Introduction: Transcending National Identities Chapter 1

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Introduction: Transcending National Identities Chapter 1 Notes Introduction: Transcending National Identities 1. One notable comparison is that presented in David Shambaugh, Robert F. Ash, and Seiichiro¯ Takagi, eds. China Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States (New York: Routledge, 2007). 2. For example, see Yu-wen Chen, “Xinjiang 13 Revisited,” Asian Ethnicity 13, 1 (2012): 111–113; Chih-yu Shih and Yu-wen Chen, eds., Tibetan Studies in Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge, 2012). 3. See Peter Katzenstein, Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes beyond East and West (London: Routledge, 2012). 4. Zhijun Ling and Licheng Ma, Jiao feng: Dangdai Zhongguo san ci sixiang jiefang shilu (Cross Fire: The Three Thought Liberations of Contemporary China on the Record) (Beijing: China Today, 1998). 5. Xuetong Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought and Modern Chinese Power, ed. Daniel Bell and Zhe Sun, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Jeremy Paltiel, “Constructing Global Order with Chinese Characteris- tics: Yan Xuetong and the Pre-Qin Response to International Anarchy,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, 4 (2011): 375–403; Tingyang Zhao, “A Polit- ical World Philosophy in Terms of All-Under-Heaven (Tian-xia),” Diogenes 56, 1 (February 2009): 5–18; Tingyang Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia),” Social Identities 12, 1 (January 2006): 29–41. Chapter 1 1. Note the literature on Sinicization in recent years, for example, Peter Katzenstein (ed.), Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes beyond East and West (London: Routledge, 2012). 2. Hence, the notion of the China model. See, for example, Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009). 182 ● Notes 3. Weiwei Zhang, The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012); Xuetong Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means for the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 4. For official perspectives on the harmonious world, see “Build Towards a Harmo- nious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” Statement by Hu Jintao, president of the People’s Republic of China, at the United Nations Summit, New York (September 15, 2005). 5. For a critical assessment of these themes, see Daniel Vukovich, China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC (London: Routledge, 2011). 6. For more optimistic perspectives, see Gordon White, RidingtheTiger:ThePol- itics of Economic in Post-Mao China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). For pessimistic views, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Vintage, 1998); John Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 381–96. 7. See Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development (Information Office of the State Council, September 6, 2011). 8. Liu Yawei and Justin R. Zheng, “The Rise of China and Its Consequences,” The 9th Annual APSA Pre-conference on Political Communication (August 31, 2011). 9. Lucien Pye, “China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society,” Foreign Affairs 69, 4 (Fall, 1990): 56–74. 10. For a discussion on how Chinese civilization improves the world, see Zhao Tingyang, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-Under-Heaven (Tian- xia),” Diogenes 56, 1 (2009): 5–18. 11. Stephen Hoare-Vance, The Confucius Institutes and China’s Evolving Foreign Policy (Saarbrücken: LAP Academic Publishing, 2010). 12. Chih-yu Shih, “Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State Versus the Ego State,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, 1 (January 2012): 71–91. 13. Evan S. Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (Santa Monica: Rand, 2009), 49–50. 14. See Jonathan Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980 (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1993). 15. See, for example, Wang Yiwei, “Why Is Pax-Americana Impossible? Comparing Chinese Ancient World Order with Today’s American World Order,” presented at the International Symposium on Civilizations and World Orders, Istanbul, Turkey, May 13, 2006. 16. M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 17. For the China threat as a self-fulfilling prophecy, see Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, “A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis,” Asian Perspective Notes ● 183 31, 3 (2007): 64; Drew Thompson, “Think Again: China’s Military,” For- eign Policy (March/April 2010): http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/ 22/think_again_chinas_military?page=full accessed on April 26, 2012; Joseph Nye, “The Challenge of China,” in Stephen Van Evera (ed.), How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security (Cambridge, MA: Tobin Project, 2006), 74. 18. Hence Chinese self-centrism, Tang Shiping and Dapeng Ji, “zhongguo waijiao taolun zhong de zhongguo zhongxinzhuyi yu meiguo zhongxinzhuyi” (China- Centrism and US-Centrism in China’s Diplomatic Narratives), Shijie Jingjie yu zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics) 12 (2008): 62–70. 19. Muthiah Alagappa, “Managing Asian Security: Competition, Cooperation and Evolutionary Change,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instru- mental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 585–586. 20. William A. Callahan, China: Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 21. The White Paper on China’s National Defense of 2002 set out for the first time the official position on China’s national interests. They included “safe- guarding state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security; upholding economic development as the central task and unremittingly enhancing the overall national strength; adhering to and improving the socialist system; main- taining and promoting social stability and harmony; and striving for an inter- national environment of lasting peace and a favorable climate in China’s periph- ery.” See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-12/10/content_654851.htm accessed on December 20, 2011. 22. http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_4.htm accessed on September 8, 2011. 23. See, for example, Daniel Gomà, “The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analy- sis of a Contested Frontier,” Asian Survey 46, 6 (November–December, 2006): 867–880; Zhao Hongwei, “zhong mian bianjie weni de jiejue: guocheng yu yingxiang” (The Settlement of the China-Burma Border Dispute: Course and Impact), Nanyang wenti yanjiu (Southeast Asian Affairs) General Serial 143 or No. 3 (2010): 37–40. 24. Zhao Quansheng, “Achieving Maximum Advantage: Rigidity and Flexibility in Chinese Foreign Policy,” American Asian Review 13, 1 (Spring 1995): 61–93. 25. Yang Jiechi explained to Hillary Clinton why there has never been disharmony in the South China Sea in “Yang Jiechi chanshu qi dian zhuzhang bo xilali nan hai lun” (Yang Jiechi’s Expounds Seven-Point Position to Rebut Hillary’s Note on South China Sea). See http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/news/usa/uspolitics/ chinapress/20100726/03191684304.html accessed on August 1, 2010. 26. The same principle was initially applied to the maritime dispute with Japan. Deng suggested the principle to the Philippine vice president in June 1986, and reiterated it to the Philippine president in April 1988. See also Deng Xiaoping nianpu: 1975–1997 (The Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping: 1975–1997) 2 (Beijing: The CCP Research Department on Literature, 2004), 1122, 1227. 184 ● Notes 27. Amitav Acharya, “Seeking Security in the Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia in the Emerging Asian Order,” Working Paper Series 44, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (March 2003), 5. 28. For more discussion, see Yin Jinwu, “wenhua yu guoji xinren—jiyu dong ya xin- ren xingcheng de bijiao fenxi” (Culture and International Trust: A Comparative Analysis of Trust Formation in East Asia), Waijiao pinglun (Diplomatic Review) 4, 2011: 21–39. 29. Duong Danh Huy, “ ‘Setting Aside Dispute, Pursuing Joint Development’ the Chinese Way,” Vietnamnet Bridge (November 7, 2011) http://english.vietnam- net.vn/en/politics/10482/-setting-aside-dispute—pursuing-joint-development— the-chinese-way.html accessed on November 12, 2011. 30. Beijing always protests on the ground of DoC, which however never acknowl- edges anyone’s sovereignty. 31. Rao Aimin, “Hu, Aquino Agree to Downplay Maritime Disputes,” Xinhua (September 1, 2011), http://www.china.org.cn/world/2011-09/01/content_ 23328684.htm. 32. This a quote from Deng Xiaoping that appears everywhere on Chinese blogs. For the complete text, see, for example, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/ 1015/6/2/9/101562905_3.html?coluid=6&kindid=26&docid=101562905& mdate=0107094837 accessed on April 20, 2012. 33. Note as well that the Beijing authorities may allow a certain level of social protest as well as implicit warning/bluffing. For example, see Editorial, “ba Feilyubin dang chutouniao chengfa” (Punishing the Philippines as the head sticking out), Huanqiu
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