The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan : a Memoir
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USAF WARRIOR STUDIES Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan General Editors USAF WARRIOR STUDIES Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, edited by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, 1983 GPO Stock # 008-070-0489-5 The Command of the Air, by Guilio Douhet, New Imprint, 1983 GPO Stock # 008-070-0505-1 Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations, 1984 GPO Stock # 008-070-0513-1 The Literature ofAeronautics, Astronautics, and Air Power, by Richard P. Hallion, 1984 GPO Stock # 008-070-0523-9 Over the Hump, by William H. Tunner, New Imprint, 1985 Available to Air Force agencies only from the Office of Air Force History Air Interdiction in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, edited by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, 1986 GPO Stock # 008-070-00571-9 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 THE STRATEGIC AIR WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND JAPAN A MEMOIR Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. Major General, USAF, Retired OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C., 1986 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hansell, Haywood S. The strategic air war against Germany and Japan. (USAF warrior studies) Bibliography: p. 295 Includes index. 1. Hansell, Haywood S. 2. World War, 1939-1945- Aerial operations, American. 3. Japan-History -Bom- bardment, 1944-1945. 4. Germany -History -Bombard- ment, 1940-1945. 5. World War, 1939-1 945 -Personal narratives, American. 6. Strategy. 7. Japan- Strategic aspects. 8. Germany -Strategic aspects. I. Title. II. Series. D790.H264 1986 940.54’4973’0924 [B] 86-23749 ISBN 0-912799-39-0 Project Warrior Studies are published by the Office of Air Force History. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 Foreword The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan is part of a continuing series of historical volumes produced by the Office of Air Force History in direct support of Project Warrior. Since its beginnings in 1982, Project Warrior has captured the imagination of Air Force people around the world and reawakened a keener appreciation of our fundamental purpose as a Service: to deter war, but to be prepared to fight and win should deterrence fail. Military history helps provide a realistic perspective on warfare. Through the study of past events, we gain insight into the capabilities of armed forces and, most importantly, a sound knowledge of the policies, strategies, tactics, doctrine, leadership, and weapons that have produced success in battle. Each of us, in broadening our knowledge of air power’s past, helps to maintain the most effective Air Force possible, now and in the future. LARRY D. WELCH, General, USAF Chief of Staff United States Air Force Historical Advisory Committee (As of January 1, 1986) Mr. DeWitt S. Copp Dr. Haskell M. Monroe, Jr. The Voice of America University of Texas at El Paso Dr. Phillip A. Crowl Lt. Gen. Thomas C. Richards, Annapolis, Maryland USAF Commander, Air University Dr. Warren W. Hassler, Jr. Gen. Thomas M. Ryan, Jr. Pennsylvania State University USAF, Retired Brig. Gen. Harris B. Hull Lt. Gen. Winfield W. Scott, Jr. USAF, Retired USAF National Aeronautics and Superintendent, USAF Academy Space Administration Dr. Alfred F. Hurley (Chairman) Mr. Eugene R. Sullivan Brig. Gen., USAF, Retired The General Counsel, USAF North Texas State University Preface The history of American air power is very short indeed. Military and naval histories span thousands of years. Military aviation history is encompassed in the lifetime of a single individual. The birth of powered flight is coincident with my own. In 1912 I got my first glimpse of an airplane. I was standing on the fairgrounds of the annual carnival in Manila, Philippine Islands, when a biplane beat its slow pace across the sky. An aged Filipino standing nearby said, in astonishment, “\Muy grande polloV or “Very large chicken!” As a boy of nine I was in full agreement. I mention this only to make a point. Military conflict on land and sea has been exhaustively reported and analyzed for centuries. The processes are well understood. The general principles have been distilled and tested. The experience and history of air war are in their infancy. They are measured in a few decades, actually in the span of my own lifetime. There has been only one major conflict involving application of air power on a grand scale. And yet that air experience has had a profound impact upon war, and upon nations in competition and conflict short of major war. The impact of space power has no history at all, but that impact may be even greater than the impact of atmospheric air power. There is dispute over the relative merits of historical experience and of abstract logic in the development of effective combat forces. Military aviation strategists must make the best of very limited historical experience and derive requirements based upon logic and forecast. This book seeks to recount the air experience and development vii before World War II, to describe the objectives, plans and effects of strategic air warfare in Europe and in the Pacific, and to offer criticism, opinion, and lessons of that great conflict. In retrospect I find that I have been singularly fortunate in my associations and assignments. I have been associated with many great men and have been in position to observe great events. In the decade before World War II, I had a priceless opportunity to work with Bob Olds, Harold Lee George, Ken Walker, Don Wilson, and Muir “Santy” Fairchild, under the guidance, inspiration, and benign protection of the Commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Col. John F. Curry. My associates also included Ira C. Eaker, who combined great ability as a staff executive with superlative leadership as Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force in England. I worked under that superb airman, Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. I was caught up in the dedication and driving spirit of Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Air Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force. And I had the special privilege of working for the greatest soldier of our day, and perhaps of any day, a man of superb integrity and highest character: Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Catlett Marshall. The observations contained in this book constitute a memoir, with all the shortcomings of faulty memory, bias, personal viewpoint, personal experience, and inadequate research that are implied in the term. They lead to speculation on probable results of alternative actions or conditions, and that speculation is likewise suspect because it reflects personal judgment. But the compendium may lead others to derive lessons and conclusions which fit into a broader mosaic. viii This work does not, of course, aspire to the dignity of “history.” Participants are notoriously poor historical observers. Participation induces bias. But there should be some limited value to the viewpoint of participants—if their opinions are properly screened to eliminate prejudice. After all, there is some virtue in the observation of the poet who wrote: The experts sit in serried rows And fill the Plaza Toros full. But only one there is who knows And he’s the one who fights the bull. These memoirs will not earn the “bull’s ear,” but the perspective is that of an aged matador. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. Hilton Head, South Carolina IX Acknowledgments Since this is a personal memoir, I acknowledge my indebtedness on two scores: to those who shaped the perspective through which I viewed the events described in this book; and to those who helped in the preparation of the book itself. My perspective and outlook were deeply influenced by my first commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr, who prior to the war served with the 2d Bombardment Group at Langley Field. He impressed me as a dynamic and charismatic leader who imbued his outfit with his own integrity, devotion, and patriotic loyalty to the Air Corps. I owe a debt of admiration to Brig. Gen. Kenneth N. Walker for his enthusiasm and his faith in bombardment; to Lt. Gen. Harold L. George, whose perceptive prewar inquiry into the basic purpose and nature of strategic air warfare colored my outlook for the rest of my military career; to Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson for his method of logical research into fundamental target systems; to Gen. Muir S. Fairchild for his thoughtful approach to and appraisal of military philosophy, particularly as it pertains to strategic air warfare; to Gen. Ira C. Eaker for his dedication to performance as Executive to Gen. Henry H. Arnold, and as Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, for his courage and steadfastness of character in the harrowing first years of the great trial of the Eighth Air Force in combat. His dedication to the Air Force knows no equal. My outlook upon strategic planning and the conduct of air warfare was influenced by my service under Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz and my admiration for his example of calm, courageous common sense and good judgment. And, I pay tribute to x — two great commanders for whom I worked and whose achievements through signally different methods—I came to admire: General of the Army George C. Marshall, the epitome of integrity and cool dedication; and General of the Army Air Forces Henry H.