German if the unit of text were taken to be one word. 2. The choice of texts was to some extent based on what was available in a small library in my hut at Tvergastein. 3. For a discussion of knowledge as Verhaltensweise, see Naess 1936. 4. On confrontation with the “apodictic” certain, see Naess 1954c: 53–63. 5. The option of possibilism is favored in my Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise (1972 [SWAN IV]).

Chapter 8: Husserl on the Apodictic Evidence of Ideal Laws 1. Husserl 1913: 1:51. All quotations are from the 2d ed. (1913). (“The essential theoretical foundations of Logic lie in psychology.... Logic is related to psychology just as any branch of chemical technology is related to chemistry, as land-surveying is to geometry, etc.” Findlay ed. 1:90.) 2. Husserl 1913: 1:57. (“Theoretically regarded, Logic therefore is related to psychology as a part to a whole. Its main aim is, in particular, to set up propositions of the form: Our intellectual activities must, either generally, or in specifically characterized circumstances, have such and such a form, such and such an arrangement, such and such combinations and no others, if the resul- tant judgments are to have the character of evidence, are to achieve knowledge in the pointed sense of the word.” Findlay ed. 1:94–95.) 3. Husserl 1913: 1:68. (“The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental, essential, never-to-be-bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical and real grounds.” Findlay ed. 1:104.) 4. Husserl 1913: 1:13. (“an immediate intimation of truth itself,” and “the lumi- nous certainty that what we have acknowledged is, that what we have rejected is not.” Findlay ed. 1:60–61.) 5. Husserl 1913: 1:229. (“If now we perform an act of cognition, or, as I prefer to express it, live in one, we are ‘concerned with the object’ that it, in its cognitive fashion, means and postulates. If this act is one of knowing in the strictest sense, i.e., if our judgment is inwardly evident, then its object is given in primal fashion [originär]. The state of affairs comes before us, not

351 NOTES TO PAGES 112–29

merely putatively, but as actually before our eyes, and in it the object itself, as the object that it is, i.e., just as it is intended in this act of knowing and not otherwise, as bearer of such and such properties, as the term of such relations, etc.” Findlay ed. 1:226.) 6. Husserl 1913: 1:73. (“one of countless theoretical possibilities within a certain factually delimited sphere” . . . “the single, sole truth, which excludes all other possibilities.” Findlay ed. 1:107.)

Chapter 9: Can Knowledge Be Reached? 1. Another restriction is this: I do not speak about “knowledge” that this is a table, that it is not raining on the table, and so on. With certain kinds of everyday utterances, we scarcely talk about evidence, collecting more evidence, etc. I am talking about utterances in relation to which it is pertinent to ask, What about the evidence? 2. This last maxim does not, of course, hold if one takes “p is known” to be implied by “our evidence that p is up to the relevant standards.” Then, however, one must also face the possibility of having to accept statements such as “Yes- terday Mr. A knew that there are birds on Mars whereas Mr. B knew that there are no birds on Mars.”

Chapter 10: Pyrrhonism Revisited 1. I follow, in the main, the terminology of Sextus Empiricus and his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. This quotation, from the opening of the work, is translated rather freely. Tois zetousi is translated as “investigators” rather than as “searchers” or “seekers” in order to make it more plausible that a person can be an all-around “zetetic.” He is a permanent searcher relative to all systematic investigations, not relative to all everyday searchings. He does not find his socks less often than others (but perhaps they never were his). 2. See Outlines of Pyrrhonism, bk. 1, chap. 29. 3. The exclusion of the admitted possibility of error in knowledge claims goes back to Plato and Aristotle. See my Scepticism (1968: 77n [SWAN II]). 4. For affirmation of truth, Sextus mainly uses the term apophasis; for utterances such as exclamations, he uses phoné (sound). It is a noncommittal word that largely leaves open the kind of meaning, whether propositional or performatory. 5. See Outlines of Pyrrhonism, bk. 1, chap. 23, and Naess 1968: 10 (SWAN II). The Sceptic is said to report things “as a chronicler,” to report what strikes him at

352 NOTES TO PAGES 129–40

the moment without reflecting on truth or falsity. This characterization is misleading today because a chronicler is generally supposed to tell what is true. The Greek expression is historikos apangellomen, which may be interpreted in the direction of uttering something as indicative of one’s mind, giving vent to a feeling or attitude or unreflective belief. 6. The Sceptic deliberately “talks loosely,” according to Sextus, because otherwise the Dogmatist misunderstands his pretensions. The Sceptic does not pretend to have a definite conceptual framework within which he conceives his own Scepticism. See Naess 1968: 10 (SWAN II). 7. In defending Sextus’s way (agogé-way, not doctrine), it is important to use a distinction such as that between an idea or notion and a (fairly precise) concept. The arguments used by Sextus against holding evident or trivial sentences such as “There are men” rely heavily on requests for definitions of man or other crucial terms in the proposed “truths.” He may be said to ask for a conceptualization of “There are men” such that it is made into a theoretical proposition constituted (konstituiert) within a definite conceptual frame. Sex- tus tends not to hold back positive reaction to what “seems so,” what “seems evident,” but starts reflecting when utterances are taken to express true or false propositions. 8. A detailed discussion of incorrigibility may be found in Naess 1968: 136–51 (SWAN II). 9. In his first publications, Tarski proclaims that his conceptual construction is adequate in relation to what “true” ordinarily means, that it is “sachlich richtig.” However, no empirical investigation had been made. The data I gathered in the 1930s confirmed his hypotheses in only about 70 percent of the cases, and then only when one adopts several nonintuitive auxiliary hypotheses. 10. For some detailed arguments, see my “Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence” (1969a). 11. See, e.g., Outlines of Pyrrhonism, bk. 1, chaps. 7 and 10.

Chapter 11: Trust and Confidence in the Absense of Strict Knowledge and Truth: An Answer to Nicholas Rescher’s Critical Reappraisal of Scepticism 1. See my “Common sense and truth” (1938a: 39–58 [in this volume]) and the many interviews in my Truth as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers (1938b).

353 NOTES TO PAGES 165–95

Chapter 12: How Can the Empirical Movement Be Promoted Today? A Discussion of the Empiricism of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap 1. See writings by C. S. Peirce and W. James and their discussions with the “in- tellectualists” in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, vols. 4 ff. 2. Older formulations of physicalism may be found in Neurath 1931 and in papers by Carnap and Neurath in Erkenntnis 2: 397, 441 and Erkenntnis 3: 136, 185 ff. See The Monist 41:620. Newer formulations may be found in the publications by Carnap mentioned in the text, as well as in Neurath 1937a. See also Neurath 1935, 1937c. 3. See Naess 1936: secs. 37 ff. (n. 13). 4. See Carnap 1932a, 1934, 1935a; Hempel 1935, 1936. 5. Hull 1938; “Preliminary draft of theorem sequence covering adaptive behavior” (MS). See also the research programs (not “doctrines”): “Memorandum presenting rough preliminary statements of problem groupings involved in a coordinated study of motivation” (37c); “Notes on some tentative research projects for the investigation of motivation based primarily on hunger” (37b). 6. See also Frank 1938. 7. One can find many a striking remark on antiempirical tendencies in psychology in Neurath 1933. 8. See the publications mentioned above by Neurath and Carnap since 1935, but also: Neurath 1936a; Kämpffert 1937. (The foundation of science was the program of the “Encyclopedia Committee of the Organisation for the Unity of Science.”) 9. Because this term was often misunderstood, Bleuler later gave it up. Nowa- days he speaks of “dereistic thought.” In his textbook on psychiatry, Bleuler (1923) writes: When we give our imagination free play, in mythology, in our dreams, in many pathological states, our thought will not and cannot trouble itself with reality; it follows goals set by instincts and passions. It is characteristic of this “dereistic thought,” “the logic of feeling” (Stransky), that it disregards contradictions with reality—Mythology lets the Easter hare lay eggs because hares and eggs happen to have in common that they are sacred fertility symbols of the Ostara. A paranoid person finds a fibre of flax (Lein) in his soup; this proves his relations to Miss Feuerlein. The reality that does not fit in with such thinking is not merely ignored but actively split off. The concept of “reality” as used here by Bleuler seems to be translatable by “reality of everyday life and of the sciences”; so it is not meant as a philo-

354 NOTES TO PAGES 199–213

sophical reality concept. When I use the term autistic below, I have Bleuler’s examples in mind, particularly those in his book on medicine, and not his definitions, which on account of his use of terms like reality seem rather too unclear to me to be applied within the area of discussion of the present paper. 10. [Editors’ note: Cf. the Dutch philosopher-logician E. W. Beth’s war against the so-called philosophical disciplines—philosophical logic (for the logic of the Interregnum), Naturphilosophie, etc.—that in this opinion were continued and called by that name in order to prevent unexpected scientific results from attaining cultural and philosophical influence.] 11. [Editors’ note: The German eine Präzisierung, Norwegian en presisering, is of the greatest importance in this and other publications by Naess. The fact that English does not have a direct translation of this noun, nor of the verb å pre- sisere (en formulering), German präzisieren, makes it hard to translate texts in which one of these words occurs. I (E. M. B.) have usually translated the sentences in which they occur into ordinary English. Naess’s translators often make use of two neologisms in English: (1) to precizate an utterance of a formulation, which in Naess’s writings means exactly to make it more precise by replacing it with an utterance of another formulation that eliminates some reasonable interpretations without adding new ones; and (2) a precization (of an utterance of a formulation), which means the outcome of a precizating operation, as well as the operation itself.] Pier A. Smit has pointed out to us that C. S. Peirce had already suggested the introduction of a new word in English as a translation of presisering/ Präzisierung. Naess was not aware of that: “we only knew one paper of Peirce’s here at that time; his Collected Works came later” (Naess, in letter to E. M. B.). 12. [Editors’ note: Naess did this himself, viz., in his empirical studies of the understanding, by the man in the street, of “or,” “true,” etc.] 13. [Editors’ note: Naess’s definition of is a precization of, or is more precise than, in terms of a reduction of the class of “reasonable interpretations,” is found in his Communication and Argument (1966) and in many other publications.] 14. In this section, I have attempted to summarize the ideas that inspired me to write the treatise Wie fördert man heute die empirische Bewegung? insofar as I want to defend them today. 15. In the history of philosophy and science one finds examples of thinkers who are hardly ever characterized as empiricists but who did further the empirical movement. It is sufficient to mention Plato’s contribution to geometry and also that of Eudoxus. Moreover, there are examples of thinkers usually classi- fied as empiricists who turned down contemporary research, or who ascribed a definitive character to their own results. Here Francis Bacon and Auguste Comte may serve as examples. It would therefore not be correct to identify all

355 NOTES TO PAGES 261–74

contributions of so-called empiricists, and only those, with the empirical movement.

Chapter 14: Logical Empiricism and the Uniqueness of the Schlick Seminar: A Personal Experience with Consequences 1. I have been asked whether the influence of logical empiricists on my thinking limits itself to their wonderfully friendly—almost Gandhian—philosophy and technique of communication. Of course not. I am also indebted to them for their use of symbols. Without symbols I would have found the conceptual structure of Spinoza’s Ethics much too complicated to survey. There are about 300 important extensional equivalences between the terms he uses. That is, he in part answers (as transformation rules) or declares (as “hypotheses” about the actual use of terms) a manifold of relations that should not be neglected in any interpretation of his wonderful text. It is pathetic to see how people shy away from reading my Conceptual Structure . . . when their eyes fall on the symbolic version of Spinoza’s theorems. Incidentally, Joel I. Friedman has now studied how the proofs of the first part of the Ethics can be made acceptable from the point of view of modern formal logic. The result is that the addition of only 164 premises will do the job. The majority are utterly trivial—Spinoza would not have cared to mention them. 2. Today it is difficult to understand why Schächter’s mildly critical way of as- sessing material implication was met with indignation. He introduced a sign “symbol” to symbolize an if-then relation closer to that of everyday language. The sign “-” indicates that nothing is said in these cases. p, q p → q- p → qp → q- p- → q- WW W F - - WF F W - - FW - - W F FF - - F W It was found intolerable that Schächter (p. 176 in his dissertation) flatly denied that logic consists of tautologies: its rules are obviously not tautologies, nor are its grammatical Konstatierungen—I deplore that he did not explain why material implication was extensively used, seemingly with great success. 3. Dissatisfaction with the treatment of empirical components of philosophical problems within the analytical tradition made me work many years on experimental and other procedures to arrive at scientifically testable conclusions on the use of words, in scientific and everyday language. In the preface to Interpre- tation and Preciseness (1953 [SWAN I]), my last effort to make a new unpreten- tious, slight Wende der Philosophie, I state my aims in formulations like the following:

356 NOTES TO PAGES 280–93

Very roughly, one may distinguish a deductive, an intuitionistic, and an empirical component in the writing of analytical philosophers. Even in those cases where deductions and intuitions can help us considerably, consistent neglect of the empirical component will bring research toward stagnation. If empirical studies are neglected, we shall see much intelligent debate along intuitionistic lines, but less of that process which many of us find so inspiring in the history of philosophy and science: the development of new branches of reliable knowledge as a result of combined philosophical and scientific efforts. My efforts to establish a wide group of “scientifically inclined” philosophers who in close cooperation would pursue the empirical components of the problems facing logical empiricists largely failed—for reasons that were not too difficult to unravel. As regards professional studies of language, Noam Chomsky told me frankly in about 1955 that their interest in the years to come would go in a very different direction: that of deep grammar, transformational grammar, generative grammar, and so on. He was perfectly right. Even though studies of the use of terms like democracy, ideology, and objectivity increased in importance before, during, and after World War II, and especially during the Cold War, performing detailed investigations of the sort I had in mind was not inspiring. In the politically relevant field, Chomsky chose a more fruitful, direct way of cooperation than mine! However, some logicians and philosophers have persevered; see, for example, From an Empirical Point of View, edited by E. M. Barth, J. van Dormael, and F. Vandamme.

Chapter 15: The Spirit of the Vienna Circle Devoted to Questions of Lebens- and Weltauffassung 1. [Editors’ note: See “Logical Empiricism and the Uniqueness of the Schlick Seminar: A Personal Experience with Consequences,” this volume.] 2. For more about this, see my Scepticism (1968, 1969b [SWAN II]). 3. What is said in this article about total views and Spinozistic views is elaborated in various publications. See, e.g., Naess 1975 (SWAN VI), 1989.

Chapter 16: Do We Know That Basic Norms Cannot Be True or False? 1. Professor Alf Ross emphatically disapproves of my suggestion in a previously published version of this article that value objectivism should be less icily considered than has been the case in recent Scandinavian philosophy of value. He refers to his own counterarguments in “On the logical nature of propositions of value” (1945). I have in what follows tried to show why his counterar-

357 NOTES TO PAGES 295–307

guments are not convincing. Magister E. Stroheim has, by his unpublished manuscript, influenced my conclusions (toward a priorism). 2. See Ofstad (1951: 55 ff.) for a summary of Ross’s argument. 3. Empirical tests of various kinds have shown that this way of speaking is rather common, but not, or at least not always, associated with an explicit or implicit belief in a normative or ideal “reality,” a Platonic heaven. 4. “Nun gibt diese ideale Forderungen, die weder in einer objektiven Realität, noch in unserm Subjekt ihre Heimat hat, ebendamit ein Problem auf, dass man wahrscheinlich nur durch das Axiom lösen kann, dass diese als Anspruch des Daseins an uns auftretende Ordnung eine selbständige, nicht auf Bekannteres zu reduzierende, völlig autochtone Kategorie ist.... Es kann diese Entgegengesetztheir der Ursprünge zu haben scheinen, weil es tatsäch- lich von keinem dieser herkommt, sondern einen ebenso primären und eigen- rechtlichen Ursprung hat, wie das subjektive Leben und die äussere oder die geschichtliche Realität” (Simmel 1950: 117). 5. A critique is attempted in my “Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws” (1954c [in this volume]). 6. See, for example, what Henry Sidgwick, the intuitionist, has to say: “when I speak of the cognition or judgment that ‘X ought to be done’—in the stricter ethical sense of the term ought—as a ‘dictate’ or ‘precept’ of reason to the persons to whom it relates, I imply that in rational beings as such this cognition gives an impulse or motive to action: though in human beings, of course, this is only one motive among others which are liable to conflict with it, and is not always—perhaps not usually—a predominant motive” (Sidgwick 1874: 34). “Unser Bewusstsein empfindet Forderungen an sich gerichtet, die es durch den Willen realisieren kann” (Simmel 1950: 114). Our obligation can be realized or our wish to do our duty only if the prescription furnishes a sufficiently strong motive. 7. The narrowness of this conception is well argued by Marc-Wogau in his “Axel Hägerströms verklighetsteori” (1940). The author thinks that scepticism about the existence of nonmaterial worlds sometimes owes to lack of empirical reasons. This is in line with our own thinking. 8. One main source of Ross’s argument for value nihilism is his requirement that truths should be testable or confirmable in a rather definite way, which he describes in detail. If this requirement is accepted as a basic postulate, the position of value objectivists is indeed in mortal danger; but why should the objectivists accept it? It has the form of a postulate, and arguments presum- ing acceptance of the postulate are irrelevant to those who do not accept it. For criticism of the postulate, see Ofstad 1951.

358 NOTES TO PAGES 333–42

Chapter 20: Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism 1. I follow here the gestalt terminology I used in “The world of concrete contents” (1985: 417–28 [in this volume]). 2. See, e.g., what Suzuki (1963: 140) calls the “ground-principles of the philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism, and, indeed, of all the schools of Buddhism”: 1. All is momentary (sarvam ksanikam). 2. All is empty (cunyam). 3. All is without self (anatmam). 4. All is such as it is (tathatvam). 3. See, e.g., Johansson’s excellent Pali Buddhist Texts (1973: 35). 4. In the oblique cases, sva is used as a reflexive pronoun, synonymously with a-tman. 5. Therefore, I think D. G. Merzel’s comment (1982: 1) might be misleading: This teaching of the illusory nature of the ego is the core of Buddhism, and the Diamond Sutra is one of its most profound expressions. According to this sutra even the idea of liberating all beings must not be cherished because in reality there is not one to be saved. If we think, “I must help this person,” we are seeing things dualistically. We are operating out of the idea that there is a self, an “I,” that is doing the saving, and one that is going to be saved. In this quotation, Merzel freely uses the word we: “if we think . . . we are seeing . . . we are operating....” To me, this use of the personal pronoun is neither more nor less metaphysically relevant than the use of the word I in saying “I must help this person.” 6. The Buddhist scholar Robert Aitken, who encouraged me to publish this article, has in a personal letter made a couple of comments of importance: About the word satori: this usually refers to an experience, but sometimes it refers to a state or condition. It implies something complete, and in view of the ongoing process of realization after realization, Zen masters generally don’t use it, preferring the word kensho, which means “seeing into (true) nature,” and by usage implies a glimpse. D. T. Suzuki used satori a lot, so this practice is copied by others. I wonder if references to inochi and kuyo should include their ordinary translations, “life” and “memorial service.” I think that Professor Abe’s statement “Only through one’s self-realization can one attain nirvana,” refers to a personal grasp of the fact that all things are empty, and also of the fact that nirvana and samsara are the same. I don’t think that it reflects any concern by Dogen that the process of generation and extinction be eliminated. The Mahayana view that all beings are enlightened from the beginningless beginning makes process a matter of realizing what has always been true.

359 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Abe, Masao. 1985. Zen and Western Thought, edited by William R. LaFleur. Hono- lulu: University of Hawaii Press. Ayer, Alfred J. 1962. The Problem of Knowledge. London: Pelican. Barth, E. M., J. van Dormael, and F. Vandamme, eds. 1992. From an Empirical Point of View: The Empirical Turn in Logic. Ghent: Communication and Cognition. Black, Max. 1954. “Pragmatic justification of induction.” In Problems of Analysis, edited by Max Black. London: Greenwood. Bleuler, Eugen. 1921. Das autistisch-undisziplinierte Denken in der Medizin. Berlin: Julius Springer. ———. 1923. Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie, 4 vols. Berlin: Julius Springer. Buhler, Karl. 1990. Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language. Translated by D.F. Goodwin. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Pub- lishing Company. Bridgman, P. W. 1927. The Logic of Modern Physics. New York: Macmillan. ———. 1934. “A physicist’s second reaction to Mengenlehre.” Scripta Mathematica 2: 101–17. Carnap, Rudolf. 1932a. “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wis- senschaft.” Erkenntnis 2: 432–65. ———. 1932b. “Psychologie in physikalistischer Sprache” (Psychology in physical language). Erkenntnis 3: 107–41. ———. 1934. The Unity of Science, translated by Max Black. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner. ———. 1935. “Les concepts physiques et les concepts psychologiques sont-ils dif-

361 REFERENCES

férents?” (Concepts of physics and concepts of psychology, are they different?). Revue de Synthèse 10. ———. 1936a. “Testability and meaning.” Philosophy of Science 3: 419–71. ———. 1936b. “Über die Einheitssprache der Wissenschaft: Logische Bemerkun- gen zum Projekt einer Enzyklopädie.” In Actes du congrès international de philosophie scientifique, Sorbonne 1935. Paris. ———. 1937. Logical Syntax of Language. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Treubner. ———. 1942. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ———. 1956. “Meaning and synonymy in natural languages.” In Meaning and Ne- cessity, 2d ed., by R. Carnap (Chicago, 1956); also in American Philosophers at Work, edited by Sidney Hook (New York, 1956). Originally published 1955 in Philosophical Studies. Comte, Auguste. 1842. Cours de la philosophie positive (Course on the positive philosophy). Paris. Darwin, Charles. 1882. The Descent of Man. London: J. Murray. Feyerabend, Paul. 1976. “Logic, Literacy and Professor Gellner.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 381–91. Føllesdal, Dagfinn, and E.S. Engelstad, editors. 1957. Oslo Studentenes Idrettslag 75, Ar/Oslo-Studentenes Idrettslag. Oslo: Laget. Frank, Philipp. 1917. “Die Bedeutung der physikalischen Erkenntnistheorie Machs für das Geistesleben der Gegenwart.” Die Naturwissenschaften 5: 65–72. ———. 1938. “Bemerkungen zu E. Cassirer: Determinismus und Indeterminis- mus in der modernen Physik.” Theoria 4: 70–80. Hamilton, William. 1870. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. 4. Edinburgh: Blackwood. Hartmann, Nicolai. 1949. Ethik. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Hempel, Carl G. 1935. “Analyse logique de la psychologie.” Revue de Synthèse 10: 27–42. ———. 1936. “Some remarks on empiricism.” Analysis 3. Hodgson, Shadworth. 1878. Philosophy of Reflection, 2 vols. London: Longmans and Green. Holleman, Arnold F. 1927. Lehrbuch der organischen Chemie (Textbook of organic chemistry). Berlin & Leipzig: de Gruyter. Hull, Clark L. 1937a. “Memorandum presenting rough preliminary statements of problem groupings involved in a coordinated study of motivation.” Unpub- lished ms.

362 REFERENCES

———. 1937b. “Mind, mechanism, and adaptive behavior.” Psychological Review 44: 1–32. ———. 1937c. “Notes on some tentative research projects for the investigation of motivation based primarily on hunger.” Unpublished ms. ———. 1938. “Preliminary draft of theorem sequence covering adaptive behavior.” Unpublished ms. Hume, David. 1951. Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Husserl, Edmund. 1913. Logische Untersuchungen, 2d ed., 2 vols. Halle: M. Niemeyer. ———. 1970. Logical Investigations, translated and edited by J. N. Findlay. Lon- don: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Jaspers, Karl. 1962. The Great Philosophers, 2 vols. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Johansson, Rune. 1973. Pali Buddhist Texts Explained to the Beginner. Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph 14. Lund: Studentlitteratur (London: Curzon Press, 1981). Kämpffert, W. 1937. “Science encyclopedia.” New York Times, February 14. Kiepert, Ludwig. 1920. Grundriss der Integral-Rechnung. Hannover. Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1944. Either-Or, translated by David and Lillian Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kolakowski, Leszek. 1968a. The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. ———. 1968b. Toward a Marxist Humanism, translated by J. Z. Peel. New York: Grove Press. ———. 1972. A Leszek Kolakowski Reader. TriQuarterly 22. Evanston, IL: North- western University. ———. 1973. “Two eyes of Spinoza.” In Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Marjorie Grene. New York: Anchor. Leroux, Emmanuel. 1923. Le pragmatisme americain et anglais: Etude historique et critique. Paris: Felix Alcan. Le Roy, Edouard. 1930. La pensée intuitive, vol. 2. Paris: Boivin. Linsky, Leonard. 1952. Semantics and the Philosophy of Language. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Loomis, Frederic B. 1926. The Evolution of the Horse. Boston: Marshall Jones.

363 REFERENCES

Lövestad, Ludvig. 1945a. Bidrag til en metodelaere for de eksakte naturvitenskaper. Oslo: Klubben. ———. 1945b. “The structure of physical laws.” Theoria 11: 40–70. Lundstedt, Anders V. 1925. Superstition or Rationality in Action for Peace.London: Longmans, Green. Mach, Ernst. 1883. Die Entwicklung der Mechanik. Leipzig: Brockhaus. Marc-Wogau, Konrad. 1940. “Axel Hägerströms verklighetsteori.” Tiden 32. Marhenke, Paul. 1922. Scientific Method and the Determination of the Moral End. Berkeley: University of California. ———. 1949. “The criteria of significance.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1950. Reprinted in Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, edited by Leonard Linsky. Urbana: University of Illinois Press (1970). Mates, Benson. 1950. “Synonymity.” In University of California Publications in Phi- losophy 25: 210–26. Reprinted in Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, edited by Leonard Linsky. Urbana: University of Illinois Press (1952). Merzel, D. Gempo. 1980. “No mind, no Buddha; gateless gate: Case 33.” The Ten Directions (journal of the Zen Center of Los Angeles and the Institute for Trans- cultural Studies) 1, no. 3. Morris, Charles W. 1946. Signs, Language and Behavior. New York: Prentice-Hall. ———. 1960. “On the history of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.” Synthese 12: 517–21. Müller, Conrad H., and G. Prange. 1923. Allgemeine Mechanik. Hannover: Heliving. Naess, Arne. 1936. Erkenntnis und Wissenschaftliches Verhalten (Knowledge Acquisi- tion and Scientific Behavior). Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. ———. 1937. “Physikalismus und radikaler Empirismus” (Physicalism and radical empiricism). Unpublished ms. ———. 1937–38. “Gesetzmessigkeiten bei Argumentationsketten.” Erkenntnis 7: 383–84. ———. 1938a. “Common sense and truth.” Theoria 4: 39–58. (in this volume) ———. 1938b. Truth as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Science and Jacob Dybwad. ———. 1941. Tenkningens utvikling (The development of thinking), I. Oslo: For Nyere Tid, Universitets Studentkontor, S.S.S.S. Trykk. ———. 1942. Tenkningens utvikling (The development of thinking), II. Oslo: For Nyere Tid, Universitets Studentkontor, S.S.S.S. Trykk. ———. 1948. “Notes on the foundation of psychology as a science.” In Philosophi- cal Problems, edited by Arne Naess. Oslo: University of Oslo Press (1960).

364 REFERENCES

———. 1953. Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to a Theory of Communica- tion. Oslo: Nowegian Academy of Science and Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I) ———. 1954a. An Empirical Study of the Expressions “True,” “Perfectly Certain,” and “Extremely Probable.” Oslo: Skrifter utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi, Hist.–Filos. Klasse, 1953, no. 4. ———. 1954b. “Forekomstanalysens grunn-problemer.” Nordisk Sommeruniver- sitet 1953. Copenhagen. ———. 1954c. “Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws.” Theoria: A Journal of Swedish Philosophy 20: 53–63. (in this volume) ———. 1957. “Synonymity as revealed by intuition.” Philosophical Review 56: 87–93. ———. 1958. “Logical equivalence, intentional isomorphism and synonymity as studied by questionnaires, sacred to the memory of Gerrit Mannoury.” Synthese 10a (1956–1958): 471–79. (in this volume) ———. 1966. Communication and Argument. London: Allen and Unwin (Oslo: Uni- versity of Oslo Press, 1966). (SWAN VII) ———. 1968. Scepticism. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. (SWAN II) ———. 1969a. “Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence: The structure of a small, central part of Spinoza’s Ethics.” Inquiry 12: 66–104. ———. 1969b. Scepticism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (SWAN II) ———. 1972. The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. (SWAN IV) ———. 1974. “Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza’s Ethics.” Oslo: Inquiry, Filosofisk Institutt, University of Oslo. ———. 1975. Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza’s “Ethics.” Oslo: University of Oslo Press. (SWAN VI) ———. 1980. Filosofiens historie (History of philosophy), 2 vols. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. ———. 1985. “The world of concrete contents.” Inquiry 28: 417–28. (in SWAN X) ———. 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Cambridge: The University Press. Nara, Yasuaki. 1985. “The practical value of Dogen’s view of nature.” Mimeo- graphed. Neurath, Otto. 1931. Empirische Soziologie (Empirical sociology). Wien: Julius Springer (English translation, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973). ———. 1932a. “Sine arte nihil est.” Scientia 5. ———. 1932b. “Sozialbehaviorismus.” Sociologus 8. ———. 1933. Einheitswissenschaft und Psychologie.Vienna.

365 REFERENCES

———. 1935. Le devéloppement du Cercle de Vienne et l’avenir de l’empirisme logique. Paris: Hermann. ———. 1936a. “Encyclopédie comme modèle.” Revue de Synthèse 12: 187–201. ———. 1936b. International Picture Language. London: Kegan Paul. ———. 1936c. Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Repub- lished, 1938, as Encyclopedia of Unified Science. ———. 1937a. “Physikalismus und Erkenntnisforschung. Bemerkungen au Ake Petzall: Methodenproblem der Erkenntnisforschung.” Theoria 2: 97–105. ———. 1937b. “Unified science and its encyclopedia.” Philosophy of Science 4: 265–77. Nordenstam, Tore. 1972. Empiricism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. Ofstad, Harald. 1951. “Objectivity of norms and value judgments according to recent Scandinavian philosophy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12: 42– 68. Ogden, C. K., and I. A. Richards. 1946. The Meaning of Meaning. New York: Har- court, Brace and World. Österberg, Dag. 1962. “We know that norms cannot be true or false: Critical comments on Arne Naess’ ‘Do we know that norms cannot be true or false?’” Theoria 28: 200–204. Peirce, Charles. 1931. Collected Papers, 8 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Piaget, Jean. 1953. Logic and Psychology. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Rescher, Nicholas. 1980. Scepticism: A Critical Reappraisal. Oxford: Blackwell. Revie, Virgil A. 1948. The Measurement of Personal and Interpersonal Vagueness in the Use of Words, Ph.D. diss. University of California, Berkeley. Richter, Raoul H. M. 1908. Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie, vol. 2. Leipzig: Ver- lag der Durrschen Buchhandlung (1904–08). Ross, Alf. 1945. “On the logical nature of propositions of value.” Theoria 11: 172– 210. ———. 1953. Om Ret og Retfúrdighed. Copenhagen. Russell, Bertrand. 1929. “Three ways to the world.” In The World Man Lives In, edited by Baker Brownell. New York: Van Nordstrom. ———. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: Allen and Unwin. Salmon, Wesley. 1954. “Pragmatic justification for induction.” In Problems of Analysis, edited by Max Black. London: Greenwood.

366 REFERENCES

Schächter, Josef. 1973. Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Grammatik (Prolegomena to critical grammar), translated by J. F. Staal. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel. Sextus Empiricus. 1933. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, translated by R. G. Bury. London: Loeb Classic Library, Heinemann. Sidgwick, Henry. 1874. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan (7th ed., 1907). Simmel, Georg. 1950. Hauptprobleme der Philosophie, 7th ed. Berlin: Göschen Ausgabe. Spinoza, Benedictus de. 1963. Ethics. London and New York: Dent and Dutton. Stevenson, Charles L. 1944. Language and Ethics. New Haven: Yale University Press (London: Oxford University Press). Suzuki, D. T. 1963. Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism. New York: Schocken Books. Tønnessen, Herman. 1980. Problems of Knowledge. Assen: Gorcum. Walker, Leslie J. 1910. Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism. Lon- don and New York: Longmans, Green. Windelband, Wilhelm. 1914. Einleitung in die Philosophie (Introduction to philosophy). Tübingen: Mohr. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus logico-philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Treubner. ———. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Ox- ford: Blackwell. Zappfe, P. W. 1941. Om det Tragiske (On the tragic). Oslo: Gyldendal.

367 Index

a posteriori argumentation, 293–94 “assumptionism,” 102 a posteriori questions leading us to empirical assumptions, 97–99, 223–26 research, 311–12 Atman, 336 a priori arguments, 293–94 Austin, John L., 60 a priorism incompatible with empiricism, 304–05 autonomy, 282 Abe, Masao, 334 auxiliary concepts, 193 absolute formulations, 8–9 Ayer, Alfred J., 119, 217–60 absolutes, belief in, 15, 16 absolutism, 188, 210, 305, 306 Ballungen, 272 action behaviorism, 189, 196, 208 absolutist requirements of ground for, 130–32 “logical,” 276, 277 how strongly normative insights should moti- belief, 314 vate, 303–04 natural, 223, 225, 257 moral vs. beautiful, 284 in science, 215 agreement and disagreement analysis, 66 “beyond reasonable doubt,” 222 agreement and pseudoagreement, analysis of, Black, Max, 310 82–85 Bleuler, Eugen, 195, 354–55n9 Aitken, Robert, 360n6 Bridgman, P. W., 167 analytic/synthetic distinction, 70–71 Brunswick, Egon, 273, 276–78 See also possibility, logical vs. empirical Buddha, everything may become, 334–35 analytoform, 71 Buddhaghosa, 338 antimetaphysical and ametaphysical attitudes, Buddhism, 333–40, 359–60nn5–6 191–92, 207, 212 Bühler, Karl, 64, 278 apodictic evidence. See under evidence argumentation calculus, 171 a posteriori, 293–94 of propositions, 107 “deep and open” approach to, 80 Carnap, Rudolf, 70, 106, 165, 174–75, 179–82, See also clarification and assessment game 269–72, 276, 285, 289 argumentation analysis, 80–81 changes in his opinions, 163 argumentational synonymity, 54–55 on encyclopedia project, 193–94 argument(s) extensionalist thesis, 56, 57 a priori, 293–94 on Heidegger, 271 imaginary planet with no, 309 intensionalist thesis, 56–58 not good enough, 131 on language, 171–75 Aristotle, 133, 143, 270, 298, 299, 317 on logical equivalence, 26, 28

369 INDEX

Carnap, Rudolf (continued) decisiveness Naess’s interactions with, 268, 270, 276 requirements for, 130–31 personal characteristics, 268 types of, 131 on physical language, 176–79 declarative sentences, 49, 302–03 on psychology, 190–91, 208 definability, 177–78 on reducibility, 167, 177–79 See also reducibility “Testability and meaning,” 178, 180, 204–08 definiteness of intention, 75, 90, 92–93, 264 See also physicalism degree of, as factor in argumentation, 86– Carnapian doctrine of syntax of language of 87 science, 187 experiment on, 68–69 certainty, 269 measures of, 72 See also predictions of experiences of apodictic definiteness of intention analysis, 66 evidence definitions, 314–15 chemistry, history of, 212 operational, 67 choices, correct vs. deep, 345 definitoid sentences, 287 See also freedom democracy, 226–27 Chomsky, Noam, 357n3 Descartes, René, 339 clarification, 202 descriptive sentences, 302–03 clarification and assessment game, options in a, designations, 49 81–82, 202 determinism, 248 Climacus, Johannes, 343, 346, 348 dialectic, 199–200 “cognitive heteronym,” 204–05 Diderot, Denis, 273 cognitivists, 143 difference, 202 Common Market, 254–56 inconceivability of, as condition of acceptance, common sense, 219–20 28 autonomy of, 134 See also isomorphism; synonymity commonsense (cs-) theories (of truth), 3–4, discrimination, degree of, 86 7 discrimination acuity. See definiteness of communication, 66 intention indirect, 348 discussing, proposals concerning the technique in philosophy, 262–64 of, 190–92 communities, 281–82 discussion, 199 See also language community disjunction Comte, Auguste, 215, 275 inclusive vs. exclusive, 34, 35, 37, 38 concept formation, 209 See also “or” conceptual analysis, 338 dogmatism (and Dogmatists), 125, 129–30, 133, confidence, 140, 222–25 135, 142–43, 152–55 test of, 17 “meaningless,” 267 See also weight expression(s) dualism, 339–40 contradiction(s), 111, 112 Duhem-Poincaré, 181 law of, 100 See also Mach-Duhem-Poincaré theorem principle of, 107, 109 Duhem-Poincaré thesis, 183–84 “showing,” 73–75 conventionalism, 102 economics, 254–56 creativity and gestalt thinking, 327–31 ecophilosophy and ecosophy, 284–85 cultures. See language community education, Kierkegaard and the values of, 343 correct vs. deep choices, 345 Darwin, Charles, 89–90 the ethical and the inward, 346–47 debate, 199 to hold true opinions and to “be in truth,” decision criteria, 166–67, 191–93 345–46

370 INDEX

illusion of greatness and unimportance of Ethics (Spinoza), 73–78, 87, 275, 276, 286–88, results, 347–48 356n1 indirect communication, 348 evidence against pretentious and premature systems, apodictic 343–44 of ideal laws, 105–13 ego, 231–36, 336, 359n5 predictions of experiences of, 107–13 See also self; subject-object dualism objective, 5 Einfälle, 16–17 evil, problem of, 341 either-or, 39, 40, 43 exclamations, 280 Elders, Fons, 217–60 sceptical, 129 “embryonic” philosophical theories, 62, 66 exclusive disjunction, 34, 37, 38, 43 empirical approach, 80–81 “exclusive or” inferences, 41 empirical attitude, 165–68, 182, 195–96, 199– extensional equivalence, expressions of, 76–78 201 extensionalist thesis, 56, 57 empirical movement, 198–99, 201, 211–15, 356n16 fact, 314 empirical semantics, 59, 62, 204–07, 209 vs. interpretation, 241–43 Empirical Semantics (ES) use of the term, 61, 241–43 characterization of, through contrasts, 59– factual question, 316 65 fallibilism, 143 main fields of research in, 65–66 “false.” See “true” (and “false”) rules or habits, 65 fanaticism, normative objectivism leading to, synonymity, operations and operational- 305–07 ism, 67–73 fear, 224–25 See also semantical concepts Feyerabend, Paul, 60 empiricism (vs. antiempiricism), 106, 192, 195– force, concepts of, 33 99, 203, 211 Frank, Philipp, 165, 189, 193, 274 a priorism incompatible with, 304–05 “free,” 74–75 decision criterion, 166–67, 191–93 absolute vs. nonabsolute sense of the term, definitions, 198 75 demarcation criteria, 200–201 “free thing,” 74 absence of universally valid, 164–68 freedom of the will, 248 physicalism, 168–71 See also choices extreme, 106 Frege, Gottlob, 98, 267 promoting it by unburdening it theoretically, Friedman, J., 75 197–98 Fukai, Mr., 322 radical, 207–08 See also logical empiricism Gandhi, Mahatma, 229–31, 264–65, 273 Encyclopedia of Unified Science project, 200, 209–11, Gemeinschaft to Gessellschaft, movement from, 272, 273, 276–77 281–82 Carnap on, 193–94 generalizations, 225 Neurath and, 180, 192–94, 196, 211, 273, 275 geometry, 114 significance for the empirical movement, 192– history, 212 97 German culture entrepreneurial culture, 282 physicalism, science, and philosophy in, equivalence, 288 170 strings of, 76, 77 German metaphysics, 211 ethical and the inward, the, 346–47 Gleichschaltung, 145, 155 ethics, 13, 204, 238, 284 God, 287 See also “ought” love of, 76–77

371 INDEX

Golden Rule, 299, 306 indecision regarding truth, 137 greatness, illusion of, 347–48 individuality, 336 See also self habits, language as set of, 65 induction, principle of, 310 Hägerström, Axel, 307, 311 inference rules, 42 Hamilton, William, 5 inochi (life), 340–42 Hartmann, Nicolai, 300–301 intellectuals, 252–53 Heidegger, Martin, 269, 271 intensional concepts, 56–57 Hempel, Carl G., 181, 271–72 intensionalist thesis, 56–58 hermeneutical spiral as factor in argumentation, intensity, principle of, 319–25 87–88 interconnectedness (of all things), 223, 231–38 heteromorphic expressions, 28–29 See also subject-object dualism historiography, history of, 212–13 Interpretation and Preciseness (Naess), 56, 209 Hitschmann, Edward, 266 intrinsics/intrinsic value, 339–42 Hodgson, Shadworth, 5 intuition, belief in, 60 Holleman, Arnold F., 175 inwardness, 347–48 Hollitscher, Walter, 262, 267, 271 Irrefutability of Knowledge, The, 141 homo liber (free human being), 74 isomorphical N-synonymity, 29–31 homofugal conception of truth, 118 isomorphism homofugal expressions, 100, 102, 119, 121 intentional, 28–32, 47 homopetal conception of truth, 118 logical, 47 homopetal expressions, 100–102, 119 isothenia, 132 Hull, Clark L., 354n5 humanism, 228 James, William, 76, 276 Hume, David, 228, 258, 308 Jaspers, Karl, 318 Hume’s argument inverted, 308–09 Hung, Tscha, 267 Kant, Immanuel, 283–84 Husserl, Edmund, 300, 301, 351–52nn1–6 Kiepert, Ludwig, 100 on apodictic evidence of ideal laws, 105–13 Kierkegaard, Soren, 129 law of contradiction, 100 and the values of education, 343–48 Logische Untersuchungen, 100, 105, 106 knowing, 94, 142 hypothesis(es) vs. not knowing, 155–58 meaning, 72 knowledge, 157 scientific, 92 by acquaintance vs. description, 91 testability, 59, 69–70 as calcified research, 93–95 working, 97–98 defined, 121 possibility of reaching, 115–23 “I,” 318 necessary and sufficient conditions of, See also self 116–18 ideal existences, meeting and grasping, 109–12 problems using the term, 140–41 ideal laws, 107–09 pure theory of, 112 ideale Bedeutungen, 112–13 truth requirement of, 116, 123 identification. See self used in strict vs. loose sense, 145–51 illusion of greatness, 347–48 knowledge claims, 143–44, 156 impermanence, 333 socially justifiable and unjustifiable, 156–57 inclusive disjunction, 34 Kolakowski, Leszek, 73 See also “or” kuyo (memorial service), 340–42 inconsistency, 73–74 incorrigibility, 132, 157, 226 language, 285 awareness of, 132 Carnap’s term, 171–74 incorrigibility principle, 157 conceptions and models of, 64, 65, 171, 174

372 INDEX

importance for philosophy, 267 meaning, 72, 201 of science, 172–75, 187 nearness of (see extensional equivalence) as system of rules, 65, 171–76 sameness of (see isomorphism) See also spontaneous experience of statements, determining, 181–84 language community/language system, 144–53 See also empirical semantics Language and Ethics (Stevenson), 204 meaning hypothesis, 72 Le Roy, Edouard, 4–5 meaning-distance, 24–25 Lebens- und Weltauffasung, 281, 285, 286 See also synonymity Leroux, Emmanuel, 3, 4 mechanics, 33 liber (free), 74 “mental-corporeal” contrariety, 208 life, intrinsic value of, 340–41 Merzel, D. G., 359n5 Life and World Until Now, status of basic views on, meta-logical approach, 34–35 281 metaoccurrence analysis, 66, 72, 73 Linsky, Leonard, 69 metaphysics, 164–65, 170, 180, 185, 191, 199, linguistic community. See language community 206–07, 236–37 logic morality and, 238 formal, 80, 107 metaquestionnaires, 56 has empirical components and needs empirical models research, 79 vs. systems, 186–88, 192 meta-logical and object-logical verbalized of thought, 189 tasks, 34–35 moral vs. beautiful action, 284 “natural history” of, 33–34 morality use of and talk about, 34–35 metaphysics and, 238 logical empiricism, 164 See also ethics Austrian culture and, 274 Morris, Charles W., 60, 204, 269, 273 Brunswick on, 273 and the encyclopedia, 211 Naess, Arne, 144, 208, 266, 311, 317, history, 163, 272, 274 355nn11–13 See also empiricism Ayer on, 219 logical empiricists, 59–60, 64, 165, 203, 277, Nara, Yasuaki, 334, 337–41 278, 356n1, 357n3 natural belief, 223, 225, 257 language, semantics, and, 204, 214, 269–70 “necessarily,” 89 logical equivalence, 26–28 Neurath, Otto, 70, 117, 165, 200, 207, 268, 272– defined, 26 74, 276 See also synonymity attitude toward philosophy, 211 logico-empirical/logical-empiricist orientation, and the encyclopedia, 180, 192–94, 196, 211, 165, 211 273, 275 See also logical empiricism physicalism and, 168–69, 184, 185, 190–92 Loomis, Frederic B., 90 on psychology, 190–91, 208 Løvestad, Ludvig, 70–71 on space and time, 184–85, 191 neurophysiology, 181 Mach, Ernst, 33, 189, 272 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 210 Mach-Duhem-Poincaré theorem, 74, 289 nihilism, 302 See also Duhem-Poincaré thesis nirvana, 336, 360n6 Malcolm, Norman, 60 nonviolence, 229–30, 248–49, 273, 340–41 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 64, 267, 276 Nordenstam, Åke, 70 Marhenke, Paul, 3, 4 norm sentences, 280 materialism, 186 are meaningless and cannot be true or false, materialists, 169 297 Mates, Benson, 23–26, 28 counterargument, 297–98 mathematics, 108, 114, 212, 264, 347 normative insights, motivating action, 303–04

373 INDEX normative knowledge, ontological argument physicalism, 174, 184, 187, 203, 210 against, 298, 301–07 Carnap and Neurath’s demarcation criteria counterargument, 298–301 and, 168–71 normative objectivism, leading to fanaticism, formulations of, 177, 179–80 305–07 Neurath’s definition of, 185 norms, 231, 293, 294, 309, 321 and proposals concerning the technique of are not propositions, 295 discussing, 190–92 two counterarguments, 295–97 psychology and, 181, 188, 189 as being true or false, 313–18 “Physicalism and radical empiricism” (Neurath), as descriptions, 301–03 207–08 disagreement about, 307–08 physicalist language, 177 doctrine that they cannot be true or false, physicalist thesis, evaluation of, 188 294–95 physicalization, 182 how to verify, 307–08 physicists, 169 verification of, as problematic, 307–08 physics, 33, 169, 186, 189 numerical set, 173 physiology, 181, 182 Platonism, 300, 317 objective evidence, 5 plausibility, assessment of, 74 objectivism, normative, 305–07 politics (and philosophy), 226–30, 243–44, object-logical approach, 34, 35 253–56 occurrence analysis, 65, 72, 73 Popper, Karl, 60, 69, 168, 264 Ofstad, Harald, 302 positivism, 164, 206, 275 Ogden, C. K., 275–76 logical, 201 oneness. See interconnectedness See also empiricism ontology, 102, 316 possibility, logical vs. empirical, 223–24, 316–17 openness of the mind, 144 See also analytic/synthetic distinction operationalism and operational view, 167, 208 postulates, 128, 134 See also under Empirical Semantics power, 76, 77 “or,” 34–35 pragmatics, 56–57, 60, 269, 276 questionnaire study of the use of, 37–39 precization, 68 results, 39–43 predictions of experiences of apodictic evidence, and sentential connectives V and A of sym- 107–13 bolic logic systems, 35–37 presumptions, 99 Ordinary Language movement, 60 presuppositions, 223 Österberg, Dag, 315–18 See also assumptions “ought,” 317–18 pro-argument, 87 probability. See confidence; weight expression(s) pacifism, 249 “probable,” use of the term, 61 See also nonviolence Problem of Knowledge, The (Ayer), 219 pain. See suffering proof, 11, 99, 108 performative and nonperformative functions, 61 propositional calculus, 107 permanence, 333 propositions, 296, 314 “person,” 336 calculus of, 107 phenomenology, pure, 111, 114 pseudoagreement analysis, 67–68 philosophical systems, 134–36 pseudoagreement and pseudodisagreement, 85 philosophical texts, analysis of, 268–69 psychoanalysis, 189, 266, 269 philosophies, 137 psychologism, 106, 190, 208 philosophy criticisms of, 106–07, 109, 113, 203–04 definitions and conceptions of, 211, 217–18, 257 defined, 106 terminology, 262 psychology, 187–88, 196–97, 202 physical language (Carnap’s term), 176–78 Carnap and Neurath on, 190–91, 208

374 INDEX

reification of theoretical constructs in, 189–90 enthusiasm for, 214 schools of, 189, 196, 276 knowledge as calcified, 93–95 Pyrrhonism, 136–37 results, unimportance of, 347–48 postulates, 128 retroactive effect, 87 relevance of systems to, 134–36 Revie, Virgil A., 51–52 Pyrrhonist(s), 136–37 Richards, I. A., 275–76 and absolutist requirements of ground for Ross, Alf, 303–07, 358n1 action, 130–32 rules, 174–75 open to debate about presuppositions, 133– implicit vs. explicitly formulated, 172–73 34 Russell, Bertrand, 266, 275, 276, 314 may be attracted to certain (dogmatic) Ryle, Gile, 249 philosophies, 128 “no decisive arguments,” 128–30 Sachverhalt (wirklich vor Augen), 110–12 who does not admit Pyrrhonism, 126–28 satori, 360n6 “sceptical utterances,” 129 “questionnaire-heteronymous,” 29 scepticism, 121, 123, 226–28, 258 questionnaires (Qs), 14 age, gender, education, and, 15–16 about people’s truth theories, 7–20 logic of knowledge leads to, 141–45 defined, 46 trust, fear, and, 224–25 level of directness, 49 Scepticism (Rescher), 141–45, 153, 156, 157 misconceptions regarding, 46 sceptics, 15, 218–19, 353nn5–6 necessary and sufficient conditions of Academic vs. Pyrrhonic, 139–40, 142, 147, 154 knowledge, 116–20 See also Pyrrhonism as object-logical, 35 sloppy-talking, 151–53 See also isomorphism; logical equivalence; Schächter, Joseph, 266, 267, 271, 356–57n2 synonymity questionnaires Schlick, Moritz, 201, 261, 264–66, 268, 274, questions, crucial, 49 275 Quine, Willard, 272, 274 science(s), 94–95, 108–9, 111 autonomy, 134 Rand, Rose, 266–67 basic norms and nonnormative assumptions, Randers, Meadows and Jørgen, 283 309–12 reality, truth as agreement with, 12, 13, 62 belief in, 215 reason, living according to, 74 classification, 215 reasonable doubt, 222 enthusiasm for research or, 214 reasonableness, 220 language of, 172, 187 reconstructions, 75, 77, 78, 120 “all terms of the language of science,” reducibility, 167, 177–79, 185 173–75 of sentences, 178, 191 philosophy and, 170 types of, 178, 179 sociology of, 186, 188 regularities, 173 terms of, 175 Reichenbach, Hans, 277–78 unity/unification of, 188, 190, 194–95, 210, relational expressions, 100 275 relational real agreements and disagreements, 85 cannibalism and, 189 Rescher, Nicholas See also Encyclopedia for Unified Science answer to his reappraisal of scepticism, 141– project 45, 153, 155–58 scientific classification, system of, 215 research, 213–14, 279–81 scientific hypothesis, 92 empirical See also hypothesis(es) a posteriori questions leading us to, 311– scientific knowledge, 94 12 as hypothetical, 94 logic needs, 79 scientific writings, weight expressions in, 95–101

375 INDEX scientism, 164 symbolic logic systems, sentential connectives self, 231–38, 318, 333–34, 336 V and A of, 35–37 self-object dualism. See subject-object dualism symbols and symbolization, 174–75, 356nn1–2 Self-realization, anatmavada and, 333–36 synonymity, 349nn1–2 selves as processes, 335–37 concepts and types of, 23–31 semantical concepts, 56–57 See also under empirical semantics See also empirical semantics See also extensional equivalence; isomorphism; sentences questionnaires declarative, 49, 302–03 synonymity expressions, 49–55 definitoid, 287 “Synonymity” (Mates), 23–24 descriptive, 302–03 synonymity questionnaires, 45–48 logical analysis vs. behavioristic description of classification, 49 functioning of, 183 terminology, 48–58 reducibility, 178, 191 synonymity requirement, 49–55 that-sentences, 263 syntax, 174 See also meaning, of statements; norm sen- of language of science, 187 tences logical, 171 Sextus Empiricus, 149, 151, 153, 157–58, See also language 353nn3–7 systems, 134–36 criticisms of, 129 against pretentious and premature, 343–44 on mathematics and logic, 143–44 on scepticism and Pyrrhonism, 125, 127–31, Tarski, Alfred, 133 135, 139–40, 142, 151, 152, 353n6 assertions about true and truth, 59–60 terminology, 129 on definition of truth, 25, 59, 69, 289 “shown,” 99 testability of his empirical hypotheses, 69–70 Sidgwick, Henry, 358n6 truth theory, 270–71, 289, 351n1 Simmel, Georg, 299, 358n4 Tarski class, 62 singular reducibility, 178, 179 teamwork, 197 Skolem, Thoralf, 264 testability of hypotheses, 59, 69–70 S-notions, 8, 11, 15 “Testability and meaning” (Carnap), 178, 180, Socrates, 129 204–08 space and time coordinates, specification of that-sentences, 263 does not protect against antiempiricism, 184– “theoretical concept,” 189 85 “thing-language,” 176, 177 Spinoza, Benedict de, 135, 270, 276, 277, 286– time 88, 290 dependence of theses on, 191 Ethics, 73–78, 87, 275, 276, 286–88, 356n1 See also space and time coordinates spontaneous experience, verbal expression of, tolerance, principle of, 60 327–31 Tønnessen, Herman, 60 Steiner, Rudolf, 185 torture. See suffering Stevenson, S. S., 204, 303 translatability. See reducibility “strictly speaking,” 93 translation(s), 71–73, 78 subject-object dualism, transcending, 337–39 indeterminacy of, 72–73 See also interconnectedness trivialism, 210, 235 substitutability, 287 “true” (and “false”), use of the term(s), 10, 61, 70, success, 347–48 79, 99–100, 116, 132, 270, 296, 297 suffering, 338 true-false questionnaire, 50 intensity of, 319–25 true opinions, holding, 345–46 suggestibility, test of, 17 true statements, 10, 15, 133 symbolic logic, 106, 206 trust, 224–25

376 INDEX truth, 127 violence vs. nonviolence, 229–30, 248–49 absolute, 9, 15, 16, 131 See also nonviolence being in, 345–46 virtue, 76, 77, 284 definitions and theories of, 3–9, 25, 70, 133, 220, 296–97, 313–15 Waismann, Friedrich, 201, 261, 265–66 age, gender, education, and, 15–17 Walker, Leslie J., 5 agreement with reality, 12, 13, 62 weight, 91 and concept of “something human,” 11–12 weight expression(s) existence of common characteristic, 14– defined, 91, 96 15 historical development of, 94 homofugal vs. homopetal, 118 most frequently used, 97 people’s beliefs regarding, 7–20, 62–63, pedagogical importance of the study of, 95 66 referring to human activity or experience, 99– problems related to, 21 101 difficulty/impossibility of defining, 14 in science, 89–90, 94–95 as ethical notion, 13 frequency, 96–98 problems using the term, 140–41 how much is known about, 90–93 and similar notions, 8 inventory of, 95–96 See also S-notions strong vs. weak claims, 98–99 types of, 12 Wheeler, J. A., 271 truth attitude, 122 Whitehead, Alfred North, 275 truth-verification notions, 62 Wilde, Oscar, 327 Windelband, Wilhelm, 5–6 Umgangssprache, 70 Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, 279, 284 unity. See interconnectedness Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 64, 129, 265–67, 285 unshakability. See incorrigibility “world of” phrases, 300 worldview, 279, 284 “valid,” 99 values, 300, 304 Zappfe, P. W., 212 all things as having, 339–42 Zen Buddhism, 338–39 in themselves, 339–42 See also Buddhism See also education zetetic point, 158 Veracity of Knowledge, The, 141 zetetic sceptics (and scepticism), 127, 144, 146– verbal and nonverbal behavior, 7 47, 149, 151–53, 157–58 Vienna Circle, 276, 286, 288–89 asking for guarantees, 153–55 attitude toward research and cooperation See also Pyrrhonism within, 279–81 Zilsel, Edgar, 274, 277

377 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

379 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

380 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Notes

Chapter 1: The Function of Ideological Convictions 1. It is not necessarily true that “gross slogans and catchwords” are devoid of truth. Under certain conditions they may even be a sign of truth if something is clearly said, easily understandable. There is generally some rather unscientific (often clearly aristocratic) contempt of the truth of mass convictions and mass movements hidden behind the attitude of social scientists toward “gross slogans and catchwords.” Think of Nietzsche, Pareto, Ortega y Gasset! Perhaps at least some of the great teachings of politics and morals can be expressed only in the form of gross slogans and catchwords. Practically all the Ten Commandments belong to the same category. Nevertheless both the sayings of Christ and the Ten Commandments have been used by many persons seeking to avoid action based on misinformation. Yet both contain “solutions” and even scientific insights into the laws of human behavior. (Alexander Szalai) 2. Here the attention of the reader should be called to the fact that the development of a critical attitude can lead to unquestioned “ideological convictions.” Naess may be for a critical attitude and against unquestioned convictions; nevertheless it is a fact that practically all the important works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have been conceived and written as explicit criticisms of their opponents’ views. None of these works is “systematic” in the abstract sense of the word; all of them are examples of a critical attitude. Nevertheless they have led millions to “unquestioned ideological convictions.” It may be observed that it was possible to build up Socialism, in the sense of Marx and Lenin, on one sixth of the earth and to develop the most integrated political theory of all times without ever publishing a “textbook, by and large”—only publishing innumerable critical essays and books. There exists no such thing as a “textbook of Marxism” written by any established expert. And all real Marxists have built up unshakable convictions (which Naess dislikes) based on criticism that Naess regards as an antidote to unshakable convictions. (Szalai)

333 NOTES TO PAGES 6–12

3. Naess seems to forget that the kind of pseudoknowledge that he rightly con- demns is definitely not the consequence of a lack of real knowledge. Lack of knowledge does not lead in itself to aggressiveness. Pseudoscientific, theological, and other harmful ideologies are based on very realistic interests of ruling and exploiting classes. It is these class interests that account for their aggressiveness. Obviously, therefore, the dangers of pseudoknowledge cannot be liquidated solely by action on the level of scientific theory. Good textbooks on the comparative biology of human races are not sufficient weapons against Negro lynchers or Jew baiters. (Szalai) 4. This hint at an antitheses seems to me to miss an important point: “the liquidation of pseudoknowledge” cannot occur unless something positive, something that feels (to the thinker) like “new knowledge” (an addition to his means of dealing with insecurity) is there to take the place of the former concepts that have ceased to serve their purpose adequately. It may be that there are two tendencies in social science: the one roots out error, the other regards an appreciation of the place of “error” in the mind of the “erroneous thinker” as one of the preconditions of satisfactory—i.e., objective—research. It is probably true that the largest contribution of social science in this century is the “liquidation of pseudoknowledge” in the sense that there is much written in that vein, but it is doubtful whether the statement would hold if “largest” means that which takes most factors into its scope. ( John Rickman) 5. Naess proposes in these last paragraphs that generals of armies fighting against each other should accept the following “working hypothesis”: “Maybe the enemy is stronger. Maybe he is right in his war aims. Maybe it is not worthwhile at all to fight.” If Naess can convince all generals of fighting armies to accept this “working hypothesis” or if he can see to it that only people holding this “working hypothesis” become generals—then, of course, there will be no more wars. But is it not a somewhat abstrusely idealistic petitio principii to make such a proposition to generals? And is it not an evasion of the real issue? It would be easy to construct simpler, more probable, but still unre- alizable utopian suggestions! (Szalai) 6. To be quite sincere, there is probably no known definition of social science to which this alleged “by definition” characteristic of Naess would fit. Is there any science at all that would have nothing to say about deliberately posed value judgments? (Szalai) 7. If Naess puts such different things together as the defense of “Marxism, Leninism, fascism, anti-Semitism,” then why not put together the defense of “goodness of heart, mother’s love, sympathy, prostitution, cruelty against children, murder”? It will be seen later in this chapter that Naess becomes increasingly unable to write down the word communism without associating it

334 NOTES TO PAGES 13–21

with “fascism.” That is exactly the neurosis all imperialistic warmongers are trying to spread in the world. No such neurosis ever existed in the conference room of UNESCO where this symposium was conducted. (Szalai) 8. Naess’s list of “keywords having important functions in ideological controversies and crusades” is not inclusive. He could have written out the whole of Webster’s dictionary since there is no word at all that could not figure in them. The fact that he includes in his selection communism and Nazism, planned society and Nordic way of life, shows only that he himself has become a prisoner of “keywords.” (Szalai) 9. To call the punishment of quislings an “aggressive treatment” seems to be a rather jocular exaggeration of liberalism. And a very bad joke too! It reminds one of the anecdote about the doctor who did not use his rifle against the at- tacking tiger because “He is a human being after all, isn’t he?” (Szalai) 10. Every fight is a fight against something rather than for something. Or else there is no fight at all. To put it more correctly, there is a dialectical synthesis of “for” and “against” in every fight. (Szalai) 11. Again Naess is a victim of the verbal obsession that the word communist cannot be written down without adding “and fascist.” I may take this opportunity to point out that, although “communist” and “fascist” are antitheses, “democratic” and “dictatorial” are not. Bourgeois democracy means dictatorship of the possessing class, i.e., the bourgeoisie. In a modern capitalist society only the possessing class can make full use of the “freedoms.” And exclusive freedom for a class means nothing but dictatorship by the same class. Everybody has the right to found a newspaper in the United States—but how many people have the dollars for such an investment? Or, as Anatole France has formulated it, “There is full equality in France.... Rich and poor people have got the right to sleep on the benches on the Seine embankment.” Marxist-Leninists are much more sincere than the theoreticians of bourgeois democracy when they declare openly that up to the point where all classes are liquidated, proletarian democracy means dictatorship of the proletariat. No equal rights for everybody can be realized without equal material possibilities for everybody to make use of these rights! (Szalai) 12. What is meant here by trivialization? Why does it trivialize the issue in philosophical discussions if one shows that “narrow conflicts of interest,” i.e., class conflicts, are to be found at their roots? This makes them even more serious! Has anybody ever heard of a discussion becoming less violent, less hostile if somebody “trivialized the issue” by showing that elementary material interests of the disputing partners are involved? (Szalai) 13. This statement seems to me to accord more with the aspirations of textbook writers than the experiences of a textbook reader. As an ex-schoolboy—

335 NOTES TO PAGES 23–27

perhaps the experience is widely shared—I can say that a textbook had less influence than the person who recommended it in class to our attention. When we thought our history teacher an ass, we did not usually cherish the views of the historians he commended; when we thought well of him, we joined in his appreciation of his own masters and absorbed what they had to say. And surely also to give so much value to textbooks is to underestimate the importance of preschool experience in the development of the personality and the capacity to join with others in cooperative enterprises. This isn’t a new theory. When the Jesuits said “Give us a boy until he is seven and you can do what you like with him afterwards,” they weren’t thinking of textbooks. (Rickman) 14. Except for the work of some anthropologists, notably the Cross Cultural Sur- vey developed under the direction of George P. Murdoch of Yale University, little effort has been spent on the search for the common ground of mankind. Up to now research has usually emphasized differences. A vast project of investigation, absolutely basic to the interests of peace and to the success of the United Nations, is the preparation of an encyclopedia of the uniformities and similarities in respect to aspirations, beliefs, and practices of all peoples. (G. W. Allport in Journal of Social Issues 1950, 4: 30) 15. “Even in Nazism!” What a fine liberal point of view regarding the “final” aims of Nazism! If Naess is right, it is a pity that the Nazis have not suc- ceeded in exterminating all inferior races. Then a situation would have been reached where the organized infliction of pain is used only as part of “sport activities.” It must be sincerely said that such sentences as this last one of Naess would be regarded in many countries as a cynical contempt of the feelings of millions of widows and orphans who owe the ruin of their lives to Nazism. Admittedly, Naess had no such thing as cynicism in mind. But benevolence alone does not seem to be sufficient. (Szalai) 16. If that were really all that can be expected from social scientists, then we should pose the famous question of Lynd: “knowledge for what?” And give the answer he has given! (Szalai) 17. The analysis offered by Naess seems to me wise and helpful. As he insists, there are no simple causes of national aggressiveness. But, also as he insists, a rigid ideology, supporting prefabricated notions of means-end relationships, can be a vastly important source of mischief. In my own chapter in this volume I make the same point in terms of people’s expectancies regarding the inevitability of conflict. When such expectancies exist, induced often by ideologies, aggression readily ensues. Naess notes the danger of relativism inherent in his position. I think he worries needlessly about the matter. For he himself clearly shows there is no

336 NOTES TO PAGE 27

basic incompatibility between single-minded devotion to a value or to an ideal and criticalness—even scepticism—regarding ideological formulations of the ideal in question. To strive ceaselessly for ethically approved goals is essential to a healthy development of personality, but to be flexible and experimental in respect to means and formulas is equally hygienic for the individual, and of course necessary for favorable human relationships. Perhaps Naess is too pessimistic in his view that the function of social science at the present time may be primarily negative, that is, to liquidate pseudoknowledge, to debunk overrigid ideologies and their attendant pre- conceived solutions. He underestimates, I think, the positive contribution that social science can now make to the discovery of common purposes and to the fashioning of peaceful means-end procedures for the attainment of these purposes. (Allport) 18. The most important aspect of Naess’s discussion is, I think, his characterization of what might be called, in a somewhat different terminology, the danger of paranoid patterns of thinking. The diffusion of this pattern can be observed throughout contemporary society and it is by no means limited to any particular ideology. Even theories that are basically true may assume paranoid functions if they are accepted rigidly and mechanically and not sub- jected to a life-process of continuous thought and open-minded experience. To look for the formal constituents of “stereopathic” thinking rather than to limit the investigation to any specific ideological content is, in my opinion, a very productive approach to our problem. Moreover, I should like to under- score his emphasis on the means-end relationship, particularly his formulation of how the increase in the means of production in Western society has tended to deflect attention from ultimate ends. This certainly defines a highly critical area of modern culture. I fully agree with most of his suggestions, especially with those on the function of ideologies. The following remarks are motivated by the idea that even exact science has to be careful not to become transformed into “scientivism” and thus fall under the category of dogmas and panaceas that Naess justifiably criticizes. It seems to me that Naess is so strongly influenced by certain epistemological controversies of a logical and semantic nature that he therefore tends to give too much weight to purely logical deficiencies in the present-day thinking of the masses. The impression is sometimes created that certain practices in the fields of philosophy and social science, such as the “quest for absolute certainty,” are directly responsible for the rigidity and standardiza- tion of modern ideology. Although an interrelationship no doubt exists, I should not hold departmentalized institutions of learning responsible for de- formities that may well be the product of much more fundamental structures of our culture.

337 NOTE TO PAGE 27

The constant warning against premature conclusions and foggy gener- alities implies, unless properly qualified, a possible taboo against all thinking. If every thought has to be held in abeyance until it has been completely corroborated, no basic approach seems possible and we would limit ourselves to the level of mere symptoms. This may even jeopardize the very ideological objectivity postulated in the article. The appeal to scientists to foster a critical attitude toward general solutions could easily be misinterpreted in the sense of a critique concerned merely with certain undesirable manifestations of our civilization rather than with the forces, inherent in its total structure, that produce such manifestations. In other words, too much scientific self-control may involve a definite political philosophy, a kind of easygoing “academic” approach. This is certainly not the aim of Naess’s suggestions. The latter point is reflected in a somewhat too benign evaluation of the destructive forces bred by the present situation. The assertion that “the daily observation that human beings do not intentionally make each other suffer prolonged pain except in very limited kinds of situations in which they think it necessary for self-preservation, or in which they react to frustrations of such intensity that we may class them as highly abnormal” is hard to reconcile with the world of concentration camps. The torturers did not act for the sake of self-preservation nor were they subject to “highly abnormal” frustrations. No approach to group tensions can get at the core of the matter unless it is constantly aware of what happened to millions of Europeans. A formulation of the problem that regards events of this scope as mere exceptions would no longer be realistic. I fully agree with Naess that it is erroneous and reactionary to blame the scientific spirit, “scepticism and relativism” for the crisis of modern civilization. However, by limiting the scientific spirit to the cool head and surren- dering the ultimate values to the warm heart, he establishes a division that in my opinion is as pernicious to the concept of truth as it is to the humanistic ideas that guide him. If this division were maintained, we should either have two kinds of truths torn asunder in medieval fashion—or the concept of truth itself would be sacrificed. The ultimate values would be a matter of arbitrary choice; those who would reject the idea of the humane altogether would be on as safe ground philosophically as their opponents—which would in turn substantiate the very charge of nihilism against which Naess defends the scientific spirit. I believe he has outlined the real task by asking, How can the division between means and ends be overcome rationally rather than perpetuated philosophically? (Max Horkheimer)

338 NOTES TO PAGES 30–41

Chapter 2: Analytical Survey of Agreements and Disagreements Unless otherwise indicated, the notes in this chapter reference sections or pages of Tensions That Cause Wars (Common statement and individual papers by a group of social scientists brought together by UNESCO), edited by H. Cantril (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950). 1. See appendix I, pp. 513–21. 2. P. 89. 3. P. 69. 4. P. 164. 5. P. 147. 6. P. 95. 7. P. 195. 8. P. 303. 9. P. 80. 10. P. 112. 11. P. 297. 12. See Horvath, p. 95; Lefebvre, p. 147; Plamenatz, pp. 303–05. 13. P. 164. 14. Pp. 111–12. 15. Pp. 367–68. 16. Pp. 96–99. 17. P. 80. 18. Pp. 365–66. 19. Pp. 1–2. 20. Pp. 120–21. 21. Pp. 172–73. 22. Pp. 295–96. 23. P. 330. 24. P. 361. 25. P. 391. 26. In a section not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 27. Pp. 196–98.

339 NOTES TO PAGES 41–48

28. P. 364. 29. Pp. 47ff. 30. P. 364. 31. P. 112. 32. Pp. 48–49. 33. P. 69. 34. Pp. 106–10. 35. P. 165. 36. P. 69. 37. Pp. 48–49. 38. Pp. 109–10. 39. P. 165. 40. Pp. 221–22. 41. P. 295. 42. P. 330. 43. P. 364. 44. The general problem of persuasive use of key terms is discussed in Stevenson (1944); see also Perelman (1946). Results of psychological experiments on persuasive use of keywords are found in Hartmann (1936: 336–57); Sherif (1937: 450–61); and Doob (1948). 45. Pp. 109–10. 46. P. 132. 47. P. 147. 48. P. 198. 49. P. 295. 50. P. 330. 51. More explicitly so in answers not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 52. Question 7; see p. 516. 53. P. 71. 54. P. 98. 55. In a section not printed in Tensions That Cause Wars. 56. P. 199. 57. All these longer historical studies are included in Tensions That Cause Wars.

340 NOTES TO PAGES 48–55

58. Question 4; p. 515. 59. Pp. 364–65. 60. Pp. 178–81. 61. P. 198. 62. P. 264. 63. Pp. 304–06. 64. Pp. 391–93. 65. Pp. 331–46. 66. Question 6; see p. 516. 67. Bober, in an answer not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 68. P. 166. 69. P. 123. 70. P. 199. 71. Pp. 246–51. 72. Pp. 95–98. 73. In answers not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 74. See pp. 516–19. 75. Pp. 519–20. 76. Question 8; p. 516. 77. P. 166. 78. P. 379. 79. See, for example, Zaslavski (1947). 80. Question 9; see p. 516. 81. P. 367. 82. In answers not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 83. P. 297. 84. P. 579. 85. P. 166. 86. Pp. 283–84. 87. Pp. 393–94. 88. In a passage not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 89. Pp. 200–02. 90. Pp. 367–68.

341 NOTES TO PAGES 56–67

91. This survey, part B, sec. IV. 92. Question 11; see pp. 516–18. 93. P. 71. 94. P. 396. 95. P. 167. 96. P. 112. 97. P. 102. 98. P. 188. 99. P. 264. 100. P. 396. 101. P. 264. 102. In question 11, the word results was used; “contents” covers more adequately what we had in mind; see p. 517. 103. Opinions on the methods-contents distinction were urged in question 16; see pp. 517–18. 104. A distinction particularly elaborated by Juan Zaragueta along traditional Catholic lines. 105. A list of meanings is given by Field, p. 84. 106. Questions 12 and 13; see p. 517. 107. P. 167. 108. See final paragraph of the questionnaire, p. 521. 109. P. 415. 110. P. 152. 111. Pp. 150–51. 112. Pp. 432–40. 113. Pp. 1–12, 16. 114. P. 72. 115. Pp. 173–77. 116. Pp. 201–02. 117. Pp. 287–92. 118. Pp. 315–21. 119. Pp. 345–53. 120. Question 10; see p. 516. 121. P. 43.

342 NOTES TO PAGES 67–78

122. P. 200. 123. Pp. 258–59. 124. Pp. 340–44. 125. P. 379. 126. Pp. 394–95. 127. In comments not printed in Tensions That Cause Wars. 128. Pp. 412–13. 129. In answers not printed in Tensions That Cause Wars. 130. Pp. 152–54. 131. Pp. 356–57. 132. P. 379. 133. P. 388. 134. P. 43. 135. Pp. 203, 204. 136. Pp. 406–07. 137. Pp. 416–17. 138. See also Sweezy’s replies, pp. 410 ff. 139. See Marshall, pp. 216 ff.; Pool, pp. 347 ff. 140. Question 19; p. 518. 141. Pp. 73–74. 142. In answers not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 143. Pp. 73–74. 144. Question 20; see pp. 518–19. 145. Pp. 350–51. 146. Pp. 372–75. 147. P. 208. 148. P. 401. 149. P. 104. 150. P. 13. 151. Pp. 156–57. 152. Pp. 359–60. 153. Pp. 113–14. 154. P. 170.

343 NOTES TO PAGES 78–83

155. P. 293. 156. Pp. 325–26. 157. Pp. 445–46. 158. Pp. 105–06. 159. P. 114. 160. P. 209. 161. P. 350. 162. P. 193. 163. P. 300. 164. P. 14. 165. Pp. 156–59. 166. Pp. 358–59. 167. Pp. 105–06. 168. P. 114. 169. Pp. 404, 411. 170. Kelsen (1929). 171. Question 26; see p. 520. 172. Pp. 114–18. 173. In answers not included in Tensions That Cause Wars; cf. p. 446. 174. P. 404. 175. In Ducasse’s comments, pp. 406–07. 176. See Field’s comments, pp. 416–17. 177. In comments not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 178. In answers not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 179. Question 30; see p. 521. 180. P. 17. 181. In an answer not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 182. P. 105. 183. Pp. 118–19. 184. Pp. 211–12. 185. In an answer not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 186. P. 405. 187. Pp. 436–37.

344 NOTES TO PAGES 84–108

188. P. 405. 189. Pp. 406–07. 190. Pp. 416–17. 191. Question 29; see p. 521. 192. P. 301. 193. In an answer not included in Tensions That Cause Wars. 194. In an answer not included in Tensions That Cause Wars.

Chapter 3: Ideology and Rationality 1. The terrifying aspect of a small number of ideologies in Europe in the period 1920–1950 previously led me to underestimate the varieties of nonabsolutist ideologies in the world. Therefore, I treated as fairly general those negative features of ideologies that I would now regard as exceptional, e.g., “claims on finality and certainty” and “distorted outgroup descriptions.” See my “Func- tion of Ideological Convictions,” in Cantril (1950: 295). [Reprinted as the first article in this volume; see pp. 3–27.] 2. By Charles Bettelheim, M. M. Bober, G. A. Borgese, D. van Dantzig, John Dewey, C. J. Ducasse, G. C. Field, Risieri Frondizi, Barna Horvath, Jørgen Jørgensen, Humayun Kabir, Horace M. Kallen, Henri Lefebvre, C. I. Lewis, Lord Lindsay of Birker, J. H. A. Logemann, Richard McKeon, James Mar- shall, Emmanuel Mounier, Stanislaus Ossowski, Umberto A. Padovani, Ricardo R. Pascual, Aimé Patri, Chaim Perelman, John Petrov Plamenatz, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Ladislaus Rieger, Wilhelm Röpke, Alf Ross, Rudolf Schlesinger, Paul M. Sweezy, Eric Weil, and Quincy Wright. See McKeon and Rokkan (1951).

Chapter 4: Science as Behavior: Prospects and Limitations of a Behavioral Metascience 1. To the above list of works, I should like to add some important ones that either explicitly discuss the possibilities of a behavioral science of science or are pertinent without explicit reference to our theme: Allport (1955), Bruner (1956), Geach (1957), Koch (1959), Kuhn (1962), Lewin (1952), Nagel (1961), Oakeshott (1951), Parsons (1949), Polanyi (1958), Popper (1945, 1957), Ryle (1949), Weber (1922), Winch (1958). 2. It is, of course, open to doubt whether any author, past or present, is in pos- session of a total view actually covering all science, and not merely of vivid intentional experiences within which there is nothing that calls for a halt—

345 NOTES TO PAGES 113–45

for exceptions, restrictions, qualifications. I shall, for simplicity, ignore the distinction between a total view and an intentional experience covering a totality. 3. An inspection of recent volumes of the Psychological Bulletin reveals the great impact of the rigorous methodologists and system builders. The superiority of behaviorism (identified with the model stimulus-response correlation) to field psychology (response-response correlation) as argued by Burns (1960) does not apply to the behavioristic organism-environment view, because “environment” is analyzed into (1) environment for the observed organism and (2) environment for the observer. Burns writes as if the field concept of stimulus could only comprise (1). 4. This happy phrase I owe to an amazed listener to the account of the “experiment,” Prof. P. Suppes. 5. The well-known way out of this, to write “A says that so and so... ,” has been sufficiently criticized to be passed over in silence.

Chapter 5: A Plea for Pluralism in Philosophy and Physics 1. The least unsatisfactory survey of different worldviews is that of Karl Jaspers in his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919). The least unsatisfactory recent arguments for a monolithic rather than a pluralist view are offered by P. F. Strawson in his Individuals (1959). For the semantics and theory of argumentation used to establish the (relative) neutrality of ordinary language and of physical research toward a variety of worldviews, see my short Communication and Argument (1966 [SWAN VII]), or my long Interpretation and Preciseness (1953 [SWAN I]). That even Hegel’s world color can be reexperienced today, and even in England, is exemplified by F. N. Findlay in his Language, Mind and Value (1963); see especially p. 230. 2. See Popper’s stress on “rational discussion,” which I take as stress on pro et contra, and on contra-arguments against his own tentative conclusions. This necessarily introduces pluralism (i.e., at least two alternatives, two mutually inconsistent ways of reasoning on any subject) in his preface to The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).

Chapter 6: The Case Against Science 1. The term counterculture is used by many to denote aberrations from a dominant cultural trend. Others take it to denote groups with cultural ideals and behavior that clearly clash with the dominant. I shall use the term in the latter sense.

346 NOTES TO PAGES 146–95

Lewis Mumford (1971: 340–41) uses the term counterculture in a sense that does not cover its most interesting manifestations when he speaks of “a counter-culture whose very disorder serves admirably to stabilize the power system.” Marxist-Leninism is not disorderly, nor are many religious and peaceful anarchist movements, but they certainly oppose all dominant trends. 2. Why is science an entirely satisfactory way of life to so many people? Re- search makes it possible to dig deeply into a subject, not just skim the sur- face. It calls on all the emotional, intellectual, and volitional faculties. It makes use of the inherent urge for identification with something greater than oneself. The common view that competent research requires special intellectual faculties probably stems from the way in which researchers are selected and the kind of schooling that is required of them. Basically, persistence, motivation, patience, and imagination are more important than a high I.Q. The history of science speaks of the special achievements of a tiny minority of exceptional individuals. This keeps alive the image of research as the work of cold, superior intellects. 3. See, e.g., E. F. Schumacher, “Buddhist economics,” in Daly (1973). 4. See the reference section for books and other resources cited. 5. See Feyerabend (1975a & 1975b). 6. See Naess, (1973 [in SWAN X]).

Chapter 8: Why Not Science for Anarchists Too? 1. Published in Cohen and Wartofsky (1967). 2. See Kampik, 1974; Ostrander and Schroeder (1973); Weiss (1969); Schadewaldt (1974).

Chapter 9: Nonmilitary Defense 1. The population of Norway in 1962 was 3.5 million. In 2004, it is 4.48 million. 2. It is probably true of most nonmilitary methods of defense that the actions recommended are more effective the more they are engaged in as ends in themselves—as parts of a way of life rather than as means for defense. 3. Examples are the earthquakes in Morocco and Chile, floods in India and England, famine in China and India. Such help should be available on an adequate scale as soon as the need is known. Hence, there must be reserve resources available on instant call.

347 NOTES TO PAGES 195–210

4. Had adequate help been ready for the 900,000 refugees from the Palestine conflict from 1945 to 1948, it is possible that current tensions in the Near East would be less intense. The UN General Assembly appropriated the small sum of $5 million and requested all countries to contribute to a fund for a peaceful solution of the refugee problem; few governments responded and only $35 million was collected (about one-tenth of the cost to Britain and France of the Suez invasion). Despite energetic efforts, the agencies involved could do relatively little. Now the problem is complicated by rigid official positions adopted by the Arab states and Israel, and the constructive program has been shoved into the background while propaganda and fruitless discussions on the question of guilt occupy the foreground. This is only one of the many cases of refugee crises throughout the world, from China to India, Africa to Hungary. 5. This does not imply always providing the invader with all the information he requests. 6. For a classification with examples of sixty-five techniques of nonviolent resistance (in the sense of resistance without weapons), many of which would be applicable in such a situation, see G. Sharp, “The methods of non-violent action” (1960). 7. Microresistance: resistance by individuals and tiny, temporary groups carried out in such a way that exposure and annihilation of larger organizations and institutions do not affect it, at least not directly.

Chapter 10: Can Violence Lead to Nonviolence? Gandhi’s Point of View 1. See Gandhi’s article in Harijan, December 9, 1939. 2. It is tempting to quote the Norwegian author Axel Sandemose’s private quarrel with Gandhi in Brev fra Kjorkelvik (1953): “So-called restraint is use- less, whether it is deliberate or forced. What you have constrained will sooner or later demand to be let out. You should not make believe that you can stop hitting people and abusing them before you have found something else to do.” Something else to do was exactly what Gandhi offered. 3. A Norwegian author is reputed to have gone so far as to identify hatred toward oppression with hatred toward the oppressors. This is an extremely un- Gandhian statement. 4. Nevertheless, the British police in India were often brutal. Nonviolent fight- ers with broken skulls and crushed genitalia were to be found in the hospi- tals. See Webb Miller’s firsthand description of police brutality during the salt satyagraha in his book I Found No Peace (New York, 1936), quoted in Fis- cher (1962b: 100–101).

348 NOTES TO PAGES 213–25

5. Even Martin Luther King, Jr., views Gandhi primarily in this light. Of his own struggle he said, in his Nobel lecture in Oslo on December 11, 1964: “This approach to the problem of racial injustice is not at all without successful precedent. It was used in a magnificent way by Mohandas K. Gandhi to challenge the might of the British Empire, and free his people from the political domination and economic exploitation inflicted upon them for centuries. He struggled only with the weapons of truth, soul-force, non-injury, and courage.” 6. For details, see Andrews (1930) and Diwakar (1946).

Chapter 11: Consequences of an Absolute No to Nuclear War 1. Many scientists seem to reject this presupposition: they think that civiliza- tions with the capacity to destroy themselves through nuclear force are likely to do so within fifty to one hundred years. 2. For comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Schell (1982). I have also profited from the publications of the Stockholm and the Norwegian peace conflict research institutes (SIPRI). 3. The consequences of black-painting were clear in World War II. The government of Germany was able to keep the war machine going in 1944 and 1945 largely by announcing that defeat would result in definitive subjugation of the German people. 4. On destruction of the natural environment, see Westing (1977, 1980) and Rotblat (1981). For a short, excellent outline, see Galtung (1982: 34–40). The unacceptability of treating the nonhuman world with moral indifference is well argued by Routley and Routley (1979: 36–59). Human “light” living on earth promotes peace. Voluntary simplicity is indispensable; see Elgin (1981). 5. Institutionalized mutual aid and concern are typical of most nonindustrial communities and cultures of moderate geographical extension. It seems that the unique stress on material progress and growth in our societies requires aggressive, individual competition incompatible with an economy of mutual aid. An instructive recent example is the incompatibility of the competitive “welfare” state and mutual-aid institutions among Greenlanders (see, e.g., Jensen [1973: 447–58]). 6. The best articles and documents on Green economics and politics are written in the German and Scandinavian languages. Notable exceptions are some of the works of E. F. Schumacher, the small-is-beautiful prophet. They combine economic and philosophic issues. Hazel Henderson’s Politics of the Solar Age: Alternatives to Economics (1981) is rather rhetorical but takes care of some of the

349 NOTES TO PAGES 225–44

Green positions. W. Leiss’s “Political aspects of environmental issues” (1981) is a good example of an American article on the politics of environmentalism. It appears in an excellent anthology on the philosophy of deep ecology. On this concept and its social and political relevance, see Arne Naess, “The shallow and the deep: Long-range ecological movements” (1973). 7. WRI Newsletter 192, (February 1983). On unilateralism, see polls referred to in Time magazine, 31 October, 1983, p. 32. 8. This is more a consequence of the size and complexity of the United States than of the likely success of its citizens in implementing a policy of nonviolent resistance. When people from occupied Europe visiting the United States after World War II asked “To what extent would the American people be able (if willing) to carry out large-scale nonviolent noncooperation under occupation?” the answer they received from Americans was usually rather pessimistic, because of the Wild West tradition of shooting villains and because of the heterogeneity of the populace. (Local communication and loyal cooperation are more difficult among widely different cultural groups.) 9. It must be remembered that important sectors of the populace in Poland and other eastern European states were, in the decisive year after World War II, not resolutely and strongly in favor of the Western powers. I find the work of Czeslaw Milosz revealing in this connection; see The Captive Mind (1955). 10. The Gandhian concept of freedom and self-realization is discussed in Naess (1974b [SWAN V]). 11. I here talk about felt quality of life, something different from quality of life defined in such a way that the opinions of B about the quality of life of A are relevant. For example, B might say that the life of A is profoundly unhealthy and will result in A’s death, whereas A, if asked, would honestly maintain that his or her life is healthy and happy.

Chapter 12: Is Freedom Consistent with Spinoza’s Determinism? 1. In formulating this paper I have profited greatly from reading two unpublished manuscripts by Ragnar H. Naess and from subsequent discussions. 2. Compare what he says, in chapters 3 and 6, on prediction of calamities, mira- cles, victories. My point is only that Spinoza has a concept of prediction and could have discussed its relation to various kinds of determination—if the problem had engaged him, which it did not. 3. It is notable how consistently and repetitiously Spinoza uses imaginari. In theorem IIIP40, and the short proof and note, he uses forms of imaginari seven times, and he uses near-synonyms or substitutes.

350 NOTES TO PAGES 245–88

4. Spinoza’s view on so-called fatalism and desire is complicated. The subject is not treated in the Ethics and we shall not take it up here. 5. Similarly, free men who live among ignorant men try to avoid receiving favors as much as they can (IVP70). In the concluding note to part IV (IVP73Sch) he uses the expression vir fortis, the man of strength ( fortitudo), as a synonym for homo liber, the free man. This also suggests degrees of freedom. That there are degrees of strength, even among the strong, is scarcely open to discussion.

Chapter 13: Through Spinoza to Mahayana Buddhism or Through Mahayana Buddhism to Spinoza? 1. See 1P17, 17Cor2, and 4P4, all quoted by Wetlesen 1978: 29. 2. Evidence referring to the text of the Ethics is given in my Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza’s Ethics (1975 [SWAN VI]). See especially part E, “The Road to Freedom Through Active Emotion,” pp. 82 ff. 3. A rather wide concept is introduced and used in my Freedom, Emotion, and Self-Subsistence (1975 [SWAN VI]: 57). What Wetlesen says about grading does not automatically hold for the “gradual” approach of that work.

Chapter 15: Spinoza’s Finite God 1. The following is a list of eleven Deus quatenus expressions, all from the small

text unit IIP5–IIP11Cor:320. p.m no ws.e a;rhey tas eabks r ilkeep ,Nhsteu mtLienbd rI 1. Deus, quatenus est res cogitans (IIP5) God as thinking thing: God insofar as he is a thinking thing 2. Dei natura, quatenus est res cogitans (IIP5Dem) God’s nature, insofar as he is a thinking thing 3. Dei essentia, quatenus, ut res extensa consideratur (IIP5Dem) God’s essence, considered as extended thing 4. Deus... , non quatenus infinitus est (IIP9) God... , not as infinite: God... , not insofar as he is infinite 5. Deus... , non quatenus est res absolute cogitans (IIP9Dem) God... , not as far as God is a thinking absolute being 6. Deus quatenus . . . affectus consideratur (IIP9) God . . . considered as affected 7. Deus... , quatenus alio affectus est (IIP9Dem) God . . . as affected by (an) other 8. Deus... , quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur (IIP9Dem) God . . . considered affected by an other cognitive mode

351 NOTES TO PAGES 292–302

9. Deus, quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur (IIP9Dem) God as considered affected by an other idea 10. Deus... , quatenus per naturam humanae mentis explicatur (IIP11Cor) God . . . as explicated through the nature of the human mind 11. Deus... , quatenus humanae mentis essentiam constituit (IIP11Cor) God... , insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind

Chapter 16: Einstein, Spinoza, and God 1. Translation by Sommerfeld. Quotation from the New York Times, 25 April, 1929, p. 60, col. 4.

Chapter 17: How My Philosophy Seemed to Develop 1. In preparing this contribution to Philosophers on Their Own Work, I have profited from reading the other biographical reflections in this series. 2. Note on the peacefulness of shore life: Books and films generally portray animal life in shallow seas as a brutal fight for existence. The remarkable peacefulness and cheerfulness that I and others have experienced there is influenced by many factors: The rapid movements of small creatures rarely suggest depression, boredom, lassitude; very often they suggest vivacity, joy of life, swimming, playing. The small predators mostly eat organisms so tiny that they are unseen, or the prey disappear at once into the mouth of the predator, suggesting very rapid death without prolonged pain. The eating or destroying of others does not occupy much time. If ten organisms are observed in an hour, there is perhaps only one case, occupying ten seconds, of killing (I do not count the eating of planktonic microscopic animals). Fur- thermore, even if, in theory, the animals are always on the lookout for suitable prey, they seem in practice to be engaged in a variety of activities and to enjoy moving around.

352 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Agassi, J. 1963. “Towards an historiography of science.” In History and Theory, Bei- heft 2. The Hague. Allport, Gordon W. 1950. “Prejudice: A problem in social and psychological causation.” Journal of Social Issues 4 (supplemental series). ———. 1955. Becoming. New Haven: Yale University Press. Amundsen, Roald. 1925. Gjennem Luften til 88 Nord (Through the air to 88˚ north). Oslo: Gyldendal. Andrews, Charles F. 1930. Mahatma Gandhi’s Ideas. New York: Macmillan. Apel, K. O. 1962. “Kahn es ein wissenschaftliches Weltbild überhaupt geben?” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 16. Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harvest Books. Aron, Raymond. 1957. The Opium of the Intellectuals, translated by Terence Kil- martin. New York: Doubleday. Austin, Mary. 1972. Acupuncture Therapy. New York: Asi. Basalla, G., ed. 1968. The Rise of Modern Science: Internal or External Factors? Lexing- ton, MA: Heath. Beard, Charles. 1937. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York: Macmillan. Bernal, J. D. 1967. The Social Function of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1939). ———. 1973. The Extension of Man: The History of Physics Before the Modern Age. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Bondurant, Joan V. 1958. Conquest of Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1988, revised).

353 REFERENCES

Boscherini, Giancotti. 1970. Lexicon Spinozanum. The Hague: Nijhoff. Bridgman, Percy W. 1946–55. The Logic of Modern Physics. New York: Macmillan. ———. 1949. The Physics of High Pressure. London: G. Bell. Bruner, Jerome S. 1956. A Study of Thinking. New York: Wiley. Bukharin, N. 1971. Science at the Crossroads. London: Cass. Burtt, E. A. 1950. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1924). Butterfield, H. 1957. The Origins of Modern Science. London: G. Bell. Campbell, Donald T. 1959. “Methodological suggestions from a comparative psychology of knowledge processes.” Inquiry 2: 179–82. Cantril, H., ed. 1950. Tensions That Cause Wars, Common Statement and Individual Pa- pers by a Group of Social Scientists Brought Together by UNESCO. Urbana: Univer- sity of Illinois Press. Carmichael, Stokley, and C. V. Hamilton. 1967. Black Power: The Politics of Libera- tion in America. New York: Vintage Books. Cassirer, Ernst. 1920. Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft, 3 vols. Berlin: Verlag Cassier. Chomsky, Noam 1969. “Objectivity and liberal scholarship.” In his book American Power and the New Mandarins. New York: Pantheon. Clark, Ronald W. 1971. Einstein: The Life and Times. New York: World. Cohen, R. S., and M. W. Wartofsky, eds. 1967. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Sci- ence, vol. 3. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel. Conze, Edward, trans. 1958. Buddhist Wisdom Books: Containing the Diamond Sutra and the Heart Sutra. London: Unwin Hayman (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). Copleston, Frederick. 1963. A History of Philosophy, vol. 4. New York: Image Books. Daly, H. E., ed. 1973. Towards a Steady State Economy. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. d’Espagnat, Bernard. 1965. Conceptions de la physique contemporaine. Paris: Hermann. Diwakar, Ranganath. 1946. Satyagraha: Its Technique and History. Bombay: Hindkitars. Doob, Leonard W. 1948. Public Opinion and Propaganda. New York: Holt. Einstein, Albert. 1923–79. The Meaning of Relativity. Princeton: Princeton Univer- sity Press. ———. 1934. Essays in Science. New York: Philosophy Library. ———. 1949. The World as I See It. New York: Philosophy Library. Elgin, Duane. 1981. Voluntary Simplicity. New York: W. Morrow.

354 REFERENCES

Ellul, J. 1964. The Technological Society, translated by J. Wilkinson. New York: Vin- tage Books. Eysenck, Hans J. 1954. The Use and Abuse of Psychology. New York: Viking Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1967. The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin. Feyerabend, Paul K. 1967. “On the improvement of the sciences and the arts, and the possible identity of the two.” In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, edited by R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel. ———. 1975a. Against Method. London: Thetford Press (Verso ed., 1978). ———. 1975b. “‘Science’: The myth and its role in society.” Inquiry 18: 167–82. Findlay, John N. 1963. Language, Mind and Value. London: Allen and Unwin. Fischer, Louis. 1962a. The Essential Gandhi. New York: Vintage Books. ———. 1962b. Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World. New York: Mentor Books. Friedrichs, R. W. 1970. A Sociology of Sociology. New York: Free Press. Galtung, Johan. 1977. Methodology and Ideology, vol. 1. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers. ———. 1982. Environment, Development and Military Activity. Oslo: Universitets- forlaget. Gandhi, M. K. 1941. Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1945. Constructive Programme. Ahmedabad: Navajivan (later edition). ———. 1949. Non-violence in Peace and War, vol. 2. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. ———. 1956. An Autobiography. Ahmedabad: Navajivan. Geach, Peter. 1957. Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Gelter, Hans. 2000. “Friluftsliv: The Scandinavian philosophy of outdoor life.” Canadian Journal of Environmental Education 5: 77–92. Godlovitch, Stanley, Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris. 1971. Animals, Men and Morals. London: Gollancz. Greenberg, D. S. 1967. The Politics of American Science. New York: New American Library. Gross, Felicks. 1971. European Ideologies. New York: Philosophy Library (1948). Gueroult, Martial. 1968. Spinoza I: Dieu. Hildesheim: G. Olms. Guthrie, Edwin R. 1935. The Psychology of Learning. New York and London: Harper and Bros. Habermas, J. 1968. Technik und Wissenschaft als “Ideologie.” Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

355 REFERENCES

Hampshire, Stuart. 1951. Spinoza. Baltimore and Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. Harijan. Weekly paper published in Poona, later in Ahmedabad. Edited chiefly by Gandhi. Hartmann, G. W. 1936. “The contradiction between the feeling-tone of political party names and public response to their platforms.” Journal of Social Psychology 7: 336-57. Henderson, Hazel. 1981. The Politics of the Solar Age: Alternatives to Economics. New York: Anchor Books. Hessing, Sigfried, ed. 1962. Spinoza-Festschrift, 1632–1932. The Hague: Nijhoff. Höffding, Harald. 1950. A History of Modern Philosophy. New York: Humanities Press. Holton, Gerald J. 1970. “Mack, Einstein, and the search for reality.” In Boston Stud- ies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 6, edited by R. S. Cohen and R. J. Seeger. Dor- drecht and Boston: Reidel, pp. 39–57. Horowitz, Irving Louis. 1967. The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Iversen, Olav H., and E. G. Astrup. 1984. “The paradigm of two-stage carcinogen- esis: A critical attitude.” Cancer Investigations 2: 51–60; review. James, William. 1904. “Does ‘consciousness’ exist?” Journal of Philosophy, Psychol- ogy, and Scientific Methods 1: 477–91. Jaspers, Karl. 1919. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. Berlin: Springer (1960). Jensen, Bent. 1973. “Human reciprocity: An Arctic exemplification.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 43: 447–58. Kaila, Eino. 1941. Uber den Physikalishen Realitatsbegriff. Helsinki: Edidit Societas Philosophica. Kampik, G. Ap. 1976. “Akupunktur-Theorie und Praxis.” Fortsschr Medicine 94: 559–62. Kelsen, Hans. 1929. Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie. Tübingen: Mohr (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1981). Koch, Sigmund, ed. 1959. Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. Koestler, Arthur. 1972. The Roots of Coincidence. London: Hutchinson. Kroeber, Alfred. 1923. Anthropology. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Leiss, W. 1981. “Political aspects of environmental issues.” In Ecological Conscious- ness, edited by R. C. Schultz and J. D. Hughes. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

356 REFERENCES

Lewin, Kurt. 1951. Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper and Row. Loomis, Frederic B. 1926. The Evolution of the Horse. Boston: Marshall Jones. Marcuse, Herbert. 1972. Counterrevolution and Revolt. Boston: Beacon Press. Markovic, Mihailo. 1972. “The ethics of critical social science.” International Social Science Journal 24. Marx, Karl. 1920. Capital. London: Glaisher (New York: International Publishers, 1929). McKeon, R., and S. Rokkan, eds. 1951. Democracy in a World of Tensions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Medvedev, Zhores A. 1969. The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko, translated by I. M. Lerner. New York: Columbia University Press. Meynaud, Jean. 1969. Technocracy, translated by P. Barnes. New York: Free Press. Miller, Webb. 1936. I Found No Peace. New York: Simon and Schuster. Milosz, Czeslaw. 1955. The Captive Mind. New York: Vintage Books. Moynihan, Daniel. 1975. Coping: On the Practice of Government. New York: Vintage Books. Mumford, Lewis. 1970–71. The Pentagon of Power. London: Secker and Warburg. Naess, Arne. 1936a. Erkenntnis und Wissenschaftliches Verhalten (Knowledge Acquisi- tion and Scientific Behavior). Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. ———. 1936b. “Zun Repert von E. C. Tolman” (Reporting on the work of E. C. Tolman). Erkenntnis 6: 397–98. ———. 1938. Truth as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Science and Jacob Dybwad. ———. 1953. Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to a Theory of Communica- tion. Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I) ———. 1966. Communication and Argument: Elements of Applied Semantics. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. (SWAN VII) ———. 1968a. Four Modern Philosophers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 1968b. Scepticism. London and New York: Humanities Press. (SWAN II) ———. 1972. The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (London: Allen and Unwin). (SWAN IV) ———. 1973. “The shallow and the deep long-range ecology movement: A summary.” Inquiry 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X) ———. 1974a. “Equivalent terms and notions in Spinoza’s Ethics.” Oslo: Inquiry, Filosofisk Institutt, University of Oslo. ———. 1974b. Gandhi and Group Conflict: An Exploration of Satyagraha. Oslo: Uni- versitetsforlaget. (SWAN V)

357 REFERENCES

———. 1975. Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza’s Ethics. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. (SWAN VI) ———. 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2005. “A Necessary Component of Logic: Empirical Argumentation and Analysis.” (in SWAN VIII) Naess, Arne, Jens Christophersen, and Kjell Kvalo. 1956. Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. Nagel, Ernest. 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explana- tion. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Needham, Joseph. 1949. Science and International Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1969. The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West. London: Allen and Unwin. Oakeshott, Michael J. 1966. Experience and Its Modes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ostrander, Sheila, and Lynn Schroeder. 1973. PSI-Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain. London: Abacus. Parsons, Talcott. 1949. The Structure of Social Action. New York: Free Press. Perelman, Chaim. 1945. De la justice. Brussels: Office de Publicité. Peters, R. S. 1951. “Observations in psychology.” Mind 60. Polanyi, Michael. 1958. Personal Knowledge: Toward a Postcritical Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Popper, Karl. 1945–57. Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1949). ———. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper Basic Books. ———. 1976. Unended Quest, rev. ed. London: Fontana/Collins. Prabhu, R. K., and U. R. Rao. 1946. The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi. London and New York: Oxford University Press. Price, D. J. de S. 1965. Little Science, Big Science. New York: Columbia University Press. Ravetz, Jerome R. 1973. “Tragedy in the history of science.” In Changing Perspectives in the History of Science, edited by M. Teich and R. Young. London: Heinemann. Reich, Charles. 1971. The Greening of America. New York: Random House. Rizzi, Bruno. 1939. La bureaucratisation du monde. Paris. Rogers, Carl R. 1961. On Becoming a Person. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Rosenfeld, Leon. 1961. “Foundations of quantum theory and complementarity.”

358 REFERENCES

Nature 190: 384–88. Reprinted in Selected Papers of L. R. Rosenfeld, edited by Robert S. Cohen and John J. Stachel. Boston and Dordrecht: Reidel (1979). Roszak, Theodore. 1969. The Making of a Counter-culture. New York: Doubleday. ———. 1972. Where the Wasteland Ends. New York: Doubleday (London: Faber, 1973). Rotblat, Joseph. 1981. Nuclear Radiation in Warfare. London: Taylor and Francis. Routley, R., and V. Routley. 1979. “Against the inevitability of human chauvinism.” In Ethics and the Problems of the Twenty-first Century, edited by K. E. Good- paster and K. M. Sayre. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Russell, Bertram. 1934. Freedom and Organisation, 1814–1914. London: Allen and Unwin. Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London and New York: Hutchinsons Uni- versity Library. Sandemose, Axel. 1953. Brev fra Kjorkelvik. Astridende no. 6. Schadewaldt, Hans. 1974. “Medicus politicus: Medicine between utopia and reality.” World Medical Journal 21. Schell, Jonathan. 1982. The Fate of the Earth. New York: Knopf. Schilpp, P. A., ed. 1949. Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers. Schumacher, E. F. 1973a. “Buddhist economics.” In Toward a Steady State Economy, edited by H. E. Daly. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. ———. 1973b. Small Is Beautiful. New York: Harper and Row. Shapiro, James. 1969. Remarks made at a press conference in November at Har- vard, as reported in the New York Times in a front-page article by Bob Rhinehart. Sharp, G. 1960. “The methods of non-violent action.” Mimeographed. Oslo: Insti- tute for Social Research. Sherif, M. 1937. “The psychology of slogans.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy- chology 32: 450–61. Skinner, B. F. 1953. The Science of Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. ———. 1971. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Bantam/Vintage. Sommerfeld, Arnold. 1949. Quoted in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by P. A. Schilpp. Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers. Sorokin, Pitirim A. 1941. The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook. New York: Dutton. Spinoza, Benedictus de. 1951. Theological-Political Treatise. New York: Dover. ———. 1956. How to Improve Your Mind. New York: Wisdom Library.

359 REFERENCES

———. 1963. Ethics. London and New York: Dent and Dutton. ———. 1965. The Political Works (includes the full political treatise in Latin and English). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Stevens, Stanley Smith. 1951–53. Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: Wiley. Stevenson, Charles L. 1944. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press. Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen. Tendulkar, D. G. 1951. Mahatma, vol. 1. Bombay: Vithalbhai K. Jhaveri and D. G. Tendulkar. Ten Hoor, Marten. 1954. Freedom Limited: An Essay on Democracy. Alabama: Univer- sity of Alabama Press. Tolman, Edward Chace. 1932. Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men. New York: Century. Trungpa, Chögyam. 1971. Born in Tibet. Baltimore: Penguin. Weber, Max. 1921. Economy and Society. New York: Bedminister Press. Weinberg, Alvin B. 1967. Reflections on Big Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Weiss, R. F. 1969. Moderne Pflanzenheilkunde. Bad Wörishofen: Sanitas Verlag. Wells, H. G. 1922. Outline of History, 2 vols. New York: Macmillan. Westing, A. H. 1977. Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment. London: Tay- lor and Francis. ———. 1980. Warfare in a Fragile World. London: Taylor and Francis. Wetlesen, Jon. 1979. The Sage and the Way: Spinoza’s Ethics of Freedom. Assen: Gor- cum (Oslo: University of Oslo Press, 1976). Whitehead, Alfred N. 1949. The Aims of Education. New York: Mentor Books (1929). Winch, Peter. 1958. The Idea of a Social Science. London: Routledge (New York: Hu- manities Press). Wolfson, Harry Austryn. 1958. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Process of His Reasoning, 2 vols. New York: Meridian Books. Zaslavski, David. 1946–47. La démocratie soviétique. Paris: Editions Sociales.

360 Index

absolutism, 7, 16, 248 Bentham, Jeremy, 8 See also under freedom; internality; justice Bergson, Henri, 309, 310 action research, 179–80 Bettelheim, Charles, 40, 50, 65, 67, 77, 79, 83 action(s), 259, 329–31 Black Power (Carmichael and Hamilton), 211, 212 external vs. internal, 255, 260 blacks and black liberation, 211 activeness vs. activity, 329–30 See also King, Martin Luther, Jr. advertising, 15, 16 Boas, George, 40, 45, 52 aggression, 73 Bober, M. M., 48, 54, 82, 83 critical attitude creates indifference in face of, Bochenski, I. M., 42, 43, 45, 56, 79 8–10 Bohr, Niels, 295–96 See also national aggression; violence bondage, 259, 260 ambiguity. See under democracy(ies); Jørgensen Bondi, Hermann, 140–41 Amundsen, Roald, 183 Borgese, G. A., 67, 68 anarchistic lifestyles, 177–78 Bowle, John, 82 anarchists, science as good for, 183 Bridgman, P. W., 114–16 anger, 240–41 Brogan, D. W., 81 anti-Semitism, 13, 320 Brogan formula, 81–82 Arendt, Hannah, 152 Brown, D., 35, 48, 70, 77, 82 argumentation, 181–82, 263 Bruner, Jerome S., 108 arguments, equivalences as, 281–83 Bryan, William Jennings, 64 Aristotle, 143–44 Buddhism, 260, 276 arms race. See nuclear arms race Spinoza and, 255–58, 272–75 Aron, Raymond, 95, 98 Astrup, E. G., 167 campaigns, positive vs. negative, 213–15 Campbell, Donald T., 107 “basic,” 125 Carmichael, Stokeley, 211 behavior units, research, 105–08 Carnap, Rudolf, 312 behavioral approach Carritt, Edgar F., 77 behaviorism and the, 110–14, 152 Carson, Rachel, 315 and operationism, 114–18 Casteñeda, Carlos, 181 behavioral science, 104–05 causality, 129 logic of science, philosophy of science, and, See also determination 119–21 certainty (and finality) of science, reformulation of, 119 excessive claims to, 3–4, 15 behavioral therapy, 152–53 See also Heisenberg; knowledge Bennett, Ivar, 148 Chinese medicine, 162

361 INDEX

Churchill, Winston, 26 common characteristics of, 49–50 Cobden, Richard, 7–8 Eastern vs. Western, 65–70, 97 coercion, 246 economic foundations, 63 cognition, 267–68 factors in current ideological use of, 60 adequate, 257–60, 269, 271 meanings and conceptions of, 35–37, 47–50, Spinoza on, 259, 262, 267–68, 270–71 55, 66, 68, 335n11 cognitive maps. See maze epistemology “narrow” vs. “broad,” 55–60 communication misuse of the term, 42–46 science of, and use in clarification of conflicts, new uses of the term, 47–49 21–22 “normal sense” of the term, 37 training in, 226 one-party systems compatibility with, 78–80 communism, 55–56 political and other, 52–73 fascism and, 334–35n7, 335n11 scepticism and, 80–83 See also democracy(ies), Eastern vs. Western; semantics of the term, 34–51 Marxists; Soviet Union aspirations vs. achievements and, 46–47 complementarity, 132 tolerance vs. treason, 73–83 conflicts, clarification of, 21–22 value foundations of conflicts regarding, 83– consciousness, 137 86 constant(s), 128 what should be repressed in, 73–78 content analysis, 18 democratic opinion-influencing Copenhagen interpretation, 129 ideals of, 71–73 cosmology, 104 vs. pressure, 70–73 counterculture, 346–47n1 democraticity, 38, 39, 54, 55 Cox, Oliver C., 41 democratization, 52 “crisis of our age,” 10 Descartes, René, 246–54, 282 social science as contributing to, 11 D’Espagnat, Bernard, 133 critical attitude, 5 determination cultural evolution, 223–24 antidetermination and timeless kinds of, cynicism, 7 239–43 infinite chain of timeless causes or reasons, decision-making power 237–39 centralization vs. decentralization of, 196–97 meanings and kinds of, 236–37 See also democracy(ies) determinism, 129, 253, 291 deep ecology and education, 317–31 (in)consistency between freedom and Spin- defense oza’s, 235, 242–43 military, 217 See also under Einstein; Spinoza inadequacy, 189–91 dialectical materialism, 69 research, 200–201 diversity, 302, 305 See also national aggression and nonviolence, 313–14 See also nonmilitary defense Ducasse, C. J., 47, 54, 65, 67, 69–71, 82, 84 definiteness of intention, 128–29, 142 on democracy, 35, 56 delimitation, 240 on misuse of words, 42–43, 45 demilitarization. See military disarmament; Duhem, Pierre, 131–32, 139 nuclear disarmament Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity (Naess), 3n eclecticism, 137 Democracy in a World of Tensions (McKeon et al.), ecological equilibrium, science in a community 3n of, 163 democracy(ies), 313 ecology, 325, 327 ambiguity of the term, 34–40 deep. See under education evidence of, 40–42 economics, 63, 157 arms race and, 223 and personal identity, 208

362 INDEX ecosophy, 315–16 freedom, 196, 229, 253, 335n11 education, 72 absolute, 268–71 deep ecology and, 317–31 through cognition only of oneself, 267– environmental, 321–24 68 textbook “knowledge” and, 4–5 commitment to, 192–93 egalitarianism, 305, 307 conceptions of, 257–58, 260, 265–66, 270, Einstein, Albert, 105, 114, 116, 139 272 on God and determinism, 291–97 fictive human, 250–53 Eisenmann, Charles, 35, 59, 65, 78 Gandhi on, 207, 229 elitism, 148–49, 154–55 grades of power and, 246–48 emotions, 258, 267–69, 272, 273 through insight into determination of essen- empiricism, logical, 312–13, 320 tials, 245–46 enlightenment Wetlesen on, 257–60, 263–74 happens in time, doesn’t develop out of what it consists of, 248–50 nonfreedom, 268–71 See also democracy(ies), what should be environmental education. See under educa- repressed in; Spinoza, on freedom and tion determinism environmental ethics, 321 Frondizi, Risieri, 35 environmental philosophy(ies) fundamentality, 124–25, 135, 136 evolution of, 318–19 See also deep ecology and education Gaia, 321, 328 epistemology(ies), 311 Galileo, 179 maze, 118–19 Galtung, Johan, 176 naturalist, 308–10 Gandhi, Mahatma, 205, 207, 208, 210, 212–13, equivalence(s) 260–61, 328–29 as arguments, 281–83 campaigns, 208, 209, 213, 215 expressions of, 278–81 on condemnation, 206 essential relations, 244–46, 254 on counterviolence, 206 eternity, 266, 270–72 on equality, 206 ethics, 321 on freedom, 207, 229 in psychology, 152–53 on God and truth, 203–04 See also under Gandhi and meditation, 261, 262 ethology, 308–09 on satyagrahi and ethics of nonviolence, 305, Ewing, A. C., 39, 67, 77 313–14 Eysenck, Hans J., 152 on self-respect, 207–09 on swaraj (self-rule), 213, 214, 229 faith in ultimate ends and values, 9, 10 Germany, 9, 26, 99, 228–29 Fanon, Frantz, 211 See also Hitler; Nazism Farber, Marvin, 50, 59, 79 gestalts, 322–24 fascism God, 7 communism and, 334–35n7, 335n11 closeness of mind to, 267–68 See also Germany; Hitler; Nazism Einstein on, 291–97 Feibleman, James K., 50 Gandhi on, 203–04 Feyerabend, Paul, 162, 176–78, 180–81, 183, law of, 8 184 Wetlesen on, 263–65, 267, 270 Field, G. C., 36, 39, 64, 67, 69, 82, 84 See also under Spinoza Finland, 218 Gough, J. W., 45, 50 Fischer, Louis, 207 grading, wide and narrow concepts of, 271–72 Four Modern Philosophers (Naess), 312 Green ideologies, 93 free men, 241 Gromyko, 68 free will. See determinism; freedom Gross, F., 91

363 INDEX

Gueroult, Martial, 285–88 industrial development, 26 Guthrie, Edwin R., 111–12 science and, 176 ingroups and outgroups, 7, 21, 96–98 Hagopian, M., 41, 78 ideologies and, 15–19 Hampshire, Stuart, 243 intention happiness principle, 8 definiteness of, 128–29, 142 Harner, Michael, 181 depth of, 139 Heckscher, Gunnar., 35, 37, 47, 48 internality, 257–60 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 132 implied by absoluteness, 262–64 Heisenberg, Werner K., 132 international character, 87 hermeneutics, 99 international service, 193–95 Hessen, Boris, 165 areas of, 195–96 heuristics, 115 international understanding, norms and attitudes history of life, immensity and nearness of, 306–08 favorable to, 22 Hitchmann, Edward, 301, 307 Interpretation and Preciseness (Naess), 313 Hitler, Adolf, 8, 16, 196, 228 intuition, complexity of, 262 Hobbes, Thomas, 317 Iversen, Olav H., 167 Hocking, William E., 52 Hollis, Christopher, 56, 77 James, William, 113, 304 Holmes, Justice, 77 Jews, 13, 320 Horvath, Barna, 35, 37, 39, 47, 50, 59, 77, 79, 80, Jørgensen, Jørgen 83 on democracy, ambiguity, and misuse of terms, Hull, C. L., 97 36, 38, 41–44, 47, 50, 58, 79–81, 83 Husserl, Edmund, 309, 310 justice, objective absolute norm of, 7 hypothetico-deductive methodology, 159 Kabir, Humayun, 40, 50 ideological conflicts, 86–88 Kaila, Eino, 108 aspirations vs. achievements, 46–47 Kallen, Horace M., 44 exaggerating philosophical profundity of, Khadi movement, 207–08 18–20 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 205, 210, 211, 215 keywords and slogans used in, 13, 17, 18, 46, knowledge, 308 335n8 hypothetical character of textbook, 4–5 ideological convictions, unquestioned, 333n2 underestimation of nonscientific, 178–79 Ideologiekritik, 99 See also certainty ideology(ies), 12, 99–100 Kohn, Hans, 77 basic agreements in, 23–25 Kuhn, Thomas S., 166–67 dangerous aspects of, fostered in schools, 20–21 deep value priorities in, 93–95 language. See democracy(ies); semantics; words end-of-ideology movement, 98–99 Laplacian universes, 241–44 as functioning to organize and justify aggres- learning theories, 97 sion, 14–15 Lefebvre, Henri, 35, 37, 44, 64, 67, 77, 79 and ideology research, 11–13, 21 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 48, 64–65, 84 impact on ingroups and outgroups, 15–18 Lewis, C. I., 136 irrationality of our opponents’, 95–96, 99–100 on democracy, 35, 38, 42–44, 50, 53, 54, 56, neutral and negative definitions, 91–92 62, 78 reductivistic theories of, 18 Lien, Arnold J., 50 imagination, 244 lifestyle(s) immortality, problem of, 142 new, 177–78 India, 214 research and, 182 See also Gandhi Lincoln, Abraham, 52–54

364 INDEX

Lincoln formula, 52–55, 89 Naess, Kit-Fai, 326 Lindsay of Birker, Lord, 40, 48, 65 Nansen, Fridtjof, 193 Logemann, H. A., 59, 79 national aggression, 6–8, 19 logic, 120–21, 132 excessive claims to certainty and finality in Loomis, Frederic B., 146 writings on, 3–4 Lovejoy, Arthur, 40, 42, 44, 47, 77, 82 factors influencing, 3 causal weight of, 25–27 Mach-Duhem-Poincaré theorem, 169, 171, 172 See also aggression; defense; military occupa- magic, belief in and technical science, 183 tion; nuclear war; war; World War II Mahayana Buddhism. See Buddhism national character, 87 Marshall, James, 44, 69 natura naturata, 288–89, 292–94 Marins, Wilson, 78 natural history, 325 Marx, Karl, 48, 149 natural medicine. See Chinese medicine Marxists, 48, 64–65, 155 naturalist, Naess as infant shoreline, 302–05 mathematics, 125, 128, 134 naturalist epistemology, 308–10 Maxwell, James Clark, 140 natural-science methodology, 160 maze epistemology, 118–19 nature, 292, 315 error of, 118 laws of, 294, 295 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 7–8 as object of science, 159–61 McKeon, Richard, 48, 77, 83 order of, 294 on democracy, 36, 41, 50, 55, 65, 67–69, 79 Nazism, 336n15 on ideological violence, 47 See also Germany; Hitler on misuse of words, 45 Needham, Joseph, 153 means-ends relations, 9–11, 13, 14 Nef, Frederic, 144 and development of large-scale aggression, Nerman, Ture, 40, 47, 48 6–8 Newton, Isaac, 165 medicine, traditional Chinese, 162 nihilism, social science as allied with, 11 meditation, 255–57, 261, 275, 276 Nomad, Max, 50, 54, 78 Medvedev, Zhores A., 154 nominalism, 289 Mephisto, 305–06 nonmilitary defense, 191–92, 196, 201 metascience, 105–07, 115–18, 123, 124, 139 nonmilitary resistance, 197–98, 201, 215, basic aim, 104 228 from the far outside and near outside, 103–05 techniques of, 198–200 metascientific model of scientific knowledge, 310 nonviolence, 199 microresistance, 200 diversity and, 313–14 militant nonviolence, 225, 227, 229 militant, 225, 227, 229 military. See defense; nuclear arms race under occupation, 225–30 military disarmament, 225–26, 231 See also Gandhi; nonmilitary resistance See also nuclear disarmament Norway, 150, 190–91, 199, 206 military occupation, way of nonviolence under, nuclear arms race, 218, 229 225–30 cultural evolution and, 223–24 Moynihan, Daniel, 150–51 nuclear deterrence, 220, 223–24 music, 322 nuclear disarmament, 220, 225 See also military disarmament Naess, Arne, 135–37, 139–41, 143–44 nuclear peril, nature of the current, 218–22 conversation on deep ecology and education, nuclear war, consequences of an absolute “no” to, 317–31 217, 225 as infant shoreline naturalist, 302–05 Mephisto cousin, 305–06 obedience and democracy, 54 motives for psychoanalysis in 1934, 301–02 objectivity, fear of, 21

365 INDEX observation and theory, 168 Pool, Ithiel de Sola, 40, 44, 45, 48, 65, 67, 69, 76, observationism, 109 79, 82 open-minded inquiry, 7 Popkin, Richard, 141 operationism, 113, 309 Popper, Karl, 120, 168, 295, 309 behavioral approach and, 114–18 positivism, 7, 159 defined, 114 See also arguments Opium of the Intellectuals, The (Aron), 98 power, 280 Ossowski, Stanislaus, 48, 50, 59, 67 grades of freedom and, 246–48 See also decision-making power pacifism, 192 power interests, clashes of, 19 panentheism, 292–93 “power to” vs. “power over,” 217, 224, 229 paradigms and paradigm shifts pragmatism, 136, 141 Kuhn’s concept, 166–67 prejudices, 13, 319–20 non-Kuhnian paradigms, 167–74 propaganda, 12, 15, 16, 21 paranoid patterns of thinking, 337n18 antidemocratic, 78 Parmenides, 295 See also democracy(ies), what should be Pascal, Blaise, 141 repressed in Pascual, Ricardo R., 79, 83 resistance to scientific, 181–82 passions, 258, 267–69, 272, 273 pseudoknowledge, 5–6, 334n3–4 Patri, Aimé, 54, 65, 78 psychoanalysis, Naess’s, 301, 303, 314 peace. See aggression; national aggression; psychologism, 120 nonviolence psychology, 152 Perelman, Chaim, 37, 40, 44, 45, 54, 79 See also behavioral approach Peters, R. S., 108, 113 Puntambekar, S. V., 47, 48 philosophical terminology, 308, 310, 312 Pyrrhonian scepticism, 141 See also ideological conflicts, keywords and slogans used in quantum mechanics, 114, 129, 139, 296 philosophies, richness of amateur, 311–12 physics Ranulf, Svend, 40, 41, 45, 47, 48, 70, 76 classical, 129 rationalism, 294 philosophy of, 136 rationalist and objectivist thesis, 92 pure vs. philosophical, 131–32 rationality, 181 See also pluralism, in philosophy and physics; empirical tests of, 92–93 quantum mechanics; relativity reality, 127 Plamenatz, John Petrov, 36, 37, 48–49, 65, 70, reductionism, 18, 157–59 78 relativism, 7, 15, 26 Plato, 311, 312 crisis of, 10 pluralism social science as allied with, 11 defined, 135 relativity, theory of, 114, 116 philosophical, and physical reality, 131 religion, 162 in philosophy and physics, 123–33 See also God discussion on, 133–44 research, 183–84 trend against, 127–28 “action,” 179–80 political campaigns. See campaigns research practice, untested, 171 political ideology, 91–92 Rieger, Ladislaus, 67, 77, 79 defined, 91 Rokkan, Stein, 92, 313 See also ideology(ies) Röpke, Wilhelm, 40 politics Rosenfeld, Leon, 129, 131, 132 science, technology, and, 150–51, 153–54 Ross, Alf, 38–41, 44, 48, 54, 55, 76 See also specific topics Roszak, Theodore, 157–59

366 INDEX rule formulation, 109 small-scale, soft, action-oriented, 179 Russell, Bertrand, 7, 66, 67 for subcultures, 178 what all kinds of science and research have in Sabine, G. H., 45 common, 179 satyagrahi. See under Gandhi See also metascience; specific topics scepticism, 15, 305, 310 scientific enterprise, modern history of, 165–66 crisis of, 10 scientific philosophy, illusion of a, 176–77 democracy and, 80–83 scientific propaganda, resistance to, 181–82 Pyrrhonian, 141 scientific rationality, 176–77 Scepticism (Naess), 314 absence of a, 181 Schlesinger, Rudolf, 48, 52–54, 67 limitations of, and depreciation of non- Sneider, Herbert W., 59 Western cultures, 156–57 schools scientific revolutions, 138 dangerous aspects of ideologies fostered in, scientists, status of 20–21 as excessive, 180–81 See also education See also elitism science, 11 self-destructiveness, 310, 311, 314 careers in, 148–49 self-respect, 208–10, 319 cheerful face of, 145–46 self-rule (swaraj), 213, 214, 229 classical history of pure, 165–66 semantics in a community of ecological equilibrium, empirical, 312–13 163 See also democracy(ies) compared to a church, 149 Shapiro, James, 149 defined, 146–47 Simons, 79 external relations of, as underrated, 175–76 simplicity rule, 158 as good for anarchists, 183 skepticism. See scepticism grievances against, 145, 184–86 Skinner, B. F., 110–11, 152, 158 autotelism and intellectualism, 154–55 Smith, T. V., 40, 82 cult of nonscience, 161–62 social democracy, 61–62 elitism and privileges, 148–49 See also democracy(ies), political and other lack of respect for personal dignity, 152– Social Democrats in Germany, 9 53 social engineering, 150 manipulation, 151–52 social science, 9 nature as object of science, 159–61 as more effective in reducing pseudo- as part of advanced industrial state, 176 knowledge than in building new Pilate reaction to criticism, 149–50 knowledge, 5–6 pretense of political neutrality, 153–54 nihilism, relativism, and “crisis of our age,” reductionism and positivism, 157–59 11 science and the powers that be, 147–48 Sommerfield, Arnold, 292 science doesn’t serve the people, 155–56 Sorokin, Pitirim A., 11 science serves the state, 148 soul, 137 support of technocracy, 150–51 Soviet Union, 155, 218, 221, 225–28 helps us learn about nonscientific cultures, democracy and, 44, 45, 48, 49, 53, 67–68 179–80 Spain and United States, conflict in 1898, 19 and joy for all, 183–84 Spinoza, Benedict de, 255–56 logic of, 120–21 Buddhist meditation and the way of, 255–57, not considered neutral, 177 272–75 philosophy of, 119–21, 123–27 on cognition, 259, 262, 267–68, 270–71 sad face of, 146–47 between East and West, 256–57 of science, 308–09 essential relations, 244–46, 254

367 INDEX

Spinoza, Benedict de (continued) uncertainty, 245 Ethics, 237, 239–40, 242, 244, 246–51, 253, See also certainty; Heisenberg 256, 257, 261, 263, 285–90 utilitarianism. See happiness principle equivalences as arguments, 281–83 propositions of, as arguments in a debate, validity, 127, 128, 136 277–78 value judgments of ideologies, 13 theses of equivalence, 278–81 value priorities in ideology, deep, 93–95 on freedom and determinism, 235, 237–54, value systems, science of description of 257–60, 263–66, 270, 271, 293, 294 and use in clarification of conflicts, 21–22 on God, 263–64, 270, 280, 281, 285–90 values Einstein and, 291–96 belief in ultimate, 9, 10 rationalism, 280 See also under democracy(ies) theory of affects, 258, 268, 272–73 van Dantzig, David, 41, 42–44 spirituality, 310 Vigier, Jean-Pierre, 133, 135, 137–38, 140, 142–43 spontaneous experiences, 321–23 violence, 47 Stevens, S. S., 115 and counterviolence, 206, 210–12 Stevenson, Charles L., 38–40 leading to nonviolence, Gandhi and, 203–15 superstructures, 18, 19 See also aggression; national aggression swaraj (self-rule), 213, 214, 229 virtue, 280 Sweezy, Paul M., 40, 48, 49, 54, 56, 59, 67, 77, 80–85 Walter, Emil J., 47, 56 symbolic logic, 120 war sympathy, reactions of, 22 causes of, 19 See also aggression; national aggression; nuclear technocracy, 150–51 war; World War II technology, science, and politics, 150–51, Weil, Eric, 65, 83 153–54 Wells, H. G., 306 ten Hoor, Marten, 44, 54, 82, 84 Wetlesen, Jon, 255, 261 Tendulkar, D. G., 204 on eternity, 270–72 Tennessen, Herman, 142 on freedom, 257–60, 263–74 theories on God, 263–65, 267, 270 established, 169 on internal vs. external effects, 264–66 and observation, 168 on passions, 267–69 See also pluralism on Spinoza, 256–59, 263–65 time, 238 and Buddhism, 272–75 tolerance Whitehead, Alfred North, 329 and liberalism toward philosophical schools, Wiener, Norbert, 138 133–35, 143 Wolfson, Harry Austryn, 277, 278 See also under democracy(ies) words, misuse of, 42–43 Tolman, E. C., 97, 104, 308, 309 See also under democracy(ies); Jørgensen tranquility, 275 World War II, 26, 199–200, 206 vs. equanimity, 257, 260–62 See also Hitler; Norway Treder, H. J., 138–39 Wright, Quincy, 45, 78, 81, 85 Trungpa, Chögyam, 261 truth, 127, 128, 311 Yourgrau, Wolfgang, 133–35 Truth as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Profes- sional Philosophers (Naess), 311

368 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

369 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

370 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922 Notes

Chapter 4: Deepness of Questions and the Deep Ecology Movement 1. This is a revised and shortened version of an unpublished manuscript, “Deep- ness of Questions,” written in the 1970s and distributed to only a few people because of its manifest weaknesses. I have revised it because some interest in it persists, and because of the prominent place it received in Warwick Fox’s important book, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (1990). 2. The term chain is important. The structure of systematization may be schematized as follows: from premises A and B, conclusion C is drawn. From premises C and D, conclusion E is drawn. From premises E and F, conclusion G is drawn. Thus, a chain of premise-conclusion relations is asserted. The rules of inference that are applied are rough. Requirements of logical validity lead to vast unnecessary complications for people other than professional logicians. 3. The study is reprinted in this SWAN volume; see chapter 18, “Expert Views on the Inherent Value of Nature.”

Chapter 5: The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects 1. For more about interspecific community relationships, see my “Self- realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves” (1979b [in this volume]). 2. I cannot here do justice to the many authors who have contributed to the understanding of the emerging deep ecology movement. Only three will be mentioned. The newsletters written by George Sessions, Department of Philosophy, Sierra College, Rocklin, CA, are indispensable. There are six letters, April 1976, May 1979, April 1981, May 1982, May 1983, and May 1984, about 140 pages in all. The significant contributions by poets and

617 NOTES TO PAGES 41–50

artists are fully recognized. Most of these materials are summarized in Ses- sions 1981. Bill Devall provides a short survey, in part historical, in his po- tent article “The deep ecology movement” (1980). See also Devall and Ses- sions 1985. Finally, The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy was started in 1983 by Alan Drengson. It was published as a print journal for fourteen years and is now an online journal. 3. I proposed the name Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement in a lecture at the Third World Future Research Conference (Bucharest, September 1972). “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement” (Naess 1973 [this volume]) is a summary of that lecture. Adherents of the deep ecology movement fairly commonly use the term deep ecologist, whereas shallow ecologist, I am glad to say, is rather uncommon. Both terms may be considered arrogant and slightly misleading. I prefer to use the awkward but more egalitarian expression “supporter of the deep (or shallow) ecology movement,” avoiding personification. Also, it is common to call deep ecology consistently antianthropocentric. This has led to misconceptions: see my “A defense of the deep ecology movement” (1983). It is better described as nonanthropocentric. 4. The technical term biospheric should perhaps be avoided because it favors the scientifically fruitful distinction between biosphere and ecosphere. I use the term life in a broad sense common in everyday speech, and may therefore speak of landscapes and larger systems of the ecosphere as “living”—ultimately speaking of the life of the planet. The biospheric point of view referred to in the text is not a narrower point of view than the ecospheric because bios is used in a broad sense. 5. Many authors take some steps toward derivational structures, offering mild systemizations. The chapter on environmental ethics and hope in G. Tyler Miller’s Living in the Environment (1983) is a valuable start, but the derivational relations are unclear. The logic and semantics of simple models of normative systems are briefly discussed in my “Notes on the Methodology of Normative Systems” (1977a [this volume]). For defense of the thesis that as soon as people assert anything at all we assume a total view, implicit with ontology, methodology, epistemology, and ethics, see my “Reflections About Total Views” (1964 [this volume]). The best and wittiest warning against taking systematizations too seriously is to be found in Søren Kierkegaard’s Con- cluding Unscientific Postscript (1941). 6. Trusting Bill Devall, one may say that “Muir is now understood as the first Taoist of American ecology” (Devall 1982); see also Cohen 1984. 7. For empirical studies of attitudes of “Wilderness-users,” see the survey by

618 NOTES TO PAGES 52–91

Chris. R. Kent in his thesis The Experiential Process of Nature Mysticism, Hum- boldt State University, 1981. 8. The term atman is not taken in its absolutistic senses, not as a permanent in- destructible “soul.” This makes it consistent with those Buddhist denials (the avatman doctrine) that the atman is to be taken in absolutist senses. Within the Christian tradition, some theologians distinguish “ego” and “true self” in ways similar to these distinctions in Eastern religion. See, e.g., the ecophilosophical interpretation of the Gospel of Luke in Verney 1976: 33–41. 9. For criticism and defense of this fundamental norm, and my answer, see In Sceptical Wonder: Essays in Honor of Arne Naess (Gullvag and Wetlesen 1982). My main exposition of Ecosophy T was originally offered in the Norwegian work Økologi, samfunn og livsstil (1976), later published in English as Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle (1989). Even there, the exposition is sketchy.

Chapter 6: The Deep Ecology “Eight Points” Revisited 1. The eighteen points of my 1973 paper “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movements” (in this volume) smacked too much of the special metaphysics of a younger Naess, as I soon found out. They were discarded in favor of the Eight Points, to the regret of some readers (e.g., Richard Sylvan, among ecophilosophers). The 1973 paper, for example, claimed the ego to be like “knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations.” I still may use the sentence “All living beings are ultimately one,” which embarrassed Sir Alfred Ayer in our one-hour debate (see Elders 1974: 31).

Chapter 7: Equality, Sameness, and Rights 1. For more about the relevance of tradition and culture, see my “Self-Realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves” (1979b [in this volume]); see also Naess and Mysterud 1987.

Chapter 11: A Note on the Prehistory and History of the Deep Ecology Movement 1. See, e.g., Rohrer 1920. For areas outside Europe, see several articles in Tobias 1985. There is, of course, nothing “Aryan” about the cult of mountains. 2. From Henri Frankfort’s “The Birth of Civilization in the Near East” (1959), as quoted in Tobias and Drasdo (1979: 201).

619 NOTES TO PAGES 101–56

Chapter 12: Antifascist Character of the Eight Points of the Deep Ecology Movement 1. The distinction Green/green corresponds roughly to deep/shallow, deep/ reform, interpersonal/nonpersonal ecology (W. Fox 1990). There are several other terminologies closely resembling the above. In short, roughly speaking, a distinction similar to that between a deep and a shallow movement— or better, a reform movement—is widespread within the total ecology movement. This means that we have (descriptive) data to refer to in changing the formulation of the Eight Points. Or, of course, we can propose a different set of points. As reformers of the terminology, we are not working in thin air.

Chapter 16: Should We Try to Relieve Clear Cases of Suffering in Nature? 1. The language of norm 1 (Self-realization!) and hypothesis 1 (The higher the self-realization attained by anyone, the more its increase depends on an increase of the self-realization of others) is introduced in Ecosophy T in order to avoid the more usual unconditional, unrestricted “Yes to life,” whatever its manifestations. Higher self-realization does not mean here anything different from the more complete realization of potentialities related to the self, the specific characteristic of each living being. The world of potentialities of a living being has no very definite borders but may be in continuous or discontinuous development. The conceptual framework is not very different from that of J. von Üexkull as described in my Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Ver- halten (1936). 2. This is according to point 5 of the proposed theoretical platform of the deep ecology movement. 3. See note 2.

Chapter 17: Sustainability! The Integral Approach 1. Among many other statements the following, using only fifteen words, should be mentioned: the requirement that “present [vital] needs must be covered without endangering the capacity for meeting future [vital] needs” (Research Policy Conference 1988: 17; I added the word vital).

Chapter 18: Expert Views on the Inherent Value of Nature 1. The Mardøla River in Sogn and Fjordane counties and the Alta River in Finn- mark County were regulated to build electricity works in 1970 and 1980.

620 NOTES TO PAGES 167–205

Both projects were supported by the Norwegian Water Resources and En- ergy Administration. The author participated in the heated debates on both of these projects. 2. Minister Kåre Kristiansen was a representative for the Christian Democratic Party. Its Norwegian name is Kristelig Folkeparti. 3. The Norwegian name of the movement is Samling om skaperverket. 4. Røros, in southeastern Norway, was once an economically important mining town. 5. The largest lake in Norway; it has been heavily polluted by agricultural and household chemicals. 6. Since 1985, when my questionnaire was distributed, the term quality of life (livskvalitet) has undergone a remarkable change of status. It is now a mainstream word, and this may be considered quite an achievement of the environmental movement. 7. These Scandinavian environmental organizations are in Norwegian named Fremtiden i våre hender and Alternativ Norden. They are concerned, to a large extent, with the nuts and bolts of how to achieve an ecologically sound way of life in Western societies. 8. This is another Norwegian environmental organization, called Folkevett in Norwegian. Common Sense is particularly well known for its pacifist program and the number of lawsuits brought against some of its members for publishing sensitive military information. 9. The author received much mass-media attention after being carried away by policemen from demonstrations protesting the regulation of the Mardøla and Alta rivers in 1970 and 1980.

Chapter 20: Politics and the Ecological Crisis: An Introductory Note 1. See “The eight points,” one of the suggestions for formulating a (general, more or less abstract) platform for supporters of the deep ecology movement, in Devall and Sessions 1985: 70–73. 2. For a discussion of the principles of ecological diplomacy, see Carroll 1988.

Chapter 21: The Politics of the Deep Ecology Movement 1. Portions of this paper, written in 1985, were incorporated into the English edition of my Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle (1989). 2. Note that the Ecology party in Britain has since changed its name to the Green party.

621 NOTES TO PAGES 220–47

Chapter 22: The Three Great Movements 1. The term deep ecology is said here to be used in a loose way in order to empha- size that my own efforts to formulate a platform of the deep ecology movement in eight points requiring about 200 words should not be taken too seriously. There are thousands of people who might be unmoved by one or more of the points I formulated but who nevertheless support the third movement as I conceive it. It would be arrogant and pretentious of me to compare the deep ecology movement with the historically tremendously important and strong movements against war, exploitation, and suppression if the term were to be closely associated with my modest effort in the way of terminology. For examples of characterizations other than the eight points that George Sessions and I have proposed, see the chapter “Deep Ecology” in Schwarz and Schwarz (1987), where Michael McCloskey, Donald Worster, Neil Evernden, Frithjof Capra, and others are quoted.

Chapter 23: The Encouraging Richness and Diversity of Ultimate Premises in Environmental Philosophy 1. My own interpretation of Spinoza in its relations to the deep ecology movement is suggested in “Spinoza and ecology” (1977b). A combined interpretation and reconstruction may be found in Naess 1975 (SWAN VI). “Self- subsistence” here refers to the dynamic development of the Self, the subsistence or perseverance in se (in itself ) as opposed to in alio (in other). Other interpretations are also in harmony with the main positions within radical environmentalism, such as those of B. Russell and G. Sessions (main feature: God is completely immanent). 2. I have discussed Lloyd’s interpretation in detail in Naess 1980: 313–25. 3. The conception of “determined in its essence” is elaborated in Naess 1974c. Are there other plausible or interesting interpretations of the term deter- minare? There are, of course, and I hope the number will not decrease. A list of close connotations (“equivalences”) between terms appears in Naess 1974a, obtainable from the Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo. 4. Gandhi laments deforestation and its possible influence on climate, advocates a religious foundation of the man-nature relation, and defends animal rights. See Power 1990. 5. In Davidson’s text, the expression “a language” is of importance. I do not feel that I understand well enough what he means by the expression to declare agreement or disagreement with members of the set of sentences in

622 NOTES TO PAGES 252–63

which he uses the expression. I am puzzled. This admission is made without any feeling of shame, perhaps because it is a prevalent feeling when I try to compare what at least prima facie seem to be deeply different total views. (Probably I should feel a little ashamed because of a belief that if Davidson may be said to “have” a total view, it will not be deeply different from mine.)

Chapter 24: The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology 1. See Greenpeace 1989–90: 53. Waste disposal procedures have improved, but “many more changes are still needed if stations are to comply with the new waste disposal guidelines contained in ATCM Recommendation SV. Indeed, most stations have not even met the minimal guidelines agreed to by the treaty States in 1975.” 2. Quoted from a valuable survey of the wilderness issues by George Sessions (1992). 3. “In contrast to the conventional lobbying efforts of environmental profes- sionals based in Washington, [Earth First!] proposes a militant defense of ‘Mother Earth,’ and unflinching opposition to human attacks on undisturbed wilderness” (Guha 1989: 74).

Chapter 25: Cultural Diversity and the Deep Ecology Movement 1. There is an unfortunate confusion of terminology surrounding the term cultural anthropology. In continental Europe what in this article is called cultural anthropology is usually called ethnology and in Great Britain social anthropology. In Europe the term ethnography is sometimes used to describe subject matter clearly falling under the American usage of cultural anthropology. Its antonym is physical anthropology. In continental Europe the term philosophical anthropology covers many subjects of cultural anthropology and also subjects of ecosophy in general, such as the debate about essential differences between human beings and animals. G. P. Gusdorf (1998) furnishes an excellent survey of the terminological developments until about 1970. 2. The distinctions between deep and shallow cultural differences, and the importance of articulated total views as expressions of the deep differences, are elaborated in my Which World Is the Real World? (2004 [SWAN III]). Cultural anthropology should, I think, be distinguished from less comprehensive units of research: economic, technological, social, and (the central European) philosophical anthropology. In my terminology, a culture is the largest hu-

623 NOTES TO PAGES 269–79

man unit and corresponds in a certain very moderate way to the unit of species in biology. Before the 1960s, discussions about cultures were considered unscientific within certain scientific communities. Expressions such as “the peoples of the world” were favored. Expressions such as “the consumerism people” do not, however, mean the same as “the consumerism culture” (cf. Fox and Lears 1983). 3. Some works of interest when we approach the new cultural anthropology and problems of deep diversity are Bateson 1972; Geertz 1973; Goodenough 1964; Keesing 1974, 1976; and Sahlins 1972. 4. The eight-point list of 1984 published in Devall and Sessions (1985) naturally needs revision. The list is, nevertheless, convenient for a short survey of complex materials. 5. Sometimes, for example, when formulating point 4 of the Eight Points, I neglected to consider in a realistic way what would be common views about population within the deep ecology movement. The first part is found to be acceptable, “The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population,” but scarcely the second, “The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.” In my experience, few supporters of the deep ecology movement have clearly thought about this, and if they have, they have either hoped for a way to give more room to other living beings or felt that there are no mild, acceptable policies for reducing the human population. Reluctantly, they see the decrease of the richness of nonhuman life as inevitable, the diversity as maintainable. In any case, point 4 should be reformulated. What holds for the 1985 version of the Eight Points holds also for the 1971 version of the Eighteen Points: the characteristics of the deep ecology movement are not consistently separated from views within Ecosophy T.

Chapter 26: Population Reduction: An Ecosophical View 1. The all-sided, mature human being has a need to “combine argumentation” regarding the richness and diversity of Earth. That is the reason for adding the word narrow. 2. For more about this classification, see Naess 1989: chap. 3. 3. Perfection (from Latin per-facere) does not necessarily imply something absolute-in-its-perfection, but rather wholeness, a practicably attainable level of performance and state of being. 4. “In my opinion, the most serious aspect of a population decline is the regional one. Some production and consumption capital will be idle (at least temporar-

624 NOTES TO PAGES 280–302

ily) if the population decline is spread out too unevenly, or if it hits communities which are so small that the economic disadvantages of a further population decline can be disastrous. In other areas or cities, the economic gains by a reduced population could be considerable. This is a very important area for economic research and possibly for policy action” (Thonstad 1982: 21). 5. I have profited most from Tore Thonstad’s “Perspectives of European Demo- graphic Evolution: Expected Major Economic Consequences” (1982).

Chapter 28: Self-Realization in Mixed Communities of Human Beings, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves 1. From the above use of “realization of potentialities” it is clear that the concept is wider than most concepts of self-realization in Western philosophy and psychology—for example, that of Maslow. It is more closely linked to concepts of life fulfillment and Eastern conceptions, among them Gandhi’s concept of self-realization. For more about this, see my Gandhi and Group Conflict (1974b [SWAN V]) and Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle (1989). The concept used in T is also close to Spinoza’s “increase in power,” wherein potentia is linked to capability ( posse), that is, capacity to act with oneself as adequate cause. I do not pretend that these remarks are more than initial formulations in a dialogue on self-realization. 2. “Two Factor Egalitarianism assumes the relevance of two matters: (1) level or importance of interests to each being in a conflict of interests, and (2) the psychological capacities of the parties whose interests conflict” (VanDeVeer 1979: 68). 3. What follows is inspired by the practical work of the bear inspector, and ecophilosopher, Ivar Mysterud.

Chapter 29: Philosophy of Wolf Policies I: General Principles and Preliminary Exploration of Selected Norms 1. Different cultures at different times have held significantly different attitudes toward nature, and within each culture, each nation, and each community there are differences of philosophic importance. On identification, see Naess 1985b: 256–70. On changes of attitude toward nature as evi- denced in the new environmental movements, see Van Liere and Dunlap 1980: 181–97; Dunlap and Van Liere 1984. Collicott (1983) provides one of the best overviews of attitudes toward nature in American Indian cultures. Different cultures have had different concepts of nature, and some have not had any concepts similar to the one we are talking about, the conservation of nature.

625 NOTES TO PAGES 303–11

2. Accounts of wolves in broad perspective may be found in Fiennes 1976; Lopez 1978; Hall and Sharp 1978; and Allen 1979. 3. This concept of “mixed community” was introduced in Naess 1979b: 231–41 (in this volume). 4. For accounts of plant and animal community concepts, refer to Cody and Di- amond 1975; Strong et al. 1984. 5. For population estimates, see Myrberget 1969; Heggberget and Myrberget 1979. The most recent survey is reported by Sørensen et al. 1984. 6. The authors have another paper in preparation exploring these fields (Mys- terud and Naess 1990). 7. Norm conflicts very similar to the one seen in Norwegian wolf ranges are found wherever white people settled in North America with herds of husbandry animals. Even in areas with no husbandry, but where locals depend on cervid hunting, conflicts may arise—for example, in Alaska (see Carbyn 1983: 1–135). 8. For preliminary discussions of economy-enhancing animal survival, see Mys- terud 1985. 9. Properly expressed, they form sentences with exclamation marks. Priorities behind “wise actions” in wildlife management should be ecologically correct, socially and politically acceptable, and economically profitable. In management procedures based on such diverse strategies, the landscape will profit most. 10. Details about the concept of normative system as conceived here may be found in Naess 1977a: 64–79 [in this volume]. 11. The term suffering is ambiguous, of course. Sometimes it is made to cover complex states of affairs—for example, the suffering of a thwarted ambition—but in A1 we think of rather more narrow notions, with simple pain as a core connotation. 12. For discussion of how carnivore attacks affect sheep herds and sheep-holder activity, see Mysterud 1979:123–61, 1980: 233–41. 13. For a valuable bibliography of life-quality research, see Chamberlain 1985: 345–401. The term self-realization is a somewhat more general and deriva- tionally more basic term than life quality, but, of course, it is an intimately related one. 14. On the causes of researchers in conservation biology not announcing their value priorities, see Naess 1986c: 512–13. 15. In what follows we do not consistently distinguish a sentence from its meaning. The term statement has a convenient degree of ambiguity, sometimes referring to meaning, sometimes being used as a near synonym for sentence. This

626 NOTES TO PAGES 315–21

holds true for all sciences, including mathematics and logic. Their sentences (expressing the statements) can, just as in the case of normative systems, be divided into two kinds: sentences ending in a period and sentences, such as rules, ending with an exclamation mark. 16. For a survey of sheep-holding and its implications for carnivore management planning in Norway, see Vaag, Haga, and Granstuen 1986: 1–162. 17. The opposition to letting wolves live where they now are in Norway is for natural reasons fiercely fought in many local communities. A well- developed “No to wolf” campaign is being organized locally in Hedmark in southern Norway and in adjacent Värmland in southern Sweden. If local communities within parts of the present-day wolf range were given the right to decide, all wolves might be exterminated, provided there were enough able hunters. 18. A basic problem in human environments is maintenance of animal and plant populations of species that now have low, no, or negative economic value (e.g., pests and predators). We are, therefore, concerned about creating an economy on endangered species (conservation capitalism) to increase the probability of their survival, which we plan to discuss in another paper, “Phi- losophy of wolf policies III: Emergency wolf management, applications and conclusions” (Mysterud and Naess [never written]).

19. Norms A7 to A9 are special applications of the first three general norms, a set of eight points. The eight points with comments were originally published in the newsletter Ecophilosophy (May 1984) but are now to be found also in Soulé 1980. 20. People in the materially richest countries cannot be expected to reduce overnight their excessive interference with the nonhuman world to a moderate level. The stabilization and reduction of the human population will take time. Interim strategies must be developed; but this in no way excuses the prevailing complacency—the extreme seriousness of our current situation must first be realized. The longer we wait, the more drastic will be the measures needed. 21. For more about Ecosophy T, refer to appendix A in Deep Ecology (Devall and Sessions 1985). 22. For more on self-realization as a fundamental norm, see Naess 1986e (in this volume). 23. See note 2. 24. In some Canadian national parks, field trips are being provided so that people can listen to and see wolves in the wild. This is part of a management strategy to improve people’s image of wolves. See Stardom 1983.

627 NOTES TO PAGES 322–70

25. The philosophically interesting area of self-verifying and self-refuting hypotheses is also relevant. The local population that feels threatened by wolves knows that people with power to impose wolf protection entertain conflicting hypotheses about the seriousness of antiwolf sentiments locally. It is, of course, in the interest of locals, as conceived by them, to convince others that the hypothesis of a very high degree of seriousness in antiwolf attitudes is verified. Prowolf people are therefore silenced. It is not difficult to see how this can influence the behavior of locals and result in verification of the hypothesis of universal, intense opposition to wolves. This state of affairs must be considered if and when central authorities plan to investigate public opinion in the affected regions.

Chapter 32: Letter Sent October 1971 to the King of Nepal 1. Naess and his fellow climbers did not go to the summit of Gauri Shankar. They stopped at about 6,000 meters. In so doing, they were observing the letter as well as spirit of the message that Naess sent to the King of Nepal.

Chapter 33: An Example of a Place: Tvergastein 1. See, e.g., articles in Tobias and Drasdo 1979; LaChapelle 1978. 2. For a theory of the world as concrete contents, see Naess 1985c (in SWAN X).

Chapter 36: The South Wall of Tirich Mir East 1. The figures 25,263 feet and 25,237 feet have been taken from what is easily the most detailed map (1:126,720) available of this district, that of Brigadier R. H. Thomas, Surveyor-General of India, published in 1931. On other maps, different heights are to be found. The Polish expedition had only two maps, both produced by the Survey of India, and to a scale of 1:1,000,000. One of them is described by the Geographical Section General Staff, War Office, London, edition 1956, and gives the height 25,426 feet. We consider it correct to retain the figures from the survey map through the General Staff in 1949, viz., 25,263 feet for the West Peak and 25,237 feet for the East Peak. 2. An account of the Norwegian expedition in 1950 was published as Tirich Mir (1952); it has been out of print since 1953. A short account may be found in Alpine Journal 58 (May 1951). 3. An early development in downhill ski-racing was based on similar considerations. In the beginning no gates were used, but after a while this way of pre- determining a certain racecourse was introduced to prevent the undue and

628 NOTES TO PAGES 381–85

very dangerous risks that some were taking as competition got stiff. It was my wish to impose such “gates” on our expedition strategy.

Chapter 37: Spinoza and Attitudes Toward Nature 1. Some may judge what I say unhistorical, or claim that I make Spinoza modern, but I look at a text by Spinoza as I look at a score by Bach—open to many interpretations. In all humility I will say that although my interpretations of the text of the Ethics can be upheld, they are certainly not the only plausible interpretations. I make a distinction between talking about the historical Spinoza as a person and presenting an interpretation of one of his texts. This, again, is different from presenting a reconstruction inspired by Spinoza. 2. Even Francis of Assisi (1968: 118), the saint of ecology, was no friend of the body: “Nous devons avoir en haine nos corps, avec les vices et les peches.... ” As used by Spinoza, the term corpus permits one to ask Francis, What about the corporeal events corresponding to your faith? and what about “les vices et les peches” of your spirit? 3. The medieval users of the distinction natura naturans/natura naturata and naturare/naturari may be said, with Gueroult and others, to have introduced the concept of immanence of the divine cause in its effect. Characteristic of Spinoza is that he uses the distinction “to express his concept of absolute immanence, which those terms never had signified” (Gueroult 1968: 567). Speaking about the immanence of God in Nature (and Nature in God) as a Spinozic conception, I take it to be absolute at the level of denotation or extension. At the narrower level of connotation or intention, immanence—if the term can be used at this level at all—is not absolute. If it were, we would have general substitutability of Deus and Natura in the Ethics. This is hardly Spinozic. 4. Some researchers seem to attribute to Spinoza the logical superstition that the content of parts II–IV of the Ethics can be deduced from part I, but all the way through the Ethics new insights are communicated: The definition of God in part I does not refer to the noninfinite aspect of God. This aspect is something new, although it does not contradict what is said in part I. Its heading may be read De Deo quatenus infinito. In general, a certain freedom in our attitude toward the exposition of Spi- noza’s system is called for, as long as we do not postulate that every one of its formulations and its order of presentation directly express insights of the third kind. G. Fløistad (1986) warns against any such assumption. 5. Proposition 24 may be interpreted in a quantitative manner (more things are understood), in a qualitative manner (a higher degree is intended: things are

629 NOTES TO PAGES 386–88

understood in the third way), or in a way that combines both aspects. The second sentence of the proof of proposition 25 provides evidence for a qualitative interpretation. On the other hand, Spinoza stresses multiplicity and diversity, especially in connection with the many parts of the body and the many (more than eighty) classes of emotions. It is also important that understanding God or Nature includes understanding of the third kind, intuitive understanding of particular things. It is implausible that it is equivalent to a qualitatively more and more perfect understanding of one particular thing. 6. The adjective totus is perhaps better rendered by “totality” than by “whole,” if we wish to stress that the third way of understanding is that of seeing single particular things from the point of view of the whole. If we wish to stress the unity of the mind with a whole that has an aspect of indivisibility and changelessness, then “whole” may be a better translation than “totality.” 7. Is “natura” here identical extensionally with “essence”? That would imply that one’s essence may be changed through self-causation. 8. Perfection is not a term introduced in the Ethics by means of a separate definition. When not applied to Nature, it admits of degrees. Joy is an emotion through which mind is said to become more perfect (IIIP11Sch). Whatever its connotation, “more perfect” cannot be separated in denotation from “more powerful.” Compare the proof of proposition 41: “Joy . . . is the emotion through which the power of the body to act, increases or is furthered.” The relation to action, and therefore to understanding, is intimate. The more perfect is the more active and the less passive (VP40). In short, “more perfect than” cannot, in denotation, be separated from a number of other basic relations. The application of the term to Nature or God clearly is on par with the application to God of terms like love (amor), intellect, and mind. That is, it cannot be taken in any precise sense known from phenomena in Nature. 9. The term maximum rather than optimum diversity presupposes a concept of diversity that is common, but not universal, among ecologists. 10. Unconditional acceptance of the axiom of perfection is not possible for me. Or, more precisely, it is possible only through dubious interpretations of the terms perfection and Nature. Spinoza helped himself with his theory of nonexistence of adequate ideas about evils. Although I find that theory dubious as well, I have not come across a better one. What follows in this essay is a thoroughly revised version of parts of my article “Spinoza and ecology” (1978). 11. The occurrences of the words bonus and malus in the Ethics admit to various conceptualizations. According to part IV, definition 1, “x is good for y” does

630 NOTES TO PAGES 388–92

not mean more than “x is useful for y” or “x is known by y to be useful for y.” Spinoza does not say anything to the effect that freedom, perfection, and the other “in itself” states are good. They enter the system both as something that things actually or in fact or with necessity strive to realize and as unquestioned desirables. An extreme naturalism is consistent with one particular well-known set of equivalences: “ . . . we strive after nothing because it is good, but on the contrary we call that good which we strive for” (IIIP39Sch). It is to be noted, however, that Spinoza does not say that we call something good because we strive for it. Good is not an effect caused by striving, and the striving is not just for self-preservation in the narrow sense, but for freedom, virtue, and power. See also note 13, below. 12. For a detailed exposition of the equivalence of these terms, see Naess 1974a, 1975 (SWAN VI). 13. According to part III, proposition 6, every thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to preserve its being. I take the term perseverar, translated as “preserve,” to mean something much more active than just to survive. Therefore, I accept as equivalent “x increases in power” and “x increases in level of self-preservation.” 14. Good relations to others are obtained, inter alia, through generosity and other forms of noninjury (ahim. sa) (Ethics, IVP46Sch1; IVP72). “Hatred can never be good” (IVP45); that is, it can never be useful to us (IVDef1). There- fore, it cannot cause an increase in power or understanding. 15. It must be conceded that Spinoza holds that we cannot be the friends of animals or include them in our society. Only human beings can be friends of human beings and be members of our societies (see Ethics, part IV, AppCh26). Because we are more powerful than animals, we have in a sense more rights. We are able to use animals as we see fit, and one cannot issue laws against killing them. Most animals lack the power to use us (cf. IVP37Sch1 and AppCh26). 16. The basic position of “understanding” (intelligere) in Spinoza’s system is seen from its relation to “causing.” If something is caused adequately through something else, it is adequately understood through that something, and vice versa. Activeness is internally related to understanding because the specific activity of the mind is understanding. It is also related to increases in power and freedom. In this way, not only intuitive understanding of the highest (third) kind, but also the understanding of nature, promotes power, freedom, joy, and perfection. 17. The panpsychism of Spinoza is expressed in the Ethics (see IIP13Sch). Indi- viduals other than human beings are animated (animata), but in different degrees (diversis gradibus). Spinoza even (in the proof of IIIP1) uses the expression “the minds of other things” (aliarum rerum mentes). About the dif-

631 NOTES TO PAGES 393–418

ference in appetites and joys between various kinds of animals, see IIIP57Sch. 18. Spinoza does not say so directly, but I think he would deny rationality of any kind to beings other than human beings. He speaks, however, about the “virtue or power” of animals, and he more or less identifies virtue with rationality: “ . . . to act virtuously is nothing else than to act according to reason” (Ethics, IVP56 proof ). Although Spinoza may be interpreted in various ways regarding the relation of animals to man, we have been interested in the main trend of his reasoning.

Chapter 38: Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement 1. Spinoza uses the term causa immanens only twice, in part I of the Ethics (IP18) and in Letter 73, where there is a positive reference to Saint Paul. 2. One may speak about the finite God (Deus modificatus) of Spinoza as well as about the infinite (see Naess 1981: 120–26) [in SWAN IX]. Researchers mostly take the first part of the Ethics more seriously than the last—the account of human freedom and power as genuine parts of God’s. Doing this, they seem not to be aware of the limitation of mere formal logical priority. They ignore Deus modificatus because it occurs only in the later parts. Deep ecology theorizing neither thrives on Man apart, nor on God apart. 3. It is important that Spinoza adds that VP24 follows from IP25Cor, that is, from the thesis of modes expressing God’s attributes. It supports a radically immanent interpretation of Deus. 4. The distinction between content and abstract structure is worked out in Naess 1985c: 417–28 (in SWAN IX). 5. For more on human intervention to decrease suffering, see Naess 1991 (in SWAN X). 6. In Naess 1974a, I quote 243 relations of equivalence among key terms. 7. I have commented on perseverare and its relation to Hobbes in Naess 1980. In what follows, some formulations are borrowed from that article. In part IV of the Ethics, the term conservare is sometimes used as a synonym for perseverare. (IVP18Sch: reason demands [postulat] that everyone endeavors to conserve its being [esse], in so far as it is in itself.) I think “conserve” is too passive; I shall accordingly write and talk as if perseverare were used consistently by Spinoza. 8. Some central places in the Ethics show the way from Spinoza’s Ethics to his political writings. Concerning reason, see IIP40Sch2. From the terminology there, IVP35 follows: “In so far men live under the guidance of reason, to that extent only do they always agree in nature.” This is queer if one does not take

632 NOTES TO PAGES 436–50

into account Spinoza’s somewhat special use of the term ratio. Concerning freedom, reason, mutual aid, peace, and friendship, he says: “Only free men are truly advantageous (invicem utilissimi) to one another and united by a maximally close bond of friendship” (IVP71, proof ). Here the term freedom must be interpreted in accordance with what is said about adequate causation and activeness (IIIDef2) and the resulting close relation between the terms freedom and reason: “a free human being, that is, a man who lives under the guidance of reason” (IVP67Dem). From these indications it is fairly clear that a Spinozistic social utopia is one conceived to furnish the best conditions of freedom for everybody—“freedom” being interpreted in his way. What, then, is the best kind of practical politics? The question is open. I do not think Spinoza’s political work can offer much here.

Chapter 39: A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution 1. Declaration published in all Indian newspapers, October 30, 1940.

Chapter 40: The World of Concrete Contents 1. I take Galileo as representative of the neither-nor answer because of his crucial position in the development of modern physics. There are, of course, a number of slightly or significantly different concepts of primary and secondary qualities. In the context of this paper, the essential aspect of primary qualities is their status as inherent in the objects themselves. Locke elaborates the “neither warm nor cold” answer in his Essays Concerning Hu- man Understanding. 2. The crucial passage concerning Protagoras in Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, chapter 32, runs as follows: Now, this man says that matter is a state of flux. As it flows, continuous addi- tions may arise to take the place of the effluxions, and the senses undergo transformation and alteration in accordance with one’s age and with other conditions of the body. He says also that the grounds of all appearances lie in the matter, so that in itself its power enables it to be all those things which appear to all beings capable of apprehension. And men apprehend different things at different times because the conditions they are in differ. The man who is in a natural state, he says, apprehends those material substances which can appear to those who are in a natural state, and a person who is in an un- natural state apprehends those things which can appear to those in an unnat- ural state. And the same reasoning applies as well to differences depending on one’s age, one’s sleeping or waking state, and every kind of condition.

633 NOTES TO PAGES 456–62

The most interesting interpretation of “matter,” as far as I can see, is such that it comprises all that man or any other being ever can experience in any state. The possibility is not excluded that other sensitive beings can experience what human beings cannot. This interpretation of the passage is, unfortunately, not consistent with what comes next in chapter 32: Therefore man becomes, according to him [Protagoras], the criterion of the existence of things. For all things, in so far as they appear to men, also exist, while those things that appear to no man do not exist at all. Strangely enough, “matter” seems, if not dependent upon, at least extensionally equivalent to the potential states of human beings; matter cannot comprise anything that cannot be apprehended by man, and vice versa. 3. The nominalism I subscribe to is a consequence of the philosophy of hypothetical-deductive systems formulated in Naess 1972 (SWAN IV). 4. The term ontology is useful for naming that part of one’s philosophy or science that tells “what there is.” In the sciences of physics and astronomy a hundred years ago, there were atoms, ether, planets, stars, and forces acting upon these so-called objects. Today, the ontology proposed by astronomers and physicists is more complicated, and they are constantly modifying it. It is usually called a classification of objects, not ontology, but the function is clearly to classify what there is according to their sciences. Ontology as part of a philosophy, and not just a group of sciences, is of course a much more controversial affair. It must somehow accommodate the objects that the sciences talk about, or give reasons for their nonexistence. What are the criteria of “existence”? Different views are open for discussion. Until recently the (basic) ontology of physics could be understood by nonphysicists. Now this is scarcely the case. The popularizations are wonderfully well written, but they do not furnish adequate understanding. Some would lament this situation, but I think it is the most positive thing that has happened for a long time: it makes it clearer to all concerned that any account we offer about the world we live in (Lebenswelt) must be independent of the ontology of modern physics. 5. The author is grateful to the Research School of Social Sciences at the Aus- tralian National University for giving him the opportunity to be a Visiting Fellow, and to discuss and rewrite (in September 1984) what he has thought about the relation of the Lebenswelt to “objective” reality.

Chapter 41: Gestalt Ontology and Gestalt Thinking 1. It may be questioned whether the third factor, the mediational, really deserves placement as something as fundamental as the subjective and objective.

634 NOTES TO PAGES 463–486

If we use a sunrise as an example of an object, the colors are said to depend very much on the medium, the air. If colored glasses are used, new complications are introduced. At this point it is advisable to distinguish two factors: the object intended when talking about “the sun when rising,” and the medium “between the sun and the subject” used to explain changing colors of the sun as experienced by the subject. 2. What is said here is based on a version of the “both-and” theory of Protagoras as interpreted by Sextus Empiricus. Compare Naess 1985c (in SWAN X).

Chapter 42: Reflections About Total Views 1. Thus, Lonergan (1992: 329) writes: “Am I a knower?” The answer, “Yes,” is coherent, for if I am a knower, I can know that fact. But the answer, “No,” is incoherent, for if I am not a knower, how could the question be raised and answered by me? No less, the hedging answer, “I do not know,” is incoherent. For if I know that I do not know, then I am a knower; and if I do not know that I do not know, then I should not answer. Here, the answer “no” is construed as being equivalent to “I know I am not a knower”—and the answer “I do not know” as being equivalent to “I know that I do not know.” Such an equivalence would only hold, however, provided nothing, or next to nothing, is added cognitively by adding “I know that—” to a sentence. 2. I have changed the translation at some points. 3. This quotation is used by Polanyi in a similar context in “The stability of beliefs” (Polanyi 1952: 218). 4. For criticism of the doctrine that different logics can be described in the way attempted by some social scientists, see Naess et al. 1954: 203 ff.

Chapter 43: Notes on the Methodology of Normative Systems 1. Norwegian National Research Council, Project A79.24-15. 2. Some authors of central importance to the deep ecology movement are: Gre- gory Bateson, Kenneth Boulding, Ottar Brox, Rachel Carson, Barry Com- moner, Erik Dammann, Rene Dubos, Paul R. and Anne H. Erlich, Clarence J. Glacken, Edward Goldsmith, Ivan Illich, Sigmund Kvaloy, Ian McHarg, Jospeh Meeker, E. J. Mishan, Ivar Mysterud, Marshall Sahlins, E. F. Schu- macher, Hartvig Saerta, and P. W. Zapffe. 3. What holds of theories in science holds of normative systems. For elaboration of the trichotomy theory/systematization/version terminology used in this article, see Naess 1972 (SWAN IV): chap. 3. On definiteness of intention, see Naess 1966 (SWAN VII): 34 ff.

635 NOTES TO PAGES 486–534

4. For a short exposition, see Naess 1966 (SWAN VII); for a more technical treatment, see Naess 1953 (SWAN I).

Chapter 44: Paul Feyerabend—A Green Hero? 1. For recent literature see Fox 1990. 2. Feyerabend’s characterization of Imre Lakatos as a “fellow anarchist” caused some indignation and protest. Lakatos’s views, however, were basically rather close to those labeled “anarchist” by Feyerabend (and perhaps by nobody else). As an argument in favor of this interpretation I shall quote Lakatos’s conclusion in reference to the pluralist and possibilist views in my work referred to above: “I did not previously realize how far our philosophical views coincided and it was a great pleasure for me that we are close allies” (Letter of November 4, 1968). The possibilist approach I take to be a little more “anarchist” in Feyerabend’s terminology than in Lakatos’s own.

Chapter 45: Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World 1. This and the following quotations from Gandhi are taken from my Gandhi and Group Conflict (1974b [SWAN V]), where the metaphysics of self- realization is treated more thoroughly. For further detailed discussions of identification, see my “Identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes” (1985b) and “Man apart and deep ecology: A reply to Reed” (1990).

Chapter 46: The Connection of “Self-Realization!” with Diversity, Complexity, and Symbiosis 1. “Oneness with Nature,” “nature mysticism.” 2. The above is not intended to make others support Ecosophy T, and especially not to make a definite sketchy, diagrammatic version of Ecosophy T acceptable to others. That would be counterproductive. Insofar as others study figure 8 (page 485), however, I am interested in profiting from their interpretations. If, against my expectation, time-consuming study is undertaken, I should point out that my methodology is heavily dependent on three factors: a peculiar semantics popularized in my Communication and Argument (1966 [SWAN VII]); a life strategy pointing out that as human beings we implic- itly presume we have a total view, including a fundamental value-priority strategy, every time we make a decision, day or night (1964 [in SWAN X]); and use of the natural science idea of models (and simulations) as a purely heuristic instrument when dealing with insurveyably complex phenomena

636 NOTES TO PAGES 564–589

such as worldviews (Leben und Weltanschauungen). Although the diagrammatic presentation of Ecosophy T does not have the form of a hypothetical-deductive system, it shares with that system a common characteristic, that of a model.

Chapter 54: Sustainable Development and Deep Ecology 1. On the so-called deep ecology movement, see Devall and Sessions 1985; Naess 1986b (in this volume). 2. For an ecologically inspired proposal for unilateral disarmament, see Naess 1986a: 425–36 (in SWAN IX).

Chapter 55: Industrial Society, Postmodernity, and Ecological Sustainability 1. The word sustainable has been used in many senses, some of which are remote from that of “ecologically sustainable.” Therefore, we shall not drop the reference to ecology.

637 References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levison, and R. N. Sanford. 1950. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Bros. Allen, D. L. 1979. Wolves of Minong: Their Vital Role in a Wild Community. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Allport, Gordon W. 1947. “Guideline for research in international co-operation.” Yearbook of Social Issues 3. Angell, R. C. 1957. “Discovering paths to peace.” In The Nature of Conflict. New York: UNESCO. Armstrong-Buck, Susan. 1986. “Whitehead’s metaphysical system as a foundation for environmental ethics.” Environmental Ethics 8: 241–59. Ascher, Charles S. 1950. “The development of UNESCO’s program.” International Organization 4. Auxter, Thomas. 1979. “The right not to be eaten.” Inquiry 22: 221–30. Barney, Gerald. 1981. Global 2000 Report to the President of the United States. Char- lottesville, VA: Blue Angel. Bateson, Gregory. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Balantine Books. Bennett, David H. 1984. “The is/ought dichotomy and environmental ethics.” Paper read at Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, Canberra, Australia. Bentham, Jeremy. 1973. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals. New York: Hafner. Bookchin, Murray. 1980. Toward an Ecological Society. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

639 REFERENCES

———. 1982. The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy. Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books. Bookchin, Murray, Dave Foreman, and Steve Chase. 1991. Defending the Earth: A Dialogue Between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman. Boston, MA: South End Press. Boyer, Carl B. 1968. A History of Mathematics. New York: Wiley. Brown, Lester, and Edward Wolf. 1988. “Reclaiming the future.” In State of the World, 1988. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, p. 186. Callicott, J. Baird. 1982. “Hume’s is/ought dichotomy and the relation of ecology to Leopold’s land ethic.” Environmental Ethics 4: 163–74. ———. 1993. “The search for an environmental ethic.” In Matters of Life and Death, 3d ed., edited by Tom Regan. New York: McGraw-Hill. Capra, Fritjof, and Charlene Spretnak. 1984. Green Politics: The Global Promise. New York: Dutton. Carbyn, L. N., ed. 1983. “Wolves in Canada and Alaska.” Canadian Wildlife Service Report Series 45: 1–135. Carroll, John E., ed. 1988. International Environmental Diplomacy. Cambridge: The University Press. Carson, Rachel. 1962. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Chamberlain, K. 1985. “Value dimensions, cultural differences, and the prediction of perceived quality of life.” Social Indicators Research 17: 345–401. Christiansen, Bjørn. 1959. Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personal- ity. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. Clark, Stephen R. L. 1979. “The rights of wild things.” Inquiry 22: 171 ff. Cody, Martin L., and Jared M. Diamond, eds. 1975. Ecology and Evolution of Commu- nities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press. Cohen, Michael. 1984. The Pathless Way: John Muir and American Wilderness. Madi- son: University of Wisconsin Press. Collicott, J. D. 1983. “Traditional American Indian and traditional Western Euro- pean attitudes toward nature: An overview.” In Environmental Philosophy, edited by R. Elliot and A. Gare. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Collingwood, Robin G. 1948. An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cooley, Charles Horton. 1964. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Schocken. Crossman, Richard H., ed. 1949. The God That Failed. New York: Arno Press. Daily, Gretchen C., and Paul R. Ehrlich. 1992. “Population, sustainability, and Earth’s carrying capacity.” Bioscience 42: 761–71.

640 REFERENCES

Davidson, Donald. 1984. “On the very idea of a conceptual scheme.” In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Devall, Bill. 1980. “The deep ecology movement.” Natural Resources Journal 20. ———. 1982. “John Muir as deep ecologist.” Environmental Review 6. Devall, Bill, and George Sessions. 1985. Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered. Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books. Diwakar, Ranganath R. 1946. Satyagraha: The Power of Truth. Bombay: Hind Kitabs. Dobson, Andrew. 1990. Green Political Thought. London: Unwin Hyman. Drengson, Alan. 1989. Beyond Environmental Crisis. New York: Peter Lang. Dryzek, John S. 1987. Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. New York: Blackwell. Dunlap, Riley E., and Kent D. Van Liere. 1984. “Commitment to dominant social paradigm and concern for environmental quality.” Social Science Quarterly 65: 1013–28. Durning, Alan T. 1991. “Asking how much is enough.” In State of the World, 1991. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, pp. 153–69. Republished as How Much Is Enough? New York: Norton, 1992. Eckersley, Robyn. 1992. Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach. Albany: State University of New York Press. Elders, Fons, ed. 1974. Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind. London: Sou- venir Press. Enzenberger, Hans Magnus. 1973. “Zur Kritik der politischen Ökologie.” Kurs- buch 33. Farvar, M. Taghi, and John P. Milton, eds. 1972. The Careless Technology: Ecology and International Development. New York: Natural History Press. Feyerabend, Paul K. 1975. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowl- edge. London: Thetford Press. ———. 1977. “Expert in a free society.” In Unter dem Pflaster liegt der Strand (Under the plaster is the beach), vol. 3. Berlin: Karin Kramer. ———. 1978. Science in a Free Society. London: NLB. Fiennes, Richard. 1976. The Order of Wolves. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. Fløistad, Guttorm. 1986. “Reality as perfection: Some remarks on Spinoza’s concept of lifeworld.” In Studia Spinozana, vol. 2: Spinoza’s Epistemology, edited by W. Klever et al. Alling: Walther and Walther. Fox, Richard Wightman, and T. J. Jackson Lears, eds. 1983. The Culture of Consump- tion: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980. New York: Pantheon Books.

641 REFERENCES

Fox, Stephen. 1981. John Muir and His Legacy. Boston: Brown and Co. Fox, Warwick. 1990. Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism. Boston: Shambhala. Francis of Assisi, Saint. 1968. Documents, écrits et premieres biographies, edited by Theophile Desbonnets and Damien Vorreux. Paris: Editions Franciscaines. French, William C. 1995. “Against biospherical egalitarianism.” Environmental Ethics 17: 39–57. Fromm, Erich. 1956. “Selfishness, self-love, and self-interest.” In The Self: Explo- rations in Personal Growth, edited by Clark E. Moustakas. New York: Harper Colophon Books. Galtung, Johan, and Arne Naess. 1955. Gandhis politiske etikk (Gandhi’s political ethics). 2nd ed. 1968. Oslo: Johann Grundt Tanum. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. London: Hutchinson. Glacken, Clarence J. 1967. Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Gladstone, A. I. 1962. “Relationship orientation and processes leading to war.” Background 6: 13–25. Goldsmith, Edward. 1972. Blueprint for Survival. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. Goodenough, Ward H., ed. 1964. Explorations in Cultural Anthropology. London: McGraw-Hill. Goodin, Robert E. 1992. Green Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Greenpeace. 1989–90. Greenpeace Antarctic Expedition 1989/90. Washington, D. C.: Greenpeace. Gueroult, Martial. 1968. Spinoza, vol. 1: Dieu. Paris: Aubier. Guetzkow, Harold. 1955. Multiple Loyalties. Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University. Guha, Ramachandra. 1989. “Radical American environmentalism and wilderness preservation: A Third World critique.” Environmental Ethics 11. Gullvag, Ingemund, and Jon Wetlesen, eds. 1982. In Sceptical Wonder: Essays in Honor of Arne Naess. Oslo: Oslo University Press. Gusdorf, Georges P. 1998. “Anthropology.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., Macropedia, vol. 1. Hall, R. L., and H. S. Sharp. 1978. Wolf and Man: Evolution in Parallel. New York: Academic Press. Hallen, Patsy. 1987. “Making peace with nature: Why ecology needs ecofeminism.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 4(3): 3–14. Reprinted in The Deep Ecol-

642 REFERENCES

ogy Movement: An Introductory Anthology, edited by Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1995, pp. 198–218. Hargrove, Eugene C. 1985. “The role of rules in ethical decision making.” Inquiry 28. ———. 1989. “Callicott and the foundations of environmental ethics.” Environ- mental Ethics 11. Heggberget, T., and S. Myrberget. 1979. “The status of bears, wolverines, wolves and lynxes in Norway during the 1970s.” Viltrapport 9: 37–45. Henderson, Hazel. 1981. The Politics of the Solar Age. Garden City, NY: Double- day/Anchor. Ibsen, Henrik. 1959. John Gabriel Borkman. In Henrik Ibsen: The Last Plays, introduced and translated by William Archer. New York: Hill and Wang. International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). 1980. World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable De- velopment. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN. James, William. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. London: Macmillan. Kant, Immanuel. 1949. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Liberal Arts Press. ———. 1963. Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s. ———. 1992. Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (An attempt at some reflections on optimism). In Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. Cambridge, UK: The University Press, pp. 71–83. Katzner, Kenneth. 1977. The Languages of the World. London and New York: Rout- ledge, chaps. 4-1, 4-3. (Revised 1986.) Kaufman, A. S. 1971. “Wants, needs and liberalism.” Inquiry 14: 191–206. Keesing, Roger M. 1974. “Theories of culture.” Annual Review of Anthropology 3. ———. 1976. Cultural Anthropology. New York: Holt. Kelman, Herbert C. 1954. “Relevance of social research in war prevention: A symposium.” Journal of Human Relations 2(3). Kent, Christopher R. 1981. The Experiential Process of Nature Mysticism, master’s thesis. Humboldt State University, Arcata, CA. Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Knutsen, Kåre. 1974. Dyrenes rettigheter (The rights of animals). Oslo: Dreyer. Kropotkin, Peter A. 1955. Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution. Boston: Extending Horizon Books.

643 REFERENCES

Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. LaChapelle, Dolores. 1978. Earth Wisdom. Silverton, CO: Guild of Tutors Press. Lackner, Stephan. 1984. Peaceable Nature: An Optimistic View of Life on Earth. San Francisco: Harper and Row. Leopold, Aldo. 1966. Sand County Almanac and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 1987 (originally 1949). A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There. New York: Oxford University Press. Levison, David J. 1957. “Authoritarian personality and foreign policy.” Conflict Resolution 1. Lewis, Charlton T. 1951. A Latin Dictionary for Schools. London: Oxford University Press. Lloyd, Genevieve. 1980. “Spinoza’s environmental ethics.” Inquiry 23: 213–25. Lonergan, Bernard J. 1992. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, edited by F. E. Crowe and R. M. Doran. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Lopez, B. H. 1978. Of Wolves and Men. New York: Scribner. Malthus, Thomas. 1872. An Essay on the Principle of Population, 7th ed. London: Dent. Mander, Jerry, and Edward Goldsmith, eds. 1996. The Case Against the Global Econ- omy, and for a Turn Toward the Local. San Francisco: Sierra Books. Mannheim, Karl. 1952. Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Maslow, A. H. 1970. Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper and Row. Marx, Karl. 1970. The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Masson-Oursel, Paul. 1926. Comparative Philosophy. London: International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. McCloskey, Henry John. 1979. “Moral rights and animals.” Inquiry 22: 25–54. ———. 1983. Ecological Ethics and Politics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Milbrath, Lester W. 1984. Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New Society. Albany: SUNY Press. Miller, G. Tyler. 1983. Living in the Environment, 3d ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Mills, C. Wright. 1967. Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills, edited by Irving L. Horowitz. London and New York: Oxford University Press.

644 REFERENCES

Murphy, Gardner. 1953. In the Minds of Men: The Study of Human Behavior and Ten- sions in India. New York: Basic Books. Myrberget, Svein. 1969. “The Norwegian population of wolf.” Meddelelser tra Statens Viltundersokelser 32(2): 1–17. ———. 1970. “The Norwegian population of wolverine and lynx.” Meddelelser tra Statens Viltundersokelser 2(33): 1–35. Mysterud, Ivar. 1979. Viltrapport 9: 123–61. ———. 1980. “Bear management and sheep husbandry in Norway.” Bear Biology Association Conference Series 3:233–41. ———. 1985. “Economic and philosophical considerations on wolf survival.” Pa- per read at CIC Symposium, Lisbon, March. Mysterud, Ivar, and Arne Naess. 1990. “Philosophy of wolf policies II: Selected aspects of wolf-human relationships.” Unpublished ms. Naess, Arne. 1936. Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Sciences, Inaugural Dissertation. ———. 1953. Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to a Theory of Communica- tion. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Science and Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I) ———. 1964. “Reflections about total views.” Philososphy and Phenomenological Re- search 25: 16–29. (in SWAN X) ———. 1966. Communication and Argument. London: Allen and Unwin (Oslo: Uni- versitetsforlaget, 1966). (SWAN VII) ———. 1972. The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (London: Allen and Unwin). (SWAN IV) ———. 1973. “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A summary.” Inquiry 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X) ———. 1974a. Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza’s “Ethics.” Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo. ———. 1974b. Gandhi and Group Conflict. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN V) ———. 1974c. “Is freedom consistent with Spinoza’s determinism?” In Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom, edited by J. G. van der Bend. Assen: Van Gorcum. (in SWAN IX) ———. 1975. Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza’s “Ethics.” Oslo: University of Oslo Press. (SWAN VI) ———. 1976. Økologi, samfunn og livsstil: Utkast til en Økosofi, 5th ed. Oslo: Univer- sitetsforlaget. ———. 1977a. “Notes on the methodology of normative systems.” Methodology and Science 10: 64–79. (in SWAN X)

645 REFERENCES

———. 1977b. “Spinoza and ecology.” Philosophia 7: 45–54. ———. 1978. “Spinoza and ecology.” In Speculum Spinozanum 1677–1977, edited by S. Hessing. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1979a. “Modesty and the conquest of mountains.” In The Mountain Spirit, edited by Michael C. Tobias and H. Drasdo. New York: Overlook Press. (in SWAN X) ———. 1979b. “Self-realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves.” Inquiry 22: 231–41. (in SWAN X) ———. 1980. “Environmental ethics and Spinoza’s Ethics: Comments on Genevieve Lloyd’s article.” Inquiry 23: 313–25. ———. 1981. “Spinoza’s finite God.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 135: 120–26. (in SWAN IX) ———. 1983. “A defense of the deep ecology movement.” Environmental Ethics 5. ———. 1985a. “Holdninger til mennesker, dyr og planter (Attitudes toward men, animals, and plants).” Samtiden 94: 68–76. ———. 1985b. “Identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes.” In Deep Ecology, edited by M. Tobias. San Diego: Avant Books. (Reprinted in Radical Environmentalism, edited by Peter List. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1993). ———. 1985c. “The world of concrete contents.” Inquiry 28: 417–28. (in SWAN X) ———. 1986a. “Consequences of an absolute no to nuclear war.” In Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, edited by Avner Cohen and Steven Lee. Totowa, NJ: Rouman and Allanheld. (in SWAN IX) ———. 1986b. “The deep ecology movement: Some philosophical aspects.” Philo- sophical Inquiry 8: 10–31. (in SWAN X) ———. 1986c. “Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise?” In Con- servation Biology: The Science of Scarcity and Diversity, edited by M. E. Soulé. Sun- derland, MA: Sinauer Associates. ———. 1986d. “Limited definiteness of ‘God’ in Spinoza’s system: Answer to Heine Siebrand.” Neue Zeitschrift für sytematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 28: 275–83. ———. 1986e. “Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world.” Keith Roby Memorial Lecture in Community Science, Murdoch University, Aus- tralia, March 12. Reprinted in The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 4(3). (in SWAN X) ———. 1987. Ekspertenes syn på naturens egenverdi. (“Expert Views on the Inherent Value of Nature.”) Trondheim, Norway: Tapir Forlag. (in SWAN X) ———. 1989. Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, translated and revised by David Rothenberg. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

646 REFERENCES

———. 1990. “Man apart and deep ecology: A reply to Reed.” Environmental Ethics 12: 185–92. ———. 1991. “Should we try to relieve clear cases of extreme suffering in nature?” Pan Ecology 6. (in SWAN X) ———. 1993. “Beautiful action: Its function in the ecological crisis.” Environmen- tal Values 2. (in SWAN X) ———. 2004. Which World Is the Real World? (original in Norwegian). Amster- dam: Kluwer. (SWAN III) Naess, Arne, K. Kvaløe, and J. Christophersen. 1954. Democracy, Ideology and Objec- tivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy. Oslo: University of Oslo Press (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956). Naess, Arne, and Ivar Mysterud. 1987. “Philosophy of wolf policies I: General principles and preliminary exploration of selected norms.” Conservation Biology 1: 22–34. (in SWAN X) Neurath, Otto, et al., eds. 1936. Philosophy of Science, vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Republished 1938 as Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Norton, Bryan G. 1991. “Thoreau’s insect analogies: Or, why environmentalists hate mainstream economists.” Environmental Ethics 13. Nuyen, A. T. 1991. “A Heideggerian existential ethics for the human environment.” Journal of Value Inquiry 25. Oelschlaeger, Max. 1991. The Idea of Wilderness. New Haven: Yale University Press. Passmore, John. 1974. Man’s Responsibility for Nature. London and New York: Duckworth and Scribner. ———. 1975. “The treatment of animals.” Journal of History of Ideas 26, no. 2: 195– 218. Pauhlke, Robert C. 1989. Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pimlott, D. M. 1975. “Wolves.” Proceedings of the First Working Meeting of Wolf Spe- cialists and First International Conference on Conservation of the Wolf. Morges, Switzerland: IUCN. Polanyi, Michael. 1952. “The stability of beliefs.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3: 217–32. Ponting, Clive. 1992. The Green History of the World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Porritt, Jonathon. 1984. Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Power, Shahed Amed. 1990. Gandhi and Deep Ecology, Ph.D. diss., Salford Univer- sity, England.

647 REFERENCES

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 1971). Regan, Tom. 1979. “An examination and defense of one argument concerning animal rights.” Inquiry 22: 189–219. ———. 1981. “The nature and possibility of an environmental ethics.” Environ- mental Ethics 3: 19–34. Research Policy Conference on Environment and Development. 1988. One Earth— One World. Oslo: Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities. Rohrer, Max. 1920. “Die Berge in Mythos, Kult und Dichtung der arischen Inder.” Deutsche Alpen Zeitung. Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. Stone Age Economics. New York: Aldine. Schilpp, P. A., ed. 1949. Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist. Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers. Schwarz, Walter, and Dorothy Schwarz. 1987. Breaking Through. Dartington, UK: Green Books. Sessions, George. 1981. “Shallow and deep ecology: A review of the philosophical literature.” In Ecological Consciousness, edited by Robert C. Schultz and J. Donald Hughes. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, pp. 391–462. ———. 1992. “Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection.” In The Wilderness Condition: Essays on Environmental and Civilization, edited by Max Oelschlaeger. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. Sextus Empiricus. 1933. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, translated by R. G. Bury. London: Loeb Classic Library, Heinemann. Sinclair, A. R. E., and M. Norton-Griffiths, eds. 1979. Serengeti: Dynamics of an Ecosystem. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Smart, J. J. C. 1961. “Colours.” Philosophy 36: 128–42. Smith, M. B., and J. B. Casagrande. 1953. “The Cross-cultural education projects: A program report.” Social Science Research Council Items, no. 3. Smith, Mick. 1999. “To speak of trees: Social constructionism, environmental values, and the future of deep ecology.” Environmental Ethics 21: 359–76. Snyder, Gary. 1990. The Practice of the Wild. San Francisco: North Point Press. Sørensen, O. J., P. Wabakken, T. Kvan, and A. Landa. 1984. Viltrapport 34: 54–59. Soulé, Michael E. 1980. “Thresholds for survival: Maintaining fitness and evolutionary potential.” In Conservation Biology, edited by M. E. Soulé and B. A. Wilcox. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. ———. 1985. “What is conservation biology?” BioScience 35: 727–34. ———. 1992/93. “A vision for the meantime.” In Wild Earth, special issue: 7–8.

648 REFERENCES

———, ed. 1986. Conservation Biology: The Science of Scarcity and Diversity. Sunder- land, MA: Sinauer Associates. Soulé, Michael E., and Bruce A. Wilcox, eds. 1980. Conservation Biology: An Ecologi- cal-Evolutionary Perspective. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. Spinoza, Baruch. 1955. Ethics. (Includes Treatise on the Improvement of the Understand- ing.) New York: Hafner. ———. 1989. Theological Political Treatise, translated by S. Shirley. Leiden: Brill. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001). Sprigge, T. L. S. 1979. “Metaphysics, physicalism, and animal rights.” Inquiry 22: 101–43. ———. 1984. “Non-human rights: An idealist perspective.” Inquiry 27: 439–61. Stardom, R. R. 1983. Canadian Wildlife Service Report Series 45: 30–34. Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1974. The Central Conception of Buddhism. Delhi: Motical Banar- sidass. Stone, Christopher D. 1974. Should Trees Have Standing? Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann. Strong, D. R., D. Simberloff, L. G. Abele, and A. B. Thistle, eds. 1984. Ecological Communities: Conceptual Issues and the Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thonstad, Tore. 1982. “Perspectives of European Demographic Evolution: Ex- pected Major Economic Consequences.” In European Population Conference 1982. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, EPC (82) 10-E. Thoreau, Henry. 1949. The Journal, vol. 13, edited by B. Terrey and F. H. Allen. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ———. 1971. Walden, edited by J. L. Sharley. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tobias, Michael C., ed. 1985. Deep Ecology. San Diego, CA: Avant Books. Tobias, Michael C., and Harold Drasdo, eds. 1979. The Mountain Spirit. New York: Overlook Press. United Nations. World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations (UNESCO). 1978. Universal Declaration of Animal Rights. (Pro- claimed in Paris on October 15, 1978 at UNESCO Headquarters.) Vaag, A. B., A. Haga, and H. Granstuen. 1986. Forslag til Landsplan for Forvaltning av Bjorn, Serv og Ulvi Norge. Viltrapport 39: 1–162. Vaihinger, Hans. 1935. The Philosophy of “As If.” London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

649 REFERENCES

VanDeVeer, Donald. 1979. “Interspecific justice.” Inquiry 22: 55–70. Van Liere, Kent D., and Riley E. Dunlap. 1980. “The social bases of environmental concern: A review of hypotheses, explanations, and empirical evidence.” Public Opinion Quarterly 44: 181–97. Verney, Stephen. 1976. Into the New Age. Glasgow: Collins. von Uexkull, J. 1909. Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. Berlin. ———. 1920. Theoretiskche Biologie. Berlin. (English translation, New York, 1926.) Wagenen, Richard W. van. 1952. Research in the International Organization Field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Walsby, Harold 1947. The Domain of Ideologies. Glasgow: W. MacLellan. Watson, Richard A., and Philip M. Smith. 1970. “The limit: 500 million.” Focus Midwest 8(52): 25–28. Wendelbo, Per. 1952. Tirich Mir: The Norwegian Expedition. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Wilson, Edward O. 1975. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Witoszek, N. and A. Brennan, eds. 1999. Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Wolff, Robert Paul. 1963. Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity. Cambridge, MA: Har- vard University Press. Wolfson, Harry Austryn. 1958. The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 2. New York: Ridian Books. Wyld, Henry Cecil Kennedy. 1932. The Universal Dictionary of the English Language. New York: Dutton. Yinger, J. Milton. 1946. Religion in the Struggle for Power: A Study in the Sociology of Religion. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

650 Comprehensive Bibliography of Arne Naess’s Works in English

This bibliography is based on information compiled by Harold Glasser and Kit-Fai Naess. It is a fairly complete record of Naess’s works published in English, including some that were coauthored. For a more complete list of his work published and unpublished, see the website of the Center for Development and the Environment (SUM) associated with the University of Oslo.

By Arne Naess 1936. Erkenntnis und Wissenschaftliches Verhalten (Knowledge acquisition and science as behavior). Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Sciences, Inaugural Dissertation. 1938a. “Common sense and truth.” Theoria 4: 39–58. (in SWAN VIII) 1938b. “Contribution to the discussions of the International Kongres für Einheit der Wissenchaft.” Erkenntnis 7 (1937/38): 369–70 (D. C. Williams); 370 ( J. H. Woodger); 371 (K. Grelling, P. Oppenheim); 382 (M. Kokoszynska); 384–86 (Walter Hollitscher). 1938c. Truth as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. Oslo: Nor- wegian Academy of Sciences and Jacob Dybwad. 1947a. “Abstracts of work by Georg Hygen, Ole Koppand, and Peter Wessel Zapffe.” Philosophic Abstracts 7: 6–7. 1947b. “Citizenship as a subject!” Universitas (special issue) 2: 1–2. 1948a. Notes on the Foundations of Psychology as a Science, vol. 9, Stencil. Filosofiske Problemer, edited by Arne Naess. Oslo: Oslo University. 1948b. Objectivity of Norms: Two Directions of Precization, vol. 9, Stencil. Filosofiske Problemer, edited by Arne Naess. Oslo: Oslo University. 1949. “Towards a theory of interpretation and preciseness.” Theoria 15: 220–41. 1950a. “The function of ideological convictions.” In Tensions That Cause Wars (Common statement and individual papers by a group of social scientists brought to-

651 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

gether by UNESCO), edited by H. Cantril. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 257–98. (in SWAN IX) 1950b. “Norwegian mountaineers in Chitral.” Pakistan Horizon 3: 3,5. 1951a. “Appendix I: The UNESCO questionnaire on ideological conflicts concerning democracy.” In Democracy in a World of Tensions, edited by Richard McKeon with the assistance of Stein Rokkan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 513–21. 1951b. “The Norwegian expedition to Tirich Mir, 1950.” Alpine Journal (London) 58 (May): 6–15. 1952. “Towards a theory of interpretation and preciseness.” In Semantics and the Phi- losophy of Language, edited by Leonard Linsky. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 248–69. 1953a. An Empirical Study of the Expressions ‘True,’ ‘Perfectly Certain,’ and ‘Extremely Probable.’ Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. 1953b. Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to the Theory of Communication. Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I) 1953c. “Philosophers and research in the soft sciences.” In Proceedings of the XIth Inter- national Congress of Philosophy, Volume VI: Philosophy and Methodology of the Sciences of Nature, Brussels, 20–26 August, 1953. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 255–59. 1954. “Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws.” Theoria 20: 53–63. (in SWAN VIII) 1956. “Synonymity and empirical research.” Methodos 8: 3–22. 1957a. “Synonymity as revealed by intuition (Discussion of B. Mates’s Synonymity).” Philosophical Review 66: 87–93. 1957b. “What does ‘testability’ mean? An account of a procedure developed by Ludvig Løvestad.” Methodos 9: 229–37. 1958a. “Editorial Statement.” Inquiry 1: 1–6. 1958b. “Logical equivalence, intentional isomorphism and synonymity as studied by questionnaires, sacred to the memory of Gerrit Mannoury.” Synthese 10a (1956–58): 471–79. (in SWAN VIII) 1958c. “Systematization of Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution.” Journal of Con- flict Resolution 2: 140–55. (in SWAN X) 1959a. “Do we know that basic norms cannot be true or false?” Theoria 25: 31–55. (in SWAN VIII) 1959b. Philosophy Within a World University (a memorandium drawn up for the Con- ference at Brissago, Switzerland, September 1959). Stuttgart: International So- ciety for the Establishment of a World University.

652 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1960a. “Empiricism and freedom in theorizing (Notes on P. K. Feyerabend’s mimeographed manuscripts How to Be a Good Empiricist and Explanation, Reduc- tion, and Empiricism).” Unpublished manuscript: 11 pages. 1960b. “Typology of questionaires adapted to the study of expressions with closely related meanings.” Synthese 12: 481–94. (in SWAN VIII) 1961a. “Can knowledge be reached? (Lecture delivered at Oxford University, Octo- ber 1960).” Inquiry 4: 219–27. (in SWAN VIII) 1961b. “The inquiring mind. Notes on the relation between philosophy and science (prepared in close cooperation with Eivind Storheim).” Inquiry 4: 162–89. 1961c. “The inquiring mind. Notes on the relation between philosophy and science (prepared in close cooperation with Eivind Storheim)” (reprint of 1961b). Philosophy Today 5: 185–204. 1961d. “Metaempirical reflections.” Unpublished manuscript. 1961e. “A study of ‘or’.” Synthese 13: 49–60. (in SWAN VIII) 1962a. Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza’s “Ethics.” Oslo: Filosofisk Institutt, Universitet i Oslo. 1962b. “Nonmilitary defense.” In Preventing World War III, edited by Quincy Wright, William M. Evan, and Morton Deutsch. New York: Simon and Schus- ter, pp. 123–35. (in SWAN IX) 1962c. “Typology of questionnaires adopted for the study of expressions with closely related meanings” (reprint of 1960b). In Logic and Language: Studies Dedicated to Rudolf Carnop on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, edited by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel et al. Dordrecht: Synthese Library, pp. 206–19. (in SWAN VIII) 1962d. “We still do not know that norms cannot be true or false: A reply to Dag Österburg.” Theoria 28: 205–09. (in SWAN VIII) 1963. “Knowledge and definiteness of intention.” Unpublished manuscript: 10 pages. 1964a. “Definition and hypothesis in Plato’s ‘Meno’.” Inquiry 7: 231–34. 1964b. “Nonmilitary defense and foreign policy.” In Civilian Defense, edited by Adam Roberts. London: Peace News Pamphlet, pp. 33–43. 1964c. “Pluralistic theorizing in physics and philosophy.” Danish Yearbook of Philos- ophy 1: 101–11. 1964d. “Reflections about total views.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25: 16–29. (in SWAN X) 1964e. “Was it all worth while? Review of P. de Vomécourt: Who Lived to See the Day: France in Arms, 1940–1945.” Peace News (March 6).

653 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1965a. Gandhi and the Nuclear Age, translated by Alastair Hannay. Totowa, NJ: Rowman. 1965b. “Nature ebbing out.” Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1965c. “Science as behavior: Prospects and limitations of a behavioral metascience.” In Scientific Psychology: Principles and Approaches, edited by B. Wolman and E. Nagel. New York: Basic Books, pp. 50–67. (in SWAN IX) 1965d. “The south wall of Tirich Mir East.” Himalayan Journal 26: 97–106. (in SWAN X) 1966a. Communication and Argument: Elements of Applied Semantics. Second printing 1981. Translated by Alastair Hannay. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN VII) 1966b. Elements of Applied Semantics, translated by Alastair Hannay. London: Allen and Unwin. 1966c. “Psychological and social aspects of Pyrrhonian scepticism.” Inquiry 9: 301–21. 1967a. “Civilian defense and foreign policy.” In Civilian Defense: An Introduction, edited by T. K. Mahadevan et al. New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, pp. 102–16. 1967b. “Notes on some similarities between Spinoza on the one hand and Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre on the other.” Unpublished manuscript. 1967c. “Physics and the variety of world pictures.” In Grundfragen der Wis- senschaften, und ihre Wurzeln in der Metaphysik, edited by P. Weingartner. Salzburg: Pustet, pp. 181–88. 1967d. Sanskrit for Generalister (Sanskrit for generalists). Institute for Philosophy, mimeograph. 1968a. Four Modern Philosophers: Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre, translated by Alastair Hannay. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1968b. “Kierkegaard and the values of education.” Journal of Value Inquiry 12: 196– 200. (in SWAN VIII) 1968c. Scepticism. London and New York: Humanities Press. (SWAN II) 1969a. “Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence: The structure of a small, central part of Spinoza’s Ethics.” Inquiry 12: 66–104. 1969b. Hvilken Verden er den Virkelige? (Which world is the real one?), vol. 37. Filosofiske Problemer. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN III) 1970a. “Can violence lead to non-violence: Gandhi’s point of view.” In Gandhi, In- dia and the World: An International Symposium, edited by Sibnarayan Ray. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 287–99. (in SWAN IX) 1970b. “The conquest of mountains: A contradiction.” Mountain 14: 28–29.

654 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1970c. “Language of creative research and language of science: A contrast.” In Lin- guaggi nella societa e nella tecnica. Convegno promosso dalla Ing. C. Olivetti & C., S.p.a. per il centenario della nascita di Camillo Olivetti. Milano: Edizioni di Comunita. 1970d. “A plea for pluralism in philosophy and physics (and discussions).” In Physics, Logic, and History: Based on the First International Colloquium Held at the University of Denver, May 16–20, 1966, edited by Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck. Denver: Plenum Press, pp. 129–46. (in SWAN IX) 1970e. “Rudolf Carnap.” Inquiry 13: 337–38. 1971a. “Kierkegaard and the educational crisis.” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 8: 65–70. 1971b. “Letter to the king of Nepal.” In The Autobiography of a Shipping Man, edited by Erling D. Naess (author). Oslo: Seatrade Publications, pp. 252–53. (in SWAN X) 1972a. “The Place of normative ethics within a biological framework.” In Biology, History, and Natural Philosophy, edited by Allen D. Breck and Wolfgang Your- grau. New York: Plenum, pp. 197–206. 1972b. The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise. Oslo: Univer- sitetsforlaget. (SWAN IV) 1972c. “Pyrrhonism revisited.” In Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, edited by Raymond E. Olsen and Anthony M. Paul. Baltimore and London: Johns Hop- kins University Press, pp. 393–403. (in SWAN VIII) 1973a. “Attitudes towards nature and interactions with nature (Three lectures given in Hong Kong).” Unpublished manuscript: 20 pages. 1973b. “Comments on ‘Knowledge versus survival’.” Inquiry 16: 415–16. 1973c. “The place of joy in a world of fact.” North American Review (Summer): 53– 57. (in SWAN X) 1973d. “Secondary qualities in the light of Sextus Empiricus’ interpretation of Pro- tagoras.” Unpublished manuscript: 19 pages. 1973e. “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A summary.” In- quiry 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X) 1974a. “The ecopolitical frontier: A case study.” Intercollegiate Bulletin 5: 18–26. 1974b. Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza’s “Ethics.” Oslo: Filosofisk Institutt, Universitet i Oslo. 1974c. Gandhi and Group Conflict: An Exploration of Satyagraha. Oslo: Universitets- forlaget. (SWAN V) 1974d. “Is freedom consistent with Spinoza’s determinism?” In Spinoza on Knowing, Being, and Freedom: Proceedings of the Spinoza Symposium, Leusden, 1973, edited by J. G. van der Bend. Assen: Van Gorcum, pp. 6–23. (in SWAN IX)

655 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1974e. “Martin Heidegger.” In Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., pp. 738–41. 1975a. “The case against science.” In Science Between Culture and Counter-culture, edited by C. I. Dessaur. Nijmegen, Netherlands: Dekker and Van de Vegt, pp. 25–48. (in SWAN IX) 1975b. Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza’s Ethics. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN VI) 1975c. “Possibilism.” Unpublished manuscript: 16 pages. 1975d. “Why not science for anarchists too? (A reply to Feyerabend).” Inquiry 18(2): 183–94. (in SWAN IX) 1977a. “Friendship, strength of emotion, and freedom.” In Spinoza Herdacht: 1677, 21 Februari 1977. Amsterdam: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijs- begeerte, pp. 11–19. 1977b. “Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws.” In Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, edited by J. N. Mohanty. Reprinted from Theoria 20 (1954): 53–63. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 67–75. (in SWAN VIII) 1977c. “The limited neutrality of typologies of systems: A reply to Gullvag.” In- quiry 20: 67–72. 1977d. “Notes on the methodology of normative systems.” Methodology and Science 10: 64–79. (in SWAN X) 1977e. “Spinoza and ecology.” Philosophia 7(1): 45–54. 1977f. “Spinoza and ecology.” In Specuum Spinozanum, 1677–1977, edited by S. Hes- sing. London: Routledge, pp. 418–25. 1978. “Through Spinoza to Mahayana Buddhism, or through Mahayana Buddhism to Spinoza?” In Spinoza’s Philosophy of Man: Proceedings of the Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium, 1977, edited by J. Wetlesen. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 136–58. (in SWAN IX) 1979a. “Modesty and the conquest of mountains.” In The Mountain Spirit, edited by Michael C. Tobias and H. Drasdo. New York: Overlook Press, pp. 13–16. (in SWAN X) 1979b. “Self-realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves.” Inquiry 22: 231–41. (in SWAN X) 1979c. “Towards a theory of wide cognitivism.” In Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy, edited by W. Callebaut, M. De Mey, et al. Ghent: Communication and Cognition, pp. 111–18. 1980a. “Environmental ethics and Spinoza’s Ethics: Comments on Genevieve Lloyd’s article.” Inquiry 23: 313–25. 1980b. Filosofiens Historie I: Fra Oldtiden til Renessansen (History of philosophy I). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

656 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1980c. Filosofiens Historie II: Fra Renessansen til vår Tid (History of philosophy II). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1980d. “Ideology and rationality” (revised and abbreviated version of 1978b). In Ideology and Politics, edited by Maurice Cranston and Peter Mair. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, pp. 133–42. (in SWAN IX) 1980e. “Whole philosophies as data and as constructs.” In Social Science for What? Festschrift for Johan Galtung, edited by H. H. Holm and E. Rudeng. Oslo: Oslo University Press, pp. 182–88. 1981a. “The empirical semantics of key terms, phrases and sentences.” In Philosophy and Grammar: Papers on the Occasion of the Quincentennial of Uppsala University, edited by Stig Kanger and Sven Öhman. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 135–54. (in SWAN VIII) 1981b. “The primacy of the whole.” In Holism and Ecology, edited by Arne Naess and Danilo Dolci. Tokyo: United Nations University (HSDRGPID-61/ UNEP-326), pp. 1–10. 1981c. “Spinoza’s finite God.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie (135): 120–26. (in SWAN IX) 1982a. “An application of empirical argumentation analysis to Spinoza’s ‘Ethics.’” In Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation, edited by E. M. Barth and J. L. Martens. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 245–55. (in SWAN IX) 1982b. Forward, Henryk Skolimowski, Ekofilosofi. Stockholm: Akademilitteratur. 1982c. “A necessary component of logic: Empirical argumentation and analysis.” In Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation, edited by E. M. Barth and J. L. Martens. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 9–22. (in SWAN VIII) 1982d. “Scepticism as the result of sufficiently deep and comprehensive inquiry: An answer to Nicholas Rescher.” Unpublished manuscript: 12 pages. 1982e. “Simple in means, rich in ends: A conversation with Arne Naess.” Ten Direc- tions (Summer/Fall): 7–12. 1983a. “Einstein, Spinoza, and God.” In Old and New Questions in Physics, Cosmology, Philosophy, and Theoretical Biology: Essays in Honor of Wolfgang Yourgrau, edited by A. van der Merwe. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 683–87. (in SWAN IX) 1983b. “How my philosophy seemed to develop.” In Philosophers on Their Own Work, edited by Andre Mercier and Maja Svilar. Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 209–26. (in SWAN IX) 1983c. “Spinoza and attitudes towards nature.” In Spinoza: His Thought and Work. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, pp. 160–75. (in SWAN X) 1984a. “The arrogance of anti-humanism.” Ecophilosophy 6 (May): 8–9. (in SWAN X)

657 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1984b. “Cultural anthropology: A new approach to the study of how to conceive of our own future (Fifteen lectures given in Vienna).” Unpublished manuscript. 1984c. “Deep ecology and lifestyle.” In The Paradox of Environmentalism: Symposium Proceedings in Downsview, Ontario, edited by Neil Everndon. Downsview, On- tario: Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, pp. 57–60. (in SWAN X) 1984d. “A defense of the deep ecology movement.” Environmental Ethics 6: 265–70. 1984e. “The green utopia of 2084 (A paper presented at the University of Min- nesota).” Unpublished manuscript: 9 pages. 1984f. “Identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes.” In Deep Ecology, edited by Michael Tobias. San Marcos, CA: Avant Books, pp. 256–70. 1984g. “Intuition, intrinsic value and deep ecology: Arne Naess replies.” The Ecolo- gist 14 (5–6): 201–03. 1984h. “The politics of the deep ecology movement.” Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1984i. Review of Wa r riors of the Rainbow: A Chronicle of the Greenpeace Movement, by Robert Hunter. Rigen Var Verden (34): 10–15. 1984j. A Sceptical Dialogue on Induction. Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum. 1985a. “Ecosophy T.” In Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered, edited by Bill Devall and George Sessions. Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith, pp. 225–28. 1985b. “Gestalt thinking and Buddhism.” Unpublished manuscript: 9 single- spaced pages. (in SWAN VIII) 1985c. “The world of concrete contents.” Inquiry 28: 417–28. (in SWAN X) 1986a. “The connection of ‘Self-realization!’ with diversity, complexity, and symbiosis.” Unpublished manuscript: 4 pages. (in SWAN X) 1986b. “Consequences of an absolute no to nuclear war.” In Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, edited by Avner Cohen and Steven Lee. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, pp. 425–36. (in SWAN IX) 1986c. “Deep ecology in good conceptual health.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 3(4): 18–22. 1986d. “The deep ecology movement: Some philosophical aspects.” Philosophical Inquiry 8: 10–31. (in SWAN X) 1986e. “Intrinsic nature: Will the defenders of nature please rise?” In Conservation Biology: The Science and Scarcity of Diversity, edited by Michael E. Soulé. Sunder- land, MA: Sinauer Associates, pp. 504–15. 1986f. “Limited definiteness of ‘God’ in Spinoza’s system: Answer to Heine Siebrand.” In Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphiosophie, edited by Oswald Bayer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 275–83.

658 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1986g. “Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world.” Keith Roby Memorial Lecture in Community Science, Murdoch University, Aus- tralia, March 12. (in SWAN X) 1987a. “Ecosophy, population, and free nature.” Unpublished manuscript. 1987b. Ekspertenes Syn På Naturens Egenverdi (Expert views on the intrinsic value of nature). Trondheim: Tapir Forlag. (in SWAN X) 1987c. “For its own sake.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 4(2): 28–29. 1987d. “From ecology to ecosophy, from science to wisdom.” Unpublished manuscript: 7 pages. 1987e. “Green society and deep ecology” (Schumacher Lecture). Unpublished manuscript: 14 pages. 1987f. “Notes on the politics of the deep ecology movement.” In Sustaining Gaia: Contributions to Another World View, edited by Frank Fisher. Glen Waverly, Vic- toria, Australia: Aristoc Offset, pp. 178–98. 1987g. “Notes on the term ‘anthropocentrism’.” Unpublished manuscript. 1987h. “Population reduction: An ecosophical view.” Unpublished manuscript: 8 pages. (in SWAN X) 1987i. “Scientific and technological biomedical progress as cultural concepts (Col- loque de l’Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, organisé à Bruxelles, du 23 au 28 avril 1984).” In La responsabilité éthique dans le développe- ment biomedical. Louvain-la-Neuve, France: CIACO, pp. 199–203. 1987j. “Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world.” The Trum- peter: Journal of Ecosophy 4(3): 35–42. (in SWAN X) 1987k. “Solidarity, money, and the well-to-do.” Pan Ecology: An Irregular Journal of Nature and Human Nature 1(3): 1–4. 1988a. “The basics of deep ecology.” Resurgence (January/February): 4–7. (in SWAN X) 1988b. “Cultural diversity and the deep ecology movement.” Unpublished manuscript: 10 pages. (in SWAN X) 1988c. “Deep ecology and ultimate premises.” The Ecologist 18 (4/5): 128–31. 1988d. “The deep ecology movement.” In Problems of International Justice, edited by S. Luper-Foy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 144–48. 1988e. “Ecosophy, population, and free nature” (revision of 1987a). The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 5(3): 113–19. 1988f. “Environmental activism and Spinoza’s amor intellectualis dei.” Unpublished manuscript. 1988g. “Environmental ethics and international justice.” Ecospirit 4(1).

659 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1988h. “A European looks at the North American branches of the deep ecology movement.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 5(2): 75–76. 1988i. “Green politics, green parties, deep ecology. How related?” Unpublished manuscript. 1988j. “Norway—A developing country with good prospects.” In One Earth—One World. Oslo: Ministry of Environment. 1988k. “Note concerning Murray Bookchin’s article ‘Social ecology versus deep ecology.’” Unpublished manuscript. 1988l. “On the structure and function of paradigms in science.” In Theories of Car- cinogenesis, edited by Olav Hilmar Iversen. Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing, pp. 1–9. (in SWAN IX) 1988m. “Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world” (excerpted from the Keith Roby Memorial Lecture, March 12, 1986, and from 1987j). In Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings, edited by John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess. Philadelphia: New Society Pub- lishers, pp. 19–30. (in SWAN X) 1988n. “Sustainable development and the deep long-range ecology movement.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 5(4): 138–42. 1988o. “What is gestalt thinking? A note.” Unpublished manuscript: 5 pages. 1989a. “Arne Naess gives his support to Edward Goldsmith’s ‘The Way.’” The Ecol- ogist 19(5): 196–97. 1989b. “The basics of deep ecology.” In Actual English.Kyoto: All English General Information Society. (in SWAN X) 1989c. “Deep ecology, wilderness, and the third world.” Unpublished manuscript. 1989d. “The deepness of deep ecology.” Earth First! (December): 32. 1989e. “Docta ignorantia and the application of general guidelines.” Unpublished manuscript: 4 pages. (in SWAN X) 1989f. “Ecology and ethics (Goteborg paper, 28th September).” Unpublished manuscript. 1989g. Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, translated and revised by David Rothenberg. Cambridge, UK: The University Press. 1989h. “Ecosophy and gestalt ontology.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 6(4): 134–37. 1989i. “Ecosophy: Beyond East and West” (an interview with Richard Evanoff ). Kyoto Journal (Summer): 40–44. 1989j. “Ecosophy, population, and sustainable development.” Unpublished manuscript: 15 pages.

660 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1989k. “The essence of the philosophy of Peter Wessel Zapffe.” Unpublished manuscript. 1989l. “Finding common ground.” Green Synthesis (March): 9–10. 1989m. “Gestalt ontology and gestalt thinking” (revised version of 1988o). Un- published manuscript: 5 single-spaced pages. (in SWAN X) 1989n. “Metaphysics of the treeline.” Appalachia ( June 15): 56–59. Also in Edge 2(4): 25–26. (in SWAN X) 1989o. “A note on definition, criteria, and characterizations.” Unpublished manuscript: 3 pages. (in SWAN X) 1989p. “A note on the function of the ‘Eight Points’ of deep ecology.” Unpublished manuscript: 8 pages. 1989q. “Quality of life research.” Unpublished manuscript. 1989r. “Integration of the 8 points of ecosophy T.” Unpublished diagram. (in SWAN X) 1990a. “The basics of deep ecology” (summary of 1987 Schumacher Lecture; reprint of 1988a). In The Green Fuse, edited by John Button. London: Quartet Books, pp. 130–37. (in SWAN X) 1990b. “Deep ecology and conservation biology.” Earth First! (March 20): 29. (in SWAN X) 1990c. “The deep ecology movement and ecologism.” Anarchy (Summer): 33. 1990d. “Deepness of questions and the deep ecology movement.” Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1990e. “An intramural note on transpersonal ecosophy.” Unpublished manuscript. 1990f. “Is freedom consistent with Spinoza’s determinism?” (revision of 1974d). In Spinoza, edited by Martin Schewe and Achim Engstler. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 227–47. (in SWAN IX) 1990g. “Japan’s second and last mistake.” Japan Environment Monitor 3(2): 6–7. 1990h. “‘Man apart’ and deep ecology: A reply to Reed.” Environmental Ethics 12 (Summer): 185–92. 1990i. “Peter Wessel Zapffe, obituary.” Aftenposten (October 15). 1990j. “Pushing for a deep change” (interview). English Journal 4 (April). 1990k. “Spinoza and attitudes towards nature” (revised version of 1983c). Unpub- lished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1990l. “Sustainable development and deep ecology.” In Ethics of Environment and Development: Global Challenge, International Response, edited by R. J. Engel and J. G. Engel. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, pp. 87–96. (in SWAN X)

661 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1991a. “The connection of ‘Self-realization!’ with diversity, complexity and symbiosis.” Unpublished manuscript: 7 pages. (in SWAN X) 1991b. “Freedom, self, and activeness according to Spinoza.” Unpublished manuscript. 1991c. “An interview with Arne Naess.” New Renaissance 2: 4–5. 1991d. “Is it a plus to have definite metaphysics in common? (Regarding Max Oelschlaeger’s book, The Idea of Wilderness).” Unpublished manuscript: 2+ pages. 1991e. “A memorial tribute to Peter Wessel Zapffe.” Norwegian Literature 1991. 1991f. “A note on the prehistory and history of the deep ecology movement.” Un- published manuscript: 4 pages. (in SWAN X) 1991g. “Paul Feyerabend—A Green hero?” In Beyond Reason, edited by Gonzalo Munévar. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 403–16. (in SWAN X) 1991h. “Politics and the ecological crisis: An introductory note.” ReVISION 13(1): 142–46. (in SWAN X) 1991i. “Should we try to relieve cases of extreme suffering in nature?” PanEcology 6(1): 1–5.(in SWAN X) 1991j. “The Spectacular—enemy?” Unpublished manuscript. 1991k. “Spinoza and the deep ecology movement.” Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1992a. “Architecture and the deep ecology movement (Stockholm lecture).” Un- published manuscript. 1992b. “Arguing under deep disagreement” (an abbreviated version of 1992i). In Logic and Political Culture: Proceedings of the Colloquium “Logic and Politics,” Amsterdam, 19–22 February 1990, edited by E. M. Barth and E. C. W. Krabbe. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 123–31. 1992c. “Ayer on metaphysics: A critical commentary by a kind of metaphysician.” In The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn. La Salles, IL: Open Court, pp. 329–40. 1992d. “Deep ecology and potters in our planet.” The Studio Potter 20: 38–39. 1992e. “Deep ecology for the twenty-second century.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 9(2): 86–88. (in SWAN X) 1992f. “Ecology and ethics.” In Ecology and Ethics, edited by A. Øfsti. Oslo: Nor- land Akademi for Kunst og Vitenskap. 1992g. “The encouraging richness and diversity of ultimate premises in environmental philosophy.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 9(2): 53–60. (in SWAN X)

662 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1992h. “To grow up or to get to be more mature?” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 9(2): 80–81. 1992i. “How can the empirical movement be promoted today? A discussion of the empiricism of Otto Neurath and Rudolph Carnap.” In From an Empirical Point of View: The Empirical Turn in Logic, edited by E. M. Barth, J. Vandormael, and F. Vandamme. Gent, Belgium: Communication and Cognition, pp. 107–55. (The original German version, Wie fördert man heute die empirische Bewegung? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Empirismus von Otto Neurath und Rudolph Carnap, was written during 1937–39. It appeared in Oslo University’s Filosofiske Problemer 19, 1956). (in SWAN VIII) 1992j. “Introductory biology and ‘life appreciation’ courses.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 9(3): 126. 1992k. “Maturity, adulthood, boxing, and playfulness.” Unpublished manuscript. 1992l. “Mountains (revised from original 1991 manuscript).” Unpublished manuscript: 6 double-spaced pages. 1992m. “The principle of intensity.” Unpublished manuscript (article originally written in the 1940s): 4 pages. (in SWAN VIII) 1992n. “Radical thinking for desperate times.” The Independent (January). 1992o. “Spinoza and the deep ecology movement” (Michigan lecture, revised from 1991k). Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1992p. “Sustainability! The integral approach.” In Conservation of Biodiversity for Sustainable Development, edited by O. T. Sandlund, K. Hindar, and A. H. D. Brown. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, pp. 303–10. (in SWAN X) 1992q. “Third world, deep ecology, socialism, and Hitlerism: An open letter.” The Deep Ecologist 43: 4–5. 1992r. “The three great movements.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 9(2): 85–86. (in SWAN X) 1992s. “Tvergastein: An example of place.” Unpublished manuscript: 18 pages. (in SWAN X) 1992t. “What about science in ecologically sustainable societies?” Unpublished manuscript. 1993a. “Beautiful action: Its function in the ecological crisis.” Environmental Values 2(1): 67–71. (in SWAN X) 1993b. “The breadth and the limits of the deep ecology movement.” Wild Earth 3: 74–75. (in SWAN X) 1993c. “Culture and environment.” In Culture and Environment: Interdisciplinary Ap- proaches, edited by Nina Witoszek and Elizabeth Gulbrandsen. Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, pp. 201–09.

663 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1993d. “The deep ecological movement: Some philosophical aspects.” In Environ- mental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence, edited by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 411–21. (in SWAN X) 1993e. Deep Ecology and Politics (a revision of three articles, “The three great movements,” “Comments on the planned official Norwegian presentation in Rio, April 1992,” and “Politics and the ecological crisis: An introductory note”). Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, working paper 1993.7. (in SWAN X) 1993f. “The deep ecology ‘Eight Points’ revisited.” Unpublished manuscript: 9 pages. (in SWAN X) 1993g. “Everything really important is dangerous” (an interview with Arne Naess by David Rothenberg). In Wisdom and the Open Air: The Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology, edited by Peter Reed and David Rothenberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 99–111. 1993h. “Fundamentalism, Rawls, and the Eight Points of the deep ecology movement: A note.” Unpublished manuscript: 3 pages. 1993i. “Gandhian nonviolent verbal communication: The necessity of training.” Unpublished manuscript: 9 pages. 1993j. “How should supporters of the deep ecology movement behave in order to affect society and culture?” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 10(3): 98–100. 1993k. “In praise of books of the big outside.” Wild Earth 3: 88–89. 1993l. “Logical empiricism and the uniqueness of the Schlick seminar: A personal experience with consequences.” In Scientific Philosophy, edited by Friedrich Stadler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 11–25. (in SWAN VIII) 1993m. “Migration and ecological unsustainability.” Unpublished manuscript: 5 pages. 1993n. “Mountains and mythology.” Unpublished manuscript: 2 pages. 1993o. “The politics of the deep ecology movement.” In Wisdom and the Open Air: The Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology, edited by Peter Reed and David Rothen- berg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 82–99. (in SWAN X) 1993p. “Simple in means, rich in ends” (an interview with Arne Naess by Stephan Bodian). In Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology, edited by Michael E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, George Sessions, Karen J. Warren, and John Clark. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 437 ff. 1993q. Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement. Delft: Eburon. (in SWAN X) 1993r. “Theory, practice, and its synthesis within a movement.” Unpublished manuscript: 1 page. 1993s. “The tragedy of Norwegian whaling: A response to Norwegian environ-

664 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

ment group support for whaling.” North Sea Monitor (December): 10–12. (in SWAN X) 1993t. “‘You assert this?’ An empirical study of weight-expressions.” In Empirical Logic and Public Debate: Essays in Honour of Else M. Barth, edited by Erik C. W. Krabbe, Reneé José Dalitz, and Pier A. Smit. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rudopi, pp. 121–32. (in SWAN VIII) 1994a. “Climbing and the deep ecology movement.” Unpublished manuscript: 3 pages. 1994b. “Creativity and gestalt thinking.” The Structuralist (33/34): 51–52. (in SWAN VIII) 1994c. “Culture and environment” (reprint of 1993c). International Journal of Eco- forestry 10(4): 158-161. 1994d. “From psychology to ontology (Ireland lecture).” Unpublished manuscript: 6 pages. 1994e. “A green history of the world (Lecture for Schumacher College, July).” Un- published manuscript. 1994f. “The heart of the forest.” International Journal of Ecoforestry 10: 40–41. (in SWAN X) 1994g. “How my philosophy seemed to have developed: 1983–1994.” Unpublished manuscript: 7 pages. (in SWAN IX) 1994h. “The Norwegian roots of deep ecology.” In Nature: The True Home of Culture, edited by Børge Dahle. Oslo: Norges Idrettshøgskole, pp. 15–18. 1994i. “Trust and confidence . . . An answer to Rescher’s reappraisal of sceptism.” Unpublished manuscript: 16 pages. (in SWAN VIII) 1994j. “What do we as supporters of the deep ecology movement stand for and believe in?” Unpublished manuscript: 9 double-spaced pages. (in SWAN X) 1995a. “The apron diagram.” In The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthol- ogy, edited by Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, pp. 10–12. (in SWAN X) 1995b. “Deep ecology for the twenty-second century.” In Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, edited by George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 463–67. (in SWAN X) 1995c. “Deep ecology in the line of fire.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 12(3): 146–49. 1995d. “Deepness of questions and the deep ecology movement.” In Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmental-

665 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

ism, edited by George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 204– 12. (in SWAN X) 1995e. “The ‘Eight Points’ revisited.” In Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, edited by George Sessions. Boston and London: Shambhala, pp. 213–21. (in SWAN X) 1995f. Foreword to The Interconnected Universe, by Irvin Laszlo. Singapore: World Scientific, pp. v–vii. 1995g. “Industrial society, postmodernity, and ecological sustainability.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 21: 131–46. (in SWAN X) 1995h. “Mountains and mythology.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 12(4): 165. 1995i. “Notes on gestalt ontology.” Unpublished manuscript. 1995j. “Ranking, yes, but the inherent value is the same: An answer to William C. French.” Published in Witoszek 1999 (see references). (in SWAN X) 1995k. “Seven point ecology (Some attitudes and convictions held by supporters of the deep ecology movement).” Resurgence (January/February): 26–27. 1995l. “The Third World, wilderness, and deep ecology.” In Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, edited by George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 397–407. (in SWAN X) 1995m. “Antifascist character of the eight points of the deep ecology movement.” Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1995o. “Ecology, sameness & rights.” In Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, edited by George Sessions. Boston and London: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 222–24. 1996a. “The Arctic dimension outside and inside us.” In Deep Ecology in the High Arctic: Proceedings of the 1994 International Ecophilosophical Symposium, Svalbard, Norway, 29th August–2nd September, edited by Elisabeth Stoltz Larsen and Robin Buzza. Longyearbyen: Norwegian Polar Institute, pp. 13–16. 1996b. “Comments on Harold Glasser’s ‘Deep ecology approach’ (DEA).” In Philo- sophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy, edited by Nina Witoszek and Andrew Brennan. Oslo: Centre for Development and the Envi- ronment, pp. 399–401. 1996c. “Deep ecology in the line of fire.” In Rethinking Deep Ecology: Proceedings from a Seminar at SUM, University of Oslo, 5 September 1995, edited by Nina Witoszek. Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, pp. 107–15. 1996d. “Does humanity have a cosmic role? Protecting and restoring the planet.” Environment Network News (May/June).

666 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1996e. “Ecosophy, community, and lifestyle.” In Humanism Toward the Third Mil- lennium, edited by Fons Elders. Amsterdam: VUB Press, pp. 83–93. 1996f. “Heidegger, postmodernism theory, and deep ecology.” Unpublished manuscript: 4 pages. 1996g. “Living a life that reflects evolutionary insight.” Conservation Biology 10: 1557–59. 1996h. “A response to Rowe’s ‘From shallow to deep ecological philosophy’.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 13(1): 32. 1996i. “Vagueness and ambiguity.” In Philosophy of Language, edited by A. P. Mar- tinich. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 407–17. 1997a. “Conquest of mountains.” Resurgence ( July/August): 24–25. 1997b. “‘Free nature’: An interview with Ian Angus.” Alternatives Journal 23(3): 18–21. 1997c. “Heidegger, postmodern theory, and deep ecology.” The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 14(4): 181–83. 1997d. “Insulin shock method and the economic crisis in Vienna in 1934.” In Some Notes on Madness, edited by Tarja Heiskanen. Helsinki: Finnish Association for Mental Health, SMS Publishers. 1997e. “An outline of problems ahead” (talk given at Environmental Justice Con- ference, Melbourne, October 1997). Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X) 1998a. “All together now: A review of E. O. Wilson’s Consilience.” New Scientist (22 August): 42–43. 1998b. “Arne Naess speaks about ecophilosophy and solidarity.” Ragtime 5: 16–17. 1998c. “Interview of Arne Naess by Casey Walker.” Wild Duck Review 4(1): 18–20. 1998d. “The spirit of the Vienna Circle devoted to questions of Lebens- und Weltauf- fassung.” In Game Theory, Experience, Rationality, edited by W. Leinfellner and E. Köhler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 359–67. (in SWAN VIII) 1998e. “The term ‘development’ today.” Development Today 8(1): 10–11. 1999a. “Articulation of normative interrelation: An information theoretical approach.” Unpublished manuscript. 1999b. “Ecoforestry and the deep ecology movement.” In Proceedings of the Fourth Biannual Conference of the Taiga Rescue Network, October 5–10, edited by Rein Ahas, Taime Puura, Anne Janssen, and Elisa Peters, pp. 72–73. Tartu, Estonia: Estonian Green Movement. 1999c. “An outline of the problems ahead.” In Global Ethics and the Environment, edited by Nicholas Low. London and New York: Routledge. (in SWAN X)

667 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1999d. “The principle of intensity.” Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 5–9. (in SWAN VIII) 2000. “Avalanches as social constructions.” Environmental Ethics 22 (Fall): 335–36. (in SWAN X)

By Arne Naess and Coauthors 1951. Naess, Arne, and Stein Rokkan. “Analytical survey of agreements and disagreements.” In Democracy in a World of Tensions, edited by Richard McKeon with the assistance of Stein Rokkan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 447–512. (in SWAN IX) 1955. Galtung, Johan, and Arne Naess. Gandhis Politiske Etikk (Gandhi’s political ethics). 2d ed. 1968. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum. 1956. Naess, Arne, Jens Christophersen, and Kjell Kvalø. Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1960. Naess, Siri, and Arne Naess. “Psychological research and human problems.” Philosophy of Science 27: 134–46. 1964. Austin, John L., and Arne Naess. “On Herman Tønnessen’s ‘What should we say’.” In Eighteen Papers on Language Analysis and Empirical Semantics, edited by Herman Tønnessen. Edmonton, Alberta: University of Alberta, pp. 143–49. 1967. Naess, Arne, and Jon Wetlesen. Conation and Cognition in Spinoza’s Theory of Affects: A Reconstruction. Oslo: University of Oslo. 1969. Naess, Arne, and Sigmund Kvaløy (translator). “Some ethical considerations with a view to mountaineering in Norway.” American Alpine Journal (London: The Alpine Club): 230–33. (in SWAN X) 1972a. Naess, Arne, and Alastair Hannay. “An appeal to the cramped scholar by way of a foreword.” In An Invitation to Chinese Philosophy: Eight Studies, edited by Arne Naess and Alastair Hannay. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. vii–xv. 1972b. Naess, Arne, and Alastair Hannay, eds. An Invitation to Chinese Philosophy: Eight Studies. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1974. Naess, Arne, and A. J. Ayer. “The glass is on the table: An empiricist versus a total view” (a debate between Ayer and Naess). In Reflexive Water: The Basic Con- cerns of Mankind, edited by Fons Elders. London: Souvenir Press, pp. 11–68. (in SWAN VIII) 1980. Naess, Arne, and Jon Hellesnes. “Norway.” In Handbook of World Philosophy Since 1945, edited by John Burr. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 159–71. 1984. Naess, Arne, and George Sessions. “Basic principles of deep ecology.” Eco- philosophy 6 (May): 3–7.

668 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1987a. Naess, Arne, and Ivar Mysterud. “Philosophy of wolf policies I: General principles and preliminary exploration of selected norms.” Conservation Biology 1: 22–34. (in SWAN X) 1987b. Naess, Siri, Arne Naess, and Torbjørn Moum and Tom Sørensen with the cooperation of Arne Mastekaasa. Quality of Life Research: Concepts, Methods, and Applications. Oslo: Institute of Applied Social Research. 1988. Seed, John, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess, eds. Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers. 1989. Naess, Arne, Liu Shiao-Ru, and Nicholas Gould. “Deep ecology (A conversation on ‘deep ecology’ and Taiwan’s environmental problems).” Issues and Options 1(44): 1–6. 1990. Mysterud, Ivar, and Arne Naess. “Philosophy of wolf policies II: Superna- tional strategy and emergency interim management.” Unpublished manuscript: 14 pages. 1995. Naess, Arne, and Johan (Bilder) Brun. Det Gode Lange Livs Far: Hallingskarvet sett fra Tvergastein (The good, long life’s father: Hallingskarvet from Tverga- stein). Oslo: N. W. Damm and Son. 1996. Gullvåg, Ingemund, and Arne Naess. “Vagueness and ambiguity.” In Philos- ophy of Language, edited by Marcelo Dascal, Dietfried Gerhardus, Kuno Lorenz, and Georg Meggle. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1407–17. 1997. Naess, Arne, and Helena Norberg-Hodge. “Self-realization and society.” Resurgence (January). 1998a. Grøn, Øyvind, and Arne Naess. Introduction to General Relativity and Its Mathematics. Oslo: Høgskolen i Oslo. 1998b. Naess, Arne, and Per Ingvar Haukeland. Livsfilosofi: et personlig bidrag om følelser og fornuft / Arne Naess med Per Ingvar Haukeland. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 2000. Naess, Arne. “Deep ecology and education: A conversation with Bob Jick- ling.” Canadian Journal of Environmental Education 5: 48–62. (in SWAN IX) 2002. Naess, Arne, with Per Ingvar Haukeland. Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World. Translated by Roland Huntford. Foreword by Bill McKibben. Introduction by Harold Glasser. Athens and London: University of Georgia Press.

669 Index

absolute and final principles, Aristotle’s doctrine animal welfare and animal cruelty, Gandhi and, of, 478 524 absolutist ding-an-sich conceptions, rejection of, animals 451–52 classes, 293 abstract structures (of reality), 449, 453, 455–56, condemned to death for “crimes” committed, 458, 462, 465 296–97 abundance, 595 death, 131 “acceptance of life,” 134 dignity, 505 acting, from inclination vs. from duty, 124 identification with, 143, 302, 518–19 See also duty intrinsic/inherent value, 95, 330 action research, 496–97 See also value (inherent/intrinsic) activeness, 112, 113, 408–09 killing (see animal rights; whaling) activism, 73, 87, 88, 408 “mere,” 330 fighting the dominance of something vs. mixed communities with wolves, sheep, and trying to eliminate it, 615 sheep owners, 303–06 See also deep ecology movement supporters; norms about fairness toward, 95–96 movements suffering, 131, 132 activists, 98, 255, 596 viewing humans as, 265 agricultural commodities and economics, 586 wild-animal “management,” 296–97 AIDS, 164, 165 See also under self-realization; specific topics “alternative (future)” movements, 64, 88 anthropocentric arguments, 46 See also movements anthropocentrism, 47, 72, 186, 244, 406 altruism, 52, 53, 519 anthropology, philosophical, 623n1 Amnesty International, 223, 288 anthropomorphism, 581–82 amor intellectualis, 417 anticlass posture, 8–9 amor intellectualis Dei, 400–401 antihumanism, arrogance of, 185–87 anarchism, 216, 506 antinuclear campaign, 215–16 Andersnatten, 463–65 appearance vs. reality, 458–60 animal rights, 214, 291, 292, 298–99, 329–30 apron diagram, 75–81 compared with human rights, 416–17 areté (virtue), 267, 415 declarations of, 568 arguing from first principles, role of, 491–97 Gandhi on, 243 argumentation and debate, 16, 80, 281, 501, 597 moral capacity as necessary for rights, 299–300 See also deep ecology, on the defensive; non- obligations as requirement for rights, 62, 614 violence, Gandhian form of point 3 of Eight Points and, 62 argumentation patterns, 192 right to self-expression, 390 Aristotle, 146–47, 478 See also life, right to Armstrong-Buck, Susan, 237–39

671 INDEX atman, 488, 524, 525, 531, 619n8 change, deepness of, 30 attributes of extension and non-extension, 391 characterizations, 539–40 Australia, 15 chemistry, teaching, 583–84 authoritarian policies, 100 children, teaching See also Eight Points of deep ecology movement, about environment, 125–26 antifascist character See also education; schools Auxter, Thomas, 294 Christianity, 50 avalanches as social constructions, 559–60 civil disobedience campaigns, 433–36 axioms, 399–400, 583 See also Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution Ayer, Alfred, 544 Clark, Stephen R. L., 297 class differences, elimination of, 210 Baastad, Kjell Friis, 371, 375 class suppression, 210–11 Barents Sea, 196, 261, 331 cognitive self-determination, 508 Barth, Fredrik, 269, 272 collectives, 94, 112 bears, 295, 296–300 commiseration, 117 beautiful action Commoner, Barry, 388 function in ecological crisis, 121–27 communication See also under Kant; “moral acts” between conflicting groups, 597 behaviorism, 392 nonviolent, 597 beliefs, level-1 through 4, 77–79 communism, 109, 216 Bennett, David, 457, 458 communities Bentham, Jeremy, 30, 479 mixed, 304, 516 Bergland, Trygve, 169 vs. societies, 253, 303, 507 Bhagavad Gita, 242–43, 415 web of, and its administration, 507–09 biocentric vs. ecocentric, 18 “compassion priority norm,” 132–33 biodiversity, 148, 193, 595 complexity, 9–10, 37–39, 293, 295, 534 See also diversity vs. complication, 533 “biospheric,” 618n3 conflict resolution body, 113 research suggestions in area of, 440–43 Bookchin, Murray, 100 See also Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 143 conformity, cultural, 235–36 Brundtland Report, 140, 143, 144 consciousness, 105, 460 Buddha (Siddartha Gautama), 525 conservation, defined, 565 Buddhism, 50, 116, 242, 245 conservation biology, deep ecology and, 325–28 budgets, private vs. public, 280 conservation efforts, 276 bureaucracy, 4 See also wolf policies; specific topics conservation strategy, 36 Callicott, J. Baird, 59, 60, 242, 458 conservatism, 22 Cameron, Mr., 4 consevare, 632n7 Canada, 15 “Constructive Programme, The,” 433–34 capitalism, 216, 587 consumerism, 585 See also free market consumption, 578–79 Capra, Fritjof, 59 of natural resources, 167, 217 carbon dioxide production, 196 criteria/criterion, 537–40 Carson, Rachel, 27, 89, 191–92, 405, 491 history of the term, 537 caste system, 534 types of, 537–38 causa, 239–40 critical philosophy, 121 centers of development, 521 crowding, 8, 608 centralization of power, 588 See also overpopulation and overcrowding; pop- See also decentralization; globalization ulation chain, 617n2 “cult of life,” 134

672 INDEX

“cult of nature,” 134 alternate names for, 41 cultural anthropology, 91, 623–24nn1–2 attitudes and tendencies characteristic of, the new, 263–65 105–07 cultural differences, deepness of, 265–69 authors who have contributed to, 617–18n2 cultural diversity, 238, 272, 502 breadth and limits, 71–74 deep ecology platform and, 269–73 defining, 37, 58, 220, 230 deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 44 fascist tendencies, 100 social justice, sustainable development, and, See also Eight Points of deep ecology move- 572–75 ment, antifascist character cultural evolution, 265 four-level conception of (see apron diagram) cultural systems and suffering, 135 historical perspective, 21–22 cultures history and prehistory/forerunners of, 89–92 development from premodern or postmodern, key slogans, 201–03 578 persistent “whys” and “hows,” 23–31 disrespect in the West of nonindustrial, 579–81 plurality and unity, 77 extinction, 270–71 politics, 194 peaceful coexistence of different, 233 role in political life, 200 richness (see cultural diversity) supporters, 72 terminology, 618n3 Darwin, Charles, 136 vision of reality, 16 Davidson, Donald, 244, 245, 247, 623n5 See also specific topics de principiis non est diputandum, 495 deep ecology movement supporters death and dying, 131 what they stand for and believe in, 83–88 debate. See argumentation and debate; mediators deep ecology platform, 275 decentralization, 10–11, 197, 258, 317, 541–42 apron diagram, 75–81 See also centralization of power See also Eight Points of deep ecology move- decision making, 10–11, 501 ment See also argumentation and debate deepness, 21–22, 26, 42, 79 deconstruction, 559 See also shallow ecology movement deep ecological questioning. See questioning “deepness and broadness of attitude” approach, deep ecologists, 90, 618n3 21–22 what they have in common, 18–20, 57 definition, 538–40 See also Eight Points of deep ecology deforestation. See forest(s), depletion of movement Dæhlin, Knut, 161 deep ecology, 90 demand, 140, 141 a call to speak out, 35–37 democracy, 99–100 on the defensive, 33–35 depreciation, 580 definitions and meanings, 538–39, 622n1 Descartes, René, 475–77 goals, 14 “determined in its essence,” 622n3 illustrated as a derivational system, 48–49 determinism and determination, 240 for the 22nd century, 611–16 deva (god), 267 possible scenarios, 613 Devall, Bill, 230 principles, 13–20, 48 developed and undeveloped countries, 141–42, multiple roots of, 49–50 266, 270, 594–96, 600 See also Eight Points of deep ecology See also low material standard, countries with; movement poor countries; rich industrial countries reasons for a, 46–47 developers and conservers, confrontations be- terminology, 64, 187 tween, 456–57 See also specific topics developing countries, 141, 508, 564 deep ecology approach, aspects of, 14–15 development, 266 deep ecology movement, 14 centers of, 521

673 INDEX development (continued) economic globalization, 585 defined, 565, 566 See also globalization ecologically unsustainable, 141–42, 563–64, economic growth, 171 595 if-statements and exponential growth, 207–08 See also sustainability sustainable, 40, 65, 141, 563–64 environment and, 599, 603, 606 economy, mixed, 587 conflicts between, 594 ecophilosophical aspect of deep ecology move- terminological and conceptual recommen- ment, 89–90 dations regarding, 593–98 ecophilosophy, 41, 203 Diderot, Denis, 465 See also ecosophy dignity, 505 ecopolitical issues, checklist of, 208–12 Diogenes of Sinope (Diogenes in the Barrel), 139, ecopolitics, 203 140 ecosophers, 518, 557–58 diversity, 8–9, 270 ecosophical development, 563 of life forms, 18, 37–39, 99, 153, 154 Ecosophy T, 51–54, 59, 320, 636–37n2 maximum, 502–03, 533, 534 codification of, 534 vs. plurality, 532, 533 diagrams of, 53, 484–85 and realization of potentials, 292–93 diversity, complexity, and, 533 vital needs and right to reduce, 568 fundamental norm, 52 See also biodiversity; cultural diversity hypothetical assumptions of, 134 “diversity norm,” 61–62 integration of Eight Points into, 535 Diwakar, Ranganath R., 434 motivations for developing, 134 docta ignorantia (conscious ignorance), 17, 503, norms in, 310 542, 543 See also under Self-realization doomsday prophets. See ecological doomsday population issues and, 275 prophets; pessimism relieving suffering and, 135 Douglas, William O., 390 self-realization and, 488, 489 dread, 111 See also self-realization Drengson, Alan, 328 See also under Feyerabend duplication, theory of, 454–55, 460 ecosophy(ies), 11–12, 17, 59, 96–99, 232, 601 duty, 122–23, 125 See also total view(s) acting from inclination vs. from, 124, 127 ecosystemic knowledge, 96 as relational, 125 ecosystemic rights, 214 See also obligations See also rights ecosystems, 222 “Earth First!,” 201 mature, 387 ecocentrism, 406–07 respect for, 96 ecofeminism, 80, 222 noninterference with, 38–40 ecological consciousness, 86, 105 preserving, 129–30 ecological crisis, 98, 398–400, 411, 612, 615 theory of, 9–10 positive function, 92 education, 210 See also under beautiful action; politics deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 45–46 ecological doomsday prophets, 207, 603–04, 612 education campaigns, environmental, 36–37 See also pessimism See also schools ecological egalitarianism. See egalitarianism egalitarianism (biospherical), 296 ecological questioning. See questioning “Against biospherical egalitarianism” (French), ecological self, 516, 517, 520, 522, 523 547 ecologism, 12 applications of the term, 187 ecologists, 9, 207 biospherical egalitarianism in principle, 68 ecology, science of, 95 deep ecology movement and, 7–9

674 INDEX

equal rights (in principle) and, 292 environmentalists, 3–4, 450 Gandhi and, 524 who predicted environmental catastrophes “human lot” and, 186 (see ecological doomsday prophets) shallow-deep ecology spectrum and, 47 See also experts species egalitarianism in principle, 300 Enzenberger, Hans Magnus, 542–43 Spinoza and, 407 epistemology, 464 two-factor, 295 See also ignorance; scepticism ego, 526 epoché, 473 ego-realization, 488 equal right to live and blossom, 494–95 ego trips, 525, 526 equal rights, 506 egocentrism. See frames of reference equality, sameness, and rights, 67–70 Eight Points of deep ecology movement, 37–42, See also egalitarianism 220, 270, 564–65, 621n1 equity, 97 antifascist character, 93–101 essence, 630n7 elaboration and examples, 77–78 ethical obligations, 97, 98 integration into Ecosophy T, 535 ethical rules and ethical views, 311–12 revisited, 57–66 ethics, 234, 241, 242 World Conservation Strategy and, 565–67 ecosystems and, 129–30, 389–90 Einstein, Albert, 356 ontology and, 456–58 elections, 206 See also Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution; elitism, 327–28 justice; “moral acts”; specific topics empathy, 517–18 Ethics (Spinoza). See under Spinoza See also identification ethnography, 623n1 empowerment, 73 ethnology, 623n1 Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Neurath et al.), ethology, 392 479 Euclid, 399 energy consumption, 217 European Common Market (EEC), 210 energy resources, 196–97, 599–600 European philosophy and religion, 90–91 environment, 202 European Union (EU), 585–88, 602–03 economics, measurement, and, 4 evil, 112, 388, 459, 581 problems of protecting, 3–5 evolution, 136 relationship with, 14–15 exclusivity, relations of, 292 See also specific topics existentialist thinking, 463 environmental, peace, and social (justice) move- experience, 459, 471 ments, 72–73, 88, 193–94, 219–24, 236, experts 613–14 attitudes of, 151 See also peace movement role of, 178–80 environmental decisions, philosophical position See also environmentalists of persons who influence, 149–51 exploitation, 487 “environmental fascism,” 94, 100 external relation, 522 environmental ontology vs. environmental extinction, 270–71, 305–06, 330 ethics, 527 environmental philosophy facts, 18 main problem of, 237–38 farms, family richness and diversity of ultimate premises in, in Norway, 586 229–49 fascism, 93–95, 100 environmentalism, 240 See also Eight Points of deep ecology move- philosophical premises, 118–19 ment, antifascist character; Mussolini; problems with the word, 614 Nazi Germany radical, 253, 614 fascist ideas, popularity of, 24

675 INDEX feminism. See ecofeminism systematization D of, 422–28 Feyerabend, Paul, 511 application to efforts of peaceful inter- fundamental philosophies, Ecosophy T, and, national cooperation, 437–40 505–07 exemplification and elaboration, 433–37 on Lakatos, 636n2 norms and hypotheses, 428–33 as mild and green, 499–500 gas. See natural gas principle of maximum diversity and, 503 Gathering for the Creation, 168 principle of minimum interference and, Gauri Shankar, 335–36 503–05 Gautvik, Morten, 179 scientific worldviews and, 509–10 genetic relations, defined, 75 traditions and rationality, 500–02 Germany, 15 and the web of communities and its admira- See also Nazi Germany tion, 507–09 gestalt apperception, 461 first-order comments, 99 gestalt ontology fisheries, policies for, 126–27 deep ecology movement and, 460 Foreman, Dave, 100 and gestalt thinking, 235, 386, 410, 455–63 forest(s) gestalt perception, 461 depletion of, 194, 255–56, 580 gestalt principles, 9–10, 202 heart of the, 551–53 gestalt thinking See also treeline; trees defined, 463 Foundation for Deep Ecology, 603 See also gestalt ontology Fox, Warwick, 26, 60, 543 gestalt(s) frames of reference, 470 higher-order and subordinate, 556 explication of one as involving introduction of and the process of identification, 465–66 another, 473–77 global action, 40, 258–59 See also total/fundamental frames; total view(s) global attitudes. See place-corrosive process France, 15 global community, 198 Francis of Assisi, St., 382 global ecology movement, 141 free market, 585–87 “global” vs. “international,” 584 “free nature,” 259–60 globalization, 585, 602–03 free nature, darker side of, 131 See also centralization of power free society, 507 God, 382 freedom, 238, 296, 391, 409, 539, 633n8 as finite vs. infinite, 404 economic, 585–87 functions of, in Spinoza’s Ethics, 404 See also self-realization See also Spinoza, Ethics French, William C., 547, 550 identified with Nature, 383–86, 388, 389, Freud, Sigmund, 118, 518 402–04, 406, 629n3 Fromm, Erich, 518–20 See also under Spinoza, Ethics fundamental frames. See total/fundamental immanence, 383–87, 398, 401–06 frames love of, 401, 405–06, 410 fundamentalists vs. realists, 16 power of, 389 Future in Our Hands, The, 174, 177 See also deva (god) Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 235, 397, 411 Gaia hypothesis, 403, 567 Goldsmith, Edward, 65 Galtung, Johan, 73 goodness, 129–33, 388, 581–82 Gandhi, Mahatma, 60, 96, 111, 242–43 Gran, Finn, 174–75 on animal welfare, 243, 524 Grand Canyon, 3–4 biospherical egalitarianism and, 524 grassroots activism, 613–14 metaphysics, 523–25 See also activism Gandhi and Group Conflict (Naess), 636n1 Great Britain, 15 Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution, 422 See also Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution

676 INDEX

green communities, 407 human beings, intrinsic value of. See value Green economics and political theory, 605–10 human chauvinism, 47 green economies, 587 human condition, 577–79 Green movement, 64, 65 human-in-environment concept, 7 Green party program, Norwegian, 198 human rights, 96, 214, 223 basic tenets, 198 humankind, goals for, 277, 322 green philosophy and politics, 41 humility, 116 green political parties, fundamental vs. pragma- Huxley, Julian, 265 tist positions in, 197 Hveding, Vidkun, 171–72, 176 green political party programs, 30 hypocrisy. See “schizophrenia” from day to day, 217–18 hypotheses, 425 Green political theory, 95 vs. green political theory, 100–101 “I,” 517 green politics, 197–200, 203–06 idealist philosophers, 557 green-red alliances, 211 identification, 417, 517, 524 green society, 65, 83–85, 236, 256–57, 574, 616 with animals, 143, 302, 518–19 goals and characteristics, 14–15, 193–94 gestalts and the process of, 465–66 “green utopias,” 256–57 with others, 142–43, 302, 516 Green vs. green distinction, 100–101, 620n1 ideology, 480–81 Green vs. green economists, 605 ignorance Greens. See Green party program, Norwegian extending the area of one’s, 467–70 gross domestic product (GDP), 590 awareness of one’s, 468 gross national product (GNP), 569 See also docta ignorantia group struggle, ethics of. See Gandhian ethics of immigration conflict resolution ethical aspect, 284 Grue, Per Harald, 161, 165, 172 See also migration Gueroult, M., 407 India, 260 Guha, Ramachandra, 254, 255, 261 See also Gandhi guided exchange, 501 inherent value/worth. See value Innerdalen, 5 Hallen, Patsy, 525 integration, 115 Hallingskarvet, 340–41 and maturity of philosophers, 111 happiness, 22, 277, 529, 530 of personality, 114 See also joy See also wholism Hargrove, Eugene C., 241, 243 intensities vs. quantities, philosophical problem healers, 504–05 of, 286–87, 313–15 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 235, 397, 398 interference, 503–05 Heidegger, Martin, 26, 235, 240, 244–46, 463 internal relation, 522 historical research, methodology of, 395 international conflict resolution. See Gandhian history ethics of conflict resolution philosophy of, 395–96 international trade, 588 teaching, 584 International Union for Conservation of Hitler, Adolf, 135, 609 Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 36, Höibakk, Ralph, 370–72, 375, 376 39, 46 holistic medicine, 504–05 internationalism, 584 holistic thinking, 461 interpretability, multiple See also wholism use of vagueness and ambiguity to achieve, “home,” and global place-corrosive process, 486–87 339–40 intrinsic value/worth. See value homocentrism, 47, 186 intuition(s), 68–70, 147, 311, 405, 449, 544 homocentrists, 557 intuitively based announcements, 147

677 INDEX isolation and elitism, 328 Leopold, Aldo, 129, 328, 457–58 Iverson, Olav Hilmar, 176 Leopold formula, 230, 231 liberation. See freedom; self-realization James, William, 522–23 life, 8, 133, 134, 214, 567 Janzen, Daniel H., 145 happy, 277 Johnson, Lawrence, 550 (intrinsic) value of (see value) joy, 110, 402, 528 reverence for, 14, 37, 38, 133, 172 according to “pessimistic” philosophers, 111–12 right to, 67, 214, 299, 416–17 self-realization and, 293 See also animal rights Spinoza on, 112–18, 402 life community, 304 See also happiness life-forms, 94–95, 187, 320 justice, 95 interdependence and interference between, 292 opinions about facts vs. opinions about, 609–10 life quality. See quality of life life unfolding/life expansion, 489 Kamal, Lieutenant-Sabir, 372 lifestyle Kant, Immanuel, 233–35, 245, 246, 397–98, 527 deep ecology and, 105–08 on beautiful acts/actions, 54, 61, 121–27, 516 of environmentalists, 110 critical philosophy of, 121 linguistics, 248 ethics, 248 See also language(s) Kantian interpretation of Spinoza, 397–98 listening to opponent’s argument, 16 karamayogi, 425 Little Hans, 3 Karim, Abdul, 371–74, 378 “Live and let live,” 136, 185, 302–03, 329, 489, 505 Karim, Safdul, 374, 378 living beings, 309, 567 Kåsa, Erik, 169, 170, 173–74 See also specific topics Kathmandu, Nepal, 581 Lloyd, Genevieve, 238 Katzner, Kenneth, 248–49, 268, 269 local autonomy, 10–11 KiÊr, Johan, 357 logic, 18 Kierkegaard, Soren, 105, 111, 145, 241, 472, 474, 507 logical relations, defined, 75 Knauth, Professor, 372 Longergan, Bernard J., 635n1 knowing, 473 love, 417 See also ignorance of oneself, 518 knowledge, 16–17, 112, 471 types of, 400–401, 405 See also ignorance low material standard, countries with (L’s), 270, Koestler, Arthur, 480 597–98, 603 Kristiansen, Kåre, 167, 169, 171 See also developed and undeveloped countries; Kropotkin, Peter, 95, 552 Third World Kuhn, Thomas S., 229 Kvaloy, Sigmund, 41 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 247–48 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 212–13 L-formulation, 129–30 Malthusianism, 212–13 Lackner, Stephan, 133, 411–12 Mannheim, Karl, 481 Lakatos, Imre Marx, Karl, 109 as fellow anarchist, 636n2 Masai, 260–61 lamentation, 272 masculinity, power, and conquest, 278 land and sea ethics, deep vs. shallow ecological Masson-Oursel, Paul, 246 approach to, 45 mathematics, 583 language(s), 246–48, 268–69, 623n5 matter, 633–34n2 See also translation maturity Lapps, 507, 521 comprehensive, 515–16 Lebow, Victor, 578–79 of the self, 516

678 INDEX

“Maximum fulfillment of life potentials,” 505 “Self-realization,” 60 McCloskey, Henry John, 214, 299–300 “Spinoza and Ecology,” 622n1, 631n10 means and ends, 426 “The deep ecology movement,” 22 mediators, need for, 609 national identity, 210 medicine, natural, 504–05 natural gas, 196–97, 599–600 Mediterranean, 15 “natural greens,” 15 Meeker, Joseph, 41 natural law, 164, 387–88 metaphysics, 320 natural medicine, 504–05 methodology natural objects, projection of personal traits onto, hard and soft, 483–84, 497 581–82 of historical research, 395 natural resources. See energy resources; resources mice, mountain, 345–46 Natural Right, philosophy of, 390 migration Nature, 134, 527–28 and ecological unsustainability, 283–89 perfection of, 386–87, 411 from poor to rich countries, how to reduce, See also under God; Spinoza 287–88 nature, 3, 155, 559–60 Milbrath, Lester W., 150 “cult of nature,” 134 Miller, G. Tyler, 41, 51 getting people to see reality in relation to, 16 minimal interference, principle of, 503–05 inherent value of, 134, 152–55, 244, 560 minorities, 272 experts’ views on, 156–77 modern cultures, 578 See also value modesty, intellectual, 467–68 man-nature relations, 90 monism, 239, 242 philosophies of, in harmony with sane ecopo- “moral acts” litical outlook, 381 vs. “beautiful acts,” 61, 121–22, 527 principle of minimal interference with, 503–05 moral law and, 526–27 projection into, 557 moral world order, 387 respect for, 14, 37, 38, 134, 150 Mount Saint Helens, 196 “romantic attitude” toward, 162–63 mountaineering in Norway suffering and, 134–35 ethical considerations with a view to, 361–64 See also specific topics See also Tvergastein, climbing Nature-as-creative, 402–03 mountains, 335–36, 573 nature mysticism, 50, 59 modesty and the conquest of, 365–68 Nazi Germany, 223, 265, 609–10 movements, 613–14 Nazi occupation of Norway, 288 See also “alternative (future)” movements; need(s), 140–41 environmental, peace, and social (justice) vs. demand, 140, 141, 206 movements See also vital needs Müller, Oluf C., 180 neither-nor and the both-and answers, 449–50 Mussolini, Benito, 277–78 neocolonialism, 271 mutual aid, 95 Nepal Mysterud, Ivar, 130, 231, 548 destruction of, 580–81 letter to king of, 335–36 Naess, Arne Dekke Eide Nirvana, 116 lifestyle, 350–51 nobility, 123 as optimist, 596, 611–12 nominalism, 456 psychological and social determiners of his nonviolence, 100, 421, 597 philosophy, 350–51 ethics of, 421, 437 writings research suggestions regarding application “Deepness of Questions,” 617n1 of, 440–43 Gandhi and Group Conflict, 636n1 writings on, 443

679 INDEX nonviolence (continued) See also norms Gandhian form of, 16, 100 optimism, 27, 87, 609 See also Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution; overpopulation and overcrowding, 214, 601, 607 satyagraha See also population Nonviolence in Peace and War (Gandhi), 422 Øye ,Ivar, 173 normative systems, 490 preponderance of nonnormatives in, 492–93 Paasche, Eystein, 162 role of social and political contexts, 490–91 pain. See suffering norms, 135, 232–33, 241, 271 parasitism, 130, 131, 533 in Ecosophy T, 310 passivity, 112, 113, 409 “hypotheses” and, 484–90 Passmore, John, 297, 457 internalization of, 125 peace movement, 202 lower (derived), 486 campaigns of deep ecology movement and, ultimate, 493–95 214–16 rational policies rest on, 310–13 See also environmental, peace, and social values and, 181–82 (justice) movements; Gandhian ethics See also “compassion priority norm” of conflict resolution; nonviolence North American Treaty Organization (NATO), peace organizations, 223 215 peaceful communities, 416 Norton, Bryan G., 231 peaceful cooperation, social science contributions Norum, Kaare R., 165 to questions of, 443–45 Norway pecking-order law, 509 consumption of natural resources, 167 perfection, 115, 277, 278, 402, 459, 630n8, 631n10 Nazi occupation, 288 of God, 401–02 oil and gas resources, 599 of Nature, 386–87, 411 wild-animal “management,” 296–97 See also integration See also specific topics perseveration/perseverare, 412–14, 520, 632n7 Norwegian policies, as hostile toward environ- See also self-preservation ment, 149 Personal Place and Person-Place, 352 Norwegian Society for the Conservation of personification of natural objects, 581–82 Nature (NNV), 331–32 perspectivism, 458–60 Norwegians, 595 pessimism, 27, 87, 612 attitudes toward environment, 595 pesticides, 28 nuclear power. See antinuclear campaign philosophers, 146 Nuyen, A. T., 244 idealist, 557 maturity and integration, 111 objectivity, 449 philosophical approaches obligations, 141 deep ecologists with different, 18 See also duty points agreed upon by various, 18–20, 57 oceanic feeling, 94 philosophical relativism, 506 Ødegaard, Hans Chr., 157–59, 180 philosophical schools, 121, 221 Oelschlaeger, Max, 230 philosophy Oftedal, Per, 159, 164, 166, 168, 173, 178 history of, 395–97, 408 oil, 599–600 vs. movement, 42 Økland, Jan, 166 origin of the term, 306 oneness. See oceanic feeling; symbiosis pity, 117 ontology, 634n4 place-corrosive process, global, 339–40 Opdal, Anders, 370–72, 376 Plato, 180, 472 open exchange, 501 pleasure, 277, 529, 530 opinions, 493 pluralism, 242

680 INDEX

plurality, 263, 531, 532 primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities, 452– vs. diversity, 532, 533 54 polarization of conflicting views, 609 problematizing, 22, 28–29 policies, ecological “profound,” 22 universalizability, 30 projection, theory of, 452–53 See also environmental decisions proof, 18 policy change, need for, 19, 38, 40 proofs, teaching mathematical, 583 political decisions, green relevance of all, 206 property. See land and sea ethics political issues, deep ecology and big, 216–17 Protagoras, 450, 633–34nn2 political relativism, 506 psychoanalytic theory, 518 political triangle, poles of public opinions, 493 and limitations of triangular analysis, 203–06 See also norms political voluntarism, 217 purna swaraj, 435 politics, 29 and the ecological crisis, 191–200 quality of life, 19–20, 38, 39, 41, 310 pollution, 9, 17 vs. self-realization, 137, 626–27n13 deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 42–43 vs. standard of living, 153, 173–76, 179–80, politics of, 209, 210 202 See also carbon dioxide production See also value (inherent/intrinsic) poor countries, 572, 594–96, 599 quantities vs. intensities, philosophical problem emigration from rich countries to, 283 of, 286–87, 313–15 See also developed and undeveloped countries; questioning, 22–26, 28–29 low material standard, countries with (L’s) deep, 38, 49 population, 201, 608–09 questionnaires, methodology of, 483 carrying capacity of Earth and, 569–70 questions, deep, 23–26, 29 deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 43–44 flourishing of life and, 19, 270, 624n5 radicalism, 614 if-statements and exponential growth, 207–08 ranking, 548 See also Malthusianism; overpopulation rational grounding, 182 population factor, 569–72 rationalism, 117, 502 population pressure, 600–601, 607–08 rationality, 49, 391, 502 population reduction, 62, 154–55, 201, 270 Rawls, John, 95, 601 ecosophical view of, 275–79 realism, 91, 527 period of transition in rich countries, reality. See abstract structures (of reality) 279–81 reason, 406 “productive” and “unproductive” people, Reed, Peter, 177 economics, and, 280 “reforestation” projects, 558, 591 postindustrial societies, 588 reform ecology movement. See shallow ecology postmodern cultures, 578 movement potentialities of realization, 292–93, 295, 505 reform vs. revolution, 216 See also self-realization potentials refugees, 284, 287–89 potentials, 531 Regan, Tom, 298–99 poverty, 572, 607 relata, 451, 523 See also poor countries relationalism, 506 power, 115, 389, 412, 416 relativism, 506 See also perseveration/perseverare religions precizations, 99, 486–87 of deep ecologists, 18, 50 premises points agreed upon by various, 18–20, 57 and conclusions, 399–400 See also apron diagram deepness of, 21 religious leaders and the environment, 29

681 INDEX research and researchers, 16–17 Schreiner, Per, 164, 170, 174, 181 resource depletion, 9 Schweitzer, Albert, 397 resources science, 449 deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 43 political function, 211 fair distribution and profit from nonrenewable, scientific enterprise, deep vs. shallow ecological 597–605 approach to, 45–46 respect, 97 scientific influence, factors in ecopolitics operat- responsibility, ethics of, 9 ing against, 211–12 rhetoric, 80 scientific worldviews, absence of any, 509–10 See also argumentation and debate; deep scientists, earth ecology, on the defensive; nonviolence, why they avoid propagating their views, 327 Gandhian form of Self, 524, 531 rich industrial countries (R’s), 270, 597–99, 603 See also atman See also developed and undeveloped countries self, 515 “Rich life with simple means!”, 406 internal and external relations, 521–23 rich-to-poor emigration, 283, 288 psychology of the, 521–23 richness, 127, 153, 154, 196, 543, 568, 595 See also “I” See also cultural diversity self-acceptance and self-respect, lack of, 113–14, 116 rights, 62, 389–90 self-defense, 522 ecosystemic, 214 self-destructiveness, convergence of three areas of living beings, 213 of, 219–20 moral capacities and, 299–300 self-determination, 293–94, 508 moral capacity as necessary for, 299–300 self-expression, 390, 489 natural, 495 self-interest, 489, 519 nature of, 329 self-love, 518, 519 “no right to,” 62 self-preservation, 272, 389, 412–13, 489 obligations as requirement for, 62, 614 See also perseveration/perseverare Rodman, John, 41 Self-realization, 320, 488 role models. See lifestyle, of environmentalists diversity, complexity, symbiosis, and, 531–34 Romanticism, European, 90, 91 maximum, 52, 620n1 Rothenberg, David, 26 as norm of Ecosophy T, 52, 53, 137, 222, 231 rules as ultimate goal, 278 fundamental, 311–12 self-realization, 135, 320 types of, 311–12 an ecological approach to being in the world, 516, 519–30 Sahlins, Marshall, 91–92, 264 complete/maximum, 532, 533 Sami language, 268 concept of self and, 172, 320 Sami people, 259, 267 exploitation, coercion, and, 8, 119 Sarvam dharmam nihsvabbavam, 451 Gandhi on, 523–26 satyagraha, 423, 435–36, 438–40 and identification with others, 52–53 Scandanavia, 15 interpretations of, 488–90 scepticism, 473–74 joy, suffering, and, 293 higher-order, 470–73 levels of, 222–23, 389 Schilling, Friedrich, 381 in self and others, 137 Schilpp, P. A., 356 vs. life quality, 137, 626–27n13 “schizophrenia,” 330–31, 602 in mixed communities of humans and animals, schools 291–300 green, 210 pleasure, happiness, and, 528–30 teaching about environment, 125–26 rationality and, 391 Western, and European unity, 583–88 right to, 119, 494

682 INDEX

self-preservation and, 389 Socrates, 52, 470 self-realization potentials, 531–33, 620n1 Somalis, 283–84 See also potentialities of realization sorrow. See commiseration self-subsistence, 622n1 Soulé, Michael, 224, 316–17, 325–27 sentences species, 95 function of one-word sentences and other ranking, 548 utterances, 487–88 species egalitarianism. See egalitarianism understanding their meaning, 627n15 (biospherical) Sessions, George, 230, 541 Spinoza, Benedict de, 76–77, 293, 476–78, 530, Sextus Empiricus, 450, 537, 633–34nn2 629n3, 631n16 Shah, Wazir Ali, 371 accounts of human nature, 295–96 shallow ecologist, 618n3 on animal rights, 416 shallow ecology movement, 170 on animals, 631n15 anthropocentrism/homocentrism, 186 antimoralist attitude, 415 vs. deep ecology movement, 7–11, 16, 17, 28– and attitudes toward Nature, 381–94, 411 30, 89, 155, 192, 202–03, 620n1 on causa, 239–40 See also Green vs. green distinction; shal- and deep ecology movement, 239, 396–419, low vs. deep ecology 622n1 impact on governmental level, 220 environmental ethics and, 239 main complaint against, 51 ethics, 300 shallow vs. deep ecology, 42–47 Kant’s ethics and, 248 See also shallow ecology movement, vs. deep Ethics, 248, 392, 406, 416, 418, 629nn1–4, ecology movement 631n11, 632nn17–2, 633n8 sheep, 295, 296–98, 301–02, 548–50 account of free human beings, 296 See also under animals apparent inconsistencies in, 400 skepticism. See scepticism argumentation in, 419 Smart, J. J. C., 452 conservare and perseverare, 412, 413, 632n7 Smith, Mick, 560 Ecosophy T and, 489 Smuts, General, 436 English translations of, 246 snakes, 317–18 “God or Nature,” 137, 383, 385, 402–06 Snyder, Gary, 230, 242, 245, 251–53 methodology, 478 social Darwinism, 295 nature and, 399 social ecology movement, 601 spiritual genesis of fifth part of, 400–403 See also ecosophy(ies) as supreme synthesis, 478 social economics, 160–61 terminology, 400–402, 414–15, 419 social epistemology, 464 total view outlined in, 399 “social greens,” 15 on God, 383–86, 400–402, 406 social injustice as violence, 73 interpretations of, 235, 238–39 social justice, 193–94 history of, 397–98 sustainable development, cultural diversity, Jewish faith, 403 and, 572–75 on joy, 112–18, 402 social (justice) movement(s). See environmental, on lamentation and emotional epistemology, peace, and social (justice) movements 272 social justice organizations, 223 metaphysics, 238–39 social science action research, 496–97 total view, 247, 399, 410–11 socialism, 216 Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding, 478 society “Spinoza and Ecology” (Naess), 622n1, 631n10 in dynamic ecological equilibrium, 381 Spinozist, Kantian, Heideggerian, and White- “no way back” to old forms of, 588–91 headian character (S-K-H-W) premises, sociobiology, 265 245, 246

683 INDEX

Spinozistic social utopia, 633n8 Tasmanian devil, 303 Spirit, 382 Taylor, Paul, 547 spiritual world order, 382 teamwork, 495–96 spontaneous experience, 461, 464–66 technocracies. See arguing from first principles forests and, 552, 553 technology(ies), 41, 83–86 Sprigge, T. L. S., 300, 459–60 deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 44 Stammberger, Fritz, 373 soft, 85 standard of living, 572 See also quality of life, vs. standard of living vs. quality of life, 153, 173–76, 179–80, 202 Tennyson, Alfred, 136 “statement,” 627n15 “Think globally, act globally,” 259 stress, 123 Third World, 98, 142, 145, 327, 603, 606 structural violence, 73 migration problems, 286 subcultures, 272, 504 wilderness, deep ecology, and, 251–62 See also communities See also low material standard, countries with; subject-object cleavage, spontaneous experience migration without, 455–56 Third World communities, environmental subject-object distinction, 454–55 concerns of, 260 substantia (substance), 239–40, 246, 247 Thonstad, Tore, 625n4 suffering, 285, 287, 293, 626n11 Thoreau, Henry David, 134 in nature, whether or not to relieve, 129–37 Tirich Mir East, 369–72 norms about, 308–10, 313–14 South Wall of, 369–78 of other, identification with, 302–03 torture, 97 quantity, quality, and experience of, 313–14 total-field image, 7 Sundby, Per, 181–83 total/fundamental frames superego, 352 explication of, 470–73 sustainability, ecological, 83, 84, 595–96, 612–14 genesis of the belief in the possibility of, classes of unsustainability, 195–97 479–82 goal of full, 578 paradoxes of, 477–79 integral approach, 139–48 See also frames of reference meaning, 565–66 total view(s), 17, 51, 59, 200, 231, 472 “narrow” vs. “wide,” 65, 257–58 ecosophies as, 97, 238 as our “way back,” 588–91 inspired by ecological crisis, 411 politics and, 193–95 nature of, 399 poverty and, 607 population issues and, 275, 279 promoting beautiful actions in the fight for, preconscious, 477–79 125–26 of Spinoza, 247, 399, 410–11 soft technologies and, 85 See also ecosophy(ies); wolf policies See also development, ecologically unsustainable “totalitarian” disposition, 478 sustainable development, 140, 141, 563–64 totalitarianism. See Eight Points of deep ecology See also under social justice movement, antifascist character sustainable economic growth and progress, 40, totus, 630n6 65, 141, 563–64 trade, international, 588 swaraj, 435 translation, 246–47, 267–68 Sweden, 288 trash, disposal of, 352–53 symbiosis, 8, 9, 52, 53, 389, 489, 533, 534 treeline, metaphysics of the, 555–58 See also oceanic feeling trees, relationship with, 14–15 System, 474 trust and mistrust, 430 systems thinking, 12, 461 truth, 429 See also ecosystems, theory of Tveit, Jon, 160, 163, 173, 176–77, 179 Tvergastein, 340 Taoism, 50 amateur research at, 355–59

684 INDEX

animals, 345–47 virtue, 267, 410, 412, 415 climbing, 354–55 vital needs (and vital interests), 62, 67–68 flowers, 342–45 vs. “needs,” 140–41, 154, 161–62, 319 genesis of a place-person, 347–48 rights and, 567–69 geography, 340–42 satisfying “wants” vs., 586 human life at, 349–54 vagueness regarding the term, 39 voting, 206 ultimate norms, 310–13 ultimate premises, 79 Walsby, H., 480–81 See also under environmental philosophy war. See peace movement ultimate source, 471 Watt, James, 79–80 understanding, 411, 631–32n16 whales, 595 unemployment, 605 whaling, response to Norwegian environmental United Nations, 599–600 group’s support for, 331–34 United States, northwestern, 15 Whitehead, Alfred North, 237, 240, 245, 246, unity. See oceanic feeling; symbiosis 453, 582 universalizability, norm of, 195 wholism, 94 urban areas and nonurbanized personal places, 350 See also integration urbanization, 254 Whorfian approach, 246 utilitarianism, 293, 567 wilderness areas, 109–10 utopia(s) Wilson, E. O., 265 green, 256–57 Wingård, Bo, 163, 166–67, 173, 174, 177 Spinozistic social, 633n8 wisdom, 306, 563 wolf policies, 301–02 Vaihinger, Hans, 243 norms, 310–13, 317–19 Valhalla of the Vikings, 504 about suffering, 309–10, 313–14 value (inherent/intrinsic), 18, 37, 38, 95 protection of sheep against suffering, 313–15 of all human beings, 97, 99 protection of wolves as members of mixed of all living beings communities, 315–21 Norwegians on, 330 reflect philosophies as total views, 306–08 as self-evident, 80 respect for international agreements, 321–23 conservation efforts and, 276 ultimate norms and, 310–13 gradations of, 97–98 Wolff, Robert Paul, 476 identification and attribution of, 417 Wolfson, Harry Austryn, 400–401 intolerance, discrimination, and, 99 wolves, 548–50, 627n17, 628n25 intrinsic value vs. inherent value/worth, 61 danger of extinction, 305–06 justifiability of views on, 181–83 dignity, 321 of natural world, 237 world conservation strategy, 574 vs. nonliving entities as having value only as World Conservation Strategy, 36, 39, 46, 158, 216 means, 4–5, 202 World Conservation Strategy (WCS) ranking and grading of, 549 deep ecology and, 564–68 See also animals; quality of life World Ecological Strategy, 283 value priorities, 114, 308 world order VanDeVeer, Donald, 295 moral, 387 views, 478 spiritual, 382 See also frames of reference; total view(s) Wyld, Henry Cecil Kennedy, 413 Vigerust, Per, 370–71 violence Yellow Cheese (Gulosten), 223 definitions and meanings of, 425–26 See also nonviolence Zapffe, Peter Wessel, 133 effects of, 427 zoning and protection zones, 256

685 Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore- most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy, Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights, and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarly work and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations of science, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestalt ontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have been honored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den- mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ- ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace. Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Paris and Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor- ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to 1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist, and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University of Oslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The Arne Naess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established at the university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s work and ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issues and the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that will help to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainability. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He is also an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe- gian Tourist Association. In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have been translated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies and journals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, including Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the first to climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling- skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting upon and relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His respect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

687 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Bill Devall, Ph.D. is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Humboldt State University, Arcata, California. He is the author of numerous books on deep ecology, including Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered and Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology. He was also editor-in-chief of Clearcut: The Tragedy of Industrial Forestry. He has written numerous articles on the deep, long-range ecology movement and has been a conservation activist in many wilderness issues.

George Sessions is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Sierra College in Rocklin, California. He is co-author, with Bill Devall, of Deep Ecology: Liv- ing as if Nature Mattered and editor of Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Read- ings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism. He has been a lifelong mountain climber who began his research in the area of ecological philosophy in 1968.

688 Comprehensive Bibliography of Arne Naess’s Works in English

651 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

652 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

653 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

654 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

655 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

656 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

657 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

658 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

659 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

660 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

661 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

662 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

663 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

664 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

665 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

666 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

667 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

1999d. “The principle of intensity.” Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 5–9. (in SWAN VIII) 2000. “Avalanches as social constructions.” Environmental Ethics 22 (Fall): 335–36. (in SWAN X)

668 COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

669 Index

672 INDEX

674 INDEX

676 INDEX

678 INDEX

680 INDEX

682 INDEX

683 INDEX

684 INDEX

687 the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the spirit of his work. Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

688 Designed by Tamotsu Yagi Design Composed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3 Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2 Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922