�IIOO�II���� ��OOW�OO ����[ro�1I JJ�[f)�[ro 1980 The views expressed herein are those of the author andare not to be construed as representing the opinions of the UnitedStates Air Force, the Department of Defense, BY or any other governmentalagency. Published under the auspicesof the Airpower Research Institute, Air War College, Maj Gen Haywood Hansell, MaxwellAir Force Base, Aillbama, 1980 S. Jr. 0905 USAF, Retired For sale h.\· thl" ::illl)prtlitelldent of Documents, U.S. GOl'ernment Printing O.IBce Wuhlolltton, D.C. 2<K02 GENERAL OF THE ARMY HENRY H. "HAP" ARNOLD The General H. H. "Hap" Arnold B-29 Assigned to the 58th Wing Air Member United States Joint Chiefs of Staff XXIst Bomber Command Commanding General US Army Air Forces Twentieth Air Force Commanding General Twentieth Air Force Tinian, Mariana Islands "Fully recognizing the indispensable contribution of other arms, I feel that air power's part may fairly be called decisive. The collapse of Japan has vindicated tbe whole strategic concept of the offensive phase of the Pacific war.-No invasion was necessary." General Arnold's report to the Secretary of War, 12 November 1945 ii Foreword IN HIS PREFACE, Hansell admits that prejudice and a natural tendency toward self-defense may have crept into this book. In my judgment, there is less prejudice apparent in his work than in most of the personaldiaries written by leaders and participantsin World War II. In fact, he has been unusually generous toward fellow participants in the historical review of the incidents he relates. Strategic Air War I believe Hansell's opportunity to review the Against Japan was unique. Few leaders in any conflict have had the opportunity to participate in the plan for a campaign, in its execution in combat, and in a review of the success or failure of the plans and operations. "Possum" Hansell not only had this rare opportunity, but fortunately for US Air Force history, he had the analytical ability, the writing capability, and the all-important industry to accomplish this significant task in superlative fashion. As a student at the Air Corps Thctical School in 1935, I first became acquainted with Hansell when he was an instructor there. I formed a high opinion of the quality and originality of his work at that time, as I did of the talent of Capt Harold George and Lts Larry Kuter and Kenneth Walker and other members of the faculty. I was also well acquainted with their superior work as planners who produced AW PD-I and AW PD-42, which proved remarkably accurate forecasts of the air resources needed to defeat Hilier and the Japanese warlords. When General H. H. Arnold sent Hansell and Kuter to the United Kingdom to get them operational experience,he said to General Spaatz and me that he could only leave them for a limited period as he would undoubtedly need their services in Washington on the Air Staff or in some other theater within the year. IN MEMORY OF KENNETH N. WALKER Hansell had a vast and varied experience which uniquely qualifies him for t)lis task. He was, Brig Gen US Army Air Forces successively, a wing and air division commander in the Eighth Air Force in the United Bombardment Instructor The Air Corps Tactical School Kingdom and a bomber commander in the Pacific. He helped to prepare the air plan for each Maxwell Field, Alabama theater. He also is the author of previous books and lectures on the results of the air campaigns Commanding General Vth Bomber Command of World War II, the most significant of which is titled, TheAir Plan ThatDefeated Hitler. His Fifth Air Force book analyzing the US Strategic Bombing Survey is an authoritative text widely used in all war Lost in combat while l�ding a formation of colleges today. He has had a distinguished career as air planner, as air combat leader, and now B-17 bombers" "er Rabaul as air historian. We have had many great leaders in each of these areas, but I cannot name one 6 January 1943 so respected in all. Congressional Medal of Honor "A well organized, well planned and well executed bomber attack I The student or historian who studies this book will probably be impressed, as I was, by the once launched, can not be stopped." logical organization of the material in three parts: Part I, Prelude to Strategic Air War 1918-1943; Part II, Strategic War Against Japan; and Part III, Observations in Retrospect. Part II, Strategic War Against Japan was of greatest value to me since all my operational experience was in Europe with the US Eighth.Air Force out of the United Kingdom and with the Mediterranean Allied Air Force as commander with headquarters in Caserta, Italy. Of iv these observations where we had an equal opportunity to observe the air war unfold, his memory and analyses coincide in general with my own. It Pan Retrospect where our experiences and conclusions di�er in is in III, Observations in . some respects. For example, General Hansell queries why we advoca«:d daylight bombmg of Euro , point targets, such as aircraft factories, generally fon;wearing populatlOn cent"'".' 10 � whereas we attacked area targets and civilian populations in Japan. I have no dIfficulty WIth this differing air strategy between Germany and Japan. In Germany, factories and workmen were housed in brick buildings that were not easily Acknowledgements burnable and that required great accuracy to locate and destroy. On the other hand, in Japan, much of the wartime industry and war supportive labor were in paper buildings, ideal for incendiary attack. There was also different treatment of our prisoners in the two situations. The Germans SINCE this is a personal memoir, I acknowledge my indebtedness on two scores: to those who treated our prisoners humanely as the signed international agreements required. They also shaped the pen;pective through which I viewed the events described in this book; and to those permitted the International Red Cross to inspect and report on prisoner conditions. Japan, on who helped in the preparation the book itself. the other hand, treatedprisonen;;nhumanely, permitted no inspections, nor made or permitted of any reports. My perspective and outlook were deeply influenced by my fIrSt commanding officer, Ml\i Those acquainted with the death march from Bataan had little concern about killing Hugh Knerr of the Second Bombardment Group at Langley Field. He impressed me as a Japanese,military or civilians. The main consideration was to end the war as soonas possible in dynamic and charismatic leader who imbued his outfit with his own integrity, devotion, and order to stop casualties on both sides. Reliable intelligence sources indicated that the morale of patriotic loyalty to the Air Corps. lowe. debt of admiration to Capt Kenneth Walker for his the Japanese people was greatly affected by the burning of their cities and the loss of their enthusiasm and his faith in bombardment; to Lt Col Harold George for his perceptive inquiry industries. into thebasic purposeand nature of strategic air warfare, which colored my outlook for the rest of my military career; to Maj Don Wilson for his method of logical research into fundamental Hansell also says in this book that General Arnold questioned dropping the atomic bombs. target systems; to Lt Col Muir Fairchild for his thoughtful approach to and appraisal of military With this I disagree. Both he and General Spaatz said it would not be necessary to drop the philosophy, panicularly as it pertains to strategic air warfare; to Lt Col Ira C. Eaker for his atom bomb to secure Japanese capitulation without Army invasion of the home island. But dedication to performance as Executive to General Henry H. Arnold, and as Commanding each said that it might aid Emperor in overcoming the warlords' opposition to surrender. the General, Eighth Air Force for his courage and steadfastness of character in the harrowing first Also, they thought there might be other considerations. And each said to me, postwar,that they yean; of the great trial of the Eighth Air Force in combat. His dedication to the Air Force considered it fortuitous that we did drop them and prove their awesomedestructive power, thus knows no equal. My outlook upon strategic planning and the conduct of air warfare was serving as a factor in preserving peace and freedom from nonnuclear war, post-World War II. influenced by my service under Lt Gen Carl "Tooey" Spaatz and my admiration for his example of calm, courageous common sense and good judgment. And, I pay tribute to two great It was also General Spaatz, at that time the StrategicAir Commander in the Pacific, who was commanders for whom I worked and whose achievements-through signally different charged by President Truman with dropping the atomic bombs. methods-I came to admire: General of the Army, George C. Marshall, the epitome of integrity and cool dedication; and General of the Army, Henry H. Arnold, whose dynamism drove men General Hansell and I often appear together at Air War College forums on World War II. In to accomplish the impossible in the creation of the United States Air Force. general, we agree in our observations and operational analyses. He does advocate a higher priority for electric power than I do. While fully agreeing on energy production and transmission as vital to weapons making, I do not believe bomber forces, as then constituted, All of these people influenced my military pen;pective and formed my military outlook. trained, and employed, made power plants, transition lines and transformers profitable targets at highest priority.