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The views expressed herein are those of the author andare not to be construed as representing the opinions of the UnitedStates Air Force, the Department of Defense, BY or any other governmentalagency. Published under the auspicesof the Airpower Research Institute, Air War College, Maj Gen Haywood Hansell, MaxwellAir Force Base, Aillbama, 1980 S. Jr.

0905 USAF, Retired

For sale h.\· thl" ::illl)prtlitelldent of Documents, U.S. GOl'ernment Printing O.IBce Wuhlolltton, D.C. 2

HENRY H. "HAP" ARNOLD The General H. H. "Hap" Arnold B-29 Assigned to the 58th Wing Air Member United States Joint Chiefs of Staff XXIst Bomber Command Commanding General US Army Air Forces Twentieth Air Force Commanding General Twentieth Air Force Tinian, Mariana Islands

"Fully recognizing the indispensable contribution of other arms, I feel that air power's part may fairly be called decisive. The collapse of Japan has vindicated tbe whole strategic concept of the offensive phase of the Pacific war.-No invasion was necessary."

General Arnold's report to the Secretary of War, 12 November 1945

ii Foreword

IN HIS PREFACE, Hansell admits that prejudice and a natural tendency toward self-defense may have crept into this book. In my judgment, there is less prejudice apparent in his work than in most of the personaldiaries written by leaders and participantsin World War II. In fact, he has been unusually generous toward fellow participants in the historical review of the incidents he relates.

Strategic Air War I believe Hansell's opportunity to review the Against Japan was unique. Few leaders in any conflict have had the opportunity to participate in the plan for a campaign, in its execution in combat, and in a review of the success or failure of the plans and operations. "Possum" Hansell not only had this rare opportunity, but fortunately for US Air Force history, he had the analytical ability, the writing capability, and the all-important industry to accomplish this significant task in superlative fashion.

As a student at the Air Corps Thctical School in 1935, I first became acquainted with Hansell when he was an instructor there. I formed a high opinion of the quality and originality of his work at that time, as I did of the talent of Capt Harold George and Lts Larry Kuter and Kenneth Walker and other members of the faculty. I was also well acquainted with their superior work as planners who produced AW PD-I and AW PD-42, which proved remarkably accurate forecasts of the air resources needed to defeat Hilier and the Japanese warlords.

When General H. H. Arnold sent Hansell and Kuter to the United Kingdom to get them operational experience,he said to General Spaatz and me that he could only leave them for a limited period as he would undoubtedly need their services in Washington on the Air Staff or in some other theater within the year.

IN MEMORY OF KENNETH N. WALKER Hansell had a vast and varied experience which uniquely qualifies him for t)lis task. He was, Brig Gen US Army Air Forces successively, a wing and air division commander in the Eighth Air Force in the United Bombardment Instructor The Air Corps Tactical School Kingdom and a bomber commander in the Pacific. He helped to prepare the air plan for each Maxwell Field, Alabama theater. He also is the author of previous books and lectures on the results of the air campaigns Commanding General Vth Bomber Command of World War II, the most significant of which is titled, TheAir Plan ThatDefeated Hitler. His Fifth Air Force book analyzing the US Strategic Bombing Survey is an authoritative text widely used in all war Lost in combat while l�ding a formation of colleges today. He has had a distinguished career as air planner, as air combat leader, and now B-17 bombers" "er Rabaul as air historian. We have had many great leaders in each of these areas, but I cannot name one 6 January 1943 so respected in all. Congressional Medal of Honor

"A well organized, well planned and well executed bomber attack I The student or historian who studies this book will probably be impressed, as I was, by the once launched, can not be stopped." logical organization of the material in three parts: Part I, Prelude to Strategic Air War 1918-1943; Part II, Strategic War Against Japan; and Part III, Observations in Retrospect.

Part II, Strategic War Against Japan was of greatest value to me since all my operational experience was in Europe with the US Eighth.Air Force out of the United Kingdom and with the Mediterranean Allied Air Force as commander with headquarters in Caserta, Italy. Of iv these observations where we had an equal opportunity to observe the air war unfold, his memory and analyses coincide in general with my own.

It Pan Retrospect where our experiences and conclusions di�er in is in III, Observations in . some respects. For example, General Hansell queries why we advoca«:d daylight bombmg of Euro , point targets, such as aircraft factories, generally fon;wearing populatlOn cent"'".' 10 � whereas we attacked area targets and civilian populations in Japan. I have no dIfficulty WIth this differing air strategy between Germany and Japan.

In Germany, factories and workmen were housed in brick buildings that were not easily Acknowledgements burnable and that required great accuracy to locate and destroy. On the other hand, in Japan, much of the wartime industry and war supportive labor were in paper buildings, ideal for incendiary attack.

There was also different treatment of our prisoners in the two situations. The Germans SINCE this is a personal memoir, I acknowledge my indebtedness on two scores: to those who treated our prisoners humanely as the signed international agreements required. They also shaped the pen;pective through which I viewed the events described in this book; and to those permitted the International Red Cross to inspect and report on prisoner conditions. Japan, on who helped in the preparation the book itself. the other hand, treatedprisonen;;nhumanely, permitted no inspections, nor made or permitted of any reports. My perspective and outlook were deeply influenced by my fIrSt commanding officer, Ml\i Those acquainted with the death march from Bataan had little concern about killing Hugh Knerr of the Second Bombardment Group at Langley Field. He impressed me as a Japanese,military or civilians. The main consideration was to end the war as soonas possible in dynamic and charismatic leader who imbued his outfit with his own integrity, devotion, and order to stop casualties on both sides. Reliable intelligence sources indicated that the morale of patriotic loyalty to the Air Corps. lowe. debt of admiration to Capt Kenneth Walker for his the Japanese people was greatly affected by the burning of their cities and the loss of their enthusiasm and his faith in bombardment; to Lt Col Harold George for his perceptive inquiry industries. into thebasic purposeand nature of strategic air warfare, which colored my outlook for the rest of my military career; to Maj Don Wilson for his method of logical research into fundamental Hansell also says in this book that General Arnold questioned dropping the atomic bombs. target systems; to Lt Col Muir Fairchild for his thoughtful approach to and appraisal of military With this I disagree. Both he and General Spaatz said it would not be necessary to drop the philosophy, panicularly as it pertains to strategic air warfare; to Lt Col Ira C. Eaker for his atom bomb to secure Japanese capitulation without Army invasion of the home island. But dedication to performance as Executive to General Henry H. Arnold, and as Commanding each said that it might aid Emperor in overcoming the warlords' opposition to surrender. the General, Eighth Air Force for his courage and steadfastness of character in the harrowing first Also, they thought there might be other considerations. And each said to me, postwar,that they yean; of the great trial of the Eighth Air Force in combat. His dedication to the Air Force considered it fortuitous that we did drop them and prove their awesomedestructive power, thus knows no equal. My outlook upon strategic planning and the conduct of air warfare was serving as a factor in preserving peace and freedom from nonnuclear war, post-World War II. influenced by my service under Lt Gen Carl "Tooey" Spaatz and my admiration for his example of calm, courageous common sense and good judgment. And, I pay tribute to two great It was also General Spaatz, at that time the StrategicAir Commander in the Pacific, who was commanders for whom I worked and whose achievements-through signally different charged by President Truman withdropping the atomic bombs. methods-I came to admire: General of the Army, George C. Marshall, the epitome of integrity and cool dedication; and General of the Army, Henry H. Arnold, whose dynamism drove men General Hansell and I often appear together at Air War College forums on World War II. In to accomplish the impossible in the creation of the United States Air Force. general, we agree in our observations and operational analyses. He does advocate a higher priority for electric power than I do. While fully agreeing on energy production and transmission as vital to weapons making, I do not believe bomber forces, as then constituted, All of these people influenced my military pen;pective and formed my military outlook. trained, and employed, made power plants, transition lines and transformers profitable targets at highest priority. Ofcourse, all that has changed tith postwar weapons technology. The creationof the book itself benefited from many who helped, offered criticism, or edited It is my view that our target planners did an excellent job of target selection and by the time and corrected. My gratitude to Maj Gen Cecil E. Combs knows no bounds. He offered we, the operational people,got our target lists and prioritiesfrom the CombinedChiefs of Staff, intelligent and constructive criticism coupled with encouragement. His observations and they had undergone such thorough review that they were optimum, both against Germany and contributions were well founded; he was an active panicipant in most of the events recorded in Japan. this memoir. On the whole, I believe these memoin; of General Hansell are significant in the study of our military history and will be of especial value to those who plan and conduct our vital air And I offer my thanks and acknowledgements to Lt Gen Raymond B. Furlong, Air campaigns of the future. Univen;ity Commander, and Col Thomas A. Fabyanic, Chief, Military Studies Division, Air War College, without whose enthusiastic support this memoir would probably not have been . published. I especially appreciate a very special scholar, Dr R. F. ·Futrell, a gifted professIOnal historian who panicipated in the air war in the Pacific. His acknowledged scholarshIp and Ira C. Eaker willingness to edit and review this manuscript have eliminated lingering fean; of some gross Lt Gen, USAF (Retired) error on my pan. vi vii I also aeknowledgemyindebtedn essto Mr RobertT. Finney and Mrs Irene P. Barnett,of the Air University, for final editing and rearranging. Mrs Barnett gave of her talents so thoroughly that I feel she is better acquainted with this memoir than its author.

Finally, I expr.. s my gratitude to the editors of Air UniversityReview for permission to use extracts from my artiel.. whieh it has published.

Haywood S. Hansell Thble of Contents

Pages

Preface...... xiii

to Strategic Air War Part I Prelude 1918.1943 Chapter I DEVELOPMENT OF US STRATEGIC AIR DOCTRINES AND STRATEGYBEFORE PEARL HARBOR......

Air Pioneers ...... I War DepartmentDoctrine...... 2 The Issu...... 3 Air Doctrin.. and Strategic Principl...... 3 The GHQ Air Force...... 4 War in Europe...... 5 The First StrategicAir Plan (AWPD-I) ...... , ...... 5

2 STRATEGIC PURPOSES, PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN...... 9 • Tidal Wavefrom Pearl Harbor...... 9 The Joint StrategicCommittee ...... 10 AWPD-42...... 15

Strategic WarAgainst Japan PartII

PACIFIC STRATEGY...... 17

QUADRANT Conference ...... 17 SEXTANT Conference...... 17 MATTERHORN...... 19 Conferenceo in the Pacific Theaters ...... 21 Pacific Strategy...... 22

4 STRATEGIC AIR FORCE-PACIFIC ...... 25

Organization, Command, Control, and Deployment of the Strategic Air Forceo...... 25 viii ix The Twentieth Air Force...... 2 6...... Requirements for 90 Percent Probability Inception...... , 27 of Destruction of Substations ...... 89 Organization and Deployment ...... 27 Requirements for 90 Percent Probability Command and Control ...... 28 of Steam Power Plants...... 89 Was the Strategy of Selective Target 5 EARLY DEPLOYMENT AND INITIAL OPERATIONS ...... 3 0 Bombing a Feasible Alternative? ...... 89 Alternative Grand Strategy in the Pacific...... 90 The XXth Bomber Command...... 30 Conclusions ...... 9 The XXlst BomberCommand ...... 31 1 Criteria for Force Employment...... 91 The Atomic Bomb...... 92 6 FIRST STRIKES...... 3 .6 ...... War Aims ...... 92 SAN ANTONIO I and II...... 36 Grand StrategyRevised in Retrospect ...... 92 Improving Successive Missions...... 40 APPENDIX A Organizational Charts ...... •...... Early Operations ...... 40 95 The Aerial Mining Campaign...... 42 APPENDIX B The B-29 Test Specifications...... 98 Technical Problems ...... 43 APPENDIX C Extracts from USSBS ...... 00 TacticalProblems...... • ...... 44 1 Weather Forecasting ...... 44 APPENDIX 0 Twentieth Air Force Staff Meeting Minutes...... 106 APPENDIX E Reportby Joint StaffPlanners ...... 7 COMMAND CHANGES...... 45 109 Command Relationshipsand Bomber APPENDIX F Details of Campaign Against Japan...... 116 4 Commanders...... 5 APPENDIX G Grapbs Showing Probable Hits ...... 125 Fim Change of Organizationand Command, XXlst Bomber Command ...... 46 APPENDIX H Correspondence...... 128 APPENDIX I Mapsof the Pacific ...... 145 OPERATIONS...... 50

Operations: Initial Phase...... 50 Pacific Strategy...... 5 I A Ta ctical Achievement...... 52 Later Operations ...... ,...... 60

Effectsof the Air Offensive...... 66 9 AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC ...... 68

SecondCbange of Command ...... 69 The Finale...... 71

Part III Obsen'atiODS in Retrosped

10 CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 74

Fundamental lssues...... 74 Speculation on Alternative Air Strategies ...... 75 intelligence...... 76 Transportation...... 76 Iron andSteel ...... 78

Oil ...... 78 Chemicals...... 78 Electric Power ...... 78 Effects of Bomb Strikes on Japanese ElectricPower installations ...... 81 Feasibilityof SelectiveBombing of Japanese Electric Power ...... 8S Capacity of Forces Available...... 8S

x xi Preface

THESE OBSERVATIONS constitute a memoir, with all the shortcomings of faulty memory, bias, personal viewpoint,personal experience, and inadequate research that are implied in the term. They lead to speculation under specified circumstances, and that speculation is likewise suspectbecause it reflects personaljudgment. But the compendium may lead others to evolve lessons and conclusions which fit into a broader mosaic. This work doesnot, of course, aspire to the dignityof "h istory." Participants are notoriously poorhistorical observers. Participation induces bias. But there should besome limited value to the viewpoint of participants-if that expression is properly screened for elimination of prejudice. After all, there is some virtue in the observation of Archibald MacLeish:

"The experts sit in serried rows And fill the Plaza Toros full. But only one there is who knows And he's the one who fights the bull."

These memoirs certainly will not earn an ear. But the perspective is that of an aged matador.

"The choice of enemy targets . . . is the most delicate operation of air warfare. . . . It is precisely in this field that the commanders of future Air Forces will be able to give proof of their ability."

General Giulio Douhet 1921 ,

On what primary basis should those "enemy targets" be selected? The answer is "The First PrinCiple of War":

"The Objective"

"What is the 'end purpose' sought; what is the 'end effect' desired at the conclusion of the war? If it is stated by higher authority, well and good. If it is not clearly stated, then it must be deduced from authoritative expressions of National Policy. "The clear definition of the 'end purpose'desired, as distinct from operations and actions to be performed, is the most vital requirement of all war planning and operations. It looks easy; it is perhaps the most difficult task of all. Everything else depends upon it and should be related to it. Yet it is·the most difficult to determine and define. Often'it must simply be deduced. "In time of peace, this rule should govern the creation of military doctrine, the development and procurement of weapons, the training of organizations, the establishment of bases, and the provision of logistic systems; in time of war, it should govern the selection of strategic military objectives and targets, the modification of military doctrine, and the application of military forces."

1st Lt Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. The Air Corps Tactical School 1936 Instructor, Air Force Section

xiii II Ii CHAPTER 1 " I

Development of US Strategic Air Doctrines and Strategy before Pearl Harbor

WORLD WAR II witnessed the first full application should make every effort and sacrifice to maintain it PART I of strategic air power in war. At this writing, in fact, for the future. Air supremacy may in the long run World War II has provided the only such full-scale become as important a factor in the defense of the application. Because that great effort was unique, it Empire as sea supremacy." Smuts himself said in should be worth analytical examination, not only in submitting the report of his commission: PRELUDE TO STRATEGIC AIR WAR terms of actions and effects, but more particularly in terms of objective, strategic plans, and the result of 1918-1943 operations designed to achieve these ends. . The day may not be far off when aerial A brief review of the development of American operations, with their devastationof enemy strategic air doctrines and their nature at the outbreak and destruction of industrial and popullandlOlll of World War II should serve as a useful prelude to centerson a vastscale, may becomethe principal discussion of the strategic air war itself.' operations of war, to which the older forms military and naval operations may becomeof Air Pioneen secondary and subordinate.

Airplanes were of course, in World War I, These were strong words regarding thepotential though on a very used,limited scale. But even with the of the new air weapon, coming as early as 1917. limited use and, for the most part, inconclusive results were even more significant, however, Theythey beeause of air operations, proponents of air power began to were spoken by a highly respected ground IOldier, appear. One of the most notable of these early described by Marshal of the Sir Sleuor expressions of the potentialof the virtually untried air RAF John _ "one of the greatest men of our time-of all times,'" a weapon came in a report from a commission (headed ground soldier speaking not as one wedded to an byField Marshal Jan Christian Smuts) which had been historic art, but as a farsighted Itatelman. established by the British Cabinet to investigate the Significantly, the reportof tbe Smuts'commit teeled to dual problems of air organization and home defense. the establishment of the Air Ministry in (The commissioncame into being largely as a result of December 191 7 and the Royal Air Force in April 1918. popular dissatisfaction with the ability of the air Then, of course, there was Maj Gen H. M. Trenchard defenses to deal with Zeppelin and Gotha attacks Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard),(later against London.)The report, submittedto the British who fended off attacks on the fledgling RAF by the 1 Prime Minister on 7 August 1917, stated: "It is other services and postulated advanced notions important for the winning of the war that we should concerning the possibilities of the air arm. not only secure air predominance, but secure it on a Support for what we call today "stratellic very large scale; and having secured it in this war, we bombardment" came from other directions as well. For example, as early as 1916, the Italian aircraft

• For " ftIOZ'e detaikd KCCUnt atthe oriJin and de¥clopment of US aratqi<: air doctrine, _ my 11w Air Pftlll TItM DqIaItdHftl� (AlluUfo, Oa.: HigiDi. MeArthur.lLoqinQ.t.Porter, Inc., 1972). 'SirJohn SlCla'll', 71w CmnvI BiwFrederidl (NewYon:: A. PI'IICpf. ItS?),P. 634. manufacturer Count Caproni di Taliedo proposed to Mitchell's ideas concerning air power came commissions to inquire into the role and organization to the Air Corps through the TRs could scarcely be destroy German and Austrian naval vessels by bomber cascading in a stream of publications and public of aviation. The reports of these various investigative called doctrines for the employment of air power. attack against fleet bases. In January 1917, he argued statements. So wide· ranging were his views, it is agencies played no small role in keeping the question Moreover, unlike the other branches of the Army, that his large triplane bombers, if built in sufficient difficult to pin down his views in one brief quotation. of military aviation alive. which had boards-the Infantry Board, the Cavalry numbers, could destroy Austria's factories, thus Perhaps, however, the principal thrust of his With one exception, the report of the Lampert Board, the Artillery Board, etC.-the Air Corps had ending the war with Italy's main opponent. In October arguments was summed up in his statement before the Committee, which in many respects endorsed no board at that time. In the absence of similar Air 1917, Caproni, in collaboration with his friend Lt Col House Committee on Military Affairs in 1926, when Mitchell's ideas, the reports reflected a general Corps agencies, the Chief of the Air Corps relied upon Giulio Douhet of the Italian army, prepared a he declared: consensus that the air arm could serve a useful purpose the Air Corps Tactical School as a center for "Memorandum on the Air War for the U.S. Air as an adjunct to the Army and Navy but that there was producing concepts of air power employment. So in Service," in which he suggested that mass attacks made no place for a separate air force in the military reality, the teachings of the Air Corps Ta ctical School, at night by long· range Allied bombers against There has never been anything that has come establishment l\I1d there certamly was no separate air as far as airmen were concerned, were the accepted industrial targets deep within Germany and Austria which has changed war the way the advent of air mission. The prevailing view was summed up in the doctrines of the Air Corps and served as guidance for could definitely overwhelm the enemy by SUbstantially power has. The method of prosecuting a war in July 1934 report of the Baker Board, perhaps the best forming strategic air plans. These American air reducing his war production at the same time that the old days was to get at the vital centers of the known of the various boards. The Baker Board doctrines and concepts of air strategy were evolved at Allied production was increasing. country in order to paralyze the resistance. This contended: "Our national defense policy contemplates the Ta ctical School in the 1930s. More must be said about Douhet. Actually, he had meant the centers of production, the centers of aggression against no nation; it is based entirely upon begunto write about military aviation as early as 1909. population, the agricultural districts, the animal the defense of our homeland and our overseas During World War I, he was imprisoned for a year industry, communications-anything that possessions, including protection of our sea and Air Doctrines and Strategic Principles (1916-1917) for criticizing Italy'S wartime military tended to keep up war. Now in order to keepthe airborne commerce." The purpose of the Army was policy. But Douhet, like Billy Mitchell of the US Air enemy out of that, armies were spread in front of "to hold an invader while the citizen forces are being Service, whose career he closely paralleled, became those places and protected them by their flesh mobilized. . . . The idea that aviation can replace The Air Corps' tactical school was established at more influential in the post.World War I period. His and blood. You had men killing there sometimes any of the other elements of our armed forces is found, Langley Field, Virginia, in 1920. Beginning as a Field wartime court·martial was expunged in InO, and he for years before these vital centers were reached. on analysis, to be erroneous. Since ground forces Officers' School, it did not expand its scope of was promoted to general officer rank in 1921. He It led to the theory that the hostile army in the alone are capable of occupying territory, the Army instruction and place emphasis on air power completed his first serious treatise on military field was the main objective, which it was. Once with its own air forces remains the ultimate decisive employment until the end of the decade. The school aviation-Il Dominio del Aria, or Ccmmand of the having been conquered, the vital centers could factor in war." was blessed with a group of gifted leaders. But the one Air-in October Inl. In this essay, he proved to be a be gotten at. . . . So that, in the future, we will Jimmy Doolittle, a member of the Baker Board and who was primarily responsible for its achievements strong proponent of strategic air warfare. In essence, strike, in case of armed conflict, when all other an experienced Army aviator, filed a minority dissent. was Col John F. Curry, the commandant when the he advocated the creation of an independent air force, means of settling disputes have failed, to go He said, "I believe that the future security of our schoolmoved to Maxwell Field, Alabama, in 1931. He made up of a fleet of bombers and "combat planes"­ straight to the vital centers, the industrial stood as a shield between his faculty and the harshly Nation is d.... ndent upon an adequate air force. This the latter to be a bomber.type plane that would be centers, through the use of an air force and hit is true at the,.,resenttime and will become increasingly ·critical superiors in Washington. He gave freedom of equippedwith many guns and to convoy bombers used them. That is the modern theory of making war. important as the science of aviation advances and the thought and expression to such leaders as Ken Walker, and fight off hostile pursuit planes. Following airplane lends itself more and more to the art of Harold George, Don Wilson, Muir "Santy" Fairchild, establishment of command of the air, which was to be warfare." He advocated separation for development and Claire Chennault. achieved by destroyingenemy air forces at their This is the general thesis of his last book, Skyways. bases and employment. The following expresses the American air doctrines and aircraft industries, the independent air force and strategic principles in effect at the outbreak of would be able to destroy an enemy nation by attacking World War II. They owe an obvious debt of gratitude transportation lines and population centers. War Department Doctrine The Issues to Field Marshal Smuts. Then in the post·World War I period, the most The basic elements of the doctrines and principles outspoken proponent of air powerin our own country While Mitchell advanced ideas on the potential of The issues between the advocates of air power and of strategic air warfare were to the effect that air forces was, of course, Gen William "Billy" Mitchell. The air power far in excess of the capabilities of the air the older services were clearly drawn. The Army and could reach and destroy vital targets deep in enemy story of Billy Mitchell's advocacy i: of an independent weapon of his day, the War Department General Staff Navy would only acknowledge the airplane as a useful territory. The selection and destruction of such targets air force and his insight into the potential of the air continued to be nourished on the time·honored auxiliary. Smuts, Caproni, Douhet, and Mitchell could bring defeat to a highly industrialized enemy weapon has been told and retold" and does not need concepts of warfare, which proclaimed that the advanced ideas and concepts that embraced a war­ nation by: repeating here. During the war, he had been exposed infantry was the "Queenof the Battle." Within the War winning potential for air power and advocated air I. destroying industrial and civic systems which to ideas of other air pioneers, notably Lord Trenchard, Department, the two decades after World War I was a attack against "the vital centers, the industrial centers, support the enemy state; or by Douhet, and Caproni, and he came out of the war period of conflict, basically between the traditional· the centers or population of the enemy nation." 2. destroying industrial systems which support the convinced, among other ideas, that to be effective air minded Army members of the General Staff and a new But these visionary concepts lacked specif-s. How enemy armed forces; and by these means power should be concentrated in the hands of airmen breed within the Army, the upstart airmen, concerning does one go about destroying or paralyzing these vital 3. undermining the nation's will and capability to and that an air force had a separate, independent both the place within the Army for the new air arm centers? Are cities really the best targets? What are resist, which is the ultimate objective of war mission from the other services. The extent to which and, more particularly, the role of air power. Gen other targets, if any? How should air power be operations. In seeking these ends, offensive strategic Smuts, Trenchard, Caproni, and Douhet influenced John J. Pershing, recently returned from Europe as controlled and employed? What effect is intended and air forces could be used as the primary war· him is speculative, (I) but in the post·World War I period head of the victorious American Expeditionary Force expected? In short, what doctrines were needed to winning force, supported or paralleled by land and sea h,s espousal of a principal role-a war.winning role­ and now Chief of Staff, US Army, threw the weight of accomplish the ends? forces, as suggested by Air Marshal Smuts, or (2) a for air power is indisputable. his considerable personal prestige against air power. In To my knowledge, the Army Air Corps had no collateral force, coequal with land or sea forces fact, airmen might have been squelched into oblivion official body of doctrines in the early 1930s. It was a operating against separate but related objectives. In if the American public had not shown an interest in part of the Army. What little guidance the Air Corps any event, the strategic air forces would have to have aviation. Public clamor was at least partially received for the conduct of its operations was strategic air intelligence peculiar to its own needs. Air responsible for forcing the Government to convene a contained in Training Regulations (fRs), issued by power, in pursuit of these two air strategies, required series of military and congressional boards and the War Department. But the brief instruction issued concentration of effort and unified command and

2 control at the top echelon of command if it were to be the capacity of your own forces and determine which too short· lived to leave any outstanding legacy of air arranged for this transfer of responsibility. Colonel effective. of the tasks COme within your capability; (6) consider doctrine. But it demonstrated in several dramatic George got the job on 4 August, just seven days before But the very flexibility of air forces made possible the risks and losses for each task; (7) select the tasks flights that the bomber had superb flexibility and . the estimates had to be submitted. the diversion of the strategic element to (3) operations which will accomplish most effectively your purpose could quickly be deployed to remote bases. Four of us, all former instructors at Maxwell, took in a supporting role. There were situations in which without unacceptable risk and loss, and which come Significantly, ho\Wever, despite the fight of airmen for on the task-Harold George, Chief of the Division; the lack of vital enemy industrial targets, the existence within your capability; and (8) prepare a plan to carry acceptance of air power theories, as late as 1939 the Ken Walker, Chief of the War Plans Group; Larry of an immediate national emergency, or the overriding out the selected tasks. War Department was still saying, "The mission of the Kuter, borrowed from G-3 of the General Staff; and authority of superior command, could result in We used this form in preparing all the strategic air air component of the Army is to perform effectively myself, Chief of the European Section of the War application of the strategic air forces to the suppon of war plans. Purpose was the keynote. Select targets the air operations devolving upon the Army in its Plans Group.' The result was a straightforward land or force objectives. Air forces organized sea which contribute most to purpose. It emphasized assigned functions in the national defense. Air product of air doctrine produced at Maxwell. primarily for performance of strategies I and 2 above another principle-the principle of the capacity of the operation beyond the sphere of action of the surface Two major problems faced Colonel George and his could be shifted to 3; the reverse was not true. force. "00 not attempt tasks which are beyond your forces are undenaken in furtherance of the strategical planning team: selecting an overall strategic concept The Air Corps Ta ctical School considered direct air capability. Keep your operations within the capability plan of the commander of the field force." and air objective, and preparing an air plan to achieve attack of urban populations to undermine morale and of the forces available. It is far better to destroy a few that objective. Army and Air Corps doctrines were in to break the civilian "will and capability to continue vital targets completely than to attack many targets open conflict in the resolution of both aspects of the the war," but rejected this strategy in favor of selected Warin Europe inconclusively. " strategic air problem. target destruction, except as a last reson. Selection of Although airmen at the Tactical School were slowly With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the After a period of discussion, we agreed to adopt a targets and strategic objectives and methods would evolving a Concrete body of doctrine for the development of air power theory shifted from the Air strategic air objective aimed at winning the war by air depend upon the national purposes for which the war employment of strategic air forces, the Army Air Corps Tactical School to other centers of development power, in accordance with Tactical School doctrine. was undenaken and the nature of the strategic Corps neither the organization nor the air weapon and application, and the instructors shifted also. Ken But we also recognized the possibility that capitulation situation. Development, organization, and equipping had necessary to implement it. The closest the Air Corps Walker and Harold George, who had served as of Germany and Italy might not result from the air of strategic air forces would be strongly influenced by came to achieving either in the 1930s was the Director of Air Tactics and Strategy at the Air Corps offensive alone, and we appended a provision for the national objective and the role they were to play. establishment of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air ctical School, were in the GHQ Air Force; Oon support of an invasion if necessary. The critical In addition to specific doctrines of air employment, Ta Force, and the appearance of the B-1 7 bomber. Wilson, who had succeeded George as Director of Air weakening of Germany and Italy through destruction the Air Corps Tactical School accepted and adapted Ta ctics and Strategy, was in War Plans Division of the of vital interior structures would, of course, contribute the War Department PrinCiples of War. The most General Staff; "Santy" Fairchild, who, in tum, t"ward the final operations of the ground forces on the imponant were: The GHQ AirForce succeeded Oon Wilson, was in the pt'fice, Chief of Air continent if that should prove necessary. Hence, we The Objective: Determine clearly what you want to Corps; Larry Kuter, who had "'-n instructor in reasoned, such an air strategy should not be accomplish and stick to it. In 1935 the Baker Board, while rejecting the Bombardment, was in G·3 of the General Staff; and I, unacceptable to the Army planners. In the initial concept of independent strategic air warfare, did The Offensive: Only offensive action against the formerly instructor in Bombardment and Air Force, phase, the air forces would go all out to make the recommend the creation of a GHQ Air Force. GHQ enemy will produce victory. was in the Information Division of the Office, Chief of weakening of the enemy interior structure so drastic as would be the General Headquarters of the Army to be decisive in itself. Mass: Air Corps. With the eruption of World War II in Concentrate the maximum possible command in the field, and the GHQ Air Force would Europe, the doctrines of air power were thrust into the In the Far East, we would initially assume the effon toward attainment of the be directly subject to this Army commander. In furnace of war. strategic defensive, whether or not Japan declared war principal objective. 00 not permit keeping with the Baker Board recommendations, the The course of the war in Europe was a cause of on the United States. Since there was no suggestion effon to be divened from the GHQ Air Force was activated in March 1935. growing concern. On 9 July 1941, President Franklin that permanent acquisition of territory was a goal of principal purpose. There were three views as to the purpose of the D. Roosevelt sent a letter to the Secret.".ies of War and our national policy, the only purpose of invasion Economy of GHQ Air Force. One view saw it as GHQ Aviation The converse of the Principle of the Navy asking them to prepare "an estimate of would be to apply "compellance.". Air power could, Force: other Reserve. This was a role advocated for Army aviation Mass.In all operations useas overall production requirements required to defeat our ve thought, apply this "compellance" at far less cost in after World War I. Parts of the GHQAir Force would little force as possible in order to potential enemies." American lives. concentrate mass on the principal be apportioned out and attached to field armies and In producing our plan, we were aided effon. corps as the situation demanded. A second view saw The FirstStrategic Air Plan(AWPD·l) immeasurably by two guidelines the War Department the GHQ Air Force as a cohesive air-striking force to Security: Unlessthe base of power is gave us-ABC-I Agreement and Rainbow War Plan be employed as a unit in furtherance of the Army No. 5. In the face of the growing threat of the Axis defended and secure, it will be very The Joint Army-Navy Board met in response to the mission. Still a third view-one which was held by Powers to the democracies, British and American difficult to sustain the strategic President's inquiry but was unable to agree on joint airmen-was that it was a unified striking force military staff conferences opened in January 1941 offensive and to continue to strategy. Each Department proceeded to estimate its available for use beyond the sphere of activity of the with the purpose of establishing principles of prosecute the war. OW� requirements. Army as well as in suppon of the Army. In other cooperation "should the United Statesbe compelled to The preparation of the Army requirements fell words, airmen viewed the GHQ Air Force as an air The schooI resort to war." In March, the military experts formally devised a form for determining the upon the War Plans Division (WPD) of the General force with missions of its own. approved a document subsequently citedas American­ optimum application of strategic air Staff. WPD requested assignment of some Air Corps power. It was The Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force called "the British Conversations-I, or in abbreviated form, air estimate of the situation for strategic air officers to assist in preparing the Air Annex. Col arfare." Maj Gen Frank M. Andrews, felt no doubt about th� ABC-I. For air planners. the most significant features � The rationale behind this form was fairly Harold George, who had just been made chief of the issue and left no doubt in the minds of his associates. of ABC-I were (I) the European Theater would be Simple, but the most imponant considerations new Air War Plans Division of the equally new Air were: To General Andrews, the GHQ Air Force was an (1) define clearly the purpose, the goal-what Staff, Army Air Forces, protested, asserting that the do you instrument of air power. Want to accomplish; (2) consider the obstacles and task of preparing the air requirements should fall upon opponunities Actually, however, as the War Department in the broad situation; (3) his division. Lt Gen Henry H. Arnold' agreed and �nl intcreallD the Ai Plam list the actions underwent a seriesof reorganizations in the face of the °It II of nok that War Divilion had eeveraI"cbieft" (tasks) which if successfully but no"Indi-."There wasno JIIIffin the Warr Pianl Group. : accomplished, will attain the purpose, growing possibilities of US involvement in war after 01 coined the word "CQlJlpeUance" which il construed to mean eoerc:ion for an 10 order of desired priority; hononble an (4) consider 1939, the concept of a GHQ went out the window and andacceptable JIlIlPI*'.aIoIle Coen:lOrI i, rK'! acceptable ta:mbocauae t i "­ the force needed WlattrlICtiveconnotation applicationof force-tMaetllxuor thrallS of to accomplish each task; (5) consider an oIthc II(IIRUI\lC with it the GHQ Air Force. The GHQ Air Force was "GcncBl Arnold.,...Commandina Omeral, US ArmyAir Corp.. 1 bully.

4 5 of application) of AW PD-I in the strategic air war Japan would fo llow the defeat of Hitler and apply a doctrinal thought and a blueprint for the air war considered the primary, decisive theater and (2) the against the European Axis in an earlier work.' This similar strategy. (For Total Force Requirements see which followed.' stipulation that "Offensive measures in the European study directs attention to the strategic air war against area will include a sustained air offensive against Table I-I.) I have described the application (including the lack Japan. German military power, supplemented by air offensive The final plan was calledAW PD- I-Air War Plans against other regions und�r enemy control which Division Plan No. I. It was submitted at the last contributed to that power." In short, offensively, possible moment and became "Annex 2 Air American air resources would be used in Requirement" of the War Department report. Gen "FIItrdl. Idaa, Concqt.r, �, p.59. collaboration with the Royal Air Force against George C. Marshall and Secretary Henry L. Stimson German military power. The provisions of ABC- I accept� the air plan in detail. But the Joint Board, in were incorporated into the war plan under submittlOg the fu ll report, took little notice of the air development by the War and Navy Departments, and, plan. The Board stated: 10 May 1941, the Joint Army-Navy Board approved the war plan known as RAINBOW No. 5. It was subsequently approved by the Secretaries of War and Air Forces and naval forces can render valuable Navy and President Roosevelt. Although the ABC- I assistance, but it can be accepted as an almost Agreements and RAINBOW No. 5 underwent some invariable rule that only armies can win wars. agonizing reappraisals on the part of the War Department and some differences in interpretation of the ABC- I Agreements arose, RAINB(JW No. 5 provided the basic guideline for planning US Total Force Requirements, AWPD-I participation in World War II. And our small Heavy bombers B-17, B-24 47 groups planning staff provided the Army Air Force input to Very heavy bombers B-29, B-32 24 groups the final plan. Very long-range bombers B-36 44 groups Fighters 54 groups In planning for the strategic air war against Others (primarily for support 82 groups Germany, we listed the vital industrial systems of of ground forces) Germany and arranged them in desired priority; Total groups 25 1 selected key targets; determined the size bombs Total Combat Aircraft required and estimated the number of hits required on Production 61 799AIC each target to cause destruction; determined the Trainers 37051 number of bombs that should be dropped to give a 90 percent chance of getting at least that number of hits Total Aircraft Production 98850 on each target; computed the number of successful The B-36s were required in caseBritain should sorties required for initial destruction and to sustain collapse. that destruction; estimated the number of missions that could be launched per month; estimated losses and Thble 1-1. Total Force Requirements aborts; estimated the capacity of the American aircraft industry to produce specified types of combat and training aircraft (information provided by the Material Division of the Air Staff); examined the target list in Dr Robert F. Futrell has pinpointed the achievement the light of the expected capacity of the force and as follows: selected the Primary and Intermediate Target Systems to be attacked; and concluded that it would take six . . . The War Plans Division had asked only to .1Ii months of operations after the force had reached full know the maximum number of air squadrons size to accomplish the results desired. which the Army Air Forces might ultimately The intermediate and primary objectives and target require to garrison a great number of geographic systems, selected after consideration of the capacity of sites and to hold as "reserves of opportunity. " But the force, were: Intermediate objective (with overriding [Col] George and his associates (most of whom priority), adequate neutralization of the German had been faculty members at the Air Corps fighter force; Primary objectives. disruption of the Tactical School) undertook to prepare a German electric power system, transportation system comprehensive air plan for the defeat of the (railroads, canals), and the oil and petroleum system Axis. Beginning on 4 August, teams of two or (includi"i! the refineries at Polesti, Romania). As a last three officers worked up separate subjects and resort, if necessary in order to topple the German state, supporting tabs, and AWPD- I, "Munitions we would undermine morale by attack of cities. The Requirements of the Army Air Forces" was offensive strategic air forces would be based in completed on 12 August 1941. The completion England, Ireland, and the vicinity of Cairo, Egypt. of the first major strategic air war plan by the Defensive strategic air fo rces were deployed to defend newly-formed Army Air Forces staff in only the Western Hemisphere and initially our Pacific nine days was a notable achievement which IOterests and possessions. Strategic offense against marked both the apex of prewar air force

6 7 CHAPTER 2

Strategic Purposes, Plans and PreparatlQl1s for the Air Offensive Against Japan

TidalWave fromPearl Harbor would have to be postponed. But emotions were running high and reversal of the "Europe first" strategy and assumption of the offensive against Japan TheJapanese aircraftthat destroyedUS the Navy's at the earliest possible time seemed likely. The order of battle line at Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 priority in building and deploying our fo rces was 1 4 1 December 9 produced reverberations that likely to veer in that direction. extended far beyond thePacific. The attack rouaed an Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the apathetic America into a fury of resentment and Germans damaged their cause by promptly declaring produced a tidal wave of emotion that swept over the war against the United States. This act within itself, carefully reasoned plans which had been prepared to however, did not stem the tide of opinion, which meet a war emergency. The wave of emotion affected demanded immediate retaliation in the Pacific. It was civilians and military alike. America had watched the not the Germans who had attacked us; it was the progress of the war in Europe and the Far East with Japanese. The US Navy understandably welcomed this bemused and pacific apprehension. Suddenly, after public surge toward reprisal against the Japanese. For Pearl Harbor, there was a call for action, and the call over a generation, the Navy had looked toward the day focused attention on the Pacific and Far East - upon when it would sweep the Pacific oceans of the the Japanese - not upon Hitler and his Nazis. Japanese. Now the Navy was seriously depleted in US military planners had not been idle after the terms of capital ships and the trained and patriotic outbreak of war in Europe. Despite the pacifists men who manned them. The Navy had also suffered an prevailing in the country, the possibility of the United affront to the pride of the organization that had States being drawn into the conflict wasvery real. The produced the world's greatest fighting machine at sea. plans which had been prepared in a calmer and more The logic of a "Europe first" strategy seemed likely to logical atmosphere called for the initial effort to be be quenched in the sea of emotion. launched apinst Axis Europe, while the war against Almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, Prime Japan would be restricted to the strategic defensive Minister Winston Churchill announced his intention pending the defeat of Hitler. Then, and only then, to come to America to join President Franklin D. America would transfer her might to the Pacific and Roosevelt for consultations between the new allies on defeat the Japanese. Ouring the defensive phase in the combined grand strategy. He may have sensed the Pacific, the US fleet would seek out and defeat the American impulse to tum west against Japan rather Japanese fleet ifopportunity occurred,but the primary than east against Axis Europe in the new situation. He effort and the priority of resources would be devoted announced that he would bring his military staff, the to the defeat of Hitler. In other words, the maximum Chiefs of Staff Committee, consisting of the Chief of possible effort would be concentrated upon the main the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke; the First objective, the defeat of Hitler; the minimum effective Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound; and the Chief of Staffof force and effort would be devoted to the restraint of the Royal Air Force, ,Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Hirohito. Portal. They would be supported by the members of With the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor, the the British Joint Plans Committee and Joint opportunity to meet the Japanese fleet on the high seas intelligence Committee.

9 We viewed this approaching visit with alarm and preliminary to committee conclusions, it is with Air Corps doctrine which taught that wars, once for the conduct of the warT' Making no reference to some misgiving. The British interservice staff intended that the members of committees entered upon, should be won in the sense that victory previous plans or policies and making no effort to organization was competent and experienced. On the these should present their individual views regarding should make possible the attainment of national war influence our views, it left the field wide open. other hand, we, as yet, had no similar committee the matter under consideration. When higher aims and that victory involved overcomingthe enemy's Unfortunately, the directive furnished no statement organizations that were prepared to confer with the authority has reached a decision or has issued a "will to resist" while preserving one's own. That end of national purpose or national objective of the war to British. Moreover, our plans and desires were in directive, the committee concerned will be could be sought by adopting one or more of the serve as guidance for our formidable task. Equally complete disarray as a result of Pearl Harbor. guided accordingly. following options: unfortunately, we, as the Joint Strategic Committee, The President met this emergency by appointingthe I. Providing security for one's own sources of did not seek to interpret national attitude and US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. On the initiative The original membership of the Joint Strategic r statement of policy to serve as guidance. We did agree, of General Marshall, the President accepted the po i Committee included the fo llowing: efeating the enemy's forces in battle; Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, �� b however, at our first meeting upon a sensible first I. 3. Destroying (or cutting off) the war-supporting step-calling upon the Joint Intelligence Committee General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold in the Joint Chiefs of Capt O. M. Read, Col R. T. Maddocks, industrial structure which supplied the instruments for a presentation of the world intelligence situation. Staff Committee, in order to meet Mr Churchill's USN USA with which the enemy fought; suggestion that there should be an American "opposite Col J. C. Balmer, The Joint Intelligence presentation was gloomy Capt B. J. Rodgers, Lt 4. Destroying or debilitating the industrial systems member" to the Chief of the Air Staffof the Royal Air indeed. All of Western Europe had become a German USN USA which supported both the war-supporting and the Force. But he issued no fo rmal directive defining citadel, and Hitler's armies were at the gates of Capt Forrest Sherman, Lt Col A. C. Wedemeyer, civil-social life-supporting vitality of the enemy State; General Arnold's position. Moscow. The Germans had suffered a rebuff, but thts USN USA 5. As a last resort, destroying great numbers of the Adm William D. Leahy, who had been US was considered to be as much the result of winter Maj H. L. Litzenberg, Maj H. S. Hansell, enemy people themselves, particularly the masses Ambassador to France, had recently' returned to USMC weather as of Russian counterattack. The Joint USA Air Corps dwelling in the cities. become the President's personal Chief of Staff. Intelligence Committee estimated that Russian these options, air power might be employed to Initially he attended the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Of resistance would collapse within three months after achieve I, 3,4 and 5, or to assist the Army and Navy in Staff for the purpose of keeping the President resumption of fighting in the spring. That would be in achieving 2. informed of the proceedings and discussions of the On a Friday morning, I received orders transferring about six months. The Japanese were pressing Committee, in much the same role as that of Sir me immediately from the Army Air Corps where I Was This Air Corps doctrine obviously was not relentlessly onward with no sign of weakening. Hastings Ismay, Mr Churchill's military assistant, who Chief of. the European Section of the Air War Plans unanimously adopted by the committee. In fact, there Corregidor might hold out for a whi Ie but would attended the meetings of the British Chiefs of Staff Division to the War Department General StaffCorps. was no unanimity - no common ground - on whIch simply be bypassed. The Intelligence Committee Committee. I was ordered to report to the Joint Strategic the members of the Joint Strategic Committee might estimated that the Germans and Japanese might join The new "Joint Chiefs of Staff' set up supporting Committee at its new offices on Monday morning. As move in unison toward recommending a joint overall hands in the vicinity of Karachi, India, within the year. committees, including, as the principal ones, the Joint a member of this committee, I found myself in the strategy for the conduct of the war. Taking note of these facts, opinions, and predictions, Plans Committee, the Joint Strategic Committee, the midst of the massive machinery which was trying to we sought to evaluate them. In our deliberations, the With the exception of Lt_ Col Wedemeyer, the I Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Joint Logistics deal with problems of worldwide proportions. I Was members of the Joint Strategic Committee were great question marks were the Russian army and the Committee. told that my loyalties in my new job were to be devoted unaware of the Air Corps' views on air power and capability of Britain to hold out. 'I to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that I must divest certainly were unprepared to accept them. The Army The Russian army offered no reason for optimism. I myself of service loyalties and all pr'

10 II million Russian prisoners at a rate which surely taxed In fact, the Committee looked upon this as a Committee sentiment and conVIctIOn gravitated concurrent strategic defensive operations in the the prisoner-of-war facilities to the utmost. requirement in view of the directive from the Joint steadily to the Pacific. Committee members had spent Pacific with minimum diversion of available forces In the winter of 1942, the hope of continued Chiefs. their professional lives studying military history, and from the effort against Hitler. Maximum effort Russian resistance on any major scale seemed dim It soon became evident the direction most of the the majority were inclined to accept a strict strategic offensive operations would be launched indeed. If Russia capitulated, or if Russian military members of the Committee would favor. If the interpretation of the Joint Army-Navy Board's precept against Japan immediately after the defeat of Hitler. resistancefaded away, what then? The Germans would salvation of Europe was hopeless, then it would be expressed in the Victory Program: "Naval and air The initial mode of offensive operations against Axis be released for redeployment against the British. The stupid to waste resources on a doomed venture and power may prevent wars from being lost and, by Europe would be through a combined strategic air British had shown a capability to preserve their leave the Japanese undisturbed while they weakening enemy strength, may greatly contribute to offensive by the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air security through the Battle of Britain. But it was consolidated their expanding areas of conquest. In victory. By themselves, however, naval and air forces Forces from bases in England. The offensive would be problematical whether Britain could be successful a short, insofar as grand strategy was concerned, the seldom, if ever, win important wars. It should be directed against the German air force and the war­ second time. With the European industry available for majority of the Committee tended toward option b, recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land making and civic-sustaining resources of the German producing new armaments, the deficiencies which led strategic defensive of the Western Hemisphere and armies can finally win wars." And invasion by land state. Preparation for an invasion of the Continent and to the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain strategic offensive against Japan. As to military force armies before the collapse of Russia seemed a very sustained and combined air and surface warfare would could be corrected. Longer-range bombers and escort application, the Navy, understandably enough, favored remote possibility. be provided. The proponents of strategic air warfare fighters might accomplish what the He 1 1 I and the Me primary emphasis on blockade and upon gaining The Joint Chiefs of Staffgrew impatient. Theysent hoped that an invasion would not be necessary, but 109 and 1 10 failed to do. The submarine campaign domination of the Pacific. gaining sea superiority in a message demanding an answer to their question. Alliedgrand strategy could not be pinnedto that hope might be extended until it did, indeed, starve Britain the critical areas vital to Japan, and, finally, of Colonel Wedemeyerand I favored a grand strategy of alone. into submission or accommodation. Thea all would be supporting invasion. Army members stoutly Axis Europefirst, even though the prospects of victory This grand strategy was accepted by the US Joint lost. and America would face either the extension of contended that invasion, both in Europe and Japan, in Europe looked very grim indeed. A head count Chiefs of Staff and was formally accepted by the German power into South America, or the prospect of was the decisive maneuver for victory. showed that the great majority of our committee Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 Dec 1941. The an uneasy peace in which the vast resources and I, of course, was the proponent of air power as the members, three-fourths in fact, favored defense of the agreement contained the fo llowing paragraph: markets of Europe were subject to German primary instrument of victory. Although my interests Western Hemisphere and offense against Japan. They exploitation. included air defense and air support, they centered on were ready to acknowledge the loss of Europe and The essential featuresof the American-British But what could bedone about it? More specifically, strategic air warfare. And I was not prepared to write Britain as a hopeless cause and assume the offensive Strategy as adopted by the Combined Chiefs of what could the United States do about it? off Europe as already lost. There were a number of against Japan at the earliest possible time, culminating Staff on December 31, 1941, based on the The "Victory Program," just completed,had shown primary modes for the application of air power. We do in the invasion and conquest of the Japanese home principle that only the minimum of force that it would take two years to raise the armies and not need to go into them here as they pertained to the islands. necessary for the safe-guarding of vital interests build ships to transport them to Europe for massive air war against Germany.· The significant point was, I wasmotivated, by a number of convictions, to turn in other theaters should be diverted from combined invasion to "Fortress Europe" even if the however, that authorities at the very highest levels had our maximum effort to the defeat of Hitler. A year's operations against Germany, were: British were able to survive and persist. Two years already approved AWPD- l. In defense of my position, study as head of the strategic intelligence section of

12 13 was referred to the Joint Strategic Committee. irrevocably lost and turning our energies to defeat of Operations. and, in June, I went to England, where he Aluminum plants The crux of the disagreement focused on Japan. But it is possible that they might have. The promoted me to brigadier general. My replacement on Synthetic rubber plants communications between Hawaii and Australia. I President and Mr Churchill would certainly have the Joint Strategic Committee was Col E. E. "Pat" The purpose of the strategic air offensive against demurred against provision of a strategic air force in overridden any recommendation to that effect. But if Partridge. I went from that job to wing and air division Japan, when it could be inaugurated, would be similar the Pacific which would compete with requirements Germany had not declared war on the United States so commands in the Eighth Air Force. to that against Germany: to undermine and destroy the promptly, the President would have to face alone capability and will of the Japanese peopleto wage war for Europe, but the other committee members agreed had AWPD.42 with the Navy's contention that the line of the wave of anger against Japan. I think it quite by destroying the war -supporting industries and the In August 1942, I was called back from England on communications to Australia through New Zealand possible that, under those circumstances, our main systems upon which the war industries and the civilian a temporary basis to direct preparation of a plan (in was vital to the war effort and that "there must be effort might have been in the Pacific. The incidents economy of Japan depended. response to the President's request) for the provided a mobile air force of long-range aircraft to have, I think, two points of significance. In comparison with operations and priorities called requirements to reach air supremacy. A WPD- I had operate with the mobile naval surface forces." The First, if Germany's declaration of war against the for in AWPD- I, by 1942 worldwide operations been a "contingency plan," in case we should go to idea was appealing and had merit-if forces to United States had been omitted entirely or had been revealed some weakening of resolve to keep the we Iwd but this later plan, AWPD-42, found us at war support delayed, Mr Churchill would have found it difficult to war; maximum possible air strength directed toward the it. with all three Axis Powers. We had just begun initial I agreed that the area was important but could not arrange for immediate conversations on British­ primary strategic air offensive: the destruction of the air operations from English air bases. AWPD-42 was agree that a long-range air force should be provided American grand strategy, on a worldwide And vital elements of Germany. Northwest Africa was essentially a "requirements" plan-a plan which for operations in that area. Actually, we had no long­ it would have been difficultfor him to bringbasis. the British drawing off air forces for support of land operations specified the munitions and base requirements to carry range air forces at all. The Eighth Air Force was to be Chiefs of Staff Committee and their supporting there. Land operations in the Middle East were out a strategy-since we still lacked the essential organized for deployment to England .at the earliest committees with him. Since there would have been no diverting air elements in support there as well. And military forces with which to conduct important air possible moment. But it was not even in existence. We immediate need for a US air member to balance the surface operations to regain base areas in the Far East, operations. AWPD-42 retained the basic structure of were short of long-range bombers and trained crews, Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force, it is quite likely as distinct from operations for strictly defensive AWPD- l. The defeat of Germany was still in first and we were straining to provide such an air force for that the initial composition of the US Joint Chiefs of purpose, were absorbing air effort too. All these must, priority, and the air offensive against Japan was still the air offensive against Axis Europe. To up Staff (if such a committeewere appointed at all) would of nec essity, detract from the air offensive against set deferred. another long-range air force for operations in the have elllbraced only the Chiefof Staffof the Army and Germany. Yet the latter had not even started in any The primary strategic purpose was still that of South Pacific would dilute our sparce resources the Qhief of Naval Operations, together with the meaningful sense and the delay would be still further undermining and destroying the capability and will of beyond recognition. This was the first of the many Presldent's personal Chief of Staff. Without air extended as diversions continued to grow. Germany to wage war by destroying the war­ efforts-some of them all too successful-to divert membership, the US Joint Chiefs in their deliberations As for the air offensive against Japan, it was still too supporting industries and the systems upon which the long-range bombers from their agreed first priority on grand strategy would have clinched the argument early to give anything more than general guidance in war industries and the urban economy of Germany job, the attack of Germany. that Britain could not be saved by surface warfare and terms of objectives and targets. Nevertheless, depended. I su mitted a dissenting minority report, would have endorsed the decision to abandon support AWPD-42 took cognizance of the strategic air ? The air operations contemplated for 1943 and contendmg that no long-range bombers other than the of Britain as infeasible and to make defeat of Japan the offensive against Japan, after the defeat of Germany, 1944 were: ones planned for the purpose in AWPD-I should be primary offensive military objective. by proposing the fo llowing targets in Japan: I. An air offensive against Axis Europe to diverted from the main air offensive against Germany. Second, the Navy never abandoned, really, its a. defeat the German air force This was, I suspect, the first "split-paper" submitted to adherence to the concept that equal priority should go Aircraft engine plants b. destroy the sources of German submarine the Joint Chiefs. to the war in the Pacific-to the defeat of Japan. When Submarine yards construction The Joint Chiefs were not pleased. They delivered the final plans for invasion of the Japanese home Naval and commercial bases c. undermine the German war-making capacity an offi cial reprimand to our Committee and directed islands were approved in 1945, the Navy had Alumina and aluminum plants 2. Air support of a land offensive in Northwest us to reconvene and come up with an agreed completed an enormous armada in the Pacific, Iron and steel Africa recommendation. General Arnold called me in and including 10 new battleships and 13 rebuilt old ones Oil 3. Air support of United Nations' land operations gave me a "personal admonition," to go on my record. and 109 aircraft carriers of assorted sizes. Nearly all of Chemical plants to retain the Middle East I believe other members received similar treatment these ships had been committed or laid down in 1942 Rubber factories 4. Air support of surface operations in the from their respective chiefs. and 1943, and they had enjoyed equalpriority with the Japanese Theater to regain base areas for a final We reconvened in continuous session. Colonel needs and demands of the Army for new armaments, There are two striking omissions from this list: the offensive against Jap;1O proper, including: Wedemeyer, who had always inclined to a "Europe though these Navy resources were destined for the electric power system; and the transportation system, a. land operations from India through China, first" strategy, recognized the danger in setting up a secondary, defensive effort in the Pacific, not to the including shipping, harbor and repair facilities, inland reopening the Burma Road; competing demand for a strategic air force in the primary offensive effort against Axis Europe. seas routes and waterways, and railroads. The b. amphibious operations from the South and omission of the electric power system stemmed from SouthPacific. He joined me, and we worked as a team. The enormous carrier force was equipped with Southwest Pacific toward the Philippine Islands the general belief, resulting from cursory analysis by Little by little the others came around-the Navy multiple aircraft complements and combat crews for members most reluctantly. Finally, we came to 5. Hemisphere defense, including antisubmarine A-2, that electric power was produced in a multiplicity each carrier. These, too, enjoyed equal priority in patrol of small hydroelectric generating plants which would agreement on the need for concentration of forces for resources with the Army Air Forces, which were the main effort against Axis Europe with a minimum The air objectives were described as: render the system as a whole practically invulnerable committed to the top priority strategic effort against Intermediate objective,with overriding priority: to attack. The analysis had not been made in depth and of diversion elsewhere. We submitted our unanimous Axis Europe. I fi ndings, which were accepted. I rather thought (German) Fighter aircraftassembly plants no examination of the distribution system had been No one will deny the magnificent performance of General Arnold would remove the record of my Bomber aircraft assembly undertaken. However, there was' ample time for these forces in the Pacific. But their production personal admonition, since I had won my point, and I plants further examination of the system. Failure to proceed schedule was not in consonance with the agreed joint am sure he would have if he had thought of it. But Aero engine assembly plants with detailed analysis was a costly error. strategy, and it competed with and jeopardized the apparently it did not occur to him. Primary objectives: My interests in the Pacific diminished as I became buildup of forces for the main effort. I do not think it wise to make too much of these (German) Submarine yards heavily engaged in the European war, and they did not incidents. I doubt that the Joint Chiefs would have My tenure with the Joint Strategic Committee was Transportation targets surface again until I attended the QUADRANT endorsed the recommendation first favored by the not long. In May, General Eisenhower asked for me to Electric power system Conference at Quebec, Canada, as General Ira C. majority of our Committee-abandoning Europe as head up an air plans office in his European Theater of Oil plants Eaker's representative.

14 15 CHAPTER 3

Pacific Strategy

QUADRANT Conference Far East should bestarted as soon as the German situation, in our opinion, so allows. PART II Grand strategy for the Pacific began to receive formal reexamination at the QUADRANT General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held at Allied Commander South East Asia Theater and Quebec in August of 1943. There was no specific in that capacity will command the Chinese STRATEGIC WAR AGAINST JAPAN emphasis placed upon a sustained strategic bomber troops operating into Burma and all US air and offensive against Japan in the conclusions of the ground forces committed to the South East Asia Conference. The QUADRANT Conference reached Theater.' the fo llowing agreement regarding the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war: The plan for defeat of Japan would be taken up at the SEXTANT Conference. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the SEXTANT Conference unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE. The SEXTANT Conference at Cairo, Egypt, took place in late November and early December of 1943. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other President Roosevelt headed the US delegation. PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and With him were his personal military aide, General extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN "Pa" Watson; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral with the purpose of continually reducing her Leahy; Maj Gen "Santy" Fairchild from the Joint military power and attaining positions from Strategic Survey Committee; Maj Gen Larry Kuter, which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces; the effect of any such extension on the overall Joint Plans Committee; and the Joint Logistics objective to be given consideration by the Committee, among others. Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken. The Joint Staff Planners consisted of Brig Gen Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in Frank Roberts, US Army; Rear Adm B. H. Bieri, US cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if Navy, formerly of the Joint Strategic Committee; and possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full myself, Brig Gen H. S. Hansell, recently returned resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT from the Eighth Air Force. For this occasion Admiral BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible Bieri, the senior member and chairman, chose to date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN. consider that there were only two legitimate members, one representing the War Department and one representing the Navy Depanment. He considered me, There were two specific agreements made at if he noted my presence at all, as a son of junior QUADRANT that would affect the air operations in consultant to Frank Roberts on air matters. the Far East.

We are agreed that the re-orientation of forces

from the European Theater to the Pacific and 'Combine:! Chiefs of swr 31915, 24 AUIIUC 1943.

17 Because Admiral Bieri would not bring himself to commander, who could use them as he deemed establishing a proVISIon for an initial strategic air the enemy air fo rce and to so weaken the Japanese recognize my existence, he could not very well argue necessary and leave the arguments to be settled later. offensive against the Japanese home islands. It was capability and will to fight as to cause capitulation or against the items I supported. The principal objectives In the final confrontation, we prevailed, pointing agreedthat preparations for invasion should proceed permit occupation against disorganized resistance; concurrently, in case such an air offensive should not failing this, to make invasion feasible at minimum that I supported were: out that the RAF did, in fact, have unity of command of its own air forces through the Air Ministry and be decisive. Strategic air power barely attained a cost,- that this bridged the boundariesbetween theaters. Why reprieve, and strategic air forces gained a temporary The position of air strategists regarding the air I. Consolidating our strategic air fo rces under should not the American strategic air forces have stay against dismemberment and apportio�ment to offensive against Japan was very weak in November unified air command and control, both in Europe and similar unity of command? various theaters for support of surface operations. But 1943. B-29s were beginning to come offthe line, but in the Pacific. final reliance upon surface invasion of the Japanese essential bases for their operation had not yet been The argument and agreement that unity of 2. Recognizing strategic air warfare as a principal, home islands was indelibly imprinted on Allied grand provided. General Arnold and his air staff were command-and-control over air operations to be war-winning strategy, and its acceptance as such in the strategy, at least so far as the US Army concerned. determined to employ the B-29s against the Japanese performed at the targetareas was more important than was war against Japan. But we succeeded in making a very substantial homeland. We were extremely apprehensive lest they that covering the base areas later served us 10 good 3. Obtaining air base sites from which strategic air change in the original statement of grand strategy for be apportioned to theater commanders for local stead when the Twentieth Air Force was created. The warfare could be waged against Japan. the Pacific. The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted operations. Once assigned to such control, it would be outcome of the issue at the Cairo Conference was the and approved the "overall plan for the defeat of difficult to extricate them and concert their efforts creation of the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe and Japan" as submitted by the Combined Staff Planners.2 against the prime targets in Japan. General Roberts was cooperative, and I was able to get the organization of the Fifteenth (Strategic) Air Force The new description of grand strategy stated: the Joint Plans Committee to agree to all the important in the Mediterranean to take its place with the Eighth. things that affected the Air Forces. Even this consolidation proved unable to prevent a 1. Ourstudies of the subject have taken account of: MATfERHORN Long before the proposed invasion of Normandy, diversion of strategic air forces away from their General Arnold sought to strengthen the strategic air primary mission and their employment in support of a. The possibiJity that invasion of the An outline plan was prepared by the Air War Plans forces opposing the European Axis powers through local missions. Without this unified command, principal JWanese islands may not be Division of the Air Staff for use of the B-29s from merger and establishment of a unified air command. however, the diversions would have been far worse. necessary and the defeat of Japan may be bases to be constructed by the forces of Chiang Kai­ The Eighth Air Force in England and the Northwest Airmen became distrustful of the powers of surface accomplished by sea and air blockade and shek in China. It was the only way we could find for African Strategic Air Forces of the Mediterranean theater commanders. When the time for organization intensive air bombardment from initially applying the B-29s, however ineffectively, should have been directed in a coordinated attack and command of air forces in the war against Japan progressively advanced bases. The plan against Japan proper, prior to capture of the Marianas. against the selected targets of Germany. But they were carne up for consideration, the fight was renewed on a must, however, be capable of expansion to The idea was not entirely new. At the Casablanca separated by command barriers. The strategic air broader scale. But command of strategic air forces in meet the contingency of invasion. Conference in January 1943, President Roosevelt forces in the Mediterranean were under the theater Europe was not the only air issue at Cairo. discussed such a possibility with Mr Churchill. commander in that area, a British general. They were I had returned from England to become the US Air General Marshall endorsed General Arnold's view being used to support theater objectives. General member of the Joint Plans Committee only about four 3. Overall Objective. that Japanese industry was very vulnerable to Arnold sought to correct this fault by merging the weeks before departing for the SEXTANT To obtain objectives from which we can bombardment from the air. The President added that command of the US strategic air forces in both areas Conference. During my preparation for the conduct intensive air bombardment and periodic bombing of Japan would have a tremendous under a single US strategic air commander, who would Conference, I surprised by one paper I carne was establish a sea and air blockade against Japan morale effect upon the Chinese people. He suggested have authority to direct the strategic air operations. across. It was the proposed Joint War Plan for the and from which to invade Japan proper if this sending 200 to 300 planes to China, including heavy As the Air Planner, I was able to put the issue conduct of the war in the Pacific. The opening should prove necessary. bombers [B-24s], and proposed that the bombers be through the Joint Plans Committee of the US Joint statement of basic strategy, which had been prepared based in India and staged through advanced bases in Chiefs of Staff, with some difficulty. As the US Air by the Far East War Plans Group and endorsed by the China. member of the Joint and Combined Plans Committee, Joint War Plans Review Board (whIch contamed an We also succeeded in inserting a sentence in the The President had gone so far as to wire Chiang it was my job to put it through the Combined Plans Air Corps flag officer), stated, in effect: "Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944," Kai-shek that he was sending General Arnold to Committee at the Cairo Conference. It met stiff which was approVed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff Chunking to discuss US aid because he was opposition from the British members. on 3 December 1943. The paragraph read: Our contention was that unity of command and . . . it has been clearly demonstrated in the war "determined to increase General Chennault's air concerted cooperation in the target area were more in Europe that strategic air forces are incapable force> in order that you may carry the offensiveto the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific. The important than unity of command of logistics and of decisive action and hence the war against Japanese at once." However this reference was to the advance along the New Guinea-NEI-Philippines administration in the base areas. The British, who had Japan must rely upon victory through surface Japanese in China, not to Japan proper. An outllOe axis will proceed concurrently with operations the overall command of all air forces in the forces, supported appropriately by air forces. plan for the use of B-29. based in India and staged for capture of the Mandated Islands (by the Mediterranean, were quick to oppose a change that Final victory must come through invasion of the the through China for attack of the Japanese home islands Central Pacific). A strategic bombingforce willbe would rob their senior air' commander in the Japanese home islands. initially presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff established in Gumn, 1inian, and Saipan fo r was Mediterranean of a large block of his air power. They by General Arnold at Quebec, but the plan was tabled strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air pointed out the complexities of logistic support and There was no dissenting voice from the air members there for consideration by the Joint Logistics bombardment of targets in the NEI-Philippine the fact that the US strategic air forces in the of these committees. The draft plan had been sent to Committee and reconsideration at SEXTANT. Area and the aerial neutralization of Rabaul will Mediterranean were completely dependent upon the the various members of the Joint Plans Committee. AW PD-42 had listed "iron and steel" as a primary be intensified. common logistics facilities. A separate operational This was October of 1943. To be sure, the bombing target system in the air offensive against the Japanese command would still be at the mercy of the logistics offensive against Germany had not yet demonstrated allocations and capacity. Why not leave the command decisive capability. It had not yet been launched 10 The strategy underlying the bombing of Japan chain as it was and direct the US strategic air strength and would not reach full power for almost proper was similar to that against Germany: to defeat commander in the Mediterranean to cooperate and another year. Nothing had been demonstrated eIther • TheellpftMion "occuplion." ..distinct rl'QlTl "inYMion," _ dctibcraaeJy inlClted the coordinate with his opposite number in England? This for or against the potentials of that strategic air by alrmm in sexTANT dise..wn.. °Oencn.l Cbc:n.lWIll wu commUidina the newly ereMed FOIlI1«nth Air Fnrce, wou ld, of course, leave the strategic air forces in the offensive. With much difficulty, I succeeded 10 ..tiODed at variOUIaitfldds in (bIlla, and, ly.conclirreril air advilot 10 OUal'll Klii-ahck 'Combined Chief, ofSIaff 417, 2 December 1943. and commander ofthe FOfCe. Mediterranean under the command of the local theater amending that statement of basic strategy and C'hi.- Air 19 18 home islands. The Committee of Operations Analysts coking plants. The vicinity of Chengtu, China, was the accelerate the destruction of selected systems of poor choice. Nevertheless, MATTERHORN (COA ) agreed that iron and steel were vital both to the preferred advanced base location. The location, critical Japanese industry, which would reduce the proceeded asplanned and approved. war-making capabilities of Japan and to the economic relative importance, and approximate distance of these Japanese war effort to impotency. Among the At the SEXTANT Conference, Allied leaders also structure of the state. plants from Chengtu was as fo llows: intermediate objectives was the partial neutralization agreed upon two coordinated, but semi-independent, Steel production was in short supply and was of theJapanese air force by combat and through the surface thrusts inthe Pacific: one from the Southwest running about 9,500,000 tons per year. The Anshan, destruction of aircraft factories, and the reduction of Pacific, under command of General Douglas consumption was divided almost equally between near Mukden 34.5% of prod. 1350 miles Japanese shipping and naval resources. This would MacArthur; one across the Central Pacific, under military and naval usage and industrial and civilian Penhisu, contribute directly to the later major air offensive from command of Admiral of the Fleet Chester Nimitz. usage. The following shows the extent to which steel near Mukden 11.2% of prod. 1300 miles the Marianas. The plan called for advance bases to be 3.6% of prod. 1400 miles provided bythe Chinese in the was vital in both categories: Kenjiho, Korea vicinity of Chengtu and Conferences in the Pacific Theaters Yawata, rear bases to be provided bythe British in the vicinity Kyushu, Japan (1) 16.2% of prod. 1500 miles of Calcutta, India. Ten B-29 groups (28 aircraft per ConsumptionGroup Yawata, group) were to be available for deployment in China At the termination of the SEXTANT Conference at Military Naval 3.9% of prod. 1500 miles Cairo, I was chosen to go with General Marshall to and Kyushu, Japan (2) by October 1944. Two thousand B-24 type aircraft, Aircri.ft 190,000 tons 2.0% Onuta, converted to transports, would be required to support meet with our principal commanders in the theaters in Armored Fighting Kyushu, Japan 3.3% of prod. 1475 miles such operations from Calcutta supply bases. This the Pacific. Our flight plan took us to Karachi, India, Vehicles 142,000 tons 1.5 number of aircraft, so converted, could be made then to Ceylon. Ammunition 1,800,000 tons 19.0 available in the Calcutta area by October 1944. Lt Gen George Kenney, General MacArthur's air Artillery & Chengtu is about 1150 miles from Calcutta. The Combined Staff Planners concluded on 14 commander, met us at Darwin, Australia. We then General Arnold directed Brig Gen K. B. Wolfe, Small Arms 190,000 tons 2.0 September 1943 that the plan was unfeasible from a flew across the Arafura Sea to Port Moresby in New Misc. Field Equip. 998,000 tons 10.5 who was to command the first combat unit of B-29 logistic viewpoint. Despite this negative reaction to the Guinea. The following day, General Marshall met Shipbuilding 950,000 tons 10.0 bombers, the XXth BomberCommand, to prepare an MATTERHORN proposal, just before he departed with General MacArthur at the latter's headquarters outline operational plan tocarry out an attack on these Buildings & for the SEXTANT conference, General Arnold on Goodenough Island. Only four persons were Works 430,000 tons 4.5 targets. General Wolfe's plan was expanded by the Air requested that the COA provide him with a list of present: General Marshall, General MacArthur, War Plans Division and became Project General Kenney, and myself. Subtotal 4,700,000 tons 49.5% recommended targets for Japan to be considered for MATTERHORN. Industrial and Civilian final air offensive which would include the General Kenney had been Assistant Chief of The strategic purpose and concept of Project the Staff,operations on the staff of Gen Frank M. Buildings & Works 430,000 tons 4.5% operations from other bases. Targets should be those MATTERHORN were sound. The logistic Andrews in the early days of G HQ Air Force and Storage and which were suitable for air bombardment and "which had requirements were staggering and the logistic plan was made a major contribution toward creation of air Transport 380,000 tons 4.0 would knock Japan out of the war." Iron and steel horrendous. The B- 29s would be based in India and power. He hit it off from the first with General Mining and were high on that list. would stage through advanced bases in China. Even if MacArthur-and little wonder. He did things with air Quarrying 470,000 tons 6.0 The COA described 13 industries which did not the Chinese could .be persuaded to build the air bases, forces that left airmen gasping. General MacArthur Carbonization "now appear profitable aviation target systems," but it would be necessary to support the operations from owed much of his brilliant success in the Southwest Industry 190,000 tons 2.0 listed other preferred target systems: the advance bases by air supply over the Himalayas. Pacific to General Kenney's imaginative performance. Agricultural 1. Merchant shipping in harbors and at sea The B-29s themselves would have to ferry bombs and The meeting place was a shack which had Machinery 95,000 tons 1.0 2. Iron and steel production, to be reached through been gasoline over "the Hump," supplemented by a fleet of fitted up as a private war room for General Machinery, Equip- coke ovens (in Manchuria, Korea and Kyushu, within B-24s which were to be converted into tankers. The MacArthur. Maps and charts covered all the walls. ment, Tools 475 ,000 tons 5.0 range of Chengtu) effective rate of the operations would be very low General MacArthur described the situation and his Railways 1,140,000 tons 12.0 3. Urban industrial areas, vulnerable to incendiary indeed. Their primary virtue would lie in striking an plans. He at various maps, strode back and forth, Motor Vehicles 190,000 tons 2.0 attacks stood important blow against Japan proper and in and talked for about two hours without notes of any Chemical & 4. Aircraft plants preservation of the command and control structure sort. He had at his fingertips all the dispositions and Electrical Ind. 380,000 tons 4.0 5. Antifriction bearing industry, highly pending the time when other Pacific bases could be recent actions of his troops. He seemed equally well Miscellaneous 950,000 tons concentrated in six main factories captured and prepared. � 6. Electronics industry, whose interruption would acquainted with his enemy. He named Japanese Subtotal 4,800,000 tons 50.5% Chiang Kai-shek, who was present at the Cairo have immediate military effects organizations and their commanders everywhere and Total 9,500,ooo tons 100.0% Conference, agreed to the base construction. He as was 7. The petroleum industry seemed well informed of their competence. He good as his word. The bases were hand-constructed by described his plans, culminating in the recapture of the hundreds of thousands of workers. The COA contended that the list was not in an order of Philippines and preparation for the next campaign, The COA fo und that, in Japan, steel production was Actually, project MATTERHORN had a painful desired priority. whether it beFormosa or the coastof China, in minute birth and its life span was brief. The Air Plans uniquely vulnerable because of the heavy In spite of all the criticism and opposition, Project detail, defining the force requirements (land, sea,and concentration of coke ovens, upon which steel Division of the Air Staff, under General Kuter's MATTERHORN was approved at the SEXTANT air), the timing, the objectives, and the logistic flow. production depends. Six coking plants, three in the supervision, planned MATTERHORN. General Conference. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to build the Throughout the presentation, he employed wit and Japanese southern island of Kyushu, two near Mukden Arnold presented the final plan to the JCS and, after advance bases at Cbengtu. The British, who would charm with devastating persuasiveness. Although I had in Manchuria, and one in Korea produced 73 percent some discussion, the JCS, at General Arnold's request, have to build the bases in the Calcutta area, went from the firstbeen an advocate of "Europe fint," with of Japanese coke. They stated that the destruction of referred it to the Joint Staff Planners. Both the Joint along. attendant delay against Japan, I simply melted under these six coking plants would deprive Japan of 66 Staff Planners and the Joint Intelligence Committee But this did not end the argument. As late as 15 the persuasive logic and the delightful charm of the raised serious questions as to the desirability and the percent of her total steel production. Coke ovens were February 1944, the Joint War Plans Committee still great MacArthur. By the time he had finished, I vulnerable to shock and their replacement would take feasibility of the concept. Nevertheless, it was sent to believed that the best use of the B-29s prior to wanted to give him everything he had asked for. yean. the Combined Staff Planners for comment or deployment in the Marianaswould befrom Australian General Marshall was of far sterner stuff, though his The Air War Plans Division proposed that B-29s be agreement. bases for use against shipping and oil. In that position left him reason for sensitivity or even based in China, within range of some or all of these The overall objective of MATTERHORN was to Committee's opinion, Chengtu, in China, was a very embarrassment. In their earlier relationship, yean

20 21 before, General MacArthur had been Chiefof Staff of constructed. His schedule called for capture of the the 'US Army when General Marshall was still, I Marianas in mid-June, Ulithi-Yap by 1 September, ;� . great prestige, was really a suppliant for approval, He General MacArthur's Chief of Staff, submitted a plan L&.I ; � " � had to have General Marshall's approval for the plans which called for major support of an operation code­ � � J: 1&1 which he proposed and espoused with such elan. named Operation RENO IV. This operation proposed i t- I-'ot Those plans would have required the assignment to a drive along the northern coast of New Guinea into � � CC'ot0:0> General MacArthur not only of the majority of the Mindanao, Philippine Islands. In a covering letter, he ., 0: en stated, "The line of action presented in RENO IV will 1--.c : : �. American forces arrayed against Japan, but also c( ()II)u substantial diversions of forces destined for Europe. sever sea communications between Japan and the vital .. "'0.. This was seven months before the launching of the Borneo-Netherlands East Indies-Malaya region and G: 0 :IE . Normandy Invasion. General Marshall had to tell him will place our forces in the Luzon-Formosa-China � , (j . he could not have these forces and hence could Coast areas at the earliest possible date under : that II CCa. not carry out the program which he had described. conditions that can be foreseen at this time."3 ". � i·.. " This General Marshall proceeded quietly to do. He Neither of these plans and presentations gave any L&. importance to a strategic air offensive against Japan reminded General MacArthur that the basic grand () ,... strategy of defeating Hitler first, and concentrating proper. When these proponents of rival strategies had c( maximum forces to that purpose, was agreed upon and reached the end of their presentations before the Joint l Gt'� approved not only by the Combined Chiefs of Staffbut Chiefs of Staff, General Arnold remarked that the � Q. d' by the President himself and Mr Churchill. General Army Air Forces (AAF) would like to present its ....2: .! Marshall stated quite calmly his own devotion to that views on Pacific strategy at the next meeting. As he was "- V scheme, of which, in fact, he had been one of the leaving the room, he turned to me and told me to principal architects. prepare the presentation. I conferred with Generals i:i: The meeting ended on the same level of punctilious Santy Fairchild and Larry Kuter and prepared an courtesy. If General MacArthur waschagr ined, aswell outline. I went up to General Arnold's office to seek his ...... as disappointed, he did not show it. We leftfor home . . via Hawaii where General Marshall met with Admiral approval or instructions and learned that he had gone �� Nimitz and his staff. There wasa presentationof a plan to the West Coast and would not be back for the next 0 for Central Pacific strategy which advocated, quite JCS meeting. Later I came to understand and .. � c naturally, the placing of primary reliance for regaining appreciate this tactic-which General Arnold o. used �� several times. His position as amember ofthe JCS base areas upon the US Navy. General Marshall made was .:10 no commitments that I know of, and we proceeded equivocal at best. The AAF was never accepted as an home. equal partner by the Navy. The Navy Department did not openly tryto quash the upstart air membership, but it worked quietly on the premise that there were by law PacificStrategy � only two recognized Departments-the War :; Department and the Navy Department. General After our return from the SEXTANT Conference Marshall was a tower of strength in supporting at Cairo, the arguments about Pacific strategy General Arnold and the Army Air Forces, but increased. The next major strategic objective was General Arnold was a subordinate Army officer, and described by General Marshall asthe "Formosa-China he could never afford to take open opposition to Coast-Luzon" triangle to be approached by General General Marshall. MacArthur from the Southwest Pacific and Admiral General Marshall was universally fair and Nimitz from the Central Pacific. Proponents of the unbiased, but the Army people as a whole tended to two thrusts made presentations before the Joint Chiefs support General MacArthur-just as the Navy people of Staff, each proposing that the preponderance of tended to support Admiral Nimitz. effort and of forces be assigned to his axis. General Arnold \cnewthat we airmen would tend to On 7 March, Admiral Nimitz, supported by his support the position of Admiral Nimitz and the Navy Deputy, Rear Adm Forrest Sherman, appeared before if we could be assured of the capture of the Mariana the Joint Chiefs of Staff and proposed bypassing the Islands and Guam as base areas for the 8-29 Japanese base at Truk and seizing the southern operations against Japan. If, in General Arnold's Marianas, then proceeding to capture Ulithi Atoll (about 360 miles southwest of Guam) for use as afleet base, together with nearby Yap, where airfields for �. F. Craven and J. L. Cue, edI., 1M Amly Air F'omlJ ill World WdI' lI, Vol IV support of Pacific naval operations could be (OJiCIF. illinois: The Uniwnity ofChiClfOrr.),p. S71. 23 22 absence from the next meeting, General Marshall Marianas -Central should take exception to this approach, General Pacific -15 Jun CHAPTER 4 Arnold could, on his return, dismiss us in good grace Palaus -Central on the ground that we had not been instructed to take Pacific - 15 this line and had exceeded our authority. The position Mindanao -Southwest Sep of the AAF and the support of General Marshall could Pacific -15 Nov be preserved. Formosa -Central But in the actual event, General Marshall did not Pacific -15 Feb 1945 take exception to our position as I presented it on 9 March 1943. The presentation was favorably The question of Pacific strategy had not been clearly received. Subsequently the Joint Plans Committee and resolved and both the rival surface strategies were the Joint Logistics Committee proposed the following endorsed, but capture of the Marianas as air bases and support for the B- 29 operations in their air offensive schedule (see Pacific War Theater map): against the Japanese home iSlands were secured. This Strategic Air Force-Pacific Hollandia -Southwest precipitated the vital question of how the B-29s would Pacific - 15 Apr be organized, commanded, and controlled.

Organization, Command, Control, and Project MAlTERHORN called for bases in India Deployment oftbe Strategic Air Forces and China. US fo rces there were under command of General Joseph Stilwell, US Army. He, in tum, was a part of the Allied Southeast Asia Command headed by The command of strategic air forces was even more Adm Lord Louis Mountbatten, Royal Navy. difficult a problem than the technical problems posed Admiral Mountbatten was Supreme Allied by the bomber airplane. Unity of command was a Commander, Southeast Asia, a command which had cherished military concept in both the Army and the created at the recent Quebec Conference. But Na�. T!'e Army achieved this unity of command by been . Chiang Kai -shek did not recognize any commander in desIgnating single commanders to exercise command China above himself. General Stilwell commanded all over all units within s�ific geographical boundaries. US fo ces in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, The Navy achieved it by retaining control of major � including the B-29 forces. Maj Gen Claire Chennault combat naval forces under ultimate command of the top naval echelon of the nation. Fleet units were rarely commanded the Fourteenth US Army Air Force in China and was at the same time Chiang Kai-shek's assign� to territorial command areas, and when they were, It was always WIth the proviso that they could be Chief of Staff for Air. Admiral Mountbatten had a withdrawn at any moment for employment elsewhere Commander in Chief, Eastern Air Command, Air if the naval situation should so require. Marshal Richard Peirse. Lt Gen George Stratemeyer �trategic air forces did not fit either concept, but was Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, in to their command characteristics more closely resembled India-Burma and Air Advisor General Stilwell in those of the Navy than those of the Army. Often the China. General Stratemeyer's command included the long-range air force straddled several land commands. Tenth Air Force, based in India. To confuse further an Its bombers might be based in many areas, each of already complicated command arrangement, General . whIch was under separate Army or Navy jurisdiction. Stilwell gave General Stratemeyer administrative But bombers of the strategic air forees had to have command of the B-29 force, which hadits main bases in India, and issued orders to the Fourteenth Air Force unity a� th� ta�et area, and they had to have continuity through him. General Stilwell proposed to exercise o� �phcatlOn If they were to accomplish their strategic direct operational control of the B-29s which he mIssIon. The very flexibility which constituted the cardinal virtue of strategic bombers also constituted planned to use extensively in combined operations in China against Japanese ground fo rces. Admiral their greatest vulnerability. There was a constant Mountbatten endorsed the initial operations involved temptation to �ive� them from their long-range . in MAlTERHORN but planned to the B-29s later strategIC war objectIVes to targets that were critical use in only to local area commanders. support of Southeast Asia Command objectives. The problem of unity of command became more (See Appendix A for organizational charts as of January and August 1945.) acute as primary attention turned to Japan and the B-29 force began to emerge. In order to apply this very General Chennault, in his capacity as Chiang Kai­ heavy bo�ber (VH8) force against Japan proper, shek's Chief of Staff for Air, made a direct appeal to wh,ch was Its real role, plans were made to establish a President Roosevelt requesting that all B-29s number of bases within action radius of Japan. Those operating out of China be placed under his control. He bases were to be in China, the Marianas, Alaska, the made a similar request directly to General Arnold Philippines, and Formosa or Okinawa. asking that the B-29s operating from Chinese bases �

24 25 placed under th� control of his Founeenth US Anny Kikai I took the paper to General Tom Handy. He took The command arrangement for the B-29s was Air Force. Island 2 groups, support fighters the paper, read it carefully, and looked at me. "I'll tell referredto the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, since The Joint Staff Planners proposed ultimately Okinawa I Sq. Suat. Recon. you the truth, Hansell," he said, "I don't like any part combined plans called for participation of British placmg four groupsof B-29s in the Philippines. Those of this paper. It violates the principle of unity of bombers in the final air offensive against Japan. Also, islands, when recaptured, would be under the The main thesis of the plan was a unified and command in a Theater of War. It inserts operational the change in command relations would affect the command of Gen Douglas MacArthur, whose chief concerted air bombardment, concentrated against a forces into a commander's area of responsibility but Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. who airman (Gen George Kenney) was already making single list of targets in the Japanese home islands and gives him no control of those forces. At the same time, operated under the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the vigorous demands for B-29s to be used in the South­ coordinated through a unified air command. the Theater Commander is expected to defend and British Chiefs of Staff Committee as executive agents. west Pacific campaign. General Kenneywanted B-29s supply and support those forces in competition with The British Chiefs countered with the proposal that stationed in Darwin, Australia, for use against targets his own requirements. I don't like it." Then he grinned the air offensive. including the Twentieth Air Force in the Netherlands East Indies. Plans were actively TwentiethAir Force and said, "But I don't have a better solution. I'll buy and later a British bomber contingent, beplaced under being prepared for placing B-29s in the Central The it." I said, "Do you think General Marshall will buy the control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, rather Pacific and in Alaska. The Mariana Islands which ' it?" He said, "General Marshall isn't here. But I know than the US Joint Chi efs of Staff. This would parallel were to be captured principally as the Central Pacific Various schemes for centralizing control of the how he'll react. If General Arnold and Admiral King the command relationship in the European Combined base for the B-29s, would be under the command of B-29s under the JCS had discussed ever since been are agreed on it, he'll go along. As a matter of fact, I'll Bomber Offensive in which Air Marshal Portal had Adm Chester Nimitz, US Navy. SEXTANT. Actually it was the similarity of this air approve it in his name." been the executive agent of the Com bined Chiefs of Each of these base was under a separate problem to the traditional naval problem which fm ally areas The memorandum served as the basis of a paper Staff. The JCS demurred. The Combined Bomber theater command, and these field commanders were was persuasive. At least, it was this similarity which submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staffby the Joint Staff Offensive in Europe was a joint British/American powerful people. Each had strategic purposes to be persuaded Adm Ernest J. King to accept the idea of a Planners. The Twentieth Air Force was established as venture. The air offensive against Japan would be achieved. Each wanted to apply the B-29s to his own strategic air force that would be ignedass to noneof the a result. primarily an American venture. The British did not strategic theater purposes, and each resented any surface commands but would report directly to the Inception. And so the Twentieth Air Force was press the issue. incursion into his area of control. Yet there was one Joint Chiefs of Staff. born. It was called the Twentieth to distinguish it from Organization and Deployment. When General in which unity of air command and continuity of The manner in which this important agreementwas area the other numbered air forces. There were no Arnold became Commanding General and I became effort was imperative, and that was the target area seems almost trivial. I secured General reached Sixteenth or Seventeenth or Eighteenth or Nineteenth the first Chief of Staff, Twentieth Air Force, it was itself, Japan, which was under the control of none of Arnold's permission to discuss the subject with air forces. On 12 April 1944, the Joint Chiefs apparent that we would need a staff fo r the new them. Admiral King. I found Admiral King and General approved the activation of the Twentieth Air Force, organization. But General Arnold already had a In March 1944, I presented to the Joint Chiefs of Arnold walking together down a corridor leading to with General Arnold as its first commander. staff-quite a large one-the Air Staff, or Staffthe Army Air Forces concept of Pacific strategy, tbe JCS conference room. I asked Admiral King if I Some years later, an Air Force officer would Headquarters, Army Air Forces. He was reluctant to which called for a concerted bomber offensive against might have a word with him. I described briefly the describe the wartime establishment of the Twentieth increase the overhead by creating still another staff. I the Japanese home islands from the Marianas to problem of concerted command and control of the Air Force as "one of the most important events in suggested to General Arnold that he use the Air Staff undermine and destroy the warmaking oapabili of long-range bombers which would be attacking United States Air Force history. If that had not to meet his needs for the Twentieth Air Force. He Japan. The plan also called for the main B-29 forcetY to common targets in Japan but would be operating from occurred," he thought, "we might still be parcelling agreed, somewhat reluctantly. The Air Staff was the be established there. When the Philippines had been bases under the command of several separate theater out our big punch in penny packets to numerous parent headquarters for all the numbered air fo rces . retaken, a B-29 force was to be established tbere, also commanders. I suggested a similari ty wi th the theaters and lower commands. And there might have To single out the Twentieth as the special concern of on within range of Japan. The B-29s in Chengtu, problems attendant on control of the US Fleet, whose � been no United States Air Force." the Air Staff-as an operational headquarters for a Chma, were to be moved forward when better base command was centralized under him as Commander The Joint Chiefs, in approving the creation of the combat air command-would seem to slight all the areas became available. A base to be constructed in Chief, US Fleet, as well asNavy memberof the Joint was Twentieth Air Force, directed: others. But General Arnold did not want another in the Aleutian Islands as well. Chiefs of Staff. Would it not be sensible to concentrate headquarters staff in Washington. so he went along The first plan for the ultimate deployment of B-29s, the very long-range bombers in a strategic air force . with my suggestion. Each of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff pnor to redeployment of the Eighth Air Force, and under General Arnold, Commanding General of the Commanders of the Theaters in which the for the several Air Staff sections-Personnel, escort fi ghters, when they became available, as Army Air Forces? Under this arrangement, the B-29s was Twentieth Air Force's XXth and XXIst Bomber Intelligence, Operations, Materiel, and Plans in the follows: would actually fall under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with General Arnold serving not only Commands are based are directed to coordinate Air Staff-was told to wear two hats-one for the B-29 operations with other air operations in Chengtu,China 4 as Commanding General, but also as executive agent Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and one for the groups· their Theaters. to construct and defend B-29 Mariana for the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs would provide Twentieth Air Force. Each of these Deputy Chiefs of bases, and to provide logistical support and Islands 16 groups, 3 squadrons each unified strategic air objectives. Like fleet units of the Staff selected one senior officer to represent him in common administrative control of the B-29 Twentieth Air Force matters. Table 4- 1.) General Ryukyu Navy, logistic support could be provided through (See directives to appropriate area and theater fo rces. Should strategic or tactical emergencies Order No I, Twentieth Air Force, assigned Col Cecil Islands 12 groups, 3 squadrons each arise requiring the use of the B-29 forces for Philippine commanders. Admiral King reflected for a moment E. Combs to the A-3 Division as Chief of Combat purposes other than the missions assigned to Islands and then said, "I could find such an arrangement Operations. I was designated a Deputy Chief of the Air 12 groups, 3 squadrons each them by the Joint Chiefs, Theater commanders Aleutian acceptable. " Staff as well as Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air are authorized to use the B-29 forces, 4 groups, (questionable) I prepared a brief memorandum to that effect, Force. On the whole, I thought the scheme worked Islands immediately informing the Joint Chiefs of such Iwo Jima discussed it with General Kuter and General . reasonably well. action. In many ways the Twentieth had unique features Island 3 groups, support fighters Fairchild, and then tookit over to the War Department and problems. It was necessary to establish and Ie Shima Operations Division. The struggle was only half won approve tables of organization and equipment and to 2 groups, support fighters because General Marshall was dedicated to the Island Admiral King's endorsement was vital because the concept of theater unity of command. He had establish tactical doctrine and standard operating even bUlk of the bombers would be in the Pacific Ocean forced through the first Alliedunified command the procedures. This was necessary for two reasons: to Area, which was a naval command. General Marshall, ill-fated organization under General Wa 1I permit the handling, control. and coordination of British � ' with his typical breadth of vision, gave full support to before the fall of the Netherlands Indies. large numbers of aircraft and units; and to provide a East the project. basis for uniform training. 26 27 used not only my meager name and authority to chum HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE communications-both command and control and find anywhere. They will respond to a gesture of administrative. The JCS had approved our request to the brew, but he used General Arnold's big name and faith, if they understand the issues and if they are authority The Air Staff members who served as principal set up our own separate communications system. This as well. I don't suppose we will ever find out treated fairly and equably. I suggest we have a staffmembers for the Twentieth Air Force while was a sizable order. We would have units and the true level of supplies that were ordered for the general meeting of all the professional aviation I was Chief of Staff of the Twentieth and Deputy headquarters scattered over half the world. I briefed Twentieth. I think it likely that 'supplies were still writers, tell them the truth, put them on their Chief of Staff of the Air Staff included: General Arnold on our communications requirements being shipped to the Marianas long after the war was honor not to divulge, and assure them that, when and watched with amusement the application of his over and the troops had come home. Through his the news can be released they will all be told so at famous technique for attacking the impossible. effo rts I also acquired for a brief time my own personal exactly the same time so that there will be no Brig Gen J. H. He called ih Brig Gen Harold McClelland, head of "Fleet," but that is another story. "scoops." Let them write their stories and fi le McCormick A- I communications for the Army Air Forces. General During the period I served as Chief of Staff of the them with us. We will release them Col W. M. Burgess A-2 Arnold said, with caustic emphasis, that he wanted the Twentieth Air Force, I had one particular experience simultaneously at the earliest time that will not Col Cecil E. Combs A-3-Combat fo llowing: which I well remember. The B-29s were coming off jeopardize our mission. Operations the P!oduction line and there was increasing interest Col W. F. McKee A-3-Operations, A net that would include Washington, Hawaii, and speculation in the aviation press. We tried to keep Commiunents, the Marianas (which had not yet been captured), a tight rein on security. The B-29s were destined for I was somewhat shaken by this bold suggestion. But and Calcutta, India, and Chengtu, China with the major air assault on Japan . They would be I had a lot of faith in Rex Smith, and I realized that I knew practically nothing about the press and news Requirements provision for extension to somewhere in the operating at high altitude, unescorted. If the Japanese Col L. O. Ryan A-3-Training Aleutian chain and somewhere in the learned this and also discovered the salient elements of media. I bought the idea and obtained General Arnold's agreement. LlCol J. W. Carpenter A-3-Crew Training Philippines (when they were captured). He B-29 performance and defensive firepower, they Col S. R. Brentnall A-4-MM&D wanted TOP SECRET Security with would try by every means at their disposal to provide We had the meeting in a midwestern city. There Col Sol Rosenblatt A-4-Supply instantaneous coding and read-out by defenses against them. Security could be directly were several hundred people present. The security Maj Gen L. S. Kuter A-5-Plans teleprinters. He wanted the net in operation equated in terms of mission success or failure and in arrangements were carefully prepared and carried out. Maj Gen D. W. Grant Surgeon twenty-four hours a day. terms of the lives of American crewmen. We were We "spi lied the beans" to a degree that ' left me Brig Gen H. L. deeply worried about news leaks. Ofcourse there was quaking. And it worked like a charm. Reponers and McClelland Communications wartime censorship, but skilled aviation writers who writers filed their stories. When the first bombs were Col Max Schneider Air Inspector Fantastic, I thought! It couldn't be done. indulged in speculation could and often did hit upon released over Tokyo and were still in the air, a message Col Guido Perera Target General McClelland didn't bat an eye. He said the truth. was flashed back to Guam and was automatically Intelligence "Yes, sir," saluted and departed. It left General We had an exceptionally fine Public Relations relayed to Washington. The President was the first and represen­ Arnold a little flat and me completely deflated. Officer in the Twentieth Air Force Headquarters. His recipient. But almost simultaneously the stories and tative of the General McClelland had the last chuckle. He nam� was Rex Smith, and he was a wartimecolonel in reports which Rex Smith had been holding were Committee of produced. Shortly after I had set up headquarters in the Air Corps. He was a veteran newsman and had at released to the press and the other news media. Operations Guam, about six months later, the machinery was one time been editor ofNe wsweek magazine. He came Analysts working. Within six weeks, I was sick of it The tome with a suggestion and recommendation. He said: Whether this approach would work again, I do not machine worked 24 hours a day all right, without know. But it worked once to perfection and every stopping. Most of the messages seemed to consist of I know my people and my associates. They are as attendee at the conference proved completely trustwonhy. Table 4-1. questions that I couldn't answer. I began to understand loyal and patriotic as any Americans you can the meaning of the remark ascribed to Lord Palmerston to the effect that the disintegration of the Arrangements had to be made for deployment to British Empire had begun with the invention of the overseas bases and for logistical support. Personnel telegraph. had to be selected for key assignments. Top At one of our daily staff meetings of the assignments had to be approved by General Arnold, of Headquarters Twentieth Air Force, I got rather upset course, and he selected commanders at his own because supplies were not being provided for the discretion. I watched anxiously the progress the Twentieth at a rate which I thought satisfactory. The Materiel Command made in correcting a multitude of staff representative for materiel was a temporary technical problems with the airplane and engines. wartime colonel named Sol Rosenblatt. I delivered I spent as much time as I could shepherding myself of a somewhat intemperate diatribe. I concepts and ideas through the Joint War Plans mentioned that the US Navy always got the best of Committee, the Joint Plans Committee, and the JCS, everything, with plenty to spare, while good fighting and discouraging dismemberment of the force. At my people in the Army-and the Army Air Forces in request, the Committee of Operations Analysts was particular-made do on a song and a shoestring. The made responsive to the Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Twentieth Air Force was on its way to becoming the Air Force for matters pertaining to the Twentieth Air most powerful fighting force in the world, and it Force. I had to be ready on a momenfs notice to deserved the best and we were going to provide it. answer General Arnold's questions. He had to be I felt that I had expressed myself well and that the informed in order to meet the questions of the other point was clearly understood-and I dismissed the members of the JCS, who were showing a lively subject from my mind for awhile. But intemperance interest in the new Twentieth Air Force. often breeds surprising results. It did so in this case. It Command nnd Control. One of the first challenges was some time before I found out what a fire I had facing the Twentieth Air Force was started. Colonel Rosenblatt took me seriously. He 29 28 engineering achievement, but it was new and different turned out to be unsuitable for night radar bombing. CHAPTER S and it had new engines which we did not fully Other targets had to be suitable for radar bombing or understand. they had to be located in lightly defended areas. Aside from the coke ovens, this left little of vital importance as·targets for the XXth Bomber Command. The XXlst Bomber Command The COA, whose advice was sought concerning the strategic targets for the Twentieth Air Force The Twentieth Air Force was under extreme regardless of base areas, recommended that the B-29 pressure to perform. Olle major slip and the critics � be employed against merchant shipping, steel would have had their way-the Twentieth Air Force producl1on (through coke ovens), urban industrial would have been dismembered and parceled out to the areas, aircraft plants, and antifriction bearing industry, various theaters. An understanding of this tension and the electronics industry and, belatedly, the petroleum pressure is vital to an understanding of the early mdustry. The COA repeated its conviction that the struggle of the XXIst Bomber Command to meet its coke oven plants in Manchuria were highly vulnerable Early Deployment and Initial Operations commitments. We had given a pledge to launch an air to bombing and were vital to the production of steel in offensive against Japan in November 1944. This Japan. The Committee also pointed out the extreme proposed offensive was tied into the carefully prepared vulnerability of Japanese urban areas to incendiary plans for the Pacific campaigns of Admiral Nimitz and attack. General MacArthur. The target date had to be met, themselves. But others of us believed it could be done. The Air Staff, with the memory of the Luftwaffe Original plans calledfor the Twentieth Air Force to and the success of a highly controversial operation had fighters still fresh in its mind, advocated the selection have, eventually, three or four bombercommands: the As a matter of fact, the XXIst did penetrate the to be demonstrated, if strategic air power was to reach defenses of Tokyo in raids from the Marianas later in of the Japanese air fo rce as an overriding priority for XX Bomber Command in China-India; the XXI in the fruition in the Pacific. the year, with only one wing of B-29s-the same the XXIst Bomber Command. The Joint Chiefs of Marianas; the XXII in the Philippines or Formosa or The XXIst Bomber Command was activated at Staff agreed. The aircraft factories and engine Okinawa; and perhaps a XXIII in Alaska. Its total strength avai lable to the XXth. Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Salina, Kansas, on 1 General Wolfe vigorously denied that his B-29s factories assigned as targets to the XXIst Bomber strength would be 1000 to 1500 operational B-29s and March 1944. At that time, the XXth Bomber Command, based in the Marianas, were precision such eScort fighters as could be developedor modified. were capable of flying in fo rmations in daylight to Command was being established in the China-Burma­ targets. There were 13 aircraft and engine plants Although the decision to concentrate the B-29s these targets and added the categorical statement that India Theater. The 73rd Wing, which was originally known to exist in Japan. Eight of these were estimated under Joint Chiefs of Staff control made po ible.. the they would be incapable of reaching their targets in scheduled for the XXth Bomber Command, had been to produce 70 percent of its aircraft engines. Though development of the concerted bomber offensive daylight operations in formation from the Marianas transferred to the XXlst when the XXth was reduced the towns in which the factories were located were against Japan, it did not mark the close of the also. This assessment was a real body blow to the from two wings (eight groups) to one wing, the 58th. known, the actual plants had yet to be located argument from the theater field commanders. They operational plans of the XXIst. General Wolfe was the The XXIst Bomber Command was trained and staffed only air commander with actual experience with the precisely-a major task for the reconnaissance continued their efforts to gain control of the B-29 by the Second Air Force. The headquarters of the squadron of the XXlst. units in their areas. General MacArthur's airplane, and he was the real expert and final authority XXlst Bomber Command was later moved from We had some general knowledge of the Japanese headquarters wasespec ially insistent and coupled its on the B-29 itself. Salina, Kansas, to Peterson Field, Colorado Springs, I directed Col Cecil Combs, Chief of Combat aircraft industry. The Japanese had canvassed requests with personal letters from General Kenney to Colorado. The XXIst Bomber Command was to European and American aircraft and engine builders General Arnold contending that B-29 operations out Operations for the Twentieth, to carry out practice consist of 1000 B-29s, and it had to be given the immediately after World War I and had obtained of the Marianas against the Japanese home islands tests to confirm or refute this contention that the B-29 necessary training. had insufficient range to operate in formation as licenses for production. Three major Japanese were militarily and technically unfeasible. In the late spring of 1944, General Arnold told me required. He went to Eglin Field, Florida, and set up a producers emerged at that time-Nakaj ima, that I was to have command of the XXlst Bomber test run over the Gulf of Mexico simulating the flight Mitsubishi, and Kawasaki. They continued to Command, destined for the Marianas. My replacement from the Marianas to Tokyo and back. Simulated dominate the Japanese airframe, engine, and propellor TheXXth Bomber Command as Chief of Staff of the Twentieth was Brig Gen Larry bombloads of 8,000 pounds were carried as well as business. As the US Strategic Bombing Survey Report Norstad. His arrival was delayed because he felt he full loads of ammunition. He was able to muster only on the Japanese Aircraft Industry later commented: The initial operations of the XXth Bomber should "visit the troops" before becoming Chief of three B-29s for the test, but it was carried out with Command in India and China did not go well. The Staff, and he insisted on going to the India-China logistics problems had been expected, but the wartime combat tactics simulated as closely as Theater. This took time so I could not get away to have While waves of Japanese technicians wefe operational tactics were not producing results even possible, including the nature of the formation itself. a look at training and organize the headquarters of the studying American factories, America's top when the B-29s had enough gas and bombs to attack That is to say, the test involved initial assembly, loose XXlst Bomber Command until August. When I finally engineering schools were training the men who, their targets. Brig Gen K. B. Wolfe was using night formation en route, climb to 30,000 feet for the bomb took command of the XXIst Bomber Command on 28 on their return to Japan, were to design the Zero operations exclusively. The coke oven targets which run, tight defensive formation in the areas of potential August 1944, the units of the 73rd Wing were training fighter, Betty Bomber and other planes on which as first priority did not present good fighter interception, and retention of that fo rmation were prescribed for radar bombing at night, along the pattern of the the Japanese bid for Pacific domination was to radar images and were not easily seen at night. As a until beyond the range of enemy fighters, then return XXth Bomber Command in China, of which it was to be based. By 1930, the Japanese Army and Navy result, the bombs were not being placed on their to base in loose formation. have been a part. had decided the industry should stand on its own targets. As Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force, The aircraft all returned successfully to the original I The XXth, because of its location, logistics feet, and established a policy of self-sufficiency, prodded General Wolfeto improve bombing results. I base, Eglin Field, but the reserves of gasoline were problems, and relationship to the main target areas, whereby only aircraft and engines of Japanese requested that daylight bombing attacks be conducted admittedly too low. The operation was feasible, but had been assigned target priorities different from those designs were to be considered. No more foreign against the coke ovens in the Mukden area in much remained to be learned about fuel consumption given the XXlst. The force was thought to be too small engineers were to be hired. This was intended Manchuria, where the Japanese fighter defenses were and daylight tactics if large formations were to be to fight its way through the defenses of the Japanese mainly as a sop to Japanese nationalistic pride, not considered to be very effective. The available B-29 flown over those distances. General Wolfe received homeland in daylight. And it could reach only the however, and did not prevent their technical force was considered by some to be too small to the report of the test, but he did not move from the southern portion of the Japanese homeland from bases minions from continuing to buy the best foreign penetrate the air defenses of the Japanese Islands stand he had taken. The B-29 was a magn ificent In the area of Chengtu. The coke oven targets had models as starting points for Japanese designs. In

30 31 lesson in Europe?The whole concept of American air 1935 Nakajima purchased licenses on the early in the time remaining. Training would have to be and 80 hardstands, necessary shops, housing, fueling Corsair from Chance Vought Corporation, and power-theselection of vitaltargets on the groundand completed in the Pacific. facilities, and other essentials, were supposed to be It acquired designs of the Whirlwind and their destruction through precision bombing-had Although the Marianas were captured on the ready on Saipan. The bases were to have been built by Cyclone engines from Wright Aeronautical faced the possibility of disastrous failure there. The initiative the Central Pacific Area Command, but stubborn ability of massive bomber fo rmations to fight their way and insistence of the Army Air Forces to Corporation in 1937. Mitsubishi purchased a interference by the Japanese garrisons in the Pacific through enemy defenses and reach remote targets, serve as a base for B-29 operations in the Pacific, the French radial engine, which became the basis for and competition from US Navy construction work had without intolerable losses, came dangerously close to decision was made before crews had enough flying their famous Kinsei series, and secured plans for set the schedule back by several months. a Curtiss fighter in 1937. beingdisproved. If the German fighter forces had been experience with the aircraft to know what the B-29 performance actually was. Initial experience in the I paid a departing visit to General Arnold and Sumitomo Metals bought rights to the left free to expand, the price might have been too high. General Marshall in Washington in mid-September. American Hamilton Standard and German And if that price had been too high, the air offensive training area indicated that the round trip from the In response to his inquiry, I assured General Marshall propellors. Kawasaki secured rights on the Marianas to Tokyo was marginal for the B-29, even on YOM would have failed and with it the hope of surface that we would carry out our pledge to attack Japan in German Daimler Benz engine, from which came invasion as well. paper and without opposition. Depending on the November. the only Japanese liquid.cooled engine in the location of the base and the target, the distance could The bombers of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Departing on 5 October, 1 took the first B-29 to the war. . . . From 1937 onward the Japanese be as much as 1550 miles, one way. Obviously, there Forces were directed against the sources of German Marianas and started the flow which ultimately aircraft industry, in general, and Mitsubishi in would be no land-based escort fighters for the first part fighter development and strength-the aircraft and became massive. I flew with the crew from the 73rd partiCUlar, was shrouded in purposeful secrecy. of the campaign, before the capture of Iwo Jima. Not engine factories, the air bases, and the sources of Wing, commanded by a bright and capable young At a time when we were �anting visas to only was the marginal range of the B-29 a factor. In aviation fuel. These constituted the targets of the major named Jack Catton.' Catton and I alternated in Japanese technicians, the lid was �lamped on addition, the Marianas were separated from Tokyo by "intermediate objective"-the enemy air fo rce. At the the pilot position; I took it from Sacramento to tighter and tighter as the Japanese Government nearly 1500 miles of hostile environment-the Pacific earliest possible time, the penetration capability of the Hawaii; he took it to Kwajalein; and I flew the last lap moved toward closer control of the aircraft Ocean. bomber formations were supplemented by escort to Saipan. We took off from Mather Field near industry. Six weeks later when the time came to move the first fighters. Sacramento. The original design gross weight of the units to Saipan, the crews had averaged less than 100 B-29 was 120,000 lbs. Wright Field reluctantly This experience in Europe obviously weighed hours of total flying time in the B-29, and the average permitted an overload weight to 128,000 lbs. With our We knew that Japan had launched upon a vast and heavily in establishing target systems in Japan. The high-altitude fo rmation flying experience was less than spare engine in the bomb bay and the various kits we hurried expansion of her military aircraft industry. We aircraft and engine factories, and to a more limited 12 hours. The engines of the B-29 developed a mean carried, we weighed in at about 130,000 knew, for example, that the Japanese government had extent, the oil resources of Japan were established as tendency to swallow valves and catch fire. The Ibs. When we reached Hickam Field in Honolulu, directed a near doubling of the aircraft plants in 1941. the "intermediate objective" in the war against Japan magnesium crankcases burned with a fury that defied Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Japanese newspapers bragged to the world that a great also, and were to receive first priority in point of time. all extinguishing efforts. In addition, gunsighting Area, greeted us, as did Lt Gen "Miff" Harmon, who new airframe and assembly plant had been built at blisters were either blowing out at high- altitude or The other lesson of European air combat simply had been designated "Deputy Commanding General Musashino, near Tokyo, and another near Nagoya, frosting up so badly that it was impossible to see could not be applied initially to the Twentieth Air Twentieth Air Force for Administration and which was heralded as the second largest in the world. Force. The range of the B-29 was such that no escort through them. But there was not time to fix them I Logistics." General Arnold retained direct control for Kawasaki set up immense modern plants near Akashi fighters could accompany the fo rmations from the properly. operations as Commanding General Twentieth Air and near Nagoya. Marianas, although efforts were made to provide a The burning-out of exhaust valves was finally Force and Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The exact location and description of these plants very long-range escort fighter. Until Iwo Jima could be solved by fitting a goosenecked pipe which sprayed I asked Admiral Nimitz and General Harmon for I was a mystery to us in the fall of 1944. We recognized, captured and a fighter base established there, the cool air directly on the valve housing and by putting an opportunity to discuss my mission and my ho��ver, that these highly concentrated plants in the bombers would be entirely on their own. This was cuffs on the props which pumped more air through the requirements. I met with Admiral Nimitz the next VICInity of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe would be really the most controversial point of all. Seasoned engine cowling. Oil flow through exhaust valve morning and explained my mission and its peculiar extremely vital precision targets-if and when we experts on every hand assured us that the B-29s would housing was also improved. The other problem, command relationship-I would be completely discovered their precise locations and descriptions. simply be shot out of the air. But it was a risk that had frosting of panes in the cockpit and of plastic bubbles dependent upon Admiral Nimitz for construction of The aircraft targets could not be found, hit, and to be taken_ if the strategic purposes were to be at gunners scanning stations, was solved by running bases in the Marianas, for movement and delivery of destroyed with the radar bombing equipment and the achieved. And the B-29s had some factors working for hot air hoses to the affected areas. With the cockpit all supplies by surface transportation, and for defense meager information we had available at the time. So them, namely, greatly improved defensive firepower blanked out, it obviously would have been impossible of the bases. At the same time, I would be independent the units of the XXIst Bomber Command had to be and high-altitude performance. to keep formation. Also with scanning bubbles of Admiral Nimitz's authority in operational matters, retrained on a crash basis to do high-altitude, daylight clouded, the gunners could not see to shoot. These I issued orders for conversion of the 73rd Wing to except for serious emergencies. precision bombing and to fly in formations which had problems were solved at literally the eleventh hour. not yet been selected. We had to plan on daylight tactics early in September, and I established This command relationship apparently had not The XXIst Bomber Command requested that units reconnaissance after we had established a base on tactical doctrine for daylight operations including a been clearly spelled out or explained to Admiral be flown to Saipan, under Air Transport Command Saipan. The airplane and engine factory targets were at standard fo rmation. Opposition to this change was Nimitz, because he expressed surprise on some counts. control, in squadron formation, in order to get needed the extreme limit of the B-29 radius of action as it was severe, especially from the 73rd Wing. Training was J, for my part, was surprised too. General Kuter had experience flying in formation for considerable then understood. Formation flying always reduces intensive. But training missions from Kansas to Cuba, made a trip to Hawaii in late March or April for the distances. This request was denied on the ground that available range, and it made completion of our simulating the mission from Saipan to Japan, left express purpose of describing these relationships. On the airplane lacked sufficient range fly in formati on missions, marginal at even more of a problem. As bombers down all over the Gulf States. Meanwhile the to his return, a staff unit, headed by Maj Gen "Tony" best, from Sacramento to Hawai i, 2400 miles. The flight a matter of fact, it took several months of actual pressure to commit the command to combat was Frank, in a fo llow-up visit, had spent a week reaching would have been without a bombload, in the face of operation to master the techniques of fuel control that becoming intense. agreement on the principal details. Colonel Combs no opposition, and with excellent communications, 'would give the B-29 its design capability. Final practice missions were flown. Groups of the represented Headquarters Twentieth Air Force on this weather reporting, and base facilities. These same There was spirited dispute at the time over this 73rd Wing participated in two long-range missions mission. The results of the mission were favorable units, on arrival in Saipan, were faced with a round change in bombing tactics. The dispute persists, but which stressed takeoff, assembly, rendezvous, indeed. trip of about 3000 miles, with bombloads, in the face Thinking that ttie JCS-approved command the r�asoni g is not hard to trace. OUf only real formation flying, and simulated frontal weather ? of expected enemy opposition, and with no weather expenence In massive bombing operations had taken penetration. But it simply was impossible to train data or communications. place over Europe. Had we not learned a painful bombardiers to achieve acceptable precision accuracy Two bases,each with two 8500-foot paved runways 'Catton relLred asafo ur·slar general in 1979 32 33 systems were Japanese industry, which was distributed fo rce, and they did direct the capture of the Marianas steadfast �n a minority dissent on this report ever since, relationship had been explained, perhaps I was . throughout the great urban industrial areas, and third as a base of operations of the XXIst Bomber undiplomatic in my presentation of my understanding to no avail. I' priority, Japanese shipping. Command. It has been implied that the air strategists of that agreement. Fortunately I had the forethought to A survey of conditions on Saipan caused dismay. Of It must be remembered that the Twentieth Air who conducted the early operations of the XXIst had bring with me a copy of the JCS agreement on the the two bases under construction on Saipan, one could I' :.• Force had won its right to exist only by becoming a limited vision and were too much influenced by the sub not be used at all by B-29s, and the other had one ject, which I produced. Admiral Nimitz studied it creature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strategic air need to pave the way for invasion. This is not so. intently and said: runway 7,000 feet long (5,000 feet of it paved ), a ! leaders believed that the war could be won by air The pattern of B-29 operations against targets in taxiway at one end only, about 40 hardstands, and no power, but the official war plans of the JCS Japan was not conditioned by the limited conception other facilities whatever except for a bomb dump and a I must say to you that I am in strong contemplated invasion, and the Twentieth Air Force of the role of air power inherent in the basic idea of vehicle park with gasoline truck trailers. It was hardly disagreement with these arrangements. If I had could not divorce itself entirely from that ultimate defeating Japan by ground invasion. The initial target ready to receive the 12,000 men and 180 aircraft of been aware of their extent I would have concept. Certainly that was wise in the early stages. Air list had as its objective the defeat of the Japanese air the 73rd Wing. Ground crews put up borrowed tents expressed this disagreement to Admiral King power, applied by itself, had never before been fo rce, but this, like the defeat of the German air fo rce, in what was certainly one of the most disorderly . . and the Joint Chiefs. I command all of US forces sufficient to bring about capaulatlon of a major nation was an intermediate objective. It was considered a military encampments of the war, but they worked day in the Pacific Ocean Area. This is an abrogation that was still in fu ll control of its own military means. necessary preliminary in order to ensure and enhance and night to meet the demands for the first strike. i of the chain of command. However this is the What if the strategic air offensive should not be the effectiveness of strategic bombing operations. To ' iI decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I say to The bases on nearby Tinian Island had hardly been effective? The Joint Chiefs simply had to have a back­ be sure, the objective also contributed to successful you again, I will give you all the help and started. Those in Guam, where the main headquarters up plan. To be sure, there was some skepticism of air future ground and sea operations. But the initial cooperation in my capability. You have my very of the XXIst Bomber Command was to be located, had power , but even if there had not been, it would have primary air objectives were essentially the same as III best wishes for success. not even been laid out. Communications were been unwise to fail to provide for a backup. Actually those in Germany-the military, economic, industrial, completely inadequate. The aircraft of the 73rd Wing the JCS did give the Twentieth Air Force priority and social structure, which supported the will and the arrived rapidly on Saipan after mid-October and had second-to-none in the creation and launching of the ability of the Japanese nation to wage war. He was as good as his word. I had good reason to be to be double-parkedon hardstands. In the meantime, a grateful for his continued support. But he ended on an shipload of supplies arrived at Guam, which was to ominous note. He said, "You are probably in for a become a depot. rough time. You are going out to the Forward Area The ship had been carefully loaded so that the where my commander, Vice Admiral John Hoover, supplies could be unloaded in reverse sequence and breaks my admirals and throws them overboard stacked at the depot in "combat loaded" order. The without the slightest compunction. God knows what he procedure was new and elaborate but one which would is going to do to you." give us an operating depot in a matter of weeks. When [ got to know Admiral Nimitz better, I Actually, fighting was still going on in Guam when the recognized the vein of merry humor that flowed depot ship arrived, and confusion reigned supreme. beneath a sometimes stern visage. But at the time I was The harbor master said, ''I'll give you 24 hours to get somewhat shaken. that goddamned ship out of here." When I finally arrived at Saipan, [ called upon Vice Before I learned what was happening, the supplies Adm John Hoover, Commander of the Forward were dumped in the jungle. They were never Area. He could not have been more cordial and recovered. It became necessary to provide aircraft helpful. I kept him constantly advised of my problems supplies for the B-29s, themselves new and unfamiliar, and progress, and I enjoyed his strong support. [ made by air all the way from Sacramento, Califomia-8,000 it a point to fo llow his advice and suggestions miles away! The in-commission rate of the B-29s was whenever I fe lt that I could. astonishingly high-considering the circumstances. The movement to Saipan had been conducted in supposed secrecy. When I left my wife in San Antonio As indicated earlier, the strategic concept was for to return overseas, I did not even tell her which seas I the defeat or neutralization of the Japanese air forces was going over-Atlantic or Pacific. The night of our as an "overriding intennediate objective." Thereafter. arrival in Saipan, "Tokyo Rose" broadcast a welcome the major strategic air offensive was to be launched to Saipan for "General 'Possum' Hansell" over the against the war-supporting and economic systems of Japanese radio network. Japan. These systems were the "primary objectives." This may have seemed am\lsing to many, but to one The plan of operations against the primary objective it was almost tragic. Col Richard Carmichael, contemplated destruction of major selected industrial commander of a B-29 group operating from Chengtu, fac ilities by selected target bombing. was shot down over Japan and captured . He was The "overriding intermediate obj ective" and its hauled before a Japanese investigator who demanded associated target system assigned to XX 1st Bomber to know why I was called "Possum." When he Command by agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, professed ignorance he was beaten unmercifully. This giving first place to Japanese aircraft and aircraft went on for days, till the Japanese finally concluded engine factories, was not lightly conceived. It had been that he really didn't know-which was all too painfully learned in Europe that air superiority is necessary in true. Years later, at a cocktail party, he asked my wife, order to carry out effective surface operations and Dotta, why I was called "Possum." She said that she invasions as well as major strategic air operations. The had fo und an old prep-school annual bearing my Joint Chiefs had been persuaded to back the air likeness at age 13 with the explanation, "He is called offensive, but they were looking over the shoulders of 'Possum' because he looks like one." I have been the airmen at the invasion shore. Second priority target 35 34 and there was deep concern in the command about the I found myself in a serious predicament. Three nearly CHAPTER 6 chances of successfully performing the mission. I simultaneous events combined to make my position decided to ignore instructions, lead the mission, and difficult. hope for the best. My hope was short lived. Two or First was the Navy recommendation that the three days after advising Washington of our plans, I mission be cancelled or indefinitely postponed until was called upon by a Navy lieutenant and a petty the Navy was ready to participate. This would clearly officer who had a copy of the message and demanded a indicate that the XXIst Bomber Command could not written acknowledgement of its receipt. The message operateindependently but must operate only in close had been sent through Navy channels. concert with the Navy. If this were so, why have a At the time I thought the decision was arbitrary and separate Twentieth Air Force chain of command? Since coordination would be necessary, and it could ill-taken. Of course, I did have knowledge of the strategic plans for the Pacific war, but plans are only be provided by the Commander in Chief of the constantly changing, and I had only a rudimentary Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral Nimitz, why not place knowledge of the atomic bomb. But there was another the XXIst Bomber Command under the control of factor which I overlooked at the time and did not think Admiral Nimitz? The primary reason to reject such an First Strikes of until much later-I was privy to the existence of arrangement was that this would almost certainly supersecret intelligence and, what was much more destroy the strategic air war against Japan as a war­ important, to the sensitive source of such information. winning grand strategy-a grand strategy in which I and my fellow airmen fervently believed. I hastened to The story is out now after 30 years of secrecy. It is notify General Arnold that the XXIst Bomber told in fascinating detail in The Ultra Secret by the man Command stood ready to carry out the missionwithout Plans for the first bombing of Japan from the hampered by bad weather, but enough information on who was responsible for it, Group Captain F. W. Navy participation. Marianas called initially for a combined first strike the location of aircraft factories was obtained for the Winterbotham, RAF. It is the story of the breaking of with the Navy, so that carrier-based aircraft would first bombing missions. Copies of the photographs the most secret codes of the Germans and the Second, I received a disturbing message from divert some of the Japanese fighter defenses and were sent to General Arnold for the JCS and to Japanese. General Arnold. Members of General Arnold's staff absorb some of their capability. For the rest, the B-29s Admirals Nimitz and William Halsey. How I could have forgotten this item is incredible. and at least one top-level Air Corps field commander, would have to depend upon high altitude and speed Mosaics were made, strips laid out, initial points It was the source of daily agony as far as I was to whom my plan for SAN ANTONIO I had been (their principal advantage) and their own defensive and target approaches selected. Every crew was concerned. For a period of several months before I passed for comment, expressed grave doubts about our gunfire. The B-29 was designed as a high-altitude required to trace its photo map, mark landmarks and took over the XXIst Bomber Command, General capability to carry out our mission. General Arnold bomber, the first to have pressurized crew target runs, an� then redraw them from memory-over Arnold required Generals White and Kuter and me to forwarded these expressions of doubt and stated his compartments. It had turbosupercharged engines, was and over. meet in his inner office every morning. We were own inclination to agree with the skeptics. It was reasonably fast at high altitudes and was heavily As the day for the combined operation against admitted at 7:30. At 7: 15, General Arnold received contended that the airplanes lacked the necessary gunned. By operating in fo rmation, it was expected to Japan approached, the Navy found itself in serious the daily group of verbatim translations of high-level range and it was further contended that the Japanese fend for itself against enemy fighters which would be combat trouble in its movement into the Philippines secret German and Japanese messages. Before we would "shoot them out of the air." General Arnold did operating at their ceiling and have little, if any. margin and announced that it was unable to participate in the entered. we were each fam iliar with our own US secret not direct me to abandon or modify the mission. of performance superiority. planned combined air operation against Japan. messages that had been exchanged during the night Rather, he put me on record as having been warned. He concluded with the statement that he had high The first airplanes and crews to arrive on Saipan and were prepared to present and discuss events respect forthe critics of the mission, but said that if I were given a small amount of training in the Pacific pertaining to our several interests and responsibilities. SAN ANTONIO I and II were convinced of its feasibility and was determined to area. Six short training missions were flown against But we did not receive "Ultra" messages direct. carry on, then I was at liberty to do so. He left the Truk and Iwo Jima. In spite of all the obstacles, the General Arnold would reveal the information he had The planned strike was labeled SAN ANTONIO decision up to me and said that if I chose to go ahead, XX 1st Bomber Command declared itself ready to meet I. just received and demand to know what we were doing I to lead the first, and Brig Gen Emmett ("Rosey") then he wished me luck. The effect was chilling. The combat commitments exactly on time, by the middle of was about it. We were not doing anything about it; we did O'Donnell, Commander of the 73rd Wing, was to lead warning was coming from the very area in which I had November. not know about it. But this did not save us from the second. These plans were reported to Washington withering comments about our competence. expected firmest support. In the early morning of I November, an F- i3A, in detail. To my surprise, I was ordered by General Doubtless, General Arnold enjoyed this game, but it Third, I received a handwritten letter from my photo-reconnaissance version of the B-29, took off Arnold not to lead the mission because of my extensive was pretty rough business to be on the receiving end. senior Wing Commander, General O'Donnell, stating from Saipan and became the first US plane over Tokyo knowledge of the Pacific campaign plans. N ow that same supersecret intelligence was that he, too, doubted the capability of his unit to carry since April 1942, the date of. the Doolittle raid. The It was concern for just this possibility that had returning to bite me again. There was an Allied out the mission. He recommended abandoning the crew, led by Capt Ralph Steakley, insisted upon an prompted me to make a special request about a month agreement, without deviation of any sort, to the effect daylight attack and substituting a night attack against immediate mission, even though they had just arrived or so earlier. Just before leaving for the Pacific, I had that recipients of "Ultra" information, and those who some area target. from the United States. I advised a rest but they were been summoned to Washington to be briefed on the had knowledge of its source, were not permitted to I pointed out to him that the operation he insistent. Thank God they were. They found clear atomic bomb. I reported to Washington as directed. I expose themselves to capture. This may well have been recomrr:tended would not accomplish the mission with skies over Japan-a phenomenon. Called "Tokyo asked if the' knowledge I was about to receive would the clinching argument in my case. which I was charged. I was determined to accomplish Rose," the aircraft flew above the Japanese capital at keep .1Jle from flying combat missions. The answer was, The message from General Arnold could no longer that mission and I told him that if he was unwilling to an altitude of 32,000 feet, photographing a complex of "Yes." I asked that I be excused from receiving the be ignored. I designated General O'Donnell, lead his wing in this operation, I would turn it over to aircraft and engine plants just west of Tokyo and information because I felt it imperative that I be free to Commanding General of the 73rd Wing, to lead SAN someone who was willing. (Roger Ramey, my deputy, another on the outskirts of Nagoya. They shot over lead my command if the going got rough. This request ANTONIO I. was anxious to head it.) He assured me that he was 7,000 excellent photographs. Before the first strike on was honored and I proceeded without the briefing. The Navy recommended postponementof the B-29 willing but had felt constrained to express his doubts Tokyo on 24 November, 17 sorties had been flown Now, it seemed to me, was the time when I should attacks on the Japanese aircraft industry near Tokyo. and worries. I recognized his right and obligation to over Japan by F- 1 3s. Many of the missions were lead the first mission. The going was likely to be rough As Commanding General, XXIst Bomber Command, give me in private his honest opinion. If the mission 36 37 failed and he had not warned me of his honest During preparation for the first strike, a delegation convictions, I would have been justified in of Congressmen visited my command. I Was extremely reproaching him. On the strength of this, with his busy. We seemed to be operating under "Murphy's agreement I destroyed his letter, with the explanation third law: if anything can go wrong, it will." that if the mission succeeded, the letter would be a I quartered the visiting Congressmen in my own black mark on his record that would be hard to live pyramidal tent, perched on a promontory which jutted down, and that if it failed the onus would be entirely out into the sea. I issued each of them a mess kit and on my head, since I had been warned from other invited them to join me in the chow line and to wash quarters. their own kits afterward as I was doing. I must admit I! was quite true that until the time for takeoff of that the chow was simply awful, but we were living on SAN ANTONIO I, the XXIst had never flown a a shoestring and devoting all our energies to training formation as large as a squadron a distance as far as and preparation for the mission. Tokyo and back, even without enemy opposition. I devoted as much time to the visitors as I felt able But the potential impact of the mission on Pacific and told them of our general plans, problems, and strategy and the future of the Air Force extended far expectations. I did not go into the details of operations beyond the XXIst. The Army Air Forces, at the JCS and tactics. We kept those pretty close to the vest planning and command level, had been advocating because security leaks would endanger our success and primary reliance upon the decisive effeC4iveness of the cost lives of our combat crews. air offensive, with provision for an invasion of the The group went back to Washington and wrote a Japanese mainland only if the air offensive proved scathing denunciation of my administrative inconclusive. This viewpoint did not mesh with Army arrangements. They also interviewed members of the and Navy planning. To admit at this late juncture that command who were from their home districts. Most of the air offensive could not even attack its intermediate the responses were understandably flavored with objectives would have grave repercussions indeed. The apprehension about the forthcoming campaign. This whole command structure of the Twentieth Air Force problem was a forerunner of the massive difficulties as a worldwide command, reporting directly to the JCS which were to fall upon future American commanders in a role parallel to that of the US naval fleet, was in in the field in the Korean and Vietnamese wars. delicate balance. To subject it to reexamination The mission was laid on for 15 November. At the resultingfrom a major degradation of capability would final briefing before dawn, I made a short talk to the have had serious aftereffects. To those who believed crews. that the air offensive was not only the most effective avenue to victory in the Pacific but also the cheapest in Enroute to Tokyo Mission SAN ANTONIO 1-24 November 1944 Stick together. Don't let fighter attacks break up terms of American lives, abandoning the planned Target Musashino Aircraft Factory-Tokyo the fo rmations. And put the bombson the target. If mission would be a disaster almost as great as the the bombs don't hit the target all our efforts and tactical disaster of failure might have been. Still, there risks and worries and work will be for nothing. was no denying that the decision to carry out the plan That's what we're here for. If we do our job, this was extremely risky. traveled north toward Japan on our route to our was the Musashino aircraft plant of the Nakajima is the beginning of the end for Japan . Put the targets . I! left the base a shambles and a sea of mud. If Aircraft Company on the outskirts of Tokyo, and the I thought I understood why General Arnold had bombs on the target. You can do it. the typhoon had arrived a few hours later, we would secondary targets and "last resort" areas were the sent me this message. Disaster on the first mission of docking facilities and urban area of Tokyo. A total of the XXIst Bomber Command would have changed already have taken off-andfo und no place to land on return. 277.5 tons of bombs was delivered. Seventeen Pacific strategy and delayed recognition of coordinate Crews took stations in the early dawn. The long line bombers turnedback of fuel problems, and six air power by many years. Since there seemed to be a The B-29s sat on their hardstands, two deep, fully because of 8-29s formed up on the single taxiway that led to missed bombing of mechanicaJ troubles. high probability that such disaster would actually loaded, for nine days. The orders had been distributed. because only one end of the runway. At the last moment, the The thought of a securityleak was a nightmare. A daily Flying at 27,000·33 ,000 feet, the bomberspicked up a ensue, the ill effects would be less severe on the future wind, which had consistently blown down the runway, weather flight followed the typhoon. To my great grief, 120·knot wind over Japan,giving them a ground speed of the Air Forces if the responsibility were borne by a died down. We needed that wind badly to get off with of 445 miles per hour. This speed taxed the limits of subordinate field commander. He had warned me, and one of them was lost and never heard from. our heavy loads. Then the wind reversed direction and On 24 ovember, B·29s of the 73rd Wing, the optical bombsights. Twenty·four planes bombed I had chosen to go ahead in spite of the warning. I! was N III freshened. I! Was impossible to taxi to the other end of XXIst BomberCommand, took off on the trip toward the Nakajima plant on the outskirts of Tokyo, and not an unreasonable precaution to take under the 64 the runway because the long taxi line could not be Japan, representing over 90 percent of the B·29s on unloaded on the dock areas. Only one B·29 was lost in circumstances. I decided to go on with the mission and reversed and we could not use the runway itself to taxi Saipan. Some of the crews had arrived less than a week combat. US gunners claimed 7 enemy fighters notified General Arnold to that effect. down and then take off by successive airplanes. The before, and their first takeoff was for Tokyo. Each destroyed and 18 probables. Final count for the XXIst Rosey O'Donnell asked for a change in the taxi time would have been excessive. causing long takeoff was an ordeal. As noted earlier, the B·29 was listed 2 B·29s destroyed, 8 damaged by enemy action, operational plan. I had set up two Initial Points, on delay in assembly and burning up too much of our originally designed for a gross weight of 120,000 I man killed, II missing, and 4 injured. opposite sides of the target, and planned for two precious fuel. pounds. By urging and pleading, we convinced Wright After the war, records indicated that 48 bombs had converging bombing runs in order to confuse and There was no choice. I had to call off the mission. I Field to raise the allowable gross takeoff weight of the hit in the factory area; I percent of the building and divide the enemy air defenses. I! called for a hated to do so. We had built up to a psychological 8·29 to 132,000 pounds. In order to carry every 2.4 percent of the machinery were damaged; and 57 complicated maneuver. Rosey asked that the plan be climax. Delay and then repeat would play on fears and gallon of gas that could be pumped aboard, they were persons were killed and 75 injured. simplified by using only one axis of attack, with apprehension. I! was one of the hardest decisions I had taking off at 140,000 pounds! A faltering engine The weather at the target had been far from Fuj iyama volcano, west of Tokyo, as the Initial Point. I to make, but it was one of the luckiest. In a few hours, would spell the end for any airplane. favorable, and the bombing left much to be desired. approved the change. a typhoon hit Saipan and lasted six days, then it Primary target for the B·29s on SAN ANTONIO I However, the losses were small, and the operatIOn was

38 39 The tower operator was a noncommissioned officer monsters which carried out in spite of the hazards and obstacles. Not run was made from observations by the radar� threatened to lash back and blow up at who earned my highest admiration. He was calm and any moment the least of the hazards was the return to base. The bombardier. He then conducted a radar bombing run, . issued instructions without a hint of panic. The only I still don't mission lasted 12 to 14 hours, and the return was at using the target if possible or an offset aiming point if know whose idea it was for the engineers thIng we could do was hope the storm, which had to take this action. It certai night. There were no runway lights, only smudge pots necessary, and the optical-bombardier coupled the . nly was not mine. I really arrived suddenly, would depart with equal dispatch, thmk It along the single runway strip. The next nearest landing optical sight into the radar bombing run. In this was a spontaneous reaction from the engineer and that the fuel gauges which read zero didn't really operators strip was at Kwajalein. over a thousand miles away. If a manner, it was possible to set into the optical sight the themselves. I have always regretted that I did mean It. We were fortunate. The storm did clear. The not get them B-29 splattered itself on the runway, the rest of the drift angle and rate of ground speed and to have the a unit combat citation. It certainly was B-29s came in in rapid succession. aircraft behind it were all through. cross hairs of the optical sight aligned approximately heroism far beyond the call of duty. The decision to launch the offensive in the face of on the target. Then if the target became visible through I realized that I really was quite helpless. The real The next three months were frustrating, to say the such adverse conditions and recommendations seems breaks in the clouds, it was necessary only to make commander of the XXIst Bomber Command was a least. Schools worked hard to train the lead crews, in a to reflect recklessness, and results stemmed more from minor adjustments of the optical sight. noncommissioned officer who was functioning determined effort to improve bombing accuracy. good luck than sound judgment. But this first great Although the bombs could be released on the radar superbly as tower operator. The best help I could give Enormous efforts were made to improve maintenance. gamble proved the feasibility of the assault. sight if the clouds obscured the target from visual him was to keep out of his way and avoid interfering The depot had to start all over again, and in the Momentum, confidence, and improved efficiency adjustment, the resulting accuracy was inferior to with him. meantime, the air supply from Sacramento had to be would come with experience and numbers. If the visual sighting. To make the radar sighting acceptably In another incident one evening, an air raid improved. More missions were run against aircraft and decision had been to "stand down " SAN ANTONIO I accurate, it would be necessary to prepare radar maps warning sounded and all lights were doused. A engine factories. But the weather was a terrible and substitute a night attack against some urban area, of the targets and determine precise location of targets Japanese twin-engined bomber made a couple of opponent, and there was no intelligence of its the result would have been catastoophic, in my with reference to good offset aiming points if the target passes. Roger Ramey, my deputy commander, and I movements. Japanese fighter opposition was desperate opinion, particularly as regards confidence in and itself did not provide a good radar return . were standing on the runway watChing the antiaircraft but not very effective, at least in comparison with continuation of the Twentieth Air Force. bursts when the bomber suddenly made a German fighters. Air Kamikaze ramming tactics were SAN ANTONIO II was staged on 27 November, reappearance at very low altitude. A couple of B-29s tried with some effect. Morale was a critical problem. with the same target priorities. The crews of the 81 Early Operations had been hit and were burning brightly. They lit up the The airplane engines were still unreliable. Airplanes B-29s that flew the mission found Tokyo completely sky, and the oncoming Japanese aircraft was clearly that were disabled from combat or from other causes Several events occurred in the first 10 days of ·Ii covered by clouds, so the bombs were dropped by visible. I think we noted something about it at just the were 1500 miles from friendly territory, and crews had operations which had a sobering impact on me. , ' I ' radar on the secondary targets. The Japanese were same instant, because we took immediate and identical the choice of drowning or bailing out over Japan, to be , The first event occurred when Japanese fighters provoked into trying to halt the bombing by making air action. It was making a low-level strafing attack down executed by maddened Japanese. The US Navy made a I began strafing attacks on the air base and parked ' raids on Isley Field, our base on Saipan, destroying the runway we were standing on. There was no place to tremendous contribution to morale by stationing B- 29s. They had come down from Iwo Jima on a one­ some B-29s. The Japanese were realizing that their go. We hit the pavement with great force at just tbe rescue submarines at intervals along the route. Their way suicide mission and were completely undetected home islands were indeed susceptible to sustained same time. Tracers from the ground defenses were performance was superb. One submarine entered by the Marine outfit that was supposed to provide air attack and that their fighters could not turn back the pouring into the Japanese bomber but it continued on Tokyo Bay in daylight and picked up a B-29 crew right defense for us. B-29s. course. Then as it approached the end of the runway, under the guns of the Japanese. I jumped in my jeep with Col John Montgomery, ! It swerved slIghtly and plowed into the ground. The From November 1944 to August 1945, 600 my Chief of Staff, and headed for the field. As I came pilot evidently had been killed. The bomber hit with a Twentieth Air Force flyers were saved in open-sea up a rise to the flying field, I found myself looking Improving Successive Missions roar about a hundred yards from us and was engulfed rescues. The system involved Navy flying boats, B-17s straight into a Japanese fighter which was strafing the in flames. Just as we were rising to our feet, there was a (Dumbos) carrying droppable lifeboats, B-29. (Super area. I brought the jeep to a halt and sought shelter The accomplishment of these first two missions, violent explosion. Evidently it still had bombs aboard. Dumbos), and submarines, all under the control of the with very light losses, was an achievement in itself. The under it. Quick as my reaction had been, it still was not That evening was replete with mental impressions as Navy. The system was largely the achievement of my fact that bombing results were only fair could be quick enough. Colonel Montgomery was already well. As soon as the attack started, the base Navy Liaison Officer, Commander George McGhee. overlooked there. was in view of the proof that the force could, aswarm with thousands of men eager and determined 3 indeed, reach its targets and return to base. But Fortunately the Wing was out on a mission over On 13 December, 74 B-29s of the 7 rd Wing to see what was going on. They were completely succeeding missions made it clear that bombing Japan and there were only a few B-29s on the ground. received credit for doing significant damage to beyond control. Two B-29s were burning like torches, accuracy would have to be greatly improved. Two But several B-29s had aborted the mission and were Japanese aircraft plants. Most of the bombers carried and there were other B-29s nearby. Men pushed and methods were adopted to achieve that end-training in fully loaded with bombs and gasoline. 500-pound general-purpose bombs, while others were pulled to get the other 60-ton monsters away from the visual bombing and the introduction of radar as an The main warning radar, which the Marines should loaded with incendiary clusters. The primary target fire. The B-29s were fu lly loaded with gasoline. Some assist and as a substitute for optical bombing in attacks have installed on a hill, was still in crates. There had was the Mitsubishi engine plant at Nagoya. of them had bombs aboard in preparation for the against selected precision targets. been ample time for installation, but the Marines Photographs failed to show the entire damage. Later morrow's mission. No one seemed simply did not expect suicide attacks. General Arnold to know which of reports indicated that engine assembly shops and A "lead-crew" school was set up, and one 8-29 them � I had bombs and which had not. Succor came from each squadron was set aside for training. This was understandably outraged when he learned of this. auxiliary buildings were destroyed or damaged. A total from an unbidden and unexpected source: the was rather a drastic move. We were desperately short He had warned of this possibility but suitable action of 246 people were killed and 105 injured. Aircraft engineers. They appeared on the scene with their of B-29s, and withdrawing at least 12 8-29s for was not taken to provide defenses. engine production capacity was reduced from 1600 to massive bulldoz�rs and earth-moving equipment. They training purposes out of a total of about a hundred Another incident had to do with Operation 1200 per month. The Mitsubishi No. 4 Engine Works pushed the flamIng carcasses aside, "Memphis One" which was returning to Saipan when piled dirt on them, no longer made parts. The Japanese also began the Bw 29s in operational condition was a critical and rode over them till they had crushed out the fires. transfer of plant equipment to underground facilities. weakening of the force. But there was no use sending an intense tropical storm hit the island. It was about It Was the most amazing sight I have ever seen. No one the force to Japan at all if it fa iled to destroy its targets. 8:30 at night and the rain was so heavy that, standing It was the most destructive mission to date for XXIst knew for sure that there were not bombs in in the improvised tower, I could not see the dim those Bomber Command. The other method to improve bombing simply made flaming masses. Fifty-caliber ammunition was going The order for succeeding missions was good sense. The AN/APQ- 13 radar bombing smudge pots which outlined the single runway. for off lIke firecrackers. The scene Over 80 B-29s were approaching the field . The air was an animated maximum strikes against top-priority targets by high­ equipment was interconnected with the Norden Illus tration out of Dante's Inferno. Engineers were optical sight. Initial points OPs) were chosen that was full of calls saying, "No __ 8-29, I am altitude precision bombing when weather was ndIn m bulldozers through flames reaching approaching Saipan. Visibility zero. I am out of � high in acceptable. When this was not possible, secondary provided good radar returns. As each fo rmation the alr� enormous monsters of steel were burying other targets were to be hit, and time was also given to single approached the initial point, the turn to the bombing gasoline. Request instructions."

40 41 reception in the first months of the XXIst Bomber to achieve continuity of operations. I think General aircraft night operations, collecting weather data and Technical Problems Command's operations. It might not have been so If we LeMay did not view mining operations at bombing by use of radar. But still bombing night as had not been so apprehensive of dIverSIon of strategIc abandonment of selective targeting. Moreover effectiveness was hard to assess because of cloud cover. the air power by surface commanders. night mining operations, like the night urban bom ing Our new equipment presented Reports of effectiveness were deliberately played b . some technical could be carried out regardless of cloud problems whIch down by the XXIst Bomber Command headquarters. I The appeal for mining of Japanese waterways cover at th � affected combat operations. I asked target. for three fixes, which wanted to build a reputation for credibility in XXIst looked like another diversion by a surface were attempted at Wright Field It is quite clear that I could have endorsed but dId not matenalize Bomber Command reports to counterbalance the commander. So the mining program, which turned out mining in time to be useful. They as an aspect of strategIc bombardment pertamed to gunnery, known tendency to exaggerate. Our whole energy was to be one of the major contributions of the Twentieth against the weatherpenetr ation, and rescue Japanese transportation system rather at sea. devoted to efforts to improve effectiveness and Air Force, met with some opposition to start with, than as an auxi liary aspect of seablockade. I probably could have accuracy. Mining of rivers and harbors in the Netherlands The gunnery equipment of the B-29 was new pe suaded General Arnold to stretch my target During November and December 1944, 49 photo East Indies by the B'29s of the XXth Bomber ; . f�rmidable, and complex. Experience in operatin pnonttes as prescnbed by the JCS to include aerial WIthout missions were flown, and, by January 1945, thousands Command had been one of the first operations carried fighter escort in Europe had made defensiveg mining when adequate force became available. I doubt gunfl e of photographs of Japanese targets had been taken . out by that command from bases in Ceylon. Admiral � Important. I had been instrumental in that I could have, or should have, devoted the major changl�g These missions performed five functions for the XXIst Nimitz's staff proposed a much more extensive the t?P turret of the B-29 from a two-gun, effo rt of the Command to this purpose in the initial .50 cahbre, Bomber Command: photo reconnaissance for target campaign for XXIst Bomber Command in Japanese pair to a set of four such guns, in order to phas� of strategic attack against Japan, when first meet and strategic intelligence� weather reco,nnaissance; home waters. In fact, the Navy's initial proposal would . the most dangerous fighter attacks-those from pnonty was prescnbed as destruction of the Japanese the radar scope photography; lead-crew training; and have absorbed the total capacity of the XXIst Bomber front. All the guns were remotely operated from aircraft industry. SIghts nuisance raids. Command in the first three or four months of its placed m transparent sighting blisters. A master In retrospect, the actual evolution of events was gunner operations. I objected to this on the ground that it operated from a master-gunner's position in a probably about right. The XXIst Bomber Command top constituted another major diversion from the prIncipal blister from which all the guns except the two tail did accom lish the "overriding intermediate obj ective guns purpose for which the command had been created and l' could becontrolled and fired. The gun sights and of undermmmg Japanese aircraft production'" it did controls deployed. The objection was directed, not primarily to were mgemous and sophisticated, but highly preserve its identity and command structur� as a complex. The Aerial Mining Campaign the idea of mining·, but to the magnitude of the The SIght was swiveled by a left-hand grip diversion at a time when utmost endeavor was needed separate command eyen though operating in a Navy control, both laterally . and in height, and the range of comman� area; and It did retam unity of effort even the approachmg Preparation for aerial mining op�r�t�ons agai!lst to develop our primary capability. The problem was fighter was automatically fed into the when subject to constant pressurefor subordination by shipping in Japanese waters was also mltlated dunng settled when General Arnold issued a directive calling SIght computer by a right-hand grip control by which other commanders and staff agencies. These the gunner this early period. for a mining effort at a much reduced initial level and sought to keep an illuminated ring in the achievements might have been jeopardized or at least postponed somewhat in time. SIght adjusted to the wingspan of the approaching Dr Frederick M. Sallagar, while with the RAND postponed, If the XXIst had initially devoted its I was not, of course, in a position to change the fight�r. Each hand had to work simultaneously with, Corporation (but a member of my 4th Operations capacity to aerial mining, and the control of the XXIst but mdependently of, the other. To complicate Analysis Section in 1944), completed a study entitled directive which had been issuedby the Joint Chiefs of the might have been compromised, perhaps, lost, as well. problem further, Lessons From an Aerial Mining Campaign (Operation Staff. But when General Arnold sought my the messages fed into the computer The aerial mining campaign as later carried were accepted in terms "Starvation recommendations on Admiral Nimitz's request, I out by of "rate." The "rate of turn" of " . Dr Sallagar shows clearly that the aerial General LeMay was effective beyond the ) opposedthe application of so large a proportion of the . anyone's controls established the velocity and rate of turn mining of Japanese inland waters by B-29s of the expectatIon. Fleet Admiral Nimitz and XXIst Bomber Command to aerial mining at that stated: "The rate of approach of the target. If a gunner failed to Twentieth Air Force's XXIst Bomber Command was a plannmg, op rattonal, e and technical execution of the mampulate his sight smoothly and moved with tremendous success and contributed enormously to the time. I recommended postponement until the force a series Tw entieth :'-If Force aircraft mining of Jerks, had grown larger and proposed that one group be on a scale never th';"" rapid jerks told the computer that the fall of Japan. He notes also a reluctance on the part of before attamed had accomplished phenomenal target charged with development of the techmque and results velOCIty was accelerating or decelerating wildly. senior Air Corps officers to enter into this operation and IS a credIt to all concerned." limited initial operations. I asked that a device be designed with the enthusiasm which it deserved. As As Dr Sal! ag states in his study: which would � "The campaign deter l Commanding General of the XXIst Bomber while the problem was being discussed at high utstandmg � �e rang� and rate of approach by radar and Even w� ? m many respects. More mines were Command, I was one of those reluctant leaders. But to prepare for a feed It dIrectly mto the sight computer. Such level, initial steps were undertaken laId m five months (ov r 12,000) than a device � were dropped was avaIlable there were reasons for my reluctance. campaign of some intensity. I directed the by all the other for the tail guns which had a somewhat mining aIrcraft m the Pacific in more than two . aircraft began to arrive in Tinian years hmtted field of fire. This would have relieved Army Air Force leaders (including me) 313th Wing, whose (9,000).'" the of techmques gunner of at least half his burden. Actually, in December, to undertake development The ':phenomenal results" mentioned it would remembered what had happened in Germany. . by Admiral have proVIded and tactics for this of operation. One group of the NImItz mcluded far more relief than that. It certainly is AW PD- I committed the America.n bomber fleets to at least 700,000 (and possibly as type work. The XXIst far easIer to do one thing at a time wing was designated to carry out this much as 1,250,000) tons of Japanese than to do two the factories, industrial systems, and enemy air bases in shipping sunk or separate things Bomber Command owes a debt of gratitude to the erely damaged. simultaneously. Germany. But the fleet was split apart and half was Perhaps more important, much of Navy personnel for their assistance in adapting Navy �t e sUlVlvmg assigned to the Allied forces invading North Africa in ship tonnage was bottled up in 'lIined Another fix that I desired had to do with "station­ mines to installation in B-29s and in helping develop harbors for prolonged Operation Torch. This provided a bitter lesson­ periods while waiting for the keeping" by radar. I was worried about penetration of dropping techniques and tactics. to be cleared, heavy weather fronts in formation. It was necessary theater commanders, accustomed to seeking victory which led to a virtual paralysis of rmesapan's through surface warfare, would demand and get The later decision by General Curtis LeMay,' when essential maritime traffic. that the fo rmatIons be able to reassemble easily after We have gotten penetr tlon of a weather front, to provide mutual strategic air forces to support surface campaigns at the he became Commander of the XXIst, to launch a . somewhat ahead of the story but in � vIe,, of the ' expense of strategic air obj ectives. The Eighth Air massive mining operation was a sound one. Adequate : later undeniable success of the aerial protectIOn. It was possible to use the APQ- 13 bombing nlng campaign, radar for thIS p rpose to a limited degree, but I was not Force had hardly recovered from this nearly mortal force had been assembled. Tactics and techniques had �� it is necessary to explain my � UCtance to initiate content about It. blow when the ordeal was again endured in been worked out (much of it by LeMay). Mining was an all-out campaign while I COmmanded preparation for and support of the invasion of not dependent on weather, and, hence, it was possible the XXIst. Finally, I asked for a floating transponder that Normandy. Strategic targets in Germany were �o�ld be ��ssed into the sea just as a damaged airplane neglected far too long while the strategic air forces dItched. ThIS would have permitted rescue aircraft were employed for support of surface campaigns. Thus .General LeMay succeeded me lIS Commander of tbe XXISI:011 20 January 1945 see to home on the transponder and quickly locate the Chapter p. 46. aerial mining in Japanese waters found a cool 7, poSItIon at which the airplane had gone down and,

42 43 hopefully, at which the crew could be rescued from dependent upon the weather forecast more than any their rubber rafts. other factor. Our weather information depended largely on a nightly B-29 flight to Japan. I had a CHAPTER 7 Tactical Problems meteorological officer who did a magnificent job under almost impossible conditions. His name was Col We had tactical problems as well as technical ones. James Seaver, whom I had known in England. He In the early stages of operations, before we learned knew perfectly well that my decision to "go" or to how to get the most from our engines, we were "stand down" depended directly upon his forecast of his seriously constrained in terms of range. To save as weather conditions. He also knew, and I knew, that much fuel as possible the first thousand miles or so estimate of weather conditions was going to be better were flown at low altitude and the climb to penetrating than mine, so he stated his forecast without altitude was begun after the airplane had become equivocation. He said what he thought would be the lighter by the weight of the expended fuel. case, without hedging it about with subjunctive General Arnold w,," understandably concerned clauses. Sometimes he was wrong, but often he was about the large number of losses due to "ditchings" right. I relied upon him heavily and was careful never Command Changes and failure to return for unknown reasons. Although I to criticize when the weather forecast did not pan out. felt that losses in a highly risky wartime operation that The XXIst Bomber Command had no Spec ial gave promise of being decisive must,be expected, I Liaison Unit (SLU) to receive "Ultra" information, undertook extensive measures to reducethose losses as and this was a grievous omission. I cannot understand why. In his book, Group Captain Winterbotham drops much as possible. The actual combat losses were not Command Relationships and Bomber materiel command with the primary misSion of the casual stat ement: excessive considering the nature of the operations and Commanders expediting production and improvements of the B-29. the desperate severity of the defenses. But losses due to He was succeeded at XXth Bomber Command for a inadequate maintenance and to equipment In Brisbane (Australia) many of our main brief periodby General Saunders. Then on 28 August, malfunction were within our capability to reduce, and signals now came from Delhi, but radio The first B-29 bomber commander was Brig Gen Maj Gen Curtis LeMay succeeded General Saunders. we simply had to do everything within our power to blackouts were frequent. Sometimes signals K. B. Wolfe, who took the XXth Bomber Command The original plans had called for LeMay to take the overcome our deficiencies. came via the Australia Post Office cable, or even to India and China and initiated operations against XXIst Bomber Command, and I was scheduled for the One measure, in addition to improved maintenance by radio from Bletchley (England), andJapanese Japan with operation MATTERHORN. The XXth next. But recall of General Wolfe altered the plan and and inspection, was lightening of the airplane by weather reports came up from Melbourne by Bomber Command was formed at Marietta, Georgia, General Arnold sent LeMay to the XXth and gave me removing items which could be spared. A lighter teleprinter, so the SLU at Brisbane had a bit of a where the B-29s were being built. command of the XXIst, which was in training in the airplane had a much better chance of returning to base job sorting out what was going on.' General Wolfe was designated Commander, XXth Midwest. after battle damage or equipment failure. We stripped Bomber Command in November 1943. He was a When I first entered the Pacific Ocean Area, I was the airplane itself of 1900 pounds and removed one of What Colonel Seaver would have given fo r those production genius and a first-class aeronautical apprehensive about my command relationship. It was a the bomb-bay gas tanks for another 4100 pounds, Japanese weather reports! Weather over Japan was our engineer; he literally mothered the initial phases of Navy domain, dominated by strong-minded Navy giving a total weight reduction of 6000 pounds. most implacable and inscrutable enemy. Weather production and modification of the B-29. Some 2,000 commanders who could hardly be expected to But our operations were still confined to narrow reports received through "Ultra" were of great value in changes were made in the engine alone. welcome an intruder from the Army Air Forces who deviations from the direct route toTokyo and Nagoya. the strategic air war against Germany; they would have The XXth Bomber Command Headquarters later was independent of their operational control. But I got Mission after mission had to follow the same path. As been priceless in the air war against Japan. moved to Salina, Kansas. The Second Air Force along well with the Navy commanders-due largely to a result, our missions were reported as we passed Iwo It seems simply incredible that no one "in the supervised its training. The 58th Wing, commanded by the broad-minded support of Fleet Admiral Chester Jima (until its capture) anda few reportingships which know" recognized our need, especially for Japanese Brig Gen LaVerne "Blondy" Saunders, was the first Nimitz and the personal attitude of Vice Admiral John provided warning in plenty of time for the Japanese weather reports, and took steps to provide me, and element to reach operational status, and the 73rd Hoover. defenses to concentrate at Tokyo or Nagoya. later General LeMay, with an SLU. Wing, commanded by Brig Gen Emmett "Rosey" My trouble came from senior Air Corps generals Weather Forecasting O'Donnell, was scheduled to follow. under Admiral Nimitz and, quite understandably, they On arrival in India in preparation for operations did resent this break in the chain of command. Lt Gen from Calcutta and advanced bases in Chengtu, China, Millard F. Harmon was the senior Air Corps general The daily "command decision" whether to launch the XXth Bomber Command came under the in the Pacific Ocean Area and, under Admiral Nimitz, a mission the next day and against what target was IF. W. Winterbotham, 11w U/trtl � (HarperRow: & New York, 197"). jurisdiction of Lt Gen Joseph Stilwell, who commanded all land-based aviation in the Theater­ commanded all US Army forces in the China-Burma­ Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. He naturally wanted India (CBI) Theater, until activation of the Twentieth command of the XXIst Bomber Command too. Air Force. First units of the XXth arrived in the General Arnold had sought to smooth over the Theater in April 1944. situation by appointing him Deputy Commander, After the XXthBomber Command was established Twentieth Air Force for Administration and in the CBI Theater, the command conducted a "shake Logistics. But General Harmon wanted full command, down" operation on 5 June 1944 against Bangkok including operational control-or at least inclusion in from bases in India. On 14 June, the XXth launched a the chain of command from General Arnold to me. I night attack against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works had resisted this arrangement in Washington, when I at Yawata, Ky ushu, Japan, from bases at Chengtu. was Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force, and I The B-29s continued to have mechanical and continued to resist it. If the Twentieth Air Force was technical problems. In July 1944 General Arnold to continue as a unified strategic air force under the finally sent for the man in whom he had the most direct and unbroken command of General Arnold, confidence, General Wolfe, who took over the and with a primary strategic mission, the chain of 44 45 Il"IillI operational command from the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated requests were directed to the loint Chiefs of through General Arnold to the XXIst Bomber Staff, who gave them a sympathetic ear. General . 'I,1, Command had to be kept direct and uncluttered.' Arnold agreed . Under General Harmon was another senior Air There were other reasons for expediting the change. Corps officer, Maj Gen Willis Hale, who commanded The XXth Bomber Command was operating under Army Air Corps forces in the Forward Area. Whereas tremendous disadvantages. TheXXth expended about my relationship with General Harmon had been one-seventh of its flying hours in attacks against the agreeable, if somewhat formal, that with Willis Hale enemy and absorbed the other six-sevenths in Brig Gen Kenneth B. Wolfe deteriorated after a confrontation on Saipan. When providing its own operation logistics-flying gasoline First Commanding General, the second air base which had been prepared for the and bombs over "the hump" from India to the forward XXth Bomber Command 73rd Wing of the XXIst Bomber Command on Saipan bases in China. Furthermore, the China-based B-29s Nov 1943-Jul 1944 proved technically unsuitable for B-29 operations, I could not reach the really vital targets in Japan. based the entire Wing on Isley Air Field. I agreed to On taking over the XXth Bomber Command, the other base over to General Hale's forces since tum General LeMay, quite independently, arrived at the it was suitable for operations by other types of aircraft. same decision which motivated me in retraining the When I arrived on Saipan with the first B-29, I found 73rd Bomb Wing. He set about the transition from not only a half-completed base but also over a hundred area night bombing to daylight precision bombing of General Hale's airplanes on Isley "ield. I made from defensive formations. He also set up a lead-crew several requests to General Hale that the field be training school just as I had done in the Marianas. But cleared for my impending operations, and he agreed to his logistic problems were so severe that it was almost do so but failed to move his airplanes. Finally, in impossible to establish effective operations against desperation, I had a showdown with General Hale. Japan itself. Radius of action limited strikes to the The situation had become intolerable and threatened southern island of Kyushu. to prevent our first strike. Admiral Hoover offered to The XXth, while under the command of General clear up the situation with a direct order to General Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. Wolfe, attacked the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Hale. But I thought it would be better if two Air Corps First Chief of Staff, Yawata on the island of Kyushu on 15 June 1944. officers undertook to settie their problem between Twentieth Air Force Only 47 of the original 75 B-29s reached the target, them. General Hale moved his aircraft, but he then 12 Apr 1944-28 Aug 1944 and damage was not extensive. Shortage of fuel at the went straight back to Washington to complain to First Commanding General, advanced bases prevented the launching of another General Arnold about my "arrogant attitude." XXIst Bomber Command full-scale strike for several weeks. On 7 July a force of General Arnold backed me up, but I suspect the 28 Aug 1944-20 Jan 1945 18 B- 29s launched a small raid against a number of incident did me no good. targets in Japan, including Suebo, Nagasaki, Omura, First Change of Organization and and Yawata. On 9 July the XXth attacked the coke Command, XXIst Bomber Command facilities at Anshan in Manchuria. Twentieth Air Force had directed a daylight precision attack with at least 100 B-29s. In carrying out the operation, only 66 About mid-January 1945 a delegation from B-29s reached Manchuria, and the effects were not General Arnold's office arrived at my headquarters at satisfactory. The next operation was shifted to the oil Guam. Brig Gen Larry Norstad, Chief of Staff, refinery at Palembang, in the Netherlands East Indies, Twentieth Air Force, bore a message from General from advanced bases in Ceylon. Arnold. There was to be a major change in organization and command. The combat elements of The attack, launched on 10 August, involved a the XXth Bomber Command were to be transferred to 3800-mile round trip. Results, unfortunately, were bases in the Marianas at the earliest possible time. poor. The same day, the XXth sent a small force to Although I had been aware of plans to move the attack the N�kajima engine works on Kyushu. The XXth Bomber Command out of China, I was not night attack was unsuccessful. B-29s again struck Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay aware of the imminence of that move. The urgency was Yawata in daylight on 20 August. The losses from Commanding General, partly due to insistence from the new Commanding combat and operational causes were heavy- l 4 out of XXth Bomber Command General of the China Theater, my oid friend General 61 B-29s. Again, effects were disappointing. On 29 20 Aug 1944-20 Jan 1945 Al Wedemeyer, who had replaced General Stilwell. August, the XXth sent 109 B-29s against Anshan, Commanding General, General Wedemeyer, strongly urged by General under General LeMay's command and with his XXIst Bomber Command Chennault, requested that the B-29s be moved out of participation. This time there was considerable 20 Jan 1945-16 Jul 1945 China as soon as possible. The supply tonnage being damage. The attack was repeated on 26 September in absorbed by the XXth was urgently needed by the daylight using 12 plane formations, but cloud cover Fourteenth Air Force and other forces in China. The obscured the target. The logistics problems became so severe that the XXth had to confine its operations primarily to targets outside Japan itself. Ta rgets included: Okajama ai rcraft assembly plant on Harmon O�r • General respected but Formosa, 14 and 16 October; Einansko Airdrome, back 10 W:WUllgton to try \0 ha�c It really approved thiS arrangement. He was on �:c:�y changed when hiS airplane was lusl without a Formosa, 17 October; Omura aircraft factory, Kyushu,

46 47 enormously increased by an invasion. Was it worth it? Commander McGhee was my naval liaison officer. 25 October; Rangoon, Burma, marshalling yards, 3 bombing of selected targets-day or night-was hoped Was time itself all that important? Or were the He was a Naval Reserve officer. The Navy made November; Singapore Naval Base, 5 November; fo r. The sights were not immediately available-their casualties the more important consideration, once repeated offers to replace him with a senior, more Omura aircraft factory, November (Nanking was use would take time. II victory was assured? Some of the emphasi� on time experienced regular professional, but I resisted all actually attacked because of weather at the primary One wing of the XXIst, the 315th, had been stemmed from military habit of thought; some of it offers. I knew I had an exceptional man. George was target); and Omura on 21 November, in daylight. The equipped with this new radar bombsight, permitting doubtless stemmed from restless impatience among the not only a competent Navy officer but had interests overall effectiveness was disappointing, caused by an more accurate bombing. All the XXIst units were American people and a desire to get this thing over and knowledge that covered a very broad range. I intolerable logistics problem, unfavorable weather, equipped and partially trained for radar bombing of with and return to a more normal life. found his judgment invaluable in discussions of many and early training problems with a new and untried those area targets that rendered good radar return. The overriding priority of targets assigned to the facets of our problem in the Pacific. His responses and airplane. Time, however, was not available to the XXIst XXIst Bomber Command called for destruction or observations were stimulating and perceptive. He was On 24 December the XXth conducted an operation Bomber Commander. General Arnold was demanding neutralization of the Japanese aircraft engine and that priceless combination, a practical intellectual. which was significant from several points of view. measurable results-now. His judgment was heavily airframe factories. One of the ironies of war is that in After the war, George McGhee became a member of Prompted by General Chennault, General Wedemeyer influenced by bomb tonnage rather than target the early months of its operations the XXIst actually the State Department Policy Planning Council and directed the XXth to attack a Theater target, the port destruction. Actually, many more tons of bombs could did accomplish its mission in this regard, though these later Ambassador to West Germany. facilities at Hankow. General LeMay objected, citing be dropped at night, using radar bombing, than in results were not then apparent. Its performance was There was another military associate for whose his command relationship as a part of the Twentieth daylight. In daylight the force had to fly in fo rmation surprisingly good-not understandably bad. But, fr iendship I am especiall grateful. When I took Air Force. General Wedemeyer then appealed to the and operate at high altitude in order to defend itself y unfortunately, we were not able to prove it, and the command of the XX 1st, I started looking about for an JCS, citing the provision for emergency use of the against Japanese fighters. These restrictions reduced proof was not apparent to anyone until after the war. I aide. I set forth my specifications to the Chief of Twentieth Air Force by the Theater COij1mander as a bombload. Furthermore, the rate of opportunity for am sure that General Arnold did not understand what Personnel. I said I wanted a young first lieutenant or matter of urgency. The urgency existed all right. The daylight operations was heavily influenced by target the XXIst had gone through or had accomplished. captain, who was intelligent, alert, hardworking, good­ Japanese were launching a major-but unsuccessful­ weather, which was extremely hard to forecast-at General Arnold wanted to change the command humored, tolerant, courteous, loyal , and trustworthy. drive toward the B-29 base areas. The Joint Chiefs least good bombing weather was hard to forecast. Bad and deployment setup at once. The proposed change In addition, he should be a top-notch four-engine agreed, and General LeMay performed the mission, weather was the rule, and cloud obstruction was about appealed to him both as a sensible move which would airplane pilot with enough guts to keep his hands off dropping incendiaries at medium altitude. Eighty-four the only weather feature which could be expected with greatly enhance the performance of the XXth Bomber the controls when I was flying. Personnel produced B-29s dropped more than 500 tons of incendiaries on any degree of assurance. But the radar bombing at the Command and as a relief from the pressure which w&s Ray Milne, who filled every one of those Hankow, setting huge fires which burned for three start of the campaign , when target locations were hard coming from General Wedemeyer. The China Theater specifications. He was a perfect aide so far as I was days. General Chennault, who urged the use of to determine and radar maps had not yet been Commander was vigorously bombarding the JCS concerned, and he became a cherished friend. incendiaries against the city, described the attack as prepared, was not adequate to put the bombs on because some of the ATC "Hump" tonnage was going I made my decision to resist remaining with the "the first mass fire-bomb raid" by the B-29s and selected industrial and economic targets. to the XXth at a time when he and the Fourteenth Air XXIst as Vice Commander under the stress of surprise contended that it was the precursor to the massive In all fairness to General Arnold, he can not be Force needed it all. blamed for his impatience and his inclination to and emotion. But I sti ll think it was the proper urban incendiary attacks against Japanese cities. General LeMay, who was senior to me, would take measure strategic air attack in terms of tonnage and decision. I had every confidence in General LeMay as over the command of the XXIst Bomber Command By year's end, neither the XXth Bomber Command sorties. He was under constant pressure and criticism a commander. He had been the outstanding group within the month. I was offered the XXth Bomber nor the XXIst had shown real effectiveness or from his associates on the JCS and from higher commander when I commanded the 1 st Bombardment Command for transfer to the Marianas; thereafter, I approached the power which was latent in the B-29. authority to explain what his Twentieth Air Force was Wing in the early and crucial days of the Eighth Air could become Vice Commander under LeMay. I did But there was a vast difference between them in accomplishing. It is exceedingly hard to measure and Force. When I returned from England to the United not wish to accept. I knew and respected LeMay as an considering the futu re. The XXth could never hope to evaluate the effects of selective target bombing. We States to be the Air member of the Joint Plans able and competent bomber commander. I did not reach real effectiveness because of the logistic were unable to report on real effectiveness of such Committee of the JCS, LeMay stayed on, was think he needed another bomber commander as deputy. problems. operations until after the war. To be sure, it is possible promoted, and became senior to me. I knew him well The XXIst had enormous potential. Given time to I was fortunate in having gifted and able associates II to report the destruction of a factory, but it is hard to enough to know that he needed no second string to his in the Twentieth Air Force. Brig Gen Roger Ramey, perfect its tactical performance and the growing might evaluate that destruction in terms of depletion of bow. He did not need a second in command, and I my deputy, was not only a fine military associate, he of the mounting accretions of new wings, it held enemy industrial support for a specific set of economic would have been unhappy as a figurehead. was also a fine friend. There were others who filled I! tremendous portent forthe future. In my own opinion, or military needs. There is always the possibility that Furthermore, it is not a good thing to replace a this dual role. Col Cecil Combs, Col J. B. that portent, given time for training and collection of the enemy has found some substitute method of commander and leave him in a subordinate position in Montgomery, and Commander George McGhee, � i I bombing intelligence, could have been attained either meeting those needs. It took the tremendous efforts of his own outfit. through selective targeting or incendiary urban USN, were among them. Such associations and i.· I'" the US Strategic Bombing Survey to evaluate those The first three months for the B-29s in the Marianas i friendships are a priceless boon which help destruction. effects after the war, both in Europe and in the Pacific. to helped lay the groundwork for the much larger Ni t incendiary attacks against Japanese urban compensate the pains and disappointments of wartime gh On the whole, these survey reports showed that bombing offensives against Japan during 1945. If it is industrial areas in 1945 were provisionally considered duty. Colonel Combs, who had been my Chief of selective targeting was far more effective than we conceded that initial periods are likely to be the most in the original plans for the employment of the XXIst. Combat Operations in Washington, became Deputy thought it to be at the time of attack. difficult ones, then the initial period of XXIst Bomber But such operations were to be undertaken only as a Commander of the 58th Wing on Tinian. On my On the other hand, statistics of tons of bombs Command was marked with reasonable success. It last resort, and only if precision bombing of selected urgent recommendation, Colonel Montgomery, who dropped and of sorties flown are easily compiled, seem cannot be denied, however, that such success as was targets proved infeasible or failed to bring about was my Chief of Staff of the XXIst Bomber Command, factual and specific, and are impressive. Photographs achieved, or at least was accompanied, by a fu ll satisfactory results. They were initially scheduled to served General LeMay in a similar capacity. of burned-out cities also speak for themselves. And measure ofgood fo rtune. It might so easily have been a take place after the Japanese aircraft and engine Colonel Montgomery was not only a fine planner "time" had become an obsessive compUlsion-the period of disaster. If one of the initial operations, from factories had been knocked out and the vital industrial and manager, he was also an expert pilot and navigator '"time for invasion of Japan. uncompleted bases, had returned to find our single, targets had been destroyed by selective bombing. and one of the best bombardiers in the Army Air Washington placed great emphasis upon ending the partially completed runway blocked by a crippled Forces. Monty and I made bomb runs against the The difficulty of conducting selective bombing in war as quickly as possible. "This carnage must not be B-29, the whole force would have been lost. All in all, Japanese-occupied island of Rota. I was glad that it daylight caused by cloud cover was anticipated and a permitted to continue a single week longer than is I think it was a good beginning. Its predominant was I who made out Monty's efficiency report on greatly improved radar bombsight, the AN /A PQ-7, necessary to achieve victory." But there were obvious pattern was woven on the theme of selective target bombing, not the other way around. was rushed to completion. With it, all-weather weaknesses in this thought. 'The carnage" would be destruction.

48 49 CHAPTER 8 interest became apparent. There was repeated industrial areas-Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe, reference to and emphasis upon incendiary urban Kawasaki, and Osaka. attack in the communications originating in The Committee of Operations Analysts contended Washington. I do not know whether this change was that the air offensive against Japanese urban areas brought about by General Norstad or by General would reduce Japanese war production substantially Arnold. by: (1) direct physical damage to major and feeder Perhaps it was General Arnold. Unknown to me, plants, (2) destruction of finished items and materials General Arnold harbored a lively interest in in process, (3) disruption of internal transportation incendiary urban attack. On 5 April 1944, he wrote and services, and (4) reduction of labor efficiency. General Spaatz about the proposed US Strategic Cities were listed as preferred targets, superseding Bombing Survey (USSBS) and included these remarks: economic and industrial systems. This list indicated "Ofparticular interest to me would be some idea as to some change from earlier strategy. The selected the most effective mixture of high explosives and industrial "primary targets" still contained aircraft incendiaries against heavily built-up areas ...." At factories, but iron and steel (to be disrupted through Operations any rate, the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) attack on coke ovens), and oil (the petroleum industry) soon gave incendiary urban attacks a high priority. were all dropped to "secondary targets," below urban The day after our first reasonably successful attack areas. Shipping, which presumably included aerial on the aircraft faci lities at Nagoya, on 18 December, I mining, was still a top priority as it had been in the first received a directive to launch a full-scale incendiary recommendation prepared by the COA nearly a year attack on Nagoya. This was a blow. I had been earlier. But anti friction bearings and the electronics Operations: Initial Phase Strategic Objective: to force Japan to acknowledge sweating blood in my efforts to make the 73rd Wing a industry had been dropped, for reasons which I do not defeat and to accept our terms of surrender. respectable precision bombing outfit, with very understand, and the electric power and rail In November 1944, Washington issued a new target Primary Air Strategy: to achieve the Strategic moderate success. We were just beginning to overcome transportation systems had not been revived from their priority list which established target systems for the Objective by application of strategic air power. More the predilection for night area bombing, and we were initial rejection. XX 1st Bomber Command in the following priority: (1) specifically: just beginning to show some improvement in bombing Since I had not yet accomplished my first priority Japanese aircraft industry, (2) Japanese urban accuracy, both visual and radar. Now we were directed task, destruction of Japanese aircraft and engine industrial areas, and (3) Japanese shipping. I. To destroy the effectiveness of the to reverse our painfully achieved progress in accuracy plants, I was not immediately affected by this change Our scheduleof operations-all against aircraft and JapaneseAir Force to the degree where it should and turn to area bombing. It was no good trying to and I continued my emphasis on selective bombing. engine factories except shakedown missions against be incapable of offering a serious threat to our achieve real accuracy with the incendiaries. Their Iwo Jima-was as follows: own bases and forces or of offering effective imprecise ballistic characteristics precluded any Pacific Strategy hindrance to our strategic air offensive. To accuracy in delivery even if the sighting performance approach this objective by destruction of should be perfect. Tokyo 24 November· On 1 December 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Japanese sources of air power using selective Iwo lima 7 December The directive had been in General Arnold's name issued a revised memorandum describing Pacific targeting and precision bombing. Nagoya 13 & 18 December but had been signed by General Norstad. I protested strategy. Iwo Jima 24 December 2. To destroy the war-making industrial directly to General Arnold. I pointed out that I had structure of Japan by destroying selected targets Tokyo 27 December "with great difficulty implanted the principle that our The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted and systems which were vital to the war effort Nagoya 5 January mission is the destruction of primary targets by the fo llowing as a basis for planning in the war through precision bombing. Tokyo 9 January sustained attacks using precision bombing methods against Japan. The concept of operations for the 3. To destroy and undermine the social and Nagoya 14 January both visual and radar." I did not contend that we had main effort in the Pacific is: economic structure of the Japanese state through Akashi 19 January achieved an acceptable measure of success in this A. Following the Okinawa operations to selection and destruction of essential structures attempt, but I did contend that diversions from our seize additional positions to intensify the which were vital to the organic functioning of the • Three times more by 3 December; an initial determined efforts would impede a progress that was blockade and air bombardment of Japan in Japanese nation, again through precision rate of four missions in 10 days. beginning to be encouraging for the future. order to create a situation favorable to: bombing of selected targets. General Norstad replied for General Arnold that B. An assault on Kyushu (Island)-in order 4. To prepare fo r, and, if necessary, to carry Thirteen missions were flown in 56 days, Of an average the aircraft industry still had overriding priority and to establish a tactical situation favorable to: out urban incendiary attacks as a last resort. of one every four and one-half days, counting Iwo that the fire raid was "simply a special requirement C. The decisive invasion of the industrial lima. resulting from the necessity of future planning." heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain. Seven of the ten primary targets prescribed by the Secondary Air Strategy: to support a surface Joint Chiefs of Staff were specific aircraft and engine invasion of the Japanese home islands if the air Future planning? Was the switch to area urban General Marshall was generally acknowledged to be factories. Then an urban area system was prescribed offensive failed to achieve its purpose. bombing already under way? The change to area urban the author and proponent of this strategy. fo llowed by "shipping." Fallowing these three top I was in fu ll agreement with this emphasis upon incendiary attack, when it finally came, cannot be laid Dr Sallagar offers the following perceptive priorities were three secondary target systems: coke, selective targeting and precision bombing. I had been directly at General LeMay's door. Its initial support comment: steel, and oil. It is surprising that these three vital one of the authors of this policy at the Air Corps came from Twentieth Air Force Headquarters. selective target systems should have been assigned a Ta ctical School. I had seen it work well in Europe and The selection of urban targets followed a revised priority below "Japanese urban industrial areas." had prepared the plans for it in that theater. I believed report prepared and issued in October by the To the Army, the JCS endorsement of naval Committee of Operations Analysts on Economic blockade and strategic bombardment merely After I left Washington as Chief of Staff of the in it. (I still do.) Twentieth Air Force, a change in strategic policy set After I left Washington and became engaged in Objectives in the Far East. By that time I had departed meant that the Navy and the Air Force should be Headquarters Twentieth Air Force and was no longer in. The policy which I had espoused, and which I preparing and directing the XXIst Bomber Command allowed to apply their favorite methods of in position to influence strategic target selection. Six believe was generally accepted, was in this vein: to carry out this strategic concept, a change in strategic warfare, provided that these preliminary cities were named in the report as vital Japanese urban operations were used to soften up the enemy in 50 51 preparation for the invasion and did not radial of 1970 horsepower, the Ha-45 Model 21, used interfere with the major obj ective.l primarily in the army's "Frank" fighter, Ki-84-la, considered by many to be the best Japanese fighter to But my primary obj ective as Commanding General, be produced in quantity in World War II. Service XXIst Bomber Command, had not been changed: the ceiling was given at 34,450 feet. It bore some "intermediate objective of overri ding priority" was resemblance to our P-47 but was smaller and much still the Japanese aircraft industry. And the overall lighter. statement of military strategy for the strategic air war The Akashi airframe plant produced "Nick," a did not specifically countermand the initial statement twin-engined fighter with day and night versions. It of the strategic air objective: to destroy Japan's was a two-seater and was used in defense against the capability to support the war. B-29. Its service ceiling was given as 32,800 feet. The plant also produced "Randy," a twin-engined single­ seat fighter which resembled "Nick" but had better A Tactical Achievement performance. Kawasaki produced 8,269 airframes in both its main plants between 1941 and the end of the In January we planned a variation from the steady war. From January 1941 throup� August 1945 stream of air attacks on factories in the Tokyo-Nagoya Kawasaki produced 10,274 engines in all its plants. area. The Kawasaki Corporation, the third largest Kawasaki accounted for 12 percent of combat engines aircraft production company in Japan, had a new manufactured in 1944, the industry's peak year, and engine and airframe complex at Akashi, about 12 17 percent of combat airframes. All in all, the Akashi miles west of Kobe and about 100 miles west of complex represented a lucrative preCision target. Nagoya. Akashi, the largest facility of the company, The mission against the Akashi works contained a (fJ was also the headquarters of the Kawasaki engine diversionary ruse and a tactical variation. The 73rd division. There was another engine plant at nearby t- Wing followed up the well-beaten path to Nagoya. But Futami, about 8 miles west of Akashi, and one at Z just as it approached the coast of Honshu, the force Takatsuki, about halfway between Kyoto and Osaka, ct split. Three airplanes of the lead squadron continued .... about 20 miles from Akashi. Akashi was, however, the -I 1/1 toward Nagoya and bombed Hamomatsu, southeast of I) key installation in the engine complex. There was Il.. Nagoya, at high altitude-35,000 feet. It dispensed c another Kawasaki airframe plant at Kagamigahara, " rope" to obscure enemy radar screens and impart the Z 1i just north of Nagoya. The Akashi and Futami plants c belief that the main force was continuing toward 101 were on the coast of Harimanada, an arm of the Inland Nagoya. But the remainder of the force, 56 B-29s, Q Sea, and adj acent to prominent landmarks which "CI turned sharply to the left and approached Akashi. The (fJ c showedup well on radar. The targets, the plants of the ftI :::> axis of attack was selected to optimize radar bombing a: Akashi engine and airframe facility, were about two 1/1 of the target if it should be covered with cloud. I.&J miles from the town of Akashi. The engine plant I) :I: Bombing altitude was dropped to 25,000/27,400 feet, Il.. occupied 1,287,700 square feet of productive floor E about 5,000 feet below previous levels. This decision (fJ space and the adj acent airframe plant occupied (/) was made in order to improve bombing accuracy. It ...:! 1,047,700 square feet, giving a total target of slightly 0 .. reduced the problems caused by very high winds and Z over 3,300,000 square feet. Kawasaki was one of the extreme turbulence encountered above 30,000 feet, ::J oldest and most experienced engine manufacturers in l: �

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After the attack of 19 January 1945 both engine and airframe production plummeted. Engine production had a brief resurgence from assembly of finished and spare parts then dropped again to near zero. the engine plant and 900 feet by 2,400 feet for the of the success of selected strategic bombardment in airframe plant. Every importantbuilding in the engine regard to the Japanese aircraft industry and war and airframe plants was hit. About two-thirds of the production industries. Using the USSBS, I came to the bombs hit within the engine works. Production of both fo llowing conclusions: UJ plants was cut 90 percent. Production never The Japanese aircraft industry did constitute a � • recovered. selected strategic target system. Initial operations .. :".....-" .!!! Eleven Japanese fighters made attacks. The against the Japanese aircraft and engine factories were � bombers claimed four fighters shot down. There were much more effective than I judged them to be at the no bomber losses. The mission has been described as time. I was highly critical of our bombing accuracy. � lr C one of the most perfect examples of selective bombing But that bombing was, nevertheless, so destructive that in the entire war. It was one of the bestof which I have the Japanese concluded that their industry was �� personal knOWledge. One important side effect of the doomed. They took the drastic countermeasure of 81 mission was to accelerate the dispersion of the aircraft dismantling their industry in order to disperse it and 1iI� industry-a drastic move from which the industry protect it underground. The combined result of our 1/ never recovered. destructive bombing and Japanese dispersal effectively The mission was, in my opinion. of great attained the purpose of the strategic air offensive l? against the sources of production and supply of :!!! significance. Not only was the selected target virtually � UJa: destroyed,but, of much greater importl\jlce in the long Japanese aircraft. Japanese aircraft production never &a. W run, the bombingaccuracy showed great improvement recovered. As Dr Futrell records: C ?< and the pattern was well concentrated. The analysis of a: CD Actually the B-29 attacks against the Japanese :I bombing accuracy produced by the Intelligence -..,J aircraft factories proved to be more effective 0 Section of the 73rd Wing showed 46 percent of the a: :) 10 than was realized at the time. The U.S. Strategic 0 Z "'It bombs which were actually released at the primary -C o O) Bombing Survey would discover that the _ � ..� target fell within 1,000 feet of the aiming point, giving &a. Zn 0 &a. - damages caused by the B-29s were enough to � a circular probable error (CEP) of 1,030 feet. Z b convince the Japanese of a need to disperse their OQ� C However, this analysis, based upon bomb craters �O)C a: :I '� aircraft plants. The destruction inflicted, plus � identified in reconnaissance photographs, did not � !!! the confusion resulting from frantic dispersal U) O- �O account for all the bombs which were carried to the :) l: a: I_ efforts, reduced the pre-attack capacity of :; I� target area. An analysis of the damage report prepared wO"' ClCi"'lt aircraft engine plants by 75 percent, of airframe by the USSBS showed a less favorable picture. Forty­ 0� o & W&a.- 0)- plants by 60 percent, and of electronics and a: five percent of the bombs fell in the primary target '\ communications equipment plants by 70 �A. ��Oc area, which was greater than 1,000 feet in radius. G • percent. 2 W As a broad approximation, the target area was .J> .., roughly equivalent to that contained within a circle of Peak production of combat aircraft occurred in l: .(:1C ,� 1 ,490 feet radius, and 45 percent hits within a circle of 1944, before the B-29 attacks which began in late � a: that radius gives a CEP of about 1,600 feet. This was November. Production for the year was 21,058, an Z &a. '\) not a demonstration of good bombing accuracy from increase from 3,180 in 1941. The increase had been 0 a: ; 26,000 feet by the 73rd Wing, but it was a very marked 560 percent of 1941 production. There were nine :I :c improvement when compared with earlier strikes, and producing companies. The production continued to be ) lhe bombing pattern showed sufficiently close dominated by: concentralion to destroy all elements of the target. '} Nakajima 37. 1% Continuation of the training program later produced Mitsubishi 23.0 ' an average CEP of 1,250 feet, based on all bombers Kawasaki 14.9 1 which did not abort for mechanical reasons. 1. fo llowed by: To be sure, the visibility was excellent and local i: fighter opposition was minimal due to the successful Aichi 6.9 !!!;; mse. Nevertheless, the XXIst Bomber Command had Ta chikawa e,'ery reason to be elated. The intensive training Total ...M...87.9% II 1 program was paying off. It was clear to all, and most Others 12.1% especially to the combat crews, that the XXIst Bomber 100.0% /I \\ Command was capable of destroying selected targets o o The primary and vital airframe and engine facilities o when weather conditions made visual bombing .. g :;: possible. It was an immense first step. The next would were concentrated in the central manufacturing areas . be the achievement of acceptable accuracy in radar in the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama area; the Nagoya bombing of selected targets. That, too, was on the way area; and the Osaka-Kobe area. and was attained later in the war. The drastic fall in actual aircraft production, beginning in the third quarter of 1944, after the It was the last mission that I laid on as Commanding General, XXI_t Bomber Command. 59

Since that time I have assessed the situation in terms 'Futrell, ld«u. ConUpl5, Doctrirlr, p. 84

58 24 Marcb-251 planes of the 73rd, 313th, and initiation of the air attacks on the Japanese aircraft expected news that General Arnold was far from began fu nctioning in December 1944. The judgment 314th Wings were dispatched against the Mitsubishi­ mdustry by the XXlst Bomber Command is shown in satisfied with performance. The factor of time was on its part that "there were no strategic bottlenecks in Nagoya plant. RAF Pathfinder technique was Figure 8-1 prepared the Aircraft Division Industry tak ing on a new insistence. The invasion of the the Japanese industrial and economic systems except by t engine plants" was employed. Ten minutes before bombing time, 10 Report of the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Japanese home islands, whose necessity had become an aircraf completely unwarranted, as obsession with the Army planners, had been agreed intelligence studies had shown and the postwar B-29s lighted the engine works area with M26 flares; upon. If air power was to be successful its application Bombing Survey was later to prove. The Joint Target five minutes later another 10 B-29s dropped MI7 LaterOperations could not be delayed. A drastic reappraisal was in Group simply embraced a new · tactic that was both incendiary clusters to start marker fires; then the main order. LeMay made it. easier to perform and to measure. fo rce attacked with 500-lb. GP bombs-sighting The cities of Japan were vital to the continued war The Joint Target Group proceeded to list, in order visually with the optical sight. Nagoya was obscured After General LeMay took over command the of effort, and they were immensely vulnerable to of priority, 22 most vital Japanese cities from the with cloud. Results were negligible- I,533 tons of XXIst Bomber Command, he "stood down" the incendiary attack. Although the first priority objective, standpoint of the important industries they contained. bombs were dropped. groups briefly. He continued the training program that destruction of Japan's aircraft industry, had not been Onthe basis of these recommendations, the Twentieth 30 Marcb-The 314th Wing sent a small force I had instituted and improved the Crew School. Lead fullyattai ned, it approximated. Night attack Air Force on 3 April issued a new target directive. The against the same target, again wi a Pathfinder force. He concentrated upon the maintenance program and had been th of Japanese cities using incendiaries and radar two principal aircraft engine manufacturers It missed entirely-again using visual sighting with the kept on my A-4, Col Clarence Irvine, who hadworked bombing which come within the capa bilities of the Nakajima-Musashimoand theMitsubishi engine plan; Norden optical sight. wonders with a terribly difficult problem. After lossof April-The 73rd Wing sent 121 planes against APQ- 13 could be undertaken on a consistent at Nagoya, were listed in top priority. Both were i the depot at Guam, Colonel Irvine to improvise a had schedule, regard less of the weather. Japanese air selected targets. Then the directive listed six priority this target. 1,019 tons of bombs were dropped with mamten ce system on tbe depot at Sacramento, only 4 hits. :m based defensives against night or all'Weather attacks were urban areas-Tokyo,,,Kawasaki, Nagoya, and Osaka 8000 mIles away. He set up an air transport system of April minimal or nonexistent. It would not be necessa ry to Urban Area I, Urban Area 2, and Urban Area 3. -'Three attacks were conducted consisting his own, and I was careful not to ask where he got the 3 operate in formation or at high altitude, both of which Again quoting The Army Air Fo rces in World War II; of one wing each, with targets the Mitsubishi Shizuoka authority to use the transpons. He had also established engine plant, the Nakajima Kozumi assembly plant, would permit much greater bombloads (up to 20,000 a streamlined maintenance system in the 73rd Wing by and Tachikawa engine plant. Results again were consolidating the resources of the groups. Ibs.). He decided to switch from primary reliance upon ThI!Joint Ta rget Group based its recommendations negligible. . The command just was not equipped for night General LeMay kept most of the tactical methods daylight precision bombingof selected targets to night on the asswnption that the principalfunction of air which I had established, including the airplane precision bombing. Specifically, it needed target . incendiary attacks against Japanese cities. attack was to pave the way fo r an invasion of the formations. This is hardly surprising since we had The first incendiary attacks under General LeMay home islands. . . . But after studying the resultS marker bombs, such as the 1,000 pounders used by the RAF, and reflex optic bombsights. Lacking these, worked together in the Eighth Air Force. against six of the greatest cities of Japan were very of the March fire raids, LeMay came to the The capture of Iwo Jima (an operation advocated effective and most impressive. The tonnage of bombs conclusion that with proper logistic support air General LeMay abandoned the experiment at that by e Twentieth Air Force in May 1944) by the time. However, with the arrival in May of the 315th ,!, delivered was high; the losses were very low power alone could force the Japanese to very Wing equipped with the APQ- 7 radar bombing Martnes m February 1945 provided an advanced air indeed; the rate of operations was practically surrender-a view shared privately by some base equipment, he tried again with satisfactory results base that was a boon to the Air Force. An air independent of weather; the devastation of the urban members of Arnold's staff. 5 imponance from the indeed, as described later. there was, of course, of enormous and industrial areas was startling. The new method of the 315th Wing as lead . s�dpomt of morale and the recovery of crippled operation represented a superb tactical and strategic Making use of aircraft from possible for the entire force aIrcraft. It was also Imponant from the standpoint of decision, a most courageous and appropriate one. Thus one resultof the first urban incendiary attacks aircraft, it might have been improved operations.. It served as an emergency and to bomb in daylight in squadron formations through . It was, however, appropriate to the particular situation was an endorsement of this method to the near . to bombing at la�dmg �ound �or crtppled B-29s returning from and circumstances; it was not necessarily appropriate exclusion of selected targeting. There was also another the undercast cloud cover, in addition aircraft with the' same raIds, and It proVIded a fighter basefrom whil'h escort to all requirements for the future. General LeMay reaction. There were obvious tactical advantages to night with individual arrival of the 315th Wing had fighters could support the B-29s or could make recognized this. He did not abandon selected targeting single-plane night operations at relatively low equipment. However the little opportunity to this strafing and bombing attacks on their own. Finally the but continued to use it when the weather and his altitudes. But did it follow that selective targeting been delayed and there was try application cap�re of Iwo Jima removed the Japanese �Iy_ equipment permitted. should be abandoned? Was it possible to apply these tactic. This interest in continued of have come from General warmng station which had been giving two-to-three­ These operations produced two interesting same tactics to selective precision targets? selective targeting may well to who was General Arnold's Assistant Chief of hour warning Japanese defenders. From 4 March, reactions. The Joint Target Group of the Joint Chiefs General LeMay was directed to find out, and he Kuter, Staff-Plans. when the first crippled B-29 landed there, to the end of of Staff seized upon the new tactic with enthusiasm. applied himself to the question with his customary General LeMay proceeded methodically to destroy the war, 2241 B-29s landed at Iwo Jima.' A large ThI! Army Air Forces in World War /I states: zeal. Basically there is every reason to believe that number of these would have been lost if Iwo Jima had General LeMay would have welcomed an effective the urban industrial areas which had been prescribed not been awilable. It became the base of the VIIth tactic to destroy selected targets rather than urban for him. But he did not lose interest in selective Fighter Command. The Joint Thrget Group, after studying reports of areas. But his equipment was limited and his crews targeting and attacked Japanese aircraft and engine General LeMay continued the effort that I had the blitz, concluded that there were no strategic were untrained in this technique. He concluded that plants whenever weather appeared favorable. He initiated for about six weeks-with· almost identical bottlenecks in the Japanese industrial and the APQ- 13 radar bombing equipment was inadequate conducted such attacks on 7 April, 12 April, 24 April, results. It was apparent that our preferred strategy, 30 April; 5 May, II May, 9 June, 10 June, 22 June, . economic systems except aircraft engine plants, for precision bombing. This was almost certainly true destruction of selected targets through precision but that the enemy's industry as a whole was in the absence of good quality radar maps and selected and 26 June, for a total of 10 such missions in three optical bombing, could not be conducted on a vulnerable through incendiary attack.' offset aiming points that would provide good radar months. Then he attacked selected targets again on 24 sustained basis in the face of the weather conditions returns. He chose to adopt and adapt the RAF night july. over From 8 April to II May, 75 percent of the effort of Japan-almost continuous cloud cover. And the The Joint Thrget Group, which was set up in the bombing technique which, late in the European war, 7 �PQ- �:'" still in the offing. General Norstad paid Joint Chiefs of Staff organization to provide had produced surprisingly accurate bombing results. XXlst Bomber Command was diverted to tactical hIm a VISIt at the end of that time and brought the recommendations on Twentieth Air Force targets, He ran four good�sized experimental missions. support of the invasion 'of Okinawa, Operation ICEBERG, particularly to attacks on airfields in Kyushu to suppress Kamikazi operations from there. After release from ICEBERG, intensive incendiary 'Ibid., P 625 attacks were resumed at once.

60 61 Mission 14 May-Daylight incendiary attack on Nagoya, incendiary attacks, 6 percent to mining. The major was another fine decision on the part of General The first attack on this target, No. 2, was including the Mitsubishi plant area. 529 B·29s were influence on the change to urban incendiary attacks LeMay. It provided an opportunity to test again the only moderately successful and the target was again dispatched carrying 2510 tons, 12,000 to 20,000 ft. came from the Joint Target Group. feasibility of all·weather attack against selected targets attacked on Mission No. 7, flown on the night of altitude: 3.15 square miles burned out. The somewhat precipitate decision of the Joint and at the same time to make a substantial 15/16 July, using 71 aircraft, of which 59 bombed the 16 May-Nagoya urban area at night. 522 B·29s Chiefs of Staff to move the 58th Wing from the CBI contribution to the conduct of the war. primary. Again there were no losses. The cumulative dispatched. 3609 tons of bombs. 3.82 square miles Theater to the Marianas had at least one ill effect. The Fifteen missions were flown by the 315th Wing effects of both missions was very effective indeed. burned out. 315th Wing, equipped with the new AN/APQ· 7 radar nst 10 oil refi neries in Japan between 26 June and agai Mission No. 3 was against the MARUZEN 13 May-Night attack on urban Tokyo. 562 B·52s bombing system, had been scheduled to arrive in the the end of the war on 14 August. These missions are Refinery at the NIPPON Oil Company, located on the dispatched. 3646 tons of bombs: 7800·15,000 Marianas in April. The decision to move the 58th listed below. coast south-southwest of OSAKA. The attack was altitude: 17 B·29s were lost. 5.3 square miles burned immediatelyresulted in postponingthe deployment of only partially successful and was repeatedfour nights out. the 315th. As a result, the 315th did not arrive in the later. lSMay-Again the Tokyo urban area at night. 502 Marianas until June 1945 and conducted lessthan two MISSION B·29s dispatched: 26 B·29s were lost to flak: 3262 months of operations before the end of the war. But DATE TA RGET The first spectacular success was achieved with the tons of bombs. In all the six incendiary attacks Tokyo the delay was used to good effect in terms of training. NUMBER fourth mission, on the night of 6/7 July. Results were was gutted. 56.3 square miles. 50.2 percent of city was The training in radar bombing accuracy was superb. The mission reports for Missions No. 3 and 4 burned out. particularly intense. As a result, the performance of contain the fo llowing description: 26/27 June UTSUBE RIVER Oil Refinery 29 May-Yokohama urban area in daylight-high the 315th with the AN/APQ· 7 bombing system was I altitude. 517 B·29s were dispatched, escorted by 101 spectacular. It clearly demonstrated the feasibility of 29/30 June 2 KUDAMATSU Oil Refinery Target: MARUZEN Refinery. P·5 ls: 2570 tons of bombs. 6.9 square'miles burned attacking selected targets at night and in periods when 2/3 July 3 MARUZEN Oil Refinery out. the targets were obscured from visual bombing. 6{7 July 4 MARUZEN Oil Refinery epeat) Located immediately norih of SHIMOTSU and 1 June-Osaka urban area in daylight, by 521 The first group of the 315th arrived at Northwest (R 9/10 July UTSUBE RIVER Oil Refinery 7 mi South-Southwest of WAKEY AMA. The B·29s. P·5 1 escort suffered heavily from violent Field, Guam, late in June. There was only one runway epeat) plant produced aviation gasoline, lube oil, weather. 18,000 to 28,000 ft. altitude: 2788 tons of available, though the other was nearing completion . (R 12/1 3 July 6 KAWASAKI Petroleum Center ordinary gasoline and fuel oil. It had extensive bombs: 3.15 square miles burned out. Many of the base facilities were not yet installed. 15/16 July 7 KUDAMATSU Oil Refinery storage facilities. Crude capacity was 5000 5 June-Kobe attacked in daylight. 473 B·29s Construction of the field had been seriously delayed. (Repeat) barrels per day. dispatched. 13,500. 1 8,000 ft. : B·29s lost: 4.35 The decision of CINCPOA to move his advanced II 19/20 July 8 NIPPON Oil Co. KANSAI square milesburned out. headquarters to Guam had caused critical changes in 22/23 July 9 UPE Oil Liquification Co. On Mission No. 3, 40 aircraft were airborne. 39 7 June-Osaka attacked in daylight. 458 B·29s construction priorities there. Roads and naval 25/26 July 10 MITSUBICHI Oil Refinery dropped 297 tons of general purpose 500 lb. dispatched with 138 P·5 1s escort: bombing was by facilitieswere given a higher priority than construction 28/29 July SHIMOTSU Oil Refinery bombs on the primary target (95.7 percent of radar: 18,000·23,000 ft. altitude: 2.21 square miles of B·29 bases. As a matter of fact, Northwest Field was II 1/2 August 12 KAWASAKI Petroleum Center bombs which were airborne). burned out. slipped to priority 95 on the Island of Guam. It took epeat) 15 June-Osaka again, at night. 516 B·29s all of General Harmon's great persuasive powers to get (R 5/6 August 13 UPE Oil Liquification Co. dispatched: 1.9 square miles burned out. the project moving again. (Repeat) On Mission No. 4, 60 aircraft were airborne. 59 In this period there were 17 maximum effort attacks, By the time the 315th actually arrived, General 9/10 August 14 NIPPON Oil Co. (Repeat) bombed the primary with 44 1 tons of 500 lb. including 6,960 B·29 sorties. During the attacks, Harmon had been replaced by Lt Gen Barney Giles 15 NIPPON Oil Co., Tsuchizaki general purpose bombs (98.2 percent of bombs 41,592 tons of bombs were carried. Losses were 136 14/1 5 August as Deputy Commander, Twentieth Air Force. which were airborne). B·29s or 1.9 percent of sorties. Thereafter, General General Giles established his headquarters on LeMay turned to the smaller cities on his list and Guam. He endorsed and supported General LeMay's eventually to a total of 66. decision to direct the operations of the 315th against a The missions were conducted by streams of single The vast majority of the bombing effort of XXlst Damage from Mission No. 3 was only moderate but set of selected targets comprising the Japanese oil aircraft at night, bombing from 15,000 ft. altitude. Bomber Command was devoted to urban industrial photographs from Mission No. 4 showed 95 percentof industry. These targets had been listed in AWPD·42 The initial bombloads averaged 14,63 1 pounds per area incendiary attacks. In the entire period of its the installation was damaged. Only five large tanks and and more recently strongly recommended by the airplane but, with experience, this grew to 20,684 operations, the Twentieth Air Force applied its several small ones were left standing. map) USSBS. General Spaatz, when queried Washington, pounds. Only 4 planes were lost and 66 were damaged (See capacity in the fo llowing manner: by also strongly supported the decision. Because the in the entire campaign . 315th launched its first mission on the night of General LeMay, who never extended unearned Tons of destruction of oil refining was not specified as a top The priority objective in the current assigned target list, 26/27 June, under the command of Brig Gen Frank praise, sent the following message after photo· Selected Ta rget Attacks Sorties Bombs General LeMay described the initial attacks as Armstrong, who had been one of my wing reconnaissance and interpretation of pictures Division of the confirmed the mission report. aircraft and engine targets 2838 14,152 shakedown training operations. The selection of . commanders in the I st Bombardment petroleum targets 1437 10,600 strategic bombing objectives was being argued back Eighth Air Force. The target was the UTSUBE SucceSsful strike is subject. I have just reviewed assorted industrial targets 1459 8,093 and forth in the Joint Target Group in Washington but RIVER Oil Refinery at YOKKAICHI, and two the post·strike photography of your strike on more and more selection of such objectives was' being groups conducted the attack. The target plant was target 1764, the MARUZEN Oil Refinery at 5734 32,845 evaluated in terms of influence upon the proposed producing aviation gasoline. The mission was only SHIMOTSU, the night of 6/7 July. With a half· urban industrial area attacks 21,671 138,215 invasion of Japan . But by April, the Strategic partly effective. Wing effort you achieved ninety-five percent aerial mining 1750 Intelligence Section of the Air Staff in Washington The second mission was flown against the destruction, definitely establishing the ability of Total 29, 155 171,060 was arguing that the petroleum industry in Japan was KUDAMATSU Oil Refinery on the night of 29/3� your crews with the APQ· 7 to hit and destroy in such critical state that the destruction of facilities June. The target was on the coast west·southwest of precision targets, operating individually at night. Thus only 19 percent of the total effort in terms of and storage in Japan would have an immediate effect KURE. lhirty.six aircraft were airborne. Thirty-two This performance is the most successful radar both sorties and bomb tonnage was directed against upon the tactical situation. So Generals Giles and aircraft bombed the primary target. There were no bombing of the Command to date. selected targets; 75 percent was devoted to urban LeMay had considerable support in their decision. It losses. Congratulations to you and your men:

62 63 On the night of 28/29 July another mISSion This means that60 percent of the bombers dispatched demonstrated the high degree of accuracy obtainable placed their salvo centers within 1,000 ft. of the with the AN/APQ-7 "Eagle" radar bombing aiming point, giving an average CEPof about 850 feet equipment. It was Mission No. II and thetarget was for salvo centers. This is an 'astonishing degree of the Nippon Oil Company Refinery also at accuracy for bombingat night from 15,000ft. through stnMOTSU, south-southwest of OSAKA. Extracts an undercast. It is actually much better than the from the mission repon are as follows: average CEP of bombing distribution of the XXIst Bomber Command for visual daylight formation An impon&nt refinery of crude petrolCU\Il bombing (1250 ft), although this was conducted at with large and modern facilities and good much higher altitude. shipping and rail connections; the targetalso had Of course, one mission does not establish a CEP a tank capacity of about 600,000 barrels. It was which can be taken as a reliable basis for forecasting roughly the shapeof an equilateral triangle about and planning. Unfonunately the other missionrepono 2,500 feet along each side. The storage area of the 315th Wing do not contain bomb plots. extended 1,000feet beyond the nonhern top of The final mission of the 315th, flown on the night the refinery area. of 14/15 August, was also remarkable. The mission 84 aircraft were airborne and 78 bombed the reponstates: primary target, dropping 658.3 tons of 500 pound GP bombs. Opposition was light and TARGET: NIPPON OIL COMPANY there were no aircraft losses or crew member REFINERY AT TSUCHIZAKI NEAR AKITA casualties. Photos showed it was unnecessaryto return to > This target was attacked on 15th and last the refineryfor in this one mission the target was missionflown by the Wing, flown on the night of !:: almost completely destroyed. 927,000 barrels of 14-15 August, 1945 with bombs released only a z the 1,245,000 barrel storage capacity was few hours before the announcement by President damaged while the 1,274,000 cubic foot Truman that the Japanese had accepted the § gasometer capacity was almost completely United States surrender terms. > destroyed. 69 percent of the 210,254 squarefoot This mission was the longest nonstop combat group area was destroyed. The target was flight ever made, a distance of 3,740 statute miles c thoroughly saturated with bombs and obliterated from base at GUAM to the target on the nonhern z beyond repair. coast of HONSHU island and return. c( Postponed for several days by the peace The target photo and interpretation showed the negotiations, the mission took off, led by the z fo llowing distribution ofbombing effon and impact of Wing Commander (Brig Gen Frank Armstrong) c( aircraft salvos: at 1637 hours on 14 August 143 aircraft were a. airborne and 134 dropped 953.9 tons of 100 No. A/C pound and 250 pound GP bombs on the c(., Bombing Per""ntage ofA/C primary. Primary Dlsplltclled Bombing Results of photo-interpretation brought now Group Target PrimaryTarget familiar words: "Almost completely destroyed or damaged." Photographs disclosed that no 464th 20 95% portion of the target was untouched. The three 33 1st 13 93% refining units were a tangled mass of wreckage, 50 1st 16 100% the main power plant still standing but seriously 502nd 15 91% hit. More than 66 percent of the tank capacity TOTAL 64 96% was destroyed. Lesserinstallatio n, including the worker's barracks, were destroyed.

Centers of impact of 80 percent of salvos identified in Note: This mission was conducted by the photographs. Ofthese: the Twentieth Air Force, after 78% were in the target circle of 1,000 ft. radius redesignation of the XXIst Bomber 7% were over the target circle of I ,000 ft. radius Command, under command of Lt 15% were shan of the target circle of 1,000 ft Gen Nathan F. Twining. radius Thus: (The figure for bomb size asgiven in the repon is 96% of aircraft dispatched bombed the primary probably in error and should have been 1000 target pound rather than 100 pound as reponed.) 80% of the salvo centers were identified 78% of those identified were within 1,000ft. of the The operations of the 315th Wing showed aiming point conclusively that it was feasible to destroy selected 64 65 I targets by radar bombing when the target location is aerial mmmg; and absenteeism of workers whose 50 percent in 1945 shows that incr�ed and urban-area targets. well known and the radar returns of the target itself homes had been destroyed and who had to forage for production alone would not have been suffiCIent The urban-area incendiary raids had are clear or its location relative to a prominent radar to provide adequate supplies for the Japanese profound repercussions on civili morale and food and the essentials of life for themselves and their "." . feature is well known. As indicated earlier, B-29s with fa milies. Army overseas. Japan's will to stay 10 the war. SIXty-SIX CitIes, AN/APQ-7 radar systems might have been as vinually all thoseof economicsignificance, were " used The Repon gives the fo llowing analysis of the lead aircraft for daylight selective bombing by effects of selective bombing on the aircraft industry: The Repon sums up its findings on the effect of subjected to bombing raids and suffered formations of the other B-29s. This technique would strategic bombing on Japanese War Industry destruction ranging from 25 to 90%. Almost 50 i:.'I' have permitted employment of the entire force for No figures are available for loss of production production in theseterms: percent of the area of these cities was leveled. daylight attack of selected targets even if those targets due to physical destruction of plant, machinery, The area raids interrupted the normal processes were obscured by clouds. There was a 53 percent decline in war of city life to an extent that interfered seriously , and equipment. Loss of production capacity � . through unsuccessful attempts at dispersal production between September 1944 (just prior with such production as the shnnkmg raw Effects of the Air Offensive Ir (which resulted from fear induced by the early to the launching of the air offensive) and July material base still permitted. I attack on airframe and engine plants) was as 1945-the last full month of production before The bombing offensive was the major factor �"I · I With the exception of the Japanese aircraft and follows: the end of the war. The magnitude of the decline which secured agreement to unconditional ! engine target system, the aerial mining campaign, and in output of each of the major categories of war surrender without an invasion of the home attack against selected targets in the iron, steel, and , I Airframes production from peak levels to the July 1945 islands-an invasion that would have cost "'.II iI petroleum industries, the USSBS was under some 33% Engines 57% level is shown below: hundreds of thousands of American lives. The I' difficulty in reponing the effects of strategic bombing Propellors 42% demonstrated strength of the United States in the on Japanese war production indust.ies and upon j Catqory Percentage drop from B-29 attacks contrasted with Japan's lack of Japan's war economy because no related system of About 55 percent of the entire aircraft industry's peak production adequate defense made clear to the Japanese targets was set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the facilities were out of production as a result of dispersal people and to the government the futility of Twentieth Air Force as selected priority strategic Aircraft 57 alone. further resistance. This was rem forced by the targets. Nevenheless, the Survey submitted repons on Army ordnance 54 evident deterioration of the Japanese economy [II For the other categories of war production, overall Naval ordnance 56 a number of war production industries. and the impact it was having on a large segment loss of production capacity through physical Merchant ships 82 The Repon on JapaneseWar Production Industries of the popUlation. The atomIc bomb and destruction of plant, machinery, and equipment wasas Naval ships 53 states that the objectives of our strategic air force were: Russia's entry into the war speeded the process of fo llows: Motor vehicles 96 I. To bring about an overwhelming and immediate surrender already realized as the only possible i drop in war production; outcome. Army ordnance 26% There can be no doubt that the air offensive 2. To shut off output of cenoin specific high Naval ordnance 28% The effectiveness of strategic air attack was crippled the Japanese war industries, even though only priority items of war production; . limited by the concepts of its mission Ha the Merchant and naval ships 10-15% one of them aircraft, was selected for dtrect attack. : ? 3. To accelerate the rate of the existing decline of purpose of strategic air al ck been pnmarlly to Motor vehicles negligible The urban .....ea incendiary attacks did have a crippling lB: Qverall war production; force an independent decISIon rather than to effect upon other industry through indirect effect. 4. To force a substantial cut in production of those suppon a ground-force invasion in No ember of production capacity through unsuccessful The Survey recognized another basic Air Force ",: military supplies of sucb high priority that they would Loss 1945, there would have been no occasIOn to attempts at dispersal, induced by the threat of . strategic objective-one that had been clearly defined otherwise withstand the effects of the current attack oil, tetraethyllead, arsenals, or, after bombing: in AWPD- I and AW PD-42, though it had been restrictive economic forces. March, aircraft. Effort could have been submerged by other considerations in later plans: the All four of these objectives were met to some concentrated against food and fuel supply by Army ordnance 12% intent to destroy not only the war-supponing structure degree. Strategic bombing did succeed both in attack on internal transponation and against Naval ordnance 12% but also the economic structure on which the Japanese . hastening and in intensifying the decline in war urban areas, thus striking solely at the mam Merchant and naval ships smaIl state depended, and hence to bring about surrender production and in preventing the Japanese from saving elements upon which continued Japanese Motor vehicles sufficient to when it became apparent to the Japanese that they the production of high-priority items from the general resistance was Moreover, a pan of the bring about a could no longer supply the basic needs upon which the based. decline. bombing effort merely duplicated results already complete population was dependent for its life and social The Repon does not say whence the objectives are achieved by blockade. Attack on the raIl collapse of survival. derived; probably they were deduced from various tran_ponation system would have secured fu ll production statements. It chose to consider "war production" as The Survey issued a repon on the effectsof strategic coordination with the blockade program. The comprising six categories of production: The loss of production capacity through bombing bombing on Japan's war economy. It concluded: railroads were overburdened, defenseless, and Japanese aircraft industry was brought about by a combination of heavy urban had only limited ability to replace rolling stock Japanese army ordnance By July 1945 Japan's economic system had area attacks and a relatively small amount of bombing or major installations. . . . Japanese naval ordnance (24,000 tons or 17 percent of total bomb tonnage) beenshattered. Production of civilian goods was Japanese naval shipbuilding directed at selected targets. belowthe level of subsistance. Munitionsoutput Japanese merchant shipbuilding Reduction in Japanese production was not the had been cunailed to less than half the war time The testimony is overwhelming that the air Japanese motor vehicle industry result of strategic bombing alone. Loss of raw peak, a level that could not support sustained offensive against Japan-which was essentially an military operations against our o mg forces. Of these, only the aircraft industry was subjected to materials as a result of shipping losses and blockade � anti-Japanese Air Force operation fo llowed by an appreciable selective attack. had an impact as well. This was panicularly true of The economic basis of Japanese resIstance had urban-area strategy-was a magnificent success. The The effects of the strategic air offensive were steel. The Repon points out that: been destroyed. This economic decay resulted conclusion that the bombing effon should have been catastrophic in the aggregate. They were caused by a from the sea-air blockade of the Japanese home concentrated upon tran_ponation and urban areas series of interacting results of air bombardment: direct The loss through ships sunk of I 7 percent of all islands and direct bombing attacks on industrial alone is, however, subject to funher evaluation. damage from bombing; indirect effect of bombing Army supplies shipped overseas (including food, reflected in frantic effo ns to disperse industry; loss of clothing, fuel, and construction materials as well essential raw materials through blockade, including as ordnance) in 1943; 30 percent in 1944; and

66 67 effort could end the war. But he in&tructed General landing on the shores of Japan. Personally I was CHAPTER I 9 Eaker to support the position taken by General convinced it could be done. I did not believe Japan Marshall. could stand the punishment from the air that Germany I General Arnold later divulged his reasons for had taken.'" supporting the invasion of Kyushu. He believed, with General Arnold sent General LeMay back to General LeMay, that Japan was already totterilli and Washington to brief the Joint Chiefs and, if they that air power would complete the collapse. But concurred, the Secretary and the President. General capture of Kyushu would have certain benefits-it LeMay arrived too late. The President had already would provide areas for the basilli of 40 groups in an agreedto the policy of invasion and the machinery had additional air force. These groups, primarily B- 17 been set in motion, not only for invasion of Kyushu, bombers, would be in close proximity to targets in but also for the subsequent invasion of Honshu. Honshu. The air units were actually available for transfer to the Pacific. And the capture of Kyushu At the Potsdam Conference, President Truman American Grand Strategy In the Pacific would make the invasion of Honshu unnecessary. In. learned of the successful test of the "atomic device. " addition, this policy position would be an expression He queried his advisors and top commanders about of loyalty to General Marshall, who had stood "in loco use of the atomic bomb. They agreed to its use, with parentis" behind the birth and growth of the Army Air one exception-General Arnold, the man whose Forces and who had given evidence of supporting a forces would deliver it. General Arnold, just back separate Air Force, coequal with the Army and Navy from the Pacific, questioned the need to usethe atomic after the war. bomb to assure defeat of Japan without an invasion. Japan had already been weakened by blockade and AS the time for the Potsdam Conference drew near, and Honshu in succession or directly General Arnold knew, as did the other chiefs, that beaten to her knees by air bombardment. However, if the President, Harry S. Truman, asked that the Joint against Honshu. Japan had already started negotiations for peace it became a question of dropping the bomb or Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries meet with Course 2. Encircle Japan by further expansion to through the Russians in Moscow, who deliberately launching an invasion, he favored the bomb. Other him to discuss Pacific strategybefore his meeting with the westward with a view to its complete failed to forward the peace feelers. considerations clinched his conviction that the bomb Mr Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Joint Chiefs isolation, and endeavor to bomb Japan Admiral King concurred with General Marshall. The should be dropped. immediately queried their theater commanders and into submission without effecting Admiral Leahy sho�ed considerable concern over invited their views. landings in the homeland. :asualties and seemed to favor blockade and In anticipation of the President's decision to use the General MacArthur had previously advocated Course 3. Attack Kyushu and install air forces to bombardment.. He asked General Marshall what the atomic bomb, potential targets had been selected. General Combs, on order from General Arnold, set invasion of Honshu at the plain of Tokyo. He had cover a decisive assault on Honshu. casualty rates had been in the other Pacific invasions stipulated that Russia must beinduced to enter the war and how many troops would be needed forinvasion of aside four cities which had not been bombed and in order to tie down the million-and-a-half Japanese He dismissed course I as time-consuming and Kyushu. General Marshall said that the plan for the passed the word to LeMay that they were not to be soldiers believed to be in Manchuria. Without this diversionary away from the decisive area-the plain of invasion of Kyushu called for 766,700 men. Admiral attacked. They included Hiroshima, Nagasaki, provision, MacArthur advised against direct invasion Tokyo. He dismissed course 2 as time-consuming and Leahy said that the Okinawa casualties (34,000 Army, Kokura and Niigata. ' of the Japanese home islands. In a staffreport dated 8 ineffective. He said that "it assumes success of air 7,000 Navy) constituted about 35 percentof the force. March 1945, General MacArthur was quoted as power alone to conquer a people in spite of its If this were applied 10 Kyushu, the casualties would be Second Change of Command saying that he was in thorough agreement (with the demonstrated failure in Europe, where Germany was numerous indeed (268,000). Admiral King said he Army) that the only meanS of defeating Japan was by subjected to more intensive bombardment than can be thought the casualty rate would besomewhere between With victory in Europe in May 1945, the second the invasion of the industrial heart of Japan . (There is brought to bcar against Japan, and where all the that on Luzon and that on Okinawa. Admiral Leahy phase of global grand strategy was put in motion. a striking parallel here. General Dwight D. available resources in ground troops of the United went on to say that he questioned the advisability of Forces rel�as.ed from combat in Europe were Eisenhower stated with regard to Germany that it States, the United Kingdom and Russia had to be demand ing unconditional surrender and said that had transferre

68 69 General Carl Spaatz Commanding General, US Army Strategic Air ForcesPacific July 1945

The FifteenthAir Force, in the Mediterranean was XXIst Bomber Command and General Twining took demobilized, but its Commanding General, Lt 'Gen over as Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force. Lt Gen Nathan Twining Nathan F. Twining, was ordered to the Pacific as a (I'hrough oversight or neglect, General Arnold failed Commanding General, member ofSpaatz's winning team. The other wing of to acquaint LeMay of the decision he had reached and Twentieth Air Force that team, the veteran Eighth Air Force, under the it remained for Twining to answer LeMay's query. on other member of the command team, Lt Gen Jimmie his arrival, "What are you doing out here?" Perhaps July 1945 Doolittle, would bereturned to the United States, re­ General Arnoldhad expectedGeneral Spaatz to notify equipped and trained with B-29s, and moved to LeMay.) General Twining had barely taken over the dutiesof TheFinale Okinawa. The old headquarters of the XXth Bomber General Twining's comment on taking command of his new command when he received orders to deliver Command would beabsorbed in the new headquarters what had been the XXIst Bomber Command and was the atomic bombs. He had been soheavily engrossed in The war was soon over. of the Eighth Air Force. The XXIst Bomber now to be the Twentieth Air Force was typical-and the performance of his functions as Commanding Command would be reconstituted as the Twentieth appropriate. He said, "Taking over the outfit from General, Fifteenth Air Force, which was carrying out During the course of the war, the Twentieth Air Air Force. Curt LeMay is about like taking over the Notre Dame maximum effort combat missions in Europe. that he Force had flown 31,387 bomber sorties-3,058 of Again there was an awkward command problem. football team from Knute Rockne." had literally no knowledge of the atomic I)omb. A these were flown by the XXth Bomber Command, General Arnold sent for General Twining and told Fortunately General LeMay's broad experienceand supersecret briefing was arranged for him. He wasted 28,329 by the XXIst. The war had taken 414 B-298, him there was going to be areorg anization of the entire demonstrated talents were saved for continued no time in questioningthe judgment of his superiors. 80 from the XXth Bomber Command and 334 from command structure in the Pacific. "I want Spaatz and application in the strategic air war. General Spaatz The orders were clear and concise. They came directly the XXIst. Losses on combat missions averaged 1.3 from the Commander in Chief, the President of the percentof sorties airborne,and 147 bomberslost (.47 Doolittle and you to take over right away. Now get on made him his Chief of Staff-a role which would keep percentper sortie) were the direct resultof combat. with it," said General Arnold. him active in the final phase of the strategic air war United States. The orders were carried out with Of General LeMay ·was relieved of command of the against Japan. precision and dispatch. these combat losses: 70 71 50% were caused by enemy fighters air attack, from all causes, was estimated at 900,000 36% were caused by enemy antiaircraft deaths and 1,300,000 injured. Following are a rew 13% were caused by a combination of both quotes on the eff ectiveness of American air power, I % were self-inflicted by accident from Japanese sources: Fighter losses were 80. I By the end of the war the Twentieth Air Force "If were to give you one factor as the leading one comprised: that led to your victory, I would give you the Air Force. " Bombers B-29 1,042 Admiral Asami Nayano Fighters P-47 733 Imperial Japanese Navy P-5 1 349 Chief of Naval Staff and Supreme Night 18 Naval Advisor to the Emperor Reconnaissance F-7 26 F- 13 52 "If I were to give you the decisive factors in the war Staff and Transports 93 in the order of their importance, I would place first the 2,3i3 Air Force," Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome Imperial Japanese Navy The total inventory of B-29s on hand in tJ!e Army Air Chief of Staff Combined Fleet Force was about 3,700. On the basis of photo coverage, A-2 estimated that The determination to make peace was the 175 square miles of urban area in 66 cities were wiped prolonged bombing by the B-29s." out. , Prince Fumimaro Konoye Total civilian casualties stemming directly from the PART III Premier of Japan urban attacks have been estimated at 330,000 killed, 476,000 injured, 9,200,000 rendered homeless. 2,210,000 houses were demolished or burned down Japan accepted defeat while still in possession of and another 90,000 were partially damaged, This " de­ over two.-anq-a,-half milli,?" combat-equipped troops OBSERVATIONS IN RETROSPECT housed" 50.3 percent of tile i 940 population of these arid nine· thousand Kamikaze-potential airplanes. No cities. A total of 159,862 tons of bombs were dropped. enemy troops were on the soil of the Japanese home Total Japanese casualties resulting from the strategic islands.

72 the world. If we made this singularly important date in terms of selected targets destroyed, then it is CHAPTER 10 decisionto abandon our own strategic concepts after a quite likely that the American strategic air concept careful consideration, not only of our brief early would have been abandoned in Europe also, in spite of operations, but more importantly of our growing the dedicated leadership of Generals Spaatz and capabilities, then the decision can stand on its own. Eaker. Actually the total destruction of the airframe . But if we failed to weigh the urban decimation in and engine plants at Akashi after only two months of terms of our national policies and purposes and in combat experience by the XXIst Bomber Command had no counterpart in the experience of the Eighth Air terms of alternate strategies, and if we were hasty in Force until it had been in combat for nearly a year. making a long-term decision in order to provide a solution based upon expediency, then some inquiry It is quite true that the cities of Japan were more and discussion concerning both the decision and the vulnerable to incendiary attack than those of basis in which it was made are appropriate to our Germany. But it is also true that the industrial targets own time, lest we draw conclusions which may lead us and the industrial systems in particular were just as vital to the continuation the war by Japan as they Critique Conclusions astray in the near future. of and The same pressures and arguments to abandon had been proven to be in Germany, and they were just selective bombing were advanced in the European as vulnerable to bombs. Destruction of those targets theater, and our determination to persevere in the and systems had caused the collapse of Germany. selected target method was later shown to be the wise The discussion which follows is a contribution to decision. the beginning of debate on alternative strategies. There is no doubt whatever that the decision to use Perhaps time simply could not be granted in the Fundamental Issues incendiaries to destroy the Japanese cities was an case of the Pacific war. When General Eaker effective, wartime decision in the light of the many personally convinced Mr Churchill that the American conflicting factors which were involved. There is no I have already drawn attention to the basic more by measurable effects. urban effects were concept should be given a fair trial in Europe, the doubt whatever that the chosen strategy was decisively dichotomy between proponents of Europe as the first measurable in very dramatic terms;The selective bombing proposed invasion of Normandy Was a year-and-a-half effective. The question is not whether the decision to and primary theater of war and those who favored effects were much lessapparent. There were elements away and had not even been agreed upon. But when Japan in that role. of the Army Air Forceswho shared preference for incendiaries against the highly flammable cities of the issue became critical in regard to the war agalRst Japanuse was a sound military decision, only whether There were basic divisions of opinion within the area bombing. the Japan, the prospect of invading the Japanese home there was an attainable alternative, and, if so,whether Pacific Theater itself. The most generally recognized The American decision to abandon the classic islands had become a firm objective of the Joint Chiefs such an alternative could have produced satisfactory division pertained to which of the two principal American concept of strategic air warfare, which of Staff, and the time for invasion was only seven or results at less cost and with fewer undesirable side surface thrusts should predominate: the Central called for selection and destruction of vital industrial eight months away. Massive forces were in motion. effects. The question transcends the scope of World Pacific axis or the Southwest Pacific axis. But there arid economic and target systems and to tum Time to overcome initial obstacles in the air campaign War II. It pertains to the future as well. Is urban attack was still another, more fundamental, division that has instead to thetargets British concept of urban area and to incorporate new equipment and develop new of cities a method to be preferred to selective target received relatively little attention or pUblicity. Was destruction, will d.oubtless be debated by future tactics and techniques for the destruction of selected destruction in all cases, or even in most cases? For that invasion of the Japanesehome islands the best route to historians. The American concept had been assailed in targets by new, all-weather precision bombing would matter, was it the best strategy in the war against victory and achievement of Allied war aims, or were Europe by proponents of the British method and had not have been granted at the expense of delaying the Japan? there alternative paths to victory? Were there better vigorously defended by American strategic air been date of invasion. paths? Was invasion really necessaryat all? This issue, commanders. The American method worked well in There were strong arguments in support of Speculation on Alternative Air Strategies which did not receive the attention that it deserved Europe. The abandonment of that method has incendiary attack. The fu ll force of the bombers could Is there any real usefulness in speculating about until late in the war, had a profound impact upon air produced surprisingly little debate so far among bethrown into the urban incendiary attacks with little other air strategies-particularly those based on strategy, which had its own basic dichotomy: defeat of current military commentators and observers. Perhaps interference from the weather. This could not be selective targeting rather than urban area targeting? I the enemy state through selective destruction of the this is because the very success of the urban area achieved in the selective bombing method until suggest that there is some real usefulness. The massive vital industrial, economic, and social structures and attacks against Japan simply engulfed any serious preCision bombing by radar had been perfected, and strategy of urban bombing brought results. But 66 system; or defeat of the enemy state by destroying the inquiries as to the wisdom of the decision, the manner even then the bombloads would be less than those cities? principal cities through area bombing. The air issue in which the decision reached,or itsapplication to was applied against the cities. But Washington r�ched the Was there not some way to curb war production and was strongly influenced by the invasion issue because future air strategy. . decision to place pnmary rehance upon incendIary civilian economic subsistence without destroying 66 the proponents of invasion held the balance of power Several important peculiarities of the Japanese attack against Japanese cities at a time when the XXIst cities? Could vital "organic" systems upon which the and they favored urban bombing. They seemed to situation tended to support the decision for urban Bomber Command had had only three months of life of the nation depended have been selected for believe that urban destruction would contribute more bombing. Japanese weather made visual bombing combat experience. The force was small, it was ill­ attack? Once the vital organic systems of Japan had directly to weakening of Japanese defenses and hence difficult and undependable. Radar precision bombing trained, and it had much to learn and improve. With been destroyed , bringing both helplessness and despair would both hasten the date of invasion and weaken the was on way. But its successful application would the exception of the superb performance in destroying and making it perfectly clear that further resistance the resistance on the beaches. Time became the dominant take time and would not really come into its own until the great airframe and engine plants at Akashi, the could not lead to victory or relief, but only to more feature in surface strategy. The two surface thrusts,led the arrival of the APQ-7, although experience, accomplishments had been disappointing-though and more suffering culminating in defeat, could by Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, were training, radar maps, and superior maintenance would they were more effective than we knew at the time. It surrender have been induced? After the destruction of literally racing with each other to determine which greatly improve the performance of the APQ- 13. was not a good time to make so important a decision as the vital organic systems, lesser means, involving should be the paramount spearhead of invasion. Many of the Japaneseprecision targets were buried in the abandonment of selective bombing in favor of area perhaps the destruction of one or two cities as It is not clear why the surface strategists felt that the sprawling cities and could not be ferreted out, bombing of cities. If a similar decision had had to be demonstration of what would follow, might then have urban air attack would favor the invasion. Perhaps the though they were vulnerable through systems which made after three months of operations of the Eighth brought Japan to the peace table. Joint Chiefs did not really weigh the issue in those supported them. And the cities themselves were more Air Force-by mid-November of 1942-and if the Two major selective target systems-organic terms. Perhaps they and the President were influenced vulnerable to incendiary attack any other cities in decision had been based upon accomplishments to systems-suggest themselves for consideration in than 74 75 have started by consideration of the suggestions addition to sea blockade. They are electric power and vital part of one of the most attractive of all the target offered in AWPD· l and AWPD-4 2, as a basIS of under extreme stress in the effort to counter the heavy internal transportation. Were they vulnerable? Could r systems, that is, transportation in all its aspects. It was they have been destroyed? Could Japanese industry, departure. losses of merchant ships at sea. In the actual event, . a part of the sea blockade which had a tremendous naval and commercial sea bases and construction Japanese economy, Japanese ...,.,iety and the Japanese Intelligence. Strategic intelligence upon whIch impact upon the Japanese capability to support the yards were vital adj uncts to the war at sea against political state have SurvIVed WIthout them? selection of vital organic systems and �rgets would war, considering her dependence upon import of raw rest was admittedly inadequate for thIS second alr Japanese shipping. That war was immensely effective. The basic question inviting speculation really is the . materials. As the inland seas and harbors were at the time of initiation of the bombmg To quote from the Summary Report of USSBS (pacific one propounded in the USSBS Report on the Effects strategy rendered useless by aerial mining, the railroads War): of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, offensive, November 1944. It must be presumedthat a became even more important. vigorous and perceptive intelligence campaIgn would quoted earlier. Was the adoption of the �rmy's grand Actually these target systems were a part of the The most important consumer of steel was the have been undertaken, a campaign that wo�ld have strategy, placing major rehance for VIctOry upon . . overall organic system "transportation," which was shipbuilding industry. The increasingly critical brought out the salient features of the �Ituatlo� as It invasion of the Japanese home islands, the better listed as a PrimaryTarget System in AWPD·l and was nature of Japan's shipping situation caused her to alternative? was later uncovered by the USSBS. ThIs mtelhgence specifically recommended by the USSBS in response would have involved analysis in greater depth. expand her naval and merchant shipbuilding Or would the other grand strategy, proposed by the to General Arnold's inquiry. programs to a point where 35% of all steel Although the paucity of target systems intelligence was Navy and the Army Air Forces, in which major The importance of transportation-sea, coastal, and consumed was being used in that industry alone. adequate reason for passing over many selected·target rail-is further emphasized in the USSBS Report, reliance for victory was to be sought through blockade potentials before the initial B·29 auacks on Japan, thIS Construction of merchant ships increased from . "The War Against Japanese Transportation." and air bombardment, have been more suit�ble? T�is condition should not have domInated later approximately 238,000 tons in 1941 to was the course 2 of MacArthur'S analYSls whlch -:- recommendations. Photo reconnaissance of the No major power in the world was more 1 ,600,000tons of steel ships and 254,000tons of he declared would be ineffective and . whIch he Japanese home islands by the XXIst Bomber dependent uponocean shipping than Japan. Her wooden ships in 1944. discarded in favor of invasion. . Command provided the basis for extensIve mdustrlal entire economy in peace, and even more so in But the increasing toll on shipbuilding materials Under the air bombardment/sea blockade grand and economic analysis. This is evident from study of war, depended upon shipping to provide the made it impossible to keep up with losses. Again the strategy at least two air strategies could have been the USSBS reports. Time and again there are such basic materials for industry and to fill out the survey reports: "Japan's merchant shipping fleet was fo llowed. One strategy, which actually was pursued, statements as that contained in the reports of the supply of staples required to feed and clothe the not only a key link in the logistical support of her involved selective targeting to defeat the Japanese au Kawasaki Stearn Power Plant: population. armed forces in the field, but also a vital link in her forces and air mining of the sea aspects of the The munitions industries were largely founded economicstructure." transportation system, followed by urban· area mass upon the basic iron and steel, aluminum, and a. OSS report in general correctly identified and Japan entered the war with some 6,000,000 tons of destruction through incendiary attack. A �nd chemical industries, all of which relied heavily evaluated this plant. merchant shipping of over 500 tons gross weight. strategy might have been the one proposed 10 t e � b . The Air Objective Folder 90.17 for Tokyo upon imported raw materials-iron ore, coking AWPD. l and AWPD·42 and the USSBS Econ c During the war an additional 4,100,000 tons were o\�ll Area issued by the Office of Assist t Chief of coal, scrap and pig iron, alumina, phosphOrite, Report. This strategy involved initial selectIve � constructed, captured or requisitioned. Some Air Staff Intelligence, hsted thIS plant as etc. targeting of the aircraft indUStry and, presumably, the 8,910,000 tons of this shipping were sunk or so Target III, correctly located it on maps, seriously damaged that it was out of action at the end air mining of the sea aspects of the transport;>tlo� Japanese waterborne transportation evaluated its importance, and gave a correct was vital and 'of the war. system, coupled with selective la 'geting of the raIl vulnerable in ! plot plan and photographic info ation . yet another mode-the distribution of . � . transportation system, of the electnc power system, of goods. The Japanese islands are mountainous, and c. JTC (Joint Targeting CommIttee) mformatlon 57.7% of this total was attributable to submarines the food system, and of the fuel system. This would be . overland transportation difficult was correct. Aerial photographIC cover was was and inadequate. 16.3% to carrier·based planes followed by urban·area auack of the citiesthemselves But the islands are linked by excellent and location of buildings correct. inland seas and the great 10.2% to Army land·based planes as a final blow, if necessary· production centers were all close to the The size of the plant area was slightly in error water. Internal 4.3% to Navy and Marine land·based planes transportation was carried by coastal shipping. The intent of this latter strategy would have been to and weapon recommendation was not 9.3% to mines (largely dropped by B·29s) destroy the Japanese capability to support ot only The USSBS Report continues: . � concurred in. 1.0% to surface gunfire and the remainder, about their fighting forces but the state Itself. ThIS would 1.2% to marine accidents. have involved selective targeting not only of systems As her shipping was highly developed and her Nearly all of Japan received such photo supporting war industry but a of the sophisticated principal heavy industry located to employ fuel !"? intelligence. Yet there doesnot seemto have beenany After April 1945, minesdropped by B·29s in Japanese systems upon which Japanese CIVIC SOCIety relI for Its and raw materials received by water, the railroad � reexamination of the electric power system to harbors and inland waterways accounted for 50 very existence. This strategy would have mvol mileage was small and the rail system was � determine whether it should have been recommended percent of all ships sunk or damaged. holding back on urban·area incendIary attack, whIch generally of limited capacity. Only two main as a Primary Target System. Up to the end of 1942, ship sinkings exceeded new might finally be used as a last reso -perhaps lines extended the length of Honshu, keepingfor � by Transportation. Other select d.target systems acquisitions by a small margin. Thereafter, the demonstration agaInst one m,aJ or city-to cause � . the most part close to the coastal margin. Only might also have reexamined the lIght of new aggregate tonnage sunk increased far more rapidly been 10 the line from Tokyo southwest to the great ports capitulation in a situation which obviously was totally than could be matched by the expansion the intelligence. Transportation, which was treated as a of the inland and the Shimonoseki ferries of lost. In this latter strategy, defeat of the Japanese aIr sea was Japanese shipbuilding program. single "organic syste�': in A�D.I and A�D.�2, developed for heavy traffic. . . . force through selective targeting would presumably Could these vital target systems, so crucial to all wasnot treated in SImIlar fashIon when co�sldermg The highway system was primitive and no have held overriding first priority, at least to the pomt phases of Japanesestrength when coupled with the sea Japan. Follow·up of the recommendations of important improved intercity highways where the Japanese could not interfere effectively with blockade, have been destroyed with the B·29 forces AWPD.1 and AW PD-42 might have !�ulted 10 existed.... the bombing offensive. This air strategy presumes available? Was the Japanese rail system vulnerable to selection of transportation as a top priorIty target Coastwise shipping and the two limited·capacity continuation of sea blockade. auack? sys main railroads were the life· lines of the basic aerial mining of harbors, straits The USSBS Report says : The desirability and feasibility of this last air ! and inland domestic movement, particularly of fuel and �was an extremely effective selective target ng strategyis worth con�i�ering. It would �ave � freed seas . � food stuffs. These life· lines proved to be Failure to attack the railroad system, as the force of the arbitrary restrIction Imposed by time, whIch � operation, coupled with the war at sea. ShIps whIch exceedingly vulnerable. was available, resulted in the loss of a major a compelling feature brought on by the Army s can not put to seabecause harbor entrances h�ve been opportunity. With her shipping so seriously dedication to invasion in November 1945. It mIght mined might just as well have been sunk. ThIs was a Japanese shipbuilding and repair services were put reduced, Japan depended almost entirely upon 76 77 her railroad system for transportation. The and although war plans initially worked to perfection refrigeration of food, electric communications, parts devastation to Japan that the need for electricity dispoJition and supply of her forces to resist in opening up the vast petroleum resources of of the transportation system, and all the great dropped rapidly. There was adequate electric power, invasion must rely upon the railroads; the Indonesia, by the time of the strategic air offensive, the industries of the realm, were completely dependent which had not been selected as aprimary target system remaining industry must rely almost wholly upon sea-lanes by which the oil was transported had been upon electric power. Even the thermal electric power and hence had suffered little direct damage, to meet Japanese sources of fuel and raw materials which interdicted. Oil storage and reserves would constitute a plants themselves depended upon electric power the requirements of the reduced remaining demand. could be transported only by rail; and the useful selective target system, but refineries would service. All the war production industries, including But if the cities had not been destroyed, the industries distribution of food and elementary necessities have lost some of their value as targets. specifically the Japanese aircraft, engine, and would have suffered immediatelyfrom effective attack of life could not be accomplished without the Chemicals. Chemicals arevital to the promotion of propeller industries, operated exclusively on electric of the electric generating and distribution system, with rails. war. They are needed for production of explosives and power. Food distribution and preservation relied attendant loss of production and widespread paralysis for ferti lizer to produce the food on which the largely oli electric power. Even fuel distribution and of the social structure, which was almost wholly The Military Analysis Division of the USSBS made population is dependent. Japan's chemical industry dispensing (gasoline and oil pumps) depended upon dependent upon electricity. an estimate of the air effort required to disrupt the was inadequate to its task. Nevertheless, the USSBS electricity. If the targets selected did not completely disrupt the Japanese railroad system. It concluded that the answers the question "Should the chemical industry Was the Japanese electric power system a suitable? electric power system, there was ample force capacity following air effort would suffice: have been chosen as a specific target?" in the negative: selective target system? Was it an alternative to urban to extend the destruction to additional substations. destruction in terms of crippling Japan's war This is a task to which the fighter·bombers based in Force requirements for initial interdiction: The bombs which fell on Japanese cities in the supporting production? Was its disruption within the Iwo Jima and Okinawa could have contributed. 100 sorties of B-29s using Azon bombs, or spring and summer 1945 would not have been capacity of the XXIst Bomber Command? The US Strategic Bombing Survey states that the 653 sorties of B·29s using GP bombs, or more effective if they had been aimeddirectly at The initial conclusions of the Strategic Air total electrical capacity of the Japanese electrical 1740 sorties of carrier based aircraft. • chemical targets. By that time, the end was too Intelligence Branch of A·2 in 1941 were borneout by system was 10,120,000 kw. Eighty·seven percent of Force requirements per month to maintain near to be hastel1ed by concentrated bombing of the findings of the US Strategic Bombing Survey. this capacity, or 8,800,000 kw, was contained in the interdiction: chemical factories. Electric power was, indeed,an extremely vital element public utility system. But this total wasseldom actually 143 sorties of B·29s using Azon bombs, or of Japanese war industry and of Japanese social available. It was the sum of the hydroelectric capacity 933 sorties of B·29s using GP bombs, or This opinion should, I think, be questioned. The economy, and it was an exceedingly difficult system to and the steam-electric capacity. The hydroelectric 2460 sorties of carrier based aircraft. effect might have taken longer, but surely it would not tackle. The USSBS agreed: capacity was 5,830,000 kw and the steam·electric One highly successful air attack on rail have been so deadly as the mass destruction of the capacity was 2,970,000 kw. The hydroelectric transportation facilitieswas carried out late in the war cities. Electric power is one of Japan's basic industries. generating capacity fluctuated with rainfall and stream by a naval carrier task force. The rail ferries at It is utilized as the almost exclusive primary flow, and the available capacity was considerably less Electric Power. Analysis of the target systems Hakodate, linking Honshu with Hokkaido, by which motive 'power for manufacturers, in a large than this peak on a year·round basis. discussed above reveals a shocking gap in coal was moved to the power plants of the south, were targets proportion of the transportation system, in This was "the industrial heart of Japan"-the seriously considered for recommendation. The wrecked and sunk . virtually all commercial establishments, and for central industrial organism on which the vitality of absence this target an oversight or else a The USSBS reached the fo llowing conclusions: of was lighting in an unusually high percentage of Japanese power was wholly dependent. General miscalculation. The target was Japanese electric dwellings. Marshall declared that the primary objective of power. AW PD·\ listed German electric power second The weakest point in Japan's economic structure invasion would be the seizure of this vital area after a only to the German aircraft industry in the air war and the one which was already most near.ly Some indication of the pervading importance of crucial battle on "the plains of Tokyo ." General against Axis Europe. defeat of Germany, disposed of was her transportation. A Later, after electric power to various prime elements of industry Eisenhower, too, had recognized a "vital industrial AW PD·I contemplated the movement of strategic air combination of accelerated and intensified and economy is given by the fo llowing, from the area" as the crowning objective of invasion: the Ruhr, forces to the Pacific and launching of a similar air assault against shipping by the naval and air Survey: which he called "the industrial heart of Germany." offensive against Japan. obj ective of such an air arms, coupled with the of railroad attack The Both these vital industrial complexes were totally type. offensive would be similar to that against Germany: discussed above, should have been ample to At peak production the Japanese iron and steel dependent upon electric power and transportation. the application of air power for the breakdown of the complete the destruction of the nation's war industry formed the single largest consuming Electric power was the life·impulse which caused industrial and economic structure of Japan. Electric making potential. group, absorbing 17 percent of energy delivered. those industrial hearts to beat The systems of power was no less vital to Japan than to Germany. The users of electric energy in order of transportation constituted the arteries which brought There seemedto beample time in which to prepare the importance, were: in the raw material., distributed parts and components, Iron and Steel. It was quite true that steel provided intelligence and make the target selections for the air Steel 17% and delivered the finished products to the military and the essential sinews of war production and economic offensive against Japanese electric power. Aluminum 10% civilian consumers. Those industrial hearts and the construction. But the raw materials for steel Unfortunately, electric power was later dropped Coal 7% flow of their arteries could be stilled by destroying the manufacture and some of theferrite ingredients which from recommended Japanese target lists. The decision Railways 6% sources and availability of electric power and were critical to aircraft engine construction to be to drop electric power from the list of primary had targets Metal mining 5% disruptingtransport ation. In the war against Germany imported by sea. It is also truethat the coke ovens were was made because of inadequate and misleading Ammonium sulphate 4% and that against Japan the prizes were so great as to vital to Japanese steel production. If they had been intelligence. Electric power sources as a selective Calcium carbide 4% invite our maximum air effort to destroy the electric destroyed earlier, the blow would have telling. target is worthy of reexamination in the light of been By system Aircraft industry 4% power system. Yet in each case, the task was dismissed the time the strategic air offensive really got under the USSBS reports. Destruction of the Japanese All other industrial customers 24% as "much too difficult" before all avenues had been way, the steel plants were already operating at partial electric power system would have rendered the great Electric light 8% examined. But the importance of the "industrial heart" production capacity because of the lack of raw cities of Japan useless as sources of Japanese stren&th. Small customers 1\% as the real source of strength behind the enemy state materials. But the significance of the target system and We justified the destruction of the 66 largest cities Total 100% and the will and capacity of the enemy nation to its vulnerability to air attack should not be forgotten. in Japan on the ground that they contained thousands continue the war was recognized by soldiers and Oil, like steel, a critical element in the war 011. 'ro. of small shops which could not be isolated and Japanese electric power was a vital and critical airmen alike. Their objectives were similar; their production and support system of Japan, and oil too addition destroyed. Yet every tool inevery shop was completely target system, not in to urban incendiary methods were different. had to be imported in its entirety. Although Japan had dependent upon public electric power. In addition, attack but as asubstitute. In the actual case, the urban laid in large reserves of oil in preparation for the war such critical services as pumped water supply, incendiary attacks caused such widespread The A·2 analysis of 1942 concluded that electric

78 79 poweraeneratinll sources in Japan were so numeroUS Hokkaido hydroelectric power was seasonal. The steam-electric damage in the attack of adjacent targets The US carry . that they did not appear to constitute a vulnerable Island 3.5% generating plants had to about one-third of the Strategic Bombing Survey reported on one such steam system. Again the Survey: Northern load during the dry season , and by the end of the plant which was near two oil refineries, the Kawasaki tar&et Honshu 4.3% winter of 1945, the reservoirs were nearly empty when . . . Some 1350 hydroelectric generating Tohoku began Steam Power Plant, near Tokyo. It received damage ltations (1944 capacity 5,819,000KW) make up Kanto (which included rains to fall and snows began to melt. incidental to night radar bombing of the refineries. the public utility system, along with 80 steam­ Tokyo-Yokohama) As indicated above, the three principal The summary of this report is as follows: manufacturing centers of Japan were centered around electric stations of significant size (1944 Kansai (which included Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, and Nagoya. Generating capacity 2,964,000 KW). There is also a Kyoto-Osaka- Central (See The Kawasaki Steam Power Plant, located on and Transmission System, Central Honshu, scattering of private generaung plants, both Kobe) Honshu 69.6% Tokyo Bay near Kawasaki, 71,500 KW in Highlighting Substations. and Electric Plants.) has hydro and steam, af!iliated with industri 1 Chubu (which included name-plate generating capacity. Main buildings . � these centers were surroundedSteam and served by two enterprises but usually ued to the utlhty system. Nagoya) are of concrete construction in two parts, the "rings" of high�tension transmission circuits - the Chugoku (which included Western larger part containing plant power, with coal outer ring at 154 kilovolts and the inner at 66 Hydroelectric generating stations in Japan would Hiroshima-Kure) Honshu 6.9% storage and handling equipment on one side, and not, indeed, have been profitable strategic bombing kilovolts. smaller part is the indoor transformer and Shikoku The TOkyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama area had a the targets they were large in num�r, small 10 high tension switching station. Its output becawe Island 3.6% demand of 1,000,000 kw and was served by 14 individual capacity, and widely dIspersed 10 averaged in excess of100 million KWH annually mountainous terrain where conditions make accurate Kyushu primary substations (154 kv) and 10 secondary during the first threeof years the It 29th 1 3.0% war. was bombing difficult. But the Survey clearly sh\lws that Island substations One-third of demand was met by 4 in size in Japan and a very important standby . (66 kv). our intelligence analysis made an error sto pmg steam plants. Thrgets: 24 substations and 4 steam plant for supply of power to the Imperial 10 p Total peakdemand 1943) was5,50 0,000kw. short at this point. The analysts should have conunued (m generating plants. Japanese Government Railways, especially The wartime peak loads of the Important in depth. Survey says: The Osaka-Kobe area had a demand of 900,000 during the dry season when hydro power production centers in totaled 3,229,000 kw, or was The kw and wasserved by 9 primary substations (154 down. approximately 60 percentJapan of total capaCIty. kv) The public utility system in Japan proper, and 9 secondary substations (66 kv). There was This plant never a primary target but was . peak was which accounts for 87 percent of mstalled adequate steamgenerated capacity to carrythe entire damaged in 3 (night) raids on adjacent by The electricenergy absorbed in th principal load targets capacity and 90 perc t of energy generation in "';" load in 7 stations. 1lugets: 18 substations and 7 steam the Twentieth Air Force (3 15th Wing). On (the � centers was as follows: the home islands, is hIghly mtegrated, and IS held generating plants. night of) 12/13 July 1945, 452 tons were together by a nation·wide network of The Nagoya area a demand of 450,000 kw and dropped in the entire raid and 4 bombs fell , The Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama served had transmission lines. Some percent of Japan s was by 4 primary substations (154 and 8 within the electric generating plant On (the 60 load center 1,000,000 kv) area. electric power is generated at 60 cycles per kw secondary substations (66 There were 2 steam night of) 25n.6 July 1945, 650 tons were The Nagoya load center 450,000 kw kv). second the remainder at 50 cycles. plants. Targets : 12 substations and 2 steam generating dropped in the entire raid, and 57 bombs fell The Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto load plants. AI�ost four·fifths of the electric energy within the generating plant area. On (the night centeI 979,000 kw in home islands is used in Honshil The Survey concluded after careful analysis that of) 1 n.August 1945, 1017 tons were dropped in consumed the destruction of all these substations and steam and of the remaining one-fifth, the major 2,429,000 kw the entire raid, and 32 bombs fell within the portion is consumed in Kyushu. Within Honshu The Hiroshima-Kure load center 100,000 kw generator plants would cripple these vital industrial generating plant area. the two principal supply centered around TheKyushu load center 700,000 kw areas. Total targets: 54 substations and 13 steam The principal physical damage was the areas, generating plants.' Tokyo and Osaka, absorb pr ctically half of the 3,229,000 complete destruction of coal handling � kw Specifically the Survey stated: energy delivered on the maIO Island. Nago:(" equipment and collapse of the circulating water accounts for the lions share of the rest. Pre-raid intake tunnel which put the plant completely out Thus 75 percent of available electric power was The destruction of 54 substations and 13 steam intelligence on the location and size of electric of commission. In addition, damage was done to used in the Tokyo-Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka-Kobe power plants would have deprived Japan of power facilities was accurate in the great the steam end of No. 3 turbogenerator unit, to load centers, which should have been recommended about 50 percent of electrical energy majority of However, there a notable generator cables and control bay. Although the �. was for air attack to isolate them from theIr sources of requirements. This percentage does not, absmeeanalysis of of the relative imporlance and electrical supply. The only other important load center plant was not in operation at the time of the jimcliotull relations of or systems or however, give the fullimportance or effect. This damage, the lossof production is equivalentto at groups was the Kyushu area, which absorbed 22 perce�t of the curtailmentwould be inthe threeareas where the jQcilitia, an absence which would have impeded least 50% of one year's normal production of 57 electric load which supported major prodUCtion and largest proportion heavy production intelli,ent selection of installations suited to war was million KWH. No attempt at recuperation has civic centers. performed, and consequently,of the economic coordinated attacks. From a map of the been made. The vulnerability of steam power If the destruction of the power substations and importance of such production loss is much transmission system, an impression is gainedthat plants is fully shown since the destruction of a steam-power generating stations of central Hons�u greater than the figure of 50% would indicate. there a network of lines and a multiplicity portion rendered the entire plant inoperative for is of should fail to cause the collapse of mdUBtnal substations, providing infinite switching str\lCture of Japan and of the Japanese nationalthe fabric, a long period of time. flexibility. Closer analysis discloses, however, which depended upon those load centers, the Kyushu Effects of Bomb Strikes on Japanese The size, importance, and location had been that the cross-ties and apparent alternate routes load center could also have been disrupted and Electric Power Installations correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but are made up of old, small capacity, lines which isolated frorn its source of electric power bringing the damage had not been correctly stated in damage arc of relatively little useif the main lines are out total disruption of major electric-based industry to 97 Although no electric power facilities were assessment reports. significance at this plant is the apparent of ICrvice. percent. This additional disruption wo�ld have deliberately attacked by the Twentieth Air Force, a Of Thepeak aenerating capacity was divided among required effective attack of six steam-electrIC plants, number of steam-generator plants received incidental ease with which a steam power plant can be rendered inoperative by a small tonnage per ttIc districtJ of the home islands as follows: one hydroplant, and a few substations, in Kyushu. acre. Although the hydroelectric system generated the in the great majority of the electric power used. Unfortunately there does not appear to be any J�P:u" ·Thistollllof67taqet1�wilh66rOldllnJptloo oflhcOc:nn.n 1)'ltem • USSBS J.- Electric Utilitia. p. 6. reservoirs were limited and avaIlabIlIty of record of daylight attack of a substation. However

80 81 Row of six 20,000 KV A transformers, all destroyed by one HE bombwhich hit the end transformer and I produced fire which destroyed all the others.

Photo USSBS JapaneseElectric Utility Repon, p. 139.

Japanese aircraft industry to other as the plants, within an area, can the electric power 1lIr8"ts, II supply be effectively destroyed. USSBS points out, and bombing accuracy could bave !I been improved by lowering bombing a1tilUde­ the I Feasibilityof Selectin Bombingof which LeMay actually directed. Days of visual I Japanese Electric Power bombing from medium altitude should have been adequate to break the back of the electrical Mie substation. Photo USSBS Japanese Electric Utility Repon,p. 139. , Capacity of Forces Available. Would adverse distribution system. weather conditions have permitted the necessaryvisual Almost the entire month of April had there is a of damage to the Mie Substation inoperative. No production loss sustained beendnoted repon was bombing of the switching and transformer substations? to attacks on Kyushu in suppon of the assault on Yolckaichi, near Nagoya, as a result of a night radar because of their ability to make substitution by Okinawa. attack on an adja

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GENERATING AN,D TRANSMISSION SYSTEM CENTRAL HONSHU HIGHLIGHTING STEAM ELECTRIC PLANTS

L[G[NO

[II II'OJST"'AL PLANTS 30,000 K ¥if OR OVER • .!in..... ELEC.TRIC PLANTS lIIJ)OO KW OR OYER • I1tOROEL[CTftIC PLANTS 30,.000 KW OR OYER TR.\NSMlaSION I..IN[S

0VtA tOOK'II TRANSMISSION U"[S

UNOf;A lOO K ... POWER PLANT S UND£A 30,,000 KW CAPl\CITY SUBSTATIONS

00 '"

GENERATING AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM CENTRAL HONSHU HIGHLIGHTING SUBSTATIONS B-Z9I OR H ..... Etrec:tb'e Sorties DaI. Total 20th A.F. 8th A.F. Total XXth D.C. XXIst D.C. 8th A.F. (Actual) (planned) April 1944 94 94 May 137 137 131 131 547 June 133 133 102 102 209 July 146 146 145 252 Aug. 150 150 145 199 521 163 163 199 279 279 1669 Oct.Sept. 219 219 339 175 514 2205 Nov. 262 262 295 492 787 3661 Dec. 34� 345 454 887 3410 Jan. 1945 447 447 433 732 1189 4020 Feb. 538 538 457 2520 2892 15283 Mar. 602 602 372 3246 3246 17492 April 705 705 4226 4226 24285 May 730 730 5243 5243 37542 June 878 878 6168 6168 43091 July 979 979 3145 3145 21873 Aug, (l5t half) rooo 42 1042

26401 29153 176060 Total Actual 1000 42 1042 2752

Potential

3200 3200 22400 Aug. (2nd 1000 42 1042 1ull0 7100 49700 1000 200 1200 6500 600 6500 1600 8100 56700 Oct.Sept. 1000 400 1400 6500 3500 10000 70000 Nov. 1000 600 1600

22700 5700 28400 198800 Total Potential 1000 600 1600

57553 374800 Grand Total 1600

CuaMdIlll ..Total c..aIIItln Total Toaa ofBo_ Dale Effectiye Sortiel To Date Dropped10 Dat. 547 June 44 131 July 233 756 1008 Aug. 378 577 1529 Oct.Sept. 856 3198 Nov. 1370 5403 9064 Dec. 2157 Jan. 45 3044 12474 Feb. 4233 16494 77 Mar. 7125 317 Apr. 10371 49269 May 14597 73554 June 19840 111096 July 26008 154187 Aug. (1st halO 29153 176059

Total Actual 29153 176059

Potential

Aug. (2nd halO 32353 197459 39453 248959 Sept. 47553 310459 Oct.Nov.·Total 57553 390959

31.VO OJ. ]A1J.Y"1nWn!) - S3I,UlOS 87 86 Was itwithin the capacity of the available strategic Since this timespan is considerable and part of the air power to destroy these targets and produce the available force might have to be employed for other � breakdown of Japanese industry, economy, and social daylight bombing missions, it might have been administration and support? The Military Analysis necessary to conduct a part of the task by radar t ...... z Division of the USSBS was asked to answer this bombing at night or in had weather. This involves ...... oJ question. Their answer was, "Yes," and their analysis further speculation and estimation...... :!!i was based on the fo llowing factors: Requirements for !HI Percent Probability of ...... � be S ... z Tonnage of bombs required "on target" for Destrnction of Substations.The substations might r;: ...... attacked in daylight, since they would be more � ... substations: 1/3 to 112 tons per acre for ... � difficult to identify and hence more appropriate for ...... 1 unprotected substations (without roof covers ... 2 or blast-walls, as was the I to 1'1. tons visual bombing. At the 90 percent probability, this ...... case); ... I per acre if the Japanese had decided to protect would require 3600 (3 X 1200 sorties) sorties or 8 their substations (which they did in only a days of da�li3!lt operations spread over twomonths.� very few cases); and I to 1'1, tons per acre for ltequlrementsfor !HIPercent Probability of Steam t" steam generator plants. Po_ Plants. The steam power plants were generally located near prominent bodies of water or on shore­ ...!i Bombing method-daylight visual bombing in formations of II aircraft, each bombingfrom lines, where radarbombing of such targets was ideally 18,000121 ,000 feet against substations; units suited to APQ- 7 radar equipment. If APQ- 13 used, of 33 aircraft against steam plants. equipment was itwould be necessaryto prepare i Bombers reaching target-88% of force radar maps and select aiming points or offset aiming dispatched (12% aborts and losses for various points in order to obtain satisfactory results. ! reasons). Daylight bombing accuracy (including radar � • Bombing accuracy-37% of bombs within a bombing) of the 58th and 73rd Wings averaged 36 :I 1000 foot radius circle from aiming point percent hits within 1000feet of the aiming point. This i is an average CEP of about 1250 feet. Specific ..." (CEP 1230 feet) . '" Average B-29 bomb load-I 3,500 pounds. accuracy data for Twentieth Air Force radar bombing Average force available for dispatch: 450 B-29s against specific targets is not available in adequate ..c ... during the period April-May-June, 1945 . quantity, but the radar CEP from high altitude using the APQ-13 equipment was probably approximately " The Military Analysis Division concluded that the double that of the visual bombing, or about 2500feet. c! destroction of all these targets could be accomplished The AN/APQ-7 "Eagle" radar bombing equipment, ,. in 1200sorties for the substations and 900 sorties for on the other hand, produced a very different picture. the steam plants, or a total of 21 00 B-29 sorties, which The APQ-7 CEP was at least as accurate as visual l included provision for aborts. The Division also bombing. The CEP in the only available record for concluded that the available force could accomplish APQ-7 bombing was 850 feet, through overcast at substation task in three operational days, and that � the night. The effect as a whole was at least as accurate as two more would be required for the steam plants. This visual bombing, considering the lower bombing estimate was based on a 50 percent probability of altitude (15000 for the APQ-7, at night. success. ft.) 1 The antenna was the key to the APQ-7 radar I, therefore, conclude that since visual bombing bombingsystem. The antenna was a straight structural I weather was available only four days permonth on the beam 16 feet long, mounted on the lower part of the b average at this period of the year, it would bave taken used ::I fuselage. It mounted 250 dipoles and electronic ... the entire available force about five to six weeks to carry scan rather than rotational scan. It produced a much " out the eritire task. Since this would have finer degree of resolution, but it surveyed only a 60 c involved only five operating days out of thirty-five to ::I degree forward sector. It had a .4 degree beamwidth. ... forty, there would have been ample opportunity to carry out the aerial mining campaign at the same time � �Ii! through night delivery. Wastbe Strategyof Selective Target Ii! The principal criticism might be leveled at Bombing a Feasible Alternative? N which this estimate seems to me to be in the low probability llYO 0.1 03ddOtiO S8111108 .:10 SNO.L - 'Y.LO.L 3AI.Ly,nlllln:> radar maps of success-50 percent. Other force requirements had With good , well-established aiming beenbased upon a 90 percent probability. To increase points and offset aiming points, and intensive the factor of probability from 50 to 90 percent would training, the CEPat 18,000 feet should bereduced to have involved a multiplication of sortie requirements perhaps 2,000 feet for the B-29 using the by a factor between two and three. This would raisethe AN/APQ.. 13. The average accuracy showed a CEPof sortie requirement to about 6300, if, for the sake of about 1250 feet using optical sighting and bombingin conservatism, the factor is taken as three. the same formation salvos. This accuracy could be measurably 88 If tactics were adopted, this would increase the timespan improved by further reducing the bombing altitude to to 15 to 18 weeks, using the entire force for all 9,000 or 10,000 feet, as was the actual case in the available daylight bombing opportunities. incendiary night urban attacks. Finally, there is an

89 advantage in bombing effects derived from multiple, The destruction of the electric prior to 31 December 1945, and in all against Japan. If, in the future, mutual fear should individual aircraft sightings, rather than formation power system might have required probability prior to I November 1945, Japan inhibit the unrestricted use of nuclear weapona bombing on a single leader.' The combination of some 6,500 to 9,500sorties. 9,500 would have surrendered even if the atomic selective destruction by nonnuclear weapons ma these effects might have reduced the radar bombing The destruction and continued bombs had not been dropped,even if Russia had again be the arbiter that produces "fatal weakening';y disruption of the rail transportation error to the vicinity of18 00feet to take a conservative not entered the war, and even if no invasion had and hastensthe peace agreement \ \ This would have established a requirement for system was calculated to require 933 been planned for or contemplated. In retrospect, I wonder if it was really necessaryto flgU1'e . about 3200 sorties forthe stearn plants. sorties for initial destruction and capture Okinawa. Perhaps it was, but not necessarily CEP 3,732 sorties to maintain disruption retrospect A of 1800 feet would provide 20 percent of It seems to me, in , that not only were the for the strategic purpose that dominated the bombs within a 1000foot radius circle, as compared for four months, for a total of 4,385 atomic bombs and invasion unnecesaary,but the urban operation-as a jumping-off base for invasion of the with the experience of daylight visual bombing which sorties. 4,385 incendiary attacks, which were more devastatingby far Japanese home islands. Probably it was worth the coot averaged 1250 foot CEP and showed 37 percent of Aerial mining actually took 1,785 than the two atomic attacks, could almost certainly as an added basefor strategic air operation•. bombswithin the 1000foot radius. To attain the same sorties. 1,785 have been avoided or their quantity greatly reduced if The Eighth Air Force operating from Okinawa expectancy by APQ- J3 radar bombing as was Attacks on aircraft and engine primary reliance upon selective bombing had been would have more than equaled the striking power of expected from visual bombing, or APQ-7 bombing, factories took 2,838 sorties. 2,838 pursued, even the end of the war were slightly the Twentieth, since it was much closer to the vital Total number of sorties required if the force would have to be increased by the ratio of postponed. targets in Japan. But Okinawa was captured as a 37120 or a factor of 1.85. This would the force for these systems-about 18,500 Although the atomic bombs need not have been set jumping-offbase for invasion. Ifthe inVasion was not requirement for 90 percent probability of destroying dropped at all, so far as Japanese coIlapse was absolutely essential to victory-and it does not appear An alternative air strategy of selective target attack the steam plants by radar bombing using APQ- 13 as concerned, they served a crucial purposethat had not to have been-then there is some question as to the 3200 x 1.85 or about 5900 sorties fOl' 90 percent appean to have been quite fea sible, and itwould have been contemplated at the time: they authenticaied the necessity for the Okinawa campaign. It was Dot probability of success. After the arrival of the 315th been far lesscostly in civilian livea. It might have taken restraining influence of American air power in essential to the prosecution of the sea blockade, the radar a little longer since some partsof it might have had to holding back the Russian domination of Western W'mg with the APQ-7 , the requirement would be aerial mining, or the strategicbombar dment It can be 2700 sonies. await the arrival of the 315th Wing with its APQ-7 Europe after the war, when Russian surface forces justified simply asinsurance providing basesfor the radar been by If half the available force (225 B-29s) were used on . But final resultswould not have delayed were immensely powerful and European and additional strategic air power. alternate nights, leaving the remainder for aerial more than a month or so. American surface forces had melted away into Actually the invasion of Okinawa caused the mining and other tasJcs, it would take (59001225) x 2 insignificance. Ifthe two bombshad not beendropped temporary diversion of nearly all the power of the or 52 days of operations with the APQ-J3, or 24 days AlternativeGrand Strategy in the Padfic and their power demonstrated, Western European XXIst Bomber Command for the entire month of after arrival of the APQ-7. This time, added to the nations today might bear a strong resemblance to the April in preparation for and supponthat of operation. daylight visual operations against the substations, There was an intense concern with "time," caused satellite states of Eastern Europe. This diversion came at a most inopportune time from requiring 3600 sorties and 8 days, would give a total bythe arbitrary selectionof a November invasion date. the standpoint of the strategic air offensive. time of 60 days for the APQ-J3 or 32 days for the But there really should have been no limitation on Criteria for Force Employment_ Ten years before appear Conclusions APQ-7. So it would that the entire operation strategic operations dictated by shortage of time.Time this climactic assault on Japan, at the Air Corps was feasible over a period of two months before the wasworking to our advantage. The combination of sea Thctical School, I proposed three basic criteria under arrival of the 315th or one month thereafter. It would blockade, aerial mining, and strategic bombing was This discussion is not intended to show that the which the employment of armed forces for suppon of urban have required about 9500 sorties (5,900for the steam bringing Japan nearer to inevitable disasterwith every decision toswitch to the incendiary attacks was national purpose and national policy might be plants; 3,600 for the substations with 90 percent day that passed. faulty. Quite the contrary. Under the pressure time analyzed: had of probability of success) prior to arrival of the 315th. General Arnold, General Spaatz, and General there, the Air Force probably no alternative. And been The entire operation would have required 6300sorties LeMay all opposed dropping the atom bombs there may have factors bearing on the decisionof ifthe which I am unaware. Given the circumstances asthey Acquisition with use of the APQ-7, or about 40 percent of the in_ion of Japan was postpon ed or abandoned. They of enemy territory with intention to sorties actually flown the XXIst Bomber Command were convinced that the air attacks on Japan existed, including a dedication to grand strategy based control; by had been in May, June, and July. already literally destroyed the means by which Japan on invasion, the decision seems to have quite Fo rced acquiescence (better described as sound, and the effectswere decisive. accept The XXIst Bomber Command actually flew26,400 could continue the war. They believed that time would "compeIlance") to make anenemy and sonies. Obviouslythere was ample capacity to destroy bring surrender without an invasion. At Potsdam, But I do think that the grand strategy was at fault, conform to our policies and aims; that the invasion should not have been considered Defense these target systems. It would have required General Arnold continued to oppose the use of the the of the homeland and its sources selected sine qua non of victory. Japan was headed for of only 70 percent of the actual sorties flown by the atomic bomb, even though the grand strategy still power. XXIst Bomber Command through mid-August of affirmed the intention to invade and the date for the inevitable collapse, without any invasion. And I believe that Japan could have been rendered helpless I think this approach still merit as a basis of 1945, and only 32 percent of the total sorties assault was only about three months away. Presumably has potentially available through November 1945. There he hoped that the acceleration in the bombing assault without the extensive urban destruction. evaluating militaryrequirements and options in reprd would have been ample force leftover to destroy other caused the advent of the B-29-equipped Eighth Air The question whether grand strategy should have to national purpose. by been selected target systems, aswell asthe 66 cities, if it had Force would bring about coIlapse before November. changed to reliance upon air power for victory is Invasion of the Japanese home islands was not an been necesaary to reson to urban attack to force The Strategic Bombing Survey, in evaluating the academic and pointless. It certainly could not have imperative requirement Going back to the principles been changed the Army Air Forces alone, though and precepts on which AW PD-I and AWPD42 surrender-itself a very doubtful requirement. war in the Pacific, found, "Even without the atomic by were they tried. But there is another point which is based it is apparent that, in the of Japan, invasion To summarize the requirements for selective target bombing attaclc, air supremacy over Japan could have , case destruction: exerted sufficient pressure to bring about important. Was American strategic air doctrine was simply a form of "compeIlance," not an end in unconditional surrender and obviate the need for sound? Which air method was beat? itself. We had no desire permanently to acquire invasion." The turn to incendiary area attack and the Japanese territory. If this had been our aim, then devastating atomic bomb did not necessarily prove that invasion would have been a fundamental necessity. More specifically, in it's Final Report the US selective strategic bombing sbould be abandoned as a But this was not our aim. We had no desire to • A ItUcIyof bexnbina requircmenll to dellroyIteam . tenmltlnaswian in Getman)' bythe Elabtb Air Foreelllin, fonnatioa aim bornblna u 1Xl/n)lfed 10 individual lilhtin, Strategic Bombing Survey stated: method for conducting strategic air warfare. Selective dismember the Japanese nation at home. What we -ad Ihdividual airplane saI_ indlcatel that IS·airplane form.tion a1_ rcqWrt; aboul bombing was decisively effective against Germany. In five tilMl.IMaY airplane rel __inclividual airpMnetilbtil\&l and al_toobu.in the wanted to do was to impose acquiescence to our war arne probability (9O':f,)of the .ame numberhil.l, of lllinalbe arne CEP(H2O 1\). . . . it is the Survey's opinion that certainly my judgment, it could have been decisively effective aims and remove the menace of Japanese aggression.

90 91 power would be needed after the war to deter Russian (1) Principal thrust across the Central Pacific to We neededto exert a compelling fo rce to this end, and the civil will to persist; only the leverage of domestic domination of Europe. defeat sea forces; to capture the Marianas, Okinawa, such compellance could be imposed by sea blockade .. impatience. The industrial machine was intact and War Aims. One of the fundamental flaws in our_ and Iwo Jima as air bases for the strategic air offensive; and air bombardment as well as by invasion. To h." unhampered. There was no need for air defense the grand strategy was failure to le with and define and capture of sea bases essential to effective of sure occupationby ground forces on a temporary basIS .grapP United States . , our national purposes and obJecttves. � I noted �ly prosecution of a sea blockade and control of essential whil� civil order was being reestablished under 2. We had time in which to recover and react. Our in this memoir, the Joint StrategIc Committee sea areas. Japanese forces overseas to be cut off from favorable terms would have been necessary, as indeed, allies held the enemy at bay while we armed. invasion probably should have tackledthat thorny challenge as the home islands and left to die or give up for lack of it transpired. But forceful was just one of 3. There drain upon the German economy. its first move. Grand strategy should be geared to was several alternative methods of "compellance." Nor sustenance. The Germans were fighting a major war on the Eastern national purpose. (2) Conduct of an effective sea blockade of the was "unconditional surrender" essential to our war Front. The effectiveness of the American strategic air Japanesehome islands, including sinking or capture aims. Assured control would have sufficed. Admiral Grand Strategy Revised in Retr�specl • The of offensive was conditioned by the strain imposed upon . Japanese ships. Leahy came closest to being right. strategic air offensive against Japan, carned out m the German industry by the war with Russia, and later by of . (3) Conduct of an effective strategic air war The destruction thesecities and the immense loss context of the Allied grand strategy, w� a magmfi t large-scale operations in Western Europe and the '7" against Japan to produce "fatal weakening" and bring of life of Japanese civilian population were in no sense and decisive accomplishment. But, lIke everythmg Mediterranean , But presumably this would have aboutthe collapse of effective Japanese resistanceand an end-objective of the US G�vernmen� or. of the else it could have been done better. continued , even without the American invasion of was to undermine the civil and social structure of the state, strategic air offensive. The ulttmate obJecttve I� a different grand strategy it might have Normandy, and the decisive effectiveness of the air been through selective air attack against: enforced capitulation of the Jap",,:ese govern�ent. The equally decisive and perhaps more efficIent. Such an offensive was not dependent upon the Normandy loss , (a) The Japanese air force, through of life and the immense CapItal destructton were alternativeoverall grand strategy for the co�duct f the invasion. � destruction of the Japanese aircraft engine and means toward enforcing capitulation. Tltis aim was whole war might have had the followmg dImenSIOns. 4, Isolated insufficiency of Japan. Japan was an achieved through the destruction of �e cities, but the First Phase airframe industry; . . island empire with insufficient resources at home to The Japanese electric power industry; wholesale destruction of those Clttes entaIled an I. Strategic offensive against Hitler's Germany to (b) support the war and the social structure of the country. . (c) The Japanese transportation systems, unwelcome burden of reconstruction after the war, bring about "fatal weakening" and colla e, WIth This did condition the effectiveness of the strategic air ps . including supplementing the sea blockade by aerial and the excessive lossof life could not becompensated (1) A sustained and unr� ltttng aIr offenSIve offensive. all. at � mining of home waters and air attack of shipbuilding at If the capitulation could be eoforced a I� against the sources of Germ military' econ�mlci and Finally, in considering the effects of our incendiary ml: . and repairfa cilities and ports, and destroying Japanese cost in life and property, then such an alternattve social strength through selecttve bombmg of. attacks as compared with selective bombing, we must . land transportation systems; approach would certainly have been preferable. (a) The German aircraft engme mdustry recognize a concurrent effect that is most unwelcome (d) The Japanese steel industry, through The Atomic Bomb. The question of using the The German electric power industry but none the less real. Incendiary destruction of great (b) destruction of coke ovens; atomic bomb caused much soul-searching. As noted (c) The German transportatio� cities has had a powerful and redundant effect upon �ems . (e) Petroleum storage and refineries; earlier at Potsdam President Truman asked the (d) The German oil and ch m cal mdusu;'es the US Air Force. American civilians have forgotten . � � (f) The Japanese food resources by individual opinions of his principal advisors­ (e) The German antIfnctlOn beanng the compelling effectiveness of selective bombing destruction of fertilizer chemicals, military, political, and scientific-whether they industries-coupled with against Germany. They have forgotten, if they ever (4) Preparation for favored dropping the bomb. One by one they Air combat to defeat the German fighter knew, that Germany was brought to the brink of defeat (I) (a) incendiary attacks of Japanese urban responded in the affirmative with the single, Important forces. by selective air attack with very few civilian losses. areas, if this should become necessary; exception of the man whose forceswould have to do it, (2) Provision for invasion of the Conti�ent after They remember only the slaughter of a million atomic attack of Japanese urban areas, if namely, General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding completion of the strategic air offensIve, If thIS should (b) civilians in Japanese cities. This engendered a this should prove necessary; has General Army Air Forces and Air Member of the prove necessary, and subsequent defeat of German reaction that is more powerful and debilitating against (c) occupation, if Japan surrenders; Joint chiefs of Staff. General Arnold questioned the ground forces, or the US Air Force than the accumulated efforts of the .. , (d) invasion if all else failed. need on the ground that the Japanese had already (3) Occupation of Germany If the aIr offenSIve German and Japanese air fo rces. That civilian Secondary effort: operations in the Southwest suffered defeat and would have to acknowledge it. caused collapse of military power or produced reaction may cripple the US Air Force by shackling Pacific to isolate large bodies of Japanese troops, and Japan was mortally wounded and bleeding to death. . the strategic air offensive entirely-whether or not it is surrender . II. impose heavy casualties. Time would make the wounds more lethal and no Initial defensive operations in the P�clfic to dedicated to selective bombing-and it may deny the miracle would offer hope for her future. Only curb the expansion of the Japanese aggressIOn and The proposed air strategy for Japan bears an United States its most effective means of exercising capitulation would staunch the flow. preserve base areas. interesting resemblance to that of A WPD-I for "compellance" in just causes. Actually, if we are . Europe. The similarity is, of course, suspect. Both But the problem was more subtle than that. There III, Priority allocatton of resources to forces denied the effective application of strategic air power proposals stem from the same basic concepts was the need not only of convincing the Japanese, but engaged in the European war. using selective bombing, we will have no means of Second PIWM developed at the Air Corps Tactical School. the United States Army as well. The atomic bombwas exerting strategic effect whatever, short of massive Any serious consideration of this speculation, and be needed not only to convince the Japanese that further As soon as victory in Europe could be assured, nuclear exchange. If that crippiing effect is to any derivation of lessons must, of course, take into be better resistance was futile, and thus to save great numbers of development of forces for the w�r against JaF. and avoided, the American public must informed account the circumstances in which the war was Japanese lives through a cessation of hostilities; it was initiation of such military operatIons for regammg or on the power and effectiveness of conventional fought. Those circumstances include: needed also to convince the American Army that securing essential base areas as could be undertaken weapons, selective bombing, as a decisive means of , I. Security of the American homeland. America invasion was not needed, and thus to save great without impairing the success in Europe, co�pled WIth applying "compellance," as well as the deterrent was in no danger at any time, There was no threat to numbers of American lives that would be needlessly intensive sea operations against Ja�ese shlppmg and power of both nuclear and conventional air power and the American people and no extemal leverage against lost on the beaches and battlefields of the Japanese the Japanese navy. the need for air and space defense. home islands. Nothing short of the atomic bombs Third PIWM would divert the single-minded determination of the On defeat of Hitler, transfer of primary resources US Army. If it was to be invasion or the bomb, he and priorities to the Pacific for the defeat of Ja� preferred the bomb. primarily by sea blockade and selectIve aIr to complete such of ''The homb" ,may not have been needed to bring bombardment. More specifically , defeat to Japan, but it was needed to save the Army the following as had not been accomplished m phase from its obsession with invasion, and its demonstrated two:

92 93 APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

95 US -BRITISH CHAING KA�SHEK CHEFS OF COMBINED JOINT CHIEFS STAFF COM CHEFS OF STAFF OF STAFF

I I 1 I NIMITZ MOUNTBATTEN MacARTHUR ARNOLD • I • CINCI CGI CINC SAC 20th AF POA WEDEMEYER SEA SOWESPAC • US FORCE _ HARMON PEARSEI • • DEP 20 ,AAF AF POA CG I CG Army fol Air FOrCes­ POA . Log � G �� � ...... ,- J CG Eastern - ----.... I ir ------C15 A Command I I � i r • HOOVER � CHENNAUL'" DAVIDSON·L MAY HANfELL HALE La C�M • • XXlst • AF 14th• AF 10th AF XXth BC 7th FOR AR BC • 1-- - .... I I ; ---� H II I I Vllth Vllth MARINE WINGS I DEPOT 58 73 313 314 315 FC AIR , BC O'DONNELL DAVIES POWER ARMSTRONG MOORE LANDON

COMMAND, CONTROL,AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS TWENTETH AIR FORCE Januar, 1945 .Responalbla for Defense of bases AIr 8-29 •• Responslble for Depot of B-29s-Marlanas Support ••• R for Depot of B-29s-XXth Command .. po .... Support Bomber

!IJ\\""""

US , JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF

i I� I MacAtthur - -,�-- - I Sp,at� Nimitz C.IIIC -SWPAC. . USASTAF CINC-POA.. Ken�ey

FAR EA T �!I Giles � AI" C/ . �...... mlth W�lte Wi!Iu:ead T -· ...... Doolittle 13th 7th 5th • '" AIR F AIR ' AIR 8th .... I" I" AIR FORe£;

.� I --.,.---, 500thI I I 3rd I I 58th 73rd 313th -�314th -r I • • • 315th �17!/1 GUAM 316th STRAT CG· -- RS WING WING WING WING 8-29 WING FTR AIR WING WING WING 8-29 COMO DEPOT WINGFTR Tlnl,n Tlnlen Salpan Tlnlan GLI�m Guam Guam IwoJlma Guam Okinawa

US ARMY AIR FORCES IN THE PACIFIC US ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE PACIF'lC AS OF 15 August 1945

Composite (Atomic) Group .509th THE BOEING B-Z9 SUPERFORTRESS

Test Specifications

Power Plants: Four Wright R-3350 -23 18 cylinder air-cooled radial engines rated at 2200 horsepower each. Armament: Twelve .50 caliber machine guns in power turrets. One 20mm cannon in tail turret. Bomb loadings: 4-4000 Ib bombs, or 8-2000 Ib bombs, or 12-1000 Ib bombs, or 40- 500 Ib bombs, or 50- 300 Ib bombs, or 80- 100 Ib bombs. Maximum speed 365 mph at 25000 ft. Long Range Cruise 220 mph Service ceiling 31850 ft. Range-Max. 5830 miles Weight, empty 69,6 10 Ibs. APPENDIX B Weight, loaded 132,000 Ibs. Span 141 ft. 2'/, in. 99 THE B-29 TEST SPECIFlCATIONS Length ft. Radar APQ- 13 of APQ-7 Crew Ten Cost $639,188 Production 3863 Stripped version with AN/APQ-7 Radar bombsight was designated B-29B (315th Wing)

99 98 Location of Japanese Airframe and Engine Factories

I (I) MillUbishi plant (airframe) near N"i0ya (2/3 ofpr od.) I plant (2) (engines) near Nagoya (1/2of prod.) I plant (3) (airframe) near Napno I plant (4) (airframe) near llIkaoka I (S) (airframe) plant near Suzuka I plant (6) (airframe) near Kapmijakara I plant (7) (airframe) near Inami I plant (8) (airframe) near Obu I plant (9) (airframe) near Till I plant (10) (airframe) near Okayama I plant (1 1) (airframe) near- Yawata I plant (12) (airframe) near Yokkaichi I plant (13) (airframe) near Narugo I plant (14) (airframe) near Musaahino APPENDIX C I plant (IS) (airframe) near Kumamoto I plant (16) (engine) near Kyoto I plant (17) (engine) near Shizuoka I EXTRACTS FROM UNITED STATES plant (18) (engine) near Napno STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY REPORTS I plant (19) (engine) near Hiroshima I plant (20) (engine) near Ogaki I plant (21) (engine) near Fukui The Japanese Aircraft Industry I plant (22) (engine) near Koromo I plant (23) (engine) near Nogata The Japanese Electric Power Industry MillUbiahi was the industry's most prominent engine producer (38% of combat engines)

Kawasaki I plant (74) (airframe & engine) Akashi I plant (2S) (airframe & engine) near Kapmijakara I plant (26) (airframe & engine) near Nagoya I plant (27) (engines) near Osaka-Knhe Nakl\jima 3 plants (28) (airframe) near Tokyo (80% fJgb ter) I plant (29) (airframe) near Nagoya 2 plants (30) (engines) near Tokyo I plant (3 1) (en8lnes) near Nagoya

Nakajima produced 30% of all aircraft engines

These primary and vital airframe and engine facilities were concentrated in the central manufacturing areas in the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama area, and in the Nagoya-Kyoto-Tsu area.

map) (Seepanying accom

101

100 IlxmalT Z.-Hlec',,", ,eneration rC'01Irce' LIST 01' POWER STATIONS OF 30,000 KW CAPACITY AND OVER-HYDRO ELECTRIC POWEn STATJONS-UTILITY Order • ...... _ DO. Na ... ote power ; :: ..map. OWDe1' alation �:tc��r LoaUOD t.r.�g:-- Lo�;d" - 1 ••_;. NJ�D BaModeD. _ ShiDaDO&aw. •••••• 186,000 NUpta·KtD Nakanoauma'lub Tomanl.ura --3-'·- • �I• ••••• . _ .�•••••••••• KurolM-pwa ••• 81,000 To . Uebl'.... · 10·00' 1i8-W 1:'17-30' · .� I #3._ r.ma.left 8bllDonUkawa-pD do mura ...... : ....•..•...•....•...•. · . a ...... •.. f •••••• Saku : - ••••••.•••• 12,700 01llll.... ·1I: •• Seta-IuD Kltataebltt.na-lIIura •• ...... 13'* •• ••••. ' ••do� . . . ..� ...... Komald ..... , ••, .. 12,000 To,.ma-hD Blcuhltonaml-pa. mcuhl,.- 30*3&' l3T* maml-mur•• •••._ •.•_ ..•_ .••.••••••••• I ...... do ••••••••••.• Kurobeca.ll #2_ ... . 72,000 Toyama-lteD 8hlmODUkawa-ruD UeblJ'&ma· 88*"G' 137*40' mura •.••••.•••• :•..• � ..••••• ; •••••••• e_ •••• ••do •••.. . __ ••••• Olp.a •••.__ . " -. $2.200 8hlsuoka·ken Halura,CUD Kamluwabe-liluf. . 35*0G' l3S* 0* T ••••_ ._do •••••••••••• Aklmoto ..•••••••• 82,000 FukullIlma-ke. Yama'lun A.suDia-mun. h ••, 3T*4O' 4 08' •• • , •• _.do ••••••• _. ••• Ttuk.baru .••••••• 80,000 lily.gllt-keD Nlahluaukl'&,UD Morotloka'Dlura 32*30' 131*1 18' 131*30" ...... Toyoml .· ...... : ... 68,.00 NIII'Ata·kea HlI.. .�lkambar.·PD TO)'OIDI· 37*fO' ...... do.. mur •.. ••.•••••...... ••••••.•..••.••• 10. •••• • .do •••••••••••• Y•• apwara .•: •••. M,ooo Toy.ma·keD ShlmonUka.. a·pn AlmolO·mura 36*-118' 137*36' 11. • . .. ..do ••.••.•••..• To)·ama .••.••• : ••; &',000 To,·lma·kf'D HI,. .hltoDarul-,uD Talra-mura 3.·3" 13j- 12 .•... ..410 •.•••••••••• Ya.uoka . o·•• � ••••• . &2,600 Xa,ano-ken Shlmolna-IUD Yuuoka-mar •. .•• 36*23' 137';00' 18 •••.• . • •. .••., •.•• ·152..000 31*10' 13S*4&' ),fIDllt..,. ot TraDI- SellJu. � NUlala-keD Nakauonuma-cun s.DJu:�aellj _ . . portatlo• ••••.• 1.. . • •• NlpPOD HalllO dea. � Kuo.. •.• ..•.••••• 151,800 NUpla·ken HII •• hlkllmbara·eua Ryok.DOte- 37*41' 138*28' . •...... : •.•. , ••, ...... ' . mura . ..3*40' 11. : .. . ..dO, . : ..� ...... Ur)'U ...... ; ; ..: 151,000 Hokkat"o, KllmJk.",.·cun FureD·mura . � ••••. . 1·U*30" 1' •• ...... ;: •• ... . 50,000 BlHOlrt·mur•• .•.•••••. 38*21' 131*10' ; .. ..410 . Kanlder...... : Tonm.·keD N.J.-IUD ...... ••Ublro #1 .:.:. 50,000 Fukushlm.-ken Kaw.numa-pD ..NJpp .. bl- 31*33' 138* IT �� -...... lu . � mara ..•.•••. , ••.••••••....: ..•...•••. 58' · . . 1 ...... 01 .....: .... . : .. · ••• 48,000 Gltu·ken Ena-lUn Ulruk."a-mura .•••, , ,' ••• 31l*30' 13 * ' >- I'. ; . . . . :dOdo •...••••.••• Obara •.: ••...•• ... 4&.000 Tor_m.·keD HllUbltoDaml'lUn KamltaJr.- 3S* 2�'. 138*M'7 26 mar•• •• , ••...•...••..•..•....•� .••.. . -20...... 410 ...... Yomlkakl ...... ; ••• 42,1 N.l!'ano·kea Ntsbteblkum.'C'UD Yomlkakl- 38" �G' 137*33" t 01? marA ...... , •.•..• z _ . _ . 21� ••, ••. .•..•••••••. KIUa,I •••.•.• : ••: 40,600 Gltu-ken Kamo·,an Iljl·mura ...... •...•.:. as *30' 127*20' 22.• • •• ••do •••••'.' • . • •• Ka8Umluw•. ...•.• 3.,000 N_pno·ken Mln.mJuuml-lun ..\.Zuml-mara .• 80*10' 131*"0' - 28.••• • ..410 ..••••.••••• Nakabup.a #1 ..•. 38.150 NlIc.t.·ken Nat_uonuma'lua Atlnan·mura .• 30*00' 138*"0' (j 24.••••• •• ...... Sbln'o ...... 38,100 FukDlhlma·ken Ka.. anum.·�a Shlnco·mura 31*40' 139*50" > •. ••.. .•do ...•••••.... Iloral ...•••••••••• 38,600 lo"" ukushlma-kf!D Date--�n Tatiukoram"-Dlur. • 3j*.fO' 140*30' 18.;. . . NIPPOn Keh:lnllOtu FnJlca-"a #1 ..•••.• 38,200 YaJllanashl-ken Nlablyat.euablro--llUI OkocbJ- 3&*3&' * 10' ...... •••....•••••••••••••.• •.• 130 Q mura � IT•• : •• Nlp�.D. Hut.Odea. . IUne7Ama ••, .•.•. , 3T,Hio 'GUu-ken Kamo,CUD Wa�bl-mur•• •••••••..• "·W 137*05' Z 21•••• � •.do ..... : ...... Sblmota.tl .;...... 88.500 To('hill-ktrn Shlo),Il'JOn Jl'ujt•• ra-mar•. h' •• 3S*4O' 140* . 3G,000 r.mall".hl·ken KJtnt.euru·,un I.. ao·mura ••• 3&*38' 139*015' :::::: ::::. :::�::::::.�: �::':a-:��. ::.:::�:: ..: . . 15.000 Nqano·lrea �Ishleblkuma-cun "-pm .bu- 38*46" 13T*4O' mac:ld ...... z 11 . . . . ';';�";'" '' JIY:.. ..hl�·#2 .... . �.ooo Fu..knahlma-ke� K.1Io·aDluaa·pD Nlppuhl· 3T*33' . 139*0S' . . �do mura ••••.,;, .••••....•...... •... •..•• tC U ...... 110 •••••••• '.' .-: 8bI UI...... 32,000 Kyoto-'u KUH-pn If.killhlma-mura..•.•••• M*A2' 135*00' . . :W ,t 13.� .. . :dO ...... : .•.•. • UJl1l ...... : ...... 32,000 K70to-tu KU.�lUa Ujl·ma�hI ..•••, ; ...... *4 135*48" CL 14...... Obonal ••: ... : .....·• 31,500 Aklta·ken Semboku·cun Obo na!·mut'a ..••.•• 39"-110' 1 0*40' ..: as. " ..do ..•..••••••. Bllablm.eIIl •••.•_ 31,300 GUll-keD yot.hlll:l·CUD lI'uDatsn·m.ebL ..••••• 38*30' 131*17'4 ••••... .. ••••.••••••• ••. #4 ..••• 30,&00 •.• 37*30' , .... -:t 38 do [n.w blro Fukushlma·ken Yllma-lUn Kom.,ala·mllr 3T ... .. "do ."..... _ ... )tnk",,·...... 30.000 To)·anm·k",n X.minUkawa-cun Orama·mur •• • 30*35' 131*30' .. •. . '. ' ., ..••.,. •....•....• 30 000 .••.•..•• 3&*30' 131*03" 88. ..do Kaw.be , Gltu·ken Kamo-,an Kawabe-maeht 19•• , .• •.do ..•.••••••.• OrodOIIl.. . < #2 •.•.• 30,000 Mirasaki·ken BI,aa:hlmorolau·,uD Tak.olta· 31*56' 13t*15' muhl ......

8TBAM.ELEC!'RIC POWER 8TATION8-UTILITY-30,000 KW CAPACITY AND OVER

1 ••••• �!ppon Bauodeu•• Am. ....kl #1...... 318.000 R;yoco·kea Amqa1l8kl·shl Suehlro·�bo ...•.. 34*40'" 135*20' 2 •., •• .. 410 . , •••••••.• , ARl&aaaakl #2 .•.... 300,000 flyoco-ken .\ma,aukl·1Ihl Sue-hlro-ebo...•.. 34*"0' 136*25" 8. • • .. ..do .•..••. ,... . Thruml ...•••••.. 178JWO K.n.,awll·lr:en K.weaakl .. hI Okawa-ebo ..•. 3:1*36' 130*"0- •. •• •• •.•..' ...... Am..... ld·lDaft ••• 147,000 Hyorn·k�n Arna,.. akl .. hl HIJUhlh.ma-eho 3"*40' 135-26' I ...... do .•••..: .••••. "\!elko .•... : •••••• 138.000 Alchl·ken N.py.-1Ihl Mln.to·ku Hltofune-cbo 35*]0' 130*151\' ...... 133.000 .•.• , .••. 33*&6' 130-50" e ...... do ...... 1'0bIlU ..., FlIkuoka-ken Tobatll·shl N.k"baru T... •• • .1:10 ..... :.. ... X",OY •••..••••••• 129.000 Aleht·ku N.COT.·.hl Mln.to-ku Qe·maehl ... 30"*10' 130*55' II••••• ••410 •.•...•••. ••• llln.to •••..••••••. 102,000 Fukuoka-ken OmutA·.hl ShIDml1Mto·m.ebl .• '33*10' 129*40- ...... Knknr. ; ...... 81,000 Fukuok.·kea Kokur.. ·.hl BI,•• blmla.to- 33*W 133*DO' ...... do . . . machl ..•...•.•••. � ...•, .••.••.., ••. 10. •...... SenJu ..••.•••••.•• TT.aOO Tokro·to Ad.ebl·1ru Senju·Sakur.'I·ebo ...•• 36*40' 139*50' 11 .•••• ..do .••...•••• . K,ulul.de #2 •...... 86,000 o..k... bl Konohana·tu Rlla-ajlk••• •dorl. . • 34-40- 135*30' : • 12•• , .. . :410do •••.•.•••••• Sblknmako •••...•. 86.000 Hyog-o·koa Shlk.m.·ebl Nakajllua ..•••.. , .• 3-11*'6' 134*150' 13 •••.• ,.do •._ •••.•..•• Alnoura ...... 84,GOO ;s"qullkl·ken SaMlto·sbl H.Iltan.kAmen" ••• 33*10' 129*"0' 14 •••.. •.do ..••••.....• Milk" ...... ••.••.• 84,200 I-IJro.bIIhA·kt"n Akl'l\Iu Sak.·mura•...••. , . 3-1*25' 13Z*30" 102 15. •• •• . .do •••••••••••• (Ishlod" •••••••••• 64.000 K.nG,awe·ken K.wasakl·shl Sblralshl-eho .• 35*SO' 139*40' 18 ...... " . 83.000 " 30' 135*30' . . dn _ ..... Klsuell"'a . Oaaka ..bl SumJyoa:hl·ku ),(ul'llaakldanl·maebl a..

103 STEA)f.ELECTUlC POWF..R 8TATIOXS-UTILITr--aO,OOO KW CArACITYAND OVElt-CunUIUlPd ()rd�r...... 0' keJ'no. Name of power lAtitude, Location on IUap. Owner atatlon �r�c;� LoeatiOD Nurth Lo'1!!��. J.JebJ·ken Nlwa·gun Hagure·mura. • • •. ... eo,ooo Hippo. ....••.•..•••• Yamquchl·ken Nubl·ln! · OId)"lUDa· 131-16' IT. Haaoden.. Ube .0.000 U...... 120.000 Alchl·.ken Ntwa-Iun Iwakura·maebt. u.etat.ehl ...... 48,4GO Aicbl-ken Nakaahtma-gun Okoahl-machL ••••. )Jlnlatr;y ot Traaa- Kawuald • _ ...•." &&,300 Kua,awa.ken Ka"'... ti ... hl Oli·machl .•••• an-3D' 18 ]�-43' 33,490 Alebl·ken Nacoya·ahi Nlshl·ku. portatloll •••••• 133-00' a,,-aGl 52.000 Alehl·ken Na,oya·shl K1ta·ku. • • •• !'ilpfIOD Huaodea .. SAmban .•.••.•••.• lodo'CUD Samban·mura..••..• 1'. 01,&00 Oka7ama.t�n 30,000 AJchl·ken A.lchl·,UDldaka-mur-a : .•• •••••.• ...... • 20. _!.•• ..do ..•••••. r(asupde #1 ..,... Osaka.llbt KODOhua·1ta Rokken-c:bo..••...• 135-W 87,480 . · AJcbl-kea Nagoya-shl Mlnato-ta. 21. ••.• • 8nmltome K;yodo #2 ••••, . . "8,000 Ehlme-ua NlIbama •••· .••.••••• ••••••• 33-58' 133-11i NUbun. . .. b1 07,000 AJchI·keo Nagoya·lhl Mlsuho·ku. Dear)'Oku .....• ""·20' 130·"" 40,000 Atcbt-ken Nagoya-Ibl Nakagawa·ku. 22••.•• Nlppoa Hauoden.• Sajlma ...•...."' •• Fukuoka.keD ltaauya-CUD Tatara·mura ..•.•• 91,700 ",000 Alcbl-ken Nago'ya-shi Hlnato·ku. •• . .do ..•.•••..•.. ElJetlu ....•...- .. .• 37 .... ".k ••ld. S.ppo ...... _tau·.... hl.,." , ' ...... 23. .. lU-3CY 100,000 Mle-ken Yokkalcbl-Ibl Tomari .. .•••• .. ••.••••.••.• ...... •... 38,000 .....,. 136-30" 24 do Jl'ukaaald 45,000 00. '60,000 20 o.:.:.-��� Toyama·keD Nel·cun Nqaolll:a-mura. ••••• ..do •.. .••••• .•. ...••..••••.• 32,000 Eblme-ken BaI,o·llIl Kitapwa •• - •.•.•••..• I 33-53' 133-1D' J Salio .���.�. �i_�:����':".�i����� 50,000 Toyama- •ken.Kamlnllkawa,pD Olawano-machl • 3G.000 Do. . 62,200 30.000 Toyama-ken ShlmonU.ka1ll"a·gun. Michljlta·muta. STEAM.ELECTRIC POWER_STATION8-INDUSTRIAL-OVER KW CAPACITY 68,500 JllehJjlta·mura Takaok.... bJ. [ ..• ..•.•... 43,000 . ... ' NIPpon Seltetsu XI.hlda �- 88,000 Fukuoka Yawata NlIb14a•• •.•. - •..•..•, .• 33"&2" Do. i ••••• •.•••- 48,500 •••••••.•••••••.•..••.•.••..•• Mlcbljlta·mura 2" Ho"kkaldo Tanko Shlrulsusawa Hotltaldo . ... liO,OOO Imlsu-l\In Taukurlwicht-murL 30,000 KIMn •...... Fukul-kn Yoshlda·gun Mauuoka-macbl. 30,000 ••••• ....•. 48,000 ..••.•••.••••. "2-20' 141·01i Fukui-ken YOlhida·gun I Nippon S.ltetsu ... Wanlsbl Chuo Bokkaldo )Jurorau WalllebL 8 •••••• Nlshlfujllblma murL 1 Nippon Hauodea. .. ll'urukawabubl •••••• 24-2,400 .•� ...... : ••• 43,000 ...... - - •••.•. .••••..•••• , ••. 134-38' Oaata-fu Kltakawaebl-pD "'._ do ...... "flirobAtll . . HyolO . . . · ...... Kadoma·maebl. . 330,000 0 ••••• ..do •...••...••• Edamltsu . . •.•..• 40,000 'Fukuoka ..•.•.•••.••••_ •.•- •.•••••••r. . 130·49' Ouka-fu Minamllc.. wacbt·gun SbJkJ-murL U-Ci2' 30,000 • • •• •.'. 30,250 •.•.••, .• ' ' ••.•..••..••••••••: 32-36' 131-W Olaka·tu Osaka-Ib} e,. NltdllUU Kapku Dal Icbl Karyoku lfl1ua1l:1 . .'. KODohana-ku TalcamJ-cho. 46,500 Kono ••....•.• Osaka·tu Sakal-,hi Naguone-c:ho. 30,000 Oaata_fu Kltakawacbl-pD Sango-machl. Souaa : Elaetrlc po",·er'Dureau. 230.000' 'Osaka-fu TOyoDo·gun Ozone·mura. 81,500 Olata-fu Osaka .. hl m,..blyodogawa-"ku.. 120,000 Olaka·to Osaka·sbi KODohana·ku. 37,000 Osata-fo 08aka·shl Joto-kn. 40,000 Olaka·tu.. Osata·lhI Tallho-ku. lleferenH '80,000 O Ita·to Fuse-lhL No. Name ot compaD;Y LoeatiOD 30,000 Osaka-fu Oaaka-shl Sumlyoahl.ku. 42.000 Do. 60,000 1 •••••. Stppoa Haasoden••• Sapporo " _ ••••••••• 80.000 Boldtaldo Sapporo-CUD Sapporo-murL O,-ka.tu Nakakawachl'CUn Tatsuml·mura. 60.000 Bokkaido Sorachi-cun BUDakawa·mach!. 45,000 Duka-fu Klshtwada·lbl. 89,000 . 49,350 Bokkaido yllfutlu·pn Tomakomll1·macbt. Kyoto-tu KyotO·lbl Fushlml-ku. ::::::: Oj��;�i:,:�::::::': �:���:aJ "::::::::': 32.000 t. : .... !tlppon Ha.-odeD ..• ruwada ....•..- •••• 76,000 Fukulhlma-ken Auka·run Hlwada-maehl. Kyoto-to Otokunt-gun Knee·mura. 90,000 ••• �. ; _ ..•, ' ' ••• 42.000 Hyogo-ken ltaml-sbl & Toboku Halden.... · Kori7ama . . FukUlhlma-ken Aaaka-I1lD Fukuyama-macbl. Ikejlri. . .. 2�2,000 8 ...... do ... � ...... _ XI1,,,� ...... - ...... 58.500 NUlatA-keD Nakntambara-cun Ilbiy"ama.mura. H,..ogo-ken Muto-gun Yamada-mura. • _ ..•' . Nippon BassodeD. .. Ibarakl • •.•• '.' •..- .'. 30.000 lbarald·ken Naka-run Xanzakl-murL 94,&00 HYOlo·ken Kobe·shi Nada-)m. T. 38,000 8 ..••, •.. �o . ' •....'. • • . . .•• Ulnaml-Sblbuta". ,. 45,000 GuJDJOa·kea Gumma"'l1ln Sblbuka"'a·nlAebl. Hyogo-ken Kobe-abl Suma-h. ' a · 30.000 Totyo-to �lnlllDltama·pn Tuna-mur"&. 37.000 Hyogo-ken Amaa:"ald-eb1.- 1 ':::::� ::: 168,000 80,000 : :.::::::::::�:: ::::;; . :;:.:::;::: Tok;yo·to Adachl·1m Nlahl Kabel-clJo. Do. ••.••.• : •• : •••• . 40,000 11 .•; do ...... Kalneldo � .... . 108,000 Tbkr,o-to Jj:dola",a-kt:t" Blral-eho. Do. . . 30:000 12. : ...... do ••...•• : • ... . Komatsupwa · .••.•.. 64,000 Tok;yo-to Edopwa:-ku Higashitunaborl-eho. B:rOlo-ken Nlahlnomlya-ahL 31.700 13 .•_ ••. . •..•.••• •.; , ..••.•.••••• 80.000 Nara·ken Kltatatsuragl'IUD :40 : . · · Tok;yo·to Ar�kaw.-ku Oau-c:ho. Takata-macbl. 'l'abata . . 39,000 .:•• . . . "";••. 14. � •. do ...... - .. . ; Ogu ... � ...... - 30,000 Do. Waleayama·ken Wakayama-lbJ 48,500 11 .••••• _ .do ••••••.••••.•• Wadabon· ..••.••.• ·• 100.000 Tokyo-to Su,lnaml-kU buml-cl\o. Do. 38.100 18...... Kanto JJalden ...•.. Sbikahama •.•.•..• · · 30,000 TokYO-to Adaehl·ku. Okayama-ken Okayamll-ahl. 18,000 11 ...... do : .• : Yejlro 89,000 Tokyo-to Yodobubl-lru. Hlre.,hlma·ken Fukuyama-ahl NaratRu-('bo. 80,000 18 •.•... •...... Yodobl.llhl •.•.•.•••. 00,000 Do. Blr-oehlma·ken. AkI-gun Fucbu·machl. do '15,000 19 ..•.•• ..do . . • . . . . . • • . . .. Sensoku .•.....••.•• 7:i,OOO Tokyo-to Omorl·ku. Hlroehlma-ken Kure·shl Hlro-maehl. 30,000 ...... 20...... do ...... Roweo ...... 89.800 Tokyo-to KamatA-ku. Hlroshlma·ken Kure·ahi Matoba-dorl. 33,000 •.•••. Nippon Has:soden. .. Raablmoto .••.•••. · &1,000 Kanacawa-ken Kou.-lUn Sapm1hara-waebt. Yamaguchl.ken T.okuyama.. hl Fukudatera·maehl. 21 · 80,000 22. • • . .• . . . • . • . • . • . . • •. ....•.••.. 132,000 Yamaguchi-ken Kuma.P-CUD .do Ttunublma . EaDalawa-kU YokohamA4hl )Un.a.t�klta·ku lllnam.I-Tnnublma-- Hikari·macll1. cho. 38,000 Yamagucbl-ken UbwbJ OlUlhl. 23...... do ...... · .. · Kelnan . _.'...... 64.000 Kanqawa·teD Yokohama ..hi �ruml-ko EplAki·cbo. laoura •••..•••••••• ... , •...... 168,000 87,299 Eblme-ken NUhama-shl. .. . � .. : Aaabl ...... Kanaa:awa·teD Yokohama-.hl Tauruml-kQ Komaoka-c:bD. ,18 ••••••' 24 do .. . Nippo. HUloden. .. Kojaku •...••.•••••• 88,000 ... .. ' 180,500 Kanqawa·ten Kawuaki-Ibi YaDIlI1·machl. Fukuoka-kea Yawata'lhl Kaml-Kojalnl. 2t\i ... do ...... Kawuak1 ...... ' •••••• •• 98 do ...... Kabo ...... 72.000 Jl"ukuoka-ken ••••, • ..do • ••••.•.••.••• Totluka ·•.•.• � •••••. 132.000 Kanqa".a-ken Yokohama·lhi Touuka·ku Totsuka-ebo. IIsuka·ahl Kawuhlma. 28 52.000 21 ••••• , Kanto Halden...... Koyalu •••.•.: .•••••• 80,000 KanaKawa·ten Yokobama-abl Itanap.a-ku. Fukuoka·keD Kokura-Ihl ltabltsu. 80,000 ...... do ...... · nallbl ...... 80,000 KaDq"awa.ken KawaUItl-abJ. Fulnlota·ken Misuma·gun Kisakl-1Dura. 28 . . - 37 ,&00 ... . 30,000 Kanara1fa·lrea Odawan.·shl. iE Fukuot�·keD Omuta·ahl Sblamlnato-cbo. . _do ...... Tako ...... ������ ��E���::�����:��� 28.� · �E�<:::::�:::: 80.000 30 .••••• ••do . . • .• . . . • •. . •• Ta;Jima ••.•..•..•••• to,OOO xanaaawa·1I:en Kawuakl-.bl. Fukuoka-ken Omuta-ahl Oura-c:bo. 30,000 ...... HodOla1& ...... 39,000 Kanalawa·ken Yokobama .. bl Naka-ku. Do. 31 . , ..do 80,000 32 •••..• •.do •.•.••••....• : YOkqtlluka. ••.••...... 45.000 Kanacawa·kt'n yokolukll.. hl. lI'ukuota·keD Omuta-Ihl Sblnmlnat(H!'ho. 30,000 OD .a 188.000 Sa1tama·ken Ka·","apchi·lhl )lltflu"\"l"a. Fukuoka·ken TaR"awa-jrun Kaw"akl-macbl. 84,330 : : : ��:: . ���:;� .. : : : : 182,000 Saltam.-Iura Kltaadaebl"'l1ln Soka·maehl. Fukuoka-ken Yawata·shl. :: : :: ..�.��� ::: :::: : : : 72,000 •••••• .. ..•••...•••.•. Shlmalawara .•..••• 90,000 salano·ken KIt.latu-CUD Kltamimakl-mura. Sara-ken Klshlma-run Ta1l:eo-maebl. 86 do 30,000 38 ...... 80.000 Nagano-ken Blp.hichlkuma·.cun Hlraoka·mura. �•••••• �·�••• �1 Kumamoto-ken Hot.ko·KUD Takata·macbl. do ...... Shlojln ...... 97,000 31 ...... Chubu Halden ... . •. Hamamatllu •.•-.' ••••• 48,480 Bblsnoka·kea Hamana·pn Nac_kaml-marL Mlyuakl-ken N!sbluIUkl-CUD Morotsuka-mura. ••.••. .•••...•... 70.000 as Sippon Kelklnzo)tu.. Kambara Sbisuoka-keD Ihara-p.D Kambara·machl. Nors-ApparentJ:r do.. not IDclude railroad lubstatiO (2) (I) D: aubatatlonl auoclated .ltb leneratine pl�u. n, .... . �Ippon HanodeD ... Ni.-biD ...•.•.•..•. 150,000 AICbl-ken Alcbl-pn NIMbin·murL 8017aCll : ICledrlc Power Bureau.

104 105 Twentieth Air Force Staff Meeting Action Assignments

Air Conference Room·0930·29 June 1944

Attendance: General Hansell,presiding Lt Col Carpenter Colonel Combs Lt Col Russell Colonel Clinch Lt Col Wilson Colonel Rosenblatt Lt Col Bohnaker, Second AF Colonel Donohew Major McIntyre Colonel Eubank Major Jackson Colonel Nelson Major Lint Lt CoI Hill Captain Cate Lt Col Haddock Captain Slator Lt Col Osborn Captain Spivak

ACTION TO BE TA KEN OFFICER TO WHOM ASSIGNED

Study on Feasibility of providing Eseort Fighters for B-29s on Col Rosenblatt APPENDIX D 1.laDd of Iwo lima. General Hansell desires a study made Col Hill immediately, this morning, on the feasibility of providing fighter Col Eubank escort for the 8·29s. General Everest has prepared a paper on this Col Donohew EXCERPTS FROM TYPICAL STAFF MEETINGS OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE which Colonel Lindsay is now holding. Intelligence has prepared a discussion for General Arnold on this subject. It is desired (1) To have an analysis from the Engineering people as to whether or not we can provide fighter escort at that distance, about a radius of 750 miles,within the next six months. Have we fighters that can go that far? What airplanes are they, and when can we get them and in what quantity? (Col Rosenblatt). (2) Where can we get people to man such a fighter outfit if we can get the planes. Troop basis cannot stand in the way. Whatkind of scheme can beworked out to getthose fighter groups from the Third and Sixth Air Forces for the Twentieth Air Force? (Colonel Hill). The deadline on this study is 1500 this afternoon as General Hansell desires this information for the weekly staff meeting. Plans is to monitor this study.

Effect of B-29 Formation on Speed. General Hansell desires a Col Carpenter report on the formations as are now being flown at the Second Air Col Hill Force. The AAF Board is to concern itself with the tests that are being conducted at the Second Air Force.

Tactical Doctrine for the XXI Be. The Tactical Doctrine book of Col Carpenter the 73rd Wing should be submitted to the XXI Bomber Command with the idea of having a single Standard Tactical Doctrine for the entire XXI Bomber Command, to be used for training of all XXI Bomber Command elements.

Manning Shortage on Service and Depot Groups. Have a Col Clinch presentation of this general problem ready for the weekly staff Col Hill meeting this afternoon. OC&R is to have the letter establishing a definite priority for manning the Service Units and theMinutes of the meeting with General Arnold establishing those priorities should also be available.

107

106 Weekly StaffMeeting of Twentieth Air Force Strategic Room 1600·29 June 1944

Attendance: B�g Oen H. S. Hansell, Chief of Staff, presiding Bng Oen J. N. McConnick, A.I Col Cecil E. Combs, A·3, Combat Operations Col W. F. McKee, A·3, OC&R Col L. O. Ryan , A·3, Training APPENDIX E Lt Col J. W. A·3, Training Carpenter, Col S. R. Brentoall, A·4, MM&D Col Sol Rosenblatt, A·4, MM&D Maj Gen L. S. Kuter, A·5, Plans WEiGIff OFSTRATEGIC AIR EFFORT BY VERY HEAVY BOMBER (VHB) Maj Oen D. N. W. Grant, Air Surgeon AIRCRAFT AND PROPOSED DEPLOYMENTAND OPERATIONS LEADING Brig Gen H. L. McClelland" Communication TO THE EARLIESTPOSSIBLE DEFEAT OF JAPAN. Col Max F. Schneider, Air Inspector

of as ACTION TO BE TAKEN Respoaolble OIIIce. Reportby the Joint StaffPlanners approved by the Joint Chiefs Staff J.C.S. 1165/1 22 March 1945. nte_ce Dlm Force. Inspectors' reports ColRyan �� ��.... SecoDd AIr mdlcate that the prmclpal trouble in maintenance at Oovi. i. the Col Carpenter This document was declassified from TOP SECRET, and alisecurity classifica· supervision and organization. This matter is to be taken up with Oen Hansell tion was cancelled on 13 January 1954. General Hansell after the meeting.

Opentl... Procedure. The B·29 SOP will be issued Note:The planneddeployme nt.asdescribed in this Appendix Was affected by the end B-19 SIaDdard as a Tech Order and strict adherence thereto will be required. The Col Schneider of the war againstGennany. The bombergroups the Eighth Air Force were reequip­ . of Air Inspector is to see that it is rigidly checked. pedwith B· 29s and the Eighth Air Force was transferred from England toOkinawa. The 316th Wing. originally scheduled for the XXIst Bomber Command in the AdmlDiltratlve Polldes. Administrative Policy Book should be The Col Lorini Marianas, was reassigned to the Eighth Air Force, so that the final planned coordinated by all Staff Sections. It is a continuing and living deployment was 5 Wings (20 Groups) in the Marianas and 3 Wings (12 Groups) in document and very necessary. Colonel Lorini, the Administrative Okinawa. Inspector for the Twentieth Air Force, i. to keep it current.

Dlredlve to General Wolfe. General Wolfe is to be advised that Col Combs every effort possible will be made to get ATC tonnage for him although this is not expected to be accomplished by I July: Regardless, he is to comply with the Ta rget Directives for July.

Requlre�Dt � Seize the� of "rollma.A Requirement placed Hansell on Twentieth Air Force stationery under the signature the Chief Gen of of Oen Kuter for the Commanding General, Anny AirForces, should be Staff . set up showmg the need to seizethe base of Iwo Jima. It should be pointed outtherein that the long distanCe escortfighters, the P.75a and the P·82s will not be available for over a year and that escort op«:�ons for the B·29s can be conducted with P·S Is from this base. to begiven to General Kuter, who will prepare a for the ThisIS paper JCS on the problem of feasibility and necessity of using escort fighters for the B·29. at Iwo Jima.

108

109 1 C S 116511 tary industrial systems in the Japanese.war economy to the point where the cost of the invasion and 22 March 1945 defeat of Japanese military forces in Japan proper can be made as small as possible so that some approx­ Pages 29-57, incl. imation can be made of the time within which this result can be accomplished.

8. It is estimated that there will be sufficient force available under the schedule set up to reduce whatever industrial systems emerge as primary targets prior to the time of invasion. ' JOINT CHIEFSSTAFF OF 9. The study is necessarily subject to repeated revisions.

WEIGHT OF STRATEGIC AIR EFFORT BY VERY HEAVY BOMBER (VHB) 10. For further discussion, Attachment B. AIRCRAFT AND PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS LEADING see TO THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

References: a. J.C.S. 1165 CONCLUSIONS b. J.C.S. 1079 c. J.C.S. 713/20 II. In order to attack and neutralize effectively the Japanese aircraft industry, the most important d. J.C.S. 1120 industrial urban areas, and the arsenals (estimated at present, I March 1945, to require approximately 33,000 sorties by January 1946 from the Marianas, the Philippines, and the Ryukyus), the buildup of ReP.,"by the Joint Staff Planners I VHB groups indicated in the fo llowing paragraphs is required. THE PROBLEM 12. During 1945, in the Marianas, 20 groups operational by August 1945; in the Ryukyus, 8 groups I. To revise J.C.S. 1165, "Weight of Strategic Air Effort Required in Operations Leading to the by December 1945; and in the Philippines, 4 groups operational by December 1945. Earliest Possible Conclusive Defeat of Japan," in light of recent developments, as directed bythe Joint Chiefs of Staff. 13. Mter December 19.45, a further buildup of units and augmentation of present unit equipment may be required during the first four months of 1946. For the present, a buildup to 48 groups in this period should be kept in the planning program. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 14. Primary target systems are the aircraft industry, arsenals, urban industrial areas, electronics 2. This is part of the overall problem of determining the weight of air effo rt, both strategic and tacti­ plants, and shipping lanes (mining) in homeland waters. The early destruction of the aircraft industry is cal, which will be so required. This paper, a revision of a previously approved study (J.C.S. 1165, II of particular importance. November 1944), is intended to serve as a basis for planning with regard to strategic (VHB) bombard­ mentrequirements and potentialities, taking into consideration operational capabilities, availability of bases and aircraft, weather, deployment, and intelligence as to Japanese war economy as now known. It RECOMMENDATIONS is appreciated that the rapid progress of events continually outdate this paper, but theeffect on the total weight of effort and employment thereof will be minimized by timely revision. 15. It is recommended that: .i!, The loint Chiefs of Staff approve this revised study for planning purposes, in order that the requirements visualized in this paper may be integrated with other requirements of equal importance in 3. The tactical air effort required hasbeen treated in a separate paper (J.C.S. 1079), which hasbeen previously approved (14 October 1944). This paper deals with the strategic air effort involved, the connection with the accomplishment of the overall obj ective in the war against Japan. results to be expected therefrom, and with requirements for fighter support of such effort, but does not include the strategic use of aircraft from carriers. Strategic bombing by British Lancaster squadrons .lh This paper be referred to the Joint Logistics Committee for examination of the logistic (J.C.S. 1120) has not been considered. implications and in connection with current studies on base development.

4. The strategic bombing objective is defined as "the destruction of selected industrial systems, pri­ .£,. The loint Chiefs of Staff note the change in title of this paper. marily in Japan proper, to undermine her war-making capacity to a point where it is fatally weakened."

5. The assumptions used are summarized in Attachment A.

6. The strategic concept of operations in the Pacific as setforth in J.C.S. 713/20 has beenfollowed.

DISCUSSION

7. The report includes a possible and comparatively firm schedule of VHB operations. The schedule is in consonance with the current estimates as to the number of sorties required to weaken primary mili-

110

III ; , ' Attach_' A have carried t8IJe! . ICS 1165/1 (2) Varyi.,, _1IIptio!u beql lII8de.pm:enlfle to ofbombl � the that aimi." puint. will be dropped2,000 wilhin feet of the

been imide: ... IDI1ic wiea loc:adon basefrom aircraft operate. I. Thefollowing assumptions have (3) Bomb ton per • to of whic:h For :Mari...... aircraft, based an a-. ton... fi&ure for .. period TO ANDDEPLOYMENT. of 3 is _ planni duri.", the JI. AS BASI'S FebruarythrouIh July, 11ft«which time the -. is4. . MARIANAS. bases (1) VHB adequate to support 8 VHB groups will be operational in the bases by bases (4) nilbt techniques,IoICther with theallowances rDade for Marianas by FebrwuY'1945; for 16 VHB grollps will beoperat ional May 1945; for 20 o.en:a.t and bombi." aborti_ grO by of on t8IJe!,will IIIfficient.leeway to allowfor neceIIUY other upsWill beoperati onal by July 1945; and vImgroups will beso deployed in 'these numbeiiIiiId and weiaht bomb &lve diwnlona and these months. Bases in the Marianas and intermediate islands will likewise be available"fur the unforaeea factors. deploymentof bombers and ta�ti�1.units to ureass the securityof and for verylong hea'V)' (HB) thearea, emphasized weather alftl\iorfactor affecti." precision range escort units. > " t8IJe!Si (5) It is that ,is thebombi." ' of viauaI ftgh ter , n Japan. bases (2) PHIUPPlNI'S. VHB adequate to support 2 groups will be available in the Philippinesfor operations in July 1945; basesfor a total of 5 groups in August 1945; for 8 groups in September 1945 and for 16 groups in December 1945. The availability of aircraft for HB groupsto be converted toVHB and VHB groups to be'augmented precludes the possibility of permanently basing I VHB groups in thePhilippines before November 1945 when group will beavailable and the buildup thereafterwill reach 4 group.in December. In the event the Ryulcyus bases cannotbe made ava ilable by thereto August 1945, it is assumed that the 4 groups scheduled for deployment during August and September will be deployed to thePhilippines. (3) RYUKYUS. Two groupswill operate out of the Ryukyusbeginning in August 1945. attackVHB In computingthe weight of , sorties possible from the Ryukyus have beenincluded on the basisof 8 VHB groups ultimately. See'd iscussion in paragraph 1.11(2) above. CHINA. (4) The 4 VHB groups which openited out of China until I February 1945 will resume operations in the Marianas during April 1945 .

TO STRATEGY. .h. AS Operations were undertaken against the Bonins about 19 February 1945 and will be undertaken against the Ryukyus about I April 1945. Present approved plans contemplate operations against theJapanese mainland in the winter of 1945. AIR FORCES AVAILABLE. lO. AS TO

Air Forces available for deployment against Japan will be as curren tly set forth in firm operational plans. Any tentative redeployment schedules are not considered. Conversionof HB to VHB haslIeen umed ass to commence at such time asto allow converted units to become operational. In the by event that HB groups scheduled for conversion to VHB groups are not available August 1945, the strength of the VHB groupsdeployed at that time will beincreased to beapproximately equivalent to the groups scheduled for conversion. OPERATIONAL CAPABIUTIES. lI.. AS TO (1) Estimateswill bebased on daylight visual bombing operations againstall primary objective systems. It considered that the primary target systems of Japan, except possibly for urban industrial , is areas, are not susceptible to a successful attack by blind bombing. Secondary targetscan and will be attacked by blind bombing.

112

113 1165/1 Attaehment B ICS Since the aircraft system is first priority, and the aero-engine plants are considered to be more important than aircraft assembly plants, the simultaneous attack of these targets in this system until a SCHEDULEOF VHB OPERATIONS favorable damage percentage is attained, would be desirable.

The large force of VHB required initially is not available under present operational factors and I. Attachment A is a schedule of VHB operations on priority targets based on ITG Estimate No. I. methods. Appreciably increasing the bomb load carried from present bases is not probable (except for Due consideration has been given to deployment, operational capabilities, and air effort requirements low altitude night bombing) during the early part of 1945, nor is there a possibility ofobtaining bases for priority targets asrecommended by current ITG Priorities, January and ITG Priorities 15 1945 15 nearer the targets than the Marianas during this period when a greaterforce than that which now obtains February 1945. could reduce drastically the Japanese capability to continue the war.

11.. The schedule outlined is to be considered as a flexible plan of attack. However, there is a possibility that a modification of bombing formations and tactics can be developed in order to reduce the bomb wastage at the target. A study of this problem is under way by the General conformance to the schcidule should produce the fo llowing results: 11, Joint Target Group.

31 Mar: 50% damage to three important aero-engine factories which represents loss of three months engine production.

31 May: 25% of urban industrial areas subjected to the then current maximum effort.

30 June: Four major aero-engine factories 70% damaged.

31 July: One minor aero-engine factory 70% damaged. Initial attacks in force on arsenals.

31 Aug: Important aero-engine factories re-attacked. Attacks on arsenals continued.

30 Sept: Minor aero-engine factories re-attacked. Attacks on major arsenals completed insofar as known requirements determine.

31 Oct: Urban industrial areas SUbjected to then current maximum effort.

2. Diversion from initial attack on priority targets in the aircraft engine industry must be he�d to a . minimum. Continuous attack thereon must not be interrupted except as dictated by the necessity for using the force available to strike the urban industrial areas in April and May just prior to the season of unfavorable weather.

VHB forces available initially are not sufficient to enable attack on aero-engine and ai craft 3. � assembly plants simultaneously; nor are they sufficient to complete attacks on each plant successively.

There is a possibilitythat appreciable damage to aero-engine factories will have been obtained prior to mid-March as a result of the combination of VHB attacks and operations by Naval air against Honshu. In this event, attacks on aSsembly plants could inflict some damage.to the pipeline, prior to, or concurrent with, the attack on urban industrial areas.

4. While the number of lucrative targets on the Japanese mainland is considerable, 89% of aircraft engine production is concentrated in only 4 factories and 70% of aircraft assembly production in 8 plants. Even this small numberof priority targets requires a large attacking force with which to obtain desired results immediately.

114

115 l.C.S. 1388{4 II July 1945 Paaes 26 - 47, incl.

JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF

N AGAINST JAPAN DETAILSOF TIIE: CAMPAIG APPINDIX f Reference: J.C.S. 1388 Series

Report by the Joint StaffPlannen DEiAILS OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN JCS 1388/4

approved by J.C.S. on II July 1945 1388 the I. TheEnclosure isa revision of J.C.S. which includes:

J!, The chanllesin phraseology recommended bythe Commanderin Chief, U.S. Fleetand Chiefof A copy of theReport by the Naval Operations in J.C.S. 1388/1 . Joint StaffPlannen .!1:. changes The in phraseology recommended by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in J.C.S. 1388/2as 1388/3. modified byapproval ofJ.C.S. This document wasdeclasaiftedfrom TOP SECRET, and all Clasaiflcation cancelled.on Jan 1971 7, 11 WIll 22 £. New paragraphs !..and..!!.on casualties, Chinese participation, and British participation. P 2. The Joint StaffPlanners recommend that the Enclosure bepresented to the resident.

DISTRIBUTION NO. DISTRIBUTION COpy copy NO.

Admiral Leahy 1 General Norstad II General Manhall 2&5 Admiral Gardner 12 Admiral King 3&6 General Cabell 13 General Arnold 4 General Lincoln 14 General Handy 7 Captain Campbell 15 Admiral Edwards 8 Secy, JCS 16 Admiral Cooke 9 Secy, JPS 17 General Hull 10 Secy, JWPC 18

117

116 Enclosure meansrequired for a rapid and decisive campaign. In general the units needed to build the required bases are being moved first, fo llowed by the required additional combat units, air and ground.

Alreadywe have eliminated practically all Japanese sea trafficbetween their main islands and points to the southward of Shanghai, and severely restricted their traffic to Shanghai and Yellow Seapons. By November 1945, when air operations from Okinawa will be in full swing, there should remain to the Japanese only thosesea routes across Tsushima Strait to Korea and across the Seaof Japan. It should be notedthat our air and submarines are already operating in theseareas on a limited scale. By November MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: 1945, the Japanese situation is expected to be critical. Their fleet units in home waters have already been so reduced as to no longer constitute a controlling strategic factor. Their air arm is already Subj ect: Campaign against Japan. committing training planes to combat and will probably continue todevote much of their remaining air powerto suicidetactics. Their ability to move ground forcesto Japanfrom Asia or vice versa is already reduced and is estimated by 1 November to be not more than one division a month. 1. Strategy. Throughout the series of staff conferences with the British, we have agreed that the about at the earliest possible overall concept for the prosecution of the war included provision "to bring In order to obtain bases still closer to the Tokyo Plain from which to augment sea and air certainly the date the unconditional surrender of Japan." We believe that the only Sllre way, and bombardment, completethe isolationof the main Japanese islands and to provide land based air cover forces in the main Japanese islands. quickest way to force the surrender of Japan is to defeat her armed and support for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, should that prove necessary, we have directed General ve agreed-that the overall Hence, 'at recent staff conferences we hav � proposed-and the British ha MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to invade southern Kyushu about 1 November 1945. obj ective of the Japanese war is "to force the unconditional surrender of Japan by (1) lowering Japanese ability and wi11 to resist by establishing sea and air blocka�es, conducting intens�ve air bom�ardment and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; (2) mvadmg and selzmg ob Jectlves m the mdustrlal We have not yet directed the execution of any operations after the invasion of southern Kyushu, heart of Japan." feeling that decision would better await further developments. However, plans and preparations are being made to invade the Tokyo Plain-the political, industrial and communication center of Japan­ about 4 months after the southern Kyusbu operation, or about 1 March 1946. We consider that this It is by no means certain that a capitlliation by a Japanese government will be recognized by Japan",:e armed forces everywhere. If, following such an acknowledgement, her forces do not surrender, their operation should be decisive. By planning and preparing for a supreme operation of this magnitude, we position will be so seriously weakened as to facilitate their defeat in detail. However, the possibility must shall be in aposition to undertake any lesser operation should developments warrant. be faced that the Japanese forces everywhere must be defeated .

In the period prior to the planned invasion of the Tokyo Plain, every effort will be made to exploit effort in the Pacific 2. Presently planned campaign. Our agreed concept of operations for the main the blockade and bombardment of Japan. In this period, from bases presently and prospectively war � available, more bombs will be dropped on Japan were delivered Germany during entire d' than against the "Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade an air European war. If this blockade and bombardment achieve decisive results, these wi11, in all probability, bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to: bebrought about by this scale of effortprior to the planned date for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain. However, in the event this invasion is not considered feasible and acceptable on the planned date, a "An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by cont:u ning and courseof action to extend bombardment and blockade is open to us. forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment m order to destroying major enemy . a tactical condition favorable to the decisive invasion of the industnal heart of Japan through establish 3. Baseson the Asiatic mainland other than in Korea are too distant to beof value in augmenting our the Tokyo Plain." present capabilities for sea and air bombardment of Japan and in cutting the remaining Japanese sea routes across Tsushima Strait and the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, the blockade of the Yellow Sea and Our campaign plans have therefore beendesigned to seize positions progressively closer tothe Tokyo the sea areasto the southward is now virtually effective. There is also the likelihoodthat any operation Plain-the political, industrial and communication center of Japan-with a view to isolatin the ll. in North China, with its vast area and large numbers of Japanese ground forces, will develop into a Japanese islands and providing sufficient bases from which, by sea and air bombardment, condltlons vacuum drawing ever more and more US forces into an indecisive and costlycampai gn.We therefore will be created which wi11 make ultimate invasion of the Tokyo Plain acceptable and fe asible. We have discarded, as unnecessary and diversionary, operations to seize bases on the coast of North China. The also endeavored so to design the campaign that the Japanese cannot fail to and feel the results of its see best areas from which to complete the isolation of Japan are obviously either in Korea or in the rapidly increasing tempo and magnitude, with the thought that at some stage of the campaign they will southwestern part of the Japanese Archipelago. We considered three possibilities: Korea, the admit defeat in order to avoid further destruction. northwestern part of Kyushu, and southern Kyushu.

Thus far in this campaign we have seized and developed air and naval bases in the Marianas, Iwo We discarded Korea as a possible operation to follow Okinawa because of its longer sea approach, Jima, the Philippines and Okinawa. No further operations in the Ryukyus after completion of the the paucity of good beaches and exits therefrom, the rugged terrain back of the beaches, the few airfield Okinawa campaign are now contemplated; all available resources are being utilized to develop air and sites available for development after seizure, and the great reinforcement capabilities of the Japanese naval bases in Okinawa to maximum capacity by November 1945. By then it is expected to have about from their fine and as yet untouched army in northern China. Furthermore, because of the distance 2700 land-based aircraft operating from this area and to have completed an advanced fleet base and from Okinawa bases, we would have great difficulty in interfering by air action with the arrival of anchorage. Meanwhile every effort is also being made totransport tothe Pacific from Europe the added Japanese reinforcements and in providing adequate air cover and support to the assault. The campaign 1 1 8 is estimated to require about the same commitment of forces as for the invasion of southern KyusiJu (14 divisions).

119 I', I 2 8 CL (AA) Similarly we considered northwestern Kyushu unsuitable as an initial objecti",: area fo llowi� CB (Large Cruisers) (Light Cruisers) Okinawa the sea approaches to the bestlanding areaare restricted, well fortIfied and heaVIly (Antiaircraft) because 22 CV (Aircraft Carriers) 364 mined, and of Japanese capability to reinforce the area f om two directions-from southern DD (Destroyers) because � . 2 CVB (Aircraft Carriers, 326 I Kyushu and from Honshu. The forces required for such an operabon are estImated to be m excess of Large) DE (Destroyer Escort Vessels) I 9 CVL (Aircraft Carriers, Small) 189 SS (Submarines) those for southern Kyushu. : 74 CVE (43 combat) seizure of southern Kyushu beendirected :1 The has because: (Aircraft Carriers, Escort) 799 LST (Thnk Landing Ships) ! 17 AGC (Operations and Command ..a. Its occupation is essential both fordecisive assault on the Tokyo �Iain and �gulation of I Japan through bombardment and through isolation from Korea and themamland of ASIa; Headq\l8rters Ships) 491 LSM (Medium Landing Ships) 223 APA (Attack Transport Ships) 108 AKA (Attack Cargo Ships) .h. It is the mostlogical extension of our operations in the Ryukyus, since shore-basedtactical air suwc:.rt can be furnished from Okinawa and lines of communication are shorter than for any other The aboveftgU res make no allowance for attrition. Three months after the Kyushu operation it is practicable objective; estimated that approximately 10% will either have been lost or still undergoing repairs to d8lllll8e Ii -" Airfields on which to base approximately 40 groups (over 25� air raft) can be develo , received in this operation. the operational shipsin service, 75% will normally be available for any l . � . Pe? Of !I from which we can practically sever Japan's last remaining communlcabon WIth� m n d of AsIa lingle operation. will be either undergoing operational repairs or be otherwiseemployed. It is � � Others and from which the air bombardment of the remainder of Japan can be greatly mtenslfied, worthyof note that the amphibious resources listed above will permit simultaneous assault landingson a scale neverbefore thoughtible. poss lI.. It will contribute toward the defeat of Japanese armies in the Japanese homeland; It is estimated that approximately 3,600 carrier-based aircraft will be available on I March 1946_ � It may well be that Japanese capitulation will be forced bythis operation. As a general statement it may besaid that the forces of allarms which are required and which should 4. Southeast Asto other areas, Admiral Mountbatten in the Asia Command plans to seize a position be employed for the operations we contemplate are all those which can be supported in the theater in the Port Swettenham-PortDixon area on the Malay Peninsula in the latter half of August 1945 and to within the means whiCh will be available to us and which can beeffectively employed. We feel that the fo llow this up with a campaign to recapture Singapore beginnipg probably in De\:ember-January. IIDremitting application of this maximum force is essential to defeating Japan at the least possible cost in General Wedemeyer has advised that, in China, the Generaliasimo plans to launch an overland advance lives and resources. with Chinese forces on the Canton-Hong Kong area beginning about I September 1945 and to fo llow up any Japanese withdrawals northward along the railroad route in Central China. 7. eu.Jtles. Our casualty experience in the Pacific war has been so diverse as to throw serious on the validity of any q\I8Dtitative estimate of casnalties for future operations. The fo llowing data 5. do\lbt Plans for the period afterthe invasion of the Tokyo Plain cannot be made widt firmness at this indicate results of experience. time. If the Japanesecontinue to resist, plans must provide for further operations in the main islands and for operations by ourselves or our allies on the mainland of Asia against those Japanese forces Jap Casualties Ratio which continue to resist. We are striving to keep US commitments on the mainland to a minimum US Casualties Killed and Prisoners US through encouraging and supporting maximum effort bythe Chinese and the Ruasians if they sho\lld Cam ign by . pa Killed, wounded, miasing (Not including wounded) to Jap enter the war. Hence, plans provide for continued US aid to Chinese forces, the scale of which can 17,000 78,000 probably be materially increased later in the campaign. Sho\lld the Japanese unconditionally surrender Leyte 1:4.6 Luzon 31,000 156,000 or concede defeat during the campaign in Japan proper, there will still remain the sizable task of 1:5.0 Iwo Jima 20,000 25,000 1:1.25 disarming their forces everywhere, assemblingthem atports, and returning tothem their home isl ds. � Okinawa 39,000 (Ground) 119,000 1:3 7,700 (Navy) 6. Forces requiredfor presently plamtecI C8IIIp8ip.Estimates of theforces required to exec\lte the (not a complete count) Normandy invasion of southern Kyushu and of the Tokyo Plain are attached. The maps show the deployment of (1 st 30 days) 42,000 land-based aircraft planned upon the completion of each of these two operations. It i. obvious from the maps that this air power will cover Japan and the approaches thereto with a blanket of destruction. The record of General MacArthur's operations from I March 1944 through I May 1945 shows 13,742 US killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 For the campaign as planned-through the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, it is expected there will be in to I. During this same period . the total US casualties, killed, wo'lnded . and miasing. were 63.s 10 or a ratio of approximately 5 to I. I the Pacific theaters, India-B\lrmaChina, and by the spring of 1946 a total of 39 Armydivisions and 127 (8,500 3,000,000 Army air groups land-based aircraft) or a grand total in Army forces of about m�. The i: nature of the objective areain Kyushu gives maneuver room for land and sea operations. For General MacArthur has indicated that if operations are after the invasi�n of theTokyo Plam, " neceSsary th� andother reasons it isprobable thatihe in ground fo rce casualties for 30 I plans shouldprovide for the movement of additional divisions from the United States to the Pacific at a coSt the first daysof the Kyush\l operation will beon the order ofthat forLuzon. Naval casualtieswiIl rate of about 4 additional divisions per month, from II planned strateSic reserveof 17 divisions in the probablybe at about the same rateas for Okinawa. United States.

A paraphrase of General MacArthur's comments on the Kyushu operation fol II By I March 1946 the fo llowing major naval vessels are scheduled for deployment in the Pacific: lows: ' BEGINS. The I:: 1 operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been I. ; 10 BB (Battleships) 26 CA: (Heavy Cruisers) suggested. Its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of nondecisive character. The operation 13 OBB (Old Batt leships) 33 CI:. (Light Cruisers) is the most economical in effort and lives thai is possible. It • III 120 121- must be remembered that the several months preceding the operation will involve practically no However, it should be noted that a more desirable losses groundin troopsand that sooner or later a decisive ground attack mustbe made. Additional Ian wou Id be to route Strait once it is under . the convoys through our control thus avoiding Tsushima subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties. I most earnestly recommend no e l e co d"lliO S °f the n avoid all possible means ;" � . ? ?rthern straits. We shOU by US co mitment to COStly 10 ld change in the operation for the invasion of southern Kyushu. ENDS. sole purpose. �pera� IOns the Kunles-K arafuto area for this regards As invasion of the Tokyo Plain the number and extent of beaches suitable for amphibious In general, we believe that the best . poli is not to the RUSSians . assault preclude concentration of defense. Furthermore, the terrain of the Tokyo Plain permits us to any commitment, but tress for further mformation merely to declare our ead' 0 . or for exploit our superiority in maneuver and in equipment mess receIVe and fully . they may wish to make. � consider any proposals which

8. TI_. Under the campaign as planned, it is estimated that the defeat of the Japanese in the Tokyo II. Participation by other natioDS. Plain area and the seizure of ports on Tokyo Bay would be completed by mid-1946 Should it prove . by .lI. China. necessaryto execute other operations prior to invading the Tokyo Plain, the earliest date which the The effectiveness of the Chinese latter operation could take place estimated to be October 1946, because of adverse weather and A "'.l enli�ly . dependent is supply. By the fall of 1945, upon US training and the ChineseNational A ground conditions and the necessity of further mobilizing resources. In either case, the war should be I'l conSist of a� t only about 545,000 (39 diVisions) ::: : t � 2,5oo,ooo men. However, are bein train u d over not later than the end of 1946. reasonably er US superVJs�on and can effective for offensive operation J � be considered me 0f �th alance defensive or � of the ChmeseArmies occupation operations while th� are capable of On the other hand, we are unable to estimate the time required or the losses that will result in an ' Iarg e ren;'al�der, for logistical, are ineffective. Increase of supply political and other reasons, . to the Chmese Armles effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade and bombardment without invasion, because of our major ma' IS dependent on the openi 0 sea Ch coast port and . ng f a r utc to a the improvement of inte . � inability to predict at what stage thereof the Japanese might concede defeat, and because of the Though rnaI a" and ground hnes of we are planning to send . G commumcation. several shi °ad of SUPPh possibility that invasion of the Tokyo area would ultimately be necessary. We feel that at best, such contingent upon I to eneral Wedemeyer his seizing a harbor no � . this summer, su tantia dIverslOn 0 ships strategy would lead to a longer and probably more costly war. made until the campaign .,." t and men for this purposecan in Japan ":ill permit. be

9. In summary, our planned course of action is: It is estimated that . Japanese strength ' Ch'ma about th e all of 1945 excluding 900,000 men. It is considered �: ::: � Manchuria, will be that major are 0 the To proceed with an operation against southern Kyushu on November 1945, as presently south of Manchuria task of defeating the enemy .!: I should fall to China. in China directed. .Q, British Empire (Commonwealth) .I!. To plan and prepare for an invasion of the Tokyo area with a target date of I March 1946. Forces• �y: One Canadian .lU. To exploit to the utmost in the interim periods the possibilities of blockade and air division has bee accepted " Australian Imperial �. for partiCipation. divisions are currentl . in CORONET. Three bombardment of Japan from positions in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, the Ryukyus and Kyushu. command. Y mg employed m The British Chiefs Southwest Pacific Area ... ". of Staff have recently under US dIVISlons partiCipate m proposed th a .. the final . . t 3 5- BrIllsh Commonwealth To basethe decision as to operations following southern Kyushu developments. phase of the camp3Ign 10 .II. The views Japan, all to of the Australian and New G operate under US command Zeal nd o e � nts on British Chiefs of Staff, but � � �� this pr�posal have been by RussllUl participation in the war. not yet receiv Th requested th� 10. In previous discussions and correspondence with the extent of ' n s mtend deploymg 21 divisions and 16 .:; . � . Commonwealth forces brigades (prO bab y mc to the Russians, they. have indicated that they would probably require about three months after VE-Day for Indies Area. ud mg the above divisions) East Under separate conside � in the Southeast Asia­ r f an offer concentration of troops and supplieson their eastern front. We have considered that Russia's entry at as to participate in � �;;.� to the United States I operations against Japan of Australian division early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is highly desirable to : . provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations and that the primary objective of Russia's Air Fo rces: Negotiations military effort should be to contain and destroy Japanese forces in Manchuria. are in pro gress t make Pacific, with use of 10 squadrons of a possible ultimate emplo � British bombers in f o u the squadrons have �ron . �Isoa force of been offered for suppo � � approximately 15 tactical We believe that we can defeat the Japanese in the main islands regardlessof Russianentry, because of ��r;;,� 3 5 :iI lons units found necessary mdlcated above. The RAF for operations in � will provide air our own estimated ability to restrict movement of Japanese reinforcements from Asia. However, the South t A:. be defeat of the Japanese army in North China including Manchuria would a valuable contribution to Na val Fo rces: Elements of the Fleet ' the early and economical termination of the war. British will . assault for su�P?rt operations In �, compriSing amphibious ' Southeast Asia; 3 naval lift for about 3 d IVIsl . Southeast Asia Command �ns, Will be conlinuously .. ' should these ele available to the As to basing US forces in Russian territory, this is no longer considered necessary, and we therefore ntIS 'fi Fleet, ments not beused m the . B h PaCI IC conSisting of maoIn o!'"ralions against 4 batlleshi ' . Japan. The suggest that this subject be discussed only if necessary in connection with Russian discussion of opening currently PS ,5 carriers accompanymg operating under Admiral . hght naval fo rces and sea Nimitz I add'ItlOn, eI train is a route to their Pacific ports. support ements of theEast Fleet of the 3-5 divisions proposed a� Indies are offered f ve� or sea Opening a route to Russian ports may well be a resultant requirement of Russian entry into the Estimated Japanese . strength in Southeast A . . war. We estimate that it might be satisfactorily accomplished by US convoy of cargo ships in small of 1945, is and �alaYSI:'- ex�ludlng about 600,000men. the Philippines, in the fall The British Sho �ntlnue groups withoutthe necessity for our seizure of Japaneseterritory or of basing forces in Russian territory up the Japanese ' �� thelf primary responsibility in SEA and the East I for mopping­ Indles exc USlve of the other than an advanced anchorage at Petropavlovsk and minor base facilities at the Russian termini. proposed British Commonwealth PhI T IPPlnes. . Acceptance contributio� Ii I of the latest s to th e ma p aseh of the war &g8Inst Japan should not 122 123 prejudice early accomplishment of this task provided the assault lift available to SACSEA is not employed elsewhere. The British PacificFleet, elements of the Royal Air Force, one Canadian division, and possibly the Commonwealth force proposed by the British will participate in the operation for invasion of Japan. It is the intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staffto turn over to British command certain portions of the SWPAC area including Australia, the Solomons, New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Netherlands East Indies.

.£, France. Certain French naval vessels are now under operational control of the Britis East Indies Fleet. It does not appear practicable or desirable to employ French naval vessels or air forc in Pacific operations. The French have offered a corps composed of two Colonial divisions for operatio in the Pacific. The questions of where and when these divisions can be best employed is now being examined. Arrangements for the French must include adequate provisions against any repetition in the Pacific of the French refusals, which have occurred in Europe, to obey military orders. The Southeast Asia Command includes minor French forces for clandestine operations in Indo-China.

Q. Portugal. If so desired by the Allies, Portugal stands ready to provide minor forces for • occupation of Portuguese Timor.

� The Netherlands. Dutch forces may fulfill a minor role in recapture of areas in the Netherlands East Indies. APPENDIX G

We believe that offers from any nation to contribute token or minor assistance in the Pacific war PERCENT should be considered on their military merits. The acceptance of any forces should be on the basis that BOMBS EXPECTED TO HI IN 1 000 THEAIMING POINT AND 2000 OF they are to be trained and equipped to meet US standards of combat efficiency, can be effectively FOR VARIOUS C�� FT ULAR PROBABLEERRO FT employed in planned operations against Japan, are reasonably self-supporting, and will operate as AVERAGE RS AND RADIAL ERRORS. determined by the United States.

12. Control and Command in the PacificWar. Based upon independent trials. Throughout previous staff discussions with the British, we have taken the position that control, command and direction of the war in the Pacific lies with the United States. The British thus far have committed their forces under this arrangement. We believe that we should continue to follow that policy and that any efforts which may be made to bring the direction of the Pacific war under the laborious, argumentative and time-consuming system of combined control should be vigorously opposed.

124 125

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126 22 September 1 944

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell Commanding General 21st Bomber Command Peterson Field Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Possum :

As you well know the original conception of the B-29 was an airplane that would carry tremendous loads for tremendous distances. We have not to date fulfilled this promise. We have flown great distances but we have not carried any sizeable bomb loads. In fact we have not carried any more bombs and in most cases considerably less than the B-24s and B- I 7s carry. One of the greatest factors in the defeat of Japan will be the air effort. Consequently every bomb that is added to each airplane that takes off for Japan will directly affect the length of the war. X H APPENDI It is my desire that you do everything in your power to increase the bomb load to the maximum when units of your command begin operating against Japan. To this end your crews and commanders should ARNOLD COMMANDING WITH GENERAL H H be thoroughly imbued with the importance of the job they are expected to do with the B-29. They should CORRESPONDENCE · GILES, wiTH LT GENBARN EY AIR FORCE , AND become accustomed to and proficient at flying the B-29 with gross weights up to 140,000 Ibs. or higher. GENERAL , TWENTIETH US ARMY AIR FORCES. CillEF OF STA FF, Every pilot should be an expert on keeping gasoline consumption to a minimum. There is a tendency to plan missions so that the weakest pilot will have a safe reserve on return to base. This cannot be tolerated. Weak pilots must either be removed or given sufficient training so that the maximum is . they are current of letters are included because obtained from the airplane. These COpIes circumstances '".nve a feel for the the events descn and . with ·bed of 1944 -.45 fall and early wmter and relationships in the I know that you, in your position as commander of one of our great striking forces, will do your utmost to help accomplish the earliest possible defeat of Japan. This can only be done by making the best possible use of the weapon at your disposal. Division, Library of Congress. collections of the Manuscript Reproduced from the Wishing you the best of luck with your new command.

Sincerely,

H. H. Arnold General, U. S. Army Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force

129 128

• (

Nov. 13, 1944 COMMAND UARTERS XXI BOMBER HEADQ General Office of the Commanding Peterson Field

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr. Colorado Springs, Colo. Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command I October 1944 A.P .0. 234, c/o PosUOasler San Francisco, California

Dear Possum: General H. H. Arnold Commanding General I have been getting reports of your photo reconnaissance missions and of your practice operations. It I United States Army Air Forces appears to me that you are working hard and well, and am pleased with the progress that you have and made with your Command. Commanding General Twentieth Air Force At the time that I write this letter, you have 77 B-29s with you and 17 more have departed the US, Washington, D. C. with at leastan equal numberready to jump off. I haven't beensatisfied with the number of airplanes we have delivered to you to date, but I believe that that has been corrected now. The weather the last few Dear General Arnold: days has slowed us down a bit but they appear to be moving again now. me. 0 September 22 has just reached so rapidly. t your lette r f I have been moving about tha In order to give LeMay modified airplanes with the center section fuel tanks, we are taking a few of bestto the end your reserve airplanes and sending them to him this month. This should have no effect on your . ure you that I will do my esslo? of CO?fid I en ce and to ass I want to thank you for your expr targets where they will operations since they are being replaced by the airplanes becoming available next month. You should I!, 0ad of bombs over Japanese XXI Bomber Command puts m�mum I receive before December at least 150 B-29s plus replacements. that the 0 the bomb load being carried. I, everythmg 10 our power t increase do the most good. We will do XXI ., .' to 135,000 pounds gross. You realize as well as anyone the important parr that you and the Bomber Command will play !� Ba'�ta are taking off at 134 present trammg mission" I As you know our . will take off at 136,000pounds. in the Twentieth Air Force program, and consequently, in the program of the entire Army Air Forces. I our I?IUal n against Japan on that experience believe that . :1�1O this without feel that these first few major missionsof yours are of particular significancebecause of the fact that they Based IS I feel confident that we can do the runways saU ac ory, I If the surface and grading of will do much to establish the standards upon which future operations will be based. know that you are I difficulty. doing everything within your power to make them highly successful. am confident that because ofyour the injection engines, and with effort, they will be successful. I Sh Id u With the water As experience, agree that the load can we gain O\ near future. Perhaps we reach that that we can reac I O , in the fuel injection engines, I am sure � Coo In looking over the pictures which you sent in, I am impressed with the regularity of the dispersal load with our present equipment. area and the fact that a Jap strafer could easily line up 12 or 15 B-29s. No matter what we do about area. I every and hope by this means dispersal, we are going to end up having too many airplanes in a small am afraid that cannot be 0 engineer after mission, the flight f every flight We are examining records . return from their aircraft. avoided, but I hope that you will seriously consider this matter and do everything possible to avoid who are not getUng the maximum to weed out those flight engineers fu rnishing a good target. Until such time as the Bonins may be cleared up, there wi.ll always exist a to to . issuing a tactical doctrine material threat the security of your bases. You will have be constantly on guard to avoid any undue . . . lIlrplane formation, and are are stablhzmg noW on an eleven congestion and to eliminate any chances of a small Jap air attack accounting for a number of your IncidentallY we 0 , so as to provide maximum defense gunfire from that �orma ti n for the control of maximum defensive airplanes. self inflicted damage. and minimize the likelihood of Wing, I . . extension of time for the 73rd I hope this reaches you before your first major undertaking because would like to have you and your u:aIDl g. as a It f ur togain the maximum p

H. H. ARNOLD General, U.S. Army HANSELL, H. S. JR. Commanding Brigadier General, USA Commanding 131 130 HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COMMAND guns and 2 I 6 fifty cal guns ofthe AAartillery. I have requested Office of the Commanding General OUr the lSi and Comman own .50 cal AA guns into the der to incorporate scheme of defense und erh' IS control . APO 234-c/o PM screen to cover We are alsop repar th e .base soon as wecan get ' . . tng a smoke Francisco, C�!ifomia As started on our ma Jor operati' San SOmeaircraft up to Iwo Jima ons, we will continue on practice raids to discou tosend e the use of that place as the capture of Iwo Jima will change a base. course the picture completr;:;,. Of , I � 't tell you how pleased I am to . . . have Bill Irvine. I have t With hiS assistance "": confidence tn him and I am we can lick the maintenance problem sure that 22 November 1944 aircraft have stood up though, of course, we have not remarkably well participated in actual co�bat.o!

I � distressed to report the loss of a photo shi last night Th e l e called the field gave him CQurse to the - radio and We field as 1800 he aCk wledged 'A r . the ! Ittr e,;"ater, about lght O� clock, for another course and we gave 0 � he asked him 187 -which he did no ac General H. H. Arnold We � l e. e SI als were had no reason to believe that he was � Th !!" not strong. in trouble and he was a t lime Commanding General We have a Navy = approxunateiy on course search unit out coverin g ISh' course now the U.S. Army Air Forces but the chances are rather slim. was good at the field last night. The visibiIi and � Commanding General I am making every effort to expedite completio f th e an Twentieth Air Force has not tnstallal1. n. The gr und insta been finished, but when it is that Lo'? . � llation will SOlv e b em of returning naVi Washington, D. C. planes takeoff 'pr? gation. Even if at daybreak which is 0500 : ':t. r our th e T0 ky 0 mission still puts the area two to three : airplanes back in the hours after nightfall. . . base My dear General Arnold: With the earnest hopethat I will be able to pass good news to you long Your letter of November 13 arrived yesterday afternoon. It was not only greatly appreciated but it before this letter arrives, I am came at a most opportune time.

I have just made for the fifth time in a row the most difficult decision I have ever been called upon to Very Sincerely yours, make-to postpone San Antonio I-our initial mission against Tokyo. We were all ready to go on the 17th with 83 of our 85 available airplanes scheduled to takeoff, when the storm which swept in that morning lingered and steadily grew worse. Afterwe have flown our first successful mission, I will write you in detail the story of these last five days, but now they would sound like an excuse. sl Possum S. HANSELL, JR. As for the airplanes which we are losing to LeMay, I fully understand that situation. To say that I H. willingly lose them to LeMay would call for a halo for my head which would not fit, but I do certainly Brigadier General, USA appreciate his requirements and have every confidence that ours will be met also. Commanding.

I am enclosing some pictures which you may not have seen. I am sure that the boys in the "back room" have beenstudying pictures like these, but in the thought that you may not have seen them, and knowing your personal interest, I am sending them along with Bill Irvine.

Your remark on the regularity of spacing of the hardstands on Isley # I was noted and I agree completely, but honestly don't know what solution can be found. We are using nearly every foot of the plateau on which Isley # I is situated, that is generally bounded by the perimeter road.

I feel quite sure that the Japs will come back again with the full moon the first part of next month. I hope that they continue their present tactics. They dispatch high altitude and low-strafing planes simultaneously. The high-altitude planes alert our defenses tomeet both. We live in great apprehension against the time when they will abandon this practice and send their strafers in at low altitude alone, because our warning system is inadequate to meet that problem.

The Island Commander has cooperated to the greatest extent possible in the defense of the island. Eighty percent of the automatic weapons available for this purpose are sighted around our air base, as well asthe majority of the heavy AAbatt eries. A total of 56 ninety mm guns are disposed aboutthe base. The Air Base is now quite well defended from the standpointof small arms fire. There are 54 forty mm

132 133 The firstphotos taken by the 3rd Photo Recon Squadron have Just come and I am delighted to say COMMAND than I HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER that the extent of damage was greater had anticipated from examination of the strike pbotos taken Office of the Commanding General by the Groups. Ifwe can accomplish damage like this with lessthan 10% of our bombs in the target area, APO 234-c/o PM then we can' really go to town once we bring our bombing proficiency up to its necessary level. San Francisco, California Dr. Bowles hasbeen with usfor several days and departed yesterday. Out of his visit came twothings of great importance to me. One (1) the conviction that we can do radar bombing against our primary targets with improved training. Second (2) the conviction that we should have by all means a wing 9 equipped with stripped airplanes to do and night bombing, carrying approximately 20,000 Ibs. per 16 December 1 44 radar airplane. I feel that there is great utility for such a wing, but not at the expense of our present three wings. It should bean additional wing and the nersoo we can get it tbe better. I $till feel that our primary effort should be by visual bombing, wben possible, because it is always inberently more accurate; but with the improvement in radar bombing, I feel that our efforts can bedirected against our primary target every time and that it will not be necessaryto waste our bombs on large city areas as asecondary effort.

General H. H. Arnold In order to improve our bombing accuracy againstprimary I bave issued a directive, a copy of Commanding General targets, wbich is attached. Its purpose is to intensify training of lead crews both in the Wings and the Bomber U.S. Anny Air Forces and Command. To do this the Wings must have access to some airplanes for training. Under the system we have using, every airplane in the Wing is made ready for operation with the result none are Commanding General been available for daily training. Sometimes we have to postpone an operation several days because of the Twentieth Air Force weather, and during that period the squadrons get no training at all. By setting aside one airplane per Washington, D.C. squadron we can intCflSify our training, especially of lead crews, and it can go on all the time. I am sure that the result will be many more bombs on the target . My dear General Arnold: you officeand I am hesitant to encumber . that comes ugh your was volume of mall . ··-�-� · __- An interesting phenomenon in connection with Mempbis One that we had literally no "overs" I know great thro I mum::o� In ·-000 the . also know that you are keen y the and readmg. materiaI. However, I ... and a great many " aborts." I think the bombardierjust couldn't believe that they were bucking a wind of with more e Ih Igh rghts ofou r latest experience. I shall attempt to on th ' 200 miles per hour. Another interesting fact is that they appeared to have got very few bits with our , experience of this command, so pass Factory, M -18 incendiaries. This, I believe, is due to the fact that an M·18 cluster opening at 5,000feet is subject hIS One against the Mitsubishi Aircraft as you. know, we conduc� Memp ' . to considerable drift from bigh winds. Most of our incendiaries hit sbort of the target. As a result, we On the 13th, t to attention. However, I m and I am sure It � b o Theoperational reportis already � � the 15th, shall go back to the M-76 500·lb. napon filled bomb. Nagoya. ymg p en be of interest. 1lleaccom F yesterday have somelater data which will �' has It IS nt derable been have fallen in the � area. � _ at show the bombs which :�IClency w we are demonstrating satisfied With the state 0 I done. However, I am far from :: realize that this has been a long letter but hope you will find it of sufficient interestto compensate for that fact. I'm in the process of moving my headquarters to Guam . All the personnel except the present. • Operations Section have already left Saipan. I expect to move with the Operations Section about I thought wehit somehigh winds nm.:and pec,ur lar expe riences To besure we are encountering some ' wind up December 20. . aIl 0 f us. W e bombing down '1es an ho r IS somethmg new to had been in Europe but 200 ml � . in an ort eff to improve our debberat�I Y flew up wind Memphis One operation . There we redueed to I should like to extend very best wishes of the Command to you and Mrs. Arnold for a MERRY until the h r r d speed was approximately 200 mlles � ou ese bombing accuracy. With the wind . �':"accuracy of apan CHRISTMAS AND A HAPPY NEW YEAR. to -:;; J AA our unitsextremely vulnerable . about 130 which made anti�rcraft ' t ofview Theyare evidently g development at high altitudes is the most surprisin :;:,�� ndaralone. On e by most nders but �ently are not ��;:'re Very Sincerely yours, using radar range fi see,we have no so the ners could not had AA,or oc when we have had a sobd overcast, � east airplanes casions gun er, we atl 31 of our his One which was m clear weath had very inaccurate fi'Ire. On emp M to it is " the four airplanes tiultfa iled return a1moat to greater or lesserextent. as h'It by AA and damaged . Of our countenneuures I ' • We shall have to develop radar certain that theyhad all beenhit severe Y by AA this accuracy. rapidly as possible to counteraCt AA H. S. HANSELL, JR. Brigadier General, USA that has us . red theo ther major danger been worrying from MemphIS One, we encounte . I have Commanding. On return . lightening and heaviest . A trOplca ! stonn WIth the rain the start: weather at . from bad thebases about 8'30 atnight Threeairplanes bad hit our just as the fir ' e y 2Incls' ever seen bases st inutes � which the visibility was uctl . there was aai perc� W:: landed ahead of It but then n ���!. came flies. Needlessto Inc! I . Photographs th B 29s inas thick as al. �fter the stonn had ' • zero and the rain torrenti passed especially hav!ng Incl 2 of directive fr th short of gasoline, after Cy we extrem ly wo ed, eq think say, were � rn because :retr ibute to the Control and I that they anl saf y is a System encountered heavy Winds. The fact �:: :i' quite a high standard of ainnanship. 135 134 19 December 1944 work they have done in connection with u i tt g out the preventing � �res as a result of Japanese destruction of other � lt attacks and ai rplanes by e ogged in the use persIstence, Ignoring their of their bulldozers. own personal safety

I am sending you this letter courier because I . by would Iik e t0 h ave an answer Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr. to It as soon as I can. Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command APO 234, clo Postmaster San Francisco, California Sincerely,

Dear Hansell: H. H. ARNOLD General, U.S. Army Your units out there have been doing a wonderfuljob. It is regretted that their strength is not such so Commanding General , Army Air Forces that we could have complete destruction o£ the plants rather than just partial destruction. I await with great interest photographs of your latest operations, in which apparently you came nearer to securing complete destruction than on any missions heretofore.

As you know, I was worried and am still somewhat concerned about the defenses of Saipan, Tinian and Guam bases. Perhaps the antiaircraft defenses have been perfected to greater extent now than they were when we first started operations. Certain phases I cannot understand. For one thing, I cannot understand Jap planes coming over in the daytime and apparently making several passes at the field during a period of 45 minutes with no mention whatsoever made of our own fighters even attempting to prevent such strafing. A little later on, reports indicated that a few enemy airplanes were knocked down, but no credit of any kind was given to our fighters for having made determined effortsto drive the Japs away from the base. I would like to know the true story concerning this. Just what do our fighters do out there, or don't we have any fighters?

Another phase of your operations that is not altogether clear to me is why we have so many planes ditched on the return trip. I am fully aware of the fact that a certain number of the planes are ditched by enemy aircraft or aircraft fire. I am also aware of the fact that some of these airplanes naturally must be ditched, but it seemsthat on every raid there are about 3 or 4 airplanes that go down, well on the return trip, with no definite cause being given. It would seem to me that as the losses from this cause are constant and if added up, will present a very large number, we should find the causes and determine what we can do to prevent them. Certainly there is no one in my office who can tell me the cause for these airplanes going down. In my opinion, the B-29 cannot be treated in the same way that we treat a fighter, a medium bomber, or even a flying fortress. We must consider the B-29 more in terms of a naval vessel, and we do not lose naval vessels in 3s or 4s without a very thorough analysis of the causes and what preventative measures may be taken to avoid loss in the future. This same reasoning must apply to our B-290.

Have some of your people get busy on this phase of your operation at once and give me a full and complete report of every mission since your arrival. I would also like for you to give me your recommendations, first telling me what you believe the causes of these ditchings are, and second, what we can do to eliminate them in the future. If we do not know, then certainly some of the restrictions on the use of radio should be lifted so that we can have thesefel lows tell what the cause of their troubles are before they leave the formation or before they land in the sea.

I wish you would convey to all of the members of your command, including all the Service Forces, my appreciation of the splendid work they are doing under very difficult operating conditions. I wish particularly that you would tell the engineers how much I appreciate their efforts and the marvelous

136 137 30 December 1944 I February 1945

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr. Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr. Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command Commanding General, 38th Flying Training Wing A.P.0. 234, clo Postmaster Williams Field, Arizona San Francisco, California Dear Possum: Dear Possum: I know that the change in command of the XXI Bomber Command was a great disappointment to I read with a great deal of interest your letter of 2 December to Norstad on the subject of your first you and it is for that reason that I am greatly impressed with the fine spirit with which you have accepted I operation. realize that during the period that you were forced to delay attack �rom day to day, much of this situation. Your letter of the 8th of January indicates a degree of loyalty, judgment, and devotion to I I the pressure on you wasthe realization of the interestback here. regret that �IS h� to be �e casebut duty which is a great credit to you as an officer. cannot deny that we were watching you from day to day with thegreatest anuclpauo. n. I think you did a splendid job and you andyour Command are'to becommended for initiating the Battle of Japan in such I want to make it clear to you that I feel that you did a very fine job in organizing, training, and good style. committing the XXI Bomber Command to action. I am cognizant of the great problems involved in pioneering a project of this type. You have my appreciation aswell as myadmiration for your excellent To oversimplify our basic operating policy, it is our purpose to destroy our targets. For this reason we work. have avoided announcing in advance what we propose to do and we have carefully screened our news timistic. We want to let the results speak for themselves. releases to avoid the public's becoming overop The decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy the 315th and 316th Wings in the Marianas puts that we have a big obligation to meet. To fulfill this we must in fact However, we must accept the fact all our eggs in one basket. The XXI Bomber Command will, in fact, be the Twentieth Air Force for the results so the public can judge for itself as to the destroy our targets and then we must show the next 8 or 9 months at least. The job from now on is no longer planning and pioneering. It has become I your PRU interpretation photos of the Musashino engine effectiveness of our operations. have seen one of operating. LeMay, because of his broad experiencein handling large units of heavybombers over the Musashino assembly plant, and I am willing to conclud that factory attack and the strike pictures of � a long period of time plus his experience of over 4 months with the XX Bomber Command, should be an increasing number of pictures of mcreaslngly we have started the job. I hope that you will send back our best qualified operator. I know that you join me in wishing him well in this great undertaking. interesting subjects.

I fully agreeit is to the best interests of the service aswell as best for you personally that you should You probably already know that the 315th and 316th Wings will ultimately be deployed to �e I Marianas. The 315th is a special strip-down instrument precision umt from which we are expectmg now enjoy a period of at least relative rest. consequently directed Personnel to assign you to the Training Command for duty of the general nature you requested . The change in your status was the great things. We expect it to be ready so that it can be deployed without delay in the present schedule result of my decision upon my best judgment. sincerely appreciate your generous acceptance of and that this will be in sufficient time to put it into effective operation during the period of the worst based I weather in Japan. this decision and I greatly regret the disappointment which I know It has caused you.

I want to assure you of mypersonal appreciation of what you have done and of myconfidence that To me the best evidence of how you are getting along is the pictures of the destruction that you have your work in the future will be of the same high standard asyou have always produced in the accomplished against your primary targets. However, I do like to hear from you so drop me a line when past. you have time. I am leaving on a rather extended trip after having been in Washington only a few days. After my return, I will look forward to seeing you either here in Washington or at your own Headquarters.

Sincerely,

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD General, U.S. Army H. H. ARNOLD Commanding Commanding General, Army Air Forces

138 139 HEADQUARTERS 38th FLYING TRAINING WING Lt. General Barney M. Giles 27 March 1945 Williams Field, Chandler, Arizona played ball 100 percent witb General Harmon and never sent General Arnoldany statement or letter 27 March 1945 without telling General Harmon what I was doing. His staff was a little more difficult to get around, because they wantedvery much to control the XXI Bomber Command.However, I think we finally won them over, too.

As for the second obstacle, the U.S. Navy, I have never received better support from anybody and Lt. General Barney M. Giles have never been able to cooperate with anyone any better. When I arrived in the Marianas I had no Chief of the Air Staff credentials, other than my own assumption of position and authority. Admiral Hoover was generally Army Air Forces considered,by all the Army, and Navy as well, as the hardest-boiledand most intolerant Admiral in the Pentagon Building Navy. We hit it off 100 percent again by the simple processof being completely honest and straight­ Washington, D.C. forward. Admiral Hoover respondedbeautifully to that approach. I left theMarianas with a firm friend in Admiral Hoover, and he did everything he could to meet my requests. Incidentally, for air-sea rescue Dear Barney: he provided an average of 6 submarines,2 destroyers, and 10 to 12 flying boats. Although the air-sea rescue wasnot especiallysuccessf ul, it was not through the lack of effort on the part of Admiral Hoover. I had a very pleasant visit with Hal G O· k Ltndsay,' and Sa ty Fairchild WestCoast. During the courseof our CO � last weekend on the representations �ti.'.I gathered that Wllhs Hale had made rather strong As for the Depot, I had less success in that respect. Up to two weeks before I left Guam, I had in Washingto n abo ut our:� relationshIp�� tn the Pacific. received only three percent of my requisitions for supplies and absolutely no maintenance assistance whatever. I didn't complain about this, because I felt the Depot was doing the best it could, but it I realize that is now water overthe dam I score. �nd th n th·tng I do or say makesany realdifference on certainly left me in a spot. Looking back, am amazed that we were still able to run 938 sorties against However, since expressedhis ve rsIDn,' I In. � . that Japan in the first 36 days, almost double our estimatedcapacity for that period. course, I might not give you mine. he : perhaps,just to complete the record,I had better Of have done any better if the Depot had been under my control, but at least I would have had a firmer hand in correcting the situation. My biggest maintenance problem was lack of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Maintenance and Supply. At General Harmon's request Steve Thomas was relieved from that job and assignedto General Harmon's staff, leaving me completely without any maintenance expert. I was operatingfrom a field that was less than half complete. My initial operationswere from a single runway, I. I had to redeem the confidenceof G nera '. 7000feet long. We had to build our own shops and supply buildings, and they were not finished until Harm �n and hIS staff,SInce he knew very well that had opposedhis control of Twentieth Atr' �orceI I long after the assault on Japan had been initiated. Bill Irvine, of course, saved the situation at the last Air Force. operatIons as Deputy Chief of Staffof the Twentieth minute, but I had an awfully tough time until he got there. My Headquarters was delayedon route and did not arrive in the Marianas until the middle of December, so I had to run the 21st BomberCommand to establiS a friendly p�fi��� . working relationship with the senior Navy Commanders out of pocket with about 10 staff officers and 15 or 20 enlisted men, operating from an improvised overcome �etr natural hostility in the to the introduction of another independentcommand. hut-no complaint, but it was not easy. 3. I had to establish a working relationship with . I did succeed in establishing just exactly the relationship that I wanted with the Island Commander, away from th e A"tr Depot whIch, asyou know, was taken my jurisdiction. General Jarmon. We did it by the simple processof pitching in and working to the greatest possible extent of our capacity, proving to him that we meant business, and expected no favors. He, too, s administrative agreementwith the Island Commander and make it clear to respondedto this kind of treatInent, and toward the latter part of my stay, was occasionallycalling me hi a y�:��� !':nand completely by-passed hIm for: administraf��� and went directly back to General Harmon up to see if tbere wasn't something morethey could do for us. I could not hopefor a finer relationship d o G n old for opera ons, while at the there. As for the administrative relationship betweenGeneral Jarmon and me, I wrote the ticket myself. the logistic sU rt b ti same time I expectedfrom him :":.� ..:�:�� I wrote a memorandum to him, explaining just how the Twentieth Air Force operated, and outlining precisely what functions I needed from him,and which we would take care of ourselves. He accepted it nt ay of thinking the 13rdWing which, from without ever changing a comma, with the resultthat the Twentieth Air Force did get firmly established 10 � ,I � �pe�:y �o:; . its Commander to its ; : ;::� to me an d eve rythIng that I wanted to do. in the way that we wanted it.

f t I nearly lost my mind about the73r d Wing. As you know, they had sold themselveson radar bombing Ple believed the job couldn't bedone anyway, and FO i :��� ��=ey h . even such Air at night. Theywere extremely bostile to my intention to bomb by daylight against precisiontargets. That operations:� ��::! : ad �ated uneqUIvocally that we could not conduct daylight on Ja from e Marian as . was what I believed in, but whether or not I had believed in it I had a directive to that effect. I very ese ffi ' l thInk thIS was a fairly large order. However, l waswell of all th di ies and� carefully sough t to overcome aware seriously considered relieving the Wing Commander and all the groupCommanders. However, to have :: them all. done sowould have wrecked the organization for a matter of months. We had told the Chiefs of Staff As for General Harmon I rejoice t0 say . that we would attack Japan in daylight in the month of November,and I fully intended to seethat it was th tn· my opInion, I was completely successful wrote me several very nice 'letters and express� there. He done. I went to Rosie and we had a frank talk, as one man to another. He carne throughvery handsomely great confidence In what I was doing. Incidentally, I and supportedmy directives very loyally. Little by little, we swung the 73rd Wing around to where I 140 141 27 March 1945 Lt. General Barney M. Giles 27 March 1945 Lt. General Barney M. Giles

wanted it, but atone time I had to call them together and give them the strongest talk I have ever heard a consider it necessary to explain to him why 100 miscellaneous airplanes on a single strip was an commanding officer deliver to a combat organization. They had to beshaken out of their smugness and excessive number, in addition to 120 B-29s. made to realize that bombs on the target were the only ones that counted. However, they did come through, and I am very proud of their accomplishment. Willis and I parted on, thought,I goodterms, but it seems I had offended his petassistant and the next I knew of it General Jarmon called me up two days later and Willis was in his office, apparently There was, unfortunately, one other obstacle which I did not recognize until too late. I had not extremely irate. Willis said that he had made an official complaint against me, through Admiral Hoover, realized that General Hale fe lt so strongly about his position in the Marianas. Here is the story of my and claimed that I had been arbitrary to him. I must confessthat I was completely taken aback and had relationship with General Hale, as I see it: to have the situation explained to me, because I did not understand that anything had been amiss. I then told Willis that I was very much surprised at his action in sending his message, through the Navy, to

I arrived on the IIth of October. I at once went to call upon General Hale and he was very cordial. I another commander, 4000 miles away, when all he had to do was pick up the telephone and I wo\,ld must confessthat I wassomewhat dismayed on arrival at Saipan. Instead of twofields of two strips each, have beenglad to come to his office, which was only five milesfrom my own Headquarters. I also felt 8500feet long, I found only one strip, 7000 feet long, and one strip nearing completion on a fieldwhich that it was a very unhappy situation, when a ground commander had to take a part in clarifying a was not usable. A slight hill rose about 140 feet above the levelof the runwayat a distance of about 500 discussion between two Air Corpsofficers. So I said to Willis, in General Jarmon's presence, that I felt fe et. I tried a heavily loaded airplane off the other."trip and measured its altitude at the end of 6000 feet, the air field would have to be cleared in order for me to launch my operation, as directed, but that I would rely completely in General Hale's decision, and if he could not clear thefield, I would find a way and finally had to admit that we cou ldn't make it. Therefore, I agreed to turn that field over to General Hale and the 7th Air Force, despite the fact that it had been built on priorities establish� by the Joint to launch my operation anyway. I repeated my statement to General Jarmon: that I would leave the Chiefs of Staff for the Twentieth Air Force. matter entirely in General Hale's hands, to resolve, as best he could, and that I had every confidence in General Hale's willingness to find a solution which would permit me to carry out my operation. The other thing that dismayed me was this: There were already over 100airplanes belonging to General Hale's outfit, operating on the single strip of the B-29 field. Willis recognized this difficulty at I mustconf ess itwas most distasteful to me to have to adopt this attitude when I felt I was so patently once and told me that he would have the field cleared by the lst of November, inasmuch as I had B-29s in the right, but I felt very strongly that two Air Corps officers, so far from home, could not afford to coming in at the rate of five a day,and they had to get somepractice before the initial operation, which have their troubles resolved by someone else. I thought the malter had ended there and made no further wasscheduled for the 6th of November. This still left me somewhat dismayed, but I acceptedwithout it comment or report on it. I was busy carrying out operations. comment of any kind. When no airplanes were moved from the B-29 field to the other field, I reminded Willis of the arrangement, and he said that he would have them off by the 6th of November. When my To tell the truth, I think perhaps that General Hale's complaint may have beenprompted partly by operation was postP'?ned to the 1 1th of November, and finally the 16th of November, Willis agreed to concern over the failure of his command to provide defense for my bases, asdirected by the Joint Chiefs vacate the field, but made no move to do so. of Staff, and by the expectancy that I would complain about it Asyou know, the defense wascompletely inadequate, and we took a prettyheavy beating. I did not complain about General Hale's failure to meet Finally, I was directed to launch an operation, with maximum force, on the 16th of November, and this obligation, and perhaps I was wrong in not doing so. there were still over 100 airplanes, belonging to Willis' command and to the ATC, on the field. On the myself story as I see it. I fully realize it is pasthistory, and I have succeeded in readjusting 12th of November, when no effort had made to clear the field and I had over 100 B-29s there, I put There is the been Incidentally, I have no complaint about my present circumstances. I h�ve my request in writing. I had to address it through Admiral Hoover, and I asked for five things: to my present circumstances. with a fine group of people, and I should l ke an opportunityto do a great deal of flying; I am associated . � ever been in-the AAF Western Flymg Trammg 1. Submarines for air-sea rescue. to say that this is the best organized unit I have 2. Destroyers for air-sea rescue. Command. 3. Flying boats for air·sea rescue. 4. That all fields in the Marianas becleared as crash landing strips for returned B-29s on the night This is not offered as a complaint, nor do I expect anybody to do anything about it, but I will feel of the first operation. better if someone there in Washington knows that there were two sides to the story. 5. That Isley field be cleared of airplanes not belonging to the XXI Bomber Command. Please drop me a line if you have an opportunity; I know that your duties are, as always, extremely I took this, in person, to Admiral Hoover, who immediately agreed to all of them, and I asked him beavy. not to take action on the last item, as that was a matter which I would adjust personally with General Hale. I then went immediately to Willis' office and gave him a copy of the message which I had Best regards to you and to Hollis. delivered to Admiral Hoover. I also gave him at that time a detailed plan of my operation against Tokyo, and we discussed it in a very friendly manner. It seemed perfectly clear to all of us that I could not Sincerely yours, operate 120 B-29s from a single strip, 7000 feet long, and still have 100 miscellaneOus airplanes operating from that same strip.

During the course of the conversation, Willis' A-3, a Colonel Eskridge, took me to task and asked me to explain in what way the extra 100airplanes were interfering with my operations, and why they would H. S. HANSELL have to be moved. This seemed socompletely unreasonable to me, that I told him (not Willis Hale, but Brigadier General, U.S.A. Colonel Eskridge) that that was a malter which General Hale and I had agreed upon, and I did not Commanding

142 143 April 9, 1945

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell Hq 38th Flying Training Wing Williams Field Chandler, Arizona

Dear Possum:

Your letter of March 27th arrived at an opportune time and has been read with very great interest.

' For your private information, I am planning on leaving Washington within the next couple of weeks to go to the Pacific to step into the big gap which has been left by Miff Harmon. For that reason, APPENDIX particularly, I am glad to get the background information which you have sent to me.

I appreciate the mixed emotion with which you are undoubtedly viewing the splendid work being MAPS OF THE PACIFIC done by your XXI Bomber Command.

For such satisfaction as it may beto you, I would like you to know that the current achievement of the B-29s over the Marianas is accepted by this Headquarters as evidence thatthe XXI Bomber Command was originallybased and launched into operations soundly and well. For that achievement we know that you deserve full credit.

With very best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

BARNEY M. GILES Lieutenant General, U. S. A. Deputy Commander, AAF

145 144 I it L i ,0 IX I- �! e( til z Z e( 1 1 ; � Q. ... e( CJ:c .... �i :t ig �()I l- e( � � l l � ;! '. � . �"- .' "- Ii :4I n e�

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147

146 NDEX INDEX I

G L A B-29, 6, 19, 30, 36, Appendix B General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, 4 Lampert Committee, 3 British Joint Plans Committee, 9 George, Harold, 3, 5, 10 Leahy, William D. Brooke, Sir 9 Aerial Mining Campaign Alan, Giles, Barney, 62 as Chief of Staffto President, 10 by XXIst Bomber Command, 42 correspondence of, Appendix H at SEXTANT, 17 under LeMay, 43 Grand strategy, national on Pacific strategy, 69 Air command, unified, 26 c definition of, 12 LeMay, Curtis Air forces, strategic for Pacific, 17, 9 on aerial mining, 42-43 Caproni, di Taliedo, 2 I supporting theater obj ectives, 18 as commander XXIst Bomber Command, 46 Chennault, Claire merging under single commands, 18 as commander XXth Bomber Command, 46 as air pioneer, 3 command of, 25 in urban incendiary attack, 61 14th US Army AF, 25 H Air plan, strategic, 5 relieved of XXIst Bomber Command, 70 Chiang Kai-shek, 20, 25 See also AWPD-I China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, 25, 45 Handy, Thomas T., 10, 27 Air Corps Tactical School, 3-6, 10, 91, 93 Churchill, Winston, 9-10, 14 Hansell, H. S. Air doctrine, 2-3 Combs, Cecil, 30, 69 assigned to War Department, 10 M Air objective Command of the Air, 2 at SEXTANT, 17 intermediate, 6, 15, 52 22 Committee of Operations Analysts (COA ) preparing Pacific strategy, Maddocks, K. T., 10 primary, 6, 15, 35, 52 first Chief of Staff, 20th Air Force, 27 recommending targets, 20-21, 31 Marshall, George C. Air offensive, 12, 15 as commander XXIst Bomber Command, 31 on economic objectives, 51 on AWPD-I, 6 Allied grand strategy, 13, 74, 90-91 Craig, Howard , 10 on selective bombing, 51 on air member to Joint Chiefs of Staff American-British Conversations-I (ABC- I), 5-6 Curry, John F., 3 Hale, Willis, 46 Committee, 10 AWPD- I, 5-7, 12, 14-15, 76, 91, 93 Harmon, Millard "Miff', 33, 45-46 meeting with MacArthur, 21 AWPD-42, 15, 76, 91 Hoover, John, 34, 45 defending "Hitler first" strategy, 22 Army Air Corps, 3-4 D on theater unity of command, 26 Arnold, Henry H. on Pacific strategy, 51, 68 as Commanding General, US Army Air Corps, 5 Douhet, Giulio, 2 I on objective of invasion, 79 as member of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee,lO, 14 Doolittle, Jimmy, 2, 7() Mariana Islands on use of B-29, 19 Incendiary urban attack, 51, 61 in Pacific strategy, 22 commander 20th Air Force, 27 as base XXth 46 E Ismay, Sir Hastings, 10 as for Bomber Command, on radar bombing, 48 MATIERHORN, 19-21,25 on incendiary urban attack, 51 Mitchell, Billy, 2-3 on Pacific strategy, 69 Eaker, Ira C. Montgomery, John, 40, 49 as Executive Agent to Joint Chiefs, 69 J at QUADRANT, 15 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 25 on use of atomic bomb,92 on Pacific strategy, 68 correspondence of, Appendix H on European strategy, 75 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11-12, 60, 68, 75 Atomic bomb Eighth Air Force, 14-15, 69-70 Joint Intelligence Committee, 9-11 Me testof, 69 Eisenhower Dwight D., 68, 79 Joint Plans Committee, 10-ll, 17-18 targets for, 69, 90-92 Joint Strategic Committee, 10-14 Electric power, 78-86 . MacArthur, Douglas, 21, 68 Joint Target Group, 60-61 on Pacific strategy, 68, 74 F McClelland, H. L., 28 B McGhee, George, 41, 49 K Baker Board, 3-4 Fairchild, Muir S., 3, 5, 17, 25 Bombers Fifteenth Air Force Kawasaki Steam Power Plant, 76 N B- 17, 4, 6 organized at SEXTANT, 18 Kenney, George, 21, 30 Nimitz, Chester B-24, 6 demobilized, 70 King, ErnestJ., 26, 69 B-36, 6 Futrell, Robert F., 6, 58 Kuter, Larry, 5, 16-17 on aerial mining, 43

1 48 149 INDEX INDEX

on Pacificstrategy, 22, 26, 33, 74 of CBI Theater, 45 Military Analysis Division of, 78, 89 s as pan Norstad,Larry sorties flown by, 71 Repon on Japanese Electric Chief of Staff 20th AF, 31 , 46 Utilities, 80-81, 84 Saipan, 33 Twenty-first Bomber Command rm al Repon, 90-91 Sallagar, Frederick M., 42, 51 activation of, 31 high-altitude, daylight bombing, 32 also Appendix C SAN ANTONIO I See o mission planned, 36-40 on Saipan, 33 mission called off, 38 change of organization, 46 O'Donnell, Emmett C'Rosey"), 36-38, 45 mission flown, 39 priority targets, 49 SAN ANTONIO II, 40 sorties flown by, 71 v Saunders, LaVerne ("Blondy"), 45 Twining, Nathan F. Seaver, James, 44 moved to Pacific, 70-71 "Victory Program", 12-13 p SEXTANT Conference, 17-18 Skyways, 2 Siessor, Sir John, I u Pacific Ocean Area, 45 Smith, Rex, 29 w Pearl Harbor, 9-10, 12 Smuts, Jan Christian, I, 3 US Navy Pershing, John J., 2 Spaatz, Carl T. on Pacific strategy, 12, 14 Policy, strategic, 50, 75 air member, Joint Strategic aiding aerial mining, 42 Portal, Sir Charles, 9 Committee, 10 US Strategic Bombing Survey Walker, Ken, 3, 5 Potsdam Conference, 68, 92 with Pacific forces, 69 Repon on Japanese Aircraft Industry, 31 War Department, 2, 4-6 Pound, Sir Dudley, 9 Stilwell, Joseph, 25, 45 Report on Japanese War Production War Plans Division (WPD), 5 Weather forecasting, 44 Stimson, HenryL., 6 Industries, 66 Sutherland, Richard K., 22 Reponon Japanese War Economy, 67 Wedemeyer, A. C., 10-11, 14, 46, 48 Reponon Effects of Strategic Wilson, Don, 3, 5 Q Bombing, 76 Winterbotham, R. W., 37, 44 T Economic Repon, 76 Wolfe, K. B., 20, 45 Repon on War Against Japanese World War I, 2-4 World War II, 3, 5-6, 75 QUADRANT Conference, 15, 17 Targets Transportation, 77 I, Akashi Airframe Plant, 52 MARUZEN Oil Refinery, 63 NIPPON Oil Company, 65 R Tenth Air Force, 25 NOTE: Military ranks have been omined because they varied widely in tM timespan ofthis book. Theater Commanders, 19, 42 Tinian Island, 34 Radar Training Regulations, 3 APQ-7, 60, 63, 74, 89, 90 Truman, Harry S., 68 APQ- 13, 60, 61, 74, 89, 90 Trenchard, H. M., 1-2 RAINBOW No. 5, 6 Turner, R. K., 10 Ramey, Roger, 40-41, 49 Twentieth Air Force Read, O. M., 10 inception of, 26-27 RENO IV, 22 organization and deployment 27-28 of, Roosevelt, Franklin D. command and control of, 28-29 queries production requirements, 5 sonies flown by, 71 consults with Allies, 9 staff meeting roles, Appendix D at SEXTANT, 17 Twentieth Bomber Command at Casablanca, 19 initial operations of, 30 Rosenblatt, Sol, 28 73rd Wing, 31-32 Royal Air Force, 5 fo rmation of, 45

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