May 28, 2013

SUMMARY - maghreb ROUNDTABLE SERIES

Al Qaeda’s Next Generation in North Africa Participating ScholarS ...... Daniel Benjamin is the Norman There is no grand strategy of global jihadi expansion from North Africa and the Sahel, E. McCulloch Jr. Director of the according to Jean-Pierre Filiu. Rising violence associated with al Qaeda in the Islamic John Sloan Dickey Center for Maghreb (AQIM) is instead fueled by competition and escalation between various International Understanding at fragmented groups in the region, he argued. Filiu is professor of Middle East stud- . Previously, ies at Sciences Po in Paris and shared his assessment of AQIM’s strategy at a CSIS he served as ambassador-at-large Maghreb Roundtable entitled “Al Qaeda’s Next Generation in North Africa” on May and coordinator for counterter- rorism at the U.S. State Depart- 28, 2013. He was joined by Daniel Benjamin, director of the John Sloan Dickey Cen- ment. Prior to joining the Obama ter for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, who agreed that militant administration, Benjamin held se- activity in the region is locally, rather than globally, focused. nior positions at the Brookings In- stitution, the Center for Strategic The array of jihadist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel are fragmented, in conflict with and International Studies (CSIS), one another, and ultimately defined by “gangsterism,” Filiu argued. Leaders within and the United States Institute of AQIM and among other regional groups—including the Movement for Unity and Ji- Peace (USIP). Benjamin has writ- had in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar al-Dine, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Those Who ten extensively on , U.S. Sign with Blood Brigade—quarrel over strategy, tactics, and territory. The geographi- foreign policy, and international cal spread of extremism in the region is in part a result of their fragmentation, Filiu affairs. ■ noted, as new off-shoots move into unclaimed territory. Jean-Pierre Filiu is a historian and professor of Middle East AQIM remains predominantly an Algerian organization, despite efforts by al Qaeda’s studies at Sciences Po in Paris, central leadership to diversify the group’s leadership and focus. The organization is where he has taught since 2006. led by veterans of Algeria’s civil war in the 1990s, many of whom previously served He has held visiting professor- as smugglers providing support to militants. This background tied AQIM and its off- ships at Columbia University and at Georgetown University. Before shoots into a network of criminal gangs across the region and facilitated its ability to entering academia Filiu spent move throughout the Sahara. MUJAO, led mainly by Africans who operate primarily over two decades as a French dip- in southern Algeria and Mali, in particular, benefits from the nexus between jihadism lomat posted in Lebanon, Jordan, and criminal activity. Since ’s death, AQIM has been only nomi- and Afghanistan as well as Syria nally a part of al Qaeda, as it has not declared allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri. and Tunisia. He has also served as an adviser to France’s prime Filiu argued that ideology plays a minor role driving the actions of these groups, minister (2000-2002), minister which are primarily composed of desert gangsters with little or no education. For of defense (1991-1993), and min- them, anti-Western sentiment is more of a mantra than a real ideology. The most so- ister of interior (1990-1991). He phisticated jihadi group in the region, ideologically, was the Libyan Islamic Fighting received his Ph.D. in history from Group, which turned against al Qaeda in 2010 by publishing an official refutation of Sciences Po. ■ the group’s doctrines. According to Benjamin, AQIM’s activities over the last five

The maghreb Roundtable Series The CSIS Maghreb Roundtable was launched in May 2013 to provide a deeper understanding of economic, social, political, and security developments within individual states in the Maghreb, as well as how these dynamics intersect across North Africa and what their implications are for U.S. policy. The roundtable assembles a diverse group of North African and U.S. regional experts, policymakers, academics, and business leaders, seeking to provide a forum for the exchange of views. ■

1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.466.4739 | www.csis.org/mideast 2 | CSIS Middle East Program | Maghreb Roundtable Summary years have been overwhelmingly criminal, focused primar- The threat is less pronounced in Libya, where salafists par- ily on kidnapping Westerners for ransom and smuggling ticipate in the political process. In both Tunisia and Libya, contraband. Rather than promote global jihad in North Af- as in the Sahel, he argued, radical groups seem to be “born- rica, many militants prefer to fight in Syria, he noted. again nationals” with primarily local grievances. Benjamin noted that the lack of understanding of the base- Development of real democracy is still the best antidote to line level of jihadi activity in the region prior to the Arab jihadism across the region, Filiu stated. Benjamin added uprisings in early 2011 makes it difficult to assess the true that economic catastrophe, more than ideological radical- extent of the proliferation of extremist individuals and ization, is most likely to bring new recruits to these groups. groups since then. It is clear that there were many jihadists While some regional governments have put in place some before, particularly in Algeria and Libya. Records found in successful deradicalization programs, religious responses Iraq, for example, showed that after Saudi Arabia, Libya to extremism may be ineffective if they do not target root was the second largest source of jihadists for al Qaeda in causes of economic insecurity as well. Iraq. It is thus difficult to determine how much of the recent Maghreb countries’ partnership with the United States growth in jihadi groups and activities is genuinely new and on counterterrorism is positive and improving, Benjamin how much is the result of the “dirty snowball effect,” in observed. There is political will in the region in favor of which existing radical elements latch on to newly empow- counterterrorism and to improve economic conditions. The ered organizations. most challenging problem remains Libya, where a lack of What is clear is that in the aftermath of the uprisings, a viable institutions to combat extremists hampers broader security void in northern Mali—exacerbated by the army’s counterterrorism efforts. According to Benjamin, the per- neglect of the north following the March 2012 coup—al- sistent conflict in the Western Sahara also prevents greater lowed jihadists to prosper. Benjamin noted that even with regional security cooperation, which is vital to combatting this void, the takeover of northern Mali still would not have militant groups across the region. The United States and been possible without the civil war in Libya. Uprisings Europe can provide assistance in the fight against extrem- across the region and the resulting weakness of regional ism and organized crime and promote greater regional co- security forces compounded the problem. operation, but North African governments will ultimately The French intervention in Mali was successful, argued Fi- have to work together to address the challenge of militant liu, in that it killed an estimated 600-700 fighters and dis- groups in their midst. lodged AQIM, but it did not destroy the military capabili- ties of AQIM and other militant groups. The January 2013 The Maghreb Roundtable Summary is an electronic news- attack on the oil and gas facility at In Amenas in Algeria letter produced by the Center for Strategic and Interna- and the May 2013 suicide attacks at a uranium mine in Ni- tional Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution ger demonstrated the ability of militant groups to continue focusing on international public policy issues. Its research perpetrating attacks. Benjamin noted that the new normal is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, in the region is likely to be one in which foreign govern- and conclusions expressed in this publication should be ments and companies cannot count on local governments understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2013 by to protect them. the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Going forward, jihadism in North Africa will likely remain The CSIS Middle East Program a persistent but non-existential threat to regional and global Jon B. Alterman security. While the region represents an “arc of challenge,” Director and Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Benjamin noted, it is unlikely to pose a security threat simi- Global Security and Geostrategy lar to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Haim Malka Pakistan. Filiu did caution that the ideology and political Deputy Director and Senior Fellow isolation of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia posed the greatest Carolyn Barnett threat to Tunisia’s nascent democracy. The group remains Research Fellow outside official politics, but it is integrated into communi- Rebecka Shirazi ties and potentially violent. Tunisia’s government was too Program Coordinator and Research Associate cautious in dealing with extremists for too long, he added. center for strategic and international studies | middle east program