FPGA-Based Evaluation of Cryptographic Algorithms
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												  Key Derivation Functions and Their GPU ImplementationMASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY}w¡¢£¤¥¦§¨ OF I !"#$%&'()+,-./012345<yA|NFORMATICS Key derivation functions and their GPU implementation BACHELOR’S THESIS Ondrej Mosnáˇcek Brno, Spring 2015 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ cbna ii Declaration Hereby I declare, that this paper is my original authorial work, which I have worked out by my own. All sources, references and literature used or excerpted during elaboration of this work are properly cited and listed in complete reference to the due source. Ondrej Mosnáˇcek Advisor: Ing. Milan Brož iii Acknowledgement I would like to thank my supervisor for his guidance and support, and also for his extensive contributions to the Cryptsetup open- source project. Next, I would like to thank my family for their support and pa- tience and also to my friends who were falling behind schedule just like me and thus helped me not to panic. Last but not least, access to computing and storage facilities owned by parties and projects contributing to the National Grid In- frastructure MetaCentrum, provided under the programme “Projects of Large Infrastructure for Research, Development, and Innovations” (LM2010005), is also greatly appreciated. v Abstract Key derivation functions are a key element of many cryptographic applications. Password-based key derivation functions are designed specifically to derive cryptographic keys from low-entropy sources (such as passwords or passphrases) and to counter brute-force and dictionary attacks. However, the most widely adopted standard for password-based key derivation, PBKDF2, as implemented in most applications, is highly susceptible to attacks using Graphics Process- ing Units (GPUs).
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												  The Double Ratchet AlgorithmThe Double Ratchet Algorithm Trevor Perrin (editor) Moxie Marlinspike Revision 1, 2016-11-20 Contents 1. Introduction 3 2. Overview 3 2.1. KDF chains . 3 2.2. Symmetric-key ratchet . 5 2.3. Diffie-Hellman ratchet . 6 2.4. Double Ratchet . 13 2.6. Out-of-order messages . 17 3. Double Ratchet 18 3.1. External functions . 18 3.2. State variables . 19 3.3. Initialization . 19 3.4. Encrypting messages . 20 3.5. Decrypting messages . 20 4. Double Ratchet with header encryption 22 4.1. Overview . 22 4.2. External functions . 26 4.3. State variables . 26 4.4. Initialization . 26 4.5. Encrypting messages . 27 4.6. Decrypting messages . 28 5. Implementation considerations 29 5.1. Integration with X3DH . 29 5.2. Recommended cryptographic algorithms . 30 6. Security considerations 31 6.1. Secure deletion . 31 6.2. Recovery from compromise . 31 6.3. Cryptanalysis and ratchet public keys . 31 1 6.4. Deletion of skipped message keys . 32 6.5. Deferring new ratchet key generation . 32 6.6. Truncating authentication tags . 32 6.7. Implementation fingerprinting . 32 7. IPR 33 8. Acknowledgements 33 9. References 33 2 1. Introduction The Double Ratchet algorithm is used by two parties to exchange encrypted messages based on a shared secret key. Typically the parties will use some key agreement protocol (such as X3DH [1]) to agree on the shared secret key. Following this, the parties will use the Double Ratchet to send and receive encrypted messages. The parties derive new keys for every Double Ratchet message so that earlier keys cannot be calculated from later ones.
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												  TMF: Asymmetric Cryptography Security Layer V1.0GlobalPlatform Device Technology TMF: Asymmetric Cryptography Security Layer Version 1.0 Public Release March 2017 Document Reference: GPD_SPE_122 Copyright 2013-2017 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Recipients of this document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patents or other intellectual property rights (collectively, “IPR”) of which they may be aware which might be necessarily infringed by the implementation of the specification or other work product set forth in this document, and to provide supporting documentation. The technology provided or described herein is subject to updates, revisions, and extensions by GlobalPlatform. Use of this information is governed by the GlobalPlatform license agreement and any use inconsistent with that agreement is strictly prohibited. TMF: Asymmetric Cryptography Security Layer – Public Release v1.0 THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHER WORK PRODUCT IS BEING OFFERED WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY WHATSOEVER, AND IN PARTICULAR, ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT IS EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMED. ANY IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHER WORK PRODUCT SHALL BE MADE ENTIRELY AT THE IMPLEMENTER’S OWN RISK, AND NEITHER THE COMPANY, NOR ANY OF ITS MEMBERS OR SUBMITTERS, SHALL HAVE ANY LIABILITY WHATSOEVER TO ANY IMPLEMENTER OR THIRD PARTY FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ARISING FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHER WORK PRODUCT. Copyright 2013-2017 GlobalPlatform, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The technology provided or described herein is subject to updates, revisions, and extensions by GlobalPlatform. Use of this information is governed by the GlobalPlatform license agreement and any use inconsistent with that agreement is strictly prohibited. TMF: Asymmetric Cryptography Security Layer – Public Release v1.0 3 / 38 Contents 1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................
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												  Modes of Operation for Compressed Sensing Based EncryptionModes of Operation for Compressed Sensing based Encryption DISSERTATION zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Naturwissenschaften Dr. rer. nat. vorgelegt von Robin Fay, M. Sc. eingereicht bei der Naturwissenschaftlich-Technischen Fakultät der Universität Siegen Siegen 2017 1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Christoph Ruland 2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Robert Fischer Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 14.06.2017 To Verena ... s7+OZThMeDz6/wjq29ACJxERLMATbFdP2jZ7I6tpyLJDYa/yjCz6OYmBOK548fer 76 zoelzF8dNf /0k8H1KgTuMdPQg4ukQNmadG8vSnHGOVpXNEPWX7sBOTpn3CJzei d3hbFD/cOgYP4N5wFs8auDaUaycgRicPAWGowa18aYbTkbjNfswk4zPvRIF++EGH UbdBMdOWWQp4Gf44ZbMiMTlzzm6xLa5gRQ65eSUgnOoZLyt3qEY+DIZW5+N s B C A j GBttjsJtaS6XheB7mIOphMZUTj5lJM0CDMNVJiL39bq/TQLocvV/4inFUNhfa8ZM 7kazoz5tqjxCZocBi153PSsFae0BksynaA9ZIvPZM9N4++oAkBiFeZxRRdGLUQ6H e5A6HFyxsMELs8WN65SCDpQNd2FwdkzuiTZ4RkDCiJ1Dl9vXICuZVx05StDmYrgx S6mWzcg1aAsEm2k+Skhayux4a+qtl9sDJ5JcDLECo8acz+RL7/ ovnzuExZ3trm+O 6GN9c7mJBgCfEDkeror5Af4VHUtZbD4vALyqWCr42u4yxVjSj5fWIC9k4aJy6XzQ cRKGnsNrV0ZcGokFRO+IAcuWBIp4o3m3Amst8MyayKU+b94VgnrJAo02Fp0873wa hyJlqVF9fYyRX+couaIvi5dW/e15YX/xPd9hdTYd7S5mCmpoLo7cqYHCVuKWyOGw ZLu1ziPXKIYNEegeAP8iyeaJLnPInI1+z4447IsovnbgZxM3ktWO6k07IOH7zTy9 w+0UzbXdD/qdJI1rENyriAO986J4bUib+9sY/2/kLlL7nPy5Kxg3 Et0Fi3I9/+c/ IYOwNYaCotW+hPtHlw46dcDO1Jz0rMQMf1XCdn0kDQ61nHe5MGTz2uNtR3bty+7U CLgNPkv17hFPu/lX3YtlKvw04p6AZJTyktsSPjubqrE9PG00L5np1V3B/x+CCe2p niojR2m01TK17/oT1p0enFvDV8C351BRnjC86Z2OlbadnB9DnQSP3XH4JdQfbtN8 BXhOglfobjt5T9SHVZpBbzhDzeXAF1dmoZQ8JhdZ03EEDHjzYsXD1KUA6Xey03wU uwnrpTPzD99cdQM7vwCBdJnIPYaD2fT9NwAHICXdlp0pVy5NH20biAADH6GQr4Vc
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												  CSE 291-I: Applied CryptographyCSE 291-I: Applied Cryptography Nadia Heninger UCSD Fall 2020 Lecture 7 Legal Notice The Zoom session for this class will be recorded and made available asynchronously on Canvas to registered students. Announcements 1. HW 3 is due next Tuesday. 2. HW 4 is online, due before class in 1.5 weeks, November 3. Last time: Hash functions This time: Hash-based MACs, authenticated encryption Constructing a MAC from a hash function Recall: Collision-resistant hash function: Unkeyed function • H : 0, 1 0, 1 n hard to find inputs mapping to same { }⇤ !{ } output. MAC: Keyed function Mac (m)=t,hardforadversaryto • k construct valid (m, t) pair. functor alone not- MAC : anyone can (m Hcm)) Hash forge , No secrets . Insecure. Vulnerable to length extension attacks for Merkle-Damgård functions. Secure for SHA3 sponge. Ok, but vulnerable to offline collision-finding attacks against H. Ok, but nobody uses. Secure, similar to HMAC. Candidate MAC constructions Mac(k, m)=H(k m) • || Mac(k, m)=H(m k) • || Mac(k, m)=H(k m k) • || || Mac(k , k , m)=H(k H(k m)) • 1 2 2|| 1|| Ok, but vulnerable to offline collision-finding attacks against H. Ok, but nobody uses. Secure, similar to HMAC. Candidate MAC constructions Mac(k, m)=H(k m) • || Insecure. Vulnerable to length extension attacks for Merkle-Damgård functions. Secure for SHA3 sponge. Mac(k, m)=H(m k) • || Mac(k, m)=H(k m k) • || || Mac(k , k , m)=H(k H(k m)) • 1 2 2|| 1|| Ok, but nobody uses. Secure, similar to HMAC.
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												  Electronics/ComputersElectronics/Computers Spaceborne Hybrid-FPGA System for Processing FTIR Data NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California Progress has been made in a continu- vantage of the reconfigurable hardware in the software, it has been possible to re- ing effort to develop a spaceborne com- resources of the FPGAs. duce execution time to an eighth of that puter system for processing readout data The specific FPGA/embedded-proces- of a non-optimized software-only imple- from a Fourier-transform infrared sor combination selected for this effort is mentation. A concept for utilizing both (FTIR) spectrometer to reduce the vol- the Xilinx Virtex-4 FX hybrid FPGA with embedded PowerPC processors to fur- ume of data transmitted to Earth. The one of its two embedded IBM PowerPC ther reduce execution time has also been approach followed in this effort, ori- 405 processors. The effort has involved considered. ented toward reducing design time and exploration of various architectures and This work was done by Dmitriy L. Bekker, reducing the size and weight of the spec- hardware and software optimizations. By Jean-Francois L. Blavier, and Paula J. Pin- trometer electronics, has been to exploit including a dedicated floating-point unit gree of Caltech and Marcin Lukowiak and the versatility of recently developed hy- and a dot-product coprocessor in the Muhammad Shaaban of Rochester Institute brid field-programmable gate arrays hardware and utilizing optimized single- of Technology for NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab- (FPGAs) to run diverse software on em- precision math library functions and a oratory. For more information, contact iaof- bedded processors while also taking ad- modified PowerPC performance library [email protected].
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												  Of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934FORM 8-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 CURRENT REPORT Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Date of Report: March 10, 1994 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC. ---------------------------------------------------- (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) Delaware 1-7882 94-1692300 - ------------------------------ ------------ ------------------- (State or other jurisdiction (Commission (I.R.S. Employer of incorporation) File Number) Identification No.) One AMD Place P.O. Box 3453 Sunnyvale, California 94088-3453 - --------------------------------------- ---------- (Address of principal executive office) (Zip Code) Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (408) 732-2400 Item 5 Other Events - ------ ------------ I. Litigation ---------- A. Intel ----- General ------- Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. ("AMD" or "Corporation") and Intel Corporation ("Intel") are engaged in a number of legal proceedings involving AMD's x86 products. The current status of such legal proceedings are described below. An unfavorable decision in the 287, 386 or 486 microcode cases could result in a material monetary award to Intel and/or preclude AMD from continuing to produce those Am386(Registered Trademark) and Am486(Trademark) products adjudicated to contain any copyrighted Intel microcode. The Am486 products are a material part of the Company's business and profits and such an unfavorable decision could have an immediate, materially adverse impact on the financial condition and results of the operations of AMD. The AMD/Intel legal proceedings involve multiple interrelated and complex issues of fact and law. The ultimate outcome of such legal proceedings cannot presently be determined. Accordingly, no provision for any liability that may result upon an adjudication of any of the AMD/Intel legal proceedings has been made in the Corporation's financial statements.
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												  2003 - 2019 Top 200 Employers for CPT Students**2003 - 2019 Top 200 Employers for CPT Students** **If a student is employed at the same Employer while in a different program, he/she will be counted multiple times for that employer. Top 200 Employer Names Number of Students Participating in CPT in 2003-2019 Amazon 9,302 Intel Corporation 6,453 Microsoft Corporation 6,340 Google 6,132 IBM 4,721 Deloitte 3,870 Facebook 3,810 Qualcomm Technologies, Inc 3,371 Ernst & Young 2,929 Goldman Sachs 2,867 Cummins 2,729 JP Morgan Chase 2,474 PricewaterhouseCoopers 2,295 Bank of America 2,241 Apple, Inc 2,229 Cisco System, Inc 2,133 Disney 2,041 Morgan Stanley 1,970 World Bank 1,956 Citigroup 1,904 Merrill Lynch 1,850 KPMG 1,464 Dell, Inc 1,448 Yahoo 1,403 Motorola 1,357 Tesla, Inc 1,314 eBay or PayPal 1,268 Kelly Services 1,195 EMC Corporation 1,119 NVIDIA Corporation 1,110 Walmart 1,108 Samsung Research America 1,102 Ericsson, Inc 1,100 Adobe Systems Incorporated 1,085 PRO Unlimited 1,042 Texas Instruments 1,022 Credit Suisse 1017 Barclays 970 Randstad 942 Sony 930 Schlumberger 928 McKinsey & Company 883 2003 - 2019 Top 200 Employers for CPT Students** **If a student is employed at the same Employer while in a different program, he/she will be counted multiple times for that employer. VMWare 868 Adecco 845 Philips 829 Deutsche Bank 797 Broadcom Corporation 791 HP, Inc 789 Oracle 789 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc 782 Micron Technology, Inc 775 Boston Consulting Group 755 CVS Pharmacy 741 Robert Bosch LLC 723 Bloomberg 711 State Street 705 Hewlett-Packard 702 Alcatel-Lucent 666 Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education 662 Genentech 657 Symantec Corporation 657 Nokia 642 Aerotek, Inc 638 Los Alamos National Laboratory 638 LinkedIn 635 Tekmark Global Solutions LLC 634 Populus Group 624 Salesforce 623 SAP America, Inc 619 Juniper Network 609 Atrium 584 The Mathworks, Inc 582 Monsanto 581 Wayfair 580 Autodesk 571 Intuit 562 Wells Fargo 559 Synopsys, Inc 546 NEC Laboratories America, Inc.
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												  ICE User GuideICE User Guide Document # 38-12005 Rev. *D Cypress Semiconductor 198 Champion Court San Jose, CA 95134-1709 Phone (USA): 800.858.1810 Phone (Intnl): 408.943.2600 http://www.cypress.com Copyrights Copyrights Copyright © 2005 Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. All rights reserved. “Programmable System-on-Chip,” PSoC, PSoC Designer, and PSoC Express are trademarks of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (Cypress), along with Cypress® and Cypress Semiconductor™. All other trademarks or registered trademarks referenced herein are the property of their respective owners. The information in this document is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Cypress. While reasonable precautions have been taken, Cypress assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. No part of this document may be copied or reproduced in any form or by any means without the prior written consent of Cypress. Made in the U.S.A. Disclaimer CYPRESS MAKES NO WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH REGARD TO THIS MATERIAL, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PAR- TICULAR PURPOSE. Cypress reserves the right to make changes without further notice to the materials described herein. Cypress does not assume any liability arising out of the application or use of any product or circuit described herein. Cypress does not authorize its products for use as critical components in life-support systems where a malfunction or failure may rea- sonably be expected to result in significant injury to the user. The inclusion of Cypress’ product in a life-support systems appli- cation implies that the manufacturer assumes all risk of such use and in doing so indemnifies Cypress against all charges.
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												  3Rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable Platform Technology PreviewPerformance made flexible. 3rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable Platform Technology Preview Lisa Spelman Corporate Vice President, Xeon and Memory Group Data Platforms Group Intel Corporation Unmatched Portfolio of Hardware, Software and Solutions Move Faster Store More Process Everything Optimized Software and System-Level Solutions 3 Announcing Today – Intel’s Latest Data Center Portfolio Targeting 3rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable processors Move Faster Store More Process Everything Intel® Optane™ SSD P5800X Fastest SSD on the planet 3rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable Intel® Optane™ Persistent processor Memory 200 series Intel® Ethernet E810- Intel’s highest performing server CPU 2CQDA2 Up to 6TB memory per socket with built-in AI and security solutions + Native data persistence Up to 200GbE per PCIe 4.0 slot for Intel® Agilex™ FPGA bandwidth-intensive workloads Intel® SSD D5-P5316 First PCIe 4.0 144-Layer QLC Industry leading FPGA logic performance and 3D NAND performance/watt Enables up to 1PB storage in 1U Optimized Solutions >500 Partner Solutions 4 World’s Most Broadly Deployed Data Center Processor From the cloud to the intelligent edge >1B Xeon Processor Cores Deployed in the >50M Cloud Since 20131 Intel® Xeon® >800 cloud providers Scalable Processors with Intel® Xeon® processor-based servers Shipped deployed1 Intel® Xeon® Scalable Processors are the Foundation for Multi-Cloud Environments 1. Source: Intel internal estimate using IDC Public Cloud Services Tracker and Intel’s Internal Cloud Tracker, as of March 1, 2021. 5 Why Customers Choose
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												  10Th Gen Intel® Core™ Processor Families Datasheet, Vol. 110th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Families Datasheet, Volume 1 of 2 Supporting 10th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Families, Intel® Pentium® Processors, Intel® Celeron® Processors for U/Y Platforms, formerly known as Ice Lake July 2020 Revision 005 Document Number: 341077-005 Legal Lines and Disclaimers You may not use or facilitate the use of this document in connection with any infringement or other legal analysis concerning Intel products described herein. You agree to grant Intel a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to any patent claim thereafter drafted which includes subject matter disclosed herein. No license (express or implied, by estoppel or otherwise) to any intellectual property rights is granted by this document. Intel technologies' features and benefits depend on system configuration and may require enabled hardware, software or service activation. Performance varies depending on system configuration. No computer system can be absolutely secure. Check with your system manufacturer or retailer or learn more at intel.com. Intel technologies may require enabled hardware, specific software, or services activation. Check with your system manufacturer or retailer. The products described may contain design defects or errors known as errata which may cause the product to deviate from published specifications. Current characterized errata are available on request. Intel disclaims all express and implied warranties, including without limitation, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement, as well as any warranty arising from course of performance, course of dealing, or usage in trade. All information provided here is subject to change without notice. Contact your Intel representative to obtain the latest Intel product specifications and roadmaps Copies of documents which have an order number and are referenced in this document may be obtained by calling 1-800-548- 4725 or visit www.intel.com/design/literature.htm.
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												  U.S. Integrated Circuit Design and Fabrication Capability Survey Questionnaire Is Included in Appendix EDefense Industrial Base Assessment: U.S. Integrated Circuit Design and Fabrication Capability U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Office of Technology Evaluation March 2009 DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT: U.S. INTEGRATED CIRCUIT FABRICATION AND DESIGN CAPABILITY PREPARED BY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION May 2009 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS REPORT, CONTACT: Mark Crawford, Senior Trade & Industry Analyst, (202) 482-8239 Teresa Telesco, Trade & Industry Analyst, (202) 482-4959 Christopher Nelson, Trade & Industry Analyst, (202) 482-4727 Brad Botwin, Director, Industrial Base Studies, (202) 482-4060 Email: [email protected] Fax: (202) 482-5361 For more information about the Bureau of Industry and Security, please visit: http://bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/ TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... i BACKGROUND................................................................................................................................ iii SURVEY RESPONDENTS............................................................................................................... iv METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................... v REPORT FINDINGS.........................................................................................................................